of the fate awaiting those who opposed the Nazis—decided

to support the Enabling Law. Hitler’s first, carefully

prepared, statement to parliament on 23 March was in
marked contrast to his hurriedly constructed
response later in the same debate when the Enabling
Act was attacked by Otto Wels of the Social Democrats.
In his first speech Hitler attempted to portray
himself as a statesman and as the leader of the
whole of Germany: “We want to restore the unity of
spirit and will to the German nation. We want to
preserve the everlasting foundations of our life …”11 In
the second he returnedto his beer hall origins and
ridiculed Wels,pouring contempt upon both him and the
party he led. “You are sissies [wehleidig—literally
“snivelling”], gentlemen,” said Hitler, “and not worthy
of this age, if you start talking aboutpersecution
at this stage of the game.” He also announced that
the Naziswere “restraining” themselvesfrom “turning against
those who tortured and humiliated us for 14 years.”12
After telling the Social Democrats that he didn’t even want
them to vote for the Enabling Law and that “Germany
will be liberated but not by you!” Hitler sat down to
a rapturous reception from the Nazi members of
parliament. It was a telling moment. In his speech
attacking the Social Democrats, Hitler had shown
all of the rhetorical attributes that had madehim
undisputed dictatorial leader of the Nazi party.But he had
also demonstrated many of the qualities that frightened
large numbers of ordinary German voters—intolerance,
aggression and wild partisanship. Still, the Naziswon the
vote. With the support of the Centre party the
Enabling Law received 444 votes against the 94 votes cast
by the Social Democrats. It was the moment all
pretence of democracy left Germany. As a
consequence, withinfour months, every political party in
the country other than the Naziswas eitherbanned or broke
 up voluntarily. However, even with this milestone reached,
Hitler still could not act exactly as he wanted. One of
the most serious restraints on him was that the two
policies that were central to his world view—the
desire to remove all the Jews from Germany and the
longing to acquire a Nazi empire in Eastern
Europe—had not been trumpeted during the various
election campaigns of the previous three years. There
was little evidence that a majority of Germans
supported eitherof them.This left Hitler in an unusual
position for a leader just voted into office—he didn’t
yet feel able to implement his most important “visionary”
ideas. It wasn’t that Hitler pretended not to believe
in these policies—just that he was careful how he
expressed this belief. The delicate line that Hitler trod
was demonstrated by his action over the Jewish
boycott in April 1933.Hitler was angryat the reception
that measures like the Enabling Law and the
mistreatment of German Jews by Nazi stormtroopers—
as well as the start of the removal of Jews from the
civil serviceand universities—hadreceived in the foreign
press. He saw in this criticism evidence of one
of his most cherished fantasies—a worldwide“Jewish
conspiracy.” This belief in Jewish influence crossing
national boundaries was certainly shared by much of the
core Nazi support. “We looked at it [anti-Semitism]
in termsof global Jewry which wanted to gain
power, whichwanted to rule the world,” says
Bruno Hähnel, one of the earliest Nazi supporters. “So
it was global Jewry that we were—I don’t want
to say afraidof, perhaps we were afraidof it— well,
standing up to.”13 In order to “stand up” to
“global Jewry,” a Jewish boycott was organised
by the Nazisto start on 1 April 1933.Significantly,
Hitler chose not to put his nameto the document
dated28 March that called for this action against
German Jews.It was signed only “Leadership of the
 National Socialist German Workers Party.” Further
evidence of
Hitler’s sensitivity on this issue was a report in the
Nazi paper, the Völkischer Beobachteron 29 March,
whichquoted Hitler as saying that it had been necessary
to organise these “defensive measures” because “otherwise
it [i.e., action against the Jews]would have come
from the people [Volk]themselvesand might have taken on
undesirable forms.”14 Hitler—already revealed in Mein
Kampf as an anti-Semiteof the most venomous sort
—now sought to portray himself as somehow
judicious in his action against the Jews. The boycott
was called off after only one day. Hitler judged that
the time was not right for such visible “official”
actions against the Jewish population of Germany
to be sustained over days and weeks. His attempts
to balance his own violent anti-Semitism with the
prevailing mood of the German public would be
one of the recurring features of Nazi rule during
the 1930s. Hitler’s reticence to advertise his desire
for Germany to obtain an empire in Eastern
Europe—specifically at the expense of the Soviet
Union—was also evident. Despite having openly
acknowledged this goal