SPOUSES LATIP vs.

CHUA
G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009

Facts:

Respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building. She filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip), who leased two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles,
Rosalie sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the
leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie's demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie; the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip.

The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. As to Rosalie's claim that her receipt of
P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, the CA took judicial notice
of such common practice in the area of Baclaran.

Issue:

Whether the CA is correct in taking judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran
area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.

Held:

No. Citing the case of State Prosecutors v. Muro, the SC held that the power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

Moreover, judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are
"commonly" known.

Here, however, the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety.
To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in
the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the
practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known. The requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity
of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie's appeal before the CA.
In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie.
 LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONEYCOMB FARMS INC.,
G.R. No. 16659, November 12, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation (HFC) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land in
“Curvada, Caintagan, Masbate. HFC voluntarily offered its land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
coverage under RA 6657 for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per hectare.

Subsequently, the LBP fixed the value of the land in the amount of P165,739.44 and sent a Notice of Valuation
to HFC. HFC rejected the LBP’s valuation and it filed a petition with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a
summary administrative determination of just compensation. HFC claimed that the just compensation for the
land should be in the amount of P25,000.00 per hectare, considering its location and productivity.

While the DARAB proceedings were still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation with the RTC, praying for a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus attorney’s fees of ten percent
(10%) of the just compensation. The LBP meanwhile countered that HFC’s petition was “premature and lacks
cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In its ruling, the RTC found that the parcel of land under consideration is located in the side of the road. It also
took judicial notice that the land is situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate.
Because of this, the RTC held that the just compensation for the land is P32,000.00 per hectare.

Issue:

Whether the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), can take judicial notice of the nature of land in
question without the requisite hearing.

Held:

No. The SC held that the RTC (SAC) erred in concluding that the subject land is commercial in nature, after
taking judicial notice that it is “situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate.”
Accordingly, the parties must be given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before
the court a quo can take judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholding.

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right within
the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request
of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the very
issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the
subject landholdings.

Citing the case of Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco, the SC said that the power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form
of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.
The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
 BE SAN DIEGO, INC. vs. CA
G.R. No. 159230, June 8, 2007

Facts:

B.E. San Diego alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land (subject property) located in Hernandez
Street, Catmon, Malabon. It claimed that Matias has been occupying the subject property for over a year without
its authority or consent. As both its oral and written demands to vacate were left unheeded, it filed a complaint
for the recovery of possession of the subject property against Matias before the RTC.

Matias questioned B. E. San Diego's claim over the subject property by pointing out that the title relied on by B.
E. San Diego covers a property located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, while the subject property is actually located
in Barrio Catmon, Malabon. She thus claimed that the property she is occupying in Barrio Catmon is different
from the property that B. E. San Diego seeks to recover in the possessory action before the RTC.

The RTC found no issue as to the identity of the property, ruling that the property covered by B. E. San Diego's
TCT No. T-134756, located in Barrio Tinajeros, is the same property being occupied by Matias, located in Barrio
Catmon. The RTC took judicial notice of the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros.

The CA disagreed with the RTC's findings. It considered the discrepancy in the location significant and declared
that this should have prompted the RTC to require an expert witness from the concerned government agency to
explain the matter.

Issue:

Whether the CA is correct that the RTC should require an expert witness to explain the discrepancy.

Held:

No. The SC does not find the testimony of an expert witness necessary to explain the discrepancy. The RTC
declared that the discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros.
The RTC has authority to declare so because this is a matter subject of mandatory judicial notice. Section 1 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court includes geographical divisions as among matters that courts should take judicial
notice of. Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio Catmon, the SC find it likely that, indeed, the two
barrios previously formed one geographical unit.
 PENTA REALTY CORPORATION vs. LEY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014

Facts:

The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City with an area of 1,068.67
square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the premises (subject property) through the
petitioner’s authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc. (Century Properties). The petitioner gave
the respondent possession of the subject property under a stipulation to the effect that in case of the respondent’s
default in its monthly rentals, the petitioner could immediately repossess the subject property.

Consequently, the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire 1,068.67 square meters, including
the subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell, denominated as a reservation agreement. After
paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly amortizations. Thus, the petitioner
filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC following the respondent’s failure to comply with the demands to
pay and vacate.

The MeTC, ruling in favor of the petitioner, found that the respondent’s lawful possession of the property had
been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had become unlawful when the respondent had failed to comply with
its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the subject property.

The RTC rendered its judgment nullifying the MeTC’s decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that
the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had no
jurisdiction.

The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, declaring that the respondent’s possession was not by virtue of the
contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which was more of a “contract of sale.” It concluded
that the petitioner’s action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind of action for the recovery of possession.

Issue:

Whether the courts can take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the realty.

Held:

No. The SC ruled that if the assessed value is not found in the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction because the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining from the allegations of the
basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another court. Courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the realty.