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eT EL.52 Chapter 2
In order to provide some intuition to these stability conditions, it is
again convenient to consider an initial steady-state equilibrium that is
disturbed by an increase in G. The immediate effects of this are to raise
Y,r, and p, and to create a budget deficit. The financing of this deficit
leads to an increase in wealth, while the instantaneous increase in the
rate of inflation will cause inflationary expectations to be revised upward.
Morcover, the induced increase in x will lead to a more than proportion-
ate increase in p, again introducing a destabilizing element into the
dynamics. All this remains unchanged from before. However, the differ-
ence lies in the subsequent effects of the increased real weaith, which are
now stabilizing. As is seen from Table 2.3A, the higher wealth will in-
crease the rate of inflation, thereby increasing the inflation tax on wealth
and providing the critical stabilizing force. Moreover, it is now quite pos-
sible for the nominal interest rate to fall, reducing the interest income
component of the budget deficit and yielding an additional stabilizing
effect. But at the same time stability is still not assured, and the possibil-
ity of instability cannot be dismissed.
Steady-state equilibrium is described by
Y¥—D(¥-G.r—p,A)-G=0 (2.5la)
A-b-L¥,r,4)=0 (2.51b)
G-T+rb-pA=0 (2.51c)
with the corresponding multipliers given in Table 2.3B. An increase in
government expenditure will have its conventional inflationary effect and
will raise the nominal interest rate; it will reduce wealth and have an
ambiguous effect on the real rate of interest. The steady-state effects of an
expansionary monetary policy, specified by a reduction in b, are qualita-
tively identical to (although possibly different in magnitude from) those
obtained when the monetary expansion is described hy an increase in
ii. The comments made previously thus apply here as well.
2.13 Conclusions: Some Methodological Remarks
This chapter has developed a dynamic portfolio balance model and used
it to analyze three forms of government deficit financing in an inflation-
ary environment: one in which the real stock of money is held fixed
(m = fi a second in which the rate of nominal monetary growth is held
constant (M = iM); and a third in which the real stock of government
bonds is held fixed (b =). The corresponding expansionary policiesA Dynamic Portfolio Balance Macroeconomic Model
have been defined as increases in the fixed parameters, Wi and py, and a
decrease in b, respectively. These policies are analyzed within the frame-
work of a relatively simple macroeconomic model in which both the
dynamics of wealth accumulation and the evolution of inflationary ex-
pectations play central roles.
For all policies, the issue of stability has been discussed, though some-
what informally. At least within the context of this particular model, all
three forms of passive monetary policy we consider are potentially unsta-
ble. One source of instability is the specification of the Phillips curve
Following the “accelerationist” view, the expectations coefficient is as-
sumed to be unity, and to the extent that an increase in inflationary ex-
pectations leads to a short-run increase in output, a destabilizing element
is immediately introduced into the system. Stability can prevail only if
the other stabilizing influences in the model—particularly the inflation
tax on financial wealth—are sufficiently strong to offset this unstable,
component of the complete system. Of the policies considered, m = ii is
highly unstable, and indeed a necessary condition for stability is that the
wealth effect in private expenditure demand be positive. The policy is
therefore definitely unstable in the absence of such wealth effects. The
constant rate of nominal monetary growth policy is also highly unstable,
and a positive wealth effect in the demand for money becomes necessary
for stability. The third policy, the fixed real stock of bonds policy, is
the most stable and does not require any wealth effects for stability to
prevail. This is because it tends to be the most inflationary policy,
generating the greatest inflation tax revenues and thereby providing the
strongest stabilizing influence.
Some of the implications of expansionary monetary policies that corre-
spond to the three forms of passive policies introduced can also be con-
trasted. First, the effects of a monetary expansion specified by an increase
in the real stock of money m are qualitatively identical, both instanta-
neously and in the steady state, with those in which it is specified by a
fall in the real stock of bonds b. In the short run, an increase in the rates
of nominal monetary expansion affects only the rate of change of the
system, and not its levels. But these effects on the rate of change are
also qualitatively identical to those of an increase in m (or a fall in b) on
the level. By contrast, the rate of monetary expansion does influence the
steady-state level of the system. Indeed, an increase in yw has identical
effects to the other two policies as far as the steady-state nominal and
real rates of interest, and real wealth are concerned. The effects on the
steady-state rate of inflation, on the other hand, can be rather different.
Whereas an increase in the rate of monetary growth will always lead to54
Chapter 2
an equal rise in the equilibrium rate of inflation, a monetary expansion
taking the form of an increase in the real stock will almost certainly lead
toa lower rate of inflation.
Finally, we wish to conclude with some general remarks on the meth-
odology employed in this chapter. We have adopted the usual strategy
of macroeconomic dynamics of considering an instantaneous (short-run)
equilibrium and a steady-state (long-run) equilibrium and used conven-
tional comparative static techniques to analyze the short-run and long-
run effects of various policy changes. Also, stability conditions have been
analyzed to determine whether or not a system disturbed from an initial
equilibrium will in fact converge to a new steady state. Although these
procedures have been and in many respects continue to be the standard
analytical methods of macroeconomic dynamics, they do have their limi-
tations. First, even in models that are only modestly complex, compara-
tive static effects are often ambiguous, so that the implications of these
models may be inconclusive even at a qualitative level. Moreover, even
where the responses can be established qualitatively, the formal expres-
sions may give little idea of the magnitudes involved. Second, as we have
noted, stability analysis is almost inevitably an intractable exercise. Even
when one can write down formal stability conditions, it is often difficult
to give them simple intuitive interpretations. Third, unless the model has
a particularly simple dynamic structure, these traditional methods may
tell relatively little about the time profile of adjustment paths. Indeed,
‘one might argue that the two extreme equilibria usually analyzed are
themselves of limited economic interest. The instantaneous equilibrium
is too short in that it allows insufficient time for relevant feedbacks to
occur; the steady state is too long, in that it takes an infinite time to
be reached. Yet it is precisely the nature of the intermediate transition
that many people would consider to be of prime interest, and the tradi-
tional methods provide little insight into this aspect of the adjustment
process.
In view of these considerations, Nguyen and Turnovsky (1979) have
studied essentially the model of this chapter, using numerical simulation
methods. This involves working with specific functional forms and pa-
rameters. By considering a range of values for each parameter, they gen-
erate about 120,000 combinations of parameter values. They find that
pegging the rate of monetary growth is the least stable policy, yielding
stability in only 0.06 percent of the cases. Given the important role this
policy has played in monetarist discussions, this numerical finding is of
some interest. The policy of pegging the real money supply is also highly
unstable. Indeed it is stable for only about 10 percent of the sample set
and only when the wealth effect in the demand for money is zero or veryA Dynamic Portfolio Balance Macroeconomic Model
small. The policy of pegging the real stock of bonds is by far the most
stable, being so for about 96 percent of the cases considered. These nu-
merical results serve to reinforce the qualitative results discussed in this
chapter. But at the same time further insight into the nature of the transi-
tional path is provided. For example, their analysis illustrates how the
policy of pegging the real money stock involves more oscillations and
requires more time to achieve convergence than does the policy of peg-
ging the real stock of bonds, Details such as this are very hard to obtain
from a formal analysis of a model even as simple as this one.
Some economists would argue that the entire analysis of stability
represented by the approach we have been discussing is misleading. This
is because we have considered linearized systems and the associated no-
tion of stability, namely convergence to some steady-state equilibrium
point, which is unrealistic. They would argue that, instead, we should
consider nonlinear systems and amend the notion of stability to require
that the system remain within some bounded region of an equilibrium
point, rather than converging to the point itself. This view has been ex-
pressed within respect to deterministic systems, such as that developed
here, so the issue is not one of stochastic fluctuations. Results from chaos
theory have suggested that it is possible to construct plausible determin-
istic macroeconomic systems that, when linearized, are unstable, but
which have higher-order terms that are stable and prevail when the sys
tem strays too far from its equilibrium. The behavior of such systems can
be shown to include nonlinear stable cyclical motion about steady-state
equilibria and to exhibit what Samuelson (1947) called “stability of the
second kind.”'? The formal analysis of nonlinear systems is difficult but
will surely become more accessible in the future.
1. See Branson and Klevorick (1969) for some early evidence.
2. Throughout this book, where no ambiguity can arise we shall adopt the convention of
letting primes denote total derivatives and denoting partial derivatives by appropriate sub-
scripts. Time derivatives will be denoted by dots above the variable concerned, Thus we
shall let
a a ey dx
UY SS SUN ec Se Fahne fiom) cele, FS
POs oe Mh F as,o8, a
The application of a bar to a letter is used to denote either a stationary equilibrium value
toa dynamic system, or the fact that the variable to which itis applied is fixed exogenously
The intended meaning should be clear from the particular context
3. The seminal works include Duesenberry (1948), Friedman (1957), and Ando and Modi-
gliani (1963), The formulation (2.9) is closest to the Ando-Modigliani version of the con-
sumption function, although the three approaches have many common elements.56
Chapter 2
4, The consumer optimality conditions derived in the process of determining the macro-
economic equilibrium in the intertemporal optimizing models in Part [1] essentially define
the agent’s consumption function, These conditions form the basis for the current empirical
research on the consumption function; see, e.g., Hall (1978, 1979),
5. See Jorgenson (1963, 1965).
6. Early models introducing costs of adjustment into investment include Lucas (1967),
Gould (1968). Hayashi (1982) related it to the Tobin q.
7. This approach was pioneered by Patinkin (1965).
8, Specifically, the utility function has the property
U,>0, U,>0, Uy, <0, Uz, <0, Uy, Uz, — UP, > 0.
9. See, e.g., Sidrauski (1967a, 1967b), Foley and Sidrauski (1971), Tobin (1968), Dornbusch
and Frenkel (1973), Turnovsky (1977),
10. Closely related to this is the well-known Christ proposition, which asserts that, ab-
stracting from interest payments, the steady-state government expenditure multiplier equals
the inverse of the marginal tax rate. This stems from the fact that for the system to be in
equilibrium, income must adjust so as to generate sufficient tax receipts to balance the
budget. The endogeneity of income taxes is obviously a critical part of this process, and
indeed with exogenous taxes no steady state would be possible in the Christ system, In the
present model, itis inflation tax receipts that adjust endogenously to balance the budget.
11. Throughout this analysis we assume that the rate of inflation and the real rate of inter-
est remain positive. Where necessary, the argument can be easily adapted to accommodate
negative values of these variables.
12. See also Tobin (1970), who describes a similar kind of policy as responding to the
“needs of trade.” It is also similar to the “real bills” regime discussed by Sargent (1977)
1. The special case where this rate is chosen to be zero corresponds to the traditional
static definition of a fixed nominal money stock.
14, Foley and Sidrauski (1971) define a passive policy in terms of maintaining a constant
ratio of money to total government debt. This policy will be considered in Chapter 15 as
the policy specification in a stochastic growth model
15, We use the term (local) stability in its conventional sense. That is, the system is locally
stable if, for sufficiently small displacements from equilibrium, the system will tend to re-
turn to equilibrium. This requires that the real parts of all eigenvalues be negative.
16, Note that the conventional specification of a passive monetary policy by a fixed nomi-
nal stock of money and obtained by setting = 0, implies a zero equilibrium rate of infla-
tion; ie., a constant equilibrium price level.
17, Samuelson (1947ycharacterized stability of the second kind to be like that of a pendu-
lum, which swings indefinitely in a bounded are about some stationary equilibrium point.II Rational Expectations3 Rational Expectations: Some Basic Issues
This chapter introduces the rational expectations hypothesis and dis-
cusses some basic issues with respect to both its formulation and the
solution of macroeconomic models in which it is embodied. The basic
hypothesis was originally formulated by Muth (1961) within the context
of a discrete-time stochastic model of a commodities market.’ However,
since many dynamic macroeconomic models are formulated using con-
tinuous time, the continuous-time analogue is also discussed. The basic
solution procedures are illustrated using the familiar Cagan (1956) model
of the monetary sector. The model has the advantage of simplicity and
makes clear how the rational expectations solution is forward looking, in
contrast with the adaptive hypothesis, upon which the original Cagan
model was based.
3.1 The Rational Expectations Hypothesis
Formally, the rational expectations hypothesis may be stated as follows:
Phat = EPs) (3.1)
where P is the variable being forecast (e.g., the price level),
P%..« = the prediction of the price level for time f + s, formed at time t,
E, = the statistical expectation conditional on information available at
time t, when the forecast is made.
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) requires that the prediction
made by the forecaster be consistent with the prediction generated by the
model, conditional on information available at that time. Setting s = 1,
equation (3.1) implies that
Pr = Phe + Gost (3.2)
This equation asserts that the price fluctuates about its forecast level with
a purely random error ¢,,, that has zero mean. This relationship between
the price and its prediction is sometimes said to characterize an efficient
market. It means that prices fully reflect available information, thus
eliminating any systematic opportunities for making supernormal profits.
As an empirical description, this assumption is an appealing one for asset
and financial markets, in which information is generally readily available.
But it is probably less appealing for forecasts of such quantities as the
consumer price index, which are likely to be based on far inferior infor-
mation. In the remainder of this section we consider some of the theoreti-
cal arguments for and against the hypothesis.60
Chapter 3
One of the most compelling arguments in favor of the REH is the
weakness of the alternatives. As already noted, traditional expectations
schemes, such as the adaptive hypotheses, involve systematic forecasting
errors. This is not particularly desirable, since one would expect indivi-
duals to learn this eventually and to abandon such rules or to modify
them in some way. By contrast, the REH generates expectations that are
self-fulfilling to within a random error, which cannot be predicted on
the basis of information available at the date when the expectations are
formed. This surely is an appealing notion. But despite this appeal, the
REH has been criticized by many authors over the years, although
the criticism seems to have become more muted as the hypothesis has
gained wider acceptance and understanding. The following objections are
among those that have been raised from time to time and should be
addressed.
The rational expectations solution of even a relatively simple economic
model is usually very complicated to obtain, involving the expectations
of the economy over all (an infinite number of) future time periods. A
common objection is that the computation of such expectations is simply
not feasible for the typical individual, whose expectations the model is
attempting to capture. One response to this charge is that it is not neces-
sary for all individuals to perform these calculations. Forecast research
institutions using sophisticated models and having the resources to com-
pute these expectations do exist, and their forecasts are disseminated
widely to other individuals who lack the necessary resources. Alterna
tively, the elaborate computations can be viewed as a formalization of
forecasting procedures that forecasters approach in a more intuitive way.
Another objection concerns the fact that the application of the REH
requires the knowledge not only of the structure of the model but also of
all relevant coefficients and parameters. Professional economists typically
cannot agree on a model, but even if they do, they usually obtain varying
estimates of relevant coefficients. How then can the public, which is pre-
sumably less sophisticated in economic theory, but whose expectations
we are trying to model, have such information? There is no doubt some
merit to this informational argument. The REH must be viewed as a
polar case, a situation in which all individuals in the economy agree on
the structure and on the relevant parameters. The theory as applied
does permit different agents to have different degrees of information. But
where information is commonly shared, it is held unanimously. One of
the areas of recent and current research is the combination of the REH
with a theory of the accumulation of information, so that agents acquire
their knowledge of the structure of the economy through some learning
process over time. This idea will be discussed briefly in Section 3.7.6
Rational Expectations: Some Basic Issues
The prevailing treatment of rational expectations in the macro literature,
however, generally assumes that in effect this knowledge is complete,
except for purely random disturbances that can never be learned in
advance.
A third limitation of the REH is that it requires all relationships to be
linear because it makes extensive use of the application of expectations
operators. In a sense this is a technical limitation, similar to the use of
linear regression techniques in econometric modeling. The computation
of rational expectations equilibria in nonlinear models is extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, although perhaps it will become more feasible as
computing capabilities develop.
In summary, the REH is a polar assumption but one that, by virtue
of its simplicity, yields sharp predictions that provide important insights
into macroeconomic theory and policy.
3.2
Specification of Expectations in Con
uous-Time Models
The relative merits of continuous-time versus discrete-time modeling
have been debated over the years. Both approaches are approximations,
and as a pragmatic procedure one should use the method that serves
‘one’s purpose most satisfactorily. In any event, many dynamic macro-
economic models are formulated using continuous-time modeling, one of
whose main advantages is its analytical tractability. In setting up models
in this way, it is important to specify precisely the expectations they
incorporate and exactly what information they embody. The consistent
formulation of expectations in continuous-time systems raises certain
technical issues, which are important but nevertheless are of specialized
Readers not interested in these technical details can skip the pre-
sent section without loss of continuity.
A continuous-time model is obtained as the limit of an underlying
discrete-time model, as the unit time interval shrinks to zero. In order
to derive the continuous time limit of expectations, therefore, we first
consider a forecast horizon is of arbitrary, but strictly positive, length
h, say —and then let h > 0. Thus let
Po) be the actual value of some economic variable, say the price
level at time ¢,
P¥(t + h.t}) be the prediction of P(t + h) formed at time ¢.
We assume initially that P(t) is continuously differentiable with respect
to ¢, thereby ruling out discrete jumps in this variable. We also assume
that forecasters have instantaneous access to information on P(t) so that62
Chapter 3
at each point of time they know P(t). Under this condition, any rational
forecasting method must satisfy what Turnovsky and Burmeister (1977)
called the weak consistency condition, that is,
(W) P*(t,t) = PCO) (3.3)
‘That is, with instantaneous information, the expectations formed at time
t for the same instant ¢ must equal the actual value prevailing at that
time. Without such information (W) need not hold.
Turnovsky and Burmeister (1977) also introduced what they called the
strong consistency axiom, namely?
PAE + ht) — PW)
s ae
= lim
ho"
(S) lim
hoo
ho ;
[" ho) PO] =P Ga)
h
It should be noted that the limits appearing in (S) are right-hand or
forward-looking limits, that is, they are the limits as h -+ 0 through posi-
tive values. Letting hr +0 and using (17) yields
PA.) = Plt) (G.5)
where P#(t,t) defines the expected rate of change of P at time t. Thus the
strong consistency condition (S) asserts that the expected rate of change
of P equals the actual rate of change of P. Turnovsky and Burmeister
show how under their assumption (S) implies (W), but not the reverse.
The relationship contained in (3.5) is often referred to as perfect myopic
foresight, in that current changes are predicted precisely and without er-
ror. It is distinct from the notion of perfect foresight, which is said to
prevail when events occurring at finite times in the future are predicted
without error. This latter concept is the deterministic analogue to ratio-
nal expectations and may be formally described by
Pert h=PU+h) — forh>0 2)
Gray and Turnovsky (1979a) proceed by generalizing the notion of
weak consistency to
(GW) PXt—h,)=PU—h) forh>h2o (3.6)
This condition states that the economic agent's memory extends at least
i periods into the past. Asked to recall the current or some previous
value of P lying within his memory span, he replies correctly with the
actual value for the time in question. The period fi may be infinite, in
which case his memory is infinitely long. But for our purposes any finite
i will suffice, because we shall be concerned with considering limits as
h +0. (GW) implies (W), but not vice versa. However, the only rational-
ization for the acceptance of (W) but the rejection of (GW) would appear63
Rational Expectations: Some Basic Issues
to be that the agent, having accurately perceived the curren’ value of
P(1), immediately forgets it. This seems a little far-fetched.
Another way of expressing the difference between (W) and (GW) is to
say that the former merely equips the agent with the knowledge of P(t) at
some point r, whereas the latter tells him the shape of the function P(-) in
some interval leading up to the point ¢. The importance of this is that for
points lying within this interval, the agent can deduce the rate of change
of P from the shape of the P(-) function. More formally,
ht ty ~ Ph,
PMt = hat) = lim [° CORE SD PME “a
a
defines the rate of change of P remembered as t as occurring at time
1 —h, Using (GW) we may write
Pt—h+ $0 — Pit— ho
PRt— hid) tim
+0
| forh>h>0
=P(it—h) forh>h>0. (3.7)
Since P(t) is differentiable for all t, equation (3.7) immediately implies
the existence of the partial derivative P* at the point (¢ —h,f) for h >
h > 0. But notice that we cannot immediately assert that (3.7) is true at
the most recent point of the time interval, that is, for h = 0. This is be-
cause (GW) does not assert that P*(r + ¢,1) = P(t + {) for positive ¢, and
this would be required in order to calculate the derivative at that point.
However, adopting the usual definition of the left-hand or backward-
looking derivative, that is,
PE (t— ht) = lim [
fo
Pat ht 0 — PMt— ms]
(GW) does imply
PHO = PO
with P(t) being known as time t, from previously collected information.
Moreover, since P(t) is differentiable, we have
PQ) = Pil = PO (3.8)
where P,(t) is the right-hand derivative of P(t) and is defined by the limit
in (3.4).
Now P¥,(t,1) is given by
(m +60- mony
P# (0) = lim
c64
Chapter 3
and is the agent’s prediction of P.(1), the forward-looking rate of change
at £. But the essence of the differentiability condition (3.8) is that this is
known at time t (from P_(t)), and assuming that available information is
used efficiently for forecasting, we require that
PB,(t,0) = PD = Pl) = PO), (3.9a)
implying
P# (t,t) = P(t.) = PAt.2). (3.9b)
‘That is, the differentiability of P(t) implies the partial differentiability of
P*(.,.) with respect to its first argument at the point (¢,¢); furthermore,
this partial derivative is equal to the actual derivative of P at time ¢.
Using the definition of P¥,(t,1) we see that (3.9) contains (S), and hence
we have shown that (GW) implies (S). In other words, the assumption of
the differentiability of P(t) enables the forecaster to transform backward-
looking information over an infinitesimally short period to forward-look-
ing information over an infinitesimally short period. Moreover, using
(3.9) now enables one to extend (3.7) to include the endpoint h = 0,
Pt—hj=P(t—h) forh>hev. (3.10)
If there are values of ¢ for which P(t) is nondifferentiable, then at those
points (GW) will not imply (S). For example, if we allow this function to
be continuous with kinks, then at the points where such kinks occur,
the left-hand derivative and the right-hand derivative will not be equal.
The link between the past and future contained in differentiability and
described by (3.9a) breaks down, and the distinction between (W) and
(S) stressed by Turnovsky and Burmeister (1977) reemerges. However,
if P(t) is the solution of an economic model formulated in terms of
differential equations, we would expect P(t) to be differentiable almost
everywhere; hence the relationship between (GW) and (S) will hold al-
most everywhere.*
The equivalence of (W) and (S) under (GW) has important implications
for the specification of expectations hypotheses in continuous time. Spe-
cifically, if one assumes as typically the case (if only implicitly) in spec-
ifying continuous-time models that
(i) forecasters have instantaneous access to relevant information and
some ability to store that information; and
(ii) the time path for the variable being forecast is differentiable:
then expectations satisfy perfect myopic foresight
PHO = PO,65
Rational Expectations: Some Basic Issues
that is, the forecast formed over an infinitesimally short time horizon is
always correct. Thus if, as is also typically the case in continuous-time
macroeconomic models, the decision horizon is infinitesimally short and
forecasts need be made for only the next instant of time; all forecasting
errors are ruled out. This is true for both deterministic and stochastic
systems. Moreover, all autoregressive forecasting procedures, such as the
adaptive, are redundant; perfect forecasts for the next instant of time can
be obtained simply by observing current behavior.
This conclusion can be interpreted as an argument for adopting the
continuous-time analogue of rational expectations, namely perfect myo-
pic foresight, when formulating expectations in continuous-time models
For some purposes this is undoubtedly appropriate. But in other circum-
stances there may be reasons for a different strategy in response to
the issues raised. The evolution of expectations is a critical aspect in
the modeling of disequilibrium dynamics, the distinguishing features of
which are failure of plans to be realized, divergences of prices and other
variables from their equilibrium values, and uncertainty about the future.
In this situation, the prediction of the future becomes a hazardous exer-
cise during which mistakes are bound to occur. Perfect myopic foresight
is not a good characterization of decision makers’ behavior here, implying
as it does that mistakes are never made. One can abandon continuous-
time modeling of disequilibrium situations, but this would be to dispense
with the many analytical and other advantages of the model. The prob-
lem may be seen as follows. Simple autoregressive schemes may be seen
as low-cost expectations formation schemes in situations where decision
makers’ information is severely limited or unreliable, and their inclusion
in disequilibrium models is thus desirable. However, the conventional
implementation of such schemes in continuous-time models produces the
extreme characteristics we have just described. In order to avoid these
difficulties, one must abandon either of the assumptions (i) and (ii) or
assume that the forecast horizon remains strictly finite. Some attempts
along these lines have been undertaken in the literature and are noted here.
One possibility is to drop the assumption of differentiability. Specifi-
cally, one might assume that the relevant variables are generated by
nondifferentiable stochastic processes, the best known of which is the
Brownian motion or Wiener process. This approach is pursued in the
stochastic models developed in Part IV. However, this particular process
is characterized by independent increments, so that the best predictor
of P(t +h) at time t is simply P(t) adjusted by a possible drift factor. In
this case any autoregressive procedure, such as the adaptive hypothe-
sis, would be inappropriate. But there may be other more general non-
differentiable stochastic processes, such as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck66
Chapter 3
process, for which hypotheses of continuous-time stochastic models in-
volve highly specialized techniques with which many economists are fre-
quently unfamiliar. This may impede lucid exposition and may render the
intuitive interpretation of the model very difficult. Moreover, although
the introduction of nondifferentiable stochastic processes offers a techni-
cal solution to the problem, it may not always be easily motivated
in terms of the underlying economic behavior. For example, although
the Wiener process is typically justified as an approximation, it is not
always clear what is being approximated and how the approximation has
been derived
Other approaches involve either dropping the assumption of the in-
stantaneous availability of information or retaining the assumption of a
finite forecast horizon. The effect of either of these is to introduce a delay
into the system. As Gray and Turnovsky (1979a) demonstrate, such a
delay can arise very naturally in the course of aggregating over indivi-
duals who are making decisions over nonsynchronized finite forecast ho-
rizons; or it may arise from an information lag reflecting the time taken
in collecting such basis statistics as the consumer price index. In either
case, a finite lag leading to a mixed differential-difference equation system
is generated, raising several important issues for the modeling of continu-
ous-time systems. First, it implies that in many circumstances it will be-
come necessary to model expectations of both the levels and the rate
of change of a given variable, and this must be done consistently. Second,
where the levels variable being replaced by a predetermined expectation
is a price, which previously had performed an equilibrating function in
the corresponding market, it may become necessary to abandon the
assumption of continuous-time market equilibrium and to introduce
instead some appropriate disequilibrium adjustment process. Third, the
possibility of forecast error is reintroduced, allowing also for the possible
role of arbitrary but simple forecasting procedures,
These issues have been developed at some length by Gray and
Turnovsky (1979a), using the Cagan (1956) model as an illustration, The
solution methods for mixed differential-difference equations are not easy.
and it would take us (uv far afield to discuss them in detail here. But that
approach may see greater use in the future, particularly as computer
capabilities increase.
3.3. ‘The Cagan Monetary Model
As a starting point for our discussion of rational expectations, we con-
sider the well-kpown Cagan model of hyperinflation. This is described by
the pair of equations67
Rational Expectations: Some Basic Issues
m(t) — p(t) = —an(t) (B11)
m0) = 1b — 2) (3.12)
where®
m= InM, and M = nominal stock of money;
p =InP,and P = price level;
n = expected rate of inflation.
The model is a very simple one, in which output and the real interest
rate are assumed to remain fixed and wealth effects are ignored. The de-
mand for money is taken to be inversely related to the nominal interest
rate, which with a fixed real rate is just the expected rate of inflation.
Equation (3.11) describes continuous money market equilibrium, where
the expected rate of inflation is specified by the usual form of the adap-
tive hypothesis.
The logarithmic specification of the model is characteristic of many of
the formulations of rational expectations models. It means that changes
of corresponding variables are percentage changes, so that p(t) in (3.12)
represents the rate of inflation P(t)/P(¢). Also, coefficients of logarithmic
variables have simple interpretations as elasticities. Note, however, that
since 7 is measured as a rate, the coefficient
_(dM/M)
aS de
is a semi-clasticity of demand, that is, it measures the percentage change
in the demand for money per percentage point change in the expected
inflation rate.
The pair of equations can be interpreted as a subsystem of the more
general model specified in Chapter 2, which allows for changes in income
as well as in financial wealth. The critical question concerns the stability
of the system described by (3.11) and (3.12).
Differentiating (3.11) with respect to ¢ and assuming that, apart from
a possible once-and-for-all increase, the nominal money stock remains
constant, yields
Blt) = o7t(0). (3.13)
Eliminating x, * between (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13), we obtain the following
differential equation in the logarithm of the price level:
[m— p]. (3.14)68
Chapter 3
Suppose that there is now a once-and-for-all rise in the nominal quantity
of money m. It is clear from (3.14) that the adjustment of prices will be
stable if and only if
ay