MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
Topic: ​Preliminary Considerations
Petitioner: ​Manila Prince Hotel
Respondent: ​Government Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel Corporation, Committee on Privatization and Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel
Nature of the Action: ​Petition for prohibition & mandamus to prohibit the sale of the shares of stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation
by GSIS to Renong Berhad, the Malaysian firm.
Legal Arguments of the Parties: ​GSIS ​decided to sell through public bids the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, the MPHC
matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check too the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to
accept.

Petitioner Respondent

They invoked Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution:
“​…​In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.” ​They submit that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and culture, and that it has become a part of national
patrimony. Since 51% of the shares MHC carries with it
ownership of the business owned by the GSIS, a
government-owned corporation it is part of the national
economy. Since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm
Respondents argue that the provision invoked
by petitioners is merely a statement of principle
and is not a self-executing provision. It needs
existing laws for the said provision to operate.
Manila Hotel does not fall under “national
patrimony” because the term only refers to
natural resources. Granting that it is part of the
national patrimony, the provision is still
inapplicable because what is only being sold is
51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the building, or the land where
it stands. Also, the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the highest bidder
cannot be awarded.

Issues for Resolution: ​I​s ​Article XII Section 10 of the Constitution a self-executing provision?
Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R): ​Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
The petition is granted.
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Some constitutions are merely declarations of policies. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the government and securing fundamental rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. A provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without aid of enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right
it grants may be enjoyed, is self-executing. In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing, unless the contrary
is intended. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact laws to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such provision, etc.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. The provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable and self-executing Hence, when our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,
it simply means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
Therefore, respondents GSIS and MHC are directed to desist from the shares of the MHC to Malaysian firm, and to accept
the matching bid of petitioner to purchase the shares of the MHC.
Case Title: ​Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc​. G.R. No.​ 213948​ Date: ​April 25, 2017
Topic: ​Preliminary Considerations
Petitioner: ​KNIGHTS OF RIZAL
Respondents: ​DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, Inc., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL MUSEUM, and NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Nature of the Action: ​Petition for Injunction, with Applications for Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
and others.

Legal Arguments of the Parties: ​DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot in the City of Manila and was
earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila condominium project, a "Forty-Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level
Residential Condominium" project. After having acquired all the necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI was ready to
commence the intended project (Barangay Clearance, Zoning Permit, and Building Permit). However, the City of Manila Council
issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI- PDI
until such time that issues had been cleared. Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila, issued another resolution giving a
formal consent and confirmation on all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City of Manila for Torre de
Manila.

Petitioner Respondent

• The subject matter of the present suit is of public
interest because this is a violation of the Rizal
Monument.
• The Rizal Monument, as a national treasure, is
entitled to "full protection of the law" and the
national government must abate the act or activity
that endangers the nation's cultural heritage "even
against the wishes of the local government hosting
it."
• The project is a nuisance because it is situated
position that 'annoys or offends the senses' of every
Filipino who honors the memory of Rizal. It is a
present, continuing, worsening and aggravating
status or condition.
• Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over this
action. The petition should have been filed with the
RTC under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and
because the petition involves questions of fact.
• Knights of Rizal has no legal right or interest to
file or prosecute this action.
• Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se.
• DMCI-PDI acted in good faith in constructing
Torre de Manila; and
• Knights of Rizal is not entitled to a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction.

• DMCI-PDI's construction was commenced and

continues in bad faith, and is in violation of the City
of Manila's zoning ordinance.

Issue for Resolution: ​Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of
DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project?

Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R): ​No. The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed. There is no allegation or
proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the
community. City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local
ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project. The rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus can only be issued when
there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.
Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila to issue a writ of mandamus.
Case Title: G.R. No. Date
Topic:
Petitioner:
Respondent:

Nature of the Action:

Legal Arguments of the Parties:

Petitioner Respondent

Issues for Resolution:

Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R):

Case Title: USA VS RUIZ G.R. No. . L-35645 Date: May 22, 1985
Topic: Rule of State immunity​ in Contracts
Petitioner: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER
Respondent: HON. V. M. RUIZ, and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,

Nature of the Action: This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Legal Arguments of the Parties:

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. In May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. The company received
from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by
William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for
the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties.

Petitioner Respondent

● Plaintiff argues that they should perform the
work on the projects and, if specific performance
was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
pay damages. The company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the
projects.
● The defendants entered their special
appearance for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court
over the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of
America.

Issues for Resolution: ​Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity.
Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R):
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are
an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function
of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.

The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity
is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.

Therefore, the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions can invoke state immunity.
MOBIL PHILIPPINE EXPLORATION INC. v. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE
G.R. No. L-23139 , December 17, 1966

Topic: ​governmental and proprietary functions

Petitioner: ​Mobil Philippine Exploration Inc.
Respondent: ​Customs Arrastre Service and Bureau of Customs

Nature of the Action: ​Appeal on the Court of First Instance of Manila’s decision to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that neither
the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable.

Legal Arguments of the Parties:

4 cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad for Mobil Philippine Exploration, Inc. The shipment arrived in Manila
and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, under the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations.
The Custom Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of Mobil only 3 cases of the shipment.
Petitioner Respondent

Mobil filed suit against Customs Arrastre Service and They filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of that both Customs Arrastre Service and the
undelivered cases amounting to P18,493,37 plus other Bureau of Customs cannot be sued.
damages.
They contend that not all government entities are
immune from suit, and that the Bureau as operator of the
arrastre service is discharging proprietary functions and
as such can be sued by private individuals.

Issues for Resolution: ​Can the Bureau of Customs be sued?

Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R):

The Supreme Court stated that the fact that a non-corporate government entity, performs a function proprietary in nature does
not necessarily result in it being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function,
there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. They also stated that as an office
of government, without any corporate judicial personality, they do not fall within the parameters prescribed under Section 1, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court.

Who may be parties.​ - Only ​natural​ or ​juridical persons​ or ​entities authorized b​ y law may be parties in a civil action.

​ hich presents a similar

The Court also gives mention to ​Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Association w
case with the case at bar. In its ruling, the Court stated that;

“The Bureau of Printing is an office of the government under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary. . . Clearly, while the Bureau
of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs . . . the additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its functions . .
.”“Indeed, as an office of the government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of printing cannot be sued. . . and the rule is
settled that the government cannot be sued without its consent much less over its objection.”

The situation in this case is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs is under the Department of Finance, with no
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Although said arrastre functions may be deemed proprietary, it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental functions of the Bureau.

Therefore, The Bureau of Customs, regardless of its proprietary functions, cannot be sued, for otherwise, it could not perform
its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit.
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 89898-99 | Oct. 1, 1990 | Cortés, J.
Topic: ​State immunity, Execution against the government

Petitioner:​ Municipality of Makati

Respondents: Court of Appeals, Salvador de Guzman, Jr. (Judge, RTC Makati), Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Sheriff
Silvino Pastrana
Nature of Action:​Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals with prayer for preliminary injunction

Legal Arguments of the Parties:

1. Municipality of Makati initiated expropriation proceedings involving a property located in Makati. It filed an action for eminent
domain with a certification showing a new bank account made pursuant to PD 42. RTC fixed the appraised value of the property
and ordered payment of P4,953,506 after deducting advanced payments.
2. After becoming final & executory, respondents’ motion for issuance of a writ of execution accompanied with a notice of
garnishment was granted. However, a hold code was placed on the account forcing them to file a motion to order its compliance.
Petitioner moved to lift the garnishment on the ground that payment should be done in installments. It also filed its opposition to
the motion.
3. Petitioner filed a manifestation informing RTC that PSB was now the owner of the property. PSB then entered into a compromise
agreement with respondents to divide the balance due between them. They were also ordered to execute a deed of conveyance.
Petitioner’s motion to lift garnishment was denied.
4. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondents filed 2 succeeding motions to require bank manager to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the immediate release of the balance due. The bank manager
informed RTC that he was still waiting for authorization from the head office. Petitioner also contended that its funds could
neither be garnished or levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing Republic v. Palacio. RTC denied motion for reconsideration and declared PNB
manager guilty of contempt of court. CA also dismissed separate petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner and bank manager and
later dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
5. SC issued a TRO against respondents. Petitioner revealed that it had 2 accounts with PNB. One specifically opened for
expropriation proceedings and one earmarked for statutory obligations. It posed no objection to the garnishment however it
contended that the funds garnished in excess were public funds exempted from execution without the proper appropriation
required under the law.

Issues for Resolution:

1. Are the funds deposited for statutory obligations exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution?
2. If the funds are exempted, what then is the remedy to be taken by the respondents?

Conclusion:​ Yes. The funds deposited for statutory obligations are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.

Legal Basis: Public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute (Republic v. Palacio).
Whether real or personal, the properties of a municipality, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution
sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions are exempt from
execution.

Exception to the Rule: Where a municipality fails or refuses to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it without
justifiable reason, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus to compel the enactment and approval of the appropriation
ordinance, and the disbursement of municipal funds (Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo).

Apply the Law to the Facts: Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its
public funds the balance due, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds deposited for statutory obligations.
However, in the case at bar, the validity of RTC decision ordering payment is not disputed by petitioner, hence, no appeal was made.
Petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of property for 3 years now, notwithstanding its failure to pay just compensation. SC will
not condone its blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriating proceedings it had initiated. The state’s power of
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

Repeat the Conclusion: Yes. SC grants the petition. RTC decision is set aside and TRO issued by SC is made permanent. The funds
deposited for statutory obligations are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution. However, in the case at bar, SC finds that
the municipality has had more reasonable time to pay full compensation. Therefore, petitioner is ordered to immediately pay PSB and
respondents the balance due and to submit a report of its compliance.
UP v. DIZON
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, J. Bersamin
Topic: ​Execution against the Government

Petitioners: ​University of the Philippines​, Jose V. Abueva, Raul P. De Guzman, Ruben P. Aspiras, Emmanuel P. Bello, Wilfredo P.
David, Casiano S. Abrigo, and Josefina R. Licuanan
Respondents: ​Hon. Agustin S. Dizon,​ in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, Stern
Builders, Inc., and Servillano Dela Cruz

Nature of the Action: ​Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, whereby CA upheld the order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City that directed the garnishment of public funds amounting to P16,370,191.74 belonging to
the UP to satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce the already final and executory judgment against the UP.

Legal Arguments of the Parties: ​On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation, represented by its President and General Manager Servillano
dela Cruz, for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building at the
University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB) campus.

Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The
third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP
failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid
billing and to recover various damages.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The RTC in its decision, ordered UP to pay Sten Builders. UP filed its motion for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. The order denying their motion for reconsideration was served upon Atty. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. However, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of UP but the OLS (Office of Legal Affairs) in
Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied the notice of appeal for having
been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ
of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks (Land Bank
and DBP) and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

The petitioner appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the decision of the RTC.

Petitioners Respondents

They invoked Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution: ​“The State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment”, ​with regards to the decision of CA in allowing
garnishment of a State University’s Funds. They argued
that the garnishment resulted in a substantial reduction of
the UP’s limited budget allocated for the remuneration,
job satisfaction and fulfillment of the best available
teachers.
Respondents said that the ruling in
Commissioner of Public Works v. San Diego
had ​no application because there was an
appropriation for the project. And that dela
Cruz had even been constrained to sell his
house, his equipment and the implements of his
trade, and together with his family had been
forced to live miserably because of the wrongful
actuations of the UP.

UP also insists that the CA decision was inconsistent with

the rulings in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San
Diego and Department of Agriculture v. NLRC to the effect
that ​government funds and properties could not be seized
 under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgment
awards.

Issues for Resolution: ​Whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment award.

Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R): ​No. UP’s funds, as government funds, are not subject to garnishment.

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government
function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any dividends. Thus, the funds of
UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP
that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA as provided in Section
26 of P.D. No. 1445. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.

Therefore, the Court annuls the orders for the garnishment of the University of the Philippines and for the release of the garnished
amount to Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS v. ABECINA
GR No. 206484 June 29, 2016

Topic: ​State immunity - execution against the government

Petitioner: ​Department of Transportation and Communications
Respondent: ​Spouses Vicente Abecina and Maria Cleofe Abecina

Nature of the action: ​Petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the 2013 decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court wherein the latter ordered the DOTC to vacate the Abecina property and pay them
actual and moral damages

Legal arguments of the parties:

Spouses Abecina are the registered owners of five parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
These properties are covered by the necessary TCTs, or Transfer Certificate of Title. In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel a
contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project
(RTDP) under the National Telephone Program Phase 1, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). DOTC and Digitel thus entered into several Facilities
Management Agreements (FMA) in order for Digitel to manage, operate, maintain, and develop the RTDP and NTPI-1 facilities
compromising local telephone exchange lines in various municipalities in Luzon. These FMA’s were then conveyed into Financial
Lease Agreements (FLA) in 1995. In order to aid the RTDP, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated parcels
of land to the DOTC. However, the municipality erroneously included portions of the Abecina property, and Digitel constructed a
telephone exchange encroaching on the same. By mid 1990’s, the Abecinas discovered Digitel’s encroachment on their property and
demanded that they vacate and pay damages, but the latter did not, claiming that the building of the telephone exchange was pursuant
to the FLA. A final demand letter was sent to the DOTC and Digitel by the Abecinas to vacate and pray rent/damages in the amount of
P1,200,000.00, which was also ignored. The arguments of the Abecinas, as well as the corresponding arguments of the DOTC, are
outlined below.

ABECINAS DOTC

Filed an ​accion publiciana (​ plenary action for recovery of Claimed immunity from suit and ownership of the subject
possession in ordinary civil proceeding to determine better right) properties

State immunity cannot be invoked to perpetrate injustice against FLA agreement with Digitel was entered in pursuit of
citizens government functions to promote and develop networks of
communication

Subject properties have the corresponding TCT’s and thus, the Did not act in bad faith and was merely exercising their power
DOTC is a builder in bad faith of eminent domain

Issues for resolution: ​Whether or not the DOTC enjoys state immunity in the instant case?

Conclusion of the court: ​NO. It is a rule that the state may not be sued without its consent, however, the doctrine of state immunity is
not absolute. Section 1, Article II of the Bill of Rights provides the limitations to state immunity: that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. As emphasized by the Court in this case, the doctrine of state immunity cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating injustice to a citizen. The DOTC is mandated with promotion, development, and regulation of
dependable and coordinated networks of communication, however, they encroached on the Abecina property when it constructed a
local telephone exchange. The Court makes the distinction between ​jure imperii, w ​ hich refer to the State’s sovereign and government
acts, and ​jure gestionis​, which refers to the State’s private, commercial, and proprietary acts. State immunity, as the Court states,
extends only to ​jure imperii​, while there exists a waiver of immunity in ​jure gestionis. T
​ he DOTC’s entry into and taking possession
of the Abecina property amounted to implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 174747 March 9, 2016
Topic: ​Execution Against the Government
Petitioner: ​Republic of the Philippines, represented by Privatization and Management Office
Respondent: ​National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) and NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter (George Emata, Domingo
Rebancos, Nelson Berina, Roberto Tirao, Amado Villote & Bienvenido Felina)

Nature of the Action: ​Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution dated
September 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals

Legal Arguments of the Parties:

Asset Privatization Trust (APT) is a government entity created under Proclamation No. 50 to conserve, provisionally manage and
dispose of assets that have been identified for privatization. PNB ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation’s loans to the government through APT. Pursuant to its mandate under Proclamation No. 50, APT decided to sell
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation to Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-Penafrancia Sugar Mill and
its employees will be terminated within 30 days. Under E.O. 323, APT became Privatization and Management Office.
Petitioner Respondent

The closure of Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation was due to serious losses and
financial reverses (foreclosure sale) and because
of this, Bicolandia became government property.
Thus, any money claims against said company
should be brought to the Commission on Audit
as per P.D. 1445.
There was no employee-employer relationships
with the APT and Bicolandia’s employees.
Additionally, money claims of Bicolandia’s
employees had already prescribed because the
complaint was filed beyond the 3-ryr
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the
Labor Code although they still voluntarily gave
the separation benefits without order from the
court.
In response to the petitioner’s claims, PMO did
not specifically cite any laws to support its
arguments. Also, issues that were brought up
involved the exercise of discretion by the Court
of Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies.
The respondents also declined in receiving their
monetary benefits because of their ‘supposed’
dismissal from the company stating that the sale
violated their Collective Bargaining Agreement
and thus was a method of union busting. Which
meant that the compensation given by PMT is
not enough to compensate for the violation of
their rights.

Issues for Resolution:

Can the respondents still claim for labor standard benefits under Article 291 of the Labor Code?

Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R):

Yes, the private respondents can still claim for labor standard benefits. Article 291 of the Labor Code states that, “All money claims
arising from employer-employee relationships accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within 3 years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.” The start of the prescriptive period began to run only after the
Commission’s decision had become final and executory under Rule 7, Section 14 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. In this
case, the prescriptive period begins from the private respondents’ receipt of the NLRC Resolution dated June 21, 2002. Under Article
2, section 18 and Article 13, section 3 of the Constitution, it guarantees the workers’ full protection of their rights including economic
security and parity. With these provisions, the workers should be granted all rights, including monetary benefits, enjoyed by other
workers in similar situations.
Arigo v. Swift​, GR 206510, Sept 16, 2014, 
C. STATE
IMMUNITY; Foreign Governments, International Agencies,
and Personnel, VILLARAMA, JR, J:
Parties​: REV. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa,
MOST REV. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan,
QUIMPO, BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, ARAULLO,
REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON.
COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, SIMBULAN, Junk
VFA Movement, PEREZ, PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list,
GONZALES, Pamalakaya,TAPANG, Agham, LABOG,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, SALVADOR, Gabriela, AFRICA,
CONCEPCION, GUAN, BAGUINON, TUPAZ, Petitioners.
SWIFT, Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, RICE, Commanding
Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT AQUINO III,
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, HON. DEL ROSARIO, DFA
Secretary, HON. OCHOA, JR, Executive Secretary, Office of
the President, HON. GAZMIN, DND Secretary, HON. PAJE,
DENR Secretary, VICE ADMIRAL ALANO, Philippine Navy
Flag Officer in Command, AFP, ADMIRAL RENA,
Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE
EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR
GEN. DOMINGO, Commandant of AFP, and LT. GEN.
ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces, and Balikatan 2013
Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
Nature of Action​: Petition for Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for
a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
Legal Arguments​:
In 2010, RA 10067, or the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act of
2009 was passed to ensure the protection and conservation of
the Tubbataha Reef.
On 17 January 2013, while in the Sulu Sea, the USS Guardian
ran aground the shoals of the Tubbataha Reefs.
Swift expressed regret for the incident. US Ambassador
Thomas, Jr. met with DFA Sec. del Rosario regarding the
compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship. By 30
March 2013, the US team had finished removing the last piece
of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
In 2013, petitioners filed the case, contending:
- The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude
affecting many provinces, violating their rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology
- There should be directive from the SC for civil, administrative
and criminal suits for the acts committed in violation of
environmental laws.
- US respondents committed the following violations under RA
10067: unauthorized entry; non-payment of conservation fees;
obstruction of law enforcement officers; damages to the reef;
and destroying resources;
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity from suit
3. The Philippine respondents contend that:
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the issuance of TEPO
or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage
operations were already completed
The petition is defective in form and in substance
The petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA
The determination of the extent of responsibility of the US
regarding the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively
with the executive branch
Issues: ​Are the US Respondents are immune from suit?
Conclusion: YES. Since the respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself, hence the
principle of State immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction over
the respondents. Also, the waiver of State immunity under the
VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions as in this case.
Legal basis​: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another State without their
consent or waiver.
Exception to the rule​: While historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State,
Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception, where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the
territorial sea.
Apply the law to the facts​: The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is against
the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction over respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling. Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS,
as a matter of policy, the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the
oceans” as codified in UNCLOS. The Court concurs with
Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS
does not allow the US to disregard the coastal rights of the
Philippiness. The Court thus expects the US to bear
“international responsibility under the UNCLOS.
Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, the principle of State immunity
bars the exercise of jurisdiction over the US respondents, but the
US is still liable for reparations for the destruction of the reef.
ENDENCIA v. DAVID
G.R No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953
Topic: ​Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances; Basic Concepts
Plaintiff-appellees: ​Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo
Defendant-appellant: ​Saturnino David, as Collector of Internal Revenue

Nature of the Action: ​Joint appeal from the Court of First Instance Manila that declared the unconstitutionality of Republic Act 590.

Legal Arguments of the Parties: ​Saturnino David as CIR ordered to tax the plaintiff judges’ salaries pursuant to RA 590, which
removes all income tax exemptions of public officers, including judges.

Plaintiff-appellees Defendant-appellant

Plaintiff judges assailed the constitutionality of RA 590,
which removes the exemption of judges from income
tax, because it was a diminution of their salaries which
was prohibited by Section 9, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution which states:
​Defendants contend that RA 590 was
promulgated precisely. Even if ​Perfecto v. Meer
ruled that judicial officers are exempt from
payment of income tax, this received
unfavourable reception from the Court.

“​They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed

by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.”

Issues for Resolution: ​Can the legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official?

Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R): ​No, the legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a
public official as this is a transgression of the fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. The decision appealed from
is affirmed.

The Constitution provides that under our system of government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact
laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws, and the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department - and this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution.

Section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a
judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax.” The Legislature then proceeds to declare that payment of said
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is
an invasion of the power of the judiciary.

Therefore, the Court declares R.A. 590 unconstitutional for the transgression of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Case Title: ​Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director General, National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
G.R. No.​ 167798 ​Date:​April 19, 2006
Topic: ​Executive v. Legislative Power
Petitioner:​Kilusang Ma, yo Uno, NAFLU-KMU, Joselito V. Ustarez, Emilia P. Dapulang, Salvador T. Carranza, Martin T. Custodio
JR. and Roque M. Tan
Respondent:​The Director-General, National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), and The Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management

Nature of the Action: ​Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Legal Arguments of the Parties:

In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order directing all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID)
systems.

Petitioner

1. ​EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch
of the government. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by
Congress for that purpose.

2.​ ​EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court in Ople
v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security
Act of 1997.

3.​ T
​ he Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420.
It allows access to personal confidential data without the owner's consent.

4.​ E
​ O 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions.

5.​ ​There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420. Granting without conceding that
the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without public hearing.

6.​ ​EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory
treatment of and penalizes those without ID.

Issues for Resolution: ​Is EO 420 a usurpation (illegal taking) of legislative power by the President?
Conclusion of the Court (C-L-E-A-R): ​No. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing
EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. There is nothing
legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the
Executive department. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
"President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.". The same Section also mandates the President to
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed .If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID
data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve
the exercise of any legislative power. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government
entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President's constitutional power of control is self-executing
and does not need any implementing legislation. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
NPC DAMA v. NAPOCOR GR 156208 Sep 26, 06
E. DELEGATION OF POWERS; Administrative Agencies
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Parties​: NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION (NPC DAMA), NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU)- NORTHERN LUZON, REGIONAL
CENTER, et al, Petitioners

THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), CAMACHO as NPB Chairman, QUILALA, as
President-Officer-in-Charge/CEO of NAPOCOR, et al, Respondents

Nature of Action​: Special civil action for Injunction

Legal Arguments​: In 2001, RA 9136, or the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Macapagal-Arroyo.
Under Section 48, a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed.

In 2002, pursuant to Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which
provided for “Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under this Resolution the services of all NPC personnel shall be
legally terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a
Transition Team to manage and implement the NPC’s Separation Program.

Petitioners contended, among others, that the other four signatories to the resolutions were not members of the Board. They were merely representatives of those actually named
under the EPIRA to sit as members of the NPB. Thus, their votes could not count.

Respondents relied on American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents, that in exercising their own judgment and discretion, administrative officers were not prevented from
using the help of subordinates as a matter of practical administrative procedure.

Issues​: Are NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 valid?

Conclusion​: No. The Resolutions are invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes for their proper adoption, being that they were signed by

Legal basis​: Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the
National Power Board of Directors.

When applied to public functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the
dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the
basis of their personal qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot
delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions. Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the fulfillment
of their responsibilities.

Exception to the rule​: Officers could seek such aid, as long as the legally authorized official is the one who would make the final decision through the use of personal judgment.

Apply the law to the facts​: Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company was misplaced. The Court explicitly stated officers could seek such aid, as long as the legally
authorized official was the one who would make the final decision through the use of personal judgment.

In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive
departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. This action violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated
department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.

There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the exercise of discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, the assailed Resolutions are null and void.
PLDT v. NLRC​ GR 80609 Aug 23, 1988
F. STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES; Social Justice and Legislation, CRUZ, J.:

Parties​: PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner,

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARILYN ABUCAY, respondents.

Nature of Action​: Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) (​hula)​

Legal Arguments​:

1. Abucay, a traffic operator of PLDT, was accused by two complainants of having demanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800 for her promise to
facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service.
She went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. Despite of her being dismissed for cause, the LA and NLRC allowed for
separation pay.
2. Petitioner’s claim: It is conceded that an employee illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws. However, an employee
dismissed for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of
the private respondent, she has been awarded financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10 year service in the company despite her
removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded rather than punished for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification. The award is made
on the ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium on dishonesty and encourages corruption.
3. NLRC’s claim: For its part, public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a
reward for her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after working faithfully with the company for ten years. In support of this, the Solicitor
General cites jurisprudence where the employees were dismissed for cause but were allowed separation pay on grounds of social and compassionate justice.

Issues​: Whether or not the award of separation pay for the private respondent is just.

Conclusion​: NO. The separation pay is unjustified because the dismissal of Abucay is grounded on his dishonestly and disloyalty to his company.

Legal basis​: Under the Labor Code, a person dismissed for cause is not entitled to separation pay, regardless of the nature or degree of the ground, be it mere inefficiency or
something graver like immorality or dishonesty.

Exception to the rule​: Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.

Apply the law to the facts​: The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly
admitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty
that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal,
it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.

If the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next
employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will
encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are
clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. Thus, the grant of separation pay is unjustified.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, the grant of separation pay is unjustified.

BANAT v. COMELEC ​(consolidated)
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
H. LEGISLATURE; Party-List System, CARPIO, J.:

Parties​:
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY, petitioner.

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS,
INC., and ABONO, petitioners.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS & SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS,

AANGAT TAYO, COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenors.

Nature of Action​: Petition for certiorari and mandamus; Petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition.

Legal Arguments​: BANAT filed before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of NBC to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.

The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC formula. Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC to reconsider. COMELEC denied the consideration. Hence, this petition raising the following issues and clarifications.

Issues​: Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory?

Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 unconstitutional?

Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat unconstitutional?

Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections?
Conclusion​: No. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; The party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives.

No, it is not unconstitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Yes. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives."

Yes (by vote of the justices). Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

Legal basis​: Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution; Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941

Exception to the rule​: However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections.

Apply the law to the facts​: In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. However, the Court applied Veterans doctrine, as such, precluding all the major poltical parties from participating
the party-list system.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, applying Veterans, the major political parties are prohibited from participating in the party-list elections.
Bondoc v. Pineda​, G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991, H. LEGISLATURE; Electoral Tribunals, GRIO-AQUIÑO, J:

Parties​: DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC.

REPRESENTATIVES PINEDA, PALACOL, CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL.

Nature of Action​: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

Legal Arguments​: In the elections held on May 1987, Pineda of the LDP and Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the 4th District of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda. Cong. Camasura of the LDP voted to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Later, Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. The Chairman of the HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter
from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Congressman Pineda's plea for dismissal is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by political parties,
the composition of the HRET is made, hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or
Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; Also, a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on
political affiliation would be completely nullified; and the expulsion of Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" and the decision to rescind his membership in the HRET
is the sole prerogative of the House, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review.

In his comment, respondent Congressman Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership
in the HRET, and petitioners failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House that withdrew Camasura's membership.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued that petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights.

Petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the
promulgation of its decision in HRET

In reply to Palacol, petitioner explained that Palacol was impleaded as respondent because several newspapers reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect
Cong. Palacol to take the seat.

Issues​: Is the House of Representatives allowed to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the
tribunal of the majority party?

Conclusion​: NO. The resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is null and void.

Legal basis​: Under the Constitution, the purpose of the constitutional convention creating the HRET was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of
contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from their political party. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for
expulsion.

Exception to the rule​: Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause.

Apply the law to the facts​: In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination of the ballots and the recount of the votes, they committed a grave abuse of discretion, injustice and violated the Constitution.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

Repeat the conclusion​: Therefore, the resolution of expulsion against Cong. Camasura is null and void.
Belgica v. Ochoa​, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 20925, November 19, 2013 H. LEGISLATURE, Appropriations and Fund Transfers

Parties​: BELGICA, VILLEGAS JR. GONZALEZ, ABANTE and SAN DIEGO, Petitioners.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA JR, DBM SECRETARY ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILS. represented by DRILON as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPS. represented by BELMONTE, JR. as HOUSE SPEAKER, Respondents.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) Petitioner.

DRILON as SENATE PRESIDENT and BELMONTE, JR., as HOUSE SPEAKER, Respondents.

NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner,
PRESIDENT AQUINO III and DBM SECRETARY ABAD, Respondents.

Nature of Action​: Consolidated petitions under Rule 65

Legal Arguments​: In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) Article appeared in the GAA, requiring prior consultation with the representative of the district
before release of funds, and allowing realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits.

In 2013, the PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district.
Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.

The National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects. Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO. Hence,
petitioners brought the cases separately raising the following issues.

Issues​: Are the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers and (b)
non-delegability of legislative power?

Conclusion​: (a) Yes. The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated. The post-enactment measures including project
identification, fund release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.
Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.

(b) Yes. The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated, since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which is lodged in Congress as a whole.

Legal basis​: Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the Legislative Branch to pass laws, and for the Executive Branch to enforce the laws. Where the Legislature participates in
the enforcement of laws, there is an encroachment of the powers of other branches.

The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Exception to the rule​: x x x “except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Apply the law to the facts​: The fact that authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Respondents failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They even admitted
that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.

In this case, the legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.

As for the Malampaya Funds (PD 910), it is a valid appropriation law because it meets the requisites that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount
and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: all fees, revenues, and
receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources. It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects.
However, it is unconstitutional as the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as it
does not determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for the use of the funds.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, the PDAF Articles and the Malampaya Fund are unconstitutional.
Rufino v. Endriga​, G.R. No. 139554, G.R. No. 139565, July 21, 2006, I. PRESIDENCY, Appointing Power, CARPIO, J.:

Parties​: RUFINO, TANTOCO, CALMA, SIMPAO, JR., and GARCIA, petitioners, respondents. (​Case 1, Case 2​)

ENDRIGA, LAGDAMEO, SISON, POTENCIANO, and FERNANDEZ, respondents, petitioners.

Nature of Action​: 2 consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from Quo Warranto proceedings

Legal Arguments​: In 1966, Mr. Marcos issued EO 30 creating the CCP as a trust governed by a Board of seven Trustees to promote Philippine culture.
After Martial Law, he issued PD 15, the CCP’s charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of
politics”, increasing its members to nine trustees. Later, EO 1058 in 1985, increased further the trustees to eleven.

After People Power, Pres. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of
President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).

In 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent
trustees. The seven new trustees were: Rufine, Tantoco, Pascual, Buenaventura, Calma, Simpao, Garcia.

The Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed their duties in early January 1999.

In 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning Estrada’s appointment of seven new members to the Board. The Endriga group alleged
that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x.” In case
“only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].” The Endriga group claimed that it
is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP
“shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation”

The CA granted the petition declaring the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees.

In their MR, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may
not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD
15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the
appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power.

Issues​: Is Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and do the CCP trustees have authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.

Conclusion​: NO. Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended, which authorizes remaining trustees to fill, by election, vacancies in the Board is unconstitutional.

Legal basis​: Such provisions run afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Exception to the rule​: The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise.

Apply the law to the facts​: The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political pressure, specifically from the President. They make the CCP a
self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation.” This provision does not free the CCP from the President’s control as it would
be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and activities, but ultimately these are all subject to the President’s
power of control.

The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that
the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the
Executive branch, including the CCP.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended, are unconstitutional.
People v. Salle​, Jr, G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995, I. PRESIDENCY, Pardoning Power, DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Parties​: PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., plaintiff-appellee

SALLE, JR. @ "KA NONOY," MENGOTE @ "KA RICKY/KA LIZA/KA JUN," and TEN JOHN DOES, accused.
SALLE, JR., and MENGOTE accused-appellants.

Nature of Action​: Resolution (Appeal from conviction)

Legal Arguments​: Salle, Jr. and Mengote were found guilty as co-principals of compound murder and destructive arson, and each were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. In 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. In 1994, however, appellant Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. They were
granted a conditional pardon and that with their acceptance, the appellants will be released from confinement, impliedly admitting their guilt and accepting their sentence, hence,
the appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on December 1993. Atty. La’o also stated that appellant Mengote left for his province without
consulting her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

Issues​: Is a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable?

Conclusion​: NO. Since a pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, such pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction
to be final and Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal.

Legal basis​: Section 19, Article VII: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of majority of all Members of Congress

Exception to the rule​: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, x x x

Apply the law to the facts​: It is entirely different where the requirement is "conviction by final judgment" as presently prescribed in the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no
pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the this case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole
before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon
as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, no pardon shall take effect unless the conviction of the accused is final.

Wherefore, counsel for accused-appellant Mengote is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice to secure the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court.
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.
Vinuya v. Romulo​, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, I. PRESIDENCY, Diplomatic Power BERSAMIN, J.:

Parties​: VINUYA, et al, in their capacity and as members of the "Malaya Lolas Organizations" Petitioners,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALBERT, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE GUTIERREZ, and SOLICITOR GENERAL
BENIPAYO, Respondents.

Nature of Action​: Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and Supplemental MR, Petition for certiorari.

Legal Arguments​: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that the officials of the Executive Department declined to give assistance to petitioners.

Petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for
the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan before the (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956. Also, in 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippines signed a MOU for medical and welfare support programs for the former comfort women. These
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Issues​: Did the Executive Department commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other reparations against Japan?

Conclusion​: NO. In Domestic Law, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine the espousal of the claims against Japan, and thus the issue is barred by
the doctrine of political questions.

Legal basis​: Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.”

It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative –‘the political’–departments of the government.

Exception to the rule​: But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements.

Apply the law to the facts​: In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. Such wisdom is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and this is especially true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic and consular officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been committed.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, the question of whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter,
the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
Moldex Realty v. HLURB​, G.R. 149719, June 21, 2007, J. JUDICIARY, Requisites for Judicial Review, TINGA, J.:

Parties​: MOLDEX REALTY, INC., petitioner,

HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, OFFICE OF APPEALS, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, BARRAMEDA in her capacity as Regional
Officer and METROGATE COMPLEX VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

Nature of Action​: Petition for prohibition and certiorari on the HLURB Resolution

Legal Arguments​: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate development, and the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, in Bulacan. The HLURB
issued petitioner a License to Sell parcels of
land within the subdivision. The lot buyers and home-owners in the subdivision formally organized the respondent association.

Petitioner claims that since the completion of the subdivision, it had been subsidizing and
advancing the payment for maintenance of common facilities and utility bills. Eventually, the petitioner decided to stop paying and advised the respondent association to assume
this obligation. The association objected to and refused to pay. Consequently, Meralco discontinued its service, prompting respondent association to apply for a preliminary
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB against petitioner.

HUDCC’s regulation as the basis of its decision against the petitioner stems from Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, which particularly provides that “subdivision
owners/developers shall continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, pay the bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street
lights until the facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after completion of development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their implementing
rules and regulations.” Rendering the petition moot and academic.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals only now raising HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, as unconstitutional for being a void exercise of legislative
power. During the pendency of the the case, the HUDCC approved Board Resolution No. R-
699, series of 2001, entitled “Amending the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree and Other Related Laws.” The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of
HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directly to the Supreme Court.

Issues​: Does the petition assailing the HLURB decision present a justiciable controversy?

Conclusion​: NO. The issue has already been rendered moot and academic. Resolution No. 699, series of 2001, was passed by the HUDCC. The amendatory provision has
superseded the provision in HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directing subdivision developers to shoulder the electricity cost of streetlights. At the time of the filing
of the instant petition, the new provision was already in effect. That being said, the instant petition has become moot and academic.

Legal basis​: It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law, or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration as the very lis mota of the case.

Exception to the rule​: x x x, unless such question is raised by the parties x x x

Apply the law to the facts​: When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that
the regulation is being enforced.

For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity,
immediately after the execution of
the action complained of; that the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a
valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.

In the instant case, petitioner has complied with the requirement that the issue of the constitutionality of the subject HUDCC Resolution must be timely raised. The alleged injury
caused to petitioner as a result of the implementation of the Resolution is continuous in nature in that petitioner is continuously obliged to pay for the electricity cost of the
streetlights. For every occasion that petitioner is directed to comply, a new cause of action to question its validity accrues in favor of petitioner.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, although the issue of constitutionality was raised at the earliest possible time, the case has already become moot and academic.
In Re: Cunanan,​ Resolution, March 18, 1954, J. JUDICIARY; Judgments, DIOKNO, J.:

Parties​: In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Nature of Action​: Resolution

Legal Arguments​: Congress passed RA 972, or the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952: “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been
expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission.

Issues​: Is R.A. No. 972 is constitutional?

Conclusion​: Yes. As to Section 1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down as the the law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation, and it was an encroachment of
judicial functions.

For lack of unanimity in votes, the part 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution

As to Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946
to 1955 Bar examinations. Section 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.
It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

Legal basis​: Under the judicial system of the Constitution, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility.

Exception to the rule​: Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. (The Court didn’t say)

Apply the law to the facts​: The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates; The law is an encroachment on the Court’s
primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and the pretended classification is
arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, R.A. No. 972 is partly unconstitutional

CSC v. Javier,​ G.R. No. 173264, February 22, 2008, K1. CSC; Security of Tenure, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Parties​: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

NITA P. JAVIER, respondent.

Nature of Action​: Petition for Review on Certiorari (R45)

Legal Arguments​: Nita Javier was first employed as a Private Secretary at the GSIS on a confidential status, she was then promoted to Tabulating Equipment Operator with a
permanent status, throughout her career. Years later, shy of her 64th birthday she was appointed as Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees. In 2001, Nita opted for early
retirement. In 2002 – GSIS President Garcia, with approval of the BOT reappointed Nita as Corporate Secretary classifying her position as “confidential in nature and tenure of
office is at the pleasure of the Board”.

But, petitioner invalidated the reappointment on the ground that the position is a permanent, career position and not primarily confidential. CSC alleges that Nita’s reappointment
on confidential status was meant to illegally extend her service and circumvent the laws on compulsory retirement.

Under RA 8291, the compulsory retirement age is 65 years old, however ‘a person who has reached the age compulsory retirement may still be appointed in a confidential position.
GSIS and Nita Javier insist that the position of Corporate Secretary is one of primarily confidential nature.

The CA ruled that the position of Corporate Secretary is a position of primarily confidential nature Petitioner CSC filed for reconsideration but this was denied, hence
present petition

Issues​: Should the position of corporate secretary in a GOCC, currently classified by the CSC as belonging to the permanent, career service, be classified as primarily confidential
and belonging to the non-career service?

Conclusion​: Yes. The position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS is clearly confidential, as it is in close proximity and intimacy with the appointing power.

Legal basis​: Under the Administrative Code, Sec. 9. the Non-Career Service shall include:
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);

Exception to the rule​: Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
The rule is that offices in government, except those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute.
Apply the law to the facts​: In the absence of law, the courts may determine the proper classification of a position in government, applying jurisprudence.

According to Jurisprudence, a position is primarily confidential; (1) when the President has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and (2) in absence of such
declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists “close intimacy” between the appointee and the appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters. The position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS is clearly in close proximity
and intimacy with the appointing power, as it calls for the highest degree of confidence between the appointer and appointee.

A strict reading of the law reveals that primarily confidential positions fall under the non-career service. It is also clear that, unlike career positions, primarily confidential and other
non-career positions do not have security of tenure. The tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter's pleasure.
However, the confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.

The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various GOCCs. The officers likely assumed their positions on permanent
career status, expecting protection for their tenure and appointments, but are now re-classified as primarily confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since the
statutes themselves do not classify the position of corporate secretary as permanent and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will not be classified as
confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final determination as to which positions in government are primarily
confidential or otherwise.

In light of this case, the Court's view is that the greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the Constitution that "public office is a public trust," and that there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No
proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property right.

Repeat the conclusion​: Therefore, Javier’s reappointment was upheld, and the position of Corporate Secretary was held to be primarily confidential in nature.
COMELEC v. Tagle​, G.R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60 February 17, 2003, K2. COMELEC; Prosecution of Election Offense,

Parties​: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner.

HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE; Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, Respondent.

Nature of Action​: Special civil action for certiorari and mandamus

Legal Arguments​: Florentino Bautista ran for the position of Mayor in Kawit, Cavite. He filed a complaint against the incumbent Mayor Poblete and others supported by
affidavits of 44 witnesses attesting to vote- buying activities. The case was handled by a prosecutor of the COMELEC’s law department. A separate complaint was filed by
Rodelas and Macapagal with the provincial prosecutor against the witnesses (vote-selling).

The COMELEC en banc declared the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to institute criminal actions against the witnesses as null and void. COMELEC cited RA 6646
otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal prosecution persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against
those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling.
Thus, the Law Department of COMELEC filed a motion to dismiss the case against the witnesses. This was denied by respondent Judge Tagle.

According to Tagle, for the witnesses to be exempt, it is necessary that they already performed the overt act of voluntarily giving information or testifying in any official
investigation or proceeding for the offense to which such information or testimony was given. It was thus premature to exempt the respondents from criminal prosecution, since
they have not yet testified.

Issues​: Are the witnesses are exempt from criminal prosecution?

Conclusion​: Yes. The witnesses are exempt from criminal execution.

Legal basis​: Under the Constitution, it must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.

The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be
liable as principals:

Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or
proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing
herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.

Exception to the rule​: “Except as may otherwise be provided by law.” The Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are given continuing authority, as deputies of the
COMELEC, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the
COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it
believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC

Apply the law to the facts​: In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor.
Where certain voters have already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying in a pending case, it cannot be denied that they had already given
information in the vote-buying case.

What the Prosecutor did was to sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the "vote-buyers" and put in serious peril the integrity of the COMELEC, which filed the said
case for vote-buying. If the Prosecutor had listened to the command of prudence and good faith, he should have brought the matter to the attention of the COMELEC.

A free, orderly, honest , peaceful, and credible election is indispensable in a democratic society, as without it democracy would not flourish and would be a sham.
One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party
whose vote was bought.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, the witnesses are exempt from criminal execution.
Republic v. Sereno​, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018, Impeachment, TIJAM, J:

Parties​: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner,

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, Respondent.

Nature of Action​: Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Quo Warranto (Rule 66)

Legal Arguments​: The Republic, represented by Solicitor General Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent
Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom. Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP
College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal counsel for the Republic in several agencies from 1994 until 2009. Despite 20 years of employment, records
show that only 11 out of 25 of SALNs were filed.

When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant, the JBC required applicants to submit all previous SALNs, stating that, “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Respondent accepted several nominations, and submitted requirements in support thereof.
Despite having submitted only three SALNs, the Report regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates shows that she was annotated with “COMPLETE
REQUIREMENTS”. Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III in 2012. Five years later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Gadon with the House
Committee of Justice, stating that Respondent failed to make a truthful SALN statements.

Case for the Petitioner:

The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment, and that the one-year bar rule does not apply
against the State. It also argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The petition alleges that the failure of Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC
disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of SALNs, Respondent has not proven her integrity, which is a
requirement under the Constitution. Thus, Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice.

Case for the Respondent:

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted from office by impeachment under the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence.
Alternatively, she argues the petition is time-barred, as it should be filed within one year from cause of ouster, and not from discovery of the disqualification.
It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not receive compensation are not required to file a SALN. To require otherwise is to
expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution.

Issues​: Can the Court can assume jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer?

Conclusion​: Yes. The Quo Warranto petition is granted, despite Respondent being an impeachable officer.

Legal basis​: Art XI, Sec. 2. The… Members of the Supreme Court… may be removed from office on impeachment for… All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Exception to the rule​: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or elected impeachable official may be removed from office. ​L o L ?

Apply the law to the facts​: Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question
the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition
against an impeachable officer (see Estrada v. Desierto and Estrada v. Macapagal- Arroyo).

Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision uses the permissive
term ​“may”​ which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned, on the basis of citizenship or membership in the Bar, for example. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment
and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified
and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office through impeachment.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, The Quo Warranto petition was granted, despite Respondent being an impeachable officer.
Santiago v. COMELEC​, G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997, M. Amendments and Revisions, DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Parties​: DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, PADILLA, and ONGPIN, petitioners,

COMELEC, DELFIN, SPS. PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

Nature of Action​: Special civil action for prohibition

Legal Arguments​: In 1996, Atty. Delfin filed COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative under RA 6735.
Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC issued an Order directing Delfin to cause publication of the petition. Senator Roco, moved to dismiss on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law. No such law has been passed.
(2) R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
(4) Only Congress, not the COMELEC is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.

Private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose
amendments to the constitution.

Issues​: Is R.A. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

Conclusion​: No, insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, RA 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.

Legal basis​: Art. XVII, Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein… The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of exercise of this right.

Exception to the rule​: The future law which would provide for amendments of the Constitution.

Apply the law to the facts​: First. Section 2 of RA 6735 does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution.The initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to amend. The people are not accorded
the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."

Second. It is true that Section 3 of RA 6735 defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution, but unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved
or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case
of initiative on the Constitution.

Third. No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for
a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Repeat the conclusion​: Thus, RA 6735 does not relate to amendments of the Constitution