My overall view of Heidegger is that he is into wholeness, unity and fluidity, but cannot preach

(sell) them directly, as nobody would buy them, so he engages in bait-and-switch: he talks stuff
that would draw people in, like Dasein, world, care, etc., and after he has lassoed them, he will
turn to sell wholeness, unity and fluidity, but the plot (a Communist plot) fails and nobody cares
about them. Nobody even notices that he wants to sell them. It is a cry in the wild.
The way he talks is: he first mentions something that common people can relate to, things that
are stable and on which people can stand in their daily life. This is often borrowed from
Aristotle, who loads up on stability, and Heidegger quotes him and explains him in such
direction (“What becomes present shows itself to Aristotle's thinking as that which stands in a
permanence having come to a stand, or lies present having been brought to its place”; quoting
Aristotle; "But all the aforementioned appear as different from whatever has not composed itself
by φύσις into a stand and a stability"; on the word “ousia”: “This coining [of ousia] consists in
the fact that Aristotle thoughtfully draws out of the content of the word a crucial element and
then holds on to it firmly and clearly”).
After mentioning stability, Heidegger then deconstructs/destroys it with fluidity (a Hegelian
theme). He liberally uses the Kantian duality of appearance (Erscheinung, phenomenon) and
reality (noumenon), with all that we know and experience falling on the side of the former (the
beings, to Heidegger), and the latter (being, to Heidegger) getting deprived of all such.
Essentially, being is a total blank deprived of all the features, qualities and attributes that we
know and experience in our daily lives.
If that is not sufficient, Heidegger then bends himself backward to make his ultimate (being)
very hard to relate to in a human way, so that anthropomorphism is discarded as much as
humanly possible. Thus Aristotle has been invoked in vain.
This last step is carried out by Heidegger by reducing what happens to a vacillating, hesitant
refusal, a vacillating self-concealment, a vacillating self-refusal in which being shows itself and
withdraws at the same time. Here the serene Aristotelian self-showing of the beings with their
names already inherently wrapped up has been thoroughly rejected. The present view of being of
Heidegger is thoroughly non-anthropomorphic. It is an austere, abstract view of what happens
(being) very distant from the natural attitude.
<<Heidegger's "Being" is a dynamic, temporal unfolding of beings>> Richard Capobianco.
<<Being is the unitary, temporal, dynamic unfolding process that is not "a being" and that is
"independent" of the human being; yet being is "related" to the human being (and to all beings,
"everything"), but not as "a being" to another being in the realm of beings.>> RC.

RC’s serene unfolding of being into/as the beings is not possible in the non-Aristotelian side of
Heidegger.
<<In the beginning of its history, Being opens itself out as emerging (physis) and unconcealment
(aletheia). From there it reaches the formulation of presence and permanence in the sense of
enduring (ousia). Metaphysics proper begins with this. What presence appears in presencing?
What becomes present shows itself to Aristotle's thinking as that which stands in a permanence
having come to a stand, or lies present having been brought to its place. The permanent lying-
present which has come forward to unconcealment is in each case this and that, a tode ti.
Aristotle understands what is permanent and lying present as something somehow at rest. Rest
turns out to be a quality of presence. But rest is an eminent way of being moved. Motion
completes itself in rest. [Im Anfang seiner Geschichte lichtet sich Sein als Aufgang (φύσις) und
Entbergung (άλήθεια). Von dort her gelangt es in das Gepräge von Anwesenheit und
Beständigkeit im Sinne des Verweilens (ούσία). Damit beginnt die eigentliche Metaphysik.
Welches Anwesende erscheint im Anwesen? Dem Denken des Aristoteles zeigt sich das
Anwesende als Jenes, was, zum Stand gekommen, in einer Beständigkeit steht oder, in seine
Lage gebracht, vorliegt. Das in die Unverborgenheit hervorgekommene Beständige und
Vorliegende ist jeweilen dieses und jeweilen jenes, ein tode τι. Aristoteles begreift das
Beständige und Vorliegende als ein irgendwie Ruhendes. Die Ruhe erweist sich als ein Charakter
der Anwesenheit. Ruhe aber ist eine ausgezeichnete Weise der Bewegtheit. In der Ruhe hat sich
die Bewegung vollendet.]>> End of Philosophy, 4, GA 6.2 403.
<<The word ούσία was not originally a philosophical "term" any more than was the word
κατηγορία, which we have already explained. The word ούσία was first coined as a technical
"term" by Aristotle. This coining consists in the fact that Aristotle thoughtfully draws out of the
content of the word a crucial element and then holds on to it firmly and clearly. [Das Wort ούσία
ist ursprünglich kein philosophischer »Ausdruck«, so wenig wie das schon erläuterte Wort
κατηγορία; das Wort ούσία ist erst durch Aristoteles zum »Terminus« geprägt. Diese Prägung
besteht darin, daß Aristoteles ein Entscheidendes aus dem Gehalt des Wortes herausdenkt und
eindeutig festhält.]>> Pathmarks, 199, GA 9 260.
<<"But all the aforementioned appear as different from whatever has not composed itself by
φύσις into a stand and a stability." (191 b 11-13). Συνεστώτα is here used for övta (cf. 193 a 36,
τοϊς φυσει συνισταμένοίς). From this we infer what "being" meant for the Greeks. They address
beings as the "stable" [das "Ständige]. "The stable" means two things. On the one hand, it means
whatever, of and by itself, stands on its own, that which stands "there"; and at the same time "the
stable" means the enduring, the lasting. We would certainly not be thinking like the Greeks if we
were to conceive of the stable as what "stands over against" in the sense of the objective.
Something "standing over against" [Gegenstand] is the "translation" of the word "object." But
beings can be experienced as objects only where human beings have become subjects, those who
experience their fundamental relation to beings as the objectification - understood as mastery - of
what is encountered. For the Greeks, human beings are never subjects, and therefore non-human
beings can never have the character of objects (things that stand-over-against). Φύσις is what is
responsible for the fact that the stable has a unique kind of standing-on-its-own.[»Alles dies
Genannte aber zeigt sich als ein Solches, das sich heraushebt gegenüber dem, was nicht von der
φύσις her zusammen sich in einen Stand und Bestand gestellt hat.« (192 b 12—15). Συνεστώτα
wird hier gebraucht für övta (vgl. 193 a 36 τοϊς φυσει συνισταμένοίς); wir entnehmen daraus,
was für die Griechen »Sein« besagt. Sie sprechen das Seiende als das »Ständige« an; das
»Ständige« meint ein Zweifaches: einmal das In-sich-von-sich-her-Stand-habende, »da«-
stehende; und zugleich das Ständige im Sinne des Währenden, Dauernden. Ganz ungriechisch
dächten wir, wollten wir das Ständige als das Gegenständige fassen. Gegenstand ist die
»Übersetzung« von Objekt; als Objekt kann das Seiende erst dort erfahren werden, wo der
Mensch zum Subjekt geworden ist, das in der Vergegenständlichung des Begegnenden als der
Meisterung desselben das Grundverhältnis zum Seienden erfährt. Für die Griechen ist der
Mensch niemals Subjekt, und deshalb kann das nichtmenschliche Seiende auch nie den
Charakter des Objekts (Gegenstandes) haben. Φύσις ist das, was ein eigengeartetes Insichstehen
von Ständigem verschuldet].>> Pathmarks, 188-189, GA 9 246.
tbc