Piss GOKULDAS SANSKRIT SERIES NO. 36 TARKABHASA REaAGa kitima Edited with Translation, Notes and an Introduction in English by S. R. IYER with a foreword by PANDIT GAURINATH SASTRY ( BxVice-Chancellor, Varanaseya Sanskrit University and President, Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad, Calcutta ) CHAUKHAMBHA ORIENTALIA A House of Oriental and Antiquarian Books VARANASI DELHIwate “TNpEERE Hee TERE 38 So Saaherstta Ts AW eS: WL. AR. Seay ( afiet argarg, Rovht ve srmera afc ) afteanttttarearteer EAR TTTTT BAI BASU sreafier qd ge seit 3 wares qa }fenter facetqaaT: maT rSTT (1) stain (INTRODUCTION ) (1) aretst at raat sarees areata: aT | Sfaca qaafacat ara waTAa? TET TT AAT UL Translation—This ( work ) Tarkabhasi—an exposition of reasoning—is brought forth by me for the sake of such beginners who do not want to take pains and to exert, but desire to enter into (i.e. learn ) the Nydya system with a little hearing (i.e. learning from the teacher ). ( With this in view ) the subject matter has been condensed (as much as possible ) retaining all the important arguments (for proper under- standing ). Notes—The word ave here and in similar contexts means a beginner who has the necessary background, cf. arerat ga arara fig’ aveine: ( T. S. ). Fara = logic or reasoning; aad Prafwelsd: 8afa eae =that by which the desired meaning is brought out clearly. ash eqamagen: weed aftaed aftafafs aéara. The arguments or reasonings on which the science of logic is based are expounded here. #¥q or condensation can be effected in two ways, (1) by omitting verbal elaboration and (2) by leaving out some ( items ) from the subject matter. By the two words dfca and graftea, the author impliesthat he haso mitted only verbal elaboration and not anything important from the subject matter. The latter would mean that only particular portions of the subject have been explained, thus detracting its usefulness as an elementary text for be ‘ers. 1. A read Gffgea tbough Ch. B, reads only dfigua. 2. G reads fgqeaitg thoub Ch. B, has ai printed here.TARKABHASA ( eeuret) It is customary with Sanskrit writers to indicate the scope and purpose of their work before beginning the subject proper. This usually consists of four parts collectively called erqara- “gee. (1) fers =the subject matter or scope of the book; (2) natet =the purpose; (3) wfasifiqethe proper person for whom the book is intended; and ( 4) relation. Here by the word agarat the subject matter, by ait sor the pur- Pose, and by are the proper person for its study, have been indicated. The relation, which in almost all such cases is '—that of the treated and the treatise—is implied in the word sera. This last one is Necessary so that the author should not stray away from the subject proper by digressing upon side issues, thus detracting attention from the main point, After introducing the reader to the. scope and aim of his work, the author directly enters into the subject by quoting the first sutra of Gautama in his »qreqa, which is the foundation stone for the Nydya philosophy. _ (2) ‘serra -sa-xiera-spisra-gerea-fararr aa - aa = Frrita-are-aer- farcua- Bearer wat-aris-Prmeeararat ae sents” fs amen ET) reat: | saTofentenraratat seaman ated | Translation-—“waqa****-aa:”” is the first. among the Nyaya Sutras of Gautama. Its meaning is that by a correct and true understanding of the sixteen categories of substances beginning with sare one gets liberated from this world of birth and death. 1. sar = Means of instruments of valid knowledge. 2. nq = Objects of valid knowledge or cognition, 3. daa = Doubt. 4. sritsrt = Purpose or motive. 5. werer= Example. 6. faaqrer = Established conclusion. 7, waaa=Members of syllogism. 8. a= Reductio ad absurdum. 9. fasta = Decisive knowledge. 10. aq = Discussion ( to arrive at the truth ).dane: 5 11. seq = Argument ( both constructive and destructive ) or disputation, 12. faavet=Mere destructive argument or wrangling, 13. qeavara = Fallacies in reasoning or fallacious reasons. 14. |B =Quibbling or specious argument. 15, anf = Unavailing or futile objection. 16, frageuta = Vulnerable point (clincher ). Notes—Gautama (also called Aksapada ) is traditionally believed to be the founder of the Nydya system of thought. It would perhaps be more correct to say that he was the first to codify the principles of that system in what are called NySya Sitras. Sitra here means a short pithy saying with the minimum words for expressing a proposition or statement, modelled on the Kalpa Satras and Panini’s Sitras on Grammar. ‘A popular definition of sitra widely accepted is as follows : weTeTaahs alvafratgea | erdaaaad ot ai qafagt fag Assitra should have the minimum words and should not give room for doubts. It should be meaningful and capable of covering all aspects of the point mentioned by it. It should not contradict any previous or succeeding sitra and should be blameless in all ways. ‘The author, following Gautama, begins to explain these sixteen categories with the minimum discussion and argu- ments. The usual way of arriving at a conclusion is by putting a question in the form of a doubt or objection which is called ‘qaae,-the opponent’s viewpoint—and then stating the accepted conclusion in the form of an answer, called faavea. [3] a a sardtat acanri= aera, aTagaft araaat semana heart a PeaT | ARTE ATAATT— ‘Pafaenses were IGF, Sea, Merei, Tart Sf atta aeaaghiay caferta gt ATT! AORTA RTH: | eT AY: ARTA ATTA MTT qaraa aafa frare: vdet | at ATT TATTSTAT aera eet 1, A has Tam wege 2. A&B have Wawa insterd of WH.TARKABHASA ( a¥arat) ‘Translatian—avayra or correct understanding of these cate- Sories beginning with warm cannot be had unless their 3qQu or enumeration, @™™ of definition, and qite or analysis are done. This has been said by the Bhasyakara, commentator on the Nyaya Sutras, ( Vatsyayana ):—“The procedure in this Sastra is threefold viz. enumeration, definition and analysis.” Enumeration is the mere statement of the categories by name and this has been done here in the sitra quoted above. Definition means the pointing out of their distinctive qualities or properties; e.g. that of a bull is that it is an animal with ate =dewlap ) etc., as its distinctive characteristic. Analysis consists in the examination as to whether the defini- tion fits in with the thing defined. The first having been already done, the other two, definition and analysis, have to be done now for a correct understanding of sm and other cate- gories. Notes—Enumeration also includes subdivision ( ferata ) which is only a statement of the classes into which a thing could be divided. This is usually done after a thing has been defined, as it is necessary that all the subdivided classes should have the Bm or characteristic of the main thing; e.g. maim is first defined as the instrument of valid knowledge. Then only arises the desire to know how many such instruments are there and hence follows the division or classification of yam into four kinds; then the definition of each kind and their subdivisions. @ym has been translated as definition for want of a better word. The definition of oem itself is ranma waif; j.c. a specific characteristic which enables the thing defined to be differentiated from other things as in the example given above. This happens when the sym is free from the following three defects usually associated with it. (1) afaeatft=over- applicability; i.e. the proposed wai is applicable to things other than the one defined ( ewtaradag ), e.g. ifthe ego of bulls is stated as safer (=the quality of having horns ), it is appli- cable to horned animals other than bulls and so goes beyond the wey or thing to be defined. (2) eemfa=partial appli- cability ( wqadegR ati ); i.e. the Be covers only a portion of the wy; c.g. if efyeea (the quality of being brown coloured) is stated as the Sqorffor bulls it is applicable only to. browndarn: 7 coloured bulls and not to bulls of other colours. ( 3) wehra= total inapplicability ( eeqari wang); ic. the w_u is not applicable at all to the ewa; e.g. if qewweer (the feature of having only one hoof ) is taken as the ym of bulls, it is nob applicable to the bull species as they are all double-hoofed. Hence the ea of a bull which is devoid of all the three defects is areatfqaea (having dewlap etc ). The purpose of having such a strict equ is mainly differents ation and in some cases proper designation. ( sargfiredagrat at wanem sats); e.g. ‘The quality of having smell’ aaqqeq is Stated as the sqm of earth (gedt) and it serves as a valid reason for differentiating earthy things from non-earthy things; for smell is the specific quality of the element earth and does not abide in anything other than earth. What helps in differ- entiation also helps in specific designation. The examination of a sya to find out that it is devoid of all these defects and that it thus serves the purpose for which it is proposed, constitutes the third and most important process in Nyaya. Hence its impact on the other systems fof thought like Mimathsé, Vedanta, etc. All other systems adopt this method of analysis.in the elaboration of their topics. (2) srerrarrfir [4] cerfi sara gees crreeg Tree ETS | TAT HTTT SHUT | TT TAT eee, ATRL TIT Ay TATA: aT aq mot alg cer Fea ae | BUTT HeAePTATT | way | Tia Gea, Treafrerd: | ger foe Te: foes BAT I Translation—So the een of wa, the category mentioned first in the sfitra, is being stated. sar is the instrument or means of valid ‘knowledge or right cognition ( saree). Here (the word ) sist is the seq (object to be defined) and sarezor is the eq. (Here the opponent puts in a query ). If saror is the erm of valid knowledge, its result has to be stated, for as arule a etm is always accompanied by a result. ( Answer) True. The result is valid knowledge itself, i.e. the thing accom-8 TARKABHASA ( aura ) plished by the instrument, just as the result of the axe, the instrument for cutting, is the cutting or breaking up itself. Next the two words in the qu, qarand ®zo1, are being explained. (5) 1 ga: sar, Fear: HRT TTT | SEAT | TeTaIgaa: wat aad eft aaaratat daafesdtaatarrat fra: agaa efa gata: | agaat ara egitanfafed ary i Translation—What then is sat whose instrument is qarm? wat means valid experience, i.e. an apprehension which accords with the true character of the object or thing apprehended. By the use of the word qard (valid or real ), cognitions such as doubt ( daa), misapprehension ( faqaa ), and hypothetical apprehensions leading to reductio ad absurdum (ae) are avoided as all these are erroneous or faulty experiences. By using the word #gwa (in the definition of mat) remembrance (eafar) is excluded. [ After this some printed editions have another sentence grafaad giv eafa:--Remembrance is cogni- tion based upon what was experienced previously]. agua here means all cognitions other than remembrance, Notes—After defining wa as aaratgwa the author examines it to show that it is devoid of the defects mentioned above. If we do not qualify wqwa by the-adjective ward, ice. ifwe say wyaa: sat, the sgn will be applicable to doubt etc, which are not wa. Therefore the flaw of overapplicability saftrearf& will creep in. To avoid this the word qard is used by which doubt etc. are excluded from weq as they are not valid (amd ). Similarly the word wgwa is used to exclude weft or remembrance from the scope of the definition. Lastly to make the definition more explicit the word agua itself is explained so as to include all knowledge other than wafer. Next, the second word star in the definition of gat is being explained :— [6] fe ge ory? araaad word | afrafad areas araTRTTy | HSS TTT: | Translation—What does eam mean (in the definition of wa) ? It means the most efficient cause. That which is mostwan: 9 instrumental ( in bringing:about the'final effect )~is qrasan and hence sqor means the most efficient cause ( = instrument ). Notes—The definition of am in the text is only a repetition of Panini’s Sitra, 1-4-42. Another definition usually adopted is “qaraol S1zo eZorA’—that which is the most effective in pro- ducing the effect out of the various causes is sqm. The author alludes to another definition of sem later on when he defines sergqrasya, vide notes under para 24. [7] ag are areofafs gaia: 1 ata a aa fe at arenfafa | eat wea araiy qearat fradtsrranfrget aq BOTY aa gaa fes Teer | aay kere aaa arene’: qaarat fare, cars aret Frere: larger g fraa: Torseta, ferries: weet seats BIT Sera T RTE | ansraenfagtrad- greet 9 rea |) aeenfafracrariad araay | Translation—(1n the above explanation ) ana and #Igo1 are only synonyms and it is not known what a gratis. This is being explained. That which invariably precedes an effect and is unconditionally necessary for it, is the cause of that effect; e.g. the threads, loom etc. are the causes of the cloth. When a cloth is being made, a donkey ( the weaver’s own ) may be preserit there accidentally and so it exists before the effect ( the cloth ). [ Therefore the donkey also may be consi- dered a cause for the cloth ]. But its presence is not invariable (firm). [So it is nota cause]. Again, the colour of the thread is invariably precedent to the cloth. [So let that also be a cause of the cloth}. But it is not an unconditional necessity ( etaeaunfae ). It is conditioned by the fact that the colour of the threads is a cause for the colour of the cloth, and if it is said to be a cause for the cloth as well, this would lead to unnecessary assumptions. Thus causality (#remea) is defined as invariable and unconditional antecedence to the effect; and effectness (@iqeq) as invariable and unconditional conse- quence of the cause. Notes—From the above definition of a cause it is clear that a cause should satisfy three conditions. (1) It must precede the10 TARKABHASA ( agar) effect ( qdarfe ). (2) Its precedence should be invariable (fire ) and not accidental as the weaver’s donkey etc. (3) It should be unconditioned ( swerufaa). This wavqaifis, when referring to a cause, means that which could not be ‘made out to be otherwise than indispensable’. This reduces. to the fact that the invariable sequence between cause and effect should be made out through the invariable concomitance ( warfit ) between these two directly as also between their nega- tions—in other words through a knowledge of sfeqq ( affirma- tive reasoning ) and wafate ( negative Teasoning ); e.g. A may invariably precede an effect B; still, on analysis, it may be found that A is not indispensable for producing B. If A were to be a cause it should be amenable to the affirmative concomi- tance (siraasaiff), “If B comes to effect A should be present”; as also to the negative concomitance (safeterafa), “Since A is not present B does notcometo effect". In the case of the donkey, whether it is there or not, the cloth is produced ( when all the other causes are present ). It is thus wequifaq and therefore not a cause, Later Naiyayikas have classified all Possible dispensable antecedents ( sequnfergi: ) under five heads. aa ge qd srr a tae) weaoaft gdart Sgt cegdarafigrag 0 sore oft wiafearraftars a taer get | afiftemafy axta fraatarasgdnfea: 0 at werner, qeenfisattay seg geec fgstents aftr aia g wag wha, geemagisa: | wa oo cenfe — endteraggsead C afgeree, 19-22 ) Dispensabitity can be judged in five ways :~ 1. aa"**---aat-Thread ( aeq ) is the material cause of cloth. This thread is known only with its delimiting adjunct ‘thread- ness’ (agtq). Therefore the latter is known as an invariable antecedent to cloth only through its counterpart the thread. Such a thing ( age ) cannot be considered indispensable for the effect—here the cloth,‘aa: 11 2. @reor-qea-Anything whose antecedence can be known only in relation to some other known cause, cannot be indis- pensable for that effect; e.g. the colour of the vhread is an antecedent only by virtue of its substratum and not on its own. Therefore it does not come within the causal apparatus and so becomes dispensable. 3. eq" sgrta:— When the antecedence of a thing is made out only after it is known to be the antecedent of some other effect, that cannot be taken as indispensable for the effect in question. Ether ( a1#ra ) is known as the inherent cause of sound; and if it were to be a cause of cloth its antecedence can be known only after the former antecedence to sound is understood. Therefore it becomes dispensable to cloth. 4. aag"""7ga:— When the antecedence of a thing can be made out only through the person behind the effect, that be- comes dispensable; e.g in making a cloth a weaver is necessery but the weaver’s father, though antecedent to the cloth in question, comes into the picture only through the weaver and not in his own right and is therefore discarded as dispensable. 5, afer anfaa:—All things extraneous to the bare minimum necessary for producing the effect must be considered dispen- sable; e.g. the donkey which has accidently strayed into the place of weaving (already explained in the text). This classification need not be taken too literally; but only as an explanation of the different methods of determining dispensability, A little thought will make it clear that the [difference between the first and second categories, as also bet- ween the third and.fourth, is too slender to deserve separate classification. Moreover the fifth class is so comprehensive that it includes all the other four, That is why the author of the above yerses concludes by saying that the last variety is the most important and necessary one. (8) aq aheere ‘eraiggaraqeatatia aren’ fafa, aageny | facafegat areal Saar cafe tereaaaTsHT Oa STL | Translation -Some one has defined cause as “that which has affirmative and negative concomitance with the effect.’ - Thisrn TARKABHASA (agarn ) is not proper because in that case the eternal (fra ) and all- Pervading (fir) substances, viz. time, space and ether, will turn out to be not causes-in-general, as their negation both in Tespect of time and space is not possible, Notes—szaq and safate have been explained earlier. Time ( e18 ), space ( fae) and ether ( erate ), which are eternal and all-pervading, are considered to be causesin-general ( vide Text para ) for all effects. Since they are eternal their negation in any form is not possible and wherefore they cannot have Negative concomitance (safetecada ) with the effect,‘and so this definition will not cover such cases. Therefore this definition is open to the defect of partial applicabiliry (aeafay). The objection is only to the definition of cause in this form and not to the fact that there should be invariable concomi- tance between cause and effect, This definition of cause is accepted by the Mimathsakas and some Buddhists, [9] asa arzoF fated, wraraaratfatatraiand | aa aernadt Bragerey aq erase | maT aera: Geet waar RTy | TEAg Ge: aaa aaa, 7 wafeg 1 Translation—Cause is of three kinds; inherent cause (amratfite ‘Siz ), non-inherent cause (aemaifirsrgor) and causes-in-general (Fafiesrear). OF these, inherent cause is that in which the effect inheres when produced, Cloth inheres in the threads and not in the shuttle etc. Therefore the former is the inherent cause of cloth ( and not shuttle etc. ), Notes—The inherent cause is usually the material out of which the effect is produced and corresponds to the aqrartarzor of the Vedantins, Itis also translated aS consequent cause and the other two as non-consequent cause and efficient cause. Here a new relation inherence (mara) has been intro- duced and so the author begins to explain the same before Proceeding to explain the other.causes. (0) ag agra ea quifemcarststt cer fret 1 ace ape ma we wae Tale Pee ae ware: Fale: waa | aargafasal: ara: araTa:, amaeg eat cavia: 13 Tronslation—-Q. Here cloth has relation with the shuttle etc. as it has with threads. Then how can you say: that cloth is produced as inherent in threads only and not in shuttle etc, ? Ans. It is true ( to some extent ), Relation is of two kinds, mere conjunction ( dat) and inherence (mara). The rela- tion between two inseparables is inherence, and that between any two others ( which are not so intimately connected ) is conjunction or contact, Here the word ‘inseparable’ ( wgafa) is used in a techni- cal sense which requires explanation. (11) @t gregafeat? 1 aahiea ceafarererafins- Rarafaga araqafadt | agary — “araargafeat at faanreat anda: wTRAAHATTA TATA AA nv war saaaraatadt, aoafiret, frarigaracat, orfrerent, fadafrazet Sf 1 aaqcaredt fe aareraaaarenfiat Garafageasfaaeaea: 1 faawrzaeareaaiinat garafaesa- SAMOA | TT TATA AFT Tz: | TAT TST AAT TT: | Pree g arrarcrarnitarfaaeay | Translation—Q.. What are ‘inseparables’ ( wgaftat ) ? Ans. When two things are so intimately connected such that one subsists on the other so long as the latter is not des- troyed, they are called inseparables. This has been said by others. “Those two things are to be known as inseparables if one of them subsists on the other so long as the latter is not destroyed.” Such inseparables are (1) the parts and the whole; (2) quality and substance; (3) motion and that which moves; (4) generality and the individual things ( having it ) and (5) speciality and the eternal substances. The whole etc. subsists in the parts etc. only till they are not destroyed, When the Parts begin to perish, the whole etc. does not subsist on the other, e.g. when the threads perish. the cloth is destroyed, Similarly when the substratum (i.e. the substance ) is dest- royed its quality also is lost. The state of being destroyed ( fierazaei ) means existence of all causes for destruction.14 TARKABHASA ( atarn ) Notes—The relation inherence ( gaara ) is accepted only in the case of the five ‘inseparables’ mentioned above. The whole ( erat ) rests on its parts and is regarded as lost only when the parts disintegrate as in the case of the cloth and its parts, the threads. In the case of the next two, quality and motion, they get lost when their substratum perishes. But when the quality or motion is destroyed (¢.g. when a white cloth is coloured blue or red, or when the motion of a ball is reversed) the substratum does not perish, but only inheres in the changed. quality or motion. Generality ( fa or am@aa) is a generic feature which inheres in all the individuals ( safts ) of a class; e.g. ata ( cowness ) is the generality inhering in all cows and it does not disappear till the cow perishes. In the fifth case of inszparables, speciality (fait) is accepted only in eternal substances and therefore the question of their destruction does not arise. The use of the word qqrm@# in the text above is not happy as it cannot be interpreted in its ordinary sense ‘in the same order’; but has to be construed ‘as applicable in each case” (as has been explained above °. Here, inherence ( amare ), generality ( @rateq) and speci- ality (faritq ) are categories adopted by the Nydya school from the Vaisesikas. Kanada, the founder of the Vaigesika system, has classified all substances into six categories. (1) q84=sub- stance, (2) q=quality, (3) s=motion (or action), (4) ararg= generality, (5) fata=speciality ( or differentia ) and (6) amqra= inherence, Later authors have added a seventh one to this list, WMAA= non-existence or negation. The first six are therefore spoken of as #iaqqiu: = existent or positive entities. The Naiya- yikas have included all these under the broad heading “saa” (sknowables), vide Kesava Misra’s own treatment under ‘alta in part LI; (@aaem). That the relation between the tableand its colour is not the same as that between the table and the book on it, can be easily understood. The former is called inherence ( aan ) and the latter is conjunction ( data). It would be easy to remember that in the above classification categories 2 to 5 (qo, eH, armta and f¥aq) inhere in the first category xem. Also when one substance is produced out of another ( eg. a cloth from cotton, a jar from clay, a table from wood etc, ) the Telation between the component parts ( cotton, clay ete. calledbara: 15 waqa) tothe finished products (the whole or wwafita) is not the same as the mere contact between the hand and a stick or the table and a book; and so here also the relation is inher- ence. These five cases, where inherence is accepted, are sum- marised in the above verse (of the text.) Generality or arava is also called snfér and is an important category for the logicians. When wesee different menor different beasts, our experience, however diverse it may be in other res- pects, shows acertain degree of uniformity which takesthe form “this is a man’ or ‘this is a beast’ (ste Agra:, wed qm). This unifor- mity in our experiencecan be explained only by assuming a gene- ric feature common to all men or to all beasts. This generic feature is wqtata (=manness) and ‘aqira (= beastness) which is common to all men and all beasts respectively, however different they may be in other respects. Thus ngvara and qe are uni- form generic characteristics of men and beasts, i.c. amarat wre: or @taretq. This generality is raised to the status of a category (ani) as it will be easier to explain many factors, according to the principle of economy in thought and words ( wrearara ). Briefly this is how the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems recognise generality asa distinct category. This is classed as high ( qt) and lower (agg). aatis the highest generality as it inheres in all the first three categories, while qsuea, gma, weita etc. are lower when compared to @qf. Similarly, geaita, weem etc. are lower genoralities when compared to Reet and aw, but greater (at) when compared to wera, Tae, atta, GIA, etc. as these latter inhere only ina smaller number of things when compa- ted to the former. This arma serves a double purpose; firstly to unify through universals on the basis of observed uniformities, as in the case of titer ( cowness ) which gives an impression of all the indivi- dual heads under the term cow; and secondly to differentiate wherever experience requires it; e.g. vita in particular cases can also denote differentiation from all things other than cows ( aadagitq ). The first process of generalisation has led to several generalities being recognised, while the second of differentiation has resulted in postulating a self discrimina- tory feature called firta (speciality or particularity ) being postulated asa differentia for everlasting substances ( farq-16 TARKABHASA ( aaa ) xenfir). Composite substances (waafta:) like a jar ora cloth can be distinguished from one another by means of their component parts. Earth, water, fire and air are producible Substances (semqeanfin) and their component parts ultima- tely reduce to their lowest components, the atoms ( 8] or WAIY ) of cach of these four. The ultimate atoms of these four and the other five substances, etm (ether ), 1s ( time ), fam ( space ), anergy (soul ), and waa (mind) constitute the everlasting substances and a unique firit@ is ascribed to each ofthese, Ofall the Indian schools of philosophy it is only the NyAya-Vaisesika that accepts this fata as a special feature. In fact the term @afits for the school of Sure is itself based on this hypothesis of fire. Since the atoms of the four producible substances are alike in qm, @af and suf, there is no criterion for distinguishing an earth atom from a water atom etc. In order to account for their differentiation a fata or specia- lity is attributed to each atom. Since atoms are countless and eternal, fire's also are innumerable and eternal, and their relation to the everlasting substances (as stated above dis inherence. They are accepted as sclf-differentiated as well as selfdifferentiating as otherwise there would be endless regress- ion ( ataeur ). It may be shown that these three categories, ward, fre and aaarq have been postulated to explain in their own way the unity and diversity in the first three categories (mea, gor and wai ) with reference to the principle of economy ( erwa ). Even among the logicians there is difference of opinion as to whether all the eternal substances like ether, space etc. should have each this fawia. Each jiva with its mind has its distinct experiences and other characteristics which could form its differentia from other jivas. But liberated jivas ( Wer: ) cannot have such differentia unless a faitq is ascribed to each, as all such jivas are considered to be alike in all respects. Regarding wire (ether) some logicians of the older schoo! contend that a faata should be ascribed to it as the delimiting determinant of its causality to sound ( weqaanfasroaraes ), while others say it is not neccessary. Similarly ste and firs are to be differentiated by farts if they are to be distinct categories. But if they are classed under Iswara ( qeArm of the logicians ), as‘qaarn: 7 Raghunatha Siromani and his followers of weqeaia do, this acceptance of firat@ is not neccessary as a separate’ category, as Iwara can be differentiated from all the rest by “His eternal omniscience etc., without the aid of any man-made It would be useful to have a brief idea of the views of certain important Indian Schools of thought on this concept of wife as compared to that of the Nyaya School. The gram- marians, besides using the term wife to denote a class attribute as in the Nyaya sense, use it for denoting caste, lineage and adherence to particular Vedic branches. This latter usage follows from their rules for derivation of terms denoting a particular class ( cf. wqeqiftare under af ). wif according to them, is not only a generic attribute, but is so essential to any substance, that they call it stoma (=lifegiver). This idea is well summed up by Bhartrhari when he says ‘afg sit: swear att, h, MenPraraangait:-ic., ‘a cow neither becomes a cow nor a non-cow merely because of its physical nature; it is a cow because of its relation to cowness.” The grammarians do not accept this relation as qaar@ nor call it a separate category. The Bhatta School of Mimimsakas accept wifa asan eternal and perceptible category, and though it is present everywhere it is manifested only through a tafe. But the relation binding anfe to the safes is not amare. They call this relation arqrea which according to them means identity-cum-difference; #q- afgeqzaa: or identity compatible with difference. In a state- ment like ‘this is a cow’ ( st¢ af: ) ‘this’ denotes the particular safe and ‘cow’ denotes the aif cowness. Thus in this states ment a aft is equated to a sats; but the question cannot be absolute, as in that case ‘this’ and ‘cow’ would become syno- nyms which they are not. Therefore they argue that on the strength of the preceptual experience the relation atarea should be accepted in such cases though, ordinarily difference is opposed to identity; for after all compatibility or otherwise of two things is determined by experience. Also, unlike the Naiyayikas who ascribe ararea or mf to the first three cate~ gories only, the Bhattas ascribe the highest ofa viz qe to ‘ararq also besides to the other three. 2 Bnei oT cura gamers ae18 TARKABHASA ( agar ) The Advaitins, who generally follow the Bhatfas in such matters, accept the Nydya theory of anf to their profit and show that their highest snff, ae, is the one grand ultimate reality called Brahman and that all the lower ones like ata, ‘weg etc., are only appearances superimposed on this grand ae. The Prabhakara school of Mimimsakas accept fia only in perceptible things and not otherwise; i.e. while wea, Gea, ‘Hgsaea etc. are accepted as wifa’s, greater generalities like UI, Fea, Tea etc. are not accepted as such. They however accept @AaTg as the relation between two inseparable things, ‘but consider it eternal only when the related objects are both eternal and not otherwise. They dismiss the relation ar@rrt as an impossible jugglery of words. ‘The Buddhist and Jain philosophers do not accept WInT*a, ‘mata and fade as separate categories and even in their refuta- tion of the-views of other systems there is nothing by way of constructive criticism. Itis necessary in this connection to know the principles which determine which of the attributes should be treated as afa’s and which otherwise. This has been summarised by Udayanacharya, one of the greatest logicians of India who lived in the early part of the 11th century, as follows: — wawtraqeqered agdsuaaftafer | ° eqefreaaedt = onfrarapeine: n ( farroreett ) (1) erage = unity of the object, e.g. the sky isa single all- pervading category and therefore ar#rera cannot be a mf. Similarly rea and fara. ( 2) eqmeqeaera= Identity of the objects though the words may be different; eg. aga and ‘ageaea cannot both be snfa’s asazand #q%, the safte’s denoted by these attributes, are only synonyms for the same object. (3) @az. When two attributes are such that while they exclude each other in some places. they exist together at another place, the defect is called eat or ated; e.g. qata exists in the five qa’s geil, az, Ana, ag and arerM, and ade exists ia the first four 4's, and also in w7a, Thus these two attributes corexist in the first four aqa’s but exclude each other In erere and #aq, This defect therefore prevents both qgeq and ageqaam: 19 being accepted as onf’s. (4) eraaftuft= Lack of finality, or endless regression, e.g. a sift cannot have another amf%, for in that case, there will be no finality for, each time we add one more afa, it will require another one over it. (5) ere = Violation of the distinctive feature of the object, e.g, Rte’ cannot have a afi, fagieea, since by hypothesis they are self- differentiating and cannot have another generic attribute to distinguish them. ( 6) Want of proper relation is aawurg, If ‘saraea is accepted as a afer we shall have to say that it rests on its substratum erara through the relation gaara which is impossible. Similarly qaataer also cannot be a af. From the above it is clear why af canexist only in the first three categories qeq, quand #H. This raises another question. What is the position then of such common features as ‘arereree, faretmea etc. 2 Such of thosz attributes which cannot be classed as anfat’s due to any of the preventives (aig%) mentioned above are called ayifa’s. Even among aqnfa's some logicians make a classification as qava and wee auifa's. eaealaifir's are those where the attributes can be explained by other means without reference to their substrata, eg. gata is explained as fieareta-a=being the substratum of actions; eTETea as wage ameaftsraataggesthe determinant factor in the inherent cause of sound. Morcover the relation subsisting between them and their substrata is not a direct one as @aart oraatq. They are said to be qesqqiasag or indirectly connected, eeedtarfy’s are those attributes which do not need another definitive expression for their understanding and which are connected to their substrata by a direct relation. Oaly those attributes which are connected with their substrata by means of gaara and which do not come under the Preventive conditions men- tioned above, become aifa’s; e.g. ate, wztaetc. All other attributes where the relation, though direct, is not ‘aaa (e.g. waerdarg ) are simply called sasaranfy’s, e.g. farts object; fawaat ( objectness ) is its characteristic; and fawqana (= being objectness ) is an wa@vatqrfy and its link to fraaan is self-link or Weqavara—i.c. the related thing itself constitutes its relation. Similarly sftrafmara (= being correlativeness ) is another wawétafe. It would be advantageous to understand the20 TARKABHASA ( agarat ) subtle differences among wifat’s and surfa’s at an early stage to understand the laboured expressions of later Naiyayikas. Though almost all Naiyayikas use the word aTATET as a synonym for anf, that term really includes aufa’s also. The division of avaq into Wand sqe relates to only wfa’s and not to sqifa’s. In fact, the aararil of Sivadiya divides ara into aiff and aqfe and the aifa’s into qu, agg and qaqa. Ordinarily it is only the anfa and evavdtafa that occur in our perceptual experience and hence the greater importance paid to them. [12] arquerserraaraafadt | aa aaltemrarrerrara: | agafazera | seqies + amare: | agafeseararard | afe gat cerfrdarafases | arfr veeqaifana: 1 araeaatearare- ela es | aaa aeqaaaT: Fe: | ATE Ta Tee AA anfrercony 1g qaife | ser cavaeare: | ot afernst shir weet TO | HEM CATTETA: | Translation—( In the present example ) the threads and the cloth are the component parts ( aaa ) and the whole thing (waafira) respectively. So their relation is inherence, they being inseparables. The relation between the cloth and the shuttle is not inherence, because these are not inseparables. The shuttle does not exist in the substratum of cloth, nor the cloth in the shuttle. Hence their relation is conjunction ( gat ) only. Thus it is in the threads that the cloth inheres and therefore threads are the inherent cause of the cloth and not the shuttle etc. The cloth is the inherent cause of its colour and other qualities (as they inhere in the cloth ). Similarly the lump of clay is the inherent cause for the pot, and the pov itself for its colour etc. Here the opponent ( qaafea) questions the validity of the last statement that the pot is the inherent cause of its colour etc. [13] ag ada seredt arat ada aguTectadist | area eT TTT, aetacarrad, weaTTT- rat arfet | Mateatararg | at at ararfeareet gerea: earcrerratary, | arcnfaatrcag anatase | TTT | a amatrteanrcartd ser fg xed Grier sew