A HISTORY OF THE FARMER-LABOR PARTY OF MINNESOTA A thesia |! Submitted to the Graduate Faculty ; of the University of Minnesota by Arthur Naftalin { in Partial Fulfiliment of the Requirements : for the Degree of- i Doctor of Philosophy i February 1948 |Worm mNower oP 12 Sy ACKNOWLEDGMENT In the preparation of this dissertation, I enjoyed the friendly assistance of a great number of persons-- Farner-Laborites, Republicans, Democrats, "professiona: and "amateur" politicians, teachers, labor leaders, gevernnent officials, and’nexspapermen-- all of when, in a variety of different ways, provided insight and infor- mation that helped shape the study, The list of those to whom T am indebted 1s much too long to detail here; @ simple thanks and acknowledgment must unfortunately suffi However, a special word of thanks should go to ssor EWM. Kirkpatrick, who, as my major adviser, onstant assistance and encouragement. Profe. gave Also, I am indebted to the Social Science Research Counell for a pre-doctoral field fellowship which pro- vided an opportunity for direct observation of political operations in Minnesota. ASU6309| seston Access etesinbioee i ae Chapter EL VEEL x ccd XII XIET CONTENTS Page The Tradition and Pattern of Protest... .. 1 Farner-Labor Criging in the Nonpartisan League 30 From Independent to Thinl Party Politice .. , 64 The Communista Attempt to Take Over»... . 9d ‘Prosperity' Impedes the Party's Progress . , loo The Party Elects A Governor»... ... 157 The First Years in Office »,.....,.. 189 Attacking the Depression With Legislation . . 217 1934; Year of Turmoll » 2... ..... . 238 The Farty's Program Suffers Another Defeat . , 276: The Party Loses Its Leader, .... 4.4. . 304 Communists Infiltrate the Party . , The Party Is Routed oe 4 353 Bibliography . oe. eee eeeBi Salesian sg SUBS ADA cate ic aetarpiceas tina CHAPTER ONE ‘THE TRADITICN AND PATTERN OF PROTEST The roots of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor movement lie deep in the history of the state. Since the 1860s, Minnesota has been a main center of the persistent tra- @ition of agrarian protest, each upsurge of which found some expression in the politice of the state. It 49 possible to trace the genesis of the Farmer- Labor movement in a straight line back to the earliest days of political activity in the state, from the emer~ gence in the late Sixties of the National Grange, to the Anti-Monopoly and Greenback Parties of the Seven- ties, to the issuance a decade later of the Farners’ Alliance, to the People's Party and Populism of the Nineties, and, finally, to the Nonpartisan League, out of which sprang in Minnesota the Famer-Labor Party. The tradition of protest of which the Farner-Labor movement was the most recent expression was nurtured first by the economic oppression and social privation + that fell upon the farmers of the Midwest, The sett- lers of the Sixties came to Minnesota's frontier land with buoyant spirit, They were sustained by the dream of fashioning a glamorous new life out of the wilder- ness, but, as the harsh realities of frontier life con~ tinued, their mood changed. "Disappointment and dis- illusion settled upon a land that before had smiled in the spring sunshine. The harvest was not fulfillingi 1 ’ i | the oxpectations of the seedtime."* The ferment bubbled up from a deep social and econ- omic frustration. "It is no holiday Job," wrote Parring- ton, "to subdue an untamed land and wrest abundance and comfort froma virgin soil. Only for the young who can project their hopes into the future is it endurable; for the middleaged and the old it is 4 heartbreaking task. The history of the western frontier is a long drab atory of hardship and privation and thwarted hopes, of men and women broken by the endless toil, the windows of their dreams shuttered by poverty and the doors to an abundant Life closed and barred by narrow opportunity." The social unrest collided with economic depression and the flames of political protest were ignited. The market value of produce dropped, and the debtor farmers of the west were further strained, They mortgaged their farms and watched their earnings lip away in the payment of interest on the mortgages. In the growing gloom of economic depression, the farmer became pre~occupied with the immediate symptoms of the economic order that he was finding increasingly oppres~ sive. He was enraged at "a conplex middleman organization that gouged him at every turn.” He fulminated against the elevator companies who fixed "monopoly tolls, swindled the farmer in their grain-gradings, and combined to force down the market price at harvest time and raise it after the 1. Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American 1 3:260, Parrington's section on "The Middle Borde: } Rises" is an excellent summary of the social and econ- omic conditions that gave rise to the ferment.crop came under control."* On the one hand his profits were controlled by the monopolies, and on the other hand, when he bought his tools or groceries, "ne was at the mercy of a non-competitive market, protected by patent rights and tariffs, to which were added extortionate transportation and middleman charges,"? In short, the farmer in Minnesota, as elsewhere in , the new West,was the victim of an expanding and violent economy in which powerful industrial interests to the © East could and were exerting a predominant influence, Given the tradition of Jacksonian democracy that he transported with him, it wae inevitable that he would seck to redress his grievances by organizing politically. It Was inevitable that he would come to identify his lot with that of his neighbors and that a definite class- consciousness would emerge. As the turn of the century approached, the rigo of (the organized labor movement in Minnesota added a new dimension to the protest. The industrial revolution and the nationalization of industry had fastened the factory system on the American community, and the worker became an urban counterpart of the oppressed farmer. The fac- tory system had developed at a time when free land stall existed in ample quantities! The factor of free land | had speeded the development of the factory system by 5. Tees: 32eat 4, Foran analysis of the land factor and the rise of the organized labor movement see Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828 to 1928, pp. 22-24,ae constantly draining off surplus labor, thus keeping wages high. With wages for skilled workmen high an@ with the rapidly expanding West supplying an ever-growing market for manufactures goods, there was a strong impetus to the introduction of time-saving machinery and the installa- tion of techniques leading to specialization of labor. “ Thus, with the coming of the factory system, came the ‘development of a group-conscious laboring class. But, while the Westward movement was speeding the rise of the factory system, at the same time it temporarily at least slowed the rise of organized labor, because as the fron~ tier moved Westward 1t drained off from the older sec~ tions the discontented farmer and laborer, who, instead of fighting for a better life at home, moved West to Degin life anew,” By 1900, the end of free land and the closing down * of the frontier had brought to the laboring man a reali- zation of his permanent dependence upon the industrial system and an awareness of the need to organize if he were to cbtain a just wage for his work. To him the downswing in the business cycle meant unemployment or at best decreased wages. He was at the mercy of his employ~ er, just as the farmer was at the mercy of those who con- trolled the price of the farmer's produce. The working man, exposed constantly to the comforts and conveniences of the urban center, found them dented unless he had the money with which to buy them. When This is part of the famous thesis advanced by Fred- erick Jackson Turner who saw in the Western free landa a social "safety-valve." See The Frontier in Ameri History. nenPe apa wages fell or he lost his Job he was unable to provide minimum nocessitics, lot alone enjoy the newar gadgets and conveniences that could make the life of his family easier and more comfortable. He, like the farmer, was frustrated by social and economic conditions over which he scomingly had little control. soon he, too, was ful- minating against his real or fanoted oppressora. It was inevitable, once he had accepted his class role in so- ciety, that he, too, would seek to redress his gricvances by political action, And it was inevitable that the far- mer and the laborer, both in quest of fundamental changes v in the social and economic order, would pericdically attempt a fusion of their forces. In the dcoade following its admission to the Union in 1658, Minnesota feverishly developed ite virgin re- sources, quite oblivious to political and economic trends. In the older parts of the nation, the first portents of the protest were becoming visible. The workingnen of the East sought to develop a national political movement in the form of the National Labor Union, but the annual con- ventions of this organization in 1864, 1866, and 1867 involved no direct participation from the state, although ' they were concerned with matters of land reform, currency, taxation, and anti-mcnopoly which were shortly to pre- occupy the minds of Minnesota farners.5 It was in 1868 that the first definite expression of ; The history of the National Labor Union is reviewed by John B. Andrews in Histor: of Labour in the United States (John R. Commons, ed.), Vol. Il, Chap. 2.-6- the protest occurred in Minnesota with formation of the first loeal of the Patrons of Husbandry, the North Star Varange.? Its declared objectives were to promote far- mers’ education, to dignify his profession, to collect and diffuse crops and market statistics, to establish depots for sxle of farm preduce in the cities, to ex- change seeds and stock, to test new farm implements, and to protect the farmers against fraud in general and against the machinatdona of corporntions in particular.® Presumably these objectives were to be pursued cut~ side of politics, and the Grange attempted to prohibit political discussicns at its meetings, Under the pressure of the times, however, the rule as relaxed in Minnesota and the Grange became the main forum for the farmer's ex- Vpression of his political views, In fact, it was at meet~ inge of the Grange that organizers for the Ant4-Moncpoly Party, which was to cnerge in 1873, were able to bring their message te the farmers. The Minnesota Grange succeeded 1m influencing some scattered items of legislation during its early years. Tn 1871, the estate legislature established mximum fares and rites and set up the office of Railroad Commissioner, and in 1874, 1t created a Board of Railroad Commissioners mith poner to establish a schedule of mates.” This early regu latory legislation proved ineffective, but it did esta- blish the doctrine that industries “clothed with public 7. The standara work on the Grange movement 4s Solon J. Buck, The Granger Movenent. 8. canmiry taken from W.%, Folvell, History of Minnesots 3:38. Ibias, 3:40.-i- interest" were subject to governnent control.*° this principle, the interpretation of which has been one of the main currents in American politics and jurisprudence since that time, has been of fundamental importance in every phase of the history of political protest. While the Grange was oxclusively = farmers’ organtea- tion, its leaders frequently recognized the political proximity of the workers. There were appeals to the workers of the East to "join hands with the farmers of the West"! and many Granges reported receiving assistance from the workers in the emaller towns.2? The mutuality of interest between the Grenge and labor was further reflect- ved in the founding of the Order of Sovereigns of Industry, which, while emphasizing primarily better working condi- tions, had 2 pattern of organization and a program similar to those of the Grange.?? The Grange flourished in the carly Seventies, but the panic of 1873 led to the bankruptcy of the railroads and A consequent repeal of Granger logislation. It created, moreover, serious financial difficulties in the management of Grange enterprises. In the wake of the panic, the Grange suffered eclipse as a political forces, although ita importance as 9 sceial and economic orgmnization continued for several decades, and it remains today a prominent farm organization. ¥, Illinois, 94 u.8, 113. 1. Quotation fron J.D. McCabe, in Fine, op. git., 9. 61. 13. Buck, op. oit., p. 307.Bu The second major manifestation of the tradition of protest in Minnesota was the emergence in 1873 of the v Minnesota Anti-Mcnopoly Party. This movement was a direct outgrowth of Grange activity. It swept over a vast sec- tion of the Midwest, scoring some important successes in a number of states.!* rn some, it held the balance of power in the legislature, and, ina few, was able, by fusion with the Democrats, actually to control the state assembly. Its leader in Minnesota was the dynamic and colorful Ignatius Donnelly, whose influence in state and national politics was to extend over several decades. He ntjwriter, speaker, and literary figure, and is today remombered as much for his writings as for his contribution in polities. He was one of those rare poli- tical figures whose colorful personality dominated the oan 1869, he had been elected to events around him, Congress as a Republican, but, in 1872, had bolted the Party after he failed of re-election in a bitter intra- party feud. He forthwith became an independent, and tock up the anti-monopolist cause in behalf of the farmers. Donnelly early and consistently agitated for a fusion of farm and labor forces, In the first issue of a weekly newepsper, the Anti-Vonopolist, which hs founded in st. Paul, he proclaimed there to be "no real antagonism be- tween the farmer and the mechanic," and later he wrote The minor party political movements of this period are covered by frederick Haynes, The History of Third farty Movements Singe the Civil’ var. See J.D. Hicks, "The Political Gareer of Ignatius Pomnetly, Misstestpps Valley Historical Review, ol. Copies of newspaper on file at Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul.-9- a pamphlet, “Facts for the Granges," inviting both far- mers and laborers to an Anti-Monopoly county convention.*? The short-lived Anti-Monopoly Party of Minnesota was bern in a state convention in Owatonna on September 2, 1873. With Donnelly dominating the proceedings, a plat- form was adopted expressing vigorous opposition to pro- tective tariffs, to monopolies of wood and cecal, to ox- travagant corporation salaries, and, as a clear indica- tion of the movement's concern with labor's welfare, it called for a reascnable limitation ef hours in shops and factories.2© The new party concluded its convention by asserting ite determination to support for public office only candidates who subscribed te the platform and by nominating a full ticket for the 1873 state election. The Minnesota Anti-Monopoly Party survived only one election. Its life was complicated from ite inception by to factors, (1) the emergence of the Liberal Repub- Lican movement of 1872, and (2) the appropriation of its symbols and program by both the Republican and Democra- tie Parties. The excesses of the Grant administration and the ferment of the tines had created a division within the Republican Party. The dissidents actavely sought an alliance in Minnesota with the Democrats 4nd the Anti- Monopolists. In the face of this threat, the Republican 17. Pamphlet on file at Minnesota Historien1 Soc ic ty. 18, Full account of Owatonm convention is given in American Annual Cyclopedia, 173. See pp. 510-512.=10- regulars nominated Cushman K. Davis for Governor. This was a devastating blow te the Anti-Monopolists, because Davis had establiehed 1 reputation as a "sound" progress- ive by presenting a vigorous argument against milroad abuses in a speech entitled "Mcdern Feudalism," which he had been giving in 811 sections of the state. In his day, vavis filled a role not unlike the one that Harold Stassen was to play when he first sought state office as 4 liberal Republican in 1938, some 65 years later. Davis, like Stassen, presented himself as an en- lightened Republican in tune with the needs of the times but opposed to radical excesses, The conservative Repub- licans in 1873 nominated Davis, not out of suppert fer his mild program of reform, but because they saw in his nomination their best hops for the maintenance of power. ; The nomination of Davis illustrates a phenomencn which, as we shall note, constitutes one phase in the recurring pattern of protest politics. Davis’ popularity, the leoseness of the coalition of protesting elements, and the appropriation of the Anti-~ Monopoly cause by the Republican Party combined to give the Republicans a sweeping victory in the election of 1873, The Anti-Monopoly defeat brought an abrupt end to the protest movement in the state, and whatever vestigial strength remainod was absorbed in a fusion with the Liber- al Republicans. Labor's participation in the Anti-Monopoly Party, Vaespite Donnelly's appeals, was not significant. In 1873, with only a handful of trade unions in existence, therewas no organized agency through which an effective appeal lle to the workers could be carried. For all practical pur- poses, the Anti-Monopoly Party was an exclusively agrarian matter. The Anti-Monopoly Party nad hardly passed from the “ Winnesota political scene when Greenbackism energed as the new phase in the continuing tradition of protest. It “was Closely related in spirit and program to the Anti- Yonopoly Party, but its main emphasis as upon identify- ing the causes of the depression that folloved 1673 with the financial policies of the mational government. It demanded, as its contral objective, the repeal of the Resumption Act, making greenbacks legal tender for all debts. - The dominant personality in Minnesota again wes Ig- natdus Donnelly. He was temporary chairman of the Indlan~ apolis convention of 1€76 that culminated preliminary organizational activity which began on» national basis as early as 1874, The national Greenbsck Party nominated candidates for the Presidency in 1676, 1880, ané 1884, and in Minnesota the Party ran candidates for state office in 1877, 1878, and 1860, but in neither case did it de~ _ velop strength sufficient to constitute a threat to the major parties, In fact, despite Donnelly's prominence in the movement nationally, it caused only 4 minor ripple in Minnesota, This is clearly revealed in the state election results of the period: 1876 Vote for Presidency in Minnesota Bu es, Republican 72,955 Samuel J. Tilden, Democrat 48,787 Peter Cooper, Gréenbrek 2a12_ 1877 Vote for Governor in Minnesota Jorn 8. Pilisbury, Republican 57,072 William L. Banning, Democrat 39,147 William Meighen, Greenback 2,396 1879 Vote for Governor in Minneso Sonn Se YT Sburys RepubLiean 57, 524 Edmund Rico, Democrat 41,844 William Meighen, Greenback 4,264 1880 Vote for or Eygstdenay in urmnesots | James &. Garfield, Repi can «93,903 Winfield 8. Hancock, Democrat 53,315 Janes B. ileaver, Greenback 5,267 While the Greenback Party was only a emall side eddy in the course of the state's protest movement, it was im- portant as a connecting link with the more vital and more powerful Farmers' Alliance whose activity later was to usher in the pericd of Populism. The decline and death of Greenbackism coincided with the economic recovery that appeared to be complete by 1879. Nationally it Lingored on and made what amount- ed to a token showing in the Presidential race of 1884. The Eighties brcught the first real flowering of effective political protest in Minnesota, for it was dur- ing this period that the Farmers' Alliance and the Knights 1 | of Labor emerged to challenge the conservative status quo. The Grange activities of the Seventies had introduced | Uinnesota farmers to the art of politics. It had given him a group consciousness and como understanding of the | nature of cooperation, Above all, it revealed to him the (political gins that awaited successful organization. By 1880, however, tho Grange, had abdicated leadership in this field, and the 4lliance now became its spiritual heir. By the end of 1881 there were 80 local Alliances1 and a state organization in Minnesota.?® Meanwhile, the Knights of Labor was finding a grow- ing response among the workers in the cities. As early a5 October of 1878 the first local assembly was organized, and by 1880 the movement had a small and promising base in several cities.“° at the same time, organization of work- ere wag proceeding rapidly along strictly economic lines among railroadmen, who were beginning to form their mumer= ous brotherhoods, and among craftsmen, who were developing local units of the American Federation of Labor,?! By 1884 at least 73 unions had been organized in Minn- esota, and, although many were short-lived, "the leaven of unionism had spread over a great portion of the state"22 and some 90 additional unions energed in the next five- year period, In this period of early development, the Knights of Labor became, in effect, the political arm of the labor movement. It joined in the programs of the Trades and Labor Assembly and scught to influence that body in political activity. Discussions at its meetings covered the full range of grievances current in that period, from land reform to the shorter working day, The Alliance and the Knights of Labor constituted a dual impact of fnr-resching effect upon the politics of Minnesota. More direct in its approach to politics than the Grange had been, the Alliance was soon urging 19. ‘Theodore C. Blegen, "The Parmora' Crusade in Minne~ sota," Minnesota Alumni Weekly, 32:511-12 (Nay 20, 1931}. The chief historical account of the Farmers’ Alliance is N.A, Dunning, Farmers’ Alliance History and Agrioultural Digest. 20 Hees So Engbore, MISE of Organized Labor in Minne~ Bota, 1850 to 1850, (M.A. Thesis, Uni f Minn.), p.368. 21, Ibid,, p.369. 22, Ibid.) p.5l.o14e the election of candidates pledged to its program, al- though maintaining the official policy of not endorsing parties. In 1884 so many friends of the Alliance were elected to the Minnesota legislature they came close to capturing the House. The legislature of 1865 reflected the influence of the Alliance and the Knights of Labor by adopting a series of laws which incorporated 2 number V of their demands, anong them the creation of the Rail- road and Warehouse Commisoion, establishment of a uniforn syatem of grading and weighing of grain, regulation of employment offices, and limiting hours for railroad workers.°? (The effectivences of the protest was thus increasing} it had arrived at the point where 1t was @ factor in Minnesota politics that could not be ignored by politicians aspiring to power. : In the period after 1879, the return of prosperity ; tended to diminish the intensity of the protest, but in 1886 a new economic crisis reinvigorated the protest spirit. By now organized labor was an established econ- omic institution in Minnesota and the Alliance was at the peak of its strength. During the summer of 1886, in ad- vance of the elections of that year, all the variegated elements of protest-- the Knights of Labor, the Alliance, the Grangers, the Anti-Mcnopolists, the Greenbackers-- were summoned to a national convention in Indianapolis,<* Thia meeting was the impetus for the formation in Febru- 23. John D. Hicks, The Po 24, andrews, op. cit, pe wi=15- ary of 18€7 of a new political party, which, although made up mostly of farmers, declared ‘tself in favor of uniting with labor and therefore assumed the name of the National Union Labor Party. Meanwhile, @ similar pattern of farm-labor unity was evolving in Minnesota, and out of it developed the first direct effort at the formation of a Farm and Labor Party in the state. Until 1886, the Alliance had cooperated ytith ene or the other of the two major parties, endcreing “individual candsdates who professed support for the Alli- ance program. Now labor was gaining strength and the ad- vantage of joint political effort became increasingly apparent, Thus, in September of 1886, the Minnesota Alli- ance and the Knights of Labor called a Joint convention in St, Faul.°? Represented, in addition to the sponsoring dedies, were the Grange and the Trades and Labor Assem- blies of Minneapolis and St. Paul. Once again, Ignatius Donnelly was the moving spirit, and the convention, while refraining from nominating for state office, selected a committee of 30 to gO before the older parties with a poli- tical platform which included demands of both farmers and wage-earners.°© the labor planks emphasized a bureau of labor statistics, protection for mine and factory workers, workmen's compensation, equal wages for men and women for like work, prohibition of child labor in mines, workshops, and factories, and recognition of incorporation of trade 33. Blegen, op. cit., p, Sil. + Ibid. oe-16- unions,?7 Both major parties responded by incorporating in | their platforms labor planks which were even stronger than labor anticipated. In the campaign of 1886, the Democrats and the Republicans competed for the Knights-Alliance support, but labor appeared to line up behind the Democrat- ic candidate for governor, A.A. Ames, who, as Mayor of Minneapolis, had supported the strike of switchmen earlier im the year. ye 1ost by only @ small margin to A. Re McGi11, the Republican camtidate. the growing effective- ness of labor's political activity was reflected in the election of some candidates with union endorsement to municipal offices and the state legislature .29 Encouraged by the events of 18, the Alliance and the Knights planned to continue their political coopera- tion. The Alliance scheduled its 1887 meeting for the same time that the Knights were to hold their national convention in Minneapolis. This resulted ina conference mesting at which mutual support was pledged, and the ground Was prepared for joint action in 1888. As the election of 1€88 approached, the farm and labor Tepresentatives met in St, Paul on August 22, and here wag founded the first political movement in the state ever to | bear the name of Farm and Labor Party.°° Again Donnelly appears as the deminant personality, and he is nominated to head the new party's ticket, The platform incorporated all 27. Engberg, op. cit., p. 69. 28. Ibid., p, 107 25) Tbia. 30, See Appleton's Annual Cyclo, edia and Register of Import, ant apesterre ee BE, 8,559, sseaenn“1te the protest demands of the day; it favored revision of the tariff, governmental control of telegraphs, further control of railroads, the Australian ballot, woman's suffrage, re- duction of railroad rates, factory inspection laws, eight~ hour work day, and a host of other farm-labor demands.) Despite an impressive and promising launching, the Farm and Labor Party of 1608 disintegrated almost immedi- ately after its formation, The volatile Donnelly, always an unpredictable factor in the protest ranks, withdrew from the gubernatorial nomination, and the entire ticket col- lapsed, In the election, William R. Merriam, the incumbent Republican governor, was reelected overwhelmingly, and the new party created scarcely a ripple. The sudden eelipse of the Farm and Labor Party once again isolated the protesting elements, The major parties, despite their promises in 1886 when the vigor. of the pro- test prodded them to include strong labor measures in-their platforms, now ignored labor's demanda, Labor was to remain without a political home until the emergence a few years later of the Populist Party, which was to gather in one movement the various elements of protest that had been de~ veloping during the preceding three decades, The Populist Party in Minnesota was born on July 16, 1890, at a nominating convention called by the State Farm= ers’ Alliance, to which were invited both farmers and work= ers. “It is a cry from the farthest retreats of a desolate country," the call said, "from the prairie farmer and from 31. Ibid. Appleton's gives platform in full.~18- the toller who looks cut tiom his factory window as from a 2 hopeless prison house. Fifty-five delegates claimed to represent labor organizations, although their credentials were under heavy suspicion, Some wi re charged with being paid agents of the Alliance's enemies and wore peremptorily expelied. > It was, however, almost entirely a farners! convention, and the leaders, in an effort to provide for \(more complete joint activity with labor in tho future, were careful to include many labor planks in the platform.“ The conventicn nominated a ticket for state offices with Sidney M. Owen, editor of The Minneapolis Farm Journal, as the candidate for governor. He was nominated as a “aark- horse” to break a deadlock resulting from a feud between RM. Wall, the Alliance president, and Ignatius Donnelly, both of whom eagerly sought the nomination,» Owen was a Democrat, and it was hoped that his nomination might lead to @ coalition with protesting Democrats that would push that party out of the political picture. The election, however, Was a three-way fight with the Republicans winning all but one state office. The vote for governor was William R. Merrian, Republican, 88,111; Thomas Wilson, Democrat, 85,84, and Cwen, 58,514, It 4s significant to note that, in ite first ontry in | Minnesota polities, the Populist Party (at this time fre- quently referred to as the Farmers’ Alliance Party) "drew its strength chiefly from the Republican Party, and prin- 32. Quoted in unpublished manuseript, "Phe Influence of the Labor Element in the Populist Party" by Maude A. Gernes, in Minnesota Historical Society, p.4. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Hicks, op. cit., p. 185.-19- cipally from the Scandinavian nationalities."*° As we will note, since the 1890's, and particularly during the period of the Farmer-Labor Party's ascendancy, the Scandinavian \ nationalities have played a predominant role in aime cota,) protest politics. While unsuccessful in electing its candidates to state office in 1890, tho Alliance did score significant victories in legislative contests, including the election of Donnelly to the State Senate, The Alliance-sponsored legislators, in fusion with the Democrats, were able, in fact, to organize 37 the future Looked both houses in the session of 1891. promising as the session opened under Donnelly's leadership but formidable obstacles frustrated the Alliance program. The farmer mombers were inexperienced, the old party machines were still effective, and Governor Merriam was opposed to the Alliance program. The session ended amid confusion and defeat for the Alliance farm and labor demands. 2 The success of the Alliance in Minnesota and in other states inspired once again efforts to form a nationwide in- dependent party with a farm-labor base. In May of 1891 after several abortive moves, a national convention, called by the remnants of the Knights of Labor but dominated by the Farmers’ Alliance, met in Cincinnati and founded the People’s Party. >? Again Mimesota was represented by a delegation headed by Donnelly, who became one of the national leaders 36. Frank R, Holmes, Minnesota in Three Gentuctes, 4:173. 37. The Senate included 20 Republicans, 15 Democrats, and 13 Alliancemen; the House, 47 Democrats, 38 Republicans @7 Alliancemen, See Holmes, ibid,, 4:177-8, 38. Ibid., 180-2. 39. Andrews, op. ott., 492-3,=20- in the new Populist Party. ‘The successes of 1890 held out great promise for the Minnesota Populiste in the election of 1892, but the differ- ont clements that made up the Party fell to quarreling ancng themselves, and the Farmers’ Alliance and labor groups were antagonized by the efforts of Donnelly and his People's Party contingent to dominate the proceedings in the convent’on of 1692.40 Donnelly, however, was nominated for governor, and hopes were high that the Populists would extend the giins of 1890, But the Republicans had learned well the reasons for the growing Populist strength, and they took skillful steps te check further depletion of their ranks. First, they appropriated the program and sygivs of the protesting Popu- lists, and, second, they recognized the aspirations of the Scandinavian people of the state fer political recognition, Accordingly, the Republictns nominsted Knute Nelson, 8 Re- publican Congressman from Western Minnesota, who was to be- come the firet in a long line of Minnesota governors of Scandinavian extraction. Nelson was not only Scandinavian, however; he also was in accord with the Alliance program. In fact, the Alliance itself had considered nominating Nelson for the governorship.“ Another obstacle in the path of the Populists in 1892 wis Donnelly's refusal to unite with the Democrats, He claimed fusion efforts had alvays ended in failure for the protestors. His cendidacy suffered further by the loss of part. of his heavy Irish Catholic following to the Democratic 40, Holmes, op. cit., 183, 41. Hicks, op. clt., p. 185.-21- candidate, Daniel Lawler, who, Donnelly charged, was nomi- nated for the purpose of aplitting this section of Domelly's support." the 1892 vote for governor was Neldon, 109,203 Lawler, 94,600, and Donnelly, 39,863. The rising crest of Populism appeared to be subsiding in Minnesota, The Populists did, however, elect one Congressman, and they did obtein the balance of power in the State Semte of 1893.43 In the legislative session of that year, the Fopu- ‘lists cooperated with the Republicans and achieved satis- faction on 4 number of issues, Laws were passed extending inspection of weighing and grading and increasing anti-trust regulation, Establishment of a atate olevater was voted, but this lew was never carried into effect. Donnelly through this period continued vigorous agitation against the truste | and the price-fixing practices of the coal and lumber in- dustries, Governor Nelson, while less extreme than Donnelly, also engrged in the anti-trust agitation. He called an anti-monopoly convention in Chicago in June of 1893 to demon- strate againat the Sherman Act, The Populiste, however, left Nelson's meeting, and, in rump session, endorsed Domnelly's “5 more extreme views. 4 The hard times of 1893 tumed the attention of Minne- sota Populists to national iesues in 1894, Their platform son placed primary emphasis on the silver question, and they Were confident that they would extend their gains in the 42, Ibid. 43, Haldor £, fcen, Parmers' Alliance official, was elected in the Seventh District by a plurality of 8 votes. In the Legislature of 1893, there were 13 Populiots in the Senate and seven in the House, Holmes, op.cit., 189. 44, Hicks, op,cit.,. 289,-22= state election. Cwen was nominated again for Governor, and “ne was decisively defeated by Nelson as the Republicans swept the entire strte ticket and all Congressional offices, Although b-dly beaten, Cwen ran shead of the Democratic candidate, George L, Becker, who was alleged te be under the 4nfluence of the railroads and consequently suffered a lose of support." the vote was Nelson, 147,943; Gwen, 87,690, and Becker, 53,854. The defeat of 1894 impressed upon the Populist leaders | the futility of refusing to merge with the Democrats. hen the Democrats nominated iilliam Jennings Bryan in 1896, the stage was set in Minnesota for a fusion of the Populist forces with the Dencersts and the Silver Republicens."© an agreoment ws made whereby the candidate for Governor would be a Silver Republican, the Secretary of State and Treasurer would be Democrats, and the Lieutenant Governor end Attorney General would be Populists.”” the fusion led to the nomina~ tion of John Lind, who, although defeated in the election of 1896, was te become tho first Governor of Minnesota ever elected as the result of the protest expression, In the election of 1896, David M. Clough, who had suc- ceeded to the Governorship when Knute Nelson was chosen by the legislature for the United States Senate, was reelected, but only by 2 slight plurality over Lind. The vote was Clough, 165,906; Lind, 162,254, Present-day political orators of the Democratic-Farmer- 45, Holmes, op.cit., p. 195. ‘6. Ipdd. yp. 205, 47, Tbid., p.208,23 Party like to claim John Lind as one of the early prophets of Minnesota's tradition of protest. His memory is now regularly invoked whenever the D-F-L gathers in convention, and his name is linked with that of John A. Johnson and Ploya B. c1son.*8 actually, Lind was a political moderate, even for his day. He wai not, for example, a consistent supporter of free coinage,“9 although he was usually on the progressive slde of political issues. Lind had retired fron politics in 1892, declining to yan for reelection to Congress, and it was only after much persuasion that he consented to run in 1896, He was at- tracted te the idea of fusion with the People's Party and the Democrats in part at least as the result of hig early friendship in Congress with William Jennings Bryan. His strongest political assets were his Swedish nationality and his: reputation for honesty. The voters of Minnesota could rally to him, despite his defection from the Republi- can Party in 1896, because they had confidence in his in- tegrity and were impressed by his sincerity of purpose.9? In 1898, John Lind was elected and became the first Democratic Governor in the history of the State. He was elected by a fusion of Democrats, Fopulists, and Silver Republicans. Lind received 131,980 votes to 111,796 for the Republican candidate, William H. Eustis. The election cf Lind is sometimes regarded as a high point in the Populist movement in Minnesota. Actually, 48. At the convention which fused the Farm r-Labor and Dis ocratic Parties in 1944 several speakers made repen id references to the tradition of Lind, Johnson, and Olson 49. George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, p.62. 50. Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 83-108. Pe2h Lind's election cannot be laid to the protest ferver., In 1898 he polled 30,000 votes lesa than he did in 1896 and the total vote was 60,000 less than it had been two years pre- viously, The explanstion of Lind's triumph ie to be found, “not in the popularity of the protest issues, but rather in the local and immediate factors of intorml etrife within , the Republican Party and the inexperience of Eustia' mana- gera.>} The decline of Populism is reflected in the mkeup of the 1899 legislature, in which only eight Populiats were elected to the House and three to the Senate.”? Populism had run its course as the Nineteenth Century came to an end. Many of its leaders remained active politically and partaci- pated in the Nonpartisan League and the Farmer-Labor Party, but by 1900 it was no longer 2 movement that could threaten tho dcminance of the major parties. In 1900, Lind was defeated for reelection and the Re- publicans were restored to power, Samuel R. Van Sant with 152,905 votes defeated Lind, who received 150,651, by only a narrow margin, and thus began a period of conservatiem in Minnesota polities that was to continue until the rise of the Nonpartigan League in the period after 1916, During the pericd from 1860 to 1900, the parties of agrarian protest followed in Minnesota a pattern conmon to other Midwest states,—It mas 7 pattern of ups and downs, in which the protest parties were alternately strong and weak, 51. Holmes, op.cit., p. 237. 52. Ibid.,"p.?56.—-25- depending on how economic conditions grew worse or improved, As the protest movéd through the last half of tne Nineteenth Century, We Sriumphea periodically, St influenced some state legislation, Te Recompls shea @ portion of its ambitious pro- gram, but te never realized the kind of ogalitarian society envisioned by Peel apteaioe In the dynamics of protest politics wo note a recurring patterzin which the declino of a particular protest movement fleaves a6 its legacy a fundamental political realignment {within the major parties and the adaptation by them of new | symbots and programs. As protest movements come and go the objectives which give them their substance and effectiveness : are partially absorbed and assimilated by the major parties and eventually some, if not mich, of the protesters’ program 48 enacted into lam, Tt ts possible te outline the main phases in the dynan- jes of the pattern of political protest: (1) A group in society experience economic or social frustration and become aware of the need to redress their erievances. (2) Spokesmen, frequently without prior political ex- perience and moved by genuine concern for the welfare of the group, emerge to press for political action. Expressions of Giscontent are spontaneous and scattered, Finally, they merge into a pattem, and from it springs a crystallized pro- gram. Frequently the program is developed about a single idea, anti-monopoly, free coinage of silver, or government ownership, (3) The protest 1s carried to those who hold governmen'.--26- al power at the time in the naive faith that men of good- will in the government will undertake to legislate effect- ive remedies for the grievances. (4) Those in power react negatively. The suggested reo forms they regard 26 threatening to the status quo and, therefore, undesirable, They are unaware of the political potential underlying the protest, and they reset. coldly, frequently scorafully. (5) Tho protesters are shocked by the indifference of the men in government, many of whom they feel they have helped elect. With indignation and vehemence they turn to fashioning a political crganization of thelr own. A coalt- tion of 211 disaffected groups is sought. Invariably the coalition is made up of diverse elements which immediately constitute the basis for continuous internal disharmony. Skillful organizers emerge, many loyal te the cause, others opportunistic and interested primarily in utilizing the fer~ ment for their personal aggrandizement or satisfaction. (6) A new political movement is born. Coalition with the decond of the two major parties is suggested and is re- jected, because both major parties are held responsible for the existing state of affairs, Both are regarded as defend- ers cf the status quc and as dominated by similar economic interests. (7) The new movement sponsors candidates for political office and scoms scme successes, usually mincr ones be- cause the organization has not had sufficient time to cap!- talize the full potential of the protest. (8) The major parties now react. Depending on the sa--27- tent of the actual or potential strength of the protest, they seek to “buy off" the uprising by embracing it as their very : own, This they scek to accomplish by including as much of the protest program in their own platform as they think they must in order to discourage a sufficient number of the fu- | sionists to abandon the protest coalition so as to impair its strength, If platform planks are insufficient, the major parties take the next step, hegrudgingly perhaps but always spurred on by loyalty to its own self-interest, by nominating A candidate or candidates whose appen1 will reach into the protest ranks. (9) By appropriating the symbols and program, and even the candidates, of the protest, the mJor parties succeed in checking the uprising. The protest now subsides. Some of its grievances are at least partially ameliorated. economic conditions, meanwhile, have perhaps improved, and the ferment levels off. (10) The protest program, however, 1s not wholly accept+ od, despite the pledges of the mjor parties. The protest Planks are compromised or ignored altogether, and remnants of the protest keep alive the ferment by charging betrayal at | the hands of the major parties, The cycle begins again when new conditions create a new set of grievances cr revive the old ones. The grievances are usually sharpened by economic depression, which, however, need not be the only cause for protest, Tho period after the second World war is usually regerded as a period of prosperi- ty, but a threatening state of internationel affairs creates a state of psychological insecurity which can unleash the-28- spirit of protest as effectively as can conditions of econ- omic insecurity. It is inevitable that this pattern should recur in the dynamics of American protest politics. This is so by ros- on of our two-party system which is the inescapable! product of our constitutional framework which provides for eingle- nemder district clections to all our legislative bodies, 53 state and national, The existence of single-menber dis- } ble a coalition of the main forces opposed ‘to the incumbent party. It has meant that politi- cal parties must obtain a majority of votes in any given district, if they are to be successful. To do this its Appenl mast be accepted by 51 per cent of the voters and the voters comprising such majority will have many diverse and even conflicting intereste. Therefore, the successful party will incorpomte in its appeal as much aa it must of the protest party's program in order to obtain the needed 51 per cent. The stronger the protest, the more of the pro~ test demands the major party will incorporate in ite plat~ form. The inevitable result is tmt the major parties will embrace as much of the protest program as they regard as neceseary in order to obtain 2 majority of votes. At the same time, complementary shift 18 occuring within the protest ranks. They, too, must obtain a majority, if they are to achieve power. This means that, in the ine terests of a broader appeal, they must avoid or eliminate the more extreme phases of their program. The closer the 53, E.F. Schattschneider in Party Government mikes a clear amlysis of the meaning Cf finglc-m.mber districts. See Chap.I7, pp, 65-98,-29- protest party comes to realizing victory, the more 4t wala ! be impelled te moderate its program. The end result is that | competing parties, appealing alaye for a mJjority out of ! the same electorate, will tend to become more and more Like one another, and this applies as much to a party of protest | as to an older established perty. Differences in program occur tn times of sccial change | when one group of political leaders sense a ferment and seok y to capitalize it, Momentarily the new political group will Pepresent a new idea or a new program, but eventually that new program Will either be assimilated by the older parties or it wall become moderated by the necesaity of adjusting itself to what 19 acceptable by a majority of the voters in any particular election district,CHAPTER TW FARMER-LABCR ORIGINS IN THE NONPARTISAN LEAGUE The first decade of the Twenticth Century found Minne- sota, like the rest of America, adjusting 1tself in a seem- ingly complacent manner to the changes and innovations wshich were produced by ' the industrial revolution, The wave of protest, upon which Populism had ridden to a crest in the late Nineties, had subsided, It was a conservative A =7The issue of free silver had all but disappeared and now 7) See eee ee ne ee litical @iscuesions usually centered abot the question era nom, a time of expansion in which prosperity and big business appeared as permanent features cf American life of imperialism and whether the policy of expansion which lay beneath the war with Spain should be encouraged.) Goo times had settled upon the people of the state, and the protest fervor was to lie quiescent, although not altogeth- “Ver dormant, until the next great upsurge when the Nonparts- gan League would capture the imaginations of many thousands of Minnesota famers and become the beginning point for the formation of the Farmer-Laber Party. While the voice of protest was momentarily silent, .the Anfluence of Populism and the pricr protest movements was = Still to be observed, Their influence could be noted in the ) Sontinuing attacke upon the railroads and also in the new = Suphasis which was placed upon reform in government sdminie tration snd upon measures to strengthen the democratic pro- 1. For a discussion of the social and economic setting of this period sse Theodore Christianson, Minnesota, The Sky-Tinted Waters, 11:263. See also Theodore CO. M7 "Entering the Twentieth Century," Minnesota Alumni Weekly, 33:203-04 (Nov.25,1933).7 031 cess. The administration of Governor Samuel R. Van Sant, whe took office on January 7, 1901, achieved its greatest prominence in its fight to prevent the merger of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific railroads,” It, at the same time, continued the emphasie upon tax reform started by Van Sant's predecessor, John Lind, and upon administrative reform which led te eetablishmont cf the Board of Control 4n 1901.7 The reform spirit alec produced in the 1901 leg islative seseicn Minnescta's first primary election law, which, although restricted to Minneapolis, was the firet step in what eventually became a statewide act.4 The "richman's panic" of 1903 scems to have hed litt: effect upon the course cf Minnesota politics,” snd cer- tainly did not produce a protest movement, although the election of John 4. Johnson as Governor in 1904 is some- times spoken of as a revival cf Populist feeling. Actually, | Johnsen, a Democrat, wae lected at a time when the cutlook | ws none too promising for the Democrats and his victory con be attributed in lange mensure to the bitter. fight be- - tween Robert ¢, Dunn and Loren $. Collins for the Republi- “ean nomination.© Jotnsen's election 18 worth special note tn connection with the background of the Parmer-Labor Party because he 16 reg-rded as 4 spiritual ancestor of the move- ment and, since the fusion of the Denccrats and Farmer- Laborites, he is frequently referred to ae an apcatie of Blegen, Abid., and Christianson, op. cit., 273-4, For'e review of Minnesota's primary system gco Willsam Watts Folwell, A History of Minnesota, IV:365-374, Christianson, op.ele-. bebe For accounts of the Dunn-Collins fight see Frank R. Holmes, Minnesota in © Centuries, 285-6; Folwel1, op.eit?, TIT 7375+ Ou Pun~32 protest. John A, Jchnscn did typify the ideals of progressive reform that held say during the period that preceded the rise of the Nonpartisan League and which nationlly were being so dramatically expressed by Theodore Roosevelt, bus hie was a spirit of reform not radical protest. In his in- | | | augral message tc the 1905 legislatures, he recommended the | nonpartisan election of all judges, adoption of incone and inheritance taxes, and more vigorous railroad regulation.” Later in his career, during which he was twice reelected,® Johnson inaugurated a state conservation program, he wag | Anstrumental in adoption of legislation establishing rail-~ read rates gt two cente por mile, and he holped adopt an Act giving citics power to own and opsrate their own public utilities.” That he was no radical was clearly shown when he vetced the tonnage tax on iron ore in 1909, which was being taken up as an issue for the first time,?? | Johnson's first election was due to the accidental | factors of intemal Republican Party strife, as already | noted, His two reelectiona can be explained in terms of | his personal popularity, certainly not in terme of popular } Acceptance of the Democratic Party, whose standard-bearer | he was, In fact, Johnson was reelected twice despite, not o~ i because of, his party identification, This 1s clearly re« vealed by the failure of the Democrats to capture any other Christianson, op.dit., 292. In 1906, Johnson carried all. but five counties, defeat- ing A.L. Cole, the Republican, 168,840 to 96,162. In 1908, Johnson defeated Jacab F, Jacobson by a plurality of 27,139. ; Blegen, gg.cit., 204, 10. Christianson, op.cit.,294, '33. state office or control of the etate legislature at any time during Jchnson's career.!+ his is of interest in a review of the background of the Farner-Labor Party because it has beon a recurring phenomenon in the political history of the state that not once hag a non-Republican Governer had the formal organized support of both houses of the ; legislature, John Lind before him and Winfield S$. Hammond after him both had to contend with legislatures controlled by opposition forces, just as the later Farmer-Laborites, Floyd B. Oleon and Flmer 4, Benson, never were supported by both houses 1n the sessions of 1931,.1933, 1935, and ags7.7? There was a striking similarity in the backgrounds and personalities of John A. Johnson and Floyd B. Olson, and many parallels in their careers account, in part at least, for the linking of the two men to the same tradition)? Both were native Minnesotans, Johnson boing the firat ever elected to the Governorshin. Both had Scandinavian ances- try with Christian and surnames that were distinet political assets in a state conscious of its predominant Scandinavian Population. Both ere born to poor and humble immigrant Parents and the childhood of both was mrked by poverty and the necessity at an early age of participating in the sup- port of their families, Both became respected and adored by great thousands of their fellow-citizens, and both were 11, Until the election of 1914, the Minnesota legislature was elected on a partisan basis. 12, See Arthur Naftalin, “The Failure of the Farner-Labor Party to Capture Control of the Minnesota Legislature," American Political Seience Review, 28:71-8 (Heb.1o44), 13, See Frank A."Day and Theodore i, Kneopen, Life of Jom, Johnson, and John S. McGrath and James J. DeImont, Floyd Bjornsterne Ciso!Fhe the acknowledged leaders in programs of social reform. Both met untimely deaths during their third terms as Gover- ner, both at a time when national prominence beckoned and there was speculation about their availability as nominees for the United States Presidency, And the deaths of both were occasions for widespresd mourning over the state, which events in themselves are something of political land- . (marke in the state's history because they mark the ends of “two eras, The name of Join A. Jonnscn had been presented in nomination for the Presidency at the Democratic national convention in 1908, but it went for a third time to William Jennings Bryan. It was generally believed that Johnson Ymould be the favored Democratic contender in 3912, but death ended his career on September 21, 1909. In the years after 1909 Minnesota began to stir out of ite complacency. The suecession of Adolph Eberhart to the Governership upon Johnson's death once agsin gave the Repub- licans full control of the state government. 4nd now the feeling against monopolies began to grow again and the far- ners of the Midwest were becoming exercised about the pro- tective tariff, There was forming an "inarticulate protest against the status quo."!5 Nationally this feeling was finding expression in the revolt within the Republican Party against the administration of Yill tam Howard Taft. The re- volt was led by Theodore Rocsevelt and its chief partici- pants Were Miduest Senators and Congressmen, among them Wisconsin's Robert M, LaFollette and Minnesota's Charles a 14, Day and Knappen, op. cite, p.259, 15] chFsstiansons og. Biss? Ps"=35- By 1912 the "inarticulate feeling" had become a “Lindt? oh. Sqajor revolt. A wave of ltberaliom seemed to sweep the State as the predominant political force began lining up behind Roosevelt and LaFollette amid cries of "tainted poli- “ties,” "Liquor ring,” "brewers! interests," "railroad lobby," “"eteel ring,” and “public utilities geng."26 In 1910, the Wirnesota Republican convention had split over the iesue with the "progressive" faction pledging itself to Roosevelt and the "regulars" to Taft.?” Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party { scored a cleancut victory in Minnescta,*® ena once again tho tradition of conservative Republican control was chal-/ lenged. The upsurge of progressivism was reflected in the 1913 legislative session which was controlled py the Progressives who elected their candidate speaker of the House. This i session approved workmen's compensation, mothers’ pensions, Submitted to the voters a constitutional amendment. providing the initiative, referendum, and recall (which later was de~ feated by the people?9), and, in the conviction that non- partisanship w2s 8 prerequisite to progressive reform, this Session adopted the no-party designation feature for the election of all county officers and all members of the legislature.” he wave of reform also prolueed the first Quoted from Arthur J. Larsen, "Winnesota on the Eve of the World War," Minnesota Alumni Weekly, 33:219-20, (Dec.2,1933). 17. Shristinnson, op.cit.,p.319. 18, Roosevelt received 125, 856 votes; Wilson, 106,426, and | Taft, 64,334, 19. The defeat of the anendmant waa regarded as due to the failure of many people to vote on it. It did receive a majority of those voting on it, but required a majority cf those voting at the polls. 20, Making the legislature non-partisan was an accident, See Christianson, op.cit., 325-6.~36- effort at administrative reorganization of State of the Federal Trade Commission, adoption joan Act and a series of statutes in or An account of the perhart see Jeremiah governmental reorganization under tae: 8. Young, “Administrative Reorgan- nin Minnesota,” American Political Science Re: BG (Mayj1915). 0 Se oe joint is elucidated by Robert 3. Balmer in Tho Eon Bolitical Background of the Nonpartisan Leamic «thesis, Universi: ty oF Minnesota, duly,1941). see edslly Chapter VIIL, pp.285-369, tenancy figures, for example, showed a percentage Y 14.5 in North Dakota and 21 in Minnesota, which (Were lover than in other states. Andrew A Brueé, Non- ‘Haptisan Leasue,p.1,-37- tween the farmer and the consumer stood 4 vast array of middlemen who graded, sorted, weighed, transported, and milled the grain, The farmers’ grievances may have been ex- aggerated, but the practices of unfair grading, improper Gockage, dishonest weighing, and exorbitant railway charges were certainly widespread and ample Justification for the 2a farmers' insistence upon correction. In their efforts to obtain a remedy, the farmers of Minnesota sought first a solution through economic organiza- tion,°° and in 1912 they founded the Equity Cooperative ex- change which was specifically aimed at eliminating the middlemen. Many of the men who had participated in the Popu- List movement had after 1900 turned their talents to the formation of farner-owned cooperative elevators, and by 1912 there were 800 such elevators operating in the spring-wheat area.°© the farmers! next sought to devise a system of co- operative selling and for this purpose a central exchange was needed. Thus, the Equity came into existence and immediately found itself in conflict with the powerful financial and milling interests which rigidly controlled the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, through which passed the Northwest's grain. An effort by the Equity to purchase a seat on the ex~ change was defeated? and there ensued a long and bitter 24, The farmers' grievances are discussed in detail by Bruce, ibid., Chaps.I,II,andlI1,pp.1-27; Herbert £. Gaston, The Nonpartissn League, Chap.Ii,pp. ; Charles Edward Rus- x sell, The Story of the Non} artisan League, Chaps.1-XxI, pp-1-202; Filliam Langer, The Nonpartisan League, and J.Edmund ‘Buttree, The Despollers. 25. Bahmer, Op.cit,, 25-6, 26. Ibta.,’ 292 27. Tbid-38- struggle to obtain legislative action that would compel the Chamber of Commerce to deal fairly with the farmers. As early ae 1903" and again in 190729 ami 1913 the stinnesota legislature investigated the practices of the Chamber of Commerce, but the investigations succeeded only in airing the grievances without providing positive remedies. In 1913, when the Equity was organized, the political atmosphere was charged with enthusiasm for LaFollette's "Wisconsin Idea," which embraced marketing reform along with the other progressive measures of the day, the initiative, referendum, recall, Presidential primary, direct election of United States Senators, and control of the railroads, Thus, the Equity and its leaders, to the extent they were political in their objectives, regarded themselves as part. of the insurgent Republican move ent, The Equity's attorney, James M, Manahan, was elected to Congress as a Progresaive Republican in 1912 with the assistance of the Equity's chicf leader, George S. Loftus, who served as President of the Minnesota Progressive Republican League. The names of Loftus and Manahan were inextricably bound up with the formation and expansion of the Equity, and it Was they who carried the message of cooperative action to the farmers of North Dakota. In fact, it was the Equity that | inspired the spirit of protest that was to be marshaled into \@ triumphant political organization by the Nonpartisan League agents, 28, Ibid., 286. 29, Teid., 291, Tbid., 309.-39- In the years before 1915, the farmers of North Dakots, had convinced themselves that the only solution to their problems of marketing was the establishment of a state- owned terminal elevator .>+ The repeated successes of ths Chamber of Commerce in thwarting the efforts cf the Equity in cbtaining fir treatment on the grain exchange eontinu- ally reinforced the farmers! determination to obtain a state-owned elevator, In 1913, the North Dakota legisla- ture had approved a general plan for such a project, and the farmers waited hopefully for specific implementation of the plan by the 1915 legislature. when the 1915 session convened, a large delegstion of farmers, organized by Loftus in the interests of the Equity program, descended on Bismarck to spply pressure that would ensure disposal of the elevator issue, Violent argument ensued between Loftus and the legislative leaders, ani during one passion- ate oxchange-- so, at least, some of the Equity leaders claimed-- one legislator told the farmers to “go home and ; Slop the hogs."32 Phe lobbying pressure of the Equity hae jae effect, and the elevator measure was defeated. Thus was struck the spark that ignited the whole State of North Dakota and flared up to become the Nonpartisan ‘League. The fashioning of the North Dakota Nonpartisan League was the handiwork of Arthur C, Townley, whose name became 31. Ibid., 363, 32. The ‘statement is probably spocryphal. Bahmer states that A casual observation was made by Treadwell Twich- ell, the legislator, that the time was date and that it Waa time to "go home and slop the hogs" and that no 1 offense was Intended. See 1bid.,408 fay-40- the symbol of hope for thousands of farmers and of hate for the defenders of the status quo who could see in the upris- ing nothing but demagogy and destructive radicaliam, Town- ley, then 35 years old, was born in a small vestern Minneso~ ta village, Browns Valley. He was graduated from the Alex- andria, Minn,, high school, in 1900, and, after teaching | school for four years, became a sort of agricultural advent urer in North Dakota. He established a large-scale flax ranch at Beach, N.D., and, in 1913, when his crops failed and he was left heavily in debt, he became an organizer for the Socialist Party. The North Dakota farmers responded to | his Socialist message without enthusiasm, howcver, "There was plenty of discontent in North Dakota," one historian wrote, "but 1t was not directed against capitalism as euch, but against such specific capitaliatic enterprises as mills, Packing plants, and the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce," >> When the Nerth Dakota legislature failed to establish the state elevator in 1915, Townley had a ready-made cause around which to organize, He set out in his Model T Ford Across the North Dakota prairies and scon he was enlisting hundreds of members in the Farmers’ Nonpartisan League at $2.50 each. Soon he had a corps of ormnizers Working on a commission basis. The membership fee was raised progressive- : jy until it reached 418 for a two-year period. In 15 months 4 1t had 40,000 members.” organizers scurried over the state in ret ted Ford automobiles, and Townley even took to flying from one speaking engagement to another in an airplane. 2° 33. Christianson, op.cat., IZ: 34. Gaston, op.cit., 87-8. 35. Bruce, opseit., 75, 67.~41- The League, in Townley's view, was not to be a politi- eal party but only an organization of dues-paying members "who Would support candidates of any party who pledged them- [selves to the League program, the min proposals of which Were, at that time, state-owned elevators, flour mills, packing houses and cold storage plants, state inspection of : grin, exemption of farm improvement from taxation, state Chai inauranoe, ond state rurei eredte banks. % By the spring of 1916 the League was ready for politi- eal action. Precinct caucuses were held throughout the state and delegntes were elected to legislative conventions, which, in turn, sent delegates to a etate convention. Here Plans were 1id to capture the Republican Party by entering carefully-selected candidates for state office in its pri- Mary. The League's appeal bad struck a deep and responsive chord. All ite candidates, except the candidate for state treasurer, were nominated in the prinary and subsequently elected in the 1916 general election. (The League's triumph WAS so complete, it even captured the state Republican com- nittee| Complete control of the state government, however, Was still not in the League's hands, because half of the membership of the State Senate carried over from the elec- ton of 1914.77 The quick and amazing success of the North Dakota Non- | Partisan League can be explained as much in terms of Town- ley's effective organizational techniques as it can in terms 36. Caston, op.cit., 60, 37! bid, 1304g. “| of the appeal the program of the League made. In this day “| of numerous political action organizations, which presume to “peak for the "conngn man” and which are financed by large contributions from wealthy individuale or by other organtza- tions with large treasuries, it is interesting to note that the Nonpartisan League made its method of raising money not only productive of revenue but aleo a source of crganiza- tional vitality. ‘Townley recognized that the farmer, by paying more than a nominal amount of dues, would take a deep- er and more intimate interest in the League. The wisdom of this Judgment was confirmed in the subsequent elections. The dues from menbers made it possible to hire hundreds of organizers, to employ other needed personnel, and to publish A newspaper which went regularly to all members, With an ample treasury the League was prepared to battle adversaries who had unlimited funds at their disposal. When its critics and opponents began to appreciate the | (ican rule, a heavy attack was made on the internal method seriousness of the League's challenge to conservative Repub~ of League organization, Charged with being autocratic, Townley demurred, claiming that it was necessary to hold the reins of League control tightly to prevent its enemies from infiltrating and dominating it. He insisted that the farmers had willingly placed full power in him and the League com- mittee because they knew that to be effective the League Would have to be organized in a way that would permit quick action. © 38. Ibid, 315-16.~AZ~ “Whe League was consistently denounced by its opponents ae the beginnings of state socialism, It was assailed as an entering wedge for a "Comministic America” by Andrew Bruce ““\n nis history of the movement. °? It is true that the League did attract many persons like Townley, who had been active in “the Socialist Party, and the League's program did embrace plans for government ownership which are socialist in char- acter, but|the League reforms did not constitute a socialist | program. They, like the later proposals of the Farmer-Labor Party, while recognizing that government mist interveno tn | | and control certain aspecte of the economy, indicated an | | acceptance of the capitalistic framework and were advanced with the implicit claim that the capitalistic system could / : be made to work with the adoption of the prescribed remedies, | The Socialist Party, in fact, saw in the movement a betrayal of the socialist cause. It repudiated the League in its 1916 convention, asserting that the "League was casentially interested in the acquisition of political power" by the | “lend-owning clase," whereas the "historic mission of the : Socialist Party was the economic emancipation of the work- ing-olass."""0 The League's successes in North Dakota stimulated ex- / \tensive activity in Minnescta and other nearby states. As early as July of 1916, League organizers were at work in the Western counties of Minnesota, In January of 1917, the League established national headquarters in St. Paul. Some 39. Bruce, op.cit., 4c, see 4’Poritical Guide for the Workers, 1920, the Social- ist Party campaign book.~hbe “500 organizers carried the League's drive into 13 states, which, in the order of the progrese made, were North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Colo- rado, Nebraska, Towa, Cklahoma, Kansas, Texas, and Wiscon~ cin.’! a5 1t radiated out from North Dakota, hovever, the potency of the League diminished, because, no doubt, there | wore natural limitations on the personal availability of Townley. The League's chief propaganda weapon was its 16- page weekly newspaper, The Nonpartisan Leader. It cirou- lated to the entire membership, which by the end of 1918 numbered about 200,000 with about one-half the total in North Dakota and Minnesota and about one-half the remainder | 4 | in South Dakota and Montana. # | In 1916, when the Nonpartisan League organizers began their work 1n Minnesota, the extracrdinary demand for food | And clothing created by the war, had stimulated production, | a: 4 | 5 \fara commodities, There was keen excitement over the Presidential and State elections that year because of the mounting concern over the possible involvement of the United States in the war, Minnesota's electoral votes went to the ' Republican nominee, Charles Fvans Hughes, by the scant mar- in of 392, and J.A.A. Burnquist, who had succecded to the { Sovernorship upon the death of Winfield 8, Hammond on Decem- 44 ber 30, 1915, was re-elected by a big majority.” Ina bit- H terly fought contcst, Frenk B, Kellogg was elected United AL. See Gaston, op.cit., Chap. XIV, 156-172. 42, Tbid., 237-38. » 111359. 43, Christianson, AL, The Presidential voto wre Hughes, 179,544; wWiison, 319;152. For Governor, Burnguist, 245,841; Dwyer, 3,112.~45- 45 States Senator. Deepite the wrr-born prosperity, farmers were receptive Ae the message of the Nonpartisan League organizers. Since 1912, when Roosevelt's Progressive Party bad excited dis- trust of both mjor parties,[ the Minnesota farmers hed liot- ened attentively te the agitation agetnbt big business and ageinst the control by "vested interests" of government and politics, They cbscrved approvingly the League vietorice in North Dakota, and were becoming eager to pursue a similar program in their state, |/It was carly recognized, however, that & successful protest movement in Minnesota would of necessity have to embrace more than tho farmers. An alli- ance with organized lnbor would have to be effected, It was, therefore, significant that, while the League was or- genizing farmers, parallel activity was taking place among the workers. By 1917, the Minnesota State Federation of sLabor had become a large and powerful organization with *pproximately 700 locals well established in 65 cities and vartagesAS/ the Raitrond Brotherhoods, whose membership wes then young and militant,wore even more actively intere ed In politics, Beginning in 1913, the Brothernocas main- tained representatives at the legislature and since that time fave published a biennial report on legislative activi- ty. It was, in fret, the Brotherhoods' report on the 1917 , Session that contained the first appeal for joint political Action between farmers and laborers. The report cited the 45. The vote was Kellogg,185, 159; Lawler, Democrat, 117,541; yo Galdcrocd, Prohibitionist, 76,425, + Official Year Book of the iinné sot Laver, 1917, 5.80.29, State Federation of {~46- impressive victories in North Dakota and exhorted labor to "do in its own legislative districts what the organized farm- ers do in theirs, and as a result the workers of the soil and "the workers in the industries will be ina position to have what legislation they desire, as there is no conflict of ine terest between these two.'"? whe report oslled for a joint ~ meeting to endorse candidates who “would carry out the party Will." It stressed the point that labor could not rely upon self-styled friends, that it must "fight its own battles.” "It behooves us, therefore," the report continued, “in the state of Minnesota as org:nized workers to give considera- tion to this matter and before another election takes place, to council together and line up with the workers of the soil, so that together we may be in a position to eliminate the middle men who are now psrasites upon all classes of workers," A reception cf violence and persecution awaited the new Movement that was to emerge out of the amalgamation of Minne- Sota farmers and laborers. It WAS & reception of extreme bitterness and hatred. It begin as carly as Soptember of 1917 when the Nonpartisan leaders called a Producers snd Con~ _ Sumers Conference in 1917. The meetings, extending over : three days, constituted a protest Agiinst war-time exploita- tion and a demonstration of support for governm ent regulation and limitation of profits."® the meetings featured many Speakers, including several prominent educators and Congress- men sympathetic to the Nonpartisan League's objectives. On 47. Biennial Report rt of the Baiiroea Brotherhoods State Legis dative Board 1917, pp. 44-47, 48. Gaston, op. ae p.206, | |~4T= which he declared: "We had grievances. Gemmny had inter= fered with the rights of our citizens to sail the high seas-- ‘on ships loaded with ammunition for Great Britain."49 this statement was quoted nationwide, but with the newspapers ine “gerting 2 "no" before "grievances," thus quoting LaFollette as saying "We had no grievances, "90 In the furious uproar that followed, the conference was denounced as a "wor dance of disloyalty" and Semtor Kellogg “introduced » resolution to expel LaFollette from the senate. The mischief was soon detected when a stenographic report re- vealed that LaPollette had been misquoted. Tho Kellogg reso- ‘lution was voted down and LaPollette was paid $5,000 for ox- 51 -penses incurred in fighting it. rs But the wave of hystori: had started and it was to mount “in intensity until virtually mob rule prevailed during the (enmpeian of 1918,°° the preamble to the conference resolu- tions described the war asa "struggle of political overlords te extend and perpetuate their power to rob and exploit their Y 5B fellow men.""? on February 28, 1918, Townley and Joseph Gi1- = bert were arrested on charges of "aisccumging enlistments” by distributing 2 pamphlet which included the preamble, ©AQ, Tht 50. p.210, Ibid.,p.211, Ernést Lundeen, "farmer-Labor Party--History, Platforms, fang Frograns," ongressional Record, (1936) Vol, 60, p. 9698. See : Sec the 1916 issues of The Minnesota Leader™ Gaston, op.cit., p.216, aa { | | |~48- The proposals of the conference itself, while militant- ly expressed, hardly seem to explain the intensity of feel- “Ang that the conference created. They asked the fixing of tho price cf wheat to eliminate exorbitant profits, reduc- to the consumer, low-interest loans to farmers whose crops failed, correction of inequalities and injustices due to _- freight differentials, ‘increase in income and excess profits “taxes, federal tax upon unused land, governmental operation of the coppers mines during the war, governmental operation of plants in which strikes are not speedily adjusted, fixed pay of $50 a month for the soldiers, and cheap government: insurance for the soldiers.’ In the light of america's ox- -Periences in Yorla War II, such proposals appear mild and certainly offer little justification for the hysterical ro- Cn February 16, 1918, the/ first issue of The Minnesota Leader, the official publication of the state Nonpartisan League, appeared. The banner headline read, "Mob Rule at Lake city." The opening editorisl was at pains to declare the League's loyalty to the government and to urge farmers to increase their production.°© throughout its entire first year, the newspaper devoted a big portion of each weok's isaue to a recital of the efforts made to suppress the League's organizing activities. Editorials demanded that Governor Burnquist remove sheriffs and other county official» =) 54, Ibid., pp.214-5, 55. The Minnesota Lea: 56. Ibias, pe er, February 16, 1918, p.1,ending story of suppression and violence. League meetings were broken up, their organizers mobbed and insulted and even threatened with lynching. Homes of leaders were paint- ed yellow. The period was like a reign of terror through- 57 The Minnesota Nonpartisan League was a genuine gracs- roots crganization. Even its most bitter enemies could not deny that fact. The \third issue of The Winnesota Leader reported the holding br Nonpartisan League caucuses in 2,000 precincts over tho state on February 22, 1918, at which delegates were named to legislative district conven- © thons in Maren.” thd tbeaiet report that 35,000 farmers “had attended the sauces may have been exaggerated, but, “even allowing for some, exaggeration, the figures reflect a “Yank-and-file interest unknown in today's organizational politics, In 1944 and 1946, it is unlikely that more than 3,000 to 4,000 persons in the entire state participated in the official caucuses of the two major parties.-? At the legislative district conventions which followed, “delegates mere elected to the League's state endorsing con- vention scheduled for the St. Paul Auditorium March 19, 20, anc 21, The state convention was announced ag the "First Nonpartisan Rally of Organized Farmers and Organized Work- ere."© an invitation to Governor Burnquist to speak wae 57. There is full recapitulation of the many incidents of violence and suppression in The Minnesota Leader for November 30, 1918, pode 58. Ibid., march 2, 1918, 5,1. 99. This observation is based upon the writer's personal ex- perience in the caucuses and conventions of those years 60. The Minnesota Leader, March 9, 1918, p.3._scornfully rejected in an insulting letter which said that “the League bore a stamp of disloyalty as the result of its last convention (the September, 1917, Producers and con- “gumera Conference). The letter was addressed to Arthur Le- : Shgeun, ae executive secretary of the League, and it assail- ed him as "an attorney who defended the murderers in the © I... trouble on the range two years ago." ‘The “murderers” ~ to which Burnquist referred had been acquitted of charges “which were unquestionably unfoundea.©! aurnquist's 1etter won for him the deserved animosity of every League member, and he became the focal point of the. League's attack upon the “vested interests." Delegates from 48 counties attended the convention. Tt was predcminantly a farmers’ affair, but labor mas repre- sented, too. The convention wae opened, in fact, by James Clancy, president of the St. Paul Trades and Labor Assembly Fy and successful League-supported candidate for the city coun- “ell. The challenge laid down by the Railroad Brotherhoods in its 1917 report becane the main order of business, and, jn the light of the North Dakota successes, there was never any doubt In the minds of the League lesders that the proper strategy was for the convention to endorse a full slate of candidates to enter the Republican primary, To head the ticket the League selected Charles A. Lind- borgh as its candidate for Governor. He woe the father of th, famous flyer, whose flight across the Atlantic nine years later was to make the name of Lindbergh known throughout the 61. feet of letter see The Minnesota Leader, March 23, isis. 62. Lundecn, op.cit., p.9697. {-51- world. Lindbergh was a farmer and attorney from Little Falle witha record of 10 years service in the United States “Gongress. Born in Sweden in 1859, hie father brought him to “Winnesota when he was one year old. He was graduated from the University of Michigan law school, and in the Nineties “entered polities as prosecuting attorney in Morrison Sounty. He had made an unsuccessful bid for the United Statoe Sena- “torship in 1916 against Kellogg, but his role as an inde- “pendent Republican in Congress had stamped him as a natural “leader for the League's campaign.©> For licutenant-govermor the March convention endorsed RE. Crane of Grand Meadow, also a farmer and a member of the state legislature. Victor Power, labor-endorsed mayor of Hibbing and 4 well-known cppenent of the steel interesta, “Was selected as the candidate for attorney-general, but he wanted the endorsement for governcr®4 and withdrew from race, Thomas V. Sullivan of St. Paul, an attormey for cooperatives, was later substituted for Power. Other endorsed candidates were 8.0. Tjosvald, a League leader from “Yellow Medicine County, for state auditor; Henry Holmes, @ Democrat and manber of the state legislature from Big 2 Lake, for seeretary of state; Thomas Melghen, also a Demo- A erat, from Preston, for state treasurer, who also withdrew - and was replaced by Albert H. Fasol, and F.E. Tilquist of St, Paul, a Railroad Brotherhood member, for the Railroad "and Warchouse Commiesion. Herman mueller was later added as =. 63. Lundeen, ibid., called Lindbergh iinnesota's "nost dis- tinguished Congressman.” 64, Gaston, op.cit., p.254.The convention mde no endorsement against the re-elec- “tion of United States Senator Knute Nelson, but later, in “the general election, openly supported W.G. Calderwood, the “paign marked by the absence of a Democratic nominee, The League's program adopted by the March convention supported the war in vigorous terms, and demanded the eatab- lishment of state-owned packing plants, elevators, and flour ‘and pulp mills. It called for a system of state rural cred [its and a tonnage tax on iron ore.©> the convention's motto, "We'll Stick," reflected the apprehension of League leaders “tat the campaign of vilification and suppression being waged against it was having a harmful effect. The most ve- - hement convention expressions were reserved for Burnquist whon it accused of permitting and encouraging mob violence. In the 1918 primary fight, the conservative Republ icane “and the conservative business interests were united against the League, The Twin Cities newspapers, particularly The St. Paul Dispatch, were the propaganda organs for the League! Opposition, Semi-secret organizations known as the "Lincoln © Club,” and "Anerica First Assceintion" were established to fight the League with finances provided by the large commer- ciel interests. two anti-League publications, On the Square and Pan-American Anti-Soclalist enjoyed brief carcers. It was during this period that the Minnesota Commission 65. The Minnesota Leader, March 23, 1918, pel, 66, Gaston, op.cit., p.218, reported that correspondence Which camé Into poesosaion of The Nonpartisan Leader demonstrated conclusively that the anti-Leazue organiza tions were financed by the large industrial interests.‘of Public Safety was in operation, Its purpose was to en- sure the patriotic behavior of all Minnesota residents dur- ing the period of the war. Its activities, embracing a state-county-tomship organization of associations and a home guard of some 8,000 men, constituted what has been called the "blackest page” in the history of the state, Governor Burnguist had established the Commission a few days after America's entry into the war, It included the govern- or, the attorney-general, and five members appointed by the governor. Its chairman was Judge John F. McGee of Minnea- polis, Whose questionable competence was clearly revealed in statements euch as these: "A Non-Fartisan League lectur- er isa traitor every time. In other words, no matter what he says or does, a League worker ie a traitor. here ne made a mistake was in not establishing a firing squad in the first days cf the wer, We should now get busy and have that firing squad working overtime."©8 tne commission, with an appropriation of $1,000,000, was, in effect, a cam- paign agency for Burnquist's reelection, The question of loyalty was the main issue in the campaign, and the use by the Burnquist forces of repressive and illegal tactics un- Goubtedly was the mest important factor in the defeat of the League's olate.o? The League, however, made 4 most impressive ehowing in the primary. Lindbergh, with 150,626 votes, polled 43 per cent of those cast to Burnquist’s 199,325 or 57 per cent. 67. See Christianson, op.ci: TIT :556-75. oH 68. Quoted in Lynn and Dora B, Haines, The Lindberghs, p.282. 69. Chap .XXIT, pp,265-294, of the Haines book is a detailed description of Lindbergh's part in the 1918 primary. » 11:396-8; Folwell, op.cit~54- Cnly 9,000 votes separated Clifford L. Hilton from Thomas “y, Sullivan, the League candidate for attorney-general. Qther League candidates all polled in excess of 100,000 “yotes, clearly demonstrating the organization's potency The League had endorsed in three Congressional contests, and here its candidates did equally well. in the Ninth, Frank M. Barton lost the nomination by less than 4,000 votes out ff 35,000 cast, and, in the Seventh, Andrew J. Volstead “defeated the League-endorsed Henrik Shipstead by less than 3,000 votes, A definite setback was suffered in the Fifth where Emest Lundeen, & League-supported incumbent, lost in 2 five-way race to Walter Newton. "© The League drew great satisfaction from its showing jn the 1916 primary. At that time 1t had 50,000 members in the state, and yet polled 150,000 votes. It rightfully felt that the primary was not an honest test of rank-and-file Republican sentiment because there was every indication that the Demoerate had invaded the Republican primary by the thousands in order to defeat the League candidates in the be~ lief that the incumbent Republican conservatives could be defeated by the Democratic candidates in the general elec tion. Only 35,000 votes were cast in the 1918 Democratic _/ primary compared to 350,000 in the Republican primary. TO, A recapitulation of the 191€ Republican primary is given in The Legislative Manual of the State of Minue- sota for 1919, pp. 255-3. i } 4~55- ‘The results of the 1916 primary intensified the deter- mination of the League to continue its fight. Organized turn to North Dakota, labor was prepared to continue and \give new leadership to the battle, It was a question now of making plans for the November “election. The choice for governor was between Surnquist and Fred E. Wheaton, the Democratic nominee. In July, the state convention of the Minnesota Federation of Labor, meeting in @n atmosphere highly charged by the war hysteria, proclaimed its opposition to both candidates and adopted a resolution calling for a state labor political convention not later “than August 24." che state committee of the Nonpartisan "League responded quickly to the Federation's action by ap- | pointing a committee of seven to meet with labor during the Projected conference. [On August 24 ant 25, for the first time in the state's history, labor held a delegated politi~ cai convention, and out of its deliberations and the joint cmeetings with Leneue represontatives developed plans for “the filing of independent candidates for state office by Petition, Because the election laws required the use of a - 71, The Minnesota Leader, July 27, 1918, p.1.-56~ party designation for independent candidates, the name of Farmer-Labor Party was selected. Thus, for the first tine “the name Farmer~Labor Party was to appear on the ballot in 3 For the Farmer-Labor candidate for governor the juint Yinnesota. labor-League committee selected David Evans, a hardware mer~ chant from Tracy. A liberal Democrat, he had been in poli- tice for many yeare and had worked with Ignatius Donnelly in the Populist Party. In 1904, he was a Demceratic candidate for Congress, Evans had won the respect and attention of "the League during the 1918 primary by defending the League against the attacks of disloyalty. It was indicative of the ers made much of the fact that he owned more Liberty bonds than anyone elge in Lyon county.’* Tom Davie, prominent Minneapolis labor attorney, was selected as the candidate for attorney-general, and Fred E, Tillquist, the Railroad = Brotherhocd leader who had been defeated in the Republican primary for Railroad and arehouse Commission, was entered again in that race as an independent Farme r-Labor candidate, In two weeks the necessary 2,000 petition signers for the three candidates were obtained and Evans, Davis, and Tillquist were duly filed. The extent of labor's participa- tion in the fall campaign was reflected in the campaign pereonnel, headed by E.d, Hall, president of the Minnesota Federation of Labor, with George Lawson, Federation secretary Ae campaign secretary, The fall campaign was a repetition 72, Lurdeen, op.cit., p.9700,-57- of the June primary. Again meetings were broken up, cars smashed, roads barricaded, speakers insulted and driven out of town, The influenza epidemic added to the League's wor- ries, and during the last month before the election Evans was unable to campaign,7? Again, however, the Farmer-Labor candidates made an im- pressive showing. The successful primary candidate for clerk of supreme court, Herman Mueller, was elected, In the three-way fight for governor, Burnquist received 166,611 votes; Evans, 111,966, and Wheaton, 76,838. The Republican nominee defeated Tillquist, 165,852 to 104,283, with the Democratic candidate polling 68,991, and, in the attorney- general contest, Davis polled 99,933 to 180,877 for the suc~ cessful Republ loan nominee, with the Democrat receiving 56,029. ‘The Republicans were thus able to win two important seats with only piuraitiesé" Janis immediately caused specu- lation over the wisdom of third party action which some re- garded as inevitably splitting the opposition foreea. The Minnesota Leader's prediction that the League would capture control of the legislature proved over-optimistic. \ The 1919 session indluded 24 League-sponsored representative (and eaght senators. Their numbers were augmented by eleven representatives and five senators elected with labor endors- ments.’ Against the judgment of many of their friends cut- side the legislature, the labor and Lesgue members decided to contest the election of W.I, Nolan as speaker of the 73. Ibid., p.9697, 74, Complete figures for the 1918 genem1 election are given in The Legislative Manual for 1919, opposite page 670. 75. Bee Cady Buclly the Winneseus Egeiarsheee of 3918, Bal’, Eee Eahouse by supporting John A, Urness of Douglas County. The vote Was Nolan, 105; Urness, 23.76 The League members main fight was for passage of a tonnage tax on iron ore, but the coalition played only a minor role in the seasion as care was taken to deny it any important strength on the commit- “tees. The seasion adopted many noteworthy pieces of legis- dation, including submission of the Babcock highway amend- ment, the ccoperative marketing law legalizing cooperative /{ action, establishment of the Board of Education, the ratafi- ( cation of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Railroad Brother- hoods' report on the session applauded the League neabers fora record "that will haunt the stand-patters for many & day to come," but it chastized the labor members who "did not always vote for labor and progressive measures as they shoula "77 The 1919 legislative session, however, fired again the labor movement's interest in political action, and plans moved ahead for extending the farm-labor influence. In the summer of 1919, the Minnesota Federation of. Labor, meeting at New Ulm, rejected a report recommending the disbanding ie ite 1918 political committee and voted instead to estab- lish the Working People's Nonpartisan Political League, fe would provide a definite political mechanism that would parallel the activity cf the Nonpartigan League.7© In its first year, the Inbor League accepted 300 unions as \affiliates, representing a membership of 45,000. To affili- 76. Ibid., p.16. 1. Bell Bosse soe of Beene Brotherhocds State Leg- 79. Proceedings of ERE Thirty-Seventh Convention of the Winnesota State Federation of Labor, pp. 70-60. i.gation of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Railroad Brother- fora record "that will naunt the stand-patters for many 2 lay to come," but 4t chastized the labor members who "did The 1919 legislative session, homever, fired again the jabor movement's interest in political action, and plans Moved ahead for extending the farm-labor influence. In the Staner of 1919, the Minnesota Federation of Labor, meeting at New Ulm, rejected a report rocomnend ing the disbanding : of its 1918 political committee and voted instead to estab- Hiten the Yorking People's Nonpartisan Political League, “I Which would provide a definite political mechaniem that - Noula parallel the activity of the Nonpartisan League, 78 ol ite tires year, the labor Leas © accepted 300 unions as ffiliates, representing a nenbarenie of 45,000. To atfili- 76. Ibid., p.16. et 7. Bisnnlal Report gf the Railroad Zrotherhocds State Leg- islative foard tor TOTS, pid. 19. Proceedings of the Thinty-Seventh Convention of the Winnesota State Federation of Labor, pp. TOsBOs> the ratifi- {¢ for the union and one for each 100 Yth no union permitted to have more 9 At its second annual convention in tore, terminal markets, ; and other public utilities of education, and imme- il rights. © aPoh 24, 1920, they my by re S7eame hotel. within both groups two confiict- arsine conventions, co wv Strategy developed. Cne group favored inde- Aste constitution, by-lawa, and rules of the eople!s Nonpartisan League is given in Lundeen, 9709-10,“sult of the 1918 genera election. The other group favored repeating the 1918 strategy by entering a slate of candi- dates in the Republican primary. \/in the end, a sort of com- promis was arranged, whereby some of the Nonpartisan candi- dates were entered in the Republican primary, and, in order to keep the third party label active, three candidates were fled with Farmer-Labor designation, For ite candidate for governor the League chose Henrik Shipstead, the Glenwood dentist who had befriended the Teegue by defending its organizers during the chaotic period of 1917. Shipstead was then 39 years old, His only prior Political experience had been one term in the state house of representatives in the 1917 seasion. In 1918, he had been Gefeated aa the League-endorsed candidate for Congress in the Seventh District primary by Andrew J, volsteaa ,°? The regular Republicans, meanwhile, had selected J.A.0. Preua as their candidate ‘to succced Burnquist, whe decided not to Seek reelection, Preus was chosen in an "extra-legal elimi« mation convention" held for the purpose of ensuring unity among conservatives in the face of the League's challenge. ©? ‘The campaign that preceded the June 21 primary was fully ae bitter as the 1926 election. Where, in 1918, the opposition charged dteloyelty and "socialism," now they raised the cries of "bolshevisn" and "free love." An author of @ friendly bicarapny of Shipstead, in reviewing the 1920 82. For an account of Shipstead's carly career sce Martin Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota, pp. 19-39. 83. Christianson, op.cit., I1:405,PURSE ST) Tee nice ee ena ~61- We--campaign wrote: "From one end of Minnesota to ancther, far- a mera were told that, 4f the Non-Partisans won, fam mort- 28 would be foreclosed. From one ond of the state to ‘another, little bisiness mon were warned that, if ‘they were Gpiven the chance, these 'radicals' would confiscate their (BFocery stores and garages and factories, Wherever ‘Money! -;eould, it mobilized Minnesotans to the campaign against Ship- etend 7e4 Preus won the Republican nomination with 133,832 votes to Shipstead's 125,432, a margin of only @,400, and Republi- ean regulare captured the other nominations but with similar- ~\ty smali majorities,®> the Republican regulars were aided ~ #e8in, Just as they were in 1916, by Democratic voters who | abandoned their own primary to vote against the League. Only 27,000 votes were cast in the Democratic primary com~ Pared with 300,000 in the Republican, One League-supportea candidate did win in the prinary, but his victory was denied him in a most unusual manner. 0.J. Kvale, the League cand 1- date in the Seventh congressional District, defeated Andrew J, Volstead, 17,369 to 15,059, but Volstead claimed that Kvale had labeled him an atheiat during the campaign and he Succeeded in having the court disqualify Kvale and declare hin the winner, Kvale entered the general election as an ins dependent but was defeated by Volstead in an ex tremely close race ,86 After the primary the defeated League-endorsed candi- 84, Ross, op.cit., p41. 85. Results of the 1920 primary are given in The Legislative Manual of 1921, pp,100-1, phe vote was Volstead, 36,822; Kvale, 35,370, with the Democrat, Mitchell, receiving 5,358, | | |“dates filed by petition as independents. Cyrus King, who ‘had filed ae the Famer-Labor candidate for governor, now ithdrew in favor of Shipstead, but the other Farmer-Labor gandidates remained to round out a slate the members of which carried varying designations of either Independent or Farmer-Labor, Shipstead's filing as an independent addea to the fury of the regular Republicens’ oppositicn. This fas scorning the accepted tradition that defeated candidates supported the victerious nominees of a party. In the gen- eral election campaign that followed, "old party lines were obliterated" and it became an open fight between "conserva- tism and radicalion."87 to oppose the Independent and Far- mer-Labor candidates a Sound Government Association was organized by businessmen who raised a fund of 3375,000,86 “fo which unquestionably matched the money at the disposal .of ‘the Nonpartisan League 89 The general election produced an. overwhelming Republi- veam landelide, Warren G. Harding carried Minnesota by al- most five te one over his Democratic opponent for the Presi- “Goncy, James u. Cox,% and all the conservative Republican candidates for state office won by large margins. Preus Gefeated Shipstead, 415,805 to 281,402, with Laurence c, 87, Christianson, op.cti 88. Ibid. SPeeh fone estimates of the money spent run even higher. Ross, opecit., p.41, says $1,°00,000 was spent to defeat the League, In any event, such enormous amounts have no parallel in present camprigns, in which #100,C00 would be considered an abnormally large budget. $0. The vote wea Harding, 519,421; Cox, 142,904, p.406.-65- of state, despite the fact she made virtually no campsign, o> polled 193,658 votes, but was defeated by Mike Holm in the latter's firet election to 4 position which he has since held continuously. Louis L. Collins was elected lieutensnt- governcr over Gecrge H. Mallon, 432,226 to 228,601. Henry Rines, Republicen, defeated John P, Wagner, 448,313 to 191,429, for state treasurer; Clifford Hilton, with 446,736 votes, defeated Thomas ¥. Sullivan, 251,488, for attorney- general, and O.P.B, Jacobson, with 445,557 votes, defeated Bmil C MacKenzie, 177,256, for Railroad and warehouse Com- ne 92 missioner. The 1920 election marked the end of the first phase of the Famer-labor Party in Minnesota, Its efforts to elect candidates by capturing the Republican Party had foiled, Its leaders were now ready to turn to the forma- tion of an independent new party and to abandon the Repub- lican label to the conservative forces that had for so long dominated that party. 51. Lily Anderson's campaign 1s reviewed briefly in Sarah Tarleton Colvin, & Rebel in Thought, p.165, $4. Results of the ioddgeneral election are given in The Legislative Manual of 1921, opposite p,526,CHAPTER THREE . A. FROM INDEPENDENT TO THIRD PARTY POLITICS The years immediately following 1920 occupy a place of special importance in the history of the Minnesota Farmer- Labor Party, because it was during this period that the energing party grappled with the fundamental question that has historically beset every new political movement. Should it continue te pursue its goals through nonpartisan activity aimed at the capture of an existing political party? or should 1t abandon the Republican Party to the clasa interests of those who had twice demonstrated their ability to controt it in the face of the League's opposition? Advocates of both points of view clung tenaciously to their reapective ideas, and a conflict over this central problen continued behind the scenes for at least four years. It was not fin- ally settled until the ultimate development of the Farmer- Labor Association in 1925, The results ofthe 1920 election had been Jubliantly — halled by the daily press as signalling the breakdown of the Nonpartisan League, A gloomy note crept into the utterances of League leaders, who were plainly worried about the future, The League's manager, George Griffith, noted dejectedly that a "few farmers...do not see the noceasity of keeping in the fight. They are getting’ tired of the battle."! Hara times Were pressing down upon the farmers, and it Was porhaps more a matter of simply being unable to afford the payment of dues rather than disinterest that accounted for the decline ui League participation, Millions of dollars in post-dated 1, The Winnesota Lesdor, Nov.20, 1920, p.2.~65- checks accumulated. Bills piled up. In an effort at re~ trenchnent, The Minnegota Leader in July of 1920, in the midst cf the campaign, had gone from weekly to a bi-weckly, with The National Nonpartisan Leader published on alternate necks.” But the leaders were by no moans wholly pessimistic about the future, and they bravely proclaimed their undimin- ished confidence in the future of the movenent. They pointed to the increased proportional vote and the doubling of the 1 actual vote over 1918 as evidence that the League was still on the march. ‘The morale of the League was custained by the imowled ce that its program was supported by many thousands of farmers and as evidence of that fact they could point te the efforts of the Republicans to appropriate part of the Loague’s pro- gram, The Republicans advocated better cooperative marketing laws. They promised a "fair and equitable” tonnage tax on iron ore. They sought to give every assurance that the far- ! mers could best remedy their ills by eschewing "radical so- ; cdalism" and embracing “enlightened conservatism." Many | farmers who might otherwise have voted for the League candi- j dates were no doubt attracted by the Republicans’ improvised program of pscudo-liberaliom.’ The League drew solace, too, from the fact that 1920 had produced a Republican landslide in the Presidential election, which had no doubt adversely affected the League's showing, America was living in the backwash of the first World War, and everyone appeared eager to return to Harding's promise of “normaloy." In such a +, duly 24, 1920, pil. ? +, November 20, 1920, -p.4. + See Robert Kingsley, Recent Variations from the Two-Party otee ag Evidenced by the Ftisan League and the Ag ricultural Bloc. (Master's Thesis, Univ. of Minn. June*23)~66- setting, the continued charge of socialism leveled agvinst the League effectively drew votes from its candidates. It is interesting to note here that the problems that confronted the people of Minnesota in the early 1920's con. stitute a striking parallel to the post-war problems of 1946 and 1947. It was a period of inflation, in which there were frantic, but ineffectual, efforts to prevent a dis- astrous deflstion. Wages were rising; crime was on the 1n- crease; there was an upsurge of nativism and bigotry as evidenced by the Ku Klux Klan; there wag a severe box-car shortage that was causing crops to rot in the fields; the state government, facing higher prices and wages for its services, was harrassed by a shortage of revenue. But, iu 1920, perhaps unlike the current post-war period, the people ers. gencrally confident that things would right them- selves once the nation had returned to "normalcy." The Farmer-Labor forces had no reason to expect the 1921 legislative session to deal kindly with its program of reform, On the vote for Speaker of the House, their candi. date, Erling Swenson of Minneapolis, received only 27 votos,* although they claimed a total of 34 League~endorsed House members ne In the Senate, there were 11 League-endorsea mon- bers who carried over from the 1919 seasion.’ The size of the League group entitled it te at least two members on the contrelling House rules committee, but the conservative leadership was able to deny it any voles in committce pro- Report of the Railroad Brotherhoode State Legie- 21, p.4. eee Léader, December 4, 1920, p.2, |< -67- “2 godure. The League group had no representation on appropria~ tions, banks, markets and marketing, military affairs, public ‘highways, and rules, and only one on elections, insurance, “and utilities, which comprise some of the more important © house committees.® Throughout the 1921 session The Minnesota Leader main- tained a consistent barrage against the efforta of the con- servatives to adopt bille that would drain off support fron “the League but whilch fell “just short of interfering with the profiteers and monopolists."9 The session aid adopt © pills aimed at helping farmers’ and producers’ cooperatives. 10 - futures and opening the grain exchanges to the cooperatives The conservatives scught to convince the farmers by such leg- ‘slatio that they had a choice between "socialism" as advo- |! ted by the League and “cooperation” which the Republicans presumably supported, The Republicans attempted to mke it Appear that the League was hostile to the, cooperative move~ “ment,"7 but the colums of The Leder clearly revenled supe : Port and sympathy for the whole cooperative idea. In their attempt to win the farmers’ backing, the Repub- jicans had the support of the Fann Bureau Federation, which was established in 1919 as the result of the efforts of the federal demrtment of agriculture and the state agricultural © colleges extension prograns to help improve farming methods, _ 5 a aaa Ate bees et Bp. ooo. —-10."Buell, op.cit., pp.24-26, 11. Seo Theodore’ Christianson, Minnesota, The Land of Sky- Tinted Watere, Vol.Ir, p.4o8,~68- To tho Longue the Farm Bureau appeared as an organization Inspired by the conservative opposition. The Lender assniné the Federstion as autocratically controlled,® ana there mere frequent headline displays similar te this: "Leaders of Farm Bureau Are All Wrong on Impertant Issues-- Non= - Farmers Handle Farm Bureau Services."13 It 48 difficult to nsecas the Importance of the rise of the Parm Bureau upon the development of the Farncr-Labor political movement, but Eb te cortaimly clear that 1 provided an outlet for sccial activity and economic expression by farmers, who, had the Bureau not come into existence, would have in considerable numbers turned to the League. Had the agricultural prosperity of tho war years con- tinued through the early Twenties, it 1a likely that the League, and with 4t the embryo Farmer~Labor Party, would have gone into total eclipse after the 1920 election. But the farm mrkot collapsed late in 1920, renewing once again the familiar conditions of bank failures, mortgages on farm \’ hones and equipment, reduced wages, and unemployment. As _ the farmer now contemplated the League he did so ina spirit of friendliness, but the best he could do financially was fe write 2 post-d-ted check. The activity of the Lesgue “Since 1918 had created a tremendous backlog of support, but it was not until the election of 1922, when the full effect cf the depression could bo felt, that the League wae to re= ceive a demonstration of that. support. During the early monthe of 1621 both the Farmers’ Non- 12. The Minnesota Leader, January 1, 1921, p.1. 13. Ibid. January 15, 1921, p.2.-69- “partisan League and the Working People's Nonpartisan Politi~ cal League, the latter having been organized with the open support of the Minnesota Federation of Labor, engaged in vigercus mombers¥ip drives. The state convention of the furmors’ League was given over largely to a discuseion of plans for increasing the membership.!" qhen the Working People's Lengue mot in Brainerd during the sumaer, the secretary, Thomas Van Lear, reported, perhaps with the cus- tomary exaggerstion peculiar te such occasions, that there was not a "single Instance" where the organization had not made a phenomenal gain.!5 As early ao August of 1921 the two Leagues, which, since thoir inception, had followed separate but parallel gourses of action, began anticipating the kind of opposition they could expect in the 1922 elections. The Lecder warned tna featured headline, "Dosperate Efforts Put Porth by alg Biz to Stem League Tide. Trusts, Selfish Employers, Polita- cians, Middlemen, Stock Gamblers, Bankers and Newspapers Combine to Hoad Off Their Defeat Next Year."15 and now the chief target of sttack became the incumbent Republican United States Senator, Frank B. kertogsy The wealthy St. “Paul attorney, who had been the first Minnesota scnator “elected by popular vote and who later was te serve as ambas~ sadore to Great Britain and as secretary of etate, was con- ~_..demned by tho Tarmer-Labor forces at every turn as the "tool" “f Wall Street.!7 tHe provided tne focal point for The Lesd- , March 12, 1921, p.l. » duly 30,1921, p.4, August 13, 1921, p.l.-10- en'g unrelenting attacks upon the water poner trust, the “failure of the conservatives te adopt a tonnage tax on iron ore, and the failure of both the national Congress and the state legislature to enact measures stabilizing the price of wheat and otherwise aiding the farmers, At thie point the ‘question of whether the Nonpartisan League should once again enter the Republican primary or whether it should turn to an independent party became of paramount importance, The final determination of this ques- tion was simplified by the action of the 1921 legislative session in amending the direct primary law so as to prevent a candidate defeated in the primaries from seeking election to the same office in the general eleetion.1® The Republi- cans, in their efforts to block the League completely, tad agitated for a much stronger bill which would have eliminat~ ed the primary altogether, This proposal drew a storm of protest from throughout the state and progressive leaders in other parts of the country took a keen interest in the a defeat of the repeal legtelation,’? A deluge of petitions nec opposing repeal gave the legislators' "cold fee and the rosult was the more moderate amendment. Governor Preus took the lead in insisting upon changes in the primary law. He condemned the League as making a “mcekery of the oath of party allegiance voluntarily taken by all candidates who 12h file at the primary. With passage of the amendment, tho League must, if it chose agein te enter the Republican pri- 18. Session Laws, 1921, Chapter 322, pp,401-406, 19. The ffinnesota Leadér, Jan, 29, 192i. > February 12, 1921, tianson, op. git. p.421.-T- nary, risk final defeat of its best candidates in the pri- mary against opponents endorsed by an official party con- vention, The question camée“to preoceupy the thinking of the League leaders. Conflicting views were vigorously stated, and feeling on both sides began to mount. A.C. Townley, in the columns of The Leader, was unyielding in his insistence that the League continue its efforts within the Republican party. "American thought and American political history are against new party movements," Townley wrote. He wanted to organize farmers in a “great, mobile voting bloc, not to build a separate party," and he foresaw the time when the League would own the politicians "just as the corporate in- tereats do now. "2? The central theme of his ideas was what he called the "balance of power" plan, but the pressure be- hind independent party action proved too atrong and Townley, his power now definitely on the decline, was defeated, In the League conferences that followed, the views of Williem Mahoney, then chairman of the Working People's Nen- Partisan Political League and editor of the Union Advocate, the St. Paul labor newspaper which became the chief organ of the Farmer-Labor Federation, prevailed as the movement for full slate of Farmer-Labor candidates in the 1922 election gathered momentum, This was a period of readjustment and realignmént for the Farmer-Labor forces, and it was only natural that there should be talk of a fusion with the Democratic party, The two parties were to go their separate ways until 1944, but 22, The Minnesota Leader, March 11, 1922, p.3. 4-T2- from the very start the talk of amalgamation with the Demo~ fs orats runs like a gonnecting thread through the history of the Farmer-Labor party. As early as April, 1921, the Demo- crate had made overtures suggesting merger, Their Jefferson Day dinner in that month was devoted to denunciations of the Preua administration, and Mrs. Anna Dickey Olesen, the na- tional Democratic committeewoman who was to become the par- ty's candidate for United States Senator in 1922, declared publicly that the Nonpartisan League ha@ educated people to “think for themselves" and that "Progressive Democrate and the members of the Nonpartisan League should join hands against the Republicans,"®? By the time of the 1922 con~ ventions of the two Nonpartisan Leagues and the Democratic | party, the fusion sentiment had become significant, and on | March 31 the three groups convened at the same time but in \ different halle in Minneapolis. The Democratic convention, attended by the party's liberal wing, was favorable to fusion and agreed to the appointment of a conference committee to meet mith a similar committee from the two Leagues, For a brief period it appeared likely that fusion would be achieved. It even had Tomiey's support.°4 But other leaders vigorously opposed having anything to do with the Demcerats, whom they frankly distrusted and whom they re~ garded as cut of sympathy with the League program.°> when the conference committee reported to the respective conven- tions, "they were full of mutually complimentary remarks, 23, Ibld., April 23, 1922, p.le 24, Kingsley, ibid., p.37. 25, The National Nonpartisan Leader, April 17, 1922,*73- put entirely lacking in definite recommendations on the matter of fusion, "76 The loosely-discussed plan to enter, vy Joint agreement, a Farmer-Labor candidate for semtor and a Democratic candidate for governor was abandoned . Behind this failure at fusion and behind the intransi- gent attitude of many of the leaders of the two Leagues are two baste factors which account for the refusal to turn to the Democratic party as the vehicle of protest in Minnesota. Firat, the ideological inspiration behind the two Leagues and the Farmer-Labor party came from a native American con- cept of socialism which almost categorically rejected both the Republican and Democratic parties as representing the interests of a capitalistic and exploiting class. The early leaders of the Minnesota protest movement were steeped with the conviction that collaboration with the dominant elements of either party would constitute a betrayal of their cause. This conviction has held the loyal devotion of a significant section of the Farmer-Labor movement down to the present time. It 4a significant that the Nonpartisan League leaders lof this early period who were atill active in 1944 opposea jthe fusion which took place in that year. The second 1m- portant factor operating against fusion was one that is only infrequently discussed, because it touches a question of religion which politicians prefer not to raise and which has, as a result, become a political taboo in the state. This is the generally assumed domination of the Democratic party in Minnesota by people of the Catholic faith. Secause the 26. Kingsley, 4p! p.38, |The Scandinavian farmers who made up the vast majority of the Nonpartiean League forces were, in the main, devout Luther- ans with deeply ingrained distrust of Catholicism, the idea of fusion could never gain a strong foothold. (It was not until the machinery of the Farmer-Lebor party had been con- pletely captured by devotees of tho Communist line that its leadership became committed to the idea of merger. \ The 1922 ccnventions which refused to enter into a fusion agreement with the’ Democrats were none too hopeful that victory of any sort awaited the Farmer-Laborites at the polla. Attendance was emall by compariaon with the conven- tions of preceding years, and The Leader rationalized that this was by design because it made for a more "workable, democratic bedy" in contrast to the old parties whose con- ventions “had mobs subject to the passion of the moment and manipulation."@? The convention, in an ambitious platforn, took note of the effects of the postwar inflation by calling for "immediate relief rather, than measurés which nesa sover- 2 al years to produce reeults."°© the platform urged repeal Cummins railroad act, the payment of the soid- ters’ Bonus to de financed by an excess profits tax, the conversion of the state testing mill into e commercial flour mill, a state-owned concrete plant, establishment of cooper ative banks, public works programs as a check on unemploy- mont, increase in the iron ore tonnage tax to 10 per cent, and it condemned use of the state militia and court injune- Minnesota Leader, April 8, 1922, p.1.“75+ fone in labor aisputes.?? The farmers’ convention heard Townley outline what he presented as three possible alternatives for political ac~ tion: (1) It could repeat the 1918 and 1920 method by enter 4ng the Republican primarics again, (2) it could formalize iteelf as a third party, or (3) 4t could follow a "balance of power" plan Which Townley was just then beginning to evolve, This plan called for s carefully devised strategy of oWinging League support in key contests to those candi- aates who pledged support for League measures, The League mould remain uncommitted to elther third party action or to entering the Republican primary, Townley's scheme failed to arouse much enthusiasm pernaps because, as Townley him- self noted, the delegates were not quite able to understand how it would work out in actual practice. The decision which smerged from the convention was that’ the League should pursue its own independent way by entering a full slate of endorsed erndidates in the Farmer-Labor primary. It was shortly after the March convention that Townley resigned ss Lergue president te become the organizer for the National Producers Alliance, which was the forerunner of the Minnesota Farmers’ Union. In subsequent years, Tomley par- ticipated intermittently in the politics of Minnesota and i North Dakota, but his resignation in 1922 marks the end 8 hie dominance of the Minnesota development. °° The 1922 convention, before adjourning, was advised by the League's accountant that a total of $1,200,000 in post- 29. Ibid. 30. The writer has interviewed A.C. Townley on the various phases of his caresr. Townley today 15 penniless, but i still keen of mind and, although interested, coupletely inactive in politics.-76- Gated checks nad been'accumulated, The League delegates, although not tco optimistic, were still hopeful that the election would produce favorable results, because they had confidence in the candidates they had enforsed for elec- tion, For their candidate for senator the Leaguers .chose Henrik Shipstead, the tall, quiet Scandinavian dentist, whose political career over the next quarter of a century was to become an enigma:to the people of Minnescta. Ship- stead had befriended the League during ite early organica- tional activity and mas endorsed for congress in the 1918 election. In 1920, he was selected as the candidate for gcvernor, and he had come within 7,000 votes of being nomi- nated in the Republican primary aginst Governor Preus. He had captivated the League leaders with his simplicity im manner and speech and with his air of humility.» wnen he was elected, the national press took for granted that Shipstead, as a Farmer-Laborite, was 3 "radical," but many of the men who helped elect him were not too certain. As a member of the state legislature, Shipstead had been classified as a conservative. The Leagues’ candidate for governor was Magnus John- | son, a farmer from Meeker county who spoke with a strong Scandinavian recent and whose appearance Was rustic and unpolished. His critics described nim as “loud-mouthed" 31. In 1920, appearing before the Leagues’ committee, he the aslution of asctciy’s protions; he anewesed ‘uy aay y's Di 3 y say ing if he knew of such a proposal he would be the smartest man in America. Acecrding to #illiam lahoney, this reply clinched the endorsement for him. 32. Personal interview, William Mahoney,