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RAQUIZA v BRADFORD 75 Phil.

50 (1945)

Characteristics of Philippine Criminal Law – General – Exceptions

FACTS:

Petitioners (Lily Raquiza (espionage), Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante
active collaboration with enemy/japanese), invoking the writ of habeas corpus (which
literally means to "produce the body" is a writ or order requiring that a prisoner be
brought before a judge or into court to decide whether he is being held lawfully or
release for liberty and to be decided within two days), were arrested by the United
States Army and have since then been detained under the custody of the respondents
by virtue of a proclamation issued by General MacArthur providing military measures
for the apprehension of Filipino citizens who have espionage activity with the
Japanese and voluntarily collaborated with the enemy. Petitioners have not been
informed of the nature of the accusation against them; no complaint with any specific
offense has been filed against them, and has not been given even a summary hearing.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 616

ESPIONAGE - SECTION 1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained


information affecting national defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to afford relief to the petitioners?

RULING:

NO.

RATIO:

The affirmative and dissenting vote is based on the following considerations:

First, the right to due process of law is an immanent and alienable right of every person
which cannot be dispensed either in time of war or in time of peace.

Second, the assailed proclamation is either a bill of attainder or a military order that
apprehends and held in restraint violators without a trial by a military tribunal.

Third, the petitioners being illegally confined without due process are entitled to be
discharge under habeas corpus (Sec 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court).
Petition was dismissed. (Six members of the Court voted for the negative and three for
the affirmative).

No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during
passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to
exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On
the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

By agreement, for stationing of the United States Army or a part of its forces in the
Philippines implies as a waiver of all jurisdiction over their troops during the time
covered by such agreement.

Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1948)

FACTS:

By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners


were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385.
The petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage
activity with the Japanese, active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power for
Commander of the US Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not
questioned. He based proclamation on the reasons that the apprehended have violated
due allegiance to the US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of
Habeas Corpus.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation?
[Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation
providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens
who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be
seriously questioned.]

No. “The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of,
some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the
province of the political department, and not the judicial department, to determine if
war has ended. The fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army
has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already
terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the power of military authorities to
make even before was terminates.

2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the
petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected?

No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during
passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to
exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the
other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

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