G.R. No.

165109
December 14, 2009
MAMBA v. LARA

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing Governor
Edgar R. Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial
advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the
governor without cost and commitment. It also ratified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation which provides that the provincial
government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the
amount of bonds floated. In addition, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, authorized Gov. Lara to
negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the
provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction and
improvement of his priority projects, including the construction of the New Cagayan Town
Center, to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently, Lara issued the Notice
of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the planning, design, construction
and site development of the town center project.
Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a
Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents. The RTC, however, dismissed
their petition on the grounds that the (1) petitioners have no locus standi to file a case as they are
not party to the contract and (2) that the controversy is in the nature of a political question, thus,
the court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to sue as taxpayers.
2. Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a political question.

RULING:
1. Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers. A taxpayer is allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites
must be met: (a) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (b) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
Here, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the
proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayers’ money, a government support
in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. The
governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of P25 million for
the interest of the bond. So clearly, the first requisite has been met. As to the second requisite,
the Supreme Court explained that the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury
test bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking transcendental
importance, paramount public interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious
legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the
court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.

2. No, the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one. A political question
is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the
legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated. A justiciable question on the other hand, calls upon the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies wherein there are rights involved which are legally demandable and
enforceable. It is one which is proper to be examined or decided in courts of justice because its
determination would not involve an encroachment upon the legislative or executive power. In
simple terms, a political question refers to the wisdom, while a justiciable question refers to the
legality of the acts complained of.
The issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts
complained of. Thus, the Supreme Court found the instant controversy within the ambit of
judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still come within
their powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon them by Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

G.R. No. 180771

April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. REYES

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin
respondents from implementing Service Contract 46 (SC-46) and to have it nullified for willful
and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution, which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated
between the islands of Negros and Cebu.
Petitioners collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are
the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in
and around the Tañon Strait allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that
they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners
implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and
as responsible stewards of God's Creations." Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the
ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the
Tañon Strait, petitioners aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish
catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic survey, the
average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could
only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the
destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."31
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill"32
observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the
ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and
discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not
held prior to the ECC's issuance.
Respondents contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals have no legal standing
to file the present petition and that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various
laws cited in the petitions.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing
2. Whether or not President Arroyo may be impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner.
3. Whether or not SC-46 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
1. No. In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of
Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in
interest.

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors
or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall
contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in
the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and
feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view
of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let
alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that
humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves,
which of course includes compassion for all living things.

2. No. A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be
obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule
3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SECTION 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined
as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be
stated in the complaint.

The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the
action but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through
summons or other court processes. Petitioners should not take it upon themselves to simply imp
lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply
included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent. This places the unwilling co-
petitioner at the risk of being denied due process, as such would be a denial of due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a

co-equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy
directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have
gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former
President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.

3. SC-46 is unconstitutional because it violates Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.