WHOA, WHOA, WHOA . . .

ONE AT A TIME: EXAMINING THE

RESPONSES TO THE ILLINOIS STUDY ON DOUBLE-BLIND
SEQUENTIAL LINEUP PROCEDURES
Zack L. Winzeler*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1595 

II. CAUSES OF MISTAKEN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS ................................ 1597 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO MISTAKEN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS ....... 1600 
IV. THE ILLINOIS STUDY .................................................................................... 1603 
V. RESPONSES TO THE ILLINOIS STUDY ............................................................. 1607 
A. Criticism .................................................................................................... 1607 
B. Support ...................................................................................................... 1609 
VI. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 1610 
VII. CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 1612 

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1984, twenty-two-year-old college student, Jennifer Thompson, was raped

by an intruder at knifepoint in her own apartment.1 Knowing she would later be
asked to identify her rapist, Thompson spent the time during her attack
memorizing her attacker’s face.2 She looked for tattoos, scars, and any other
distinguishing characteristics.3 During the ensuing police investigation, Thompson
identified Ronald Junior Cotton as her attacker.4 As Thompson put it, “I knew this
was the man. I was completely confident. I was sure.”5 As a result of Thompson’s
testimony, Cotton was convicted of rape and was sentenced to life in prison.6 In
1995, after serving eleven years in prison, Cotton was exonerated by DNA

* © 2008 Zack L. Winzeler, 2008 Graduate, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University
of Utah. Special thanks to my wife, Taylor, and my daughter, Sophie, for their support as I
wrote this article, and to Professor Daniel S. Medwed for his encouragement, insight, and
comments.
1
Jennifer Thompson, Op-Ed., I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2000, § 4, at 15.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.

1595
1596 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

evidence.7 The evidence showed that Cotton was not the rapist.8 Rather,
Thompson’s rapist was a man very similar in appearance to Cotton named Bobby
Poole.9 Thompson, resolved to prevent others from making the same mistake she
made, has sought to increase nationwide awareness regarding eyewitness error and
solutions for change.10 In spite of the good she has brought about through her
advocacy, Thompson still “live[s] with constant anguish that [her] profound
mistake cost [Cotton] so dearly.”11
Mistaken eyewitness identifications rank as the leading cause of wrongful
convictions in the United States.12 In fact, one study estimates that mistaken
eyewitness identifications account for 88 percent of wrongful rape convictions and
50 percent of wrongful murder convictions.13 The double-blind sequential lineup
procedure is one of many solutions advanced to reduce mistaken eyewitness
identifications.14 Under this procedure, the officer administering the lineup is
“blind” in that he/she does not know whether the lineup contains the chief suspect.
This procedure prevents the lineup administrator from exercising any undue
influence over the eyewitness.15 Additionally, under the sequential procedure, the
eyewitness views the lineup individuals one at a time, as opposed to the traditional
side-by-side simultaneous approach.16 The sequential procedure is intended to
prevent eyewitnesses from engaging in relative judgment; or, in other words, to
prevent eyewitnesses from comparing the lineup individuals against one another to
identify the culprit. Thus, the sequential procedure requires eyewitnesses to make
an absolute judgment with respect to each lineup individual by comparing each
individual against their memories.17
Citing favorable laboratory studies, some social scientists have touted the
superiority of the double-blind sequential procedure over the simultaneous
procedure and have even recommended its implementation in practice.18 Yet,
critics of such an extensive change in procedure have pointed to the absence of
practical field studies capturing the effects of real crimes, real victims, and real

7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Timothy P. O’Toole, What’s the Matter With Illinois? How an Opportunity Was
Squandered to Conduct an Important Study on Eyewitness Identification Procedures,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 18.
13
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544 (2005).
14
See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical
Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 361–63 & n.179 (2006).
15
Id. at 362.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See John Turtle et al., Best Practice Recommendations for Eyewitness Evidence
Procedures: New Ideas for the Oldest Way to Solve a Case, 1 CAN. J. POLICE & SECURITY
SERVICES 5 (2003).
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1597

eyewitnesses.19 While other field studies have been performed measuring the
benefits of the double-blind sequential lineup procedure in the field,20 the Illinois
pilot program was the first field study to actually compare the double-blind
sequential lineup procedure with the traditional simultaneous lineup procedure.21
Thus, the Illinois pilot program and its results were highly anticipated by scholars
and practitioners alike.22
This paper analyzes the results of and the responses to the highly
controversial Illinois study. Section II discusses the causes of mistaken eyewitness
identifications, including faulty human memory and suggestive police procedures.
Section III addresses some of the proposed solutions to remedying the problem of
mistaken eyewitness identifications including the double-blind sequential lineup
procedure. Section IV discusses the Illinois Study, including its purpose,
methodology, and results. Section V summarizes the responses to the Illinois
Study, both positive and negative. Section VI includes analysis and
recommendations for further field studies and ongoing research into the problem of
mistaken eyewitness identifications. Finally, Section VII concludes that the Illinois
pilot study of the double-blind sequential procedure missed its mark, and social
scientists must work with law enforcement in the future to ensure more meaningful
research in the lineup reform debate.

II. CAUSES OF MISTAKEN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS

Eyewitness testimony is compelling evidence that is tough for defense

counsel to rebut. In fact, when analyzing the eyewitness in the jurors eyes, two
social scientists specializing in eyewitness identification concluded the following:

It is a fortunate lawyer who has photographs available to contradict an

eyewitness. In their absence, the eyewitness, however wrong, is likely to
be believed. In most eyewitness cases, whether civil or criminal, those
who must judge the eyewitness’ testimony have no alternative sources of
information. It is not clear, however, that even if they did have
alternative information, they would choose to use it.23

19
Sheri L. Mecklenburg et al., The Illinois Field Study: A Significant Contribution to
Understanding Real World Eyewitness Identification Issues, 32 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV.
22, 22 (2008).
20
Notable among these field studies is the one conducted in Hennepin County,
Minnesota. See Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin
County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
381, 383 (2006).
21
Mecklenburg et al., supra note 19, at 23.
22
Shirley N. Glaze, Selecting the Guilty Perpetrator: An Examination of the
Effectiveness of Sequential Lineups, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 204 (2007).
23
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 23–24 (1987) (emphasis added).
1598 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

Maybe it is the misguided confidence we have in our own memory that leads
us to weigh eyewitness testimony so favorably. This faith in our own ability to
identify other people possibly causes us to transfer the same faith to other
eyewitnesses. Whatever it is, eyewitness testimony is very strong evidence that
many jurors view as almost irrefutable.
Scholars and social scientists studying the problem of mistaken eyewitness
identifications have attributed the problem to two main causes: imperfect human
memory and potentially suggestive police procedures.24 First, there are many
factors that influence the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. For example,
eyewitnesses do not remember the details of violent events with as much accuracy
as they remember the details of nonviolent events.25 In addition, event factors such
as lighting conditions, duration of the event, and distance from the crime scene all
impair an eyewitness’s ability to witness an event and record its details to
memory.26 This information relating to the accuracy of eyewitness identifications
is particularly relevant when one considers the circumstances under which crimes
usually occur: at night, under poor lighting conditions, and in a rapid fashion.27
Other factors such as the age of the eyewitness and the existence of a cross-racial
identification also affect the ability of an eyewitness to make an accurate
identification.28
These factors do not include the effect that time has on the memory of an
eyewitness. It is no surprise that an eyewitness’s memory fades over time. Not
only do specific details become less clear, eyewitnesses’ memory of events also
becomes distorted over time.29 Finally, even if an eyewitness is confident in her
identification of the culprit or recollection of events, this confidence does not
necessarily translate into accuracy.30
The second main cause leading to mistaken eyewitness identifications is the
potential for suggestive police identification procedures. Among the police
procedures that some social scientists believe lead to mistaken eyewitness
identifications is the traditional simultaneous lineup.31 In the traditional
simultaneous lineup, eyewitnesses view either six photos at a time or six
individuals at a time. Social scientists believe that this method for administering a
lineup encourages the eyewitness to engage in relative judgment—to compare each
lineup individual against the others to determine which individual most closely

24
Medwed, supra note 14, at 358.
25
LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 23, at 27.
26
Id. at 33–41.
27
Medwed, supra note 14, at 358.
28
LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 23, at 55–56; see also Medwed, supra note 14, at 359
(discussing that “people often have difficulty identifying members of different racial
groups”).
29
LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 23, at 69–72.
30
Id. at 88–89.
31
Medwed, supra note 14, at 359–60.
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1599

resembles the culprit.32 The obvious flaw in this procedure is that the person the
eyewitness believes most closely resembles the culprit might not be the culprit at
all. The true culprit might not even be present in the lineup.33
Another police procedure some social scientists fault for mistaken eyewitness
identifications is the practice of having the investigating officer involved with the
case investigation administer the lineup. In this case, the investigating officer,
being closely involved with the case under investigation, knows which of the
lineup individuals is the suspect. Unfortunately, the eyewitness might also know
the investigating officer is aware which individual is the suspect and might dictate
her identification based on verbal and nonverbal cues, whether intentional or not
intentional, received from the investigating officer.34 For example, once a witness
makes an identification, any confirmatory feedback from the investigating officer
(e.g., “good, you identified the actual suspect”) can drastically increase the
witness’s confidence.35 Once an eyewitness receives this type of confirmatory
feedback, going forward, she draws confidence from the confirmatory feedback
rather than from her actual memory of the event.36 Witnesses receiving such
confirmatory feedback are even more likely to testify about their identification in a
court proceeding.37 Likewise, any negative feedback (e.g., “are you sure?” or “look
carefully” or “that’s not our guy”) can falsely diminish the eyewitness’s
confidence in her identification.38
In sum, the two main causes of mistaken eyewitness identifications are faulty
human memory and potentially suggestive police practices. The following section
discusses possible solutions to reduce mistaken eyewitness identifications based on
these causes.

32
Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform,
CHAMPION, June 2005, at 14 (explaining that “witnesses compare one lineup member to the
other lineup members, determine who looks most like the perpetrator, and then tend to
select that person”); see, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & Regina E. Richards, Suspect/Foil
Identification in Actual Crimes and in the Laboratory: A Reality Monitoring Analysis, 29
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 280 (2005) (explaining research that tests the relative judgment
process).
33
Medwed, supra note 14, at 359–60.
34
Id. at 360.
35
Klobuchar et al., supra note 20, at 390; Medwed, supra note 14, at 360.
36
Medwed, supra note 14, at 360.
37
Klobuchar et al., supra note 20, at 390–91.
38
See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 626 (1998) (discussing
studies that have shown that negative feedback can make eyewitnesses less confident in
identification).
1600 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO MISTAKEN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS

The problem of mistaken eyewitness identifications and resulting wrongful

convictions has been well known and documented for many years.39 As a result,
various solutions to prevent mistaken eyewitness identifications have evolved.40
This section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of some of the proposed
solutions.
One of the solutions proposed by social scientists is to videotape the entire
lineup procedure.41 A videotape recording of the procedure would give those
challenging the identification process actual evidence from which they can base
their legal challenges. In theory, a videotape recording would show whether proper
instructions were given to the eyewitness, whether the investigating officer
manipulated the identification process through verbal or nonverbal cues, and the
confidence with which the eyewitness identified the individual.42 All of this
information would be beneficial to have in the case of a post hoc review, but,
unfortunately, there is “no evidence that videotaping leads eyewitnesses to be less
likely to make identification errors.”43 Additionally, a proposal to implement a
videotape procedure nationwide would be costly and difficult to administer.44
While videotaping might provide some prophylactic safeguards, it is limited in its
effect on actually reducing mistaken eyewitness identifications.
Another solution to prevent wrongful convictions resulting from mistaken
eyewitness identifications is to instruct the jury regarding the shortcomings of
eyewitness identifications.45 Ideally, the instructions would highlight, among other
things, all of the conditions that can impair an eyewitness’s perception of events,
the problems associated with an eyewitness making cross-racial identifications,
and how an eyewitness’s memory fades over time.46 This solution also has its
limitations, however, given the evidence showing how strongly jurors credit
eyewitness testimony even in instances where defense counsel has almost entirely
discredited the eyewitness through cross-examination.47 Additionally, jury
instructions do not target the prevention of inaccurate identifications; rather,

39
See generally EDWIN M BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 367 (1932) (collecting sixty-five wrongful conviction cases occurring in
the early 1900s).
40
Wells et al., supra note 38, at 603, 627–641 (recommending that procedures such as
“double-blind lineup testing should be used, that eyewitnesses should be forewarned that
the culprit might not be present, that distractors should be selected based on the
eyewitness's verbal description of the perpetrator, and that confidence should be assessed
and recorded at the time of identification”).
41
Id. at 640–41.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 641.
45
Medwed, supra note 14, at 361.
46
See supra text accompanying notes 24–38.
47
See LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 23, at 24–25.
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1601

instructions attempt to “assist jurors in evaluating the reliability of eyewitness

identifications at trial.”48
Instructing eyewitnesses regarding the lineup before they make their
identification has been shown to reduce inaccurate identifications.49 The
instructions to the eyewitness should include a warning that the person in question
might not be in the lineup or photo spread and that they should not feel obligated
to make an identification.50 “[T]his instruction serves to alert eyewitnesses about
the possibility that the actual culprit is not in the lineup, encourages eyewitnesses
to not merely make relative judgments, and legitimizes the behavior of not
identifying anyone.”51 Ideally, such an instruction would minimize the pressure
exerted by police and victims’ families on an eyewitness to make an identification.
This solution appears, at face value, to be easy for police stations to implement.
Law enforcement may argue, however, that this procedure will discourage
eyewitnesses from making identifications and, as a result, fewer identifications will
be obtained. Closely related to the idea of instructing eyewitnesses is the idea of
requiring eyewitnesses to complete confidence statements. The confidence
statement asks eyewitnesses to rate their degree of certainty.52 The confidence
statement can later be used at trial or in another stage of the proceeding to make
sure eyewitnesses do not inflate or exaggerate the confidence with which they
made their initial identification.
The blind administrator solution, like the viewing instructions, attacks the
problem of mistaken eyewitness identifications at its source. In blind
administration (or double-blind administration) the person conducting the lineup or
photo spread does not know which lineup individual is the suspect.53 However, this
method is not commonly employed. The “[c]ommon practice at this time is for the
detective involved closely in the case, who knows which lineup member is the
suspect, to administer the lineup.”54 This practice, law enforcement argues, is
preferred because eyewitnesses are more accustomed to dealing with investigating
officers and detectives and this familiarity puts the eyewitness more at ease.55 Law

48
Medwed, supra note 14, at 363.
49
Wells et al., supra note 38, at 629.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 635.
53
Id. at 627.
54
Id.
55
SHERI L. MECKLENBURG, ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES app. at exhibit 19 (2006), available at
http://www.chicagopolice.org/Apndx%20to%20IL%20Pilot%20on%20Eyewitness%20ID.
pdf (Police participating in the Illinois study, commenting on the double-blind procedure,
stated that “As a detective, you develop a rapport and trust with your victims. Your victims
depend on you, the investigator, and must likely resent being ‘punted’ to other, unknown
detectives, on the case”).
1602 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

enforcement also complains that finding a blind administrator not associated with
the case causes delay and disrupts the flow of the case.56
Supporters of the double-blind procedure, on the other hand, point to the
potential for suggestiveness when the case detective or investigator administers the
lineup.57 The lineup procedure between the administrator and the eyewitness can
be a “highly interpersonal process.”58 Additionally, there may be a preexisting
relationship between the lineup administrator and the eyewitness. Thus, given the
nature of the lineup process, even a smile or a nonverbal reinforcement of a
particular lineup individual can lead an eyewitness to make a false identification.59
While it is most likely rare that an investigating officer would intentionally taint
the process and suggest to the eyewitness the police’s main suspect, there is still
potential for unintentional suggestiveness. One example is the problem of
confirmatory feedback addressed in Section II.60 Witnesses rely on such feedback
as much or more than their own memory to gain confidence for their
identification.61 These issues of suggestiveness and the potential for undue
influence go by the wayside when the process is administered by a blind
administrator. The eyewitness will no longer read into the administrator’s verbal or
nonverbal cues to gain confidence in their identification.62 The blind administrator
will not even know who the suspect or person of interest in the lineup is and
therefore will not be able to affect the procedure in any way. The double-blind
procedure, as discussed in this paragraph, was one of the procedures the Illinois
pilot program set out to study in the field.63 The other main procedure, as the
following paragraphs discuss, is the sequential lineup procedure.
The sequential lineup procedure is a solution that is intended to prevent an
eyewitness from engaging in relative judgment. As was briefly discussed in
Section II, lineups are traditionally administered simultaneously.64 Under the
simultaneous procedure, all individuals are presented side-by-side, whether it is in
a live lineup or in a photo array. Researchers suggest that simultaneous lineups
allow eyewitnesses to engage in relative judgment by comparing the lineup
individuals against one another, and through almost a process of elimination, select
the individual who most closely resembles the culprit.65 Sequential lineups
eliminate any opportunity for an eyewitness to engage in relative judgment by
presenting the lineup individuals one at a time and requiring the eyewitness to

56
See id. at 57–58.
57
See, e.g., Wells et al., supra note 38, at 627 (discussing research on experimenter-
expectancy effects indicating how “powerful” the interaction between the administrator and
the witness can be).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 628.
60
See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
61
Wells et al., supra note 38, at 629.
62
Id.
63
MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at i.
64
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
65
See Medwed, supra note 14, at 361.
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1603

make an absolute judgment (e.g., “yes, that’s him.” or “no, that’s not the guy.”)
after each person or photo is viewed. Research has shown that sequential lineups
reduce the number of inaccurate identifications.66 One of the criticisms of the
sequential lineup procedure is not so much of its implementation, but of its effects.
Critics argue that the sequential lineup procedure reduces identifications overall,
both inaccurate and accurate.67
The main criticism, however, of the sequential procedure is that its
effectiveness has only been proven in the laboratory.68 For this reason, the Illinois
pilot program studying the double-blind sequential procedure was highly
anticipated.69 In fact, ever since the United States Department of Justice
recommended the implementation of double-blind sequential procedures in
October of 1999,70 the procedures have been a hot topic. Some jurisdictions,
including New Jersey; Boston, Massachusetts; and Hennepin County, Minnesota
have already implemented the procedure.71 Other jurisdictions such as California,
Virginia, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have recommended, but not made
mandatory, the double-blind sequential procedures.72 Still, many other jurisdictions
are awaiting the results of field studies that conclusively prove the superiority of
the double-blind sequential procedure before they choose to implement the
procedures.73 Given this political climate, it is easy to understand why the Illinois
study, the largest field study of its kind to date, was so controversial.

IV. THE ILLINOIS STUDY

Illinois has been the hotbed of reform in the area of wrongful convictions. The
Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment released a report in April
2002 detailing the causes of wrongful convictions in capital cases and proposing
66
Wells et al., supra note 38, at 639.
67
See Klobuchar et al., supra note 20, at 395.
68
David Feige, Witnessing Guilt, Ignoring Innocence?, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at
A21 (“For years, district attorneys have resisted calls to reform lineups, arguing that
because double-blind sequential protocols had never been tested on ‘real’ victims outside
the laboratory, they shouldn’t be adopted in the field.”).
69
Glaze, supra note 22, at 204.
70
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
178240.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (“Blind procedures are . . . a direction for future
exploration and field testing. In the interim, an enhanced awareness on the part of
investigators of the subtle impact they may have on witnesses will result in more
professional identification procedures.”).
71
Glaze, supra note 22, at 204.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., David Heinzmann, Lawyers Seek Lineup Data: Lawsuit Filed in Bid to
Rebut Police Study on New Procedures, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2007, at Metro Section (noting
that New Mexico prosecutors are now using the Illinois pilot program results to defeat
proposed legislation requiring double-blind sequential lineup procedures).
1604 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

reforms to improve the criminal justice process.74 The document, titled the Report
of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, included recommendations
to prevent wrongful convictions in capital cases.75 The Governor’s Commission
noted in its Report that mistaken eyewitness identifications were a major
contributor to wrongful convictions in the state of Illinois.76 To address the
problem of mistaken eyewitness identifications, the Governor’s Commission made
several recommendations for change.77 It recommended, among other things, that
law enforcement tell eyewitnesses the suspect might not be in the lineup, that the
eyewitness should not assume the person administering the lineup knows who the
suspect is, and that the lineup identification should be videotaped when possible.78
While the Governor’s Commission made several recommendations to
improve police practices, it focused mostly on the implementation of the double-
blind sequential identification procedure.79 In fact, some members of the
Governor’s Commission felt so strongly about the double-blind procedure that
they sought to make its implementation mandatory.80 Naturally, the Commission
understood that implementing the double-blind procedure would pose special
problems for law enforcement agencies, but nonetheless made its recommendation
in hopes of improving the accuracy of identification procedures.81 The Governor’s
Commission also recommended the use of the sequential identification
procedure.82 Again, most Commission members were convinced by the research of
Gary L. Wells and other social scientists that “[t]he sequential procedure produces
a lower rate of mistaken identifications . . . with little loss in the rate of accurate
identifications . . . .”83
Not surprisingly, many police departments spoke out against the
recommendations. Among the most ardent opponents of the recommendations was
the Chicago Police Department.84 In fact, its spokesman complained that Chicago

74
O’Toole, supra note 12, at 18.
75
See STATE OF ILL. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF
THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/complete_report.pdf
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
76
See id. at 31 (noting that “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness testimony has become
increasingly well-documented in both academic literature and in courts of law”).
77
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, at 19–43.
78
Id. at 34, 39.
79
O’Toole, supra note 12, at 18.
80
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, at 33 (stating that Commission members in
the “minority view” were convinced that “the ‘double-blind’ procedure is critical to
accurate identification procedures, and that the alternative [non-blind administration]
carries an unacceptable risk of faulty identifications”).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 34.
83
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wells et al., supra note 38, at 639).
84
O’Toole, supra note 12, at 19.
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1605

was being used as “the proving ground” for academic research.85 Facing such
opposition, the Illinois legislature decided to exclude the double-blind sequential
procedure from its 2003 reform package.86 Instead, the Illinois legislature
commissioned a pilot project studying the double-blind sequential procedure in
three Illinois cities: Chicago, Joliet, and Evanston.87
The Illinois State Police, charged with conducting the pilot program,
appointed Sheri H. Mecklenburg, the General Counsel to the Superintendant of the
Chicago Police Department, as its program director.88 Mecklenburg selected Roy
Malpass, a Professor of Psychology at the University of Texas-El Paso, as the
program analyst.89 The pilot program selected Chicago, Joliet, and Evanston as its
participating jurisdictions because the cities met the requirements for three
jurisdictions of differing populations.90 Its stated mission was to “measure both the
effectiveness and the practicality of conducting the sequential double-blind
identification procedure.”91
In preparation for the launch of the pilot program, Mecklenburg conducted
seventeen training sessions training approximately 476 officers.92 Data comparing
the double-blind sequential procedure with the simultaneous procedure was
collected from October 1, 2004 through approximately November 17, 2005.93
Mecklenburg released the Report summarizing the pilot program’s findings
on March 17, 2006.94 In the end, 319 simultaneous lineups and 229 sequential
lineups were analyzed, making for a total of 548 lineups.95 Selection of a suspect
was considered an accurate identification.96 Selection of a filler, on the other hand,
was considered an inaccurate identification.97 Eyewitnesses identified the suspect
59.9% of the time in simultaneous lineups, as compared to only 45% of the time in
sequential lineups.98 This data confirmed the belief of sequential procedure
critics—that it results in fewer positive identifications. This result might be
acceptable, however, if there was also a decrease in the sequential procedure’s

85
Id. (citing Frank Main, One-By-One Police Lineup Considered, CHI. SUN TIMES,
May 6, 2003, at 12).
86
O’Toole, supra note 12, at 19.
87
Id. at 19 & 22 n.28.
88
MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at 22, exhibit 9.
89
Id. at 22.
90
Id. at 24. Chicago has a population in excess of 500,000 people, Joliet has a
population between 100,000 and 500,000 people, and Evanston has a population less than
100,000 people. Id. at 24–25.
91
Id. at 29.
92
Id. at 36.
93
Id. at 36–37.
94
See id. at cover page.
95
Id. at 38.
96
Id. at iii.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 38.
1606 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

number of inaccurate identifications as compared to the simultaneous procedure.

That, the Illinois Study suggested, was not the case. In fact, eyewitnesses made
inaccurate identifications in 9.2% of sequential identifications as compared to only
2.8% in simultaneous identifications.99 Finally, eyewitnesses made no
identification at all at a higher rate in sequential identifications versus
simultaneous identifications—47.2% to 37.6%.100
Regarding the implementation of the sequential procedure, the Illinois study
concluded it was fairly easy for police departments to implement the procedure for
photographic lineups.101 It was, however, much more of a logistical challenge for
the departments to conduct a sequential presentation for live lineups.102 Overall,
the Illinois study assuaged much of the sequential critics’ concern over its practical
implementation.
On the other hand, implementation of the blind administration procedure
posed several problems for the participating jurisdictions.103 First, law enforcement
complained that blind administrators did not have a rapport with the witnesses
enough to “allay the witness’s fear or reluctance to make an identification.”104 The
study found this was especially true when the witness was the victim and was
being asked to identify her assailant.105 Additionally, those participating in the
study found many precincts did not have the necessary resources to implement the
procedure.106 Even where resources could be allocated to implement the procedure,
law enforcement complained, the tradeoff meant fewer police resources on the
street.107
Taking into account both the practical and statistical conclusions of the
Illinois pilot study, Mecklenburg concluded that “[t]he Illinois data shows that the
sequential, double-blind method as proposed by the scientific research did not
prove to be a superior lineup procedure when compared to the simultaneous
method as currently employed by law enforcement and, in fact, proved to be
inferior under the measure of known errors.”108

99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 50–51.
102
Id. at 51.
103
Id. at 57.
104
Id.; see also MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at exhibit 19 (discussing that in a
survey completed at the end of the pilot program, officers gave the following responses:
“Having to use a administrator [sic] in a police setting had drawbacks. Finding someone
not associated with the case was sometimes difficult. Witnesses were unsure of what was
going on when the person they’d been dealing with wasn’t the same any longer.”; “It is
very inconvenient for both the police and the victim/witness to wait for an administrator to
respond.”; “Too much down time finding and waiting for blind administrator, interrupts
flow of investigation. Causes more inconvenience for witnesses having to wait around to
view lineup.”).
105
MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at 57.
106
Id. at 57–58.
107
Id. at 58.
108
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1607

V. RESPONSES TO THE ILLINOIS STUDY

As mentioned, the Illinois pilot program was highly anticipated because of

what it could mean for reform in police procedures and protection of the
wrongfully convicted. The results of the pilot program, which were contrary to
many well-established scientific studies, were very controversial.109 Many scholars
and practitioners spoke out against the study and its employed methodology.
Others, such as the pilot program’s director, Sheri H. Mecklenburg, defended the
study and its results. This section will summarize both reactions—the criticism and
the support.

A. Criticism

One critic characterized the Illinois study as follows: “the study was so rife
with methodological errors and biased analysis that it crossed the line between
science and advocacy.”110 The criticism can be broken down into two main
categories: first, flawed methodology; and second, biased circumstances.
First, critics complain that “the sequential lineups [in the Illinois study] were
always conducted using double-blind procedures and the simultaneous lineups
were always conducted using non-blind procedures.”111 In other words, the Illinois
pilot program did not compare “apples to apples.”112 Social scientists refer to this
inconsistency in research variables as a “confound.”113 Critics contend the only
solution to remedy the confound and obtain meaningful data would be to compare
sequential and simultaneous lineups when both are blindly administered.114 Thus,
scholars concluded that the confound “has devastating consequences for assessing
the real-world implications of this particular study.”115 For example, critics argue
that the confound in the study may have allowed nonblind administrators

109
Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the
Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2008) (“The Mecklenburg Report was vigorously
publicized, and it immediately drew both determined support and sharp criticism from
psychologists who had long been interested in the issue of eyewitness investigative
procedures.”).
110
Feige, supra note 68, at A21.
111
Gary L. Wells, Field Experiments on Eyewitness Identification: Towards a Better
Understanding of Pitfalls and Prospects, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 6, 7 (2007); see also
Schacter et al., supra note 109, at 3–4 (finding that “although the conditions used in the
study made some sense from a practical standpoint, the design guaranteed that most
outcomes would be difficult or impossible to interpret”).
112
O’Toole, supra note 12, at 19.
113
See Schacter et al., supra note 109, at 4 (noting that the Illinois Study’s procedure
“does contain a confound”).
114
See Wells, supra note 111, at 7.
115
Schacter et al., supra note 109, at 4.
1608 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

conducting the simultaneous procedure to manipulate the process and influence the
outcomes.116
Second, critics of the pilot program contend the study was conducted under
potentially biased circumstances.117 For example, the Illinois State Police did not
run the pilot project, rather it was the Chicago Police Department, the same police
department who had so vehemently opposed any legislatively mandated change in
its procedures.118 Before the pilot program began, all of the officers involved were
trained on the nature and purpose of the study.119 Therefore, the officers knew if
the new double-blind sequential procedure outperformed the status quo, they
would be required to implement the new procedure.120 This training, critics
contend, “cannot be squared with valid scientific methodology because it creates
the possibility that the subjects will change their behavior to influence the
outcome.”121
The critics’ contention of bias finds support in the participating officers’
responses to the pilot program’s final survey. When asked to identify any negatives
of the double-blind sequential procedure, the officers did not hold back in making
the following comments and observations:

• “It’s all negative because it is useless and does not have a purpose.”
• “When is the government and the criminal justice system going to
stop permitting a small but vocal group of liberal thinkers, whose
only concern is the rights of criminals, to dictate procedures and start
doing its job of protecting the innocent victims and witnesses?”
• “This is a bad idea, scrap it.”
• “Get rid of it, it is useless. Stop making the idiot who decided to start
this look like they have a purpose.”122

These comments are only a few among many retrieved by the survey. Critics argue
the comments and feedback clearly show that the officers were not unbiased
participants in a scientific study.123
Additionally, critics contend the Illinois study’s conclusions do not comport
with common sense. For example, the study only reported a 2.8% error rate for
simultaneous procedures.124 This number is significantly lower than the 20% error
rate reported in other field studies.125 Critics suggest that this lower rate justifies
“the concern that administrator bias is operating, either consciously or

116
Id.
117
See O’Toole, supra note 12, at 19.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at exhibit 19.
123
See O’Toole, supra note 12, at 19 & 22 n.16.
124
MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at 42.
125
Id. at 42 & n.41.
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1609

unconsciously; either by failing to count tentative ‘filler’ choices, or in steering

witnesses away from fillers, or toward suspects.”126 Additionally, the study oddly
concluded that a witness’s memory improves over time.127 This, the critics
contend, is yet another reason not to trust the Illinois study and its results.128
To summarize, the main criticism of the study is the confound—testing blind
sequential against non-blind simultaneous. Also, the critics contend that the study
was conducted under biased circumstances and they point to the participants’
feedback and the study’s results to prove the bias.

B. Support

Not surprisingly, the main support for the Illinois study has come from its
director, Sheri H. Mecklenburg. The supporters respond to the criticisms with three
main points: first, the pilot program did just as it was directed by comparing the
status quo to the double-blind sequential procedure; second, the presence of a
confound does not affect the value of the results; and third, there is no proof that
the results of the program are the product of undue police influence or bias.129 I
will address each of the supporter’s points in turn.
The first argument is basically that the pilot program did just as it was
commissioned: it compared the double-blind sequential procedure to the traditional
simultaneous procedure. In other words, the commission was not asked to isolate
variables, either the sequential or the double-blind procedures, to test their
effectiveness individually. Rather, the commission was asked to compare the
proposed system, which included both sequential and double-blind, against the
traditional system.130 Supporters also contend that just because the results of the
pilot program do not comport with past studies does not mean that the study cannot
be trusted.131 They suggest, rather, that the effects of real world factors like real
eyewitnesses, real crimes, and real victims make the study’s results more credible
than conventional lab studies.132 The supporters also suggest that critics of the
study are social scientists married to their own theories and are unwilling to admit
they could be wrong.133

126
Schacter et al., supra note 109, at 5.
127
MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at exhibit 17, tbl.11 (reporting that simultaneous
procedures produced a suspect identification rate of 56.7% for identifications conducted 48
hours after the incident, while identifications made 31 days after the incident in the same
control group improved to 67.1%).
128
See O’Toole, supra note 12, at 21.
129
See Mecklenburg et al., supra note 19, at 23–26.
130
Id. at 24.
131
Id. at 24–25.
132
Id. at 22.
133
Id.
1610 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

Second, the supporters contend that even given the existence of a compound,
the study’s results can be evaluated independent of the compound.134 Therefore,
rather than comparing the proposed versus the traditional procedure, the supporters
would like to isolate the results from the sequential double-blind procedure to
determine whether its known error rate of 9.2% is acceptable.135
Third and finally, supporters contend that there is no proof or reason to
believe that the police officers participating in the study influenced its results.136
Without a way to support its claim, the supporters point to similar statistical results
in other studies in which they claim no undue influence was exercised.137
Mecklenburg concludes her article in support of the study by appealing to her
duties as a prosecutor:

As prosecutors, we have an allegiance only to the truth, not to any

particular method of eyewitness identification procedure. We believe that
the truth will be found in field studies, which flesh out the issues that
laboratory research cannot address and provide an acceptable basis for
evaluating eyewitness identification procedures.138

VI. ANALYSIS

As mentioned, Illinois had an opportunity to conduct a groundbreaking

research study regarding the causes of mistaken eyewitness identifications. Like
the critics of the study, I agree that Illinois missed its opportunity to do so. Even if
the study’s results were accurate and the confound did not have a devastating
effect, the study is clouded with so much suspicion of bias and errors in
methodology that its results will always be questioned. Now, many opponents of
lineup procedure reform are citing the study in their arguments to state legislators
considering mandated changes in lineup procedures. This is unfortunate because
the Illinois study has not closed the debate on the superiority of the traditional
simultaneous lineup. Legislatures should not base their decisions regarding lineup
reform on the Illinois study given its many problems.
If there is a silver lining to the Illinois study, it is that the study has brought
focus and attention to the problem of wrongful convictions. The critics of the study
are now more committed than ever to conduct a study free from bias and
methodological error. Hopefully, if anything, the Illinois study can be used as a
lesson learned for social scientists designing future studies on lineups. Without
question, any new studies must address and correct the Illinois study’s confound. I
believe that any new study must do so by isolating sequential and simultaneous
lineups for comparison, while holding constant the blind method of administration.

134
Id. at 24–25.
135
Id. at 24.
136
Id. at 25.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 26.
2008] DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL LINEUPS 1611

Such an approach would eliminate any possibility for law enforcement bias to
manipulate the study.
Even though the study’s confound is troubling, more alarming are the results
of the police questionnaire.139 These comments show that some of the police
officers participating in the study were not at all interested in finding a solution to
the problem of mistaken identifications. Upon reading these comments, the study
loses its credibility.
As I have analyzed the Illinois study, I have wondered if an effective and
unbiased study can ever be designed and conducted given the law enforcement
community’s opposition to such reforms. There have, however, been promising
results from other studies such as the one conducted in Hennepin County,
Minnesota, that provide hope for the success of future studies.140
Future social scientists must also recognize that the sequential procedure and
the double-blind procedure need not necessarily go hand-in-hand. In other words,
if one of the two procedures proves successful at reducing mistaken identifications,
it can be implemented independent of the other procedure. The historical grouping
of the two procedures together has impeded progress toward finding out if either of
the two, or both, can reduce mistaken identifications.
In addition, while further studies should be performed to test the accuracy and
success of both the sequential and double-blind procedures, researchers should also
look at other options to reduce mistaken identifications. Gary L. Wells addressed
the myopia surrounding the sequential procedure in the following statement:

[I]t is unfortunate that the sequential procedure has come to dominate so

much of the discussion regarding lineup procedures. . . . Regardless of
whether one uses a simultaneous or sequential procedure, there are other
important problems with lineups that have to be addressed. These other
problems include: instructions to the eyewitnesses, the selection of lineup
fillers, how witness certainty is assessed, how to eliminate inadvertent
influences from the lineup administrator, what records must be kept and
so on. Fixation on the sequential procedure is creating a certain degree of
myopia with regard to seeing the broad problems with lineups.141

The debate over the sequential versus the simultaneous procedure has taken
away from the underlying problem of mistaken identifications leading to wrongful
convictions. Therefore, going forward, law enforcement must be open to many
potential changes in procedure if it hopes to reduce mistaken identifications.

139
See MECKLENBURG, supra note 55, at exhibit 19.
140
See Klobuchar et al., supra note 20, at 410–13.
141
You Asked About the Sequential Lineup: Could You Read This First?, (Dec.
2001), http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/ouaskedaboutsequential.htm.
1612 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4

VII. CONCLUSION

Mistaken eyewitness identification is the leading cause of wrongful

convictions. Illinois has led the nation in police procedure reform attempting to
reduce wrongful convictions. Unfortunately, the Chicago Police Department
missed the mark in its pilot study of the double-blind sequential procedure. The
study is plagued by a confound that compares blind sequential procedures with
nonblind simultaneous procedures. There are also several suggestions throughout
the Mecklenburg report of police bias and undue influence in administering the
study. Therefore, the pilot study’s results cannot be trusted to prove the superiority
of the simultaneous procedure over the sequential procedure. Going forward, law
enforcement must continue to recognize that mistaken eyewitness identifications
occur at an astounding rate and that a change in their procedures will be necessary
to remedy the problem. Also, social scientists must work alongside law
enforcement to conduct studies that are meaningful to the lineup reform debate. In
the future, the sequential procedure must be compared against the simultaneous
procedure while controlling the blind administration variable. Otherwise, there will
still be potential for manipulation in future studies. Additionally, researchers must
search for new ways to improve lineups and prevent mistaken identifications so
that the innocent remain free.