252.

Macalintal vs President Electoral Tribunal

En Banc
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
Respondent.
Nachura, J
Topic: Constitutional Law; Questions the constitution of Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Facts:
 Atty. Macalintal questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal
and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 He allegedly concedes that the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a
budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the
constitutional mandate.
 Further, petitioner highlights Court’s decision in Buac vs COMELEC, which declared that "contests
involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
PET, . . . in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."
 On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the
Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.
Issue:
Whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and
violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No, the constitution of PET is constitutional and does not violate Section 4, Art. VII and Sec. 12, Art.
VIII of the Constitution.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full
authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e.,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which we have armed on numerous occasions. Particularly cogent are the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point
to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning
as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government —
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary — but not separate but not separate therefrom.
The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional
directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was
designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special
electoral court. the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
 252. Macalintal vs President Electoral Tribunal

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.