REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

NATIONAL CAPITLA JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY

XXXXX and XXXXX,

Plaintiffs,

-versus- Civil Case No. R-QZN-18-XXXXX

XXXXX and the Registry of Deeds of

Quezon City, and all other persons
acting for and on their behalf,
Defendants.
x------------------------------------------x

ORDER

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration (to the Order dated
January 26, 2018) dated February 6, 2018.

In the said Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiffs, though counsel

allege, among others, that in an Order dated January 26, 2018, the Court
denied plaintiffs’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) because “(a) TRO will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right
which is merely contingent and may never arise, since to be protected by a
TRO, there is an urgent necessity for the TRO to prevent serious damage”
and it was “not shown by the plaintiff”; that in plaintiff’s testimony, it could
be culled that defendant XXXXX Construction & Trading Corporation had
already completed and filed all the documentary requirements, including the
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale, for the issuance of a new transfer certificate
of title in its favor; and that without an injunctive relief issued by the Court,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City will have to issue a title in favor of
defendant XXXXX based on a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale to the
irreparable injustice of the plaintiffs and as well as damage and injury to the
integrity of the Torrens System which strives to cleanse itself of fake land
titles. Plaintiffs pray for the reconsideration by the Court of its Order dated
January 26, 2018 denying plaintiffs’ prayer for issuance of a TRO.

After carefully evaluating the arguments raised by the opposing

parties, the Court finds no cogent reason to reconsider the Order dated
June 22, 2015.

Under existing jurisprudence, these requisites must be proved

before a writ of preliminary injunction, be it mandatory or prohibitory, will
issue:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to

be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and
 (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists
to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 1
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive
reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights and interests.2

1
Isabel Marquez et. al. Vs Hon. Sanchez, et. al. G.R. No. 141849, February 13,
2007.
2
Australian Professional Realty, Inc., Jesus Garcia, and Lydia Marciano vs.
Municipality of Padre Garcia Batangas Province, G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012, citing
Brizuela v. Dingle, G.R. No. 175371, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA 662, citing Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 473, 479 (1998).
 Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of
an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious
damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme
urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise
unless it is issued immediately.3

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an

application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the
following grounds are established, thus: virtual law library
 
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
 
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
 
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.

Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must

show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to
be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. 4

3
Id,. citing Abundo v. Manio, Jr., 370 Phil. 850, 869 (1999)
4
Id., citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 342 Phil. 90 (1997).
 In the present case, petitioners failed to show that they have
a clear and unmistakable right over the property they are
occupying. A perusal of the petition shows that petitioners rely on
their alleged right of possession of the subject property on the
Residential Use Permit issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development. However, only a photocopy of an alleged Ordinary
Residential Permit attached to Annex “J” of the petition was
submitted. No other proof was presented to show that petitioners
have a right of possession over the subject property. Moreover, a
perusal of the said permit provides for several restrictions on the
permittee, including, but not limited to: “The permittee shall vacate
the area occupied should a valid title be found over the same.”

A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted

by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. 5 It has been settled
that where the complainants’ right or title is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper.6

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a

pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case.7 Where it is the Government which is
being enjoined from implementing an issuance which enjoys the
presumption of validity, such discretion must be exercised with
utmost caution.8 The burden is on petitioner to show in his
application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a
TRO in his favor,9

5
Id., citing  Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 162336, 1 February 2010, 611 SCRA
191.
6
Id., citing  Ocampo v. Sison vda. de Fernandez, G.R. No. 164529, 19 June
2007, 525 SCRA 79.
7
Id., citing Barbieto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184645, 30 October 2009,
604 SCRA 825
8
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his official capacity as the Executive Secretary vs.
Hon. Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino, et al., G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011.
9
Id.
 which petitioners failed to do in this case.

Considering that the acts sought to be enjoined by

petitioners in their prayer for the issuance of the injunctive relief
are the very same acts which are the crux of the petition, the Court
will now delve into the merits of the petition.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the public

respondents’ act of implementing or enforcing the questioned Final
Notice of Demolition, Notice of Demolition and Notice of Pre-
Demolition Conference violated petitioners’ right to due process.

The Court rules in the negative.

The authority of the public respondents to conduct

demolition, eviction and relocation activities is not disputed by
petitioners. What petitioners are claiming is that the Final Notice of
Demolition is contrary to substantive and procedural due process,
as “they were not given their day in court.”

It has been explained that due process, as a constitutional

precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.10

10
Ray Peter O. Vivo vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013,
citing Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780, December 27, 2007.
 A perusal of the petition itself reveals that petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to the Memorandum dated 18
September 2014. Although it was subsequently dismissed, still
petitioners had a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side and seek reconsideration of said Memorandum. They even
attended the Pre-Demolition Conference on 10 July 2015 at Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City. Aside from the bare
allegation that the said conference was an “intimidation tactic”
utilized by public respondents to frighten them, no proof was
submitted to substantiate said claim. Clearly, there was no
violation of petitioners’ right to due process.

Wherefore, premises considered, the prayer for the issuance

of a temporary restraining order and the petition for prohibitory
injunction are denied for lack of merit.

A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and

preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and
interests.11 Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the
existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent
serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such
extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would
arise unless it is issued immediately.12

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an

application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the
following grounds are established, thus: virtual law library
 
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
 
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
 
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
11
Australian Professional Realty, Inc., Jesus Garcia, and Lydia Marciano vs.
Municipality of Padre Garcia Batangas Province, G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012, citing
Brizuela v. Dingle, G.R. No. 175371, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA 662, citing Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 473, 479 (1998).
12
Id,. citing Abundo v. Manio, Jr., 370 Phil. 850, 869 (1999)
 subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.

Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must

show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to
be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. 13

After a careful evaluation of the allegations in the Petition the

Court finds that irreparable injury would be suffered by the
petitioners if the implementation of the questioned Decision and
Writ is not restrained before the matter of the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction be heard. Moreover, considering the urgency
of the situation, the Court hereby issues a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the Sheriff of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 37,
Quezon City, for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt of this
Order, from implementing the questioned Decision dated
November 10, 2015 and Writ issued in Civil Case No. 4756.

Set this case for hearing on the application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction on ______________ at ________
a.m. Notify the parties.
SO ORDERED.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that plaintiffs did not attach any
evidence to support their allegation in their Motion for Reconsideration that
defendant XXXXX Construction & Trading Corporation had already completed
and filed all the documentary requirements for the issuance of a new
certificate transfer of title. Absent any such evidence, the Court is constrained
to deny the Motion for Reconsideration (to the Order dated January 26,
2018).

13
Id., citing\ Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 342 Phil. 90 (1997).