Extortion under IPC (1960)

The scope Extortion as given for the purpose of Indian Law is defined under Section 383 –
Section 389 of the Indian Penal Code (1860).

Hence the definition is as follows –

Section 383 – Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person,
or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any
person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be
converted into valuable security commits “extortion”.

From the above description of extortion as per section 383 on the Indian Penal Code it can be
inferred that the offence of extortion must have following essential ingredients –

a. Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury - One of the necessary ingredients of

the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any
property or valuable security etc. under of injury. The fear must be of such nature and
extent as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and takes away from
his acts the element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent.

Here the wide interpretation of injury must be kept in mind in respect to section 44 which is
as follows –

Section 44 – The word ‘injury’ denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person,
in body, mind, reputation or property.

The above section therefore ascribes to the description and nature of injury being against
property, injury whether physical or mental or against the goodwill of a person which may
cause distress.

Whether a person has in fact been put in any injury is a matter which courts must decide.
Since the fear of injury is an essential ingredient to constitute the offence of extortion, it is
necessary to imply that the nature and extent of such injury under similar circumstances
keeping in consideration the facts of the case would be found in an ordinary reasonable
prudent man.

Therefore the Courts have remarked that, though fear is not necessarily confined to an
apprehension of bodily injury, it must be in reason as, in reason and common experience, is
likely to induce a person to part with his property against his will, and to put him as it were
under a temporary suspension of the power of exercising it through influence of the terror
impressed; in which case, fear implies as well in sound reason in legal construction, the place
of force, or an actual taking by violence or assault upon the person.1

Illustration – A threatens to publish defamatory libel concerning Z, unless Z gives him

money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

State v. Basavegowda2

Here the husband, the accused took his wife to a forest and obtained her ornaments under
threats to kill to kill her. The ornaments were subsequently recovered from him. Since the
essential ingredient constituting the offence of extortion, putting a person in fear of injury i.e.
the threat to kill was present in the above mentioned case therefore the accused was held
guilty under the offence of extortion under s.383 of the Indian Penal Code (1860).

Threat of Criminal Accusation – It is also to be noted that the threat of a criminal charge,
whether true or false would also amount to the fear of injury. Herein the guilt or the
innocence of the party threatened would be immaterial.

Therefore threatening to expose a clergyman who had criminal intercourse with a woman in a
house of ill-fame in his own church and village, to his own bishop, and arch-bishop and also
publish his shame in the newspapers was held to be such a threat wherein an ordinary prudent
man could not be expected to resist such threat. The injury in the case was an injury to the
reputation thus falling under the scope and meaning of ‘injury’ as per s.44. This constituted
the offence of extortion and the clergyman was held guilty.3 Similarly it was decided in an
another key English case, where the prisoner was charged with robbery for having induced
the prosecutor to part with money by a threat that the prisoner would take him before the

1
Re Donolley’s Case.
2
1997 CrLJ 4386 (Kant).
3
Miard (1844) 1 Cox 22.
magistrate and accuse him of having attempted an unnatural offence4. The prisoner
inducedfear and therefore was guilty of extortion.

Purshrottam Jethanand v. State of Kutch 5

In this case the accused was a police jamadar working in the local in the local investigation
branch of the State of Kutch. He had visited a particular taluk, and checked passports of a
number of persons who had returned from Africa. In the course of the check he collected the
passport of one Ananda Ratna in a village and demanded a sum of Rs. 800 for its return.
Accordingly the said amount was paid and the passport returned.

The accused was convicted under s.384 IPC, it was contented before the Supreme Court, no
fear of injury was held out by the accused to support the conviction under s.384 of IPC.
However the Supreme Court held that from the evidence, it was found that the accused in the
course of his check of the passports had suspicion that some of the passports were not
genuine. There was an implied threat for prosecution in respect of the same and withholding
of the passport on that threat. Even assuming that the passports were genuine, wrongfully
with holding the same was equally a fear of injury. Also in the mentioned case, it is eminent
that there was a fear of injury in the form of threat of criminal accusation. Hence the offence
was covered under s.384 of IPC.

b. Dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property – Another chief element or

ingredient of the extortion is that the inducement must be dishonest. Delivery by
person put in fear is essential in order to constitute the offence of extortion. The
offence of extortion is not complete until there is actual delivery of the possession of
the property of the person put in the fear and there is wrongful loss. The delivery of
property is as distinct from taking away property is of essence of the matter in
extortion. Where there is no delivery of property, but the person put in fear of injury
offers no résistance to carrying of the property, the offence is of robbery instead of
extortion. Then again immovable objects may also become the subject matter of
extortion in as much as the offence of extortion consists in inducing a person put in
fear to deliver to deliver valuable security or anything signed or sealed which can be
converted into valuable security.

4
Re Donolly’s 1 Leach 229.
5
(AIR 1954 SC 700, (1954) Cr LJ 1751 (SC)
Illustration - A, by putting Z in fear of injury, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal
to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A. Here as the paper so
signed maybe converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion.

Where the accused honestly believed, complainant had taken money belonging to him (the
accused), an attempt to take back that amount cannot be said to be with the intention of
causing wrongful loss to the victim.6

To Any Person – It is not necessary that a threat should be should be used and property
received, by one and same individual. It may be a matter of arrangement between several
persons that the threats should be used by some and the property received by others. Hence
all people involved in such arrangement would be guilty of the commission of the offence of
extortion.

RS Nayak v. AR Antulay7

In this case the respondent was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra at the relevant time. During
this period, he formed seven trusts, one of which was Indira Gandhi Pratibha Prathisthan
(IGPP). The chief minister demanded that unless the sugar do-operatives who had placed a
charter of demands before the Government of Maharashtra, made contributions to the IGPP,
their demands pending before the government would not be acceded to. The entire official
machinery, particularly of the Sugar Directorate, was utilised to pressurise the sugar
federation for extracting the contributions. As a result of such extortion, several sugar
factories had to yield and pay up.

It was contented by the respondent that in order that s.383 should apply, the respondent
should out threat to do or to omit to what he is legally bound to do in future. If all that a man
does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do, then such act would not
amount to extortion. The Supreme Court accepted the contention and merely held that merely
because the respondent was the chief minister at that time and pressure was brought on sugar
co-operatives to pay up donations as a measure of reciprocating for consideration of their
demands pending before the government, it cannot be said that the ingredients of extortion
was made out.
6
Shankar Bhagwat (1866) 2 BHC 394.
7
(AIR 1954 SC 700, (1954) Cr LJ 1751 (SC)
Since the element of consent in voluntary act is necessary, it should be an act which the
victim is legally bound to do in the future or an illegal omission.

Distinction between Theft and Extortion –

The offence of extortion is carried out by an overpowering will of the owner. In theft, the
offender’s intention is always to take without the person’s consent. The offence of extortion
differs from the offence of theft, while in theft property is removed or taken away without the
consent of the person in possession thereof whereas in extortion there is a delivery of
property with the consent of the person induced by fear and thereof is more akin to robbery.
Delivery of property as distinct from taking away the property is the essence of the matter in
extortion. Where there is no delivery of the property but the person put in fear offers no
resistance to carrying away of the property. The offence is not extortion but robbery (by
theft). Then again immovable objects may become the subject matter of extortion inasmuch
as the offence of extortion also consists in inducing a person put in fear of to deliver any
valuable security or anything which is signed or sealed which is capable of being converted
in valuable security. Therefore in theft movable property may be the subject matter of the
offence while in extortion of property it is not limited only to movable property. In theft the
property is taken by the offender whereas in extortion the property is delivered to the
offender.

Here “valuable security” is defined in s.30 if IPC, which is as follows:

Section 30 – Valuable Security: The words “valuable security” denote a document which
is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred,
restricted, extinguished or released, or where by any person acknowledges that he lies
under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right.

The Indian Penal Code simply distinguishes the offence of extortion as ‘the intimidation by
which the extortionist dishonestly victimises another, the object of which is dishonest
deprivation of property, where delivery of property is by intimidation.’
Section 384 – Punishment for extortion: Whoever commits extortion shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to three years, or with
fine or with both.

This section awards conviction for the offence of extortion. Extortion being a midway
offence between theft and robbery, this section requires 2 essentials for such conviction –

i. Intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to himself or another

ii. Dishonestly inducing the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any
property or valuable security.
Jadunandan singh and Another v. Emperor.

Narain Dusadh and Sheonandan Singh were returning after inspection of some
fields when two petitioners and others assaulted them. The petitioner gave a blow
to Narain on the right leg and the other people assaulted Sheonandan, after this,
forcibly took the thumb impression of Narain on one blank piece of paper and of
Sheonandan on the blank papers. On these finding, the petitioners and the others
were convicted for extortion under s384 of IPC

Referring to the definition of extortion under s383 it was contented on behalf of

Jadunandan Singh that no offence under s383 has been brought to him, allowing
the appeal the Patna High Court held that:

To convict a person for extortion it must be proved that the victims were put in
fear of injury to themselves or to others and further were thereby dishonestly
induced to deliver papers containing their thumb prints. The prosecution story in
the present case goes no further than that thumb impressions were “forcibly taken”
from them. The lower courts only speak of forcibly taking of the thumb
impressions of the victim and this does not necessarily involve including victim to
deliver paper (which could be converted into valuable securities). The offence of
extortion is not established. On the findings the offence is no more than use of
criminal force of an assault punishable under s 352 IPC.
Mere threat of divine displeasure does not amount to extortion.
Section 385 – Putting, a person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion: Whoever, in
order to the committing of extortion, puts any person in fear of, or attempts to put any
person in fear, of any injury, shall be punished imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both.

By this section a distinction between the inchoate and consummated offence is recognised.
The attempt to commit extortion may proceed so far as to put a person in fear of injury, or
there may be an attempt to excite such fear; but there may not be any delivery of property,
etc. This section punishes the putting of a person in fear of injury in order to commit
extortion.

Inchoate offence - A person is guilty of the inchoate offence of attempt if they take more
than merely preparatory actions toward committing an offence, with the intention of
committing it, which the law would have tried to prevent. A person is guilty of attempting to
commit an offence if he or she “does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the
commission of” the offence in question, with the intention to commit the offence. Every
inchoate crime or offense must have the mens rea of intent or of recklessness, but most
typically intent. Absent a specific law, an inchoate offense requires that the defendant have
the specific intent to commit the underlying crime. For example, for a defendant to be guilty
of the inchoate crime of solicitation of murder, they must intend a person to die.

For this section it is necessary that the accused should have put some person in fear of injury
in order to extort some property. Here injury would be the same as interpreted in section 44
of the Code.

Emperor v. Chaturbhuj8

In this case a cloth seller was threatened with the imposition of a fine if he continued to sell
foreign cloth. He continued to sell such cloth, and, to enforce the payment of fine, his shop
was picketed for two hours and he lost a certain amount of business and ultimately paid a
fine. It was held that the person responsible for picketing was held guilty for the offence
under this section.

Similarly in a another case a mukhtar in a criminal case threatened with intent to extort
money put questions to the prosecution witness which were irrelevant, scandalous and

8
1922 45 All 137.
indecent and which were intended to insult and annoy. He was also held guilty under this
section.