1. MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners, vs.

Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents. taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
G.R. No. 206510               September 16, 2014 the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
  overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

 PONENTE: Villarama
                In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit
“public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
 
first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
FACTS:
fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
                              The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty
the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” to refrain from impairing the environment.

On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on                               On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have
                On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can
its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. do so in representation of their own and future generations.

while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Second issue: YES.               The US respondents were sued in their official
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
of leaking fuel or oil.
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
                Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental was committed while they were performing official military duties.
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

ISSUES:
                              During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its
Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
USS Guardian.
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
case.
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
 
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of
HELD:
the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail
First issue: YES. Petitioners have legal standing
to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
                Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest  

in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of                 In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they
the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
coastal State
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention,
to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and account characteristic regional features.

regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is
sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
law.
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately
non-commercial purposes
if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be
                              With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel
articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial

purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal Third issue: NO                             The waiver of State immunity under the VF A
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
which the above provisions may apply.
the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a
case, the US?
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the separately.

UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound                 The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or
by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
codified in UNCLOS.
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep writ of Kalikasan.

seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed
commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do
with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”
we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility”
                              The Court also found  unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein,
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including
the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate
civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.

under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which

adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that
our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from  

its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while

2. PNB VS CIR and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the
G.R. No. L-32667    81 SCRA 214     January 31, 1978 company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its
vs. associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and

GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as authorized Deputy
sheriff, respondents. 3. San Fernando v. Firme
  G.R. N. L-579   [April 8, 1991]

the test of suability is found in its charter

Facts:
FACTS:

A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney
previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel
United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino
order assailed is challenged on two grounds:
Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy and driven by Alfredo Bislig.  Several passengers of the jeepney including
sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and  4
That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on  The heirs of Baniña Sr. filed a  complaint for damages against the Estate of
the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines Nieveras and Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party
amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of The case was transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of
garnishment is denied for the lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to Baniña Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular
comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of Garnishment’ dated employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its decision
May 6, 1970.”
rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally
 
liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, attorney’s fees.

this certiorari petition.

 
ISSUE:

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner was liable.

Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment

can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:

 
 

Discussions:
The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the
According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government State.

Agencies:
The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives
“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent
separate judicial personality. If the agency is incorporated, the test of may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of
suability is found in its charter.”
the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from
From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the government
pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a enters into business contracts and also when the State files a complaint.
government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does
not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that
the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable.”
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality
insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties
or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for the
torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions.
to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
FACTS:  A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of
Baniña filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the
jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality
and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and
raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Baniña.
ISSUES: 
which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on
1. Are municipal corporations suable?
adverse findings regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake, or
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?
In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former
HELD:
1.  Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the
State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore
should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant
cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he
was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence
presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of
any liability. (Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme,  No. L-52179, April 8,
1991)
4. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA.
MARGARITA M. GALON, Petitioners, v .PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC.,
Respondent. G.R. No. 182358; February 20, 2013).
FACTS:  On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C
accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of
misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation.
Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon(Galon), issued Memorandum No.
209 series of 2000,inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, former
including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon.

October 27, 2000. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them
copies of a document entitled "Report on Violative Products"issued by the In their Amended Answer,the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez, then
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse Secretary Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon sought the dismissal of the
findings relative to these accredited drug companies products. Specifically, Complaint, stressing that PPI accreditation was suspended because most of
the BFAD found that PPI products which were being sold to the public were the drugs it was importing and distributing/selling to the public were found
unfit for human consumption.
by the BFAD to be substandard for human consumption. They added that
the DOH is primarily responsible for the formulation, planning,
During the October 27, 2000 meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed implementation, and coordination of policies and programs in the field of
to submit within 10 days, or until November 6, 2000, their respective health; it is vested with the comprehensive power to make essential health
explanations on the adverse findings covering their respective products services and goods available to the people, including accreditation of drug
contained in the Report on Violative Products.
suppliers and regulation of importation and distribution of basic medicines
for the public.

Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as

required, PPI belatedly sent a letter dated November 13, 2000 addressed to In a January 8, 2001 Order, the trial court partially granted PPI prayer for a
Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on temporary restraining order, but only covering PPI products which were not
Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the included in the list of violative products or drugs as found by the BFAD.

corresponding reply. However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be
submitted; nor did it seek an extension of the 10-day period, which had In a Manifestation and Motion dated July 8, 2003, petitioners moved for the
previously expired on November 6, 2000, much less offer any explanation dismissal of Civil Case No. 68200, claiming that the case was one against
for its failure to timely submit its reply.
the State; that the Complaint was improperly verified; and lack of authority
of the corporate officer to commence the suit, as the requisite resolution of
In a letter-reply dated November 23, 2000 Undersecretary Galon found PPI board of directors granting to the commencing officer PPI Vice
"untenable" PPI November 13, 2000 letter and therein informed PPI that, President for Legal and Administrative Affairs, Alan Alambra, the authority to
effective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years file Civil Case No. 68200 was lacking. The trial court dismissed Civil Case
pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C.
No. 68200, declaring the case to be one instituted against the State, in
which case the principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.

In another December 14, 2000 letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon,

PPI through counsel questioned the suspension of its accreditation, saying
that the same was made pursuant to Section VII of AO 10 which it claimed
was patently illegal and null and void because it arrogated unto the DOH
Accreditation Committee powers and functions which were granted to the
BFAD under Republic Act (RA) No. 3720 and Executive Order (EO) No. 175.
PPI added that its accreditation was suspended without the benefit of notice
and hearing, in violation of its right to substantive and administrative due
process. It thus demanded that the DOH desist from implementing the
suspension of its accreditation, under pain of legal redress.
official functions. Thus, the issue of whether the suit is against the State
On December 28, 2000, PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
On appeal, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision, reversed the trial court
ruling and ordered the remand of the case for the conduct of further
proceedings. The CA concluded that it was premature for the trial court to
have dismissed the Complaint. The CA further held that instead of
dismissing the case, the trial court should have deferred the hearing and
resolution of the motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial. It added that it
was apparent from the Complaint that petitioners were being sued in their
private and personal capacities for acts done beyond the scope of their
could best be threshed out during trial on the merits, rather than in
proceedings covering a motion to dismiss.

City a Complaint seeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative
ISSUE:  Should Civil Case No. 68200 be dismissed for being a suit against
the State?
itself commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state
HELD: The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that t)he State may
not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of
the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is
based on the very essence of sovereignty. x x x [A] sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the
doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called the royal prerogative of
dishonesty because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to
the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental
principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to
be accordingly restricted.n
suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly
phrased, the doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without its
consent; it's clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The
State consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be made through a general law or a special law. x xx Implied consent,
on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise
of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity.
BFAD is an office under the Office of the Health Secretary. Also, the Health
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either
expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express
consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other
hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it
enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its
non-suability. The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be implied.""Statutory
provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty."
The DOH can validly invoke state immunity. The DOH is an unincorporated
agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions because it has
not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the
DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of
governmental character.
As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit,
and Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state
immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state
officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. "The
was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts
done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or
financial liability against the government." Otherwise stated, "public
officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith."
It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit, as well as Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance
and discharge of their official functions or in their official capacities, and not
in their personal or individual capacities. Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit were being charged with the issuance of the assailed orders. On the
other hand, Undersecretary Galon was being charged with implementing the
assailed issuances. By no stretch of imagination could the same be
categorized as ultra vires simply because the said acts are well within the
scope of their authority. Section 4 of RA 3720 specifically provides that the
Secretary is authorized to issue rules and regulations as may be necessary
to effectively enforce the provisions of RA 3720. As regards Undersecretary
Galon, she is authorized by law to supervise the offices under the DOH
authority, such as the BFAD. Moreover, there was also no showing of bad
faith on their part. The assailed issuances were not directed only against
PPI. The suspension of PPI accreditation only came about after it failed to
submit its comment as directed by Undersecretary Galon. It is also beyond
dispute that if found wanting, a financial charge will be imposed upon them
which will require an appropriation from the state of the needed amount.
Thus, based on the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against them
should likewise be dismissed for being a suit against the state which
absolutely did not give its consent to be sued. Based on the foregoing
considerations, and regardless of the merits of PPI case, this case deserves
a dismissal. Evidently, the very foundation of Civil Case No. 68200 has
crumbled at this initial juncture.
with De Guzman Custodial Services. It was left to new contractor JAC
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE PHARMA WEALTH, INC.,
G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013
and underpayment of wages and added claims for emergency, cost of living
Political Law; The State may be sued if it consents, either expressly or
impliedly. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that
the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as
correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, ‘the state may not be sued
without its consent;’ it’s clear import then is that the State may at times be
sued. The State’s consent may be given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. x x x
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a
waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which
is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity.
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either
expressly or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit. There is express
consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other
hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it
itself commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state
enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its
non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. ”Statutory
provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”
5. T/SGT Aldora Larkins vs National Labor relations Commission
Fact:
Petitioner was a member of United State Air Force assigned to oversee
dormitories of Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base
Pampanga. 3 AGS terminated the contract for maintenance of dormitories
Maintenance Service owned by Joselito Cunanan and decide whether it
would retain services. Cunanan decided to bring in his own workers.
Compaint was filed against Larkins, Lt. Cor Frankhauser for illegal dismissal
allowance, etc. Petitioner failed to answer the complaint and appear to
hearings, thus the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision granting all claims of
private respondents and found both the Petitoner and Lt. Col. Frankhauster
“guilty of illegal dismissal”. Petitioner appealed but NLRC affirmed the
decision or the Labor Arbiter, but declared that: “In the event this decison is
executed and/or enforced and considering our finding that the real party
respondent is the United States Government through its Armed Forces
stattioned at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing
international agreement and diplomatic protocol”
Issue:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
case, on the basis of lack of proper jurisdiction over the person of the
petitoner and violation of RP-US Base Agreement and / or submission of the
Government of America to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Held:
Petition was granted. The Labor Arbiter did not follow the procedure under
R.P. -U.S. Agreement under Article XIV. In this case, summons was
addressed to Lt. Col. Frankhauser instead to the Base Commander , or if he
withholds giving permission to serve the summons, he should instead
designate another person to serve the process and obtain ther server’s
affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. It is basic that Labor Arbiter
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the
latter being served with summons. Although petitioner, participated in the
NLRC, it does not constitute on the waiver of lack of summons and
voluntary submssion of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand,
6. Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler &
Anthony Persi, respondents
Second Division
are immune from suit.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the
continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/
statements made by them in performance of their official governmental
functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim
that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was
under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim
that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should
be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants

Doctrine: official v. personal capacity

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require
Date: November 27, 1990
consent.

Ponente: Justice Regalado

Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that
the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal &
Facts:
unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a international law.

member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified.
Issue: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an US Armed Forces

equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don

Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), Held:

for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.

No they are not immune.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education
Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she
will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs
after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future
vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.  Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and severally, to
pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages,  P20,000.00 as
and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s
appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said Ratio:

position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to
deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed
against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision
of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil
Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court,
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen.  The cloak of protection afforded the officers
individual capacity.   This situation usually arises where the public official
acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. 

etc.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
exemplary damages.
scope of his authority or jurisdiction

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen Inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.  In the same tenor, it
has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act
for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
proscribed, which will best advance and protect her interests.  There is,
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial judge
in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which
they should be held personally liable.
Shauf v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 90314, 27 November 1990
There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff
Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as Guidance Counselor by
the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Santo
Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in
psychology?guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral
science.  She has also completed all course work in human behavior
and counselling psychology for a doctoral degree.  She is a civil
service eligible.  More important, she had functioned as a Guidance
Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level for
approximately four years at the time she applied for the same
position in 1976.
they are immune from suit.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant Persi
did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but
referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson
who was not eligible to the position.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.  This is a carry-over from Article II, Section 9, of the
1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in
committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic
constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which
is very much an integral aspect of the right to life.  For this, they
should be held accountable
Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of
her remedy under the United States federal legislation on equality of
opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other
remedy under American law, let alone remedies before a foreign court and
under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled
as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise
thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which
should not be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive
representations of private respondents on that score.
Second Division
[REGALADO, J.]
FACTS: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City for the alleged discriminatory acts of
herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS
1710-9 position in Clark Air Base. Private respondents, as defendants, filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States
Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers
vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement,
ISSUE: Can the private respondents validly set up the defense invoking the
doctrine of immunity from suit?
HELD: NO.
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has been formally

impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not also all- v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of
encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.

the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic constitutional right
of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very much an integral
aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held accountable.
vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered
owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the
Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.

2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State

7. SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY
OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by
the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO
Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 163609     [November 27, 2008]
engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This
immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme,
where the Court held that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they
are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the

FACTS:
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct
board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly
Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and
of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the
Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily
crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.

collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear The petition is DENIED.

indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the
accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention,
Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.

ISSUE:
Jayme vs. Apostol; Torts & Damages- Vicarious Liability of Employers
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the G.R. No. 163609             November 27, 2008
driver assigned to him

MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
Facts:

RULING:
 Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano
to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport
Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.

instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.
The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from
the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident. The victim was brought to the hospital,
but despite medical intervention he did not survived.
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of
Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence. In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if
Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the
negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment
power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the
employer's right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the
employer's right of suspension or dismissal.

Apostol [registred owner of the vehicle], Simbulan [possessor of the car],

Lozano [driver], Miguel [passenger], Municipality of Koronadal [employer Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality
Lozano].
of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the
RTC rendered a decision  absolving defendant Municipality of Koronadal accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the
being an agency of the State performing governmental functions. The same municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the
with defendant Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject vehicle, he is time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several occasions,
absolved of any liability. However, defendants Lozano, Apostol, and Mayor held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee
Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control
severally to pay the plaintiff.
over the employee subsists. In the case under review, the Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding Lozano's
The CA affirmed the decision, absolve Mayor Miguel of liability.
assignment to Mayor Miguel.

Issue:
As to the contention that Miguel has the control over Lozano when the
Whether or not Mayor Miguel is solidarily liable with Lozano.
accident happen- the same has no leg to stand on and must necessarily fail.
No negligence, said the Court, may be imputed against a fellow employee
Held:
[Miguel as mayor of Koronadal] although the person may have the right to
For the determination of the liability of Miguel, it must be established that he control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an
is the employer of Lozano.
employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's
negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens
Per Article 2180 of the Civil Code -a person is not only liable for one's own to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant
quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of
for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To the doctrine of vicarious liability.

sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen
by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to
give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him
and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.

occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.

Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was
committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
one that may be delegated to others.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the
driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make
the passenger liable for the latter's negligent acts. The driver's duty is not