M - Caamano - Analisis - Estructural - Caso - Flogisto (Ejemplo de Una Buena Introduccón) PDF

Erkenn (2009) 70:331–364
DOI 10.1007/s10670-008-9141-y
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
A Structural Analysis of the Phlogiston Case
Maria Caamaño
Received: 30 November 2006 / Accepted: 19 November 2008 / Published online: 14 February 2009
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
Abstract The incommensurability thesis, as introduced by T.S. Kuhn and P.K.

Feyerabend, states that incommensurable theories are conceptually incompatible
theories which share a common domain of application. Such claim has often been
regarded as incoherent, since it has been understood that the determination of a
common domain of application at least requires a certain degree of conceptual
compatibility between the theories. The purpose of this work is to contribute to the
defense of the notion of local or gradual incommensurability, as proposed by late
Kuhn. The application of this notion would allow to render the incommensurability
thesis coherent. To support this view, a typical example of incommensurability will
be formally analyzed by applying the structuralist metatheory developed, among
others by W. Balzer, C.U. Moulines and J.D. Sneed. The structural reconstruction of
the relation between the phlogiston theory and the oxygen theory offered here will
reveal that they are locally incommensurable, and will even make possible to
determine the ontological reduction relation that they also exemplify.
1 Preliminary Remarks
1.1 Focus, Goals and Structure of the Work
This work deals with the problem of the incommensurability of scientific theories,
focussing on a specific historical episode proposed by Thomas S. Kuhn as a
paradigmatic case of incommensurability. It should be remembered that the notion
of incommensurability was introduced simultaneously and independently by Kuhn
and Feyerabend in (1962), with the aim of characterizing relations between rival
M. Caamaño (&)
Departamento de Filosofı́a, Facultad de Filosofı́a y Letras, Plaza del Campus s/n,
47005 Valladolid, Spain
e-mail: mariac@fyl.uva.es
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332 M. Caamaño
scientific theories.1 The relationship is characterized by each author in a partially

divergent manner, although both coincide in presenting it as a radical form of
conceptual disparity between theories that are applied to the same field of research.
The radicality of conceptual disparity was due not only to the fact that theories
would be made up of different concepts, but also to the fact that the conditions for
the formation of these concepts would be incompatible. In accordance with both
authors, this becomes apparent in the incompatibility between the rules of use for
the terms that transmit these concepts. Incommensurability between rival scientific
theories would be patent not only in the impossibility of mutually translating the
languages the express these theories, but also in the impossibility of expanding one
of these languages in order for it to incorporate the other.
The defence of the theory of incommensurability, by Kuhn and Feyerabend, has
run parallel both with regard to their rejection of the verificationalist and
falsificationalist models of the relation between successive theories, and in their
claims for a radical version of the theory of the theoretical load of observation. The
theoretical dependence of all observation, understood as the dependence of all
observation with respect to the theory for which it serves as observation, implies a
relativization of all observation to the theoretical context in which it is taken into
account. This entails three closely connected consequences: (1) the rejection of the
difference between theoretical and observational enunciations; (2) the acceptance of
a radical semantic holism, in accordance with which the meaning of a term depends
on the theoretical context in which it occurs; and (3) a radical semantic
incommensurability, deriving from the global scope that radical semantic holism
gives to the variation of meaning that is characteristic of passing from one theory to
another, incommensurable one.
The research that is presented below is carried out as response to the demand,
made openly by Kuhn, Feyerabend and the proponents of the structuralist trend, for
the need to structurally analyse historical cases of incommensurable theories in
order to be able to formally specify and empirically support the notion of
incommensurability.2 Another general motive behind the work is that of contrib-
uting to a more coherent characterization of the notion of incommensurability,
developing Kuhn’s final proposal of presenting this as a local or partial relation
between theories,3 which would make it possible to overcome the paradoxes
provoked by other more extreme notions. In particular, the aim is to overcome the
paradox that consists of affirming that globally incommensurable theories can,
nevertheless, be applied to common domain.
With regard to the approach taken in the present study, its specificity lies in
combining a formal-type structuralist approach with one of an informal historicist
nature. The novelty of this approach lies in the application of a formal treatment to a
specific case of incommensurability, taking into account the historical context of the
1
This initial appeal to the notion of incommensurability is found in Kuhn (1962/1970) and Feyerabend
(1962/1981, pp. 44–96).
2
Cf. Kuhn (1976), as well as Feyerabend (1977).
3
Cf. Kuhn (1983).
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A Structural Analysis of the Phlogiston Case 333
knowledge and beliefs in which this case arises.4 This very methodological choice
contrasts with that underlying Andreas Kamlah’s structural reconstruction of the
phlogiston case. His account, however serious and helpful, is not only explicitly
anachronistic,5 but also limited by its reliance on the observational/theoretical
distinction, which latter structuralists avoided and replaced with one between T-
theoretical and T-non-theoretical concepts.
Using the structuralist, history-sensitive approach, I will attempt to defend the
plausibility of the theory of local incommensurability that was introduced in Kuhn’s
later work. Thus, I will uphold that the structuralist approach makes it possible to
establish a restrictive criterion for the scope of incommensurability, and this, in turn,
an interesting comparability between incommensurable theories. This comparability
will require the analysis of conceptual coincidences or equivalences, as well as
conceptual divergences and incompatibilities. That is, it will be attempted to
determine not only the incommensurable components, but also the commensurable
components of the theories of phlogiston and of oxygen.
With regard to structure, the work shall be laid out as follows: firstly, an
explanation of the type of theoretical entity that would arise from the theories of
phlogiston and oxygen; secondly the presentation of the corresponding structural
reconstructions; and finally, the analysis of the intertheoretical relations between the
theories of phlogiston and of oxygen, showing how the manner in which they are
related satisfies the conditions established in the definitions of weak ontological
reduction and of incommensurability. Given the constraints on space available to
4
Besides the structuralist approach, there are other highly sophisticated and interesting approaches for
tacking the problem of incommensurability. Among these, three are worthy of special mention: the
cognitivist computational treatment of Thagard (1992); the treatment of Laudan, the inaugurator of the
so-called ‘problem-solving approach’, which is characterized in (1977); and the proposal of Niiniluoto in
the setting of his critical scientific realism, which he expounds in (1980).
5
‘‘I shall use a quite modern formulation for my purpose, and I shall disregard completely the fact that
chemists in the eighteen century were not able to express their ideas in the same way. I still think that I do
not miss the point by my anachronistic account. Furthermore I do not try to do justice to the historical
facts. I just want to formulate a phlogiston theory which is the best I can think of and which explains as
many chemical facts as possible. After all the problem at issue is not only an historical one but also a
problem of logical analysis’’, Kamlah (1984, p. 223). Kamlah’s anachronistic treatment of the relation
between the phlogiston theory and the oxygen theory essentially relies on concepts like those of
molecular or atomic weights, that were not available until John Dalton developed his atomic theory at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Described in these terms, the relation between the above rival
theories may seem structurally closer than it actually was, since more information than that available at
the time is being employed in redefining the theoretical concepts of one theory in those of the other. But
let us not forget that, in order to understand the reasons why the transition from the phlogiston theory to
the oxygen theory finally happened, it is crucial to provide a historically faithful description of both rival
theories. In making use of anachronistic notions, Kamlah implicitly introduces an experimental
background clearly beyond the experimental possibilities available for identifying substances during
Pristley’s and Lavoisier’s historical period. In particular, the chemical distinction between atoms and
molecules was not drawn until Amedeo Avogadro, by experimentally determining the density of gases
under different temperature and pressure conditions, extensively developed the Daltonian atomic theory.
Furthermore, Kamlah’s conclusion that the phlogiston theory is reducible to a restricted oxygen theory,
even despite their discrepancies relative to ontological postulates, only holds if we accept as the standard
version of the former theory that according to which phlogiston is ascribed a negative atomic weight (cf.
ibid., p. 227). This, however, does not seem right, for ascribing a negative weight to phlogiston is
commonly understood as an ad hoc hypothesis that emerged only once the phlogiston theory was already
in crisis.
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334 M. Caamaño
expound the different matters, both a certain degree of familiarity with the historical
episode referred to and a basic knowledge of structuralist methodology shall be
assumed.
1.2 Characterization of the Type of Theoretical Entity that is Constituted

by the Theories of Phlogiston and Oxygen
Taking into account that the aim of the model-theoretical reconstructions that are
offered below is the structural comparison of two incommensurable theories, just
which of the different structuralist notions of theory is to be applied in this case
should be clarified and justified beforehand.
From a synchronic structural approach two principal possibilities are contem-
plated: conceiving theories as theoretical elements or as theoretical networks.6
Although this is mentioned as a preliminary matter, the type of theoretical entity
that is represented by the theory of phlogiston and that of oxygen is an empirical
matter that can only be elucidated a posteriori. The empirical task of construction
was started with the aim of proving the simplest hypothesis: that both theories are
theoretical elements. Once this hypothesis had been confirmed by the reconstruction
that are offered in the sections below, the aim was to evaluate the more complex
hypothesis that the two combustion theories analysed belonged to one type of
theory, which was also more complex, and represent able in the structuralism as a
theoretical network.7 Specifically, it was attempted to characterize the theories of
phlogiston and oxygen as specializations of the theoretical networks of chemical
principles, composition and reactions. It was not possible to corroborate any of these
hypotheses, and one possible reason for this, which is of a general nature, is the fact
that the theories of phlogiston and oxygen belong to an incipient stage of Chemistry,
during which both the application settings and the conceptual apparatus of the
6
Cf. Balzer et al. (1987, pp. 167–177).
7
In structuralist literature, the notion of a theory-net is defined by establishing two conditions: (1) that
there should exist a finite non-empty set of theory-elements TE and a specialization relation r; (2) that the
specialization relation be restricted to the set TE. By adding new conditions to the two aforementioned
one, it is possible to define a more restricted theory-net. This is a theoretical tree network or theoretical
tree, the specific characteristics of which are as follows: (1) the connection between the theory-elements
that belong to TE, such that for any pair of different theory-elements belonging to TE it is held that either
both are specialization of some other common theory-element, or that both have some specialization in
common; (2) the existence, within this set, of a single basic theory-element, i.e. of a single theory-element
that is not a specialization of any other element of the aforementioned set. Given that the definition of a
theory-net presupposes that of specialisation, the principle defining features of this should be mentioned,
even if in passing. They are as follows: (a) equality between the classes of potential models and partially
potential models of the respective related theory-elements; and, (b) the inclusion of the current class of
models, the class of constraints, the class of links and that of intentional applications of the theory that it
specializes, respectively, in the class of actual models, the class of constraints, the class of links, and that
of the intentional applications of the theory that is specialized. Expressed in other terms, two theory-
elements that are related by means of a specialization relation will share their conceptual apparatus, while
they will diverge with regard to the scope of their laws and, consequently, with regard to the extension of
their classes of intentional applications, since the theory-element that specializes restricts the laws and the
empirical scope of the specialized theory-element.
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theories frequently overlapped, without the theoretical network having developed

yet.8
Another, final, possibility was evaluated, namely, that of characterizing both
theories as alternative theoretical elements belonging to successive theory-holons.
Within structuralism, the term ‘theory-holon’ is reserved for those theoretical
‘totalities’ or scientific macro-units that are generated from the interconnection of a
group of theories by means of intertheoretical links or bridging laws.9 These links,
which are represented by means of partial functions, will have a specific
directionality (they will not be reversible), they will link all the theoretical
elements in the domain to at least one other, and will be transitive. The related
theories may form part of one discipline, or even of several. This, precisely, seems
to be the case with the two theories under study; both are linked not only to
chemical theories, such as Cameralism, but also the physical theories, such as
Newtonian mechanics, and even to others converging with medicine, such as occurs
with the theory of phlogiston and iatrochemistry. The general link that is
characteristic of theory-holons may take the form of any type of intertheoretical
relation (specialization, theorization, reduction, equivalence),10 due to which, in
each case, it will be necessary to specify its particular mode of concretion. Hence, a
mixed criterion of the identification of theoretical totalities comes into play. By
applying the aforementioned criterion to the case under study in this work, it can be
verified that the dependence of the theories of combustion with regard to others
complies with each of the first ones constituting different theorizations of the second
ones. In spite of not having undertaken the reconstruction of these, the last
hypothesis mentions would seem to be sufficiently confirmed on the basis of crucial
data obtained in the reconstructions of the rival theories of combustion.
Without denying the importance that a thorough examination of this type of macro-
theoretical unit would have for the understanding of the global structure of scientific
disciplines, such as chemistry, it should be borne in mind that such a task is beyond
the scope of the current analysis, namely, the clarification of the type of relation of
incommensurability that arises between the theory of phlogiston and the theory of
oxygen.11 On one hand, the restriction on the scope of the reconstruction explains
8
As will be clear from the reconstructions, both theory-elements diverge, particularly with that
concerning its dependence (PHLO) or not (OXG) on the theory of principles, and consequently, on a
theory of the qualitative chemical composition. Neither of the theories studies constitutes a theory-net as it
has not been necessary to establish more specific laws to account for the different types of specific cases of
combustion, nor is it the case that both theories specialize the same theory. Nor do they constitute part of a
theory-net given they do not satisfy any of the conditions that must be fulfilled for all specialization; i.e.
neither do the laws nor either of the two theory-elements restrict any fundamental law established in the
other, nor do its corresponding classes of potential and partially potential models coincide with any other
theory-element. As will be seen in the reconstructions, P and Q, for example determine Mp of PHLO and
of OXG, respectively, but not Mp of the Cameralist theory of elements (on which both depend). In the
same manner, the relation of equal or lesser respirability, R, does not determine Mpp of either the theory of
principles, or of composition or reactions, while it does determine Mpp of the theories of combustion.
9
Cf. ibid., pp. 386–423, and Dı́ez and Moulines (1999, p. 365).
10
Cf. Balzer et al. (1987, p. 390).
11
Below, the theory of phlogiston will be represented by the abbreviation ‘PHLO’, and the theory of
oxygen by ‘OXG’.
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336 M. Caamaño
why concepts that were central to the chemistry of that age have not been taken into
account, concepts such as those of principle and element, which are characteristic of
other theories related to the theories of combustion. The exclusion of such concepts
from the reconstructions consequently involves the omission of all reference to the
change undergone by them, which is habitually highlighted by theorists of
incommensurability when dealing with the phlogiston case.
2 Reconstruction of the Phlogiston Theory
By means of PHLO the aim is to explain the combustion of other phenomena

related with it, such as calcinations, reduction and the composition of chemical
substances.12 This set of phenomena of different types would thus constitute the
class of intentional applications of PHLO. In order to give an account of these, we
shall postulate the existence of a chemical principle, phlogiston, establishing it as
the fundamental law of the emission of this substance in combustion (by the
chemical substances subjected to this process).
In order to simplify the meta-theoretical analysis, only examples of complete
combustion shall be taken into account, i.e. instances of combustion in which the
phlogiston of the body that is subjected to combustion is exhausted. However, all
chemical reactions that are considered shall be instances of combustion, it coming
about that each model of PHLO is an instance of combustion. Before undertaking
the formal definitions of the different types of models, it should be stressed that the
present study aims to remain faithful to the historical context in which the theories
arose; thus, in order to avoid falling into anachronisms, certain quantitative terms
will not be used (e.g. ‘density’, ‘volume’, etc.).
2.1 Potential Models of PHLO
Mp(PHLO): x is a potential model of the theory of phlogiston (x [ Mp(PHLO)) iff

there exist S, T, C, A, F, g, w, R, 8 such that13
(1) If x = hS, T, C, A, F, R?, g, w, R, 8i [ Mp(PHLO) then
(2) S is a finite, non-empty set
(3) T = {t1, t2}
(4) C , S and C = [
(5) A , S and A = [, likewise A \ C = [
(6) F , S and F = [
(7) g: (C 9 A 9 {t1}) ? (S 9 A 9 {t2})
(8) w: S ? R?
(9) R A 9 A, and R determines a weak order
(10) 8: S 9 S ? S
12
The principal historiographic sources used in the reconstructions of the theories of phlogiston and
oxygen are those mentioned in Sect. 3.1.
13
Adhering to the method of presentation used in An Architectonic for Science, I shall include the set of
numbers among the constituents of the models.
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Basic intended interpretation: S is a set of portions of specific chemical

substances (not a class of types of substances), T is a set whose only elements are
two temporal instants: one prior to the combustion (t1) and another subsequent to it
(t2). C is a subset of S which excludes A, and is interpreted as being the set of
portions of specific combustible substances. A is a set of chemical substances in the
air, i.e. of the substance that surrounds the bodies subjected to combustion. Finally,
with regard to the domains, F is a set of portions of an element called ‘phlogiston’.
The function g determines the combustion or chemical reactions, by assigning to
each portion of the combustible substance c and to each portion of air a in t1 a
portion of substance s and a portion of air a0 in t2. w is the function that determines
the weight, assigning to each chemical substance s its weight w(s) as an element of
R?. R lists different specific portions of air in terms of its equal or lesser degree of
respirability. It should be noted that R does not have a functional character. It may
come about that the same air may be as breathable or less breathable than more than
one air; i.e., there may be several airs that are more or less breathable than it. The
combination of substances that form aggregates is represented by means of the
function 8. Each pair of substances has assigned to it another substance, an
aggregate, which arises from the combination of the initial two.
We now go on to define certain notions derived from the primitive concepts of
PHLO.
If x = hS, T, C, A, F, R?, g, w, R, 8i [ Mp(PHLO) then
(1) Let \c, a, t1[ and \s, a0 , t2[ be such that g(\c, a, t1[) = \s, a0 , t2[ then
g1(c) = defs and g2(a) = defa0 (i.e., the image of a substance c under the
combustion function, g1(c), is the residue of s obtained on the basis of c, and
the image of a substance a under the combustion function, g2(a) is the
substance a0 obtained on the basis of a)
In (1) the concepts of the residue of the combustible substance obtained after the
combustion and of air obtained after the combustion on the basis of the air prior to
the combustion are defined. These concepts are defined by mean of the restriction of
c with regard to the domains C and A.
(2) Let s, s0 , s00 be such that 8(s, s0 ) = s00 then s00 = defs 8 s0 (s00 should be
understood as the aggregation of s and s0 )
In (2) the concept of aggregate is defined by means of applying the function o as
the value assigned to the arguments of this function, i.e. as that substance which
results from the combination of the other two.
(3) s contains s0 iffdef: there is some s00 s = s0 8 s00 or s = s00 8 s0
In (3) the mereological relation of containing is defined, also on the basis of the
function 8, as the relation between the value assigned to the arguments of this
function and one or other of these; i.e. as the relation between that substance
resulting from the combination of two other and one or other of these two.
(4) fs is the total (or maximum) quantity of phlogiston contained in s iffdef: s
contains fs and for every f0 if s contains f0 then fs contains f0
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On the basis of the aggregation function and of the mereological containment

relation (derived from it), it is possible to define in (4) the concept of total or
maximum value of the phlogiston contained in a substance as that portion of
phlogiston that constitutes one of the arguments of the function 8 giving a value s,
or, expressed in other terms, as that portion of phlogiston that is combined with
some other substance to produce the aggregate s.
(5) P S 9 S and sPs0 iffdef: w(fs) B w(fs0 ) (understood as—applied to combus-
tion—s0 is depleted of phlogiston giving rise to s iff the total quantity of
phlogiston s weighs less than or the same as the weight of the total phlogiston
in s0 )
In (5) P is defined on the basis of the primitive concept of weight, and on the
derived concept of the total quantity of phlogiston in a substance, as a relation
between different specific portions of substances according to their equal or lesser
content of phlogiston. The relation P determines a weak order.
2.2 Actual Models of PHLO
M(PHLO): x is an actual model of the theory of Phlogiston (x [ M(PHLO)) iff

there exist S, T, C, A, F, g, w, R, 8 such that
(1) If x = hS, T, C, A, F, R?, g, w, R, 8i [ Mp(PHLO) then
(2) x [ Mp(PHLO)
(3) for every \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g):
(3i) c contains g1(c)
(3ii) there exists some f [ F such that s contains f in t1 and g1(c) does not contain f
in t2 and g2(a) contains f in t2 and a does not contain f in t1
(3iii) for each f [ F: if a contains f in t1 then g2(a) will contain f in t2
(4) for each a [ A: g2(a)Ra iff w (f2g(a)) C w(fa)
Condition (3) is the requirement that there should be a type of entity acting as a
principle in combustion, being emitted by the substance subjected to this process.
(3i) requires that the substance subjected to combustion should contain the residue
remaining after combustion. (3ii) establishes that the substance that is responsible
for the combustion should pass from the body to the air. (3iii) requires that none of
this substance should pass from the air to the body. Lastly, in (4) the decrease in
respirability for the air substance that, on having absorbed phlogiston, now contains
a greater quantity of that substance is established.
The demonstration of the following theorem, which is implied by axioms (3) and
(4), allows the conclusion to be reached that that air has less respirability after the
combustion.
Theorem 1 for every \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): g2(a)Ra and it is not the case that
aRg2(a)
Proof Supposing that \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g):
\g1(c), g2(a), t2[ = g(\c, a, t1[) by definition of g
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for all f [ F: if a contains f in t1 then g2(a) contains f in t2, by (3iii)

g2(a)Ra
there exists f [ F such that g2(a) contains f in t2 and a does not contain f in t1
not for all f [ F: if g2(a) contains f then a contains f
it does not hold that aRg2(a), by (4) h
On the basis of Axiom (4) and Definition (5) a new theorem follows in which the
lower ‘phlogistication’ of the more breathable air and the greater ‘phlogistication’ of
the less breathable air are established. That is, the theorem expresses a correlation
between the lower respirability of air that takes part in the reaction and its greater
‘phlogistication’, presenting the restriction of P over the domain A as the inverse
relation of R, and, thus, as implying a lower quantity of phlogiston in the more
breathable air.
Theorem 2 for every \c, a, t1 [ [ Dom(g): aPg2(a) iff g2(a)Ra
Proof Let that \c, a, t1 [ [ Dom(g)
\g1(c), g2(a), t2 [ = g(\c, a, t1[) by definition of g
for all a, a0 [ A: g2(a)Ra iff w(f2g(a)) C w(fa), by (4)
cPs iff w(fc) B w(fs), by def. (5)
aPg2(a) iff w(fa) B w(f2g(a)), by the restriction of P over the domain A
w(fa) B w(f2g(a)) iff w(f2g(a)) C w(fa), by the inverse of C/B
aPg2(a) iff g2(a)Ra, by substitution on the basis of def. (5) and axiom (4) h
2.3 Partial Potential Models of PHLO
Mpp(PHLO): y is a partial potential model of the theory of phlogiston (y [

Mpp(PHLO)) iff there exists x such that x = \ S, T, C, A, F, R?, g, w, R, 8 [ [
Mp(PHLO) and y = \ S, T, C, A, R?, g, w, R, 8[
The matter of theoricity concerns S, T, C, A, F, g, w, R, 8. The first two basic sets,
along with the two following derived ones, the (non-functional) relation R and the
functions, are non PHLO-theoretical, given that they may all be determined without
resorting to the notion of phlogiston, and ignoring the fundamental laws of PHLO.
Whereas F and the non-primitive, derived relation P must be considered as PHLO-
theoretical given their dependence of these laws. In particular, both the determi-
nation of F and that of P require the assumption of the law when affirming the
existence of an element, referred to as ‘phlogiston’, which acts as a principle in
combustion. This law appears in the formal definition of M(PHLO) as Axiom (3).
In spite of ‘phlogiston’ and related terms such as ‘phlogisticate, ‘dephlogisticate’,
etc., being the only PHLO- theoretical terms, the importance of the concepts that
are related to them are evident in the fact that they necessarily intervene in the
determination of one of the sets derived from the theory. This importance stems
from the key conceptual role that they play in articulating the specific conceptual
schema of PHLO.
Thus, I shall now go on to examine the criteria for determining the functions and/
or notions expressed by non PHLO-theoretical terms. The phenomena or entities to
which these terms refer will be recognized, at least in part, by taking these criteria
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into consideration. This is especially clear in the cases of S, A, g and R, when they
are determined (during the historical period in which PHLO prevailed) by
principally applying notions that were independent of all scientific theory,
belonging to the sphere of ordinary knowledge.
Certain terms from ordinary language are introduced into scientific theories as
primitive terms, i.e. which are not defined in these theories. This occurs in PHLO
with the notion of combustion. This must be understood as a primitive notion that
can only be determined on the basis of the disjunction of descriptions or predicates
that express different properties: increase in temperature, reduction of size, emission
of gases, reduced respirability of the surrounding air,14 etc. On the basis of the
aforementioned reasons, it can be inferred that the criteria for determining g will be
identified with those that may be used for determining Mpp. Thus, as combustion is
the principal phenomenon dealt with by PHLO, and given that the notion of
combustion must be characterized within the non PHLO-theoretical language (more
specifically, in ordinary language, i.e. at the most basic level of conceptualization),
it is deduced that in effect the determination of g is governed by the same criteria as
that of Mpp. g is the non PHLO-theoretical phenomenon that it is aimed to explain.
I shall postpone the analysis of the non PHLO-theoretical concepts until Sect.
2.5, where we shall specify the essential intertheoretical links of PHLO, i.e., those
links that are necessary to define or characterize (in the case of primitive terms)
some of the non PHLO-theoretical concepts. Nevertheless, I shall deal with some of
the different theories of conceptualizations on which the determination of these
concepts depends. In order to determine the function w we must resort to classical
particle mechanics. The determination of T presupposes some type of chronometric
theory. The cameralist theory of composition, along with the physical theories of
Boyle and Newton will be essential in the determination of the aggregation function
8. As has already been pointed out above, S, A, g and R will be determined using
essentially ordinary language, although the characterization of the notions of air,
combustion and respirability will similarly require taking into account the
iatrochemical theory of composition, as well as Boyles physical and chemical
ones. T will not be dealt with in 1.5, since given that it is a very common notion in
scientific theories and not specific to chemistry, the analysis of its intertheoretical
links is of no real interest for the present study.
Before moving on to the following section, one last matter should be clarified;
this is the problem that seems to arise from the inclusion of the PHLO-theoretical
sub-domain F in the non PHLO-theoretical domain S. It is possible to think that this
inclusion assumes the necessary PHLO-theoretical determination of S, and thus, its
PHLO- theoretical character. Nevertheless, this is only an apparent problem, as the
domain S is not necessarily determined by recourse to its different sub-domains,
rather on the basis of certain non PHLO-theoretical properties that each element of
14
The reduced respirability of the surrounding air is not explicable by any law of PHLO, thus it is
possible to identify the combustion on the basis of other properties.
123
the domain in question must have (have weight, certain size, etc.).15 In the case of
the sub-domain F, which historically was discovered as empty, its inclusion in the
domain of substances would be explained by the acceptance that the substances to
which chemists attempt to refer will not be empirically determined in all cases, thus
allowing their existence to be inferred on the basis of certain determinable, non
PHLO-theoretical properties (such as, for example, the greater or lesser respira-
bility of the air surrounding the substance that is subjected to combustion).
2.4 Constraints for PHLO
As we shall see, the different constrictions that are identifiable in PHLO, in the
same way as those identifiable in OXG, are not strictly from these theoretical
elements, rather they are inherited or imported from other theories (in particular
Newtonian mechanics) with which they are connected by intertheoretical links.
There are two conditions for natural links: identity of weight and extensivity of
weight. The constrictions C1 and C2 are the same ones that are presented in
Classical Collision Mechanics relative to mass. In C1 the weight of any substance is
required to be independent from the system in which that substance appears. C2
requires that relative to a given aggregation operation, represented by the basic
notion 8, the weight should behave as an additive under this relation. To each pair of
chemical substances, 8 assigns another chemical substance whose weight results
from the addition of both substances.
C1(PHLO): for all X: X [ C1(PHLO) iff [ = X Mp(PHLO) and for all x, y
[ X and for all s: if s [ Sx \ Sy then wx (s) = wy (s)
C2(PHLO): for all X: X [ C2(PHLO) iff [ = X Mp(PHLO) and for all x, y,
z [ X:
(a) 8: S 9 S ? S where S : = [ {Sx/x [ Mp(PHLO)}
(b) for all s [ Sx, s0 [ Sy (if s 8 s0 [ Sz then wz(s 8 s0 ) = wx(s) ? wy(s0 ))
The global constraint of PHLO would be:
GCðPHLOÞ ¼ C1 ðPHLOÞ \ C2 ðPHLOÞ
The theorem that is demonstrated below, which is implied by Axiom (3) and by
C2(FLO), establishes the reduction in weight of every body subjected to
combustion.
Theorem 3 for all \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): w(g1(c)) \ w(c)
Proof Let that \c, a, t1 [ [ Dom(g)
\g1(c), g2(a), t2 [ = g(\c, a, t1[), by definition g
c contains g1(c), by (3i)
w(s0 8 g1(c)) = w(s0 ) ? w(g1(c)), by C2(FLO)
w(c) = w(s0 ) ? w(g1(c)), by substitution on the basis of (3i)
w(g1(c)) \ w(c) h
15
For the same reasons, the inclusion of the theoretical-OXG O sub-domain in the non-theoretical OXG
domain S does not imply the necessary theoretical-OXG determination of S.
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342 M. Caamaño
2.5 Intertheoretical Links of PHLO
Below I shall examine the different links that should be considered as essential
constituents of PHLO. The first of them is the one that provides PHLO with the
values of the function w. These are determined using a variety of instruments,
namely, analytical balances, beam balances and dynamometers. The use of such
instruments requires the assumption of some model of rigid body mechanics
(RBM). Bearing in mind that this theory is reducible to classical particle mechanics
(CPM), it can be stated that a link L1 is needed between M(RBM) (or M(CPM))
and Mp(FLO).
L1(FLO) M(RBM) 9 p(RBM, 1, 2, 5) 9 Mp(PHLO) 9 p(PHLO, 1, 2, 9)
which is determined by the following condition:16
For each x [ M(RBM) and x0 [ Mp(PHLO):
\x, \Px, Tx, mx[, x0 , \Sx0 , Tx0 , wx0 [ L1(PHLO) iff there exists s [ S y t = Tx \
Tx0 such that
(a) Sx0 = Px
(b) wx0 (s) = mx(s)
P is interpreted as a set of particles, T as a set of temporal instants and m as the
function for determining mass.
Besides w, there are other non PHLO-theoretical functions, relations and
domains (basic sets) that are determined by specific essential links with other
theories. Nevertheless, as here we are dealing with theories that are pre-scientific
and/or non-axiomatized, neither the structural reconstruction nor the formal
definition of these intertheoretical links will be dealt with here. What constitutes
the intertheoretical links that determine S, C, A, g, R and 8 will simply be informally
indicated,17 by pointing out the manner in which the non PHLO-theoretical notions
that intervene in this determination depend on certain theories. As has already been
mentioned, the characterization of some of these notions principally involves a type
of conceptualization that is expressed in ordinary language, and not presented in the
form of a theory. Only a certain aspect of the characterization will depend directly
on pre-scientific or obsolete scientific theories. This is the case with the notions
represented by C, g and R, which will require an analysis of both the strictly
intertheoretical links and the connection with conceptualization from the sphere of
ordinary knowledge. Needless to say, this ordinary knowledge, transmitted via
ordinary language, will have to be relativized to the historical period being
considered, in the same way as theories. I shall now go on to examine the terms
‘substance’, ‘air’, ‘respirability’, ‘combustion’, ‘combustible substance’ and
‘aggregation’, in that order.
In the determination of S, the notion of matter that is characteristic of the physical
or corpuscular theory of matter is used. At the end of the seventeenth century and
16
The axioms given in p(RBM, 1, 2, 5) are in keeping with those established in Balzer et al. (1987, p.
269), where the class of potential models for rigid body mechanics is defined.
17
The informal analysis that follows is based on the historical study of chemistry by Brock (1992, pp.
43–86).
123
the beginning of the eighteenth century the mechanistic theories of Boyle and
Newton (precursors of Dalton’s atomic theory) consolidated a conception of
substances in terms that were eminently physical, with regard to conglomerates of
particles or bodies. In order to define the term ‘matter’ use is made of geometric
qualities and the mechanisms of affinity and repulsion, whilst the use of secondary
qualities (temperature, colour) and forms from Aristotelian physics are rejected.18
Undeniably, weight has to be considered as an essential property of matter. In
reality, it was only with the development of Newtonian mechanics that matter and
weight started to be distinguished. It seems obvious that this association leads
necessarily to the dependence of the theory of phlogiston on classical particle
mechanics, as the methods for determining weight presuppose the use of CPM or
some other theory that is reducible to it, such as RBM.19 At the beginning of this
epigraph, the connection between the models of RBM and the potential models of
PHLO in terms of weight is pointed out.
The determination of the basic set A is carried out in accordance with the
manners of determining air stipulated in the iatrochemical theory presented by Joan-
Baptista van Helmont.20 Here, air is conceived as the setting for the chemical
reactions, and is defined as an elastic fluid that transports particles, substances and
chemical elements. The results of chemical studies by Boyle in this respect reaffirm
those put forward by Helmont.21
The relation of equal or reduced respirability of air is derived from the property
of air of being breathable, this being determined by means of ordinary knowledge,
e.g. on the basis of the actions of inhaling and exhaling. Nevertheless, in order to
define the concept of respirability, which is indissociable from the concept of air, it
is necessary to once again turn to the iatrochemical definition of the term ‘air’. Some
of the models from the theory of iatrochemistry necessarily coincide with some of
the potential models of PHLO, due also to the fact that the conception of respiration
as the absorption and emission of gases, along with the corresponding character-
ization of the notion of gas, constitutes another of Helmont’s contributions to the
chemistry of his time. The subset of substances formed by gases would thus be
determined in accordance with the iatrochemical analysis of the latter, and by means
of which it is established that the gases are made up of air and earth of water.22
With regard to notion of combustion, in spite of there being certain links which
are constitutive with other theories that are essential for the determination of g, these
links do not contribute to forming a criterion for determination, i.e. a set of
conditions that are necessary and sufficient to do so. As modes of determining g, the
verification of the increase in temperature, of the reduction in size, of the emission
of gases, of the reduced respirability of the surrounding air, etc., must also be taken
into consideration. All of this principally involves different sections of ordinary
knowledge. Nevertheless, insofar as the concept of gas plays a role in this
18
Cf. ibid., pp. 66, 75.
19
Balzer et al. (1987, pp. 53–54).
20
Cf. ibid., p. 49.
21
Cf. ibid., p. 59.
22
Cf. ibid., p. 51.
123
344 M. Caamaño
determination, and this is considered scientific, there will be at least one essential
link derived from this intervention. As has already been mentioned when analyzing
the notion of respiration, in accordance with the theory of iatrochemistry and the
chemistry of Boyle, gases are considered as compounds and/or mixtures of either
earth and air, or water and air.23 Consequently, and given that the determination of
the function g requires both the verification that gases are emitted in the combustion
process, and the reduced respirability of the air surrounding the reaction, the
essential link of g with the aforementioned theories will be generated in a dual
manner: firstly, directly, due to its dependence on the notion of gas; and secondly,
more indirectly, due to its dependence on the notion of respiration, which in turn is
directly dependent on that of gas.
The concept of aggregation (characterized by means of the function 8) specifies
two different cases within the cameralist theory: that of compounds, and that of
mixtures. Its origin is physical, as it is based on the physical theories of Boyle and
Newton.24 In accordance with these, matter is made up of particles that are
hierarchically organized into groups or clusters to form mixtures or compounds. The
former are characterized by having been constituted by means of a quantitatively
unstable combination of elements. On the contrary, the latter are defined on the
basis of a quantitatively stable combination of elements.
Nevertheless, certain significant differences between the physical and chemical
concepts of composition should be pointed out. The former refers to the
concatenation relation between particles, the result of which would be the
concatenation or grouping together of these particles. The second, however,
explains the aggregation relation between chemical substances, which would lead to
the formation of an aggregate. The essential difference lies in the fact that an
aggregate does not consist of a mere grouping of substances, rather of a new
substance that is obtained on the basis of other different ones. This distinguishing
aspect is not a case of using specific concepts from any scientific theory, rather of
notions that are characteristic of ordinary language. Thus, in the description of this
distinguishing aspect only ordinary terms (e.g. ‘substance’, ‘formation’, etc.) are
involved. Finally, the need to take into consideration both the physical and the
strictly chemical meaning of the notion of aggregation must to be stressed, as, even
though part of the meaning of the term ‘aggregation’ depends on notions from the
sphere of ordinary language, another fundamental part requires notions that are
characteristic of physics for its determination. More specifically, the physical
concepts of ‘mass’ and ‘conservation of mass’ will come into play. Thus, it would
seem reasonable to uphold the existence of an essential intertheoretical link of 8
with the corpuscular theories of Boyle and Newton, so that the notion of
composition of these theories would be essential for setting the meaning of
‘aggregation’. Nevertheless, as has already been alluded to, the specification of this
link will be necessary but not sufficient to lend meaning to this term, it also being
necessary to take into account the aforementioned ordinary knowledge.
23
Cf. ibid., pp. 51, 71–72.
24
Cf. ibid., pp. 55, 75.
123
If we concede that the physical theories of Boyle and Newton are essential for the
determination of w, 8 and S, with the iatrochemical theory and Boylean chemistry
being required to determine A, g and R, then the global link of PHLO could be
defined as the intersection of all the intertheoretical links of PHLO.
2.6 The Theory-Element of PHLO and Its Empirical Claim
T(PHLO) := \K(PHLO), I(PHLO)[ where

K(PHLO) := \Mp(PHLO), M(PHLO), Mpp(FLO), GC(PHLO), GL(PHLO)[
and I(PHLO) Mpp(PHLO) is such that
(1) I0 I(PHLO) where I0 is {the combustion of non-metallic inorganic
substances (wood, coal), the calcination of mercury, the reduction and
composition of mercury}
(2) all the members of I(PHLO) are sufficiently similar to those of I0.
Formulation of the empirical claim of PHLO: The intentional applications may
be extended to a set of models that are connected among themselves by GC(PHLO)
which satisfy the laws and the links.
More specifically, the express assertion that the members of I(PHLO) that are
made up of a number of substances S, such as air A and combustible substances C,
may be extended to structure containing the substance phlogiston P. The structures
have to comply with the law and the bonding conditions. Members of I(PHLO) will
consist of a structure of temporal instants T, with a series of functions g for
determining the reactions of combustion, functions w for weight, and 8 for
aggregation. The relations R and P also intervene by giving account of the members
of I(PHLO), as they establish connections respectively between different
substances, on the basis of the property of being equal or less breathable, and in
accordance with their equal or reduced phlogistication. In each individual reaction
or process of combustion determined by g, T and S (and consequently their subsets
C, A, P) along with the other functions and relations that have been mention, the
laws of PHLO must hold. However, each substance in S will be applicable in at
least one member of I(PHLO). The string of functions w must assign to each
substance the same weight throughout the chemical reaction in I(PHLO) in which it
intervenes.
3 Reconstruction of the Oxygen Theory
In the same way as with PHLO, with OXG the aim is to give account of the
phenomenon of combustion as well as other phenomena associated to it; principally,
the calcination, reduction (analysis) and composition (synthesis) of chemical
substances. The set comprising the (types of) phenomena mentioned make up the
class of intentional applications of OXG. In order to give an account of these, we
shall postulate the existence of a new chemical element, oxygen, with the absorption
of this substance in combustion (by the chemical substances subjected to this
process) being established as a fundamental law.
123
346 M. Caamaño
3.1 Potential Models of OXG
Mp(OXG): x is a potential model of the theory of oxygen (x [ Mp(OXG)) iff there

exist S, T, C, O, g, w, R, 8 such that
(1) x = hS, T, C, A, O, R?, g, w, R, 8i
(2) S is a finite, non-empty set
(3) T = {t1, t2}
(4) C , S and C = [
(5) A , S and A = [, likewise A \ C = [, it also being the case that A \
O=[
(6) O , S and O = [
(7) g: (C 9 A 9 {t1}) ? (S 9 A 9 {t2})
(8) w: S ? R?
(9) R A 9 A, and R determines a weak order
(10) 8: S 9 S ? S
Basic intended interpretation: S is a set of portions of specific chemical
substances, T is a set whose only elements are two temporal instants: one prior to the
combustion (t1) and another subsequent to it (t2). C is a subset of S which includes
elements of A, and is interpreted as being the set of portions of specific combustible
substances. A is a set of chemical portions of air, i.e. of the substance made up of
portions of elements, some of which intervene in the process of combustion. Finally,
with regard to domains, O is a set of portions of an element called ‘oxygen’.
The function g determines the combustion or chemical reactions, by assigning to
each portion of the combustible substance c and to each portion of air a in t1 a
portion of substance s and a portion of air a0 in t2. w is the function that determines
the weight, assigning to each chemical substance s its weight w(s) as an element of
R?. R lists different specific portions of air in terms of their equal or lesser degree of
respirability. It should be borne in mind that, unlike the rest of the relations that
appear in the definition of Mp(OXG), R does not have a functional character. It may
come about that the same air may be as breathable, or less breathable than more than
one air; i.e., there may be several airs that are more or less breathable than it. The
combination of substances that form aggregates is represented by means of the
function 8. Each pair of substances has assigned to it another substance, an
aggregate, which arises from the combination of the former two.
We now go on to define certain notions derived from the primitive concepts of
OXG, in a similar manner to that done for the reconstruction of PHLO.
If x = hS, T, C, A, O, R?, g, w, R, 8i [ Mp(OXG) then
(1) Let \c, a, t1[ and \s, a0 , t2[ of which g(\c, a, t1[) = \s, a0 , t2[ then
g1(c) = defs and g2(a) = defa0 (i.e. the image of a substance c under the
combustion function, g1(c), is the residue of s obtained on the basis of c, and
the image of a substance a under the combustion function, g2(a) is the
substance a0 obtained on the basis of a)
In (1) the concepts of the residue of the combustible substance obtained after
combustion and of air obtained after combustion on the basis of the air prior to the
123
combustion are defined. These concepts are defined by means of the restrictions of g
with regard to the domains S and A.
(2) Let s, s0 , s00 be such that 8(s, s0 ) = s00 then s00 = defs 8 s0 (s00 should be
understood as the aggregation of s and s0 )
In (2) the concept of aggregate, by means of applying the function 8, as the value
assigned to the arguments of this function; i.e. as that substance which results from
the combination of the other two.
(3) s contains s0 iffdef: there is some s00 s = s0 8 s00 or s = s00 8 s0
In (3) the mereological containment relation of containing is defined, also on the
basis of the function 8, as the relation between the value assigned to the arguments
of this function and one or other of these; i.e. as the relation between that substance
resulting from the combination of two others and one or other of these two.
(4) os is the total (or maximum) quantity of oxygen contained in s iffdef: s contains
os, and for every o0 if s contains o0 then os then o0
On the basis of the aggregation function and of the mereological containment
relation (derived from it), in (4) it is possible to define the concept of total or
maximum value of the oxygen contained in a substance as that portion of oxygen
that constitutes one of the arguments of the function o giving as a value s, or,
expressed in other terms, as that portion of oxygen that is combined with some other
substance to produce the aggregate s.
(5) Q S 9 S and sQs0 iffdef: w(os) B w(os0 ) (when applied to combustion,
understood as s0 deoxygenated (loses oxygen) giving rise to s iff the total
quantity of oxygen s weighs less than or the same as the weight of the total
oxygen in s0 )
In (5) Q is defined on the basis of the primitive concept of weight, and on the
derived concept of the total quantity of oxygen in a substance, as a relation between
different specific portions of substances according to their equal or lesser content of
oxygen. The relation Q determines a weak order.
3.2 Actual Models of OXG
M(OXG): x is an actual model of the theory of oxygen (x [ M(OXG)) iff there exist
S, T, C, A, O, g, w, R, 8 such that
(1) x = hS, T, C, A, O, R?, g, w, R, 8i
(2) x [ Mp(OXG)
(3) for all \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g):
(3i) a contains g2(a)
(3ii) there exists o [ O such that a contains o in t1 and g2(a) does not contain o in t2
and g1(c) contains o in t2 and c does not contain o in t1
(3iii) for all o [ O: if c contains o in t1 then g1(c) contains o in t2
(4) for all a [ A: g2(a)Ra iff w(o2g(a)) B w(oa)
123
348 M. Caamaño
Condition (3) is the requirement that there should be a type of entity that is
absorbed in combustion by the substances subjected to this process. (3i) requires
that the substance air with participates in the combustion should contain the residue
remaining after combustion. (3ii) establishes that the substance that is responsible
for the combustion should pass from the air to the body. (3iii) requires that none of
this substance should pass from the body to the air. The decrease in respirability for
that substance air with a lower quantity of oxygen is established in (4).
The demonstration of the following theorem, which is implied by axioms (3) and
(4), allows us to conclude that that air has less respirability after the combustion.
Theorem 1 for all\c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): g2(a)Ra and it is not the case that aRg2(a)
Proof Let \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g)
\g1(c), g2(a), t2[ = g(\c, a, t1[) by definition of g
a contains o in t1 and g2(a) does not contain o in t2, by 3 (ii)
g2(a)Ra, by (4) and by def. (5)
Not for all o [ O is not the case that a contains o in t1 and g2(a) does not contain o
in t2
Not for all o [ O is the case that if a contains o in t1 then g2(a) contains o in t2
it is not the case that aRg2(a), by (4) h
On the basis of Axiom (4) and Definition (5) a new theorem is followed, in which
the lower ‘phlogistication’ of the less breathable air and the greater ‘oxygenation’ of
the more breathable air are established. That is, the theorem expresses a correlation
between the lower respirability of air that intervenes in the reaction and its reduced
‘oxygenation, presenting the restriction of Q over the domain A as an isomorphic
relation of R, and, thus, as implying a lower quantity of oxygen in the less
breathable air.
Theorem 2 for all \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): g2(a)Qa iff g2(a)Ra
Proof Let \c, a, t1 [ [ Dom(g)
\g1(c), g2(a), t2[ = g(\c, a, t1[), by definition of g
for all a, g2(a) [ A, for all o [ O: g2(a)Ra iff w(o2g(a)) B w(oa), by (4)
s0 Qs iff w(os0 ) B w(os), by def. (5)
g2(a)Qa iff w(o2g(a)) B w(oa), by restriction on Q with respect to A
g2(a)Qa iff g2(a)Ra, by substitution on the basis of definition (5) and
axiom (4) h
3.3 Partial Potential Models of OXG
Mpp(OXG): y is a partial potential model of the theory of oxygen (y [ Mpp(OXG))

iff there exists an x such that x = \S, T, C, A, O, R?, g, w, R, 8[ [ Mp(OXG) and
y = \S, T, C, A, R?, g, w, R, 8[
The matter of theoricity affects S, T, C, A, O, g, w, R, 8. ‘Oxygen’, ‘oxidation and
derived terms such as ‘deoxigenation’, are the only OXG-theoretical terms, as only
these depend on the laws of OXG for the determination of their meaning. The
determination of O and of the non-primitive relation Q specifically require the
123
assumption of Axiom (3) from the formal definition of M(OXG), where one of the
fundamental laws of OXG is expressed. In this law, the existence of an element,
oxygen, which is absorbed by all bodies subjected to a process of combustion is
stated. The role of the concepts of oxygen and oxidation in the organization of the
specific conceptual schema of OXG is fundamental, given their involvement in the
constitution of the fundamental laws of this theory. The concepts of oxygen and
oxidation intervene in the conceptual schema supplied by Mp(OXG), which in turn
is proposed in the one offered by M(OXG).
The rest of the sets, the basic ones (S and T) and those that are characterized on
the basis of them (C and A), along with the (non-functional) relation R and the
functions (g, w, and 8), may be considered non OXG-theoretical, as they can be
determined without resorting to the OXG-theoretical concept of oxygen, or to the
fundamental laws of OXG. The fact that oxygen appears as a component of air does
not imply that ‘air’ must be conceived as an OXG-theoretical term, since the
identification of the substance air is possible by means that are independent of the
laws supplied by the theory of iatrochemistry. According to that established in this
theory, air is defined as an elastic fluid that is a transporter of particles that acts as an
environment for combustion. It can be seen that PHLO and OXG share their non T-
theoretical terms. The Kuhnian notion that theoretical terms of a theory could infect
the non-theoretical ones is not borne out in the light of the results of the above
analysis.25 In the case of the transition from the theory of phlogiston to that of
oxygen, in the determination of the non PHLO-theoretical concepts inherited by
OXG there is no need for the fundamental laws of OXG, due to which they are kept
as non-theoretical concepts in the latter theory.
Taking into account that the partial potential models are determined by means of
non T-theoretical models, and that, according to what has already been said, PHLO
and OXG share all their non-theoretical concepts, it can be concluded that
Mpp(PHLO) = Mpp(OXG). The coincidence that both theories supply an
explanation for the non-theoretical phenomenon of combustions which they
exemplify in the same manner, along with the assumption that the classes of
intentional applications are subsets of the classes of partial potential models, makes
it possible to infer that I(OXG) \ I(PHLO) = [. This is the same as saying that
the classes of intentional applications of OXG and PHLO are not exclusive, rather
they overlap, either totally or partially.
The above analysis enables a study to be carried out on the discrepancies and
coincidences between the successful and unsuccessful intentional applications of
both theories. Such a study should give account of the success of both theories in
explaining the reduced respirability of the air surrounding combustion. Similarly,
it would have to explain the success of OXG, as opposed to PHLO, in resolving
the anomaly of the increase in weight of calcined metals, and its failure, also in
contrast to PHLO, of leaving unsolved the problem of the apparent decrease in
weight of non-metallic substances that are subjected to combustion(as will be
proved below).
25
Kuhn expresses this concern in (1983, p. 673).
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350 M. Caamaño
At this point no explanation will be given of how the different notions expressed by
non OXG-theoretical terms are determined, given that as these notions are shared with
PHLO, their determination criterion has already been examined in Sect. 2.5.
3.4 Constraints for OXG
OXG shares with PHLO the ‘‘inherited’’ (not its own) constraints C1 and C2 for the
identity and extensivity of the weight. It should be remembered that in C1 the
weight of any substance is required to be independent of the systems in which the
said substance appears. C2 requires that relative to a given aggregation operation
(represented by the basic notion 8) the weight should behave as an additive under
this relation. To each pair of chemical substances, 8 assigns another chemical
substance whose weight results from the addition of the weight of both substances.
Nevertheless, there is one crucial discrepancy between PHLO and OXG that
should not be overlooked. The point of divergence is related with Theorem 3 of the
theory of phlogiston, implied by (3) and C2(PHLO), and therein is established the
decrease in weight of every substance after having been subjected to the process of
combustion. As has already been pointed out, this theorem is deduced on the basis
of the constriction that stipulates the additivity of the aggregation and of one of the
fundamental laws of PHLO according to which every substance emits phlogiston
on being burnt. Given that OXG shares C2 with PHLO, but this is not the case with
the aforementioned fundamental law, the deduction of the same theorem on the
basis of the axioms of OXG is impossible. One important consequence emerges
from this, namely that from OXG no account is given of the apparent decrease in
weight that certain bodies undergo when subjected to combustion. It only supplies
an explanation of the increase in weight of metals and certain minerals (such as
sulphur) when burnt. By combining C2(OXG) and Axiom (3), included in the
formal definition of M(OXG), where the absorption of oxygen by the some of the
bodies that react in combustion is established, it is possible to obtain a theorem in
which the increase in weight undergone by combustible substances when burnt is
expressed. It should be noted that this theorem contradicts the second theorem of
PHLO, which is derived on the basis of C2(PHLO) and Axiom (3) from the formal
definition of M(PHLO). This serves to highlight how the increase in weight of
metals is the principal anomaly that the defenders of the theory of phlogiston
tackled, unsuccessfully, and how the solution of this anomaly from the theory of
oxygen requires the theory of phlogiston to be rejected, by denying certain
consequences that follow the fundamental law of that theory.
We now go on to give the definitions of the constraints for OXG that, as has
already been mentioned, coincide with those of PHLO.
C1(OXG): for all X: X [ C1(OXG) iff [ = X Mp(OXG) and for all x, y [ X
and for all s: if s [ Sx \ Sy then wx (s) = wy (s)
C2(OXG): for all X: X [ C2(OXG) iff [ = X Mp(OXG) and for all x, y,
z [ X:
(a) 8: S 9 S ? S where S := [ {Sx/x [ Mp(OXG)}
(b) for all s [ Sx, s0 [ Sy (if s 8 s0 [ Sz then wz(s 8 s0 ) = wx(s) ? wy(s0 ))
123
The global constraint for OXG would be:

GC(OXG) = C1(OXG) \ C2(OXG)
The theorem that is demonstrated below, which is implied by Axiom (3) and by
C2(OXG), establishes the increase in weight of every body subjected to combustion.
Theorem 3 for all \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): w(g1(c)) [ w(c)
Proof Let \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g)
\g1(c), g2(a), t2 [ = g(\c, a, t1[), by definition of g
g1(c) contains o in t2 and c does not contain o in t1, by (3ii)
w(g1(c)) = w(c) ? w(o), by C2(OXG)
w(g1(c)) [ w(c) h
3.5 Intertheoretical Links of OXG
Six essential links can be identified for OXG. Of them, those relative to S, C, w and
8 are shared with PHLO. As here we are dealing with links that have already been
examined, only their origin is given, and no analysis is made of them. As was
already pointed out in the previous section, when determining the values of the
function w some model from classical particle mechanics (CPM) needs to be
assumed: i.e. a link L1 is required between M(CPM) and Mp(OXG). In the same
manner, with regard to the determination of S, the need to resort to the notion of
material as it is defined in the mechanistic theories of Boyle and Newton, as well as
the characterization of w offered in CPM, became evident. Lastly, 8 also conserves
its links, which connect OXG with classical mechanics, with the cameralist theory
and with Boyle’s corpuscular theory. The dependence on ordinary knowledge,
already described in the previous section, should not be forgotten.
The concepts of air, respiration, combustion and combustible substance lose
some of their links with the iatrochemical theory as with the physics of Boyle.
Nevertheless, their determination, which is principally dependent on ordinary
knowledge, does not vary, so that the changes in beliefs that justify the
disappearance of these links do not, however, justify the consideration that this
variation generates a conceptual change.
I shall now touch on a pair of historical aspects relative to alterations in
intertheoretical links. The first of these is the evolution of the concept of air,26 and
the second, the role of Boyle as a driving force behind the scientific revolution, and
precursor of Dalton’s chemical atomism. Both topics are partially linked, as air not
only ceases to be considered as an environment to go on to be considered as an
aggregate made up of a variety of elements that are active in combustion, but it is
also completely disassociated from the state in which it appears. Air ceases to be a
sui generis substance, which is merely the carrier of particles and passive in the
combustion process, to go on to be considered as a substance composed of different
types of elements, among which appears oxygen, and which is active in the process
of combustion. To the extent in which they depend on the concept of air, some of
the intertheoretical links of the concepts of respiration, combustion and combustible
26
Cf. Brock, op. cit., pp. 124–127.
123
352 M. Caamaño
substance with the iatrochemical theory and the physics of Boyle will also be
modified. For the determination of the three concepts, with everything, the use of
ordinary knowledge will still be fundamental. In general, states are dissociated from
elements, the former being explained on the basis of changes in temperatures or
affinities with other substances, and not in terms of chemical principles or intrinsic
properties of elements. As a result of this, in the chemistry of Lavoisier, air will be
identified with gases (aggregates of elements) without the substances thus named
having necessarily to remain in a gaseous state. According to the above, the
elements are dissociated from both states and principles. Consequently, chemical
reactions (including combustion) can no longer be explained by resorting to
principles but to proportional relations between substances. The effective
disappearance of the notion of principle in chemistry will not come about until
the emergence of Dalton’s atomic theory. Nevertheless, proponents of OXG will
make only nominal use of this notion, varying the meaning of ‘principle’ until they
make it coincide with that of ‘element that is systematically active in certain types
of reactions’.
If, as has been supposed in the previous section, it is acknowledged that the
physical theories of Boyle and Newton are essential in the determination of w, 8 and
S, then the global link of OXG could be defined as the intersection of all the
intertheoretical links of OXG.
3.6 The Theory-Element of OXG and its Empirical Claim
T(OXG) := \K(OXG), I(OXG)[ where

K(OXG) := \Mp(OXG), M(OXG), Mpp(OXG), GC(OXG), GL(OXG)[
and I(OXG) Mpp(OXG) is such that
(1) I0 I(OXG) where I0 is {the combustion of non-metallic inorganic
substances (wood, coal), the calcination of mercury, the reduction and
composition of mercury}
(2) all the members of I(OXG) are sufficiently similar to those of I0.
Formulation of the empirical claim of OXG: The intentional applications may be
extended to a set of models that are connected among themselves by GC(OXG)
which satisfy the laws and the intertheoretical links.
The assertion states that the members of I(OXG), which consist of various
structures of substances S (such as air A and combustible substances C) can be
extended to the structures of the substance oxygen O. The structures must comply
with the laws and constraints. Members of I(OXG) will consist of a structure of
temporal instants T, with a series of functions c for determining the reactions of
combustion, functions w for weight, and 8 for aggregation. The relations R and Q
also intervene by giving account of the members of I(OXG), as they establish
connections between different substances, on the basis of the property of being
equal or less breathable, and in accordance with their equal or reduced oxidization,
respectively. In each individual reaction or process of combustion determined by g,
T and S (and consequently their subsets C, A, O) along with the other functions and
relations that have been mention, the laws of OXG must hold. However, each
123
substance of S will be applicable in at least one member of I(OXG). The string of

functions w must assign to each substance the same weight throughout the chemical
reaction in I(OXG) in which it intervenes.
4 Analysis of the Incommensurability Relation Between PHLO and OXG
In this section, I shall argue in favour of the thesis, assumed by some structuralists,
that every coherent notion of incommensurability implies that of applicative
reduction,27 and even, that of ontological reduction, although I shall propose a
modified version of the latter, which does not presuppose that of theoretical
reduction.28 Note that, if incommensurability is presented as being incompatible
with any type of reduction relation, it must thus have other resources alternative to
reduction in order to lend meaning to the affirmation that incommensurable theories
that are not reducible in any way nevertheless give account of the same setting of
reality. However, defenders of the thesis of incommensurability have not supplied a
sufficiently developed proposal in this sense.
The episode of incommensurability that is reconstructed in the present work will
show the possibility of applying a weak applicative or ontological reduction
between incommensurable theories, even when the tout court exact, approximate or
ontological reductions may not be possible. The notion of weak or applicative
ontological reduction does not presuppose compliance with the conditions for a
strict or theoretical reduction, rather only compliance with the conditions for a
correspondence between [a certain especially relevant subset of] the intended
applications of the theories, the domains of which would be shared or correlation-
able with relations structures from the other theory. The proposal of this type of
reduction responds, in part, to methodological considerations (such as guaranteeing
a coherent notion of incommensurability) and, in part, to the acknowledgement of
the meta-theoretical evidence (derived from the study of incommensurable theories)
that is available.29
The stance that I shall take can be summarized in terms coined by Stegmüller
(and employed also by Moulines), by stating that the incommensurability studied
herein will be theoretical and not empirical.30 That is, the relation of incommen-
surability will affect the class of potential models of the theories involved, without
extending to the class of partial potential models (i.e. those structures that determine
27
Cf. Dı́ez and Moulines (1999) op. cit., p. 459.
28
Dieter Mayr anticipated this notion of reduction by establishing the explanation of anomalies as a
criterion for reduction between incompatible successive theories (cf. Mayr 1976, pp. 275–294).
29
The relevant sources to this respect are mentioned in Moulines (1984, pp. 69–70). The author refers
there to numerous pairs of theories related by ontological reduction, being plausible to assume that this
relation would imply some sort of translation between the partial potential models of these theories (at
least for the case of homogeneous ontological reduction, which will be discussed below). Among the pairs
of theories mentioned by Moulines are the following: Kepler’s Planetary Theory and Newtonian Particle
Mechanics, Geometric Optics and Ondulatory Optics, Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics and Kinetic
Theory of Gases, Newtonian Particle Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics, Mendelian Genetics and
Molecular Biology (cf. pp. 61–62).
30
Cf. Stegmüller (1976, § 11); Moulines, Exploraciones Metacientı́ficas, cit., p. 207.
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354 M. Caamaño
the intentional applications of theories). The latter class will form a setting that is
susceptible to reduction.
4.1 Relation of Theoretical Incommensurability Between PHLO and OXG
Below, I shall reproduce the definition of incommensurability given by J.A. Dı́ez

and C.U. Moulines in a recent work in which they present certain new developments
in the structuralist programme.31
‘‘Let N, N* be two different theoretical networks. We say that N is supplantable
(incommensurably) by N* iff there is a relation q Mp* 9 Mp and a non-empty
set Ia such that:
(1) q is not effectively calculable.
(2) is a function, is effectively calculable and Rec( ) = Mpp.
(3) There do not exist n non-empty sets M*1, …, M*n included in M*0 such that q[M*1
[ [ M*n] & M0.
(4) (i)Ia I0 \ qe[I*0] y (ii) for each y [ Ia (y [ r[M*0] ^ y 62 r[M0])’’.32
When explaining the above formal definition, both authors stress one aspect of
great interest. This is the distinction between two factors of incommensurability:
one which is conceptual (referred to in Condition (1), which affects potential
models, and thus, the conceptual apparatus of the respective theories), and another,
which is propositional (referred to in Condition (3), which affects the actual models,
and consequently, the laws of the respective theories). The former determines the
impossibility of establishing a systematic correlation between the models (and, thus,
between the basic concepts) of the two theories. The latter determines the
impossibility of deducing the fundamental laws of the supplanted theory on the
basis of the laws of the supplanting one. In any case, Conditions (2) and (4) give
account of the partial nature of incommensurability (or of the degree of
commensurability that it implies), considering, equally, the two aforementioned
factors. In (2) the possibility of systematically correlating the partial potential
models (and consequently, the basic non –theoretical concepts) of each theory is
determined. Finally, (4) determines that the set of anomalies from the supplanted
theory forms part of the set of intentional applications of both theories, and that
these anomalies should not be submissible under the laws of the supplanted theory,
but that they should be submissible under the laws of the supplanting theory.
31
The definition of theoretical suplantation with incommensurability is established in Dı́ez and Moulines
(1999, pp. 456–460). The reason why the definition of incommensurability given in Balzer et al. (1987,
pp. 306–320) is not given here has to do with its lesser interest for the analysis of this case in particular. In
the present study the case requires a definition of incommensurability that may be independent of the
theoretical reduction and, in that manner, it may comply with all possible cases of incommensurability,
among them, these that are not susceptible to theoretical reduction, such as the one dealt with herein.
There is a more recent and suited structuralist proposal for defining the relation of incommensurability. Its
character is more global, it allows the substitution of highly specific but not very illuminating conclusions
for the present case to be substituted by other more general and revealing ones. In particular, it makes it
possible to do without the prerequisite of the reduction relation, resorting to the T-non-theoretical relation
to establish a sufficiently significant relation between the theories.
32
Dı́ez and Moulines (1999, p. 459).
123
In order to demonstrate that the relation between PHLO and OXG fulfils
condition (1), it needs to be demonstrated that this relation does not satisfy the
definition of exact reduction. Let us first consider the six constituent conditions of
the definition of reduction that are established in the structuralist programme.33
Firstly, the condition of derivability (D) of the laws of the reduced theory T is
established on the basis of the reducing theory T0 and through the mediation of q.
Secondly, the reduction needs to be compatible (C) with the constraints for both
theories. A third condition is the compatibility (L) of the reduction with the links of
both theories. The fourth condition requires that each potential model of T be related
(‘‘translatable’’) (T) by means of reduction with some potential model of T0 . In fifth
place, independence (I), with respect to the definition of q, from the derivation
expressed in (D) is required. Lastly, as a sixth condition a connection (IA) is
established between the intentional applications of the two theories.
I shall now reproduce the formal definition of reduction proposed in the
structuralist programme:
If T and T0 are idealised theoretical elements, then q directly reduces T to T0
0
(T q T) iff
(1) q Mp0 9 Mp
(2) Rng(q) = Mp (T)
(3) for all x0 , x: if \x0 , x[ [ q y x0 [ M0 then x [ M (D)
(4) for all X0 Dom(q): if X0 [ GC0 then q(X0 ) [ GC (C)
(5) for all x0 , x: if x0 [ GL0 y \ x0 , x[ [ q then x [ GL (L)
(6) for all y [ I there exists y0 [ I0 such that \y0 , y[ [ (IA)
Let us now consider the difficulties in applying the structuralist definition of
reduction to the present case, where the impossibility of calculating the reduction
relation between PHLO and OXG will be obvious. Firstly, the fulfilment of
condition (3) is incompatible with that of condition (4). The intervention of
phlogiston in combustion, which is necessary for the fulfilment of (3), involves
consequences that are incompatible with the role of oxygen in the same
phenomenon, since the constraint C2(OXG) of the extensivity of the weight, which
is required for the satisfaction of (4), means that in one case the combustible
substance decreases in weight, and in the other, the same substance increases in
weight. The conceptual framework in which oxygen is the substance that is
principally active in the process of combustion, recognisable due to it being
absorbed by the substances that are submitted to this process, and in which these,
due to C2(OXG), will have to increase in weight, is incompatible with the other one
in which the substance that is principally active in combustion is phlogiston,
recognisable due to having been emitted by the substances that are subjected to this
process, and in which these, C2(PHLO), will have to decrease in weight. Similar
inconsistencies arise when attempting to determine from OXG the derived concept
of dephlogistication, which forms part of PHLO. For the reasons explained,
conditions (3) and (4) cannot be satisfied jointly, and given that both are necessary
33
Cf. Balzer et al. (1987, pp. 275–279).
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356 M. Caamaño
conditions for exact reduction, it can now be concluded that this will not come
about.
Proof Let (3) for all x0 , x: if\x0 , x[ [ q y x0 [ M(OXG) then x [ M(PHLO), y (4)
for all X0 Dom(q): if X0 [ GC(OXG) then q(X0 ) [ GC(PHLO)
(4) for all X0 Dom(q): if X0 [ GC(OXG) then q(X0 ) [ GC(PHLO)
Let X0 [ GC(OXG)
for all X0 if X0 [ GC(OXG) then for all s [ Sx0 , s0 [ Sy0 (si s 8 s0 [ Sz0 then
wz0 (s 8 s0 ) = wx0 (s) ? wy0 (s0 )), by definition of C2(OXG) and of GC(OXG)
for all \ c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): w(g1(c)) [ w(c), Theorem 3 of OXG
for all X if X [ GC(FLO) then for all s [ Sx, s0 [ Sy (si s 8 s0 [ Sz then
wz(s 8 s0 ) = wx(s) ? wy(s0 )), by definition of C2(PHLO) and of GC(PHLO)
for all c\, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): w(g1(c)) \ w(c), Theorem 3 of PHLO
for all \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): w(g1(c)) \ w(c) and for all \c, a, t1[ [ Dom(g): not
w(g1(c)) \ w(c)
it is not the case that q(X0 ) [ GC(PHLO), by ECQ
If X0 [ GC(OXG) then it is not the case that q(X0 ) [ GC(PHLO)
for all X0 Dom(q): if X0 [ GC(OXG) then q(X0 ) [ GC(PHLO) and if X0 [
GC(OXG) then it is not the case that q(X0 ) [ GC(PHLO)
It is not the case that (3) for all x0 , x: If \x0 , x [ [ q y x0 [ M(OXG) then x [
M(PHLO), and (4) for all X0 Dom(q): if X0 [ GC(OXG) then q(X0 ) [
GC(PHLO), by reduction ad absurdum.
Condition (6) is not satisfied either, given that there are successful intentional
application of PHLO that are lost in the transition to OXG, although they are
subsequently recovered in the development of chemistry. In spite of the condition
that establishes the connection (IA) between the intentional applications of the two
theories not being satisfied in a literal interpretation, it is satisfied in a more
restricted version in which I and I0 are substituted, where appropriate, by Ia, (set of
anomalies contained in the theory of phlogiston), I0, (set of paradigmatic
applications of the theory of phlogiston) and I00 (set of paradigmatic applications
of the theory of oxygen). In effect, although not for each successful application of
PHLO is there a corresponding successful application in OXG (remember, for
example, the combustion of hydrogen), it is true that there is a set made up of the
aimed applications of both theories such that these applications are not submissible
under the laws of PHLO but are so under those of OXG. Expressed formally, the
new version of the condition (IA) would be as follows:34
Ia I0 \ [I00 ] and for all y [ Ia (y [ r[M00 ] ^ y 62 r[M0]);
where r represents the ‘‘cut off’’ of T-theoretical concepts, assigning partial
potential model to actual or potential models that are formed by adding T-theoretical
concepts to the said partial potential models.
After revising which defining conditions of exact reduction satisfy the relation
between PHLO and OXG, and which do not, it is verified that the only condition
that is satisfied is the final one (IA), that which principally involves the intentional
34
As shall be reiterated at a later point, this condition appears in Dı́ez and Moulines (1999, p. 459), as
one of the defining conditions of the relation of incommensurability.
123
applications and, thus the non T-theoretical conceptual framework (Mpp) that is
common to both theories in which such intentional applications are characterised. In
conclusion, the relation between FLO and OXG does not fit in with an exact
reduction relations, given that it does not satisfy five of the six conditions necessary
for this, but, as it does satisfy the condition (IA), it does fit in with a new type of
ontological reduction, of a weak or applicative nature (which shall be characterized
below), and it satisfies one of the two general conditions of exact reduction, namely,
the resolution of anomalies in the theory that it is aimed to reduce. Consequently,
the irreducibility is due to the non-satisfaction of the other general condition of
exact reduction, the derivability of the laws of theory that it is aimed to reduce on
the basis of the laws of the theory that is supposed to be the reducing one.
Condition (2) of the definiens of the relation of incommensurability is thus
fulfilled, as is deduced from the definitions of Mpp(PHLO) and of Mpp(OXG), to
each partial model of OXG (which intervenes in the reduction relation),
corresponds a partial model of PHLO until the domain of the partial models of
PHLO is used up. What is more, as we have seen, each partial model of OXG is
identified with a partial model of PHLO.
Thus, condition (3) of the definiens of the relation of incommensurability is
satisfied, as correlation between the actual models is impossible in all cases, due to
the application of the laws and the satisfaction of the constraint being incompatible.
That is, the application of the laws and the satisfaction of the constraints in one
theory are incompatible with the application of the laws and the satisfaction of the
constraints in the other theory. The deducibility of the laws of the supplanted theory
on the basis of the laws of the supplanting theory is impossible in all cases given the
general scope of this incompatibility.
Finally, condition (4) of the definiens of the incommensurability relation is also
satisfied, as the (interesting) set of anomalies from the supplanted theory contains
anomalies that are submissible under the laws of the supplanting theory (and not
under those of the supplanted theory). Any example of the calcination of metal is a
case in which the aforementioned is satisfied.
4.2 Empirical Commensurability and Weak Ontological Reduction Between

PHLO and OXG
Going back to the question of empirical commensurability between theoretically

incommensurable theories, it is possible to ask about the types of global inter-
theoretical relations in which this come about in the present case.
Firstly, the empirical convergence between both theories is clear in their
convergence in the pre-theoretical approach or in the theoretical presuppositions. As
is established in their definition, the inter-theoretical relation of theorization is
characterised by the presence of a special type of determining like, such as
interpretive links.35 The existence of determining links between the theorized theory
and that which theorizes constitutes a presupposed condition that must be satisfied
in order to guarantee the presence of interpretive links. On the other hand, these
35
Cf. Balzer et al. (1987, pp. 250–251, 278–279).
123
358 M. Caamaño
links must satisfy the requirements that determining links should always culminate
in actual models of the previous (or underlying) theory, and that they should not be
‘‘reversible’’, i.e. that they should not imply another determining link in the opposite
direction. The semantic determination of the PHLO-non-theoretical and OXG-non-
theoretical terms, be they either referential of definitional, presupposes the
acceptance of the laws of theories that underlie both theoretical elements. Given
that PHLO and OXG share all their non-theoretical concepts, the theories
presupposed in their determination or interpretation will be the same. The theories
of phlogiston and oxygen thus coincide in theorizing (or, at least, presupposing) the
same theories of matter, respiration and composition.
Secondly, both theories are reducible, either applicatively or by means of a weak
ontological reduction, as shall be seen below. Firstly, it should be borne in mind
that, as Moulines explicitly states, the structure formed on the basis of the non-T-
theoretical terms constitutes the ‘‘outside world’’ of T, while the structure
corresponding to the T-theoretical terms can be conceived as being the specific
apparatus of T for ‘‘seeing the world’’.36 The first type of substructure shall be
considered as a partial potential model of T, and will play decisive role in the
empirical interpretation and application of the potential model in which it is
included. With a more general character, the class of partial potential models is
identified with the basis of empirical contrasting or the empirical application of T,
the relevant subset of them being known as the ‘‘intentional applications’’ of T. With
regard to PHLO and OXG, and how this differs with that previously established,
both would be theorizations of Boyle and Newton’s physics (which are necessary in
order to determine the domain of the substances along with the aggregation and
weight functions), at the same time as of iatrochemistry and Boylean chemistry
(which are essential in the interpretation of the domain of the air substances, the
combustion function and the relation of respirability). Similarly, in accordance with
the above, the substructures of PHLO and OXG shaped on the basis of the shared
non-theoretical terms ‘substance’, ‘combustible substance’, ‘air’, ‘aggregation’,
‘weight’, ‘combustion’ and ‘respirability’ make up the terminology in which the
partial potential models that are common to both theories would be characterised,
and thus would necessarily intervene in the characterisation of a shared empirical
basis for theory testing.
The notion of ontological reduction was introduced in the structuralist meta-
theoretical context by C. U. Moulines with the aim of enriching the schema of exact
reduction, reproduced in the previous section. In such a schema the ontological
aspect that is inherent to our intuition about reduction would, in his opinion, be
avoided. Moulines explains his proposal in ‘‘Ontological Reduction in the Natural
Sciences’’,37 as well as in Sect. III.3.6. of Pluralidad y recursión.38 It also comes
into play, although in an implicit form, in the definition of incommensurability
given the structuralist programme.39 The interest in the notion of ontological
36
Cf. ibid., p. 277.
37
This work is included in the compilation Reduction in Science, cit., pp. 51–70.
38
‘‘Conexiones ontológicas en la reducción de teorı́as’’, cit., pp. 364–374.
39
Cf. Balzer et al. (1987, pp. 317–320).
123
reduction lies in the fact that it makes it possible to identify the relation between the
domains in the respective theories, thus assuring that the theoretical reduction
relation that is established between them gives us information on the world, on the
empirical.
The notion of ontological reduction is highly relevant for the treatment of the
problem of incommensurability, since it allows the conception of a new type of
applicative ontological reduction, which clarifies certain aspects of this problem.
We should start by pointing out that the reconstruction of the correspondence
between domains, which is characteristic of ontological reduction, can be used not
only to verify the empirical adaptation of inter-theoretical reduction, but also to
determine the empirical connection between theories that have an inter-theoretical
relation other than theoretical reduction. For example it could be used to examine
the type and extent of empirical connection between two incommensurable theories
on a theoretical level. This, in fact, will be the aim of the analysis that is offered
below, in which it will be shown how the relation between PHLO and OXG falls
into the definition of a new type of ontological reduction, and, consequently, how
theoretical incommensurability (which is associated to theoretical irreducibility)
entails empirical commensurability (which is associated to ontological reduction).
Let us now examine the formalisation of the relation between basic domains
carried out by C. U. Moulines. Given that the structural relation between the basic
sets of different theories may reach a high level of complexity and that, moreover, it
involves direct consequences for the structural relation between the respective
relations and functions that are typified over these basic sets, it is worthwhile
analysing the form of these typifications first. These will indicate which class of
arguments the functions take, or to which class of accounts the relations are applied;
they will do so by establishing a procedure for constructing the sets corresponding
to these functions or relations on the basis of previously given sets, over which the
set-theoretical operations of power set and Cartesian product are repeatedly
applied.40
Let T and T0 be two theories related by means of reduction, each one of their
respective potential models will have the following form:
x ¼ \D1 ; . . .; Dn ; A1 ; . . .; Am ; r1 ; . . .; rp [ and
x0 ¼ \D01 ; . . .; D0v0 ; A01 ; . . .; A0w0 ; r10 ; . . .; rz0 0 [
Di (or D0 i) are the basic sets, Ai (or A0 i) are the basic auxiliary sets, and ri (or r0 i) the
functions or relations that constitute the potential model. For each ri there will be a
typification si making it possible to establish that:

ri 2 si Di1 ; . . .; Dih ; Aj1 ; . . .; Ajk
where fDi1 ; . . .; Dih g fD1 ; . . .; Dn g and

Aj1 ; . . .; Ajk fA1 ; . . .; Am g
(and analogically for each r0 i in T0 ).
40
Ibid., pp. 6–7.
123
360 M. Caamaño
It will be said that q M0 p 9 Mp is an ontological reductive link between T0

and T if, besides satisfying the formal definition of reduction, ‘‘it is formed at least
in part by a connection between some of the Di and some D0 i and perhaps also some
A0 j’’,41 the last of which will not be taken into account in the formal definition due to
the fact that they belong to the setting of mathematics and are not specific to
empirical theories. Based on an informal distinction by M. Spector between domain-
preserving reduction and domain-eliminating reduction,42 Moulines establishes a
formal distinction between homogeneous ontological reduction and heterogeneous
ontological reduction. Both types correspond to two general forms in which
different reductively linked theory domains can be related. If the basic sets of the
reduced theory are related by means of a total or partial identity (proper inclusion)
with those of the reducing theory, the theories will be considered to be connected by
means of a homogeneous ontological reduction relation. Whilst, if one of the basic
set of the reduced theory is related with one or more in the reducing theory, in such
a way that does not imply the identification of elements, rather a bi-univocal
correspondence between domains, the theories will be considered to be related by
means of a heterogeneous ontological reduction. The theories connected by means
of both types of ontological reduction links would maintain a relation of mixed
ontological reduction. Let us now see the definition of the first type of reduction, the
one that is relevant for the present case.
If T is reducible to T0 by means of q, then: q It is a homogeneous (ontological)
reductive link of T to T0 iff:
For all x [ Mp, x0 [ Mp0 , si q(x0 ) = x,
Then there exist i, j [ N such that
Di(x) is a basic set of x, Dj(x0 ) is a basic set of x0 ,
and Di(x) Dj(x0 )
As the theories of phlogiston and oxygen are non-reducible, it is clear that the
condition that is presupposed in the two definitions above, the reducibility between
the theories will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, leaving this point to one side, it still
makes sense to ask about the satisfaction or not of the remaining definitional
conditions—those that are directly expressed in the conditions. As was stressed
above, on demonstrating that between PHLO and OXG there is no strict reduction
relation q; nevertheless, between both theories there is a special type of reduction
relation (which can be represented by ‘ a’) to the level of their respective classes of
paradigmatic intentional applications. If in the definition of the ontological
reduction the precondition that there must be a relation q is substituted by another
that established that there must be a relation a, it would be possible to establish a
new type of ontological reduction relation. Thus, in order to define this new type of
relation first we need to define the relation a, on which the novel character the
former depends.
41
Moulines (1991, p. 266).
42
Spector (1978).
123
If T and T0 are two idealised theoretical elements, then a weakly or applicatively

reduces T to T0 (T0 aT) iff there exists a relation Mpp0 9 Mpp and a non-empty
set Ia such that:
(1) is a function, is effectively calculable and for all y, y0 : if \y0 , y [ [ then
0
y =y
0 0
(2) (i) Ia I0 \ [I0] and (ii) for all y [ Ia (y [ r[M0] ^ y 62 r[M0])’’.
The relation between PHLO and OXG fulfils condition (1) by virtue of the
definitions of classes of partial potential models in each theory. The satisfaction of
condition (2) by this relation has already been commented on in the previous
section.
We shall now verify that a is a homogeneous weak (ontological) reductive link
of PHLO to OXG.
We know that PHLO is reducible to OXG by means of a, by the definitions of
Mpp(PHLO) and Mpp(OXG) as well as by the analysis of the relation between the
classes of intentional applications of both theories that was carried out above.
and that for all y [ Mpp(PHLO), y0 [ Mpp(OXG), if a(y0 ) = y,
Then there exist S, S0 such that
S(y) is a basic set of y, S0 (y0 ) is a basic set of y0 ,
and S(y) = S0 (y0 ), by the definitions of Mpp(PHLO) and Mpp(OXG)
Similarly, we know that PHLO is reducible to OXG by means of a
and that for all y [ Mpp(PHLO), y0 [ Mpp(OXG), if a(y0 ) = y,
Then there exist T, T0 such that
T(y) is a basic set of y, T0 (y0 ) is a basic set of y0 ,
and T(y) = T0 (y0 ), by the definitions of Mpp(PHLO) and Mpp(OXG)
Thus, for OXG aPHLO, all the condition of the definiens of the homogeneous
ontological reduction are satisfied. All the basic sets of PHLO, namely, S y T, are
homogeneously linked with the basic sets of OXG, S0 y T0 .
The fact that the situation is different for any of the derived sets or domains is due
to some of them depending on T-theoretical concepts, for which there does not, nor
can exist an equivalent in the other theory. Specifically, I refer the domains F of
PHLO and O of OXG. Not only does it not occur that F is not identifiable with any
set or subset derived from OXG nor correlationable with any typification of OXG,
but also that any similar attempt at identification or correlation by means of any
modification in OXG would lead to incompatibilities within the theory itself. The
ontological irreducibility of the derived set F and O, both dependent on T-
theoretical concepts with incompatible implications, demonstrates one of the
defining features of the incommensurability between the theory of phlogiston and
that of oxygen. With regard to the rest of the derived domains, A and C are
homogeneously linked with A0 and C0 .
4.3 Resolution of Anomalies and the Scientific Progress from PHLO to OXG
With regard to the comparative or gradual relations, which is commensurable with

respect to the substructures of the potential models (Mpp, I), incommensurability
123
362 M. Caamaño
makes it possible to compare the success of both theories on the basis of the shared
intentional applications that constitute anomalies in PHLO (consisting of the
increase in weight of certain substances when burnt) and not in OXG. Thus there is
an objective (inter-theoretical) procedure for comparing the greater or lesser success
of the theory of oxygen in relation to the theory of phlogiston. The explanation of
scientific progress by virtue of the relation between the intentional applications of
the rival theories is expounded in detail by C. U. Moulines, in his article ‘‘Is There
Genuinely Scientific Progress?’’.43 The author argues that the thesis of incommen-
surability, as well as that of the theoretical baggage accompanying it, is compatible
with epistemological comparability at the level of intentional applications, and at
the same time with scientific progress, which can be evaluated on the basis of this
comparability. Nevertheless, this would no longer be understood as additional
knowledge on the same things, which would presuppose a conceptually linear and
veritatively accumulative conception of scientific development in which theories
would be presented as sets of enunciations referring to things, but as additional
knowledge on certain identical or homomorphous sub-domains of paradigmatic
intentional applications of special epistemological or pragmatic relevance. This
conception of scientific progress allows conceptual discontinuities or partial
changes in the universe of discourse of competing theories to be produced, but it
also requires a minimal degree of continuity between some of them. In the same
way, conceptual discontinuity does not allow us to consider an accumulation of
truths linked to the transition between theories, but it permit the consideration of a
build-up of solved problems (or of especially interesting solved problems). From the
viewpoint of structuralism the existence is confirmed of an inter-theoretical
epistemic-pragmatic criterion for prioritising certain intentional applications, whose
possible extension to models is of special interest in this sense. This corresponds
with Condition (4) (i) of the aforementioned second definition of incommensura-
bility. Having more knowledge on the same things is substituted by knowing better
how to solve the same problems. The highly pragmatic nature of intentional
applications reinforces this idea. The possibility of extending more intentional
applications, or simply more interesting applications, to the models of a theory is
equivalent to being able to resolve more (epistemic-pragmatic) problems or more
interesting problems. Moulines formalises this last, more quantitative, aspect of
scientific progress in the following way:44
S ¼: I \ r ðMÞ;
where ‘S’ is the success of a theory, I its class of intentional applications and r(M)
the class of partial potential models that make up part of its models. Thus, the
success of a theory is defined by virtue of those intentional applications that can
effectively be extended to models of the theory to which they belong.
43
This article appears in Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities (Moulines
2000).
44
Moulines provides a formalization relative to theory-nets (ibid., p. 190), the one offered here, relative
to theory-elements, amounts to a simplified version of the former.
123
In order to compare the success of two rival theories by applying the

aforementioned definition, these will have to share at least part of their intended
applications and, consequently, part of their partial potential models; since,
otherwise, neither theory could be compared with respect to the same property, i.e.
its success in the application of the theory to the same phenomena. By sharing I and
Mpp, PHLO and OXG share the type of property that is required to examine the
greater or lesser success of one of them with respect to the other. In spite of the fact
that a number of decades will be needed for the experimental demonstration of the
greater success of the theory of oxygen with respect to that of the theory of
phlogiston, the fact is that in the former there are many more paradigmatic
applications that are extendible to models that in the latter. Examples of this are all
those cases of calcination of metals. Expressed formally:
S½PHLO S½OXG:
From what has been said up until this point, it can be inferred that the decision
between scientific theories is governed by a rational criterion of success (resolution
of certain cognoscitive and/or paradigmatic problems); i.e. that this inter-theoretical
criterion permits the determination and comparison of scientific progress between
incommensurable (non-T-theoretically commensurable) theories. In this way, the
notion that the thesis of incommensurability is linked to the defence of irrationalism,
as well as to an absolute theoretical relativism, is refuted.
5 Conclusions
I will now highlight the three principal results that the study of the case that has
been presented has made it possible to reach:
(1) The contribution of a pro-example supporting the thesis that there exist locally
incommensurable theories, more particularly, those which are theoretically
incommensurable but empirically commensurable.
(2) The demonstration of strict irreducibility between each theory given the
incompatibility between the satisfaction of the condition of ‘‘deducibility’’ and
the satisfaction of the condition of maintaining the constraints.
(3) The possibility of an applicative and weak homogeneous ontological reduction
between the two theories and, consequently, the determination of the key
factor for explaining the objectivity of the progress that the transition between
incommensurable theories supposes.
Acknowledgments I am indebted to Jose Antonio Diez Calzada for his extremely insightful revisions to
many previous versions of this paper. I am also thankful to Ulises Moulines for providing me clear
guidelines on different intricate matters related to the structuralist treatment of the phlogiston case. This
work was financially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education.
123
364 M. Caamaño
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123

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Erkenn (2009) 70:331–364

A Structural Analysis of the Phlogiston Case

Abstract The incommensurability thesis, as introduced by T.S. Kuhn and P.K.

1.1 Focus, Goals and Structure of the Work

scientific theories.1 The relationship is characterized by each author in a partially

1.2 Characterization of the Type of Theoretical Entity that is Constituted

theories frequently overlapped, without the theoretical network having developed

2 Reconstruction of the Phlogiston Theory

By means of PHLO the aim is to explain the combustion of other phenomena

2.1 Potential Models of PHLO

Mp(PHLO): x is a potential model of the theory of phlogiston (x [ Mp(PHLO)) iff

Basic intended interpretation: S is a set of portions of specific chemical

On the basis of the aggregation function and of the mereological containment

2.2 Actual Models of PHLO

M(PHLO): x is an actual model of the theory of Phlogiston (x [ M(PHLO)) iff

for all f [ F: if a contains f in t1 then g2(a) contains f in t2, by (3iii)

2.3 Partial Potential Models of PHLO

Mpp(PHLO): y is a partial potential model of the theory of phlogiston (y [

2.4 Constraints for PHLO

2.5 Intertheoretical Links of PHLO

2.6 The Theory-Element of PHLO and Its Empirical Claim

T(PHLO) := \K(PHLO), I(PHLO)[ where

3 Reconstruction of the Oxygen Theory

3.1 Potential Models of OXG

Mp(OXG): x is a potential model of the theory of oxygen (x [ Mp(OXG)) iff there

3.2 Actual Models of OXG

3.3 Partial Potential Models of OXG

Mpp(OXG): y is a partial potential model of the theory of oxygen (y [ Mpp(OXG))

3.4 Constraints for OXG

The global constraint for OXG would be:

3.5 Intertheoretical Links of OXG

3.6 The Theory-Element of OXG and its Empirical Claim

T(OXG) := \K(OXG), I(OXG)[ where

substance of S will be applicable in at least one member of I(OXG). The string of

4 Analysis of the Incommensurability Relation Between PHLO and OXG

4.1 Relation of Theoretical Incommensurability Between PHLO and OXG

Below, I shall reproduce the definition of incommensurability given by J.A. Dı́ez

4.2 Empirical Commensurability and Weak Ontological Reduction Between

Going back to the question of empirical commensurability between theoretically

It will be said that q M0 p 9 Mp is an ontological reductive link between T0

If T and T0 are two idealised theoretical elements, then a weakly or applicatively

With regard to the comparative or gradual relations, which is commensurable with

In order to compare the success of two rival theories by applying the

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