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28
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4 March 1951 f.to
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'3.5(c)
Copy No. C-1- f

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 3.5(c)
DOCUMEi~T.NO

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3.5(c)
Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

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• SUMMARY

• GENE RAL
1. Anon ymou s sourc e repor ts Sovie t plans to enter
• (page 3) .
Kore an war

•
FAR EAST
•
2 . Peipi ng repor tedly comm itting more units to Kore a (page
3).
• 3. Polit ical wran gling conti nues in Indoc hina (page 4).

•
EAST ERN EURO PE
• 4. Yugo slavia hopes Coun cil of Forei gn Mini sters will not con-
sider Tries te issue (page 5) .
•
•
WESTERN EURO PE
• 5. Frenc h Comm unist s appea l to "neu tralis ts" on Germ an neu-
traliz ation quest ion (page 5) .
•
•
•
•

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•
• GENERAL

• 1. Anonymous source reports Soviet plans to enter Korean war:

/41<'-':.
An anonym ous letter receive d by the New y(._. 'e... ,C
(.-L_

• York field office of the FBI warns the US

c .•

3.3(h)(2)
Govern ment that the USSR intends to use
the forthcom ing Four-P ower Confere nce only as a smoke- screen
• to hide its offensiv e prepara tions. The anonym ous source alleges
that "an old World War II friend, now in a UN Iron Curtain group,"
• told him all "Iron Curtain UN delegat ions" were informe d late in
Februa ry that the USSR plans to enter the Korean war in full force
in April. The source' s friend believe s both Japan and Alaska will
• be invaded and that Mao Tse-tun g has been in Moscow getting final
instruct ions.
Iii
Comme nt: No evidenc e e~ists to support
. the stateme nts in this letter; it seems unlikely that such plans would
be commu nicated to Satellit e delegat ions at the UN. Commu nica-
tions intellig ence indicate s that Soviet military and naval air activity
Iii
in the Far East has reached higher levels this winter than in any
previou s winter and appears to be aimed at reachin g a state of
readine ss in the near future. Trainin g flights have been conduct ed
• at night and in bad weather and are increas ing in length; flights of
1,000 miles are becomi ng common in the Tenth Air Army, operatin g
north from Sakhalin. Trainin g in the Soviet fleets in the Far East
Iii has been active during the winter. Firm informa tion regardi ng the
Soviet ground forces in the Far East is lacking , but a number of unsub-
Ill
stantiat ed reports have mention ed troop movem ents to the Far East
and to Sakhalin .

•
FAR EAST
• 1./;::'(. ~ /7-
2. Peiping reporte dly commit ting more units to Korea: I~
.·~ l'j''

•
. 3.3(h)(2)

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•
3.3(h)(2)
•
•
Comment PW' s and captured documents
have referred to a late January decision to the effect that Communist
• forces in Korea would make a planned withdrawal to the vicinity of
the 38th Parallel where they would receive reinforcements for a
• "fourth and final phase offensive." The "Fifth Field Army"l~--~I _ (h)( )
33 2
'------,.~~~~--~-~
Iis believed to be the North China Military Area
Special Army Group: Nieh Jung~chen is known to be the Commander
• of this army group; he commanded the Fifth Field Army, which was
formed (and later dissolved) in 1949 in the North China Military Area .
•
• 3 . Political wrangling continues in Indochina: v1 n[wlfiJ'Fr
Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai has informed
• US Minister Heath he is strongly opposed to 3.3(h)(2)
the 1:,olicies of his Premier, Tran Van Huu.
• When asked why he did not remove the Premier, Bao Dai replied that
even though Huu' s mismanagement of the Defense Ministry would re·-
sult in three or four months' delay in the formation of a Viet Nam
• army, he could not "risk" disposing of the Premier at present for
fear that Huu, abetted by the French, would start a separatist move-
ment in Cochinchina. Bao Dai commented that Huu' s incompetence
• •
would eventually become evidenL

- Minister Heath comments that the Bao Dai-

Huu conflict is a "sort of civil war" between the legal central

- government (headed by Huu) and a second Hcabinet1' (consisting of

the Emperor and his personal following), Heath considers this de--
velopment gravely detrimental to Vietnamese national reconstruction,
to the formation of a national army and to the prosecution of the "real"
• civil war against the Communists"

•
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EASTERN EUROPE
•
4. Yugoslavia hopes Council of Foreign Ministers will not consider
Trieste issue:

Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Mates

• has informed US Ambassador Allen that
the Yugoslav Government hopes the Trieste
.
3.3(h)(2)
question will not arise at a possible Council
• of Foreign Ministers, since any likely Soviet proposals would cer-
tainly be opposed to Yugoslav interests. In the event that the question
• does arise, however, Mates said he wished US authorities to know
that the Yugoslav position had not changed since last summer and that
his government still favored a settlement of the Trieste question
• through direct negotiation between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav
Government, however, does not feel that the time is ripe for direct ne-
gotiations since, as long as the Italian Government does not genuinely
• wish settlement, formal discussions of the issue would only exacerbate
public opinion and reverse the present favorable trend in Italian-
• .Yugoslav relationso
\ Comment: In the summer of 1950, the Yugo-
• slav Government indicated to the Italian Government that it was willing
to discuss the Trieste question on the basis, in principle, of Zone A to
Italy, Zone B to Yugoslavia, with minor modifications along ethnic
• lines. In his recent Reuters interview, Tito said he preferred that the
question be tabled for the present, since it was not an urgent problem
• and there was no mutual desire to settle it, The Italian Government,
likewise, would prefer no international discussion of the Trieste issue
at this time; it continues to insist upon the implementatio n of the West's
• Tripartite Declaration of 20 March 1948, which promised that the en-
tire Free Territory of Trieste would be returned to Italy .
•
• WESTERN EUROPE

5. French Communists appeal to aneutralists" on German neutralization

• question: -£ ! 10
' ~

At a 6 'neutralist" mass meeting in Paris on

• 1 March, Pierre Cot, speaking for the 3.3(h)(2)

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- Communis t-front Progressiv e Union, seemed mainly interested in

• Cll"eating a favorable climate of opinion for some eventual Soviet
proposal to neutralize Germany, This emphasis in his speech re-
ceived approving comment from "orthodox neutralists ." It was
• evident from the speeches that the Progressiv e Union has not yet
had much success in winning "orthodox neutralists " to the support
• of the Soviet peace policy and, hence, Cot'and his followers can be
expected to increase their efforts to exploit neutrality sentiment
during the next few months. At the same time, the French Communist
• Party is understood to be conducting a covert struggle to prevent the
spread of "neutralism " and national deviatfonis m within its ranks .
• Comment: This is the first report of a mass
meeting sponsored by both "orthodox" and Communis t-front "neu-
• trali$ts" and the first indication that tile French Communist Party is
falling in its propaganda campaign with respect to the ''orthodox neu-
tralists.'' By shifting its emphasis to the neutralizat ion of Germany,
• it probably hopes to accomplish two objectives: to convince those who
favor neutrality to support the Soviet peace offensive and to avert de-
• fections within the Party itself .

•
•
•
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•
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•

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