In a case it was held that “though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the

reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subjected to cross-examination, there is neither
a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying
declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. Thus, Court must not look for
corroboration unless it comes to the conclusion that a dying declaration suffered from any
infirmity by the reason of which, it was necessary to look out for corroboration.1

In a case, the identity of the assailant stated in the dying declaration could not be established.
The dying declaration was not accepted and the prosecution failed.2 1850(Done)

A confessional soliloquy is a direct piece of evidence. It may be an expression of conflict of the

emotion; a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience an argument to find an excuse or
justification for his act; or penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime. The
tone may be soft and low; the words may be confused; they may be capable of conflicting
interpretations depending on the witnesses, whether they are biased or honest, intelligent or
ignorant, imaginative or prosaic, as the case may be. Generally, they are mutterings of a
confused mind. Before such evidence can be accepted, it must be established by a cogent
evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. Even if so much was established,
prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It
may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence.3 (done

The conduct exhibited by the co- accused on the date of occurrence, would cast serious suspicion
on him but that by itself, would not be sufficient to find him guilty of the offence u/s. 302/34 and
120B I.P.C.. He was entitled to acquittal.4(d

The circumstances of the last seen together, does not, by itself and necessarily leads to the
inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more,
establishing the connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the
part of the accused by itself cannot lead to the proof of guilt against the accused.5

1
Munna Raja v. State of M.P., AIR 1976SC 2199:(1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 CrLJ 1718; Surendra Singh v. State of
Rajasthan,(1989) 3 Crimes514 (Raj)
2
Sudhir Kumar v. State of U.P., (1989) 3 Crimes 583 :1990 CrLJ 119 (All)
3
Sahoo v. State of U.P; AIR 1966 SC 40 : 1996 CrLJ 68.
4
Madammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 CrLJ 4748 (Mad.)
5
Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 : 2014 (3) SCALE 598: Ashok v. State of Maharashtra,
2015 CrLJ 2036 : 2015 (3) SCALE 530 : (2015) 4 SCC 393
The Supreme Court held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence
must satisfy the following tests: The circumstance from which an inference of the guilt is sought
to be drawn (1) must be cogently and firmly, established; (2) those circumstances should be of a
definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances
taken cumulatively, should be a chain, so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion
that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else; (4) and
the circumstantial evidence, in order to sustain conviction, must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence,
should not be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his
innocence.6 1793

The Supreme Court, reiterating the principle in the case of Kishore Chand v. State of H.P held
that whether the facts leads to the inference of the guilt of the accused or not is another aspect
and in dealing with the aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit would apply and an
inference of guilt can be drawn only if the proved facts are inconsistent with the innocence of the
accused and are consistent only with the guilt. In order words there must be chain of evidence so
far consistent and complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and it must be such, as to show that within all probability, the
act must have done by the accused and the accused alone.7 1793

326

The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are:

(1) Voluntarily causing hurt; (2)Hurt caused must be grievous hurt;(3) The grievous hurt
must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means.8

In the matter of imposition of proper sentence for the offence under Section 326 I.P.C. the nature
of injury, the weapon used and the part selected for causing injury, are important factors to be
taken into consideration.9 2211

6
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P; (1990) I SCJ 44 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 : AIR 1990 SC 79
7
Kishore Chand v. State of H.P: 1990 CrLJ 2290 (SC) : (1990) 3 Crimes 341
8
Prabhu v. State of M.P; AIR 2009 SC 745 : (2008) 17 SCC 381
9
Emperor v. Bhojo
A punishment for an offence under Section 326 I.P.C; should be severe when injuries inflicted
are caused out of vindictiveness.10 2211

Section 322

In order to attract Section 322, the court has to see that the accused intended to cause hurt or that
he knew that grievous hurt was likely to be caused and that such grievous hurt is actually
caused.11The respondent humbly submits that in the instant case the victim medical examination
report tells that the patient was having only nail wound on back and neck

To prove the offence under Section 326 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish.

1. That, the accused caused grievous hurt as contemplated in Section 320 of IPC.
2. that the accused caused it voluntarily as envisaged in Section 322 of IPC.
3. That causing of such grievous hurt was made by means of instrument for shooting etc. or
by means of any instruments which can be used as a weapon is likely to cause death or by
means of fire etc. or by means of any poison or any substance which is deleterious to the
human body to inhale etc. or by means any animal.12

On behalf of the respondent, argument advanced that as per medical examination report no injury
has been caused to the deceased externally by any sharp object. 13 It is humbly submitted
although it is confessed by Rahul that “Vishnu first raped her followed by me and Jayesh. During
rape, we also hit her badly into her private body parts and other parts of body. During this entire
act, Vishnu was very brutal. After doing the act we all flew away from there.” 14Upon
examination of the medical report it can be concluded that the statement made by Rahul is not
true because on internal examination there was no wounds on vaginal part and on external
examination there was only Nail wound on back and neck. 15 Bearing in mind the underlying
principles of Section 326 the question is whether the appellant in this case intended to cause or
had the knowledge of the likelihood of causing grievous hurt. The respondent contended that at
the time of the occurrence the accused namely Mr. Vishnu, Mr. Rahual and Mr.Jayesh was

10
State v. Shivraj. (2002) CrLJ 2493 (Kant) :2002 AIR Kant HCR 1432.
11
12
Rakesh Gujar and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh
13

14
15
admittedly without any weapon. The ingredients of section 326 are IPC is lacking. Therefore,
prima facie it is found that the offence under Section 326 of IPC is not made out. So the
petitioner humbly submits to set aside so far as it relates to Section 326 of IPC.

Section 299

The accused on the unjustified belief that his wife was unchaste inflicted as many as 23 incised
wounds by sharp cutting weapon. After being stabbed repeatedly by her husband, the deceased
asked for water and the accused promptly gave it to her. Then the accused put his two small
grand- children to sleep and then left for Police Station and stated there that he had murdered his
wife. It was held his subsequent conduct in bringing a glass of water to the victim militates
against his intention of causing death.16

In a recent case where the cause of death is recorded as ‘asphyxia as a result of strangulation’ but
there was no external mark or symptoms of strangulation of strangulation on the body of the
deceased, the Supreme Court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused.17

When the court is called upon to arrive at a finding as to the real intention of the accused in
committing a particular offence, the Court is expected to consider every available circumstance
and should accept only that conclusion which could be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt.18

For being an offence within the meaning of Section 503, I.P.C, and punishable under Section
506, I.P.C., the threat should be real one and not not just a mere word. When a person uttering it
does not exactly mean what he says and when the person at whom threat is launched does not
feel threatened actually the offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506, I.P.C.
goes out of the way.19

The accused had only given the threats to cause death or grievous hurt but did not an act in
pursuance thereof. It was held that offence of criminal intimidation was not made out and the
accused would be entitled to the acquittal.20

16
Alex Marin Fernandes v. State of Maharastra(1983) 3 Crimes 711 (Bom.)
17
Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P; 2015 CrLJ 1690 : 2015 (1) SCALE 498
18
State of Gujarat v. Mohonlal Kuberdas Upadhya, 1975 Guj LR 263.
19
Noble Mohandas v. State of T.N., 1989 CrLJ 669 (Mad) LW (Cr) 178 : (1988) 2 All Cr LR 248.
20
Subramanian Swamy (Dr.) v. State. 2011 CrLJ NOC 48 (Mad).
 The evidence against one of the accused was that witness saw him going towards the house of
the deceased along with other accused. The Supreme Court held that this alone was not sufficient
to establish his guilt. The conviction under section 302 and 120-B of the Code was thus side
aside.21(done)

The accused allegedly abused the victim and gave her back while she had gone to well to fetch
water. There was no evidence to corroborate the evidence of eye witness. Acquittal of accused
was held proper.22

Where there is no corroborative evidence that injuries found on person of informant was caused
none other than by the appellant. The offence under Section 323 of I.P.C could not be proved
beyond doubt. Conviction recorded against appellant is improper and liable to be set aside.23

In Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emp, the court have held that the section comes into
application when the accused persons actively participate in the execution of a pre- arranged plan
or prior concert.24

When there was no evidence as to how death came about, evidence relating to charge of murder
was held to be insufficient and unacceptable; Kedar Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh25

Chain of evidence must be complete with fully established circumstances not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of accused. It should be of
conclusive nature;26

deals with the commission of an offence "by means of several acts". The section renders anyone
who intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence "by doing any one of those acts"
to be liable for that offence.

21
Kuldeep Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2001 CrLJ 479 ( SC).
22
State v. Udhao Pandurang Aglawe, 2005 CrLJ 989 (Bom.)
23
Gunadhar Majhi v. State of Jharkhand, 2011 CrLJ 2536 (Jhar).
24
AIR 1925 PC 1.
25
(1991) Cr LJ 989 (SC)
26
Arvind v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1999 (4) SCC 4861: 1999 (3) JT 554.
Although the principle “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is inapplicable in Indian
jurisprudence, evidence of interested witnesses require to be subjected to stricter scrutiny so
that their overzealous versions do not rope in innocent persons along with the real offenders.27

27
Jagan Gope & Ors. -Vs- State of West Bengal