ANS. CIVIL LAW REVIEWER QUIETING OF TITLE When may an action to quiet title prosper? When the following requisites are present: 1, Existence of an instrument or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; The document appears to be valid or effective; But the document is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable; and 4. The document is prejudicial to the title. (Art. 476, NCC; Lucio Robles, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000), The purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on his title. (Sps. Azana vs. Lumbo, ef al., G.R. No. 157593, March 22, 2007). Does an action to quiet title prescribe? It depends. (1) If the plaintiff is in possession, the action to quiet title does not prescribe because the owner is given the continuing aid by the court to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title. He can wait until his possession is disturbed and attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. (Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683; Rodolfo Coronel vs. IAC, October 29, 1987). (2) If plaintiff is not in possession, it may prescribe. The rationale of the rule above was laid down in Pingol, us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 102909, September 6, 1993, 44 SCAD 498, where it was said that: “The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is invaded or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming title to real property, but not in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and within the time provided by law. Possession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such possession x x x.” (See Coronel vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 270; Solid State Multi-ProductsANS. PROPERTY 285 Quieting of Title Corp. vs. CA, 196 SCRA 630 [1991]; Ragasa vs. Sps. Roa, G.R. No. 141964, June 30, 2006). Aparcel of land was sold in 1930 for P3,000.00 with the agreement that the seller would repurchase it within six (6) months; otherwise, the sale would become absolute and irrevocable. The seller a retro failed to repurchase. The purchaser sold it to another person who asked the original owner to execute a deed of sale so that he could acquire a title. The original owner refused. Was the refusal correct? Why? No. When the seller a retro failed to redeem the land within the stipulated period, its ownership became consolidated in the name of the purchaser who can subsequently transfer ownership thereof. While the successive sale was in a private instrument, it was a valid one. The subsequent purchaser of the land may bring an action to compel the prior owner to execute a deed of conveyance in a public instrument to quiet the title of the prior owner and to prevent any further cloud from being east upon it, (Gallar vs. Husain, 20 SCRA 186). Areal property was used as a property bond to secure the release of an accused, who failed to appear later, hence, there was forfeiture of the bond. A writ of execution was issued, hence there was levy on the property. It was sold at a public auction with the Republic as the highest bidder. A sheriff's certificate of sale was issued on September 24, 1982, and registered on October 5, 1982 giving the petitioners one (1) year to redeem but they never did. They filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming that they are the owners for failure of the Republic to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and to obtain a writ of possession within 10 years from the registration of the certificate of sale. They contended that the State waived its right over the property. The Republic contended that its right was perfected when the petitioners failed to redeem it within one (1) year from the registration of the Sheriff's Sale. Whose contention is correct? Explain.286 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER ANS. The contention of the Republic is correct. The action for quieting of title should not prosper. When the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest failed to redeem the property within one (1) year, they lost any interest. Its failure to execute the acts within 10 years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale did not operate to restore to them ownership over the property. The reason is that prescription does not lie against the government. It cannot be bound or estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials and employees. Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that “upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy.” Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1- year redemption period forecloses the obligor’s right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. (Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, 101 Phil. 968; Calacala, et al. vs. Republic, et al., G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005). What are the requirements for an action to quiet title to prosper? Explain. There are two requirements for an action to quite title to prosper: (1) the plaintiff had a legal right or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting doubt/cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. (Calacala, et al. vs. Rep., et al., G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005; Rumarate vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, April 18, 2006; Diaz vs. Virata, G.R. No. 162037, August 7, 2006). State the nature of an action for quieting of title. Explain. An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. In Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA, 382ANS. ANS. PROPERTY 287 Co-Ownership Phil. 15 (2000), it was said that it is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. (Calacala, et al. vs. Rep. et al., G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005). CO-OWNERSHIP State the characteristics of a co-ownership. They are: 1, There must be more than one subject or owner; 2. There is one physical whole divided into ideal shares (Sps. Coja vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 151153, December 10, 2007); 8. Each ideal share is definite in amount, but is not physically segregated from the rest; 4, Regarding the physical whole, each co-owner must respect each other in the common use, enjoyment or preservation of the physical whole; 5. Regarding the ideal share, each co-owner holds almost absolute control over the same; , 6. The co-ownership does not have juridical personality; 7. A co-owner is in a sense a trustee for the other co- owners. What is the nature of the possession of a co-owner over the property subject of co-ownership? Explain. The possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded adverse to the other co-owners but in288 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER fact as beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considereq adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by aco- owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences, and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. (Aguirre, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004 citing Salvador vs. CA, 243 SCRA 239; Carmen Fangonil-Herrera vs. Tomas Fangonil, et al., G.R No. 169359, August 28, 2007). Cite certain distinctions between co-ownership and partnership. The distinctions are: 1. Co-ownership has no legal personality; while partner- ship has a legal or juridical personality; 2. Co-ownership is created by contract or other things; while a partnership is created by contract only; 3. The purpose of co-ownership is for collective enjoyment; while a partnership is for profit; 4. An agreement of a co-ownership to exist for ten (10) years is valid; while in partnership, there is no term limit; 5. There is no mutual representation in co-ownership, while there is mutual representation in partnership; 6. Co-ownership is not dissolved by death or incapacity of a co-owner; while partnership is dissolved by death or incapacity of a partner; 7. Aco-owner can dispose of his share without the consent of the others; while in partnership, a partner cannot substitute another in his place without the consent of the others; 8. Inco-ownership, profits must depend on proportionate share; while in partnership, profits may be stipulated by the partners.ANS. ANS. ANS. PROPERTY 289 Co-Ownership State the distinctions between conjugal partnership and co-ownership. They are: 3. Conjugal partnership arises only because of a marriage contract; while co-ownership arises by an ordinary contract; 2. The parties in a conjugal partnership must be a male and a female; while in co-ownership sex is immaterial; 3. In conjugal partnership, the owners are always two; while in co-ownership, the co-owner may be more than two; 4, In conjugal partnership, the profits are divided equally, unless there is a contrary stipulation in the marriage settlement; while in co-ownership, profits are proportional to their respective shares; 5. Death of either party in conjugal partnership dissolves it; while death of one in co-ownership does not dissolve it. X, Y, and Z are the co-owners of a house being rented by A. May X alone sue A for ejectment? Why? Yes, because anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. The reason for the rule is that an action instituted by one is really in behalf of all. (Art. 487, NCC). ‘ Dominador & Garciana were married. Dominador died, survived by his wife and his children. A child who averred to be Dominador’s acknowledged natural child alleged that he was the sole heir of Dominador and executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of his father’s property. Can he file an action for ejectment alone against the possessors of the property? Why? No. Under the law, anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. (Art. 487, NCC). This can be done without joining all other co-owners because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. But if the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of theCIVIL LAW REVIEWER, litigated property the action should be dismissed and it will not prosper especially so that there is evidence of co- ownership of the property, and there is no showing that they waived their rights. (Adlawan vs. Adlawan, G.R. No, 161916, January 20, 3006, 479 SCRA 275 citing Baloloy vs, Hular, G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 8), A co-owner of a real property may eject the other co-owners who occupied the whole property on the acquiescence of another co-owner. The MTC ruled in the negative saying that they have no preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by the other co-owners since the property has not yet been partitioned. The RTC reversed the decision based on Article 487 of the Civil Code allowing any one of the co-owners to bring an action for ejectment. It held that the co-owners could resume their occupation of the premises. It was affirmed by the CA, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed raising whether or not a co-owner has the right to eject the other co-owners. Decide. Yes, because anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment which is a categorized and an unqualified authority. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. Outside of Article 487, NCC, the occupants have no authority to occupy the premises. Time and again, it has been ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contact between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. (Citing Banco de Oro vs. CA, e¢ al., 182 SCRA 464; Resuena, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005). When is the possession of a co-owner deemed adverse? Explain. In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts ofANS. ANS, PROPERTY 291 Co-Ownership repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of. repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co- owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. (Aguirre, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004). May a possessor by tolerance be entitled to reimburse- ment of the value of his improvement? Why? No. It is well-settled that while the Article 465 of the Civil Code allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. (Pada-Kilario, et al. vs. CA, et al., 379 Phil. 515 [2000]; Refugia vs. CA, et al., 327 Phil. 982). Thus, they have no right to get reimbursed for the expenses they incurred in erecting their houses thereon. (Resuena, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005). A, B, and C are co-owners of an agricultural land. A is the administrator of the property. He wants to convert it to a subdivision. What requirement is necessary before he can do so and before he can recover expenses? Explain. In order that A can make alterations, there must be unanimous consent of all the co-owners, unless there is a judicial order obtained to the contrary. Unanimous consent may be given impliedly. But for the one making alterations to recover expenses, express consent must be given. (Javier vs. Javier, 6 Phil. 493). * What are the rights of the co-owners? Aco-owner has: 1, Full ownership of his part and share of fruits or benefits;292 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 2, The right to alienate, assign or mortgage his share; 3. The right to substitute another in his enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved (Art. 493, NCC); 4, The right to exempt himself from necessary expenses or taxes by renouncing part of his interest in the co- ownership. (Art. 488, NCC). Explain the juridical concept of co-ownership. The juridical concept of co-ownership is unity of the object or property and plurality of subjects. Each co-owner, jointly with the other co-owners, is the owner of the whole property, but at the same time of the undivided aliquot part. Each co- owner has the right to sell, assign or dispose of his share, unless personal rights are involved and therefore, he may lose such rights to others, as by prescription thereof by a co- owner. (Gacapan, et al. vs, Omipet, G.R. No. 148943, August 15, 2002 citing Consignado vs. CA, 207 SCRA 297; Avila vs. Sps. Barabat, G.R. No. 141933, March 17, 2006). Pacita Gapacan has been in possession of an unregistered property and declared the same for taxation purposes since 1931. He has 2 children, Antonio and Maria. Antonio got employed in a mining company in Mountain Province but when he retired, he went back to his hometown with his family, In the meantime, Maria continued to possess the land. When he returned, he executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property showing that said property was transferred to him by his sister Maria. He declared the same for taxation purposes. In the meantime Antonio filed a Forcible Entry case against Maria where the MTC ruled in his favor. In the meantime, Maria filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against Antonio claiming that the property was part of her inheritance from her parents which she declared for taxation purposes. She further alleged that she merely lent the property to Antonio when he went back to their town. The RTC ruled in favor of the defendant. The CA declared them as co-owners, hence, appeal was made contending that such decision was a deviation from the cause of action for quieting of title anda ANS. PROPERTY 293 Co-Ownership prayed that the decision of the RTC declaring that defendants have the right of possession be reinstated. Is the contention correct? Why? No. An action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to real property or any interest therein. In Bautista vs. Exconde, 70 Phil. 398, it was held that a property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper determination of the respective rights of the party-claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property not only the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It goes without saying therefore that the court in resolving the present controversy is well without its authority to adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the subject property; hence to declare the same as common property of the parties. Besides, plaintiff instituted the action for the purpose of asking the court to pass judgment. upon the issue of ownership of the disputed property with the hope that the plaintiff would be declared its rightful owner. (Gapacan, et al. vs. Omipet, G.R. No. 148943, August, 15, 2002). The heirs of A inherited from him a building which he constructed during his lifetime. What is the extent of the rights of the heirs over the building prior to partition? Explain. It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion. (Villanueva vs. Florendo, 139 SCRA 329). As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co- owner against a co-owner is to obtain recognition of the co-294 ANS. CIVIL LAW REVIEWER ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. (Engreso vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 148727, April 9, 2003). X, Y, and Z are co-owners of a parcel of land. X sells his aliquot part of the whole property without the consent of the others. Is the sale valid? Explain. Yes, it is valid, because the right of alienation is one of his rights over the ideal shares in the co-ownership. With respect to the whole property, the sale is valid only insofar as his share is concerned. A person cannot sell that which he does not own. (Halili vs. Lloret, 50 O.G. 2493; Punsalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320). If a co-owner sells the whole property subject of a co- ownership, is the sale valid? Explain. It is valid only as far as his share is concerned. Well-settled is the rule that when a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. The sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owners/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. (Aguirre, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004; Oesmer vs. Paraiso Dev’t. Corp., G.R. No. 157493, February 5, 2007). If a co-owner sells the whole property subject of the co-ownership, what is the remedy of the other co- owners? Explain. The remedy is to ask for partition, not to ask for the nullity of the sale, since the seller transmitted only his undividedANS. PROPERTY 295 Co-Ownership share to the buyer, thus, the buyer and the other owners became co-owners. (Aguirre, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004). May an heir sell his share of a property under administration? Yes, an heir may sell whatever right, interest or participation he may have in the property under administration. (Vda. de Gil vs. Cancio, 14 SCRA 796 [1965]). This rule is so because at the time of sale, he is already the owner. One of the rights of an owner is the right to dispose. What is the basis of the right of an heir to sell his share in a property under administration? It is based on the rule that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. (Art. 533, NCC; Acebedo, et al. vs. Hon. Abesamis, et al., G.R. No. 102380, January 18, 1993). A, B and C are co-owners of a property. If one of them sells his undivided share to another co-owner, does the right of legal redemption exist? Why? No. As a rule, the right to redeem is granted not only to the original co-owners, but also to all those who subsequently acquire their respective shares while the community subsists. However, this right of redemption is available only when part of the co-owned property is sold to a third person. Otherwise put, the right of redemption referred to in Article 1620, NCC applies only when a portion is sold to a non-co- owner. A third person, within the meaning of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner. (Fernandez vs. Sps. Tarun, G.R. No. 143868, November 14, 2002). The co-owners of a real property entered into a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange of Shares excluding one of them. The Deed was executed on November 4, 1969. What is the effect of the execution of such Deed as far as the other co-owner is concerned who was not a party to the Deed? Explain.296 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER The execution of the Deed is deemed tobe a notice to him of the sale due to the Exchange of Shares. The law does not require any specific form of written notice to the redemptioner. Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject of varying interpretations. In Conejero us. CA, it was held that a written notice was still required, even if the redemptioner has actual prior knowledge of the sale. However, in Distrito vs. CA, the Court ruled that written notice was not necessary, if the co-owner was actually aware of the sale. While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it does not prescribe any particular form, so long as the reasons for a written notice are otherwise satisfied. Thus, in a civil case for collection of a share in the rentals by an alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the receipt of a summons by a co-owner has been held to constitute actual knowledge of the sale. On that basis, the co-owner may exercise the right of redemption within 30 days from the finality of the decision. (Fernandez vs. Sps. Tarun, G.R. No. 143868, November 14, 2002). A, B, and C are the co-owners of a property. A acts as trustee, with the property registered in his name alone. He sells the whole property to X. Will an action to annul the sale by B and C prosper? Why? It will not prosper because X is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. He cannot be blamed for relying on the title. One need not go beyond the title to look for the owner. (Gov't. of the P.I. vs. Abalos, 56 Phil. 504). May prescription run against a co-owner? Are there exceptions? No. Prescription as a rule does not run against co-owners and co-heirs as long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. The exception is when there is repudiation, provided that the following requisites are present: 1, He must make known to the others that he is repudiat- ing the co-ownership and claiming complete ownership of the entire property. (Trinidad vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1998, 93 SCAD 610).ANS. ANS. PROPERTY 297 Co-Ownership 2, Evidence of repudiation and knowledge of others is clear and convincing. 3. There is open, continuous, peacefal, public and adverse possession for a period of time required under the law. (Santos vs. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 342). Note: Mere receiving of rents or profits, payment of taxes, or construction of a fence or building would not be sufficient proof of exclusive or adverse possession because anyone in the co-ownership may do it. Definite repudiation is necessary. (Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566). Self- adjudication and registration of the property subject of the co-ownership is not repudiation. Property remains the subject of co-ownership. (Galvez, et al. vs. CA, et al.,G-R. No. 157954, March 26, 2006). In a co-ownership, under what circumstances may a co-owner not demand partition? They are the following: 1. When there is an agreement, but the period should not exceed ten years; 2. When the testator prohibits it, but the period shall be limited to twenty years; 3. Whenitis prohibited by law (as in conjugal partnership or absolute community of property except in case of legal separation); 4, When partition renders the object unserviceable; 5. When the legal nature of the property does not allow the partition of the object, like a party wall. (Arts. 494 and 495, NCC). Can a co-owner sell a particular portion of the co- ownership before partition? Why? No. It is well-settled that a co-owner has no right to sell a divided part, by metes and bounds, of the real estate owned in common, (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567). This doctrine was reiterated in Mercado vs. Liwanag, L-14429, June 30, 1962, where it was held that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common. Applying the298 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER foregoing principles, a mere co-owner could not have validly sold a specific part of the land he owned in common with his co-owners and two others as described in the Deed of Sale executed by him in favor of the vendees. Vendees, therefore, cannot claim title to that definite portion of the land owned in common. (See Sps. Abad vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 84908, December 4, 1989; Heirs of Pedro Escanlar, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 119777; Holgado, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 120690, October 10, 1997, 88 SCAD 537). A co-owner can only dispose of his undivided share. (Sps. Alexander and Adelaida Cruz vs. Eleuterio Leis, et al., supra.). X and Y are the co-owners of a two-storey house. The lower portion is for rent, while the upper portion is for dwelling purposes. X uses one room upstairs. Discuss the rights of the co-owners. Explain. No rent can be demanded from X because he is exercising his right of co-ownership. Y can use a part of the upper floor also. (Pardell vs. Bartolome, 23 Phil. 450). Under the law, each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided that: (a) Hedoes soin accordance with the purpose it is intended for; (b) He does not injure the intention of the co-ownership; (c) He does not prevent other co-owners from using it according to their rights. (Art. 486, NCC). X is a co-owner of a real property with Y and Z. The said property was sold to A with a right to repurchase. Only X exercised the right to repurchase and obtained a title over the property. Did his act of repurchase terminate the co-ownership? Why? No. The redemption of the land by X did not terminate the co- ownership. It did not give him title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. (Paulmitan, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 61584, November 25, 1992). The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share. When he acquired the whole property, he merely acquired the right to be reimbursed for the amount equivalent to the sharesPROPERTY 299 Co-Ownership of Y and Z. (Adille vs. CA, 157 SCRA 455; Guinto vs. Lim Bonfing, 48 Phil. 884). X, Y, and Z are co-owners of a parcel of land. X was able to register the land under his name. What is the effect of the registration under his name? Explain. He does not acquire exclusive ownership over the property. In Ceniza, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-46345, January 30, 1990, the Supreme Court said that registration of a parcel of land subject of co-ownership in the name of one co-owner is not repudiation of co-ownership for purposes of prescription. Under Art. 494(5), NCC, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. The registration merely created a trust in favor of his co-owner. (Art. 1452, NCC). A property was the subject of co-ownership. It was contended that with the execution of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication by one of the heirs, its registration before the Register of Deeds of La Union and the issuance of a new tax declaration, there existed an implied trust. Is the contention correct? Why? No, because there was no repudiation. The act of executing the affidavit of self-adjudication did not constitute sufficient act of repudiation. In fact, there was bad faith of the co-heir in feigning sole ownership of the property to the exclusion of the other co-heirs. He cannot profit from it to the detriment of others. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co- owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. (Galvez vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 346). In order that prescription may lie against a co-owner, what requisite must be complied with? Explain. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co- ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co- ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear300 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. (Galvez vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 346). Enumerate some acts of repudiation. The following may constitute acts of repudiation: 1. Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or for recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute an act of repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the latter. 2, The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription. 3. Anaction for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitation is counted. 4. There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of property causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in his own name. It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in question, executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein they appear as the new owners of a definite area each, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged share in the entire lot, that the Statute of Limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder. (Galvez vs. CA, e¢ al., G.R. No. 57954, March 24, 2006).ANS. ANS, PROPERTY 301 Co-Ownership May the co-owners of a property agree that the co- ownership shall be for an indefinite period? Why? No. In Oliveras vs. Lopez, L-29727, December 14, 1988, the Supreme Court said that the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Arts. 494 and 1083, NCC, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed 20 years. Any agreement to keep the thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year period only. If the parties stipulate a definite period of indivision which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation is void only as to the period beyond such maximum period. The Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of property for more than twenty-years. The Supreme Court, however, said that it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation would be rendered meaningless. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. When is this scheme resorted to? The aforesaid scheme is resorted to: (a) when the right to partition, the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of its nature, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners; and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. (Aguilar vs. CA, G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993, 45 SCAD 564; Reyes vs. Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171 [1990]). X, Y and Z are co-owners of a real property which was mortgaged to A. X redeemed it during the period of redemption with his personal funds. Did X become the sole owner of the property, thereby terminating the co-ownership? Why? No, because the redemption did not vest in X the sole ownership over the said property but inured to the benefit of all co-owners. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a302 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER co-ownership. (Mariano vs. CA, ef al., G.R. No. 101522, May 28, 1993, 41 SCAD 927). Upon her husband’s death in 1948, Luisa managed an 89-hectare agricultural land until her death in 1971. The couple had six children. One of them, Alfonso, filed a complaint in 1975 against his brothers and sisters, for recovery of ownership of coconut trees and damages, alleging that one-half of the coconut trees numbering more than 6,000 were his in accordance with his oral agreement with their mother, way back in 1944; that he was to plant said coconut trees on said land (which he did, completing the planting in 1957), and that the coconut trees, including the fruits and produce thereof, would be equally divided between him and their mother. It turned out, however, that in 1953, or even during the mother’s lifetime, the OCT No. RT-121 was issued in the names of all six children and their mother “in pro-indiviso of one-seventh (1/7) each.” The agreement between mother and son must be deemed superseded by the issuance of said OCT, which expressly made of record that the mother and all the surviving children were co-owners in equal shares. If, in fact, Alfonso had an agreement as to ownership of the trees and produce with his mother, that was the time for him to have insisted on a lien to be specifically included in the title. His mother, too, would have been in a position to confirm or deny the existence of the agreement. Besides, whatever agreement there was regarding the produce of the coconut trees could legally, bind her share only and ceased upon her death. Additionally, to give Alfonso the right to receive one-half of the produce of the coconuts, as respondent Court ordered, would be to perpetuate a state of co-ownership, contrary to Article 494 of the Civil Code, which limits co-ownership to a period of ten (10) years or at most twenty (20) years. (Tac- an Dano, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, e¢ al., L-62251, July 29, 1985, 137 SCRA 803). Is an existing mortgage a bar to the partition of a property? Why? No, because the latter does not operate to extinguish the mortgage. A mortgage is inseparable from the property.PROPERTY 303 Co-Ownership Under Art. 2126, NCC, a mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. (Sps. Pailano vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 99333, June 28, 1993, 42 SCAD 735). Furthermore, Art. 494, NCC provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. What does it mean when the law provides that each co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the common property? Explain. It means that an action to demand partition is imprescrip- tible or cannot be barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be invoked when one of the co- owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription and where the following are present: (1) that a co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to actual ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. (Salvador vs. CA, G.R. No. 109910, April 5, 1995, 60 SCAD 303). How may co-ownership be extinguished? Co-ownership is extinguished by: 1. Judicial partition; 2. Extrajudicial partition; 3. | When by prescription, one co-owner has acquired the whole property by adverse possession; 4. When a stranger acquires by prescription the thing owned in common; 5. Merger in one co-owner; 6. Loss or destruction of the thing; 7. By expropriation.