The voluminous record in this case pertains to a marriage which lasted just for three months.

The
marriage was solemnised on January 31, 2004. as per Hindu rites and customs in Rajasthan. After
marriage, the respondent was residing with appellant No.14 in her matrimonial house at Chennai along
with appellants No.1 and 2 who are the parents of the appellant.

The allegations raised in the complaint are that while the complainant was staying in the matrimonial
house for few days, she was tortured by her husband and the mother-in-law was always scolding her at
the instigation of other respondents, by demanding her to transfer the property owned by her in the
name of her husband. The respondents always harassed her by demanding more dowry and she was
treated as slave by the respondents and she was not helped by any one in the domestic work. and the
husband came to house on 07.08.2013 and scolded her with filthy language and the husband again
came to her house along with the relatives who threatened her with dire consequences in filthy
language and the same compelled the complainant to come forward with the complaint on 25.08.2014
before the All Women Police Station, Perur. He used to beat the complainant with fists and legs and
even sometime with danda. He also started casting aspersion on the character of the complainant and
started accusing her of adultery. 

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act had been promulgated in the year 2005. As per
its statement of objects and reasons since the phenomenon of domestic violence had become widely
prevalent, this Act had been introduced in addition to the penal provisions contained in Section 498-A of
the IPC; this was to enable the civil law to address this phenomenon in its entirety. 

Apart from the incidents which have been disclosed in the complaint under the DV Act it has been
alleged that these acts of cruelties coupled with the demands of dowry raised by the parents of her
husband were acts of cruelty.

She has deposed that her marriage was solemnized on 6.7.2007with appellant and it was consummated
but no issue was born. She used to do all the household jobs but the behaviour of her inlaws was not
good towards her and they always taunted, harassed and tortured her physically as well as mentally.
Respondent(appellant) and family members raised demand of Rs.1.00 lac and a motorcycle from her
and when she showed her inability, she was beaten up. She has further stated that her brother and
family members were not given respect when they came to meet her. Even after fulfilling their demand
they did not stop their cruel acts and used to beat her on petty matters almost everyday. She was
against asked to bring Rs.50,000/.During June 2008 she was thrown out from the matrimonial home.

A bench of Justice Banerjee and Justice Shah in the case titled as Kamlesh Devi vs Jaipal & Ors. dated
04.10.2019 has opined that mere vague allegation is not sufficient to bring the case within domestic
violence act. The Supreme Court is in favour of high court order and hence dismissed the petition for
special leave.

P” o maintain a case under the Domestic Violence Act, it is essential for the parties in question to be in a
"domestic relationship" with each other. The said expression is defined by the law - by Section 2 (f) - as
under:-

"2 (f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point
of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or
through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a
joint family."

That all the accused were not satisfied with the dowry articles given to accused at the time of the
marriage. They started taunting, humiliating the applicant on one excuse or the other. 

It is , therefore, prayed that a case under Section 406, 498-A, 120-B IPC and Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 may kindly be registered .

Ms. Nidhi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has contended that by virtue of Section 27 of
the Domestic Violence Act, the place where the complainant permanently or temporarily resides or
carries on business, Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and grant protection order and
other orders under the Domestic Violence Act. It was submitted that the respondent is currently residing
within the territorial limit of the Metropolitan Magistrate of Bengaluru City and that the High Court
rightly held that the Metropolitan Magistrate at Bengaluru has the jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint. Taking us through the averments in the complaint, learned counsel for the respondent has
submitted that there are several instances of domestic violence against the husband-appellant No.14
and other relatives particularly, appellant.

Nos.1 and 2-father-in-law and mother-in-law who have been harassing the respondent who have taken
away respondent’s jewellery and insisting upon her to buy properties. The learned counsel submitted
that the High Court rightly refused to quash the order of taking cognizance.

Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act relates to protection order. In terms of Section 18 of the Act,
intention of the legislature is to provide more protection to woman. Section 20 of the Act empowers the
court to order for monetary relief to the “aggrieved party”. When acts of domestic violence is alleged,
before issuing notice, the court has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of
domestic violence.

In the present case, the respondent has made allegations of domestic violence against fourteen
appellants.

The decisions in Nand Kishore v. State of Rajasthan 1and Rema Devi v. State of Kerala2upheld the same
view that a female can be a respondent. In the first case, the Court categorically held that, “the term
‘relative’ is quite broad and it includes all relations of the husband irrespective of gender or sex”. The
second case, further clarified that, “section 2(q) of the Act and its proviso if read together nowhere
suggest that relative of the husband or the male partner has to be a male. In proviso to section 2(q) of
the Act the word is ‘relative’ and not ‘male relative’… a female relative is not excluded from the
definition of respondent…” This stance was reinforced in a number of rulings in the High Courts of
Madras3, Hyderabad4 and Bombay.

1
R.L.W.2008(4)Raj3432.
2
I (2009) D.M.C. 297.
3
S. Meenavathu v. Senthamarai Selvi, MANU/TN/2547/2009.
4
Afalunnisa Begum v. State of A.P, MANU/AP/0206/2009.
In Shankar Prasad Shaw v. State5, it was held by the Calcutta High Court that mere demand is not an
offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It should either be given or agreed to be given.
Mere demand may be offence under Section 498-A of Penal Code 6

A voluntary and affectionate giving of dowry and traditional presents would thus be plainly out of the
ambit of the particular definition under the Act and once that 18 is so the rest of the provisions thereof
would be equally inapplicable.7

Times have changed considerably; much water has flow down the bridges. The actual position, however,
is that the custom of giving Tilak and Dahez has been in vogue uptill in now, although most of the people
in India where 40 percent of them are below the poverty line, cannot afford to meet the high demands
of their slender means, with the result that they have to incur the loans and pledge their valuables to
meet such demands. It leads to ruin and a disaster of the family.

Sometimes girls commit suicide to mitigate the sufferings of their poor parents. 8 In spite of all this,
dowry is considered as a basic component of our marriage system.

In criminal matter the burden of proof lies on the prosecution side but in this Act, the burden of proof
lies upon the accused person that, he had not committed offence. If he has proved that or they have not
committed offence certainly the accused person shall be acquitted. But on the other hand if the accused
person failed to prove the offence certainly he or they shall convicted.

Since the relief sought under the Act is civil in nature, proof will be tested on the balance of probabilities
and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It must be remembered that domestic violence is a
unique offence as it takes place within the privacy of the home where no outside witnesses are likely to
be present. If it happens within the joint family then, although the relatives of the husband witness the
violence it is unlikely that any relatives of the husband will support the woman. The woman, therefore,
will be the primary witness under the Act. When no eyewitness is available and there is only the
statement of a woman, circumstantial evidence is considered to arrive at a conclusion of the facts of the
case.

The DV Act is in addition to existing laws and the aggrieved has the right to file a complaint
simultaneously under Section 498A of the IPC.

Whether the petitioner was treated with cruelty by the respondent after solemnization of marriage?

in S.A.L. Narayan Row and another vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and another - (1966) 1 SCR 190 equivalent
to (AIR 1965 SC 1818), has laid down the criteria by which to determine the nature of a proceeding.
According to it, he further submits, the expression "civil proceeding" includes all proceedings in which a
party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the civil law or statute and claims relief for breach
thereof, whereas the expression "criminal proceeding" connotes a proceeding which is ordinarily the
one which if carried to conclusion, may result in penal consequences such as imposition of sentences of
death or imprisonment or fine and/or forfeiture of property. He further submits that by these
parameters, one can say that the proceeding initiated under Section 12(1) of the D.V. Act, in order to

5
Ramesh Kumar v. State, 1986 Cr.LJ.2087 (P&H); ee also Jaspal Singh v. State, 1984 Cr.LJ. 691 (P & H)
6
Shankar Rao v. L.VJadha, 1983 Cr.LJ. 269
7
Vinod Kumar v. State, AIR 1982 P & H 372
8
K.Subba Rao, Social Justice and Law (1974) p.109
seek various reliefs under the Act as are available under Sections 18 to 22 of the D.V. Act, is civil in
nature, though, the procedure, that has to be generally followed for taking the proceeding to its logical
end, is criminal.9

The Act allows the institution of proceedings by an ‘aggrieved person’ who has been defined as any
woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship with any adult male person and who alleges to
have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him, or his relatives, in the case of a married
woman or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage. 10

A ‘ domestic relationship ’ has been defined in wide terms as a relationship between two persons who
live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family
members living together as a joint family. 11

It has been specifically mentioned that such conduct might be in the nature of physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, or economic abuse. 12 The definition also specifically includes within
its ambit any conduct that harasses, harms, injures, or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry, property, or
valuable security.13

Furthermore, any such conduct that has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person
related to her 14or otherwise injures or causes physical or mental harm to her 15 has been brought within
the ambit of domestic violence.

Physical abuse includes any act or conduct that causes bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or
health or impairs the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal
intimidation, and criminal force.16

The Act also provides for compensation orders that may be additionally granted by the magistrate to the
victim as compensation for any injury, including mental torture and emotional distress, which may have
been caused by the aggressor.17

In the case of Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel the apex court recognising this ‘
right of residence ’ has placed it on a higher pedestal to the existing right of maintenance as conferred
under previous legislations. To exercise this right, the Act provides for a residence order that may be
obtained by the victim either restraining the respondent from dispossessing her of the shared
household or disturbing her possession irrespective of whether or not he/she has a legal or equitable
9
(AIR 1965 SC 1818),
10
Section 2(a) defines ‘ aggrieved person
11
Section 2(f); Azimuddin v . State ofUttar Pradesh (High Court ofAllahabad).

12
Section 3(a).

13
Section 3(a).

14
Section 3(c)
15
Section 3(d).
16
Section 3, Explanation I, clause (i)
17
Section 22.
interest in it, directing him to remove himself from the shared household, restraining him or his relatives
from entering any portion in which the victim resides, restraining him from alienating, disposing off,
encumbering, or renouncing his rights in it, directing him to secure an alternate accommodation for the
victim of the same level of comfort.18

 in A. Sreenivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (23 supra) was dealing with
a domestic violence case and a criminal case simultaneously being pursued and held that
the domestic violence case cannot be considered to be a criminal proceeding and the mischief of Article
20 Clause (2) of the Constitution of India or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable in such an event.19

in in Neera Singh v. State20 also, it was noted that exorbitant claims are being made about the amounts
spent on marriage, other ceremonies, dowry and gifts due to which the Court should insist on disclosing
the source of such funds. It was also stated that vague allegations against every member of the family of
the husband cannot be accepted at face value and the allegations have to be scrutinized carefully by the
Court before framing the charge. The principles laid down in the three decisions relied on by Sri T.
Pradyumna Kumar Reddy should put the trial Court on guard to appreciate the allegations made against
the petitioners with reference to such factors, but no deep probe into the acceptability and reliability of
the allegations can be indulged herein, more so, in the absence of any clinching proof either way on the
material placed before the Court herein. Refraining from expressing any opinion on merits of the rival
contentions, the matter has to be, therefore, left to be decided by the trial Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present is a total false and fabricated case.

Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to first read Section 27 of Protection of Women From
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which is quoted as under:-

"Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005--

Section 27 Jurisdiction-(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan
Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which--

(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or

(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or

(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other
orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.

(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India."

6. It is evident from the aforesaid Section respondent/wife can file a petition, where, she temporarily
resides. After the incident, respondent/wife is residing her parental home. Therefore, the Court of
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barely has jurisdiction to proceed the case.

In the absence of any statutory definition, the term "relative" must be assigned a meaning, as it is
commonly understood. Therefore, the court held that "respondent" under section 2(q) of the Act
18
2008(2) RCR(Crl.)699
19
2011 (2) ALD (Crl.) 191 (AP)
20
 I (2007) DMC 545
includes a female relative of the husband or the male partner. The Court further emphasized: “Proof of
legal marriage in the rigid sense or required under the civil law is unnecessary for establishing an offence
under Section 498A IP. The expression ‘marriage’ or ‘relative’ can be given a diluted meaning which a
common man or society may attribute to those concepts in common parlance for the purpose of s.498A
IPC.