SANTIAGO v.

PEOPLE
• lack of marriage license
• Santiago and Santos were charged with bigamy, because Santiago was
still married to Galang when he married Santos.
• Santos contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio due
to the lack of marriage license. Their marriage does not fall under any
of the marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have
not previously lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
• Santiago and Santos lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least 5 years
before they married each other, but it appears that they had not.
Hence, their marriage is valid.
• Jurisprudence requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy,
the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity. Since Santiago’s marriage to Santos is valid,
they were liable for bigamy.
• The crime of bigamy does not necessarily entail the joint liability of
two persons who marry while the previous marriage of one of them is
valid.
• Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be liable as a co-accused. Since
Santos did not know that Santiago is still married to Galang when she
married him, she is liable only as an accomplice.

RONULO v. PEOPLE
• Aglipayan priest Ronulo knowingly solemnized a marriage without a
marriage license.
• Ronulo contended that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to a solemnization of marriage.
• Article 6 provides that “no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to (1) appear personally before
the solemnizing officer and (2) declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife.”

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
• The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probationers value, being issued
by the officer charged under the law to keep a recorded of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

1
 • Under Article 35, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those marriages exempted from such, shall be void ab initio
• Since the parties cohabited without the benefit of marriage, Art 148
will govern as regards to their property relations. Only the properties
acquired by them through the actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions.

KHO v. KHO
• No marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the
LCR

NIÑAL v. BAYAGDOG
• Five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as
“husband and wife”. No third party should be involved at any time
during the five years
• Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party;
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of both
parties

REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
• Five-year common law cohabitation period covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity
• If requirement(s) are not satisfied, affidavit is merely a scrap of paper
and is not valid

LLAVE v. REPUBLIC
• article 256 the Family Code shall have retroactive effect as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
civil code or other laws

UY v. SPOUSES LACSAMANA
• persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed to be
married, unless proven otherwise
• Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence:
1. Testimony by one of the parties
2. Testimony of the solemnizing officer
3. Documentary evidence - e.g. marriage contract
• Properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless
there is proof to the contrary (Article 148)

MORIGO v. PEOPLE

2
 • no actual marriage ceremony performed by a solemnizing officer,
parties merely signed a marriage contract, marriage is void ab initio

LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA

• two Filipino citizens contracted marriage. One of them obtained a
divorce decree abroad. Divorce decree is void, invoking Article 15 of
the Civil Code (laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity are binding upon PH citizens, even
though living abroad.
• Divorce between Filipinos is ineffectual and void under nationality rule
adopted by PH law
• Article 26(2) is not applicable

REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO
• Article 26(2) should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on one of them became naturalized as a foreign
citizens and obtained a divorce decree.
• The PH should likewise be allowed to remarry
• The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad capacitating the latter to remarry
• The foreign divorce decree should be proven to be valid according to
the national law of the alien spouse to become truly valid in PH

CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS

• The alien spouse is the one who filed a petition for judicial declaration
of foreign divorce in the PH
• ISSUE: Whether Article 26(2) extends to aliens the right to petition a
PH court for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
• RULING: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Article 26(2)
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
• Where a marriage between a PH citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is validly obtained by the alien spouse
capacitating him/her to remarry, the PH spouse shall also have the
capacity to remarry under PH law
• Article 26(2) provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his/her marriage to the alien spouse dissolved, capacitating him/her to
remarry
• Hence, only the Filipino spouse can invoke Article 26(2); the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision

FUJIKI v. MARINAY

3
 • A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
• However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic.
• To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the PH, PH courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.
• A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a PH court of the case as if it were a
new petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage
• PH courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition, and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state.
• Thus, PH courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence
• Article 26 extends the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a PH spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage
• Article 26 applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground
of bigamy (since bigamy is penalized in JPN and PH laws).

MEDINA v. KOIKE
• The divorce decree issued abroad and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven
• The foreign law must not be in conflict with the PH law

REPUBLIC v. MANALO
• Article 26(2) can be applied/interpreted to include cases where the PH
spouse initiated/filed the divorce decree abroad instead of the alien
spouse
• The PH spouse is allowed to remarry
• To avoid the absurd and unjust situation where the PH spouse remains
married to the alien spouse, who after obtaining a divorce decree
abroad, is no longer married to the PH spouse
• Regardless of who initiates the foreign divorce proceeding, a favorable
degree has the same effect upon the Filipino spouse.
• The Filipino spouse will effectively be without a spouse.

JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC
• the parties, by agreement, obtained a foreign divorce decree
• Article 26(2) still applicable; it should not make a distinction for a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place

4
 and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien-initiated proceeding.

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

CARIÑO v. CARIÑO
• Article 40: for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

CAPILI v. PEOPLE
• subsequent marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage is void ab initio
• Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding

QUIAZON v. BELEN
• in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage

RE-MARRIAGE DUE TO ABSENCE OF SPOUSE

REPUBLIC v. SAREÑOGON
• for the present spouse to obtain the judicial declaration of his/her
spouse’s presumptive death, there are requisites which are provided
by the FC
• Article 41: that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead
• However, the law did not clearly define what is meant by “well-
founded belief”
• To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
proof that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead

REPUBLIC v. VILLANUEVA
• only relied on unsubstantiated inquiries, failed to present any person
whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband, she was
the lone witness

5
 • The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present
spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
• It requires exertion of action even effort. Mere absence of the spouse
(even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the
absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the law would not suffice.

SANTOS v. SANTOS
• an annulment of judgment is the proper remedy when the declaration
of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently
• Filing such affidavit would not be a sufficient remedy because it would
only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the legal
effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death
• Article 42: an undisturbed subsequent marriage is valid until
terminated and the children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate
• If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be
considered legitimate
• Hence, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice if
the purpose is not only to terminate the subsequent marriage but to
nullify the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

SUAZO v. SUAZO
• habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and
physical beatings occurred after the marriage do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity
• All of these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that cannot be considered as grounds of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness
• Article 36: psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage

KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
• Facts on record show that respondent was not incapable of
appreciating and performing her martial and parental duties

6
MATUDAN v. REPUBLIC
• Irrationality, irresponsibility, immaturity, and self-centeredness do not,
by themselves, show psychological incapacity
• Psychologist’s findings based on one-sided evidence
• Santos v. CA: psychological incapacity under Article 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
• The incapacity “must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the essential marital obligations; it must be
rooted in the history of the party at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, although manifested only after marriage; and it must be
incurable or the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.”

MALILIN v. JAMESOLAMIN and REPUBLIC

• Private responded did not perform her responsibilities of being a
housewife, she dated several men and contracted loans without
petitioner’s knowledge
• Not grounds, by themselves, of psychological incapacity
• The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
constitutes “downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic martial obligations,” not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, mischief less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse
• Decisions of the Matrimonial Tribunal and the Catholic Church, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given respect by the courts, yet it
is still subject to the law on evidence
• To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment
under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench

TANI DELA FUENTE v. DELA FUENTE

• respondent was prone to jealousy while they were still sweethearts.
Jealousy worsened when they married
• Treated petitioner like a sex slave that made her feel maltreated and
mileages
• Respondent poked a gun at petitioner’s head.
• Respondent had paranoid personality disorder. Was invited to be
examined but refused
1. Gravity - root cause of paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in
nature, his father suffered from a similar disorder
2. Juridical antecedence - petitioner noticed respondent’s jealousy even
before the marriage
3. Incurability - respondent repeatedly refused treatment

7
LEGAL SEPARATION

BUGAYONG v. GINEZ
• There was condonation, cannot claim decree of legal separation
• A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse between the parties is
sufficient to constitute condemnation, and where the parties live in the
same house, it is presumed that they live in terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.

LAPUZ-SY v. EUFEMIO
• an action for legal separation is abated by the death of either spouse,
even if property rights are involved. This involves nothing more than
the bed-and-board separation of the spouses and is purely personal
• Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to
the action causes death to the action itself

ONG v. ONG
• The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one year

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

ILUSORIO v. BILDNER
• no court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel one spouse to
live with the other spouse. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus or through a court action. That
is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
woman’s free choice

VALINO v. ADRIANO
• the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
surviving legal spouse. To say that said spouse had, in effect,
waived/renowned, expressly/impliedly, his/her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of the deceased spouse is baseless

PROPERTY RELATIONS

DOMINGO v. SPOUSES MOLINA

• married before the family code’s effectivity, so their property relation
is a conjugal partnership, which dissolved when one spouse died
• When the spouse died, her heirs will be governed by an implied co-
ownership among the conjugal properties pending liquidation and
partition

8
 • This includes the surviving spouse’s share of the conjugal partnership.
As co-owner, he cannot claim title to any specific portion of the
conjugal properties without an actual partition being first dine, either
by agreement or by judicial decree
• On the other hand, he owns one-half of the original conjugal
partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest,
so he had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest
in the subject property

PNB v. GARCIA
• subject property is conjugal, married prior to FC’s effectivity, so
property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains
• “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife.”
• Living spouse acquired the property at the time when his marriage was
subsisting, said property is conjugal and presumption applies
• Registration of a conjugal property alone in the name of one spouse
does not destroy its conjugal nature, as long as it was acquired during
the marriage

• Upon spouse’s death, the conjugal partnership was automatically

dissolved and terminated.
• Upon its dissolution, the conjugal partnership was converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased
• Living spouse had the right to freely mortgage or sell his undivided
interest without the other heirs’ consent, however he could only do it
only to the extent of his share in the conjugal property
• Since the living spouse constituted the mortgage over the entire
subject property extending to the undivided shares of the children
without their consent, the mortgage contract is void

TAN v. ANDRADE
• “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife.”
• For this presumption to apply, it must be proven that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage
• The presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical
and convincing evidence proving that the property was owned by the
spouse exclusively

9
 • The issuance of the title in the name solely of one spouse is not
determinative if the conjugal nature of the property, since there is no
other proof that it was acquired during the marriage of the parties
• When the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and
there is no proof as to when the property was acquired by the spouse
during the marriage, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to the same spouse.
• Hence, presumption does not apply

PNB v. REYES, JR.

• Article 124: any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by
one spouse must be consented to by the other; otherwise it is void
• Article 122: the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse shall be charged to the conjugal partnership if said debts
resounded to the benefit of the family
• Article 121: if the conjugal partnership is insufficient to pay the loan,
the spouses will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties

PELAYO v. PEREZ
• the consent need not be expressed. It can be implied, as long as it is
shown by the acts of a person that such consent or approval was
indeed given
• No evidence that proved that the spouse had been defrauded, forced,
intimidated or threatened by her spouse into affixing the signature
over the deed of sale
• Under the New Civil Code (before Family code’s effectivity) which was
the law in effect when the deed of sale was executed, the lack of
marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make
the contract void ab initio but merely voidable (the contract is valid
until the courts annul the same and only upon an action brought by
the spouse whose consent was not obtained)
• Does not apply in the present FC, any disposition by one spouse of the
community property without the knowledge and consent of the other
spouse is null and void

PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

AGAPAY v. PALANG
• Article 148 provides for cases of cohabitation when parties who are
not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage

10
 • Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions
• If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares

• Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not

take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when
there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.

BARRIDO v. NONATO
• Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other has husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership
• In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
• A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household
• Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
• When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.
• In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
• This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage.
• It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.

11
• The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains
to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.

• Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the
part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
• Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership.
• Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts.
• A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
• Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry.

12