G.R. No. 167707              October 8, 2008 Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y.
. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY,
DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS
OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS
PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of
Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine
tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in
the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
6
Island,  which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man.
Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant
to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation
of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of
parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with
coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had
heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less
fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego
with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island,
more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners
and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein;
and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands
titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA
Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could
not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public
Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay
and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of
the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The
Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of
a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence,
the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of
roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
27
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,  Wilfredo
Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested
rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral
nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification
of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT
OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS
THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST
AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141,
OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring
supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-
claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775)
have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin
petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure
title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874
and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be
provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified
under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine
has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of
the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of
their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land,
under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information
title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a
title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one
year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo
real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion
con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase;
and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines
under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into
three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a
system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was
sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos
and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as
the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands
of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately
owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the
decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of
their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the
various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of
lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA
No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These
cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or
portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the
land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on
proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This
was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through
Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was
then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved
the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to
an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically
reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of
imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and
disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and
worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration
cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those
cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply
to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest,
who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them,
their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.
Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof
that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption.
In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to
one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land
has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare
that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the
minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the
land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must
be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of
the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a
right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever
the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral
land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of
land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall
be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside
and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of
lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became
private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section
6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by
the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put,
there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No.
926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for
judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine
the property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on
Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila, 100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public
domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government, 101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands. 103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally
different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots
were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,
whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring
agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No.
2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those
cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that
their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island
into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals
of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of
the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which
lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local
and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso
beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its
forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will
destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and
"forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and
not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments,
it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay
into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified
Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that,
as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No.
3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural.
Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and
areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department
pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular
recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare
areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest,
or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public
and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but
sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro,
Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and
Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as
tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open
for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6
and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of
the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification,
the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest
land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads
and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of
the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within
her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or
RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They
claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo
can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of
Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not
bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay
Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No.
705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state
that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification"
of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law.
We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section
4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which
are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses
under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest
lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of
the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on
the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable
and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the
land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their
lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove
the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of
recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of
pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued
possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants
do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give
them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This
Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand,
private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title
over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession
and considerable investment in the island.
be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the
island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by
now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their
contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come
the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops,
livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious human lives.
Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of
years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang
batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA
No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack
of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their
possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales
patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now
pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill
will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not
G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D.
AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO
MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack
of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in
part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112
groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts
that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the
State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights
of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing
with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground
that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)
(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66
of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those
whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation,
the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget

and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D.
AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO
MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack
of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in
part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112
groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts
that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the
State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights
of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget
and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing
with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground
that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)
(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66
of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those
whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation,
the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich
Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life."
Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-
looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition,
precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic
terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation
conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth.
These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law
in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to
collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of
land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot
be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths
of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul
shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by
Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more
importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of
indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public
domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural
resources, control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and
is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA
may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International
Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL
SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees
embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura
regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards
into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The
Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish
Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands,
territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and
patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true
deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors
may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in
those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their
present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary,
all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of
pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to them seem most
expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms,
plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers
appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who
are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to
be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest.
Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the
lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and
civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government
either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the
Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880.
The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of
the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by
previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated
in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to
the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the
first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton
v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of
land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful
occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest,
on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac
in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they
had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale.
Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse
possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the
Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the
State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of
"those special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of
the public lands in the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did
these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as
to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the
absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies
would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed
that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the
Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies,
the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all
those lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in
his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the
idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the
king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all
ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse
occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of
the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and
within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good
title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is
apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a
length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed
by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by
Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the
Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a
system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be
restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it
ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing
the publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to
the date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have
occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x
appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of
which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time
warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title
deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor,
they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be
granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and
concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and
other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a
general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if
he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State
remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was
no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the
ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere
possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of
the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton
upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the
Spanish Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public
lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by
the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition
of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land
Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more
comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874
was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act
No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as
Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the
Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens
system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the
Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the
Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim
copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn,
followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration
formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant
Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the
government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the
person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to
such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or
reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This
system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the
fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was
the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country.28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor
of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of
the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a
necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in
the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article
XIV on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit
of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article
XII on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to
the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is
being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote
the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating
a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities
or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It
grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same
ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of
transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by
vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable
consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the
right to self-governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human
rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions
and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own
sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the
Office of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners
belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the
Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro,
Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western
Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The
NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities
and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former
President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and
practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP,
which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not
limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and
domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned
from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00
and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs"
is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary
international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a
group of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and
ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims
of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such
territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and
other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political,
social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.
ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country,
at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of
people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These
groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural
traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of
ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains
of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and
Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian
or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos
Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and
Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan
of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal,
Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya
of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro;
Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan,
Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur;
Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and
Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the
Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the
Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of
Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur,
Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of
the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli
and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of
the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato;
the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del
Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and
Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,
Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to
as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled
largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these
groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the
dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences
from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C.
augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural
influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian
influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial
society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food
gathering became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced
by fishing and the cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and
riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous
culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary
factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and
responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and
the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life
was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and
form. They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-
stock and used them not only as media of daily communication but also as
vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts
and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed
to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs.
They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their rituals
were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang
Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul
spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds,
for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be
respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life,
indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object of
nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning
from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them
to these shores.52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and
consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and
ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and
govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had
wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the
executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of
war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down
orally from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of
the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory
of the elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that
the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity
arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by
Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of
Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the
laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans,
partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and
adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through
a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as
"jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were
resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private
property in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of
the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs
embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore,
participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of
production as a member of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was
practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so
that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership
of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what
regulated the development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds
were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic
welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land
communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by
virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges
and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to
their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide
them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction
over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan
and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama,
Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out
from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao
del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was
still held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the
Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of
cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive
economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers
and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies
geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the
population of the islands into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they
found the Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water
routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries
and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in
a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an
unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it
a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate
people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral
and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and
vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the
church and convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts
were required to construct their houses around the church and the
unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards
attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination
using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to
the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding
citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately
adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as
well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared
to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from
the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction
of the concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental
results of Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish
king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral
rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and
religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and
beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the
Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations.
Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were
the infieles or the indigenous communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was
favored by the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the
Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros
were driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to
the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior.
The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of
Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult
and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus,
the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only
able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization
process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian
community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept
constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a
generally mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the
Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism
tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related
populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices
of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of
April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of
our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace
and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or
unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected
to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference,
constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices
and introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in
the path of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter
measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national
conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and
the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to
religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903,
they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
(BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was
to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including
those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and
prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American
Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine
cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about
them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian
Filipinos. The raging issue then was the conservation of the national
patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate
in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and
political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural
minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all
said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating
the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The
law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the
Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on
National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task
as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence policy of
integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation understood in the
context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired
result. Like the Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at
integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of
Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the
highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of
the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of
several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative
and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from
their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects
undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following
provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of
national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of
State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the
"cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic,
and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this
time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their
"customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the
State in the formulation and implementation of State policies. President
Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential
Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to
integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger
community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to
preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short,
while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right
of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as
the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land
occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who
were given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which
provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems
involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some
100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the
Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The
Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar
Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development
Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550
hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del
Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber
concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and
other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the
indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction
of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration
to one of preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom
Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office
for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the
right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 96 This Constitution goes
further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of
tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has
effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the
Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible,
marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not
dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as
different from those of the rest of the population.97 The kind of response the
indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their
advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode
their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become
peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural
perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems
were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts
of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which
emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of
social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is
no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the
Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use
the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or
stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he
loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit
world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of
"trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the
present generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the
land except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its
mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal
ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by
residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage.
The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its
meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic
production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation
like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it
natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial
grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a
common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and
obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also
sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms
are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited
because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as
defined under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation
of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death
in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be
offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in
no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social
system. The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is
alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous
peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts,
passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728
and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was
a consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on
Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and
Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive
version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional
consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples
nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator
Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of
indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long
suffered from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the
majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland
shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the
hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and
with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among
the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has
been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the
resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the
Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws
to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant
of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited
and cared for the land long before any central government was established.
Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related
with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling,
the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their
environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is
manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-cultural and
spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their
rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct
peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier
proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and
(2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the
Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State
have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in
the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous
member of the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in
legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In
fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141,
P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally
or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence
of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however,
Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American
occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in
its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the
period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine
Republic when government organized and supported massive resettlement
of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and
possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle
of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply
embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons
suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a
position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are
entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21)
Senators voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the
Committee on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and
subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio
Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar
implications that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation
to assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the
cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before
this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a
need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of
the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the
dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the
mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of
preservation as mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the
rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to
the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE
CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of
Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public
Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral
domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples
Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all
areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal
areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and
lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of
the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence
of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited
to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously
until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also
include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but
from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands
are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands
include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private
forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2,
series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the
issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of
Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a
power conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is
self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in
determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities
pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is
set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and
certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under
the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the
NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of
the community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral
domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is
left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain,
the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP
before the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may
be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains
which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim
of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are
thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held
under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral
lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of
the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native
title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted
to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have
been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore,
indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case
of Cariño v. Insular Government.130 Cariño firmly established a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land
registration court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet
Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by his
ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around
the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some
parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom.
He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no
document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a
possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North
American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and
built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his
property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S.
military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a
military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle
and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and
the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the
land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine
Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño
took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine
government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño failed
to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which
required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on
the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium,
and that the land never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S.
Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general
attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to
the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and
that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such
power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength,
and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it
shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The
choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided
under U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's
concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to
the natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands
via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white
race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to
the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America
was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny
that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the
internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902,
chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and
rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the
attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It
provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the
declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that
the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person"
did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property"
only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large
part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as
public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the
profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like
the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as
far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of
the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far
back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private
ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public
land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish
decrees upheld in the 1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S.
Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native
title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to
recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant.
The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all
"theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist
beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover
such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not
own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the
counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the
natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine
537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for
the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good
grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic
assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were
admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never
held sway over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws
were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to
register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such
land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to
establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief
the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine
of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the
applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of
the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the
ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the
court validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even without
government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law
present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We
have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the
change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental
principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we
are of the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice
and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the
148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name. 144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer
to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-
General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was
brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It
seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his
title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position
of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost
all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his
land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native
titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want
of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not
the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in
the entire length of the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread
use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch,
Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law
from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article
in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal
Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty
tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and
development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and
used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of
"native title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar
to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians.148 This is not surprising,
according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime,
government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to
native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing
the provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and
place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any
Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some
Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the
reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the
Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police
power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent
settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans,
introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and
protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through
Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to
the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an
investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known
to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have
been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and
that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as
many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in
Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the
United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the
Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by
proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of
Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by
executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It
also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy." 156 The
aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands
in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that
such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the
particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty,
statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances
treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal
possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting
their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights
to land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas
by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants
made by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused
to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only
conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the
government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they
had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by
bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the
court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and
consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to
the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the
court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives
were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being
exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be
the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a
power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants
have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only
to the Indian right of occupancy." 161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained
the exclusive right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to
the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right
belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition
of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until
the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned
Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer
to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to
the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the
discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was
only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian
rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could
not convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other
parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to
nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned. The claim of
government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right
of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right." 162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present
day, proves the universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their
native lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the
government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case,
the State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within
the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of
Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The
plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were
thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering
with the treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee
nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It
characterized the relationship between the United States government and
the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on
some foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their
protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That
power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under
the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power
in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in
its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that
they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.
They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted
with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of
one more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national
character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with
distinct territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all
the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations,
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection
which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is
still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United
States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of
the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which
those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a
people distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with
treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the
discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the
naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject
to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians'
legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the
original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the
exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive"
conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the
discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate
dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the
rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion
and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee
title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived
became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and
later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in
the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government
continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes
called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete
ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes
"permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere
possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear
that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a
property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the
right of occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal
title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and
occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must
be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold
to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians
have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual
Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually
depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being
held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is
ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other
disposal under general laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is
deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and
occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the
reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished,
no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the
nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the
ancestral land claims of indigenous Americans. 182 And two things are
clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can
be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite
the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however, there are
at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians
may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the
possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is
deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The
aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by
action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely
guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize
the native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to
extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty
over the ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still
in its infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines
vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the
peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and
enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to
the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never
public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes
native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title
and the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño was cited
by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription
under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the
Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural
land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act
are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part
of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court
declared that the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an
exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was
decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to
support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public
agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in
the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and
members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from
public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates
that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA
is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the
State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It,
however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner
since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the
members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their
ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,
or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are
agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural, residential,
pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen
percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20)
years from the approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to
ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not
communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner
since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which
claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be
registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act
496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-
owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and
are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming
purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands
regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance
with the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act.
C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public
domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or
concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public
purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land
Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public
agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the
ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself
converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of
eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land
for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be
exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of
approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b)
forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of
the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it
does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them
as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA
law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the
ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of
sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that
"Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the
recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral
domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes
the concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on
adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the
Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or
incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior
thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax
thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to
him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of
this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application
he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the
provision of the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in sub-section (b) hereof." 204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was
originally public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since
July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the
land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is
sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The
possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a
torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as
entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of
the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept
is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines
through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be
exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to
enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of
the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces,205 the
right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber,
transform or even destroy the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from
the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner
has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to
a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT
formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over
their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership
sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall
serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept
of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private
but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore
cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable
traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is
owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The
IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether
delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the
Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition
of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very
community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real
property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist
only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty
years in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate
himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be
dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of
the land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and
future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be
kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold
or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of
ownership. The lands are communal. These lands, however, may be
transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of
the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c)
subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if
the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of
ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law. 217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the
Civil Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly
provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is
applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the
Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA
and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the
absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized,
and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a
paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is
clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and
respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the
title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is
"belongingness" to the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of
having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful
nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary
relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring,
intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from
man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian
Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession
of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected.
Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right
to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the
right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to
be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and
prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain.
x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of
natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced
ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support
systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of
migrant settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall
have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters
and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the
ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except
those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default
thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the
Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of
the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to
transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of
land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member
of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or
is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor
ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding
fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any
time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following
rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to
stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement;
(d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean
air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as
reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with
customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the
ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the
land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members
thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a
torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the
Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the
Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and
Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of
natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on
real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the
State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the same in
four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these
natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and
development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector
through co-production,224 joint venture,225 or production-sharing
agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale
exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and
financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-
scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining
activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and
methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The
right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this
"ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does
not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting
grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred
places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral
domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other
natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the
Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands,
waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any
time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not
limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right
to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights
or interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be
particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated
consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership
over "lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is
not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our
Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim
ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land.231 The
IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section
7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the
ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural
resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the
ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
was not specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners
actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in
general.232 Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the
law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA
Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in
Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section
56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within
the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which
they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation
and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the
IPRA enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories
and uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration
of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage
and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits
from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and
conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological
and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be
noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural
resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of
ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation
measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form
of management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources
and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their
exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the
natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future
generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the
ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken
to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished
from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly
allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners,
marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural
resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources
and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains,
which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-
scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the
IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-
member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the
development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five
(25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into
with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own
decision-making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided
finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate
action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the
ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely
for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require
technology other than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of
requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development
and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation
for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This
may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into
by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and
conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs
"priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means
giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not
necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that
there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the
power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself
chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an
affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the
ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the
Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as
owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the development
and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it
may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on
which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may
likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to
participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter
into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under
the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25
years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the
ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4)
options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority
rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such
development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or
(4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the
ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State
to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options
and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover,
there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57
of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of
the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these
resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural
resources by the following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing,
renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that
the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such
certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted
by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no
certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed
and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing
agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally,
That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with
this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this
consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the
exploitation of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by
all departments and government agencies without prior certification from
the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any
ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-
based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and prior
informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the
consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any
project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the
issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that
a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement
does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the
NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine
whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely
gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed
of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note
that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do
not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found
within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-
imperialism stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a
massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the
decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of
peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-
determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.238 The
rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of
North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand
the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were
founded,239 and during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the
international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first
Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the
Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the
building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one
of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the
international scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity focused
on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction
of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national
governments' inability to deal with the situation.241 Indigenous rights came as
a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have
become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying
policies, programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The
World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the
dismal experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks
to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has
provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian Development
Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of
ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within
the framework of national unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates
the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is
heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27,
1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other
international instruments on the prevention of discrimination.249 ILO
Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new
international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the
aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions,
ways of life and economic development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by
ethnic and religious differences. These differences were carried over and
magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national
legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist,
the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of
society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the
indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to
the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is through the IPRA that
an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in
terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of
history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people
into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the
Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence
with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots
in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906,
decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to
them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said
registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by
him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of
said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also
included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted
to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant
.They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in
the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without
notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during
the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the
wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of
the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for
the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that
the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and
oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate
they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their
name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the
wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant
himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their
name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The
plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were
they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in
the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of
the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative,
then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem
that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de
su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be
denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens
system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is
clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding
upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands
(supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil.
Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219
U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than
does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government.
After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there
are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the
world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself
assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are
parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again
litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better
title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have
it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement
of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest
of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished,
except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for
the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy.
There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like
the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different
persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of
a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between
the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must
follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no
persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except
as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently,
and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A
title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be
defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered,
is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two
different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the
difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has
been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian
Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of
two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2
Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land
Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written
documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior
date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the
two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in
discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to
include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do
not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same
land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect
of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the
title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration),
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not
be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for
fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not
be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding
by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be
deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the
right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides,
among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first
inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in
such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in
the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive
influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance
with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the
opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful
argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al.
were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the
defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land
described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his
right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them,
they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground
for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with
torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens
system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain.
If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in
the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which
elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold
their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee?
That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the
rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of
the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was
the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the
real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name
of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration
of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his
failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry
of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for
impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall
is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of
the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against
impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the
doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to
him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration
Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is
the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive
vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of
the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to
an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no
greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right
which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier
certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the
later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some
doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire
rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by
virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an
original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent
purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have
been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate
in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale
by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including
the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in
the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under
these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is
said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they
are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under
the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with
which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the
rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs,
assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public
registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens
world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers
persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even
charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus
which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had
necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent
710 [a]). purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of
said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the
97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the
351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No.
Cases, 341.) 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been
irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and
guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his
is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would
successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who
have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence
had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second
record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof
original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and
of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence,
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule
should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he
that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record
who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead
negligence.
to endless confusion and useless litigation.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the
deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the
requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.)
effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it,
face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had
that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If
not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision,
that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to
and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens
the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of
system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining
such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of
the real status of the title to the land.
land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the
plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have
of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be
notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all protected.
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may
of the existence and contents of a public record. correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land other duplicate certificates issued.
from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser,"
when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55,
and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that
the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He
cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts
contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the
owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier
original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes
the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an
innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a
name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999
the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the
phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner,
cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO,
CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A.
GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999
PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all
surnamed CAPAY, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO
L. PE and JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P.
ALFELOR II and LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and
LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The present controversy has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses
Maximo and Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a
loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered several
properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of the present
dispute. 1 The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having
remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon
the mortgaged property.
To prevent the property's sale by public auction, the Capays, on September
22, 1966, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil
Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging
that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the
loan. The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of
Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the disputed property. Said notice
was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays' certificate of title.
Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing
the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and
on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the highest
bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name
on the same day. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the
name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the
Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272, 2 was
entered in the bank's name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not
carried over in the certificate of title issued in the name TRB.
Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying
for the recovery of the property with damages and attorney's fees. Trial in
Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and, on October 3, 1977, the CFI rendered
its decision declaring the mortgage void for want of consideration. The CFI
ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the
name of TRB and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the
Capay spouses.
TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in
whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774, 3 was issued, also,
without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. Santiago in turn divided
the land into six (6) lots and sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz
and Artemio Sanchez, who became co-owners thereof. 4 Alcantara and his
co-owners developed the property and thereafter sold the six (6) lots to
seperate buyers who issued seperate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis
pendens. 5
On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the
decision of the trial court as to the award of damages but affirming the same
in all other respects.
For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition
for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court 6 was denied in a Resolution dated
September 12, 1983. TRB's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied
in a Resolution dated October 12, 1983. The Court's September 12, 1983
Resolution having become final and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial
court issued a writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City
to cancel TCT No. 16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue a new one in the
name of the Capay spouses.
Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the successive
subsequent transfers of the subdivided property to buyers who obtained
separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for recovery of possession
ownership dated 8 June 1985 was filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court against TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the
respondents in G.R. No. 118862 (hereinafter, "the non-bank respondents").
Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay, her children by Maximo 7 who
succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon Gonzales,
counsel of the spouses in Civil Case No. Q-10453 who become co-owner of
the property to the extent of 35% thereof as his attorney's fees (collectively,
"the Capays"). On March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against
the defendants and ordering the Register of Deeds for Baguio to cancel TCT
No. T-36177, Books 198, Page 177 in the names of defendants Spouses
Honorato D. Santos and Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT No. 36707, Book
201, Page 107 in the names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and Josefina L.
Pe; to cancel TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron
Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel TCT
No. 36147, Book 198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo P. Alfelor II
and Liza R. Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730, Book 201, Page 130 in the
names of Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and Laarni Magdamo Fernando;
to cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37 in the name of Remedios Oca,
and issue new ones free from all liens and encumbrances, together with all
the improvements therein in the names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as
follows: 35% to Ramon A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age,
with postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City 37.92% to
Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to Ruby Ann Capay,
of legal age, Filipino married to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen; Chona
Margarita Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Waldo Flores; Rosario
Capay of legal age, Filipino, married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Raul Flores; Linda Joy Capay, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all with postal address at 37 Sampaguita St.,
Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City, ordering said defendants to vacate the
premises in question and restoring plaintiffs thereto and for defendant
Traders Royal Bank to pay each of the plaintiffs moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in exemplary damages and P40,000.00
as attorney's fees, all with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, with
costs against defendants.
SO ORDERED. 8
TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision promulgated on February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. 9 It ruled that
the non-bank respondents cannot be considered as purchasers for value and
in good faith, having purchased the property subsequent to the action in Civil
Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens was not carried
over to TRB's certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent transferees'
titles, it was entered in the Day Book which is sufficient to constitute
registration and notice to all persons of such adverse claim, citing the cases
of Villasor vs. Camon, 10 Levin vs. Bass 11 and Director of Lands vs. Reyes. 12
As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when
it sold the property knowing that it was under the litigation and without
informing the buyer of that fact.
On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside
the CA decision, docketed herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking the following
grounds:
I.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION
AND THEREBY DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY TO
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
II.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED SO
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM
THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT.
a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically,
arbitrarily, capriciously, with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of
jurisdiction tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
x x x           x x x          x x x
b) The public respondent erred in not finding that it was not the fault of
petitioner when the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to its new
title.
x x x           x x x          x x x
c) The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had legally
caused the invalidation of the Capay's property and the subsequent
validation of TRB's title over the same property was effective even as against
the Capays. 13
Meanwhile, the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals' decision. Convinced of the movants' arguments, the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on August 10, 1994 granted the
motion for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint as against them. The
dispositive portion of the resolution states:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the
motion for reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the
decision of this Court, promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby
RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against defendants-appellants with the
court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate of titles
originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby ordered
restored and duly respected. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R.
No. 118862 to set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals raising the
following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW
HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48
PHIL. 836 ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 198 SCRA 436, IS APPLICABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW
HOLDING THAT ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134
SCRA 34, ARE NOT APPLICABLE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW
HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL.
404 AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE
HEREOF.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF
VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS VIS-A-VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS
AND WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED
FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM
REGISTRATION.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH
REGARDS TO TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS
APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTER-
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT:
B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE
BOUND BY THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-10453.
Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was consolidated with G.R No. 114299,
pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated July 3, 1996. 15
The consolidated cases primarily involve two issues: (1) who, as between the
Capays and the non-bank respondents, has a better right to the disputed
property, and (2) whether or not TRB is liable to the Capays for damages.
On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.
I
First, when TRB purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice
of lis pendens that the Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate of
title was not carried to the new one issued to TRB. Neither did the certificate
of title of Emelita Santiago, who purchased the property from TRB, contain
any such notice. When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6)
new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained any notice
of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-
owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-
bank respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property in
question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their respective
portions of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title or
respective predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their suspicion.
The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face
of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound
to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal
objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate
transactions involving lands.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title
to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title
thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such
rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an
outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate
of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens
system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has
been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him.
What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system
would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more
abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are
satisfied. 16
Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents
nevertheless physically inspected the properties and inquired from the
register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the
property they were purchasing — an exercise of diligence above that
required by law.
Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son Dean,
testified:
Q How did you come to live in Baguio City, particulary in Kim. 2.5 San Luis,
Baguio City?
A In one of my visits to my sister who has been residing here for twelve (12)
years now, I got interested in buying a property here.
Q How did you come to know of this property at Asin Road where you now
reside?
A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.
Q When this particular property was bought by you, when was that?
A I do not remember the exact date, but it was in 1984, sir.
Q At the time when you went to see the place where you now reside, how
did it look?
A This particular property that I bought was then a small one (1) room
structure, it is a two (2)-storey one (1) bedroom structure.
Q What kind of structure with regards to material?
A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.
Q And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room structure, how did the
surrounding area look like at the time you visited?
A There were stone walls from the road and there were stone walls in front
of the property and beside the property.
Q At the time you went to see the property with your agent, rather your
sister Ruth Ann Valdez did you come to know the owner?
A We did because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there
supervising the workers.
Q And who?
A Amado Cruz sir.
Q After you saw this property, what else did you do?
A My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title.
Q In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this concern
of yours?
A At first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.
Q What was his answer?
A That it was a property with a clean title, that he has shown me the mother
title and it is a clean title.
Q Aside from being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you
do anything to answer your question?
A Yes, sit.
Q What did you do?
A Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration Office.
Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?
A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.
Q And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds?
A We looked for the title, the original title, sir.
Q When you say we, who was your companion?
A Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir.
Q The three (3) of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What title did you see there?
A We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado Cruz, sir.
Q And what was the result of your looking up for this title in the name of
Amado Cruz?
A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty.
Diomampo who heads the office. We showed him a copy of that title and we
were also reassured by him that anything that was signed by him was as
good as it is.
Q Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good?
A He did.
Q After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you do?
A The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend from RCBC
Binondo, Manila this is Atty. Nelson Waje.
Q What is your purpose in going to this lawyer?
A We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case we
think of buying the property.
Q What was the result of your conference with this lawyer?
A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title.
Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds,
looking at the title and seeing your lawyer friend, what decision did you
finally make regarding the property?
A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as advised by
that same lawyer, there is another office of the Bureau of Lands. I cannot
recall the office but it has something to do with registration of the old.
Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?
A I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title.
Q What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?
A We found the title of this property and there was reassurance that it was a
clean title and we saw the mother title under the Hilario family.
Q Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this Banaue?
A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.
Q And when you saw the title to this property and the mother title, what was
the result of your investigation, the investigation that you made?
A We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a genuine
title.
Q When you were able to determine that you had a valid, authentic or
genuine title, what did you do?
A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. 17
Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar
routine:
Q How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are
presently residing?
A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who is presently the Branch
Manager of CocoBank. She informed my wife that there is a property for sale
at Asin Road, and she was the one who introduced to us Mr. Alcantara, sir.
Q When you were informed by Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr.
Alcantara, did you see the property that was being offered for sale?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you specifically see the property, if you can recall?
A I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.
Q When you went to see the place, could you please describe what you saw
at that time?
A When we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara. As
a matter of fact the road leading to the property is still not passable
considering that during that time it was rainy season and it was muddy, we
fell on our way going to the property and walked to have an ocular
inspection and physical check on the area, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q What was the improvement, if any, that was in that parcel which you are
going to purchase?
A During that time, the riprap of the property is already there, the one-half of
the riprap sir.
Q Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that you went
there?
A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir.
Q After you saw the place riprap and you were in the course of deciding to
purchase this property, what else did you do?
A First, I have to consider that the property is clean.
Q How did you go about determining whether the title of the property is
clean?
A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his
office and checked the documents he has regarding the property.
Q And what was the result of your checking as to whether the title of the
property is clean?
A He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir.
Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to check up the title of the property,
what else did you do?
A Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the Bureau
of Lands or rather the Registry of Deeds, sir.
Q What registry of Deeds are you referring to?
A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir.
Q And were you able to see the Register of Deeds regarding what you would
like to know?
A Yes, and we were given a certification regarding this particular area that it
was clean, sir.
Q What Certification are you referring to?
A It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of Deeds
Adelina Tabangin, sir.
Q Do you have a copy of that Certification?
A Yes, I have, sir. 18
The testimonies of Honorato Santos 19 and Josefina Pe 20 were to the same
effect.
The non-bank respondent predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was
less thorough:
Q And will you give a brief description of what you do?
A I normally acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into smaller
lots and sold it to some interested parties.
Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara will you please inform the Court in what place in
Baguio have you acquired and subdivided and sold lots?
A Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill, Cristal Cave and Asin Road, sir.
Q You mentioned Asin Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you
referring?
A That property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir.
Q When you say you bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come to
know that Emelita Santiago is disposing of the property?
A Because of the father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir,
Armando Gabriel.
Q Is he also a resident of Baguio?
A He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad sir,
Q How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a
property in Asin?
A He approached me in the house, sir. He has acquired a title from the
Traders Royal Bank.
Q Can you inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation with
Armando Gabriel on the sale of the property at Asin Road?
A Later part of March, 1983, sir.
Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed you that he wants his property
to be sold, what did you do?
A I went to the place with the agent, sir.
Q When you say you went to the place with the agent, what place?
A Kilometer 2, Asin Road sir.
Q And when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to see
the place?
A By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir.
Q Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there were
no roads?
A None, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Mr. Alcantara, when you went to see this place at Asin Road last week of
March, 1983, will you please briefly describe how this place looked like at
that time?
A The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of the
roads were eroding already, so we cannot possibly enter the property, sir.
Q At the time you entered the place, was there any visible sign of claim by
anyone?
A None, sir.
Q In terms of fence in the area?
A There is no such, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Aside from looking or going to the property, what else did you do to this
property prior to your purchase?
A I investigated it with the Register of Deeds, sir.
Q What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of Deeds?
A To see if the paper in clean and there are no encumbrances, sir.
Q To whom did you talk?
A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.
Q And when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check, did
you have occasion to talk with Atty. Diomampo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo?
A The papers are clean except to the annotation at the back with the road
right of way, sir.
Q After making this investigation with the Register of Deeds and talking with
Atty. Diomampo, what else transpired?
A We bought the property, sir.
Q After purchasing the property from Emelita Santiago, could you please tell
the Honorable Court what you did with that deed of sale?
A We registered it with the Register of Deeds for the Certificate of Title
because at that time when we bought the property, Emelita Santiago had it
subdivided into six (6) lots, sir.
Q Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase the property was
subdivided into six (6) parcels?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers in the
subdivision of this property prior to your purchase?
A Yes, I have.
Q This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought for action?
A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided by
the owner, could you please inform the Court if there was any claim by any
other party opposing the subdivision or claiming the property?
A None, sir.
Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you said that you presented it to
the Register of Deeds and after the subdivision already, what action did the
Register of Deeds have regarding the matter?
A They approved it and registered it already in six (6) titles, sir.
Q In whose names?
A One (1) title under my name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.
Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said that you are the sole purchaser of this
entire area of One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591) Square
Meters. Now, you are informing this Honorable Court that one Amado Cruz
and one Dr. Sanchez were also issued two (2) titles. Could you explain how
these titles came into their possession?
A Actually, two (2) are our co-owners, sir.
Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale from Emelita Santiago is in
favor of these two (2) Atty. Cruz and Dr. Sanchez?
A Yes, sir. 21
Third, between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the
wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. 22 The Capays
filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was
not TRB's title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew
in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the
consolidation of title in the bank's name following the lapse of the one-year
period of redemption. But in the next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not
bother to find out the status of their title or whether the liens noted on the
original certificate of title were still existing considering that the property had
already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject property had
undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It was not
until after the land was subdivided and developed with the buyers building
their houses on the other lots when the Capays suddenly appeared and
questioned the occupants' titles. At the very least, the Capays are guilty of
laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the
party entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 23
Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover situations
such as the case at bar, where there have been a series of transfers to
innocent purchasers for value. To set aside these transactions only to
accommodate a party who has slept on his rights is anathema to good order.
Independently of the principle of prescription of actions working against
petitioners, the doctrine of laches may further be counted against them,
which latter tenet finds application even to imprescriptible
actions. . . . 24
In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 25 we held:
While it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the deed of
conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered
under the Torrens System (Davao Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 171 SCRA 612), the petitioners cannot invoke said dictum because
their action to recover Lot 4362 is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
The act of registering the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to
the whole world of the fact of such conveyance (Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253).
But the petitioners' complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362
was filed only on July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years after the registration of the
sale to Rosendo. The petitioners failed and neglected for an unreasonably
long time to assert their right, if any, to the property in Rosendo's
possession.
Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs.
Camon Levin Bass and Director of Lands vs. Reyes 26 to the effect that entry of
the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to
constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse
claim. Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after sleeping on
their rights for fifteen years to assert ownership over the property that has
undergone several transfers made in good faith and for value and already
subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their
owners.
In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in their first two (2)
assignment of errors, do not help them any, as the transferees in said cases
were not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. In Tuazon vs. Reyes
and
Siochi, 27 where the land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to
Vicente Tuazon, it was with a deed containing the recital that the land was in
dispute between the vendor and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon, who was merely
subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of the dispute and,
furthermore, David did not warrant the title to the same. In Rivera vs.
Moran, 28 Rivera acquired interest in the land before the final decree was
entered in the cadastral proceedings. Rivera, the transferee, was aware of
the pending litigation and, consequently, could not have been considered a
purchaser in good faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs. Nuñez, et al. 29 and Laroza
vs. Guia, 30 the buyers of the property at the time of their acquisition knew of
the existence of the notice of lis pendens. In contrast to the cited cases, the
non-bank respondents in the case at bar acquired their respective portions of
the land with clean title from their predecessors-in-interest.
II
We come now to TRB's liability towards the Capays.
The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash its hands off the present controversy,
and attempts to shift the blame on the Capays, thus:
x x x           x x x          x x x
23. The petitioner Bank, during all the time that it was holding the title for
over fourteen (14) years that there was no legal impediment for it to sell said
property, Central Bank regulations require that real properties of banks
should not he held for more than five (5) years:
24. The fault of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis
Pendens to the new title of the petitioner Bank should not be absorbed by
the latter considering that in all good faith, it was not aware of the existence
of said annotation during all the time that said title was in its possession for
almost fourteen (14) years before the property was sold to Emelita G.
Santiago. . . . 31
TRB concludes that "(t)he inaction and negligence of private respondents
allowing ownership to pass for almost 15 years constitute prescription of
action and/or laches." 32
Sec. 25 of the General Banking Act, 33 provides that no bank "shall hold the
possession of any real estate under mortgage or trust, deed, or the title and
possession of any real estate purchased to secure any debt due to it, for a
longer period than five years." TRB, however, admits hoding on to the
foreclosed property for twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its name.
The bank is, therefore, estopped from involving banking laws and regulations
to justify its belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed to hide
behind the law which it itself violated.
TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens because when
the property was foreclosed by it, the notice of lis pendens was annotated on
the title. But when TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was
cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was issued in place
thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice of lis pendens.
We do not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and negligence" as against TRB.
It may be recalled that upon the commencement of foreclosure proceedings
by TRB, the Capays filed an action for prohibition on September 22, 1966
against the TRB before the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that
attempt, the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the
property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or laches could not have
worked against the Capays because they had persistently pursued their suit
against TRB to recover their property.
On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRB's assertion that after holding
on to the property for more than ten (10) years, it suddenly realized that it
was acting in violation of the General Bank Act. What is apparent is that TRB
took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of
their certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser. This
notwithstanding the adverse decision of the trial court and the pendency of
its appeal. TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad faith, thus transferred
caused the property without the lis pendens annotated on its title to put it
beyond the Capays' reach. Clearly, the bank acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy and should be held liable for
damages. 34
Considering however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared
null and void for want of consideration and, consequently, the foreclosure
proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays would ordinarily be
entitled to the recovery of their property. Nevertheless, this remedy is not
now available to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has passed
into the hands of third parties who acquired the same in good faith and for
value. Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair
market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago, the
transferee of TRB.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Frebruary 24, 1994
in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994
is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the
Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to
Emelita Santiago.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative
action against the Register of Deeds and or his assistants that may be taken
by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over
the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195825               February 27, 2013
SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI, Petitioners,
vs.
LILIA V. DOMINGO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 195871
RAMONA LIZA L. DE VERA, Petitioner,
vs
LILIA V. DOMINGO AND SPOUSES RADELIA AND ALFRED SY, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under the Torrens system of land registration, the registered owner of realty
cannot be deprived of her property through fraud, unless a transferee
acquires the property as an innocent purchaser for value. A transferee who
acquires the property covered by a reissued owner's copy of the certificate of
title without taking the ordinary precautions of honest persons in doing
business and examining the records of the proper Registry of Deeds, or who
fails to pay the full market value of the property is not considered an
innocent purchaser for value.
Under review in these consolidated appeals is the Decision promulgated on
July 16, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90452
affirmed the revised decision rendered on March 1, 2007 by the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC) against the petitioners and their seller.2
Antecedents
The property in dispute was a vacant unfenced lot situated in White Plains,
Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-165606
issued in the name of respondent Lilia V. Domingo by the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City. It had an area of 658 square meters.3 In July 1999, Domingo
learned that construction activities were being undertaken on her property
without her consent. She soon unearthed the series of anomalous
transactions affecting her property.
On July 18, 1997, one Radelia Sy (Sy),4 representing herself as the owner of
the property, petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a new owner’s copy of
Domingo’s TCT No. N-165606, appending to her petition a deed of absolute
sale dated July 14, 1997 purportedly executed in her favor by Domingo;5 and
an affidavit of loss dated July 17, 1997,6 whereby she claimed that her bag
containing the owner’s copy of TCT No. N-165606 had been snatched from
her on July 13, 1997 while she was at the SM City in North EDSA, Quezon
City. The RTC granted Sy’s petition on August 26, 1997.7 The Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City then issued a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
N-165606, which was later cancelled by virtue of the deed of absolute sale
dated July 14, 1997, and in its stead the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
issued TCT No. 186142 in Sy’s name.8
Sy subsequently subdivided the property into two, and sold each half by way
of contract to sell to Spouses Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera and to
Spouses Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi. The existence of the individual
contracts to sell was annotated on the dorsal portion of Sy’s TCT No. 186142
as Entry No. PE-8907/N-186142,9 stating that the consideration of the sale
was ₱1,000,000.00 for each set of buyers, or for a total of ₱2,000,000.00 for
the entire property that had an actual worth of not less than ₱14,000,000.00.
TCT No. 186142 in the name of Sy was then cancelled by virtue of the deeds
of sale executed between Sy and Spouses De Vera, and between Sy and
Spouses Cusi, to whom were respectively issued TCT No. 18956810 and TCT
No. 189569.11 All the while, the transactions between Sy and the De Veras,
and between Sy and the Cusis were unknown to Domingo, whose TCT No. N-
165606 remained in her undisturbed possession.12
It turned out that the construction activities taking place on the property that
Domingo learned about were upon the initiative of the De Veras in the
exercise of their dominical and possessory rights.
Domingo commenced this action against Sy and her spouse, the De Veras
and the Cusis in the RTC, the complaint being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
99-39312 and entitled Lilia V. Domingo v. Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy,
Spouses Alfonso G. and Maria Angeles S. Cusi, Spouses Edgardo M. and
Ramona Liza L. De Vera, BPI Family Savings Bank and The Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, seeking the annulment or cancellation of titles, injunction
and damages. Domingo applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction, and a temporary restraining order
(TRO).13 The RTC granted Domingo’s application for the TRO enjoining the
defendants from proceeding with the construction activities on the property.
The RTC later granted her application for the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling of the RTC
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision,14 disposing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) declaring the sale between Lilia V. Domingo and Radella Sy void and of
(sic) effect;
(b) declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera and Sps. Alfonso and
Maria Angeles Cusi to be purchasers in good faith and for value;
(c) lifting the writ of preliminary injunction;
(d) finding defendant Radella Sy liable to the plaintiff Lilia Domingo liable (sic)
for damages, as follows:
1. Fourteen Million Pesos (₱14,000,000.00) representing the value of the
property covered by TCT No. 165606 plus legal rate of interest until fully
paid;
2. One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) representing moral damages;
3. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) representing exemplary
damages;
4. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) representing attorney’s fees;
5. Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) representing litigation
expenses; and
6. Costs of Suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Sy and
Domingo,15 the RTC reconsidered and set aside its September 30, 2003
decision, and allowed the presentation of rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence.
On March 1, 2007, the RTC rendered a new decision,16 ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the sale between Lilia Domingo and Radelia Sy void and of no
effect;
(b) Declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera and Sps. Alfonso and
Maria Angeles Cusi not purchasers in good faith and for value;
(c) TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569 are hereby cancelled and declared Null and
Void Ab Initio;
(d) Directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annotate this Order on
TCT No. 189568 and 189569;
(e) TCT No. 165606 in the name of Lilia Domingo is hereby revalidated; and,
(f) Finding defendant Radelia Sy liable to the plaintiff Lilia V. Domingo liable
(sic) for damages, as follows:
1. One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) representing moral damages;
2. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) representing exemplary
damages;
3. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) representing attorney’s fees;
4. Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) representing litigation
expenses; and,
5. Costs of suit.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever civil action for recovery and
damages, the defendants Sps. De Vera and Sps. Cusi may have against
defendant Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the assignment of errors each set of appellants made was as
follows:
Spouses Cusi
a) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANTS SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI ARE NOT
PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
b) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT CODEFENDANTS SPOUSES RADELIA SY AND
ALFRED SY ARE LIABLE FOR SPOUSES CUSI’S CROSS-CLAIM.
c) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES TO DEFENDANTS SPOUSES CUSI.17
Spouses Sy
a) THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE BETWEEN
LILIA DOMINGO AND RADELIA SY VOID AND OF NO EFFECT AND WAS
PROCURRED (sic) THROUGH FRAUDULENT MEANS.
b) THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL MORAL
DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION
EXPENSES THE SAME BEING NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW.
c) THAT THE SAID DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AS THE SAME CONTAIN SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN THE COURT A QUO DECLARED THAT TCT NOS.
189568 AND 189569 CANCELLED AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
d) THE INSTANT ASSAILED DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT HAVE (sic)
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT[S] SPOUSES SY OF THEIR BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.18
Spouses De Vera
a) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DE VERA SPOUSES ARE
NOT PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH AND NOT ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION
OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. N-189568.
b) THE LOWER COURT ALSO ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT DE VERA HER COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.19
As stated, the CA promulgated its decision on July 16, 2010, affirming the RTC
with modification of the damages to be paid by the Sys to Domingo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied. Accordingly,
the Decision dated March 1, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification on the award of damages to be paid
by defendants-appellants Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy in favor of the
plaintiff-appellee Lilia V. Domingo, to wit;
1. ₱500,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
3. ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.20
The CA held that the sale of the property from Domingo to Sy was null and
void and conveyed no title to the latter for being effected by forging the
signature of Domingo; that Sy thereby acquired no right in the property that
she could convey to the Cusis and De Veras as her buyers; that although
acknowledging that a purchaser could rely on what appeared on the face of
the certificate of title, the Cusis and De Veras did not have the status of
purchasers in good faith and for value by reason of their being aware of Sy’s
TCT No. 186142 being a reconstituted owner’s copy, thereby requiring them
to conduct an inquiry or investigation into the status of the title of Sy in the
property, and not simply rely on the face of Sy’s TCT No. 186142; and that
the Cusis and De Veras were also aware of other facts that should further put
them on guard, particularly the several nearly simultaneous transactions
respecting the property, and the undervaluation of the purchase price from
₱7,000,000.00/half to only ₱1,000,000.00/half to enable Sy to pay a lesser
capital gains tax.
The CA later on denied the motions for reconsideration.21
Issues
Hence, this appeal via petitions for review on certiorari by the Cusis (G.R. No.
195825) and Ramona Liza L. De Vera22 (G.R. No. 195871).
In G.R. No. 195825, the Cusis submit the following issues:23
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 186142 REGISTERED IN THE
NAME OF RADELIA SY IS A RECONSTITUTED TITLE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR
VALUE.
III
GRANTING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND ISSUE,
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF ALL
THE PAYMENTS MADE BY PETITIONERS TO THEIR CODEFENDANTS SPOUSES
ALFRED AND RADELIA SY IN ADDITION TO DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.
In G.R. No. 195871, De Vera asserts that the primordial issue is whether or
not she was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.
Ruling of the Court
The petitions for review are bereft of merit.
Firstly, now beyond dispute is the nullity of the transfer of Domingo’s
property to Sy because both lower courts united in so finding. The unanimity
in findings of both the RTC and the CA on this all-important aspect of the
case is now conclusive on the Court in view of their consistency thereon as
well as by reason of such findings being fully supported by preponderant
evidence. We consider to be significant that the Sys no longer came to the
Court for further review, thereby rendering the judgment of the CA on the
issue of nullity final and immutable as to them.
Secondly, the Cusis and De Vera commonly contend that the CA gravely
erred in not considering them to be purchasers in good faith and for value.
They argue that Sy’s TCT No. 186142 was free of any liens or encumbrances
that could have excited their suspicion; and that they nonetheless even went
beyond the task of examining the face of Sy’s TCT No. 186142, recounting
every single detail of their quest to ascertain the validity of Sy’s title, but did
not find anything by which to doubt her title.
The Court concurs with the finding by the CA that the Cusis and De Vera were
not purchasers for value and in good faith. The records simply do not support
their common contention in that respect.
Under the Torrens system of land registration,24 the State is required to
maintain a register of landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title to those
included in the register. The system has been instituted to combat the
problems of uncertainty, complexity and cost associated with old title
systems that depended upon proof of an unbroken chain of title back to a
good root of title. The State issues an official certificate of title to attest to
the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what
the law warrants or reserves.25
One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the curtain
principle, in that one does not need to go behind the certificate of title
because it contains all the information about the title of its holder. This
principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long complicated
documents kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a
private conveyancing system, and assures that all the necessary information
regarding ownership is on the certificate of title. Consequently, the avowed
objective of the Torrens system is to obviate possible conflicts of title by
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and,
as a rule, to dispense with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of
the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that he
would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed
of any right over the covered land.26
The Philippines adopted the Torrens system through Act No. 496,27 also
known as the Land Registration Act, which was approved on November 6,
1902 and took effect on February 1, 1903. In this jurisdiction, therefore, "a
person dealing in registered land has the right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry".28
To obtain a grasp of whether a person has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry, an internal matter, necessitates an analysis of evidence of a person’s
conduct.29 That renders the determination of intent as a factual
issue,30 something that the Court does not normally involve itself in because
of its not being a trier of facts. Indeed, as a rule, the review function of the
Court is limited to a review of the law involved.
But the Court now delves into the facts relating to the issue of innocence of
the petitioners in their purchase of the property, considering that the RTC,
through its original decision, at first regarded them to have been innocent
purchasers who were not aware of any flaw or defect in Sy’s title based on
the fact that the property had been unfenced and vacant. The RTC also
regarded the petitioners’ making of reasonable verifications as their exercise
of the due diligence required of an ordinary buyer.31 The RTC later
completely turned around through another decision, however, and it was
such decision that the CA affirmed subject to the modifications of the
damages granted to Domingo.
There is no question that the petitioners exerted some effort as buyers to
determine whether the property did rightfully belong to Sy. For one, they did
not find any encumbrance, like a notice of lis pendens, being annotated on
the TCT of Sy. Nonetheless, their observance of a certain degree of diligence
within the context of the principles underlying the Torrens system
was not their only barometer under the law and jurisprudence by which to
gauge the validity of their acquisition of title. As the purchasers of the
property, they also came under the clear obligation to purchase the property
not only in good faith but also for value.
Therein lay the problem. The petitioners were shown to have been deficient
in their vigilance as buyers of the property. It was not enough for them to
show that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it would be too
easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its possession,
through illegal occupation. Nor was it safe for them to simply rely on the face
of Sy’s TCT No. 186142 in view of the fact that they were aware that her TCT
was derived from a duplicate owner’s copy reissued by virtue of the loss of
the original duplicate owner’s copy. That circumstance should have already
alerted them to the need to inquire beyond the face of Sy’s TCT No. 186142.
There were other circumstances, like the almost simultaneous transactions
affecting the property within a short span of time, as well as the gross
undervaluation of the property in the deeds of sale, ostensibly at the behest
of Sy to minimize her liabilities for the capital gains tax, that also excited
suspicion, and required them to be extra-cautious in dealing with Sy on the
property.
To the Court, the CA’s treatment of Sy’s TCT No. 186142 as similar to a
reconstituted copy of a Torrens certificate of title was not unwarranted. In
doing so, the CA cited the ruling in Barstowe Philippines Corporation v.
Republic,32 where the Court, quoting from precedents, opined that "the
nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title of registered land is
similar to that of a second Owner’s Duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title," in
that "both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the representation of
the registered owner that the original of the said TCT or the original of the
Owner’s Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be located or
found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose;"33 and that both were
"subsequent copies of the originals thereof," a fact that a "cursory
examination of these subsequent copies would show" and "put on notice of
such fact [anyone dealing with such copies who is] thus warned to be
extracareful."34
Verily, the Court has treated a reissued duplicate owner’s copy of a TCT as
merely a reconstituted certificate of title. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,35 a
case with striking similarities to this one, an impostor succeeded in tricking a
court of law into granting his petition for the issuance of a duplicate owner’s
copy of the supposedly lost TCT. The impostor then had the TCT cancelled by
presenting a purported deed of sale between him and the registered owners,
both of whom had already been dead for some time, and another TCT was
then issued in the impostor’s own name. This issuance in the impostor’s own
name was followed by the issuance of yet another TCT in favor of a third
party, supposedly the buyer of the impostor. In turn, the impostor’s
transferee (already the registered owner in his own name) mortgaged the
property to Spouses Miguel and Adela Lazaro, who then caused the
annotation of the mortgage on the TCT. All the while, the original duplicate
owner’s copy of the TCT remained in the hands of an heir of the deceased
registered owners with his co-heirs’ knowledge and consent.
The inevitable litigation ensued, and ultimately ended up with the
Court.1âwphi1 The Lazaros, as the mortgagees, claimed good faith, and
urged the Court to find in their favor. But the Court rebuffed their urging,
holding instead that they did not deal on the property in good faith because:
(a) "the title of the property mortgaged to the Lazaros was a second owner’s
duplicate TCT, which is, in effect a reconstituted title. This circumstance
should have alerted them to make the necessary investigation, but they did
not;" and (b) their argument, that "because the TCT of the property on which
their mortgage lien was annotated did not contain the annotation:
"Reconstituted title," the treatment of the reissued duplicate owner’s copy
of the TCT as akin to a reconstituted title did not apply, had no merit
considering that: "The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title
of registered land is similar to that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer
Certificate of Title. Both are issued, after the proper proceedings, on the
representation of the registered owner that the original of the said TCT or
the original of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and could
not be located or found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose.
Both, therefore, are subsequent copies of the originals thereof. A cursory
examination of these subsequent copies would show that they are not the
originals. Anyone dealing with such copies are put on notice of such fact and
thus warned to be extra-careful. This warning the mortgagees Lazaros did
not heed, or they just ignored it."36
The fraud committed in Garcia paralleled the fraud committed
here.1âwphi1 The registered owner of the property was Domingo, who
remained in the custody of her TCT all along; the impostor was Sy, who
succeeded in obtaining a duplicate owner’s copy; and the Cusis and the De
Veras were similarly situated as the Spouses Lazaro, the mortgagees
in Garcia. The Cusis and the De Veras did not investigate beyond the face of
Sy’s TCT No. 186142, despite the certificate derived from the reissued
duplicate owner’s copy being akin to a reconstituted TCT. Thereby, they
denied themselves the innocence and good faith they supposedly clothed
themselves with when they dealt with Sy on the property.
The records also show that the forged deed of sale from Domingo to Sy Resultantly, the Court affirms the lower courts, and restores to Domingo her
appeared to be executed on July 14, 1997; that the affidavit of loss by which rights of dominion over the propetiy.
Sy would later on support her petition for the issuance of the duplicate
owner’s copy of Domingo’s TCT No. 165606 was executed on July 17, 1997, WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
the very same day in which Sy registered the affidavit of loss in the Registry promulgated on July 16, 201 0; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs
of Deeds of Quezon City; that Sy filed the petition for the issuance of the of suit.
duplicate owner’s copy of Domingo’s TCT No. 165606; that the RTC granted
SO ORDERED.
her petition on August 26, 1997; and that on October 31, 1997, a real estate
mortgage was executed in favor of one Emma Turingan, with the mortgage
being annotated on TCT No. 165606 on November 10, 1997.

Being the buyers of the registered realty, the Cusis and the De Veras were
aware of the aforementioned several almost simultaneous transactions
affecting the property. Their awareness, if it was not actual, was at least
presumed, and ought to have put them on their guard, for, as the CA pointed
out, the RTC observed that "[t]hese almost simultaneous transactions,
particularly the date of the alleged loss of the TCT No. 165606 and the
purported Deed of Sale, suffice[d] to arouse suspicion on [the part of] any
person dealing with the subject property."37 Simple prudence would then
have impelled them as honest persons to make deeper inquiries to clear the
suspiciousness haunting Sy’s title. But they still went on with their respective
purchase of the property without making the deeper inquiries. In that regard,
they were not acting in good faith.

Another circumstance indicating that the Cusis and the De Veras were not
innocent purchasers for value was the gross undervaluation of the property
in the deeds of sale at the measly price of ₱1,000,000.00 for each half when
the true market value was then in the aggregate of at least ₱14,000,000.00
for the entire property. Even if the undervaluation was to accommodate the
request of Sy to enable her to minimize her liabilities for the capital gains tax,
their acquiescence to the fraud perpetrated against the Government, no less,
still rendered them as parties to the wrongdoing. They were not any less
guilty at all. In the ultimate analysis, their supposed passivity respecting the
arrangement to perpetrate the fraud was not even plausible, because they
knew as the buyers that they were not personally liable for the capital gains
taxes and thus had nothing to gain by their acquiescence. There was simply
no acceptable reason for them to have acquiesced to the fraud, or for them
not to have rightfully insisted on the declaration of the full value of the realty
in their deeds of sale. By letting their respective deeds of sale reflect the
grossly inadequate price, they should suffer the consequences, including the
inference of their bad faith in transacting the sales in their favor.

De Vera particularly insists that she and her late husband did not have any
hand in the undervaluation; and that Sy, having prepared the deed of sale,
should alone be held responsible for the undervaluation that had inured only
to her benefit as the seller. However, such insistence was rendered of no
consequence herein by the fact that neither she nor her late husband had
seen fit to rectify the undervaluation. It is notable that the De Veras were
contracting parties who appeared to have transacted with full freedom from
undue influence from Sy or anyone else.

Although the petitioners argue that the actual consideration of the sale was
nearly ₱7,000,000.00 for each half of the property, the Court rejects their
argument as devoid of factual basis, for they did not adduce evidence of the [G.R. No. 137739. March 26, 2001.]
actual payment of that amount to Sy. Accordingly, the recitals of the deeds of
sale were controlling on the consideration of the sales. ROBERTO B. TAN, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORP., HELEN
LEONTOVICH VDA. DE AGUINALDO and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious
MARIKINA, Respondents.
advantage of another. It means the "freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry."38
DECISION
Given this notion of good faith, therefore, a purchaser in good faith is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the
same.38 As an examination of the records shows, the petitioners were not
innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. Their failure to investigate KAPUNAN, J.:
Sy's title despite the nearly simultaneous transactions on the property that
ought to have put them on inquiry manifested their awareness of the flaw in
Sy's title. That they did not also appear to have paid the full price for their
share of the property evinced their not having paid true value.39
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Roberto Tan (petitioner)
seeking to reverse and set aside the resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and
23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. In the
said resolutions, the CA directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina to
reinstate the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 194096 and 194098 in
the name of Philippine Banking Corporation (respondent bank) over the
same parcel of land already covered by petitioner’s valid and subsisting TCT
No. 296945.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the decision 1 of the CA are
as follows: On 29 December 1995, petitioner bought from Helen L. Aguinaldo
(respondent Aguinaldo) a parcel of land at the Valley Golf Subdivision in
Antipolo, Rizal. The lot was then covered by TCT No. 294192 in the name of
respondent Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the
said title. After payment of the agreed purchase price, TCT No. 294192 was
cancelled and a new one (TCT No. 296945) in the name of petitioner was
issued.
On 29 February 1996, two (2) months after he bought the property,
petitioner was served a copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent
bank in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. Said petition stated that petitioner was "being
sued here as a nominal party as the new registered owner of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 296945." It was only then .that petitioner learned that
the lot he bought from respondent Aguinaldo was subject of legal dispute
between her and respondent bank.
It appears that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband Daniel R. Aguinaldo
obtained a loan in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
from respondent bank some time in December 1977. To secure the payment
of this obligation, the Aguinaldos executed in favor of respondent bank a real
estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated in Antipolo and Cainta,
Rizal covered by TCT Nos. 234903, 153844 and 151622. In January of 1985,
Daniel Aguinaldo obtained three more loans from respondent PBC totalling
over five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). He died without having
paid these loans.
Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent a demand letter to
respondent Aguinaldo, as administratrix of the estate of her husband.
Despite said demand, the loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank thus
initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the real estate mortgage.
In the public auction sale, the mortgaged properties were sold to respondent
bank as the highest bidder.
On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one
year, respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the
aforesaid foreclosure proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1705-A,
with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal. In said proceedings, the
parties (respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank) entered into a Joint
Partial Stipulation of Facts stating, among others, that they "agree that the
decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court [RTC] shall be final and
unappealable, subject only to the filing within the reglementary period of the
usual motion for reconsideration." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On 20 April 1995, the trial court rendered its decision the dispositive portion
of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
(1) The Notice of Sheriff’s Sale dated February 10, 1989, Certificate of Sale
dated March 10, 1989, Affidavit of Consolidation executed by the defendant
bank, and the deed of sale dated February 1, 1995 executed by the bank in
favor of the Terraces Realty & Development Corporation are hereby declared
null and void and of no legal force and effect;
(2) The Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to
cancel Transfer Certificates of Title No. 194096 and 194098 in the name of
the bank and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces
Realty & Development Corporation, and to issue, in lieu thereof, new titles in
the name of the plaintiff or her successor-in-interest upon proof by the latter
of the payment to be made by them to the bank or by similar proof that such
amount is deposited by the plaintiff in trust for the bank.
The plaintiff shall pay to the bank or deposit the amount in trust for the bank
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this decision the amounts as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) on the promissory note for P176,623.24 — The amount of P176,623.24
plus the stipulated 12% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until
March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum on said amount of P176,623.24
from March 11, 1989 until fully paid.
(b) on the promissory note for P380,000.00 — The amount of P380,000.00
plus 14% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989;
and 12% interest per annum on said amount of P380,000.00 from March 11,
1989 until fully paid; and
(c) on the promissory note of P31,000.00 — The amount of P31,000.00 14%
interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12%
interest per annum of said amount of P31,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until
fully paid.
(3) The claim of plaintiff for damages and attorney’s fees is hereby denied.
No pronouncement as to costs. 2
Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Pending resolution thereof, respondent bank moved for the inhibition of the
presiding judge. The motion for inhibition was granted, thus, the case was re-
raffled to Branch 72. The presiding judge thereof subsequently denied
respondent bank’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent bank then filed a
notice of appeal but the same was denied on the ground that it (respondent
bank) already waived its right to appeal pursuant to the joint stipulation. The
decision was declared final and executory.
On 6 October 1995, the Clerk of Court of Branch 72 issued a certification that
the decision had become final. Upon presentation of the trial court’s decision
and certification, the Register of Deeds of Marikina canceled respondent
bank’s TCT No. 194096 and 194098 and Terraces Realty & Development
Corporation’s TCT No. 275504 and issued new titles in lieu thereof, all in the
name of respondent Aguinaldo. She subsequently sold the lot covered by one
of these titles to petitioner who was then issued TCT No. 296945
therefor.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
trial court but the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by
way of certiorari. In its decision, dated 27 February 1998, the CA substantially
granted the reliefs prayed for by respondent bank and directed the trial court
to, among others, give due course to respondent bank’s appeal and elevate
the records of the case to the CA for review. The CA, however, denied
respondent bank’s prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs stating that the
averments as against petitioner are insufficient to make up a cause of action
against the latter. 3
Respondent bank thereafter moved for a partial reconsideration of the CA
decision insofar as it denied its prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs. For
his part, petitioner filed a motion to cancel notice of lis pendens while
respondent Aguinaldo filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on these
motions, the CA issued the assailed resolution of 28 August 1998 the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens dated 23 March
1998 filed by respondent Roberto B. Tan and the motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent Helen Leontovich Vda. De Aguinaldo dated 23 March
1998 are hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 20 March 1998 is
hereby GRANTED and par.(d) of the dispositive portion of our decision
promulgated on 27 February 1998 is hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Directing the Registrar of Deeds to reinstate the cancelled Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 194096 & 194098 in the name of petitioner and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty &
Development Corporation, or issue new ones in the event this is not legally
feasible in their favor, pending review of the case on appeal.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution of 23 February 1999. Hence, petitioner filed
the instant petition assigning the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. The Court of Appeals erred and committed serious irregularity in directing
the "reinstatement" of Philbank’s cancelled TCT No. 194096 (or the issuance
of a new one in its place), in the fact of an existing TCT in Roberto Tan’s name
over the same parcel of land, and absent any proper direct action and
judgment for reconveyance against him which rescinds or cancels his TCT No.
296945;
2. The Court of Appeals erred and acted without jurisdiction in deciding upon
the question of whether Philbank’s cancelled TCT No. 194096 should be
reinstated, or a new title issued in its place, this being within the exclusive
jurisdiction of regional trial courts, and outside the scope of
a certiorari proceeding. 5
The Court required respondent bank and respondent Aguinaldo to file their
respective Comments. Thereafter, the parties were required to file their
respective memoranda.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The first assailed CA resolution (28 August 1998) directing the Register of
Deeds of Marikina to reinstate the TCTs of respondent bank had the effect of
canceling petitioner’s title over the same parcel of land. The CA clearly
committed reversible error in issuing the aforesaid resolution. Petitioner was
not even a party to the action between respondent Aguinaldo and
respondent bank in the court a quo. Petitioner was impleaded only in
the certiorari case filed by respondent bank in the CA. In fact, the petition
filed by respondent CA merely stated that petitioner was being "sued as a
nominal party in his capacity as the new registered owner of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 296945." 6 Other than this averment, there were no
allegations to constitute a cause of action against petitioner. As the CA held
in its main decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Private respondent Roberto Tan has filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds, one of which is." . . the petition stales no cause of action against
Roberto B. Tan." In his submission to support this ground, Tan claims being a
buyer in faith and for value (P2.5 Million), P2 Million of which came from a
loan directly paid by the lender bank to the seller, and the full consideration
was fully paid.
Under the circumstances obtaining, the prayer under paragraph 3.5 cannot
be granted. The aforequoted averments as against private respondent
Roberto B. Tan are insufficient to make up a cause of action for the desired
relief. 7
The CA, in its decision, correctly denied respondent bank’s prayer to
reinstate its canceled TCTs because to do so would effectively cancel
petitioner’s title on the same lot. It must be noted that petitioner’s title was
regularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by
respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the seller’s title, which was then
free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As such, petitioner’s title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well
settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can
be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. 8 Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is
entitled to protection against indirect attacks against his title. The CA’s
original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent
bank’s prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles "without prejudice to
the filing of proper action" should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the
purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him.
What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system
would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more
abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens system, should be the First to accept the validity of
the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are
satisfied. 9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions, dated 28 August 1998
and 23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Its Decision, dated 27 February 1998, is REINSTATED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 171056 : March 13, 2009]
DINAH C. CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A.
MISTAS, MARIETTA L. LINATOC, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the Decision,2 dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533, as well as the Resolution,3 dated 11 January 2006 of
the same court denying reconsideration of its afore-mentioned Decision. The
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint Resolution4 dated
28 April 2004 and Joint Order5 dated 20 June 2005 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F,
dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillo's complaint for grave misconduct and
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public officers Antonio M.
Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas) and Marietta L. Linatoc
(Linatoc), together with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and
Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel),
married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to
satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her
mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-
owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters,
situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to
secure an Order6 dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R.
Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of
several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla K.
Mortilla, et al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office
of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification7 stating that Lot 13713, covered
by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel,
Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A
itself.8 Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a
Certification9 attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel,
Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial
or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and
the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002.
Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner
learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club
Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
(Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit
Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that
Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by
Summit Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty,
the Leviste family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle
with.
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitioner
bought Raquel's 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition
of Raquel's 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary Entry
Book and Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in
accordance with Act No. 334410 : (a) Notice of Levy;11 (b) Certificate of
Sale;12 (c) Affidavit of Publication;13 and (d) Writ of Execution.14
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A,15 indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of
Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-
meter share in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out that, without giving
her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was
said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meter
parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 12964216 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A,17 both in the name of
Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three
entries, reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty, to wit:
ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of LEONARDO
YAGIN: For purposes more particularly stipulated in the contract ratified
before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per Doc. No. 639; Page No. 29;
Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976.
Date of instrument - 2-6-1976
Date of inscription - 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m.
ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORP:'
ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: - Of the parcel of land described in this
cert. of title is hereby sold and cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-6672938) Vol.
671-A, having been issued by virtue of the aforesaid instrument ratified
before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No.
148; Page 31, Book No. LXVII, Series of 2002.
Date of instrument: July 22, 2002
Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M.18
On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was
cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in
its place.
The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint
Affidavit19 before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging
several public officers and private individuals as follows:
32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July
2002 and onwards in Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations
Officer III of the City Assessor's Office of Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records
Clerk, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers and
acting in concert and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L.
Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation x x x while in the
discharge of their administrative functions did then and there unlawfully,
through evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and with manifest
partiality towards Summit caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by
cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City and
instead issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A when
aforesaid personalities well knew that TCT No. 129642 was already cancelled
and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax declaration thereby manifestly
favoring Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation who now
appears to be the successor-in-interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to my
damage and prejudice.20 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner's Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous administrative and
preliminary (criminal) investigations, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and
OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances surrounding
the alleged sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty and in the documents evidencing
the same.
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on
22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbac's attorney-in-fact,
appeared to be a "one-way street." It did not express the desire of Summit
Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity
to the terms of the Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed the left
margin of each and every page of said Deed. It also did not appear from the
Deed that a representative of Summit Realty presented himself before the
Notary Public who notarized the said document. The Tax Identification
Numbers of Yagin, as vendor, and Summit Realty, as vendee, were not stated
in the Deed.
Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could only
act through its Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
of Lot 1-B was presented for recording before the Register of Deeds, it was
not accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate attesting to the existence of a
Board Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit Realty. There
was no entry regarding such a Secretary's Certificate and/or Board
Resolution, whether on TCT No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A Secretary's
Certificate eventually surfaced, but it was executed only on 30 July 2002, five
days after TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was already
issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at exactly the
same date and time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit Realty.
Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen, TCT No. T-134609 was already
prepared and ready even before the presentation for recording of the Deed
of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency Catigbac
supposedly executed in favor of Yagin was extinguished by Catigbac's death.
Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to execute on 22 July
2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making
the said Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbac's death,
having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for
Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed
by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City. During
the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense
testified on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbac's property used to form
part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975
square meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after
Catigbac's death, Lot 1 was informally subdivided into several parts among
his heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of whom again transferred their
shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts
of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area of 105,648
square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite the subdivision
and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering the same was never
cancelled; and the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of
such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No. 181 with
the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order21 dated 3 January 2001, the
RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the issuance
of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the
same terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in
connection with Catigbac's property, purportedly without legal personality
and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted
Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which
instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said
case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Orense, who, through a letter22 dated 27
June 2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the
issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orense's
request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of
Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642
in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in
the name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used
as basis for canceling petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac,
instead of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint Affidavit
the alleged scheme perpetrated against her and the involvement therein of
each of the conspirators:
28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action right
after I paid Orense a visit sometime May 2002. Summit resurrected from the
grave. (sic) Francisco Catigbac whom they knew to be long dead to face
possible litigation. This is the height of malice and bad faith on the part of
Summit through its Lauro Leviste II, the Executive Vice President and
Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I had only in my favor a tax declaration
to show my interest and ownership over the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject
parcel of land. Evidently, Leviste and Orense came to the desperate
conclusion that they needed a TCT which is a far better title than any tax
declaration.
Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing
on June 26, 2002 at 11:20 a.m. the inscription with the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City of a purported Special Power of Attorney in favor of Leonardo Yagin
(Annex "I"). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "J") was made the
following month in order to make it appear that Yagin unilaterally sold to
Summit the subject parcel of land purportedly belonging to Francisco
Catigbac. Since the latter was already dead and realizing that the agency was
already extinguished, Annex "J" was not signed or executed by Leviste or
Orense. This fact however did not deter the two from securing a BIR
clearance on July 25, 2002. Also, on this same day, July 25, 2002, Annex "J"
was presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30 p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the
same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summit's name was issued by
Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the necessary
documentation such as the Board Resolution, DAR Clearance, Revenue Tax
Receipts for documentary stamps, real property tax clearance, proof of
payment of transfer tax, tax declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC
certification, license to sell and/or certificate of registration by HLURB, etc.
Without the total and lightning speed cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close
his eyes to the total absence of said vital documents, the desperately needed
TCT to erase my interest and ownership would not have come into existence.
Atty. [Escutin] had indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with Leviste and
Orense in producing Annex "H" and Annex "K".
29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelled TCT No.
129642 in the name of Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the
cancellation of TD #00942A in my name (Annex "F"). The Tax Mapping
Division of the Office of City Assessor of Lipa City opined that my 5,000 sq.m.
was (sic) part and parcel of the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No. 129642. A
photocopy of the Certification from said division is hereto marked and
attached as Annex "P", hereof. Aquilina Mistas, the Local Assessment
Operations Officer III of the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City then
conveniently caused the disappearance of my Notice of Levy and other
supporting documents which she had personally received from me on March
13, 2002. For her part of the conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records
Clerk, forthwith cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she issued TD
#00949-A in the name of Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas
and Linatoc were presented a cancelled TCT as basis for obliterating my
5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is clearly stated on the posterior side of
TCT No. 129642. Both can read. But the two nevertheless proceeded with
dispatch in canceling my TD, though they had ample time and opportunity to
reject the request of Summit who is not even the registered owner appearing
on TCT No. 129642. Francisco Catigbac could not have been in front of Mistas
and Linatoc because he was already six feet below the ground. Mistas and
Linatoc could have demanded presentation of the document authorizing
Summit in requesting for the cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have
demanded from Summit any document transferring my interest and
ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at least, they could have annotated in
Tax Declaration No. 00949-A the fact that I bought my 5,000 sq.m. from a
public auction sale duly conducted by the court sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc
and Mistas should have advised Summit to the effect that since they already
appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land, the new tax
declaration should bear their name instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed
conspired with Summit in the illegal and unwarranted cancellation of my TD
and in covering up the behind-the-scenes activities of Summit by making it
appear that it was Francisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even
Leonardo Yagin, the alleged attorney-in-fact did not appear before Mistas
and Linatoc. Yagin could not have appeared because he is rumored to be long
dead. The aforementioned acts of the two benefitted (sic) Summit through
their manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable
negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is dead
because he does not even have a TIN in the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale. If indeed Yagin is already dead or inexistent[,] the allged payment of the
purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a mere product of the
fertile imagination of Orense and Leviste.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of Leonardo Yagin must be
presented by Orense and Leviste.23
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriff's
Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share
in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. She also
sought the annotation of her Affidavit of Adverse Claim on the said 5,000
square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner
Juanita H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriff's Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance registered, since:
The Sheriff's Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic)
ownership in favor of the Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it
happen (sic) that the presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is already
transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, therefore[,] the
registration of Sheriff (sic) Final Sale is no longer necessary.24
Escutin likewise denied petitioner's request to have her Affidavit of Adverse
Claim annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the following grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the registered
owner. The registered owner is Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134609 of the Registry
of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest
of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional
Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No.
SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo v. Raquel Buenaventura. The registered
owner, Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its
predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the said
case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them (Consulta
No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse claim is against Raquel
Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over the property.25
Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of her request for registration of
the Sheriff's Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and annotation of her adverse
claim on TCT No. T-134609. This petitioner did on 3 July 2003.
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Complaint Affidavit26 and a Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit27 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, bringing to
its attention the aforementioned developments. In her Second Supplemental
Complaint Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Sta. Ana be included as a co-
respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, averring that the
latter's actuation deprived petitioner of a factual basis for securing a new
title in her favor over her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713,
because the public auction sale of the said property to her could never
become final without the registration of the Sheriff's Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed
their respective Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609
reflected the same date and time of entry of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Yagin (as Catigbac's attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July
2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance with Section 5628 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. He emphasized
that his duty as Register of Deeds to register the Deed of Absolute Sale
presented before him was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and
in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its face, the
Register of Deeds had no authority to inquire into its intrinsic validity based
upon proofs aliunde. It was not true that he allowed the registration of the
Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the absence of the required
documents supporting the application for registration thereof. On the
contrary, all the required documents such as the DAR Clearance, Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR), Real
Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretary's Certificate and Articles of
Incorporation of Summit Realty were submitted. While it was true that the
Secretary's Certificate did not accompany the Deed of Absolute Sale upon
the presentation of the latter for registration, Section 117 of the Property
Registration Decree gives the party seeking registration five days to comply
with the rest of the requirements; and only if the party should still fail to
submit the same would it result in the denial of the registration. The License
to Sell and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Registration of
Summit Realty are only required when a subdivision project is presented for
registration. The use of TINs in certain documents is a BIR requirement. The
BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor his TIN in the Deed of Absolute
Sale, and issued the CAR even in the absence thereof. The Register of Deeds,
therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the Certification earlier issued
by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of
co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by any certificate of
title, Escutin explained that the Register of Deeds was not technically
equipped to determine whether a cadastral lot number was within a titled
property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating in the
cancellation of petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A for, as Register of
Deeds, he was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation) of tax
declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the
Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, disputed petitioner's allegations that
she personally received from petitioner copies of the Notice of Levy and
other supporting documents, and that she caused the disappearance thereof.
Although she admitted that said documents were shown to her by petitioner,
she referred petitioner to the Receiving Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly
received the same. Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of
records of the Office and she should not be held responsible for the missing
documents. She opined that petitioner's documents could have been among
those misplaced or destroyed when the Office of the City Assessor was
flooded with water leaking from the toilet of the Office of the City Mayor. As
Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas identified her main
function to be the control and management of all phases of administrative
matters and support. She had no hand in the cancellation of petitioner's Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A, and the issuance of Catigbac's Tax Declaration No.
00949-A for such function pertained to another division over which she did
not exercise authority. Thus, it was also not within her function or authority
to demand the presentation of certain documents to support the
cancellation of petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A or to cause the
annotation of petitioner's interest on Catigbac's Tax Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of
the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, she was in charge of safekeeping
and updating the North District Records. With respect to the transfer of a tax
declaration from one name to another, her duty was limited only to the act
of preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a number, in lieu of the
cancelled tax declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no
authority to demand the presentation of any document or question the
validity of the transfer. Neither was it within her jurisdiction to determine
whether petitioner's interest should have been annotated on Catigbac's Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A. Examining the documents presented in support of
the transfer of the tax declaration to another's name was a function
belonging to other divisions of the Office of the City Assessors. The flow of
work, the same as in any other ordinary transaction, mandated her to cancel
petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and to prepare and release
Catigbac's Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the transfer had been reviewed
and approved by other divisions of the Office. It was also not true that TCT
No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was already cancelled when it was
presented before the Office of the City Assessors; the photocopy of said
certificate of title with the Office bore no mark of cancellation.
Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the respondent
public officers, admitted that they were corporate officers of Summit Realty.
They related that Summit Realty bought a parcel of land measuring 105,648
square meters, later identified as Lot 1-B, previously included in TCT No. 181,
then specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of Catigbac.
As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from
Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in
good faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of
the latter's certificate of title over the same. Catigbac's right as registered
owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to
petitioner's, which was based on a mere tax declaration. Leviste and Orense
rebutted petitioner's assertion that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin,
as Catigbac's attorney-in-fact, and Summit Realty was a "one-way street."
The Deed was actually signed on the left margin by both Yagin and the
representative of Summit Realty. The inadvertent failure of the
representative of Summit Realty to sign the last page of the Deed and of both
parties to indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the sale, especially
since the Deed was signed by witnesses attesting to its due execution.
Questions as regards the scope of Catigbac's Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Yagin and the effectivity of the same after Catigbac's death can only
be raised in an action directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-
B, and not in an administrative case and/or preliminary investigation before
the Ombudsman, which constituted a collateral attack against said title.
Leviste and Orense further explained that since the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. 181 was lost and was judicially ordered replaced only on 3 January 2001,
entries/inscriptions were necessarily made thereon after said date. As to
Orense's failure to show petitioner any document proving ownership of Lot
1-B by Summit Realty when the latter paid him a visit, it was not due to the
lack of such documents, but because of petitioner's failure to establish her
right to peruse the same. Orense also denied ever threatening petitioner
during their meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense, petitioner's
allegations were based on mere conjectures and unsupported by evidence.
That particular acts were done or not done by certain public officials was
already beyond the control of Leviste and Orense, and just because they
benefited from these acts did not mean that they had a hand in the
commission or omission of said public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-
0728-F were finally submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Resolution29 dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutin's
defenses, as opposed to petitioner's charges against him:
Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained
that he allowed the registration of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale
because he, as Register of Deeds, has no power to look into the intrinsic
validity [of] the contract presented to him for registration, owing to the
ministerial character of his function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by
said respondent, all the documents required for the registration of the Deed
of Sale were submitted by the applicant.
We likewise find said respondent's explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of
P.D. 1529 mandates that the TCT bear the date of registration of the
instrument on which the said TCT's issuance was based. It is for this reason
that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the registration of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioner's] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and
Sheriff's Certificate of Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of
Deeds Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June 2003 Order denying
registration thereof, such matter had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a
letter-consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and administrative charges respecting this
issue is premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the LRA, we find it
premature to make a finding on the same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the Second
Supplemental Complaint Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as additional
respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded solely on the basis of
having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29 July 2003 Order of denial of
[petitioner's] application for registration.
Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, through
Consulta 2103 dated 25 July 1994, wherein the denial of registration by the
Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City was upheld by the LRA
Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in the different Registries that
Examiners are given authority by the Register to sign letters of denial.30
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same Joint
Resolution that there was no basis to hold respondents Mistas and Linatoc
administratively or criminally liable:
In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that
Aquilina Mistas caused the disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other
supporting documents received from [petitioner] on 13 March 2003 when
she applied for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in her favor, she did not
present her receiving copy thereof showing that it was Mistas who received
said documents from her. Neither did she show that Mistas is the employee
responsible for record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that respondent
Marietta Linatoc cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax
Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled Transfer Certificate of
Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty], which was not the registered
owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioner's] allegation, admits having
physically cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new
declaration covering the same property in Catigbac's [name], as mandated by
the flow of work in the City Assessor's Office. However, she denies having the
authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and sufficiency of the
documents supporting the application for the issuance of the Tax
Declaration, arguing that her official function is limited to the physical
preparation of a new tax declaration, the assignment of a new tax
declaration number and the cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the
application had passed the other divisions of the City Assessor's Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are
the ones officially designated to receive applications for issuance of Tax
Declaration, evaluate the sufficiency of the documents supporting such
applications, and on the basis of the foregoing recommend or order the
cancellation of an existing Tax Declaration and direct the annotation of any
fact affecting the property and direct the issuance of a new tax declaration
covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said
respondents. While [petitioner] impleads Mistas, in her capacity as Local
Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records Clerk, Mistas, in
her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e., Assistant City
Assessor for Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the Local Assessment
Operation Officer II of the City Assessor's Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly defined
by [petitioner], this Office cannot make a definitive determination of their
liability for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
which charges both relate to the performance or discharge of Mistas' and
Linatoc's official duties.31
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probable
cause to criminally charge private individuals Leviste and Orense for the
following reasons:
Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause
the transfer of the title of [herein petitioner's] property to Summit
sufficiently explained by respondent Register of Deeds, such allegation
against private respondents loses a legal leg to stand on.ςrαlαω
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official
functions of respondents Mistas and Linatoc to pin down their specific
accountabilities, the imputation that private respondent (sic) conspired with
said public respondents respecting the cancellation of Tax Declaration No.
00942-A is likewise stripped of any factual and legal bases.32
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square
meter property, which issue comprised the very premise of OMB-L-A-03-
0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon ruled that such matter was not within its jurisdiction and should be
raised in a civil action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that : (1)
the administrative case against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN,
AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be DISMISSED, for lack of
substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case against the same respondents
including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE,
be DISMISSED, for lack of probable cause.33
In a Joint Order34 dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took
notice of the Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in Consulta No.
3483, which involved circumstances similar to those in petitioner's case. The
LRA distinguished between two systems of land registration: one is the
Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration Decree,
and the other is the system of registration for unregistered land under Act
No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree). These
systems are separate and distinct from each other. For documents involving
registered lands, the same should be recorded under the Property
Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the
wrong system produces no legal effect. Since it appeared that in Consulta No.
3483, the registration of the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale
and the Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No. 3344, it did not
produce any legal effect on the disputed property, because the said property
was already titled when the aforementioned documents were executed and
presented for registration, and their registration should have been made
under the Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same
Joint Order, took into account petitioner's withdrawal of her appeal en
consulta before the LRA of the denial by the Register of Deeds of her request
for registration of the Sheriff's Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of
Adverse Claim, which prompted the LRA Administrator to declare the
consulta moot and academic. For want of a categorical declaration on the
registerability of petitioner's documents from the LRA, the competent
authority to rule on the said matter, there could be no basis for a finding that
respondent public officers could be held administratively or criminally liable
for the acts imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging the 28 April 2004
Joint Resolution and 20 June 2005 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.35 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
90533.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision36 on 18 October 2005, also
finding no reason to administratively or criminally charge respondents.
Essentially, the appellate court adjudged that petitioner can not impute
corrupt motives to respondents' acts:
Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or
other pay-off or that they were induced by offers of such, the Court cannot
impute any taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of respondents.
Thus, any indication of intent to violate the laws or of flagrant disregard of
established rule may be negated by respondents' honest belief that their acts
were sanctioned under the provisions of existing law and regulations. Such is
the situation in the case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the
honest belief that the agency recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-
0376 between the registered owner Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin
subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to Summit as the
vendee, and that the Special Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale
presented as evidence during said proceedings are valid and binding. Hence,
respondent Escutin was justified in believing that there is no legal infirmity or
defect in registering the documents and proceeding with the transfer of title
of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner Summit. On the other hand,
respondent Linatoc could not be held administratively liable for effecting the
cancellation in the course of ordinary flow of work in the City Assessor's
Office after the documents have undergone the necessary evaluation and
verification by her superiors.37
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme Court
not to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his investigatory
power. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case
dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave
abuse of discretion. The appellate court pronounced that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon in dismissing petitioner's Complaint Affidavit against respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and
Joint Order dated June 20, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-
0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.38
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for failing to present new matter
which the appellate court had not already considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari, with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENTS COULD NOT BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY
FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER.39
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property,
Registration Decree which provides:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In case of loss
or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath
shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft
is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for
the registration of any new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such
loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in
interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the
court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new
duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is
issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be
entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter
be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the lost one.
However, respondents did not only issue a new owner's duplicate of TCT No.
181, but also cancelled petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued
in its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac.
Respondents did not even annotate petitioner's existing right over 5,000
square meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that a new owner's duplicate
of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one.
Under Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree, the new duplicate of
title was issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioner's position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments and
befuddled reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a
certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of
possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership
of property, real or personal.40 Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that
which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the
foundation of ownership of property.41 Certificate of title, on the other hand,
is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.42 Under
the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of
Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a
Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new
owner's duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of the same from
Yagin, the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said
property. Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could accordingly
register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1 covered
by said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbac's title to Lot 1-B passed
on by sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the separation
of the said portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of
title specifically covering the same. This resulted in the issuance of TCT No.
129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which was subsequently
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is
totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost
duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the
cancellation of petitioner's tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because
of the issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact
that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays
claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No.
129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute
and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the
whole world.43 All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance
of the registration.44 Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No. 129642, the
Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by
Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for the said property. And
since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac,
accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion
thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of
title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor
would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the
same property.
As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner's
title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior
and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property,
conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's
certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent
public officers and even petitioner herself. Time and again, the Court has
ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to
prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not
conclusive evidence of the same.45 Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000
square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is
important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. In
addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that, "[c]uriously, as to how
and when petitioner's alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla
and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot
13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly
silent."46
Petitioner's allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to
Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbac's attorney-in-fact, are beyond the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It
must be remembered that Summit Realty had already acquired a certificate
of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes
conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property
and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in the administrative and
preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree categorically provides
that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant
petitioner's prayer in the instant Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-
134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on the
administrative liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that petitioner's
Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise
to two charges: (1) OMB-L-A-03-0573-F involved the administrative charge
for Gross Misconduct against respondent public officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-
0728-F concerned the criminal charge for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act47 against respondent public officers and
private individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the
Petition at bar, petitioner only assails the dismissal of the administrative
charge for grave misconduct against respondent public officers. Since
petitioner did not raise as an issue herein the dismissal by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the
criminal charge against respondent public officers for violation of Section 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the same became final and
executory.48
In Domingo v. Quimson,49 the Court adopted the well-written report and
recommendation of its Clerk of Court on the administrative matter then
pending and involving the charge of gross or serious misconduct:
"Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary
action. And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the Civil Service Commission
on July 28, 1970, which sets the 'Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in
Administrative Cases and other Matters Relative Thereto,' the administrative
offense of 'grave misconduct' carries with it the maximum penalty of
dismissal from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S. 1970). But the term
'misconduct' as an administrative offense has a well defined meaning. It was
defined in Amosco v. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No. 439-MJ, Res. September
30, 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects the performance of his
duties as an officer and not such only as effects his character as a private
individual.' In the recent case of Oao v. Pabato, etc., Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ,
Res. July 29, 1977, the Court defined 'serious misconduct' as follows:
'Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would
be merely an error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term
`serious misconduct' is a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action more particularly, unlawful behavior of gross negligence by the
magistrate. It implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that
the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to
violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We
have previously ruled that negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained
by a reasonable interpretation. This is not so in the case at bar.' " (Italics
supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence
showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention
to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.
Both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of SO ORDERED.
Appeals found that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate
petitioner's charge of grave misconduct against respondents. For this Court
to reverse the rulings of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and
the Court of Appeals, it must necessarily review the evidence presented by
the parties and decide on a question of fact. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.50

Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue, the Court would
necessarily have to look into the probative value of the evidence presented
in the proceedings below. It is not the function of the Court to reexamine or
reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower courts or administrative bodies
performing quasi-judicial functions. It should be emphasized that findings
made by an administrative body, which has acquired expertise, are accorded
not only respect but even finality by the Court. In administrative proceedings,
the quantum of evidence required is only substantial.51

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not
disturb findings of fact. The Court cannot weigh once more the evidence
submitted, not only before the Ombudsman, but also before the Court of
Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, findings of fact by the
Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.52 Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.53

The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that respondents did not
commit gross misconduct. Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of
the former and the 18 October 2005 Decision of the latter is that they arrived
at such findings only after a meticulous consideration of the evidence
submitted by the parties.

Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to

convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in
their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents. Respondents also enjoy
in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial evidence falls on
petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.

From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the
positions held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City
Assessor. How then could she even assert that a particular action was within
or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner
should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was
being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the
responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not
present statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that
respondents should have done or not done a particular act. A perfect
example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should have
annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of
Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or
recognizes the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally,
absent any reliable evidence, petitioner's charge that respondents conspired
with one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing
more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of
respondents were consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean
that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner prejudice. Respondents'
actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over
Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens
system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution dated 11
January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Dinah C. Castillo.
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA
V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E.
COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A.
NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA
TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64957,1 affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. 1220,2 dismissing petitioners’
Complaint for declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed
parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban
(now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of several
Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a
certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.3
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a
vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga," which extended to Parañaque,
Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig,
Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish
title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest
of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a
Special Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25 February
1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment,
assigning portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion
measuring around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and
work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their
predecessors.4
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them
from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received
notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was
included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No.
N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the
name of respondent.5
OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondent’s mother, Isabel
Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals, pursuant to Decree No.
10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole property covered by OCT
No. 670 was subsequently adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago
(formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel
Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel Manahan Santiago
executed a Deed of Donation transferring the property to her son,
respondent herein, who subsequently secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-
39258 and No. 205270 in his own name.6
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for
declaration of nullity of respondent’s certificates of title on the basis that
OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the defects of OCT No. 670
pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670 was not signed by a
duly authorized officer; (2) Material data therein were merely handwritten
and in different penmanships; (3) OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official
Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It failed to indicate the Survey
Plan which was the basis of the Technical Description of the property
covered by the title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670 was
issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No. 670 was issued earlier, on 13
February 1913; and (6) Decree No. 10248 was issued over a property other
than the one described in OCT No. 670, although also located in the Province
of Rizal.7
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the
Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According to respondent, "[t]he
allegations in the Complaint would readily and patently show that the same
are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in law and in fact…"8
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no
legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause
of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT
No. 670 and all of respondent’s land titles derived therefrom, are
incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the
whole world.9
Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel
M. Muñoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation v.
Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et al.,10 respondent argued that the Spanish title, on
which petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor
imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892, which took
effect on 16 February 1976, required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to
apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act,11 within six months from effectivity of
the decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens System. 12
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He pointed
out that any action against his certificates of title already prescribed,
especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more
than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the
very least, respondent contended, "it must be presumed that the questioned
land titles were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of
their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law."13
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied the
Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders, squatters and illegal
occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the Subject Property was
already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent
and his predecessors-in-interest.14
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less, threatening to
evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included as defendants in Civil Case
No. 783 entitled, "Carmelino M. Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al.,"
which respondent instituted before the same trial court against squatters
occupying the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July 1992, the trial
court held that "there is no doubt that the plaintiff (respondent herein) is the
owner of the land involved in this case on which the defendants have built
their houses and shanties…" Although the decision in Civil Case No. 783 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, it had become final and executory for
failure of the defendants-appellants therein to file their appellants’ brief.15
In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses as prayed for by the respondent. During said hearing,
petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed
expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable
Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that
a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title
was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title.
Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on
all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court.16
After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the questioned Order,
dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners’ Complaint. Pertinent
portions of the Order of the trial court read:
After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, this
Court is inclined not to grant plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and
giving weight to plaintiffs (sic) lone but "expert witness", it is crystal clear
that, to quote:
1. "a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the State
2. it is the State who must file the corresponding case of annulment of title
through the Office of the Solicitor General, and
3. a land illegally titled in the name of private individual, the State through
the Office of the Solicitor General should file the corresponding case for
cancellation of title." (TSN August 26, 1997).
The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic) mouth so to speak as
this was the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from
the said testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic) cause [of action] is bound
to fail. "Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony" wrote "finis" to their case. From the
record, this case was initiated and filed by private individuals, Nemencio
Evangelista, et. al., contradicting their witness (sic) testimony. To reiterate,
this Court finds credence to the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) witness, i.e., is
(sic) the State through the Office of the Solicitor General who must initiate
and file a case of this nature when title to a land is being claimed to be
obtained through fraud and allegedly spurious.
The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the witness is not without
basis. Explicit is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case
of Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
An action for reversion has to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant
to Section 101, Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA 43).
As to the documentary evidence, having gone through with the "Deed of
Assignment/s" purportedly executed by and between a certain Ismael Favila
y Rodriguez and the plaintiffs, which is the principal if not the only basis of
plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land, the
same does not hold water in a manner of speaking, for being self-serving.
"Assignor Ismael Favila y Rodriguez" claimed in said Deed that he is the
Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special Power of Attorney executed
in his favor by his "mga kapatid" on February 23, 1965, but said Special
Power of Attorney was not presented before this Court, thus there arises a
doubt as to its existence and execution not to mention doubt on the
existence of his "mga kapatid" who as alleged executed said Special Power
Attorney (sic) in his favor.
Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the authenticity of said
"Deeds of Assignment/s", that will not alter the outcome of the pending
incident/s before this Court. Why? Because the said "Deed of Assignment/s"
which were based on Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value pursuant
to the Presidential Decree No. 892 i.e. "DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH
MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES
AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS."
… different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between "the lack of
There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited provisions of PD 892 as
they are self-explanatory. Suffice it to say that there is no showing, that
plaintiffs complied with the said law i.e. to "apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree (February 16, 1976).
Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in
any registration proceedings under the Torrens System."
This being the case and likewise being clear that plaintiffs were not the lawful
owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892,
the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court
the instant complaint…
Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the declaration of nullity of
defendant’s title, which has nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of
ownership and possession even if we set aside, albeit momentarily, the truth
that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred Spanish Title/s, and thus
plaintiffs were never the owners of the parcel of land subject of this case.
Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was
entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the
same not having been questioned by any party. Only now that it is being
questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the offensive and relying on
their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly sealed
their fate… 17
After the trial court denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in its
Order, dated 20 July 1999,18 petitioners appealed both Orders of the trial
court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July 2002,19 affirmed the Order
of the trial court, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners’ Complaint.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution, dated 14 February 2003.20
Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review 21 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, raising the following issues and praying for the reversal of the
aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of
dismissal of the trial court:
I. Whether the lower court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint should be
proscribed by the rules of evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Naval’s
testimony, which was indisputably not based on facts but conclusion of law.
II. Whether the lower court’s dismissal of petitioners’ complaint should be
proscribed by the rules of evidence it being done sans ample evidence except
bare allegations of respondent.
III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens system, holds of an exception.
IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are
in possession of subject land, can be subject of prescription.
In his Comment,22 the respondent, for the most part, reiterated the findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners’
Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied upon by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.
According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file the
Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before the trial court stated no
cause of action.
Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue"23 and "the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action"24 are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two
legal capacity to sue" from "the lack of personality to sue" is a fairly common
mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court
in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:25
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack
of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack
of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case,
or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other
hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a
cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused
with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a
plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not
the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a
motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;
whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based
on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause
of action.
In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the
affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the
trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the
personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest. It is the respondent’s
contention that only the State can file an action for annulment of his
certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the
ownership of the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar
to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon v.
Redemptorist Fathers,26 this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for
dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to dismiss a complaint
based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these
allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the
insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint
in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of
whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged
therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court may not
inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false before a
hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the
allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as
basis for said motion.
In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause
of action, the trial court should have limited itself to examining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from
inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity
of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these
are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court
evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of
Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994
and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of the Special
Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February
1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent hypothetically
admitted that: (1) Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of
owners, had been in actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse
possession of the Subject Property against the whole world since time
immemorial; (2) The Subject Property was part of the vast tract of land called
"Hacienda Quibiga" awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of
Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael Favila, an heir and successor-in-
interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant
to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25 February
1965, executed Deeds of Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor
of petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed the Subject
Property, on which their houses were erected, when they discovered that
the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of respondent; and (5) That petitioners filed the Complaint to
prevent their eviction by the respondent. To determine whether these
allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for
this Court to establish first the nature of petitioners’ action.
Indeed, petitioners’ Complaint filed before the trial court was captioned as
an action for declaration of nullity of respondent’s certificates of title.
However, the caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but
rather the allegations therein should determine the nature of the action,
because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may
nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the Complaint and the evidence introduced.27
The trial court believed that petitioners’ action was ultimately one for
reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain. Based on the
testimony of Engineer Naval and the case of Nagaño v. Court of Appeals,28 it
declared that the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is
the party-in-interest in an action for cancellation of a certificate of title
illegally issued in the name of a private individual, because the eventual
effect of such cancellation is the reversion of the property to the State.
The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and calls for a
far closer review of its decision in Nagaño v. Court of Appeals,29 wherein the
Court held that –
It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents
claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in
the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and
adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or
that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had
already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942…
Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes,
segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is "conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot
in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence,
dismissal of private respondents’ complaint was premature and trial on the
merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion,
in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General
pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141, which provides:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the [Republic] of the Philippines.
In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio
Dacut,30 the difference between an action for declaration of nullity of land
titles from an action for reversion was more thoroughly discussed as follows:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and
certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference
between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the
realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. Hence, in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff
in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendant’s title because even if the title were canceled
or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion
affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that
the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to
relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent
and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership
of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate
of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land
claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the
fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is
not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership
over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the
defendant…
In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was
part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the
Subject Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open, continuous and
adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and
through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of
Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred
to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-
interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting
private title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could
not be one for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an
action for nullity of respondent’s certificates of title, theirs was more
appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the
Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting of title,
provides that:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.
Respondent’s certificates of title over the Subject Property appeared valid or
effective; but according to the petitioners, they were fake, spurious and/or
fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to the same property that needed to be
removed. A cloud on title has been defined as follows:
Cloud on Title. – A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but
which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. The
matter complained of must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal
form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the
instrument is not apparent on the face of such instrument, and it has to be
proved by extrinsic evidence…31
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for
removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same
conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no
personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their
Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove
a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest
in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.32 Petitioners
failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title
to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to
file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the
evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which
means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.33
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue
of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time
immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Yet,
the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to
and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the
Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to
the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and
at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest.34 If the Subject Property
was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would
have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to
anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title
of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the
Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said
portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only
be based on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking
the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No.
892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring
all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title,
unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from its
effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration
of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens system. 35 Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any
legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens
title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an
allegation in petitioners’ Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest
complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do
so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish
title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration
proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest
title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested.36 By virtue
of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens
system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish
title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from
accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of
action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title),
only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would
open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the
existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would
never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would
definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability
in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of
ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas
clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the
operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject
Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property. 37
This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of possession
only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out,
Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still
lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period.38 Because of this
inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his
Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in
actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that
someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of
prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or
phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different
from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general
provision may have a limited application if read together with other
provisions of the statute.39
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and
harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute.40 Note that the
tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish
titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It
had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration
of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its
effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no
longer be presented to prove ownership.

All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of
their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the
applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual
possession of the real property. However, if such land registration
proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could
no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of
the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual
possession.

Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject
Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996
does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their
Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the
Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming
ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided
in either the Land Registration Decree41 or the Public Land Act.42 Petitioners
though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside
from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this
Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already
ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property.

Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the

petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on,
or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it
is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of
the action.

Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999,
dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 5246           September 16, 1910

MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.

Ramon Salinas, for appellants.

Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba,
are the only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey,
deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on
the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July,
1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as
coowners, sought to have registered the following-described property:

A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag,

Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin
of light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22
centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and
the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz
Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang
Buslut; on the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and
on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de
la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane
and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was
filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and
technical description of the above-described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of
February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner
be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to
the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the
Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the
decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of
land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his
allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged
that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of
land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of
land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of
section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and
that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land
described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the
case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties,
rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former
decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners
appealed and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case
and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason
that said decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the
court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's
motion are not their property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma
part of the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of
February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder
of the land described in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the
same, including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is
evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly
executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a
state grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question.
This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the
6th of April of the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this
case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is
also admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said
petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the
appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they
did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee
contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under
the estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include
the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two
parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this
constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration
Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail
over the public document of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died
prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years
of age when their mother died. So these children were minors when the
father of the appellee obtained the estate grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the
petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the
petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years.
On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the
petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de
la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed in
writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la
Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of
December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the
same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de
la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself
and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits
that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in
fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small
parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the rental
contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee
the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of
the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two
small parcels of land in question are included, according to the description
given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said
court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was
not binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of
the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase
and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state
grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was
obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were
minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee
was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented
their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any
fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name
of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was
not necessary nor required that they include in their application the names
of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below commit an
error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered
in February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by
the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain
an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the
address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all
occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it
shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice
given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state
and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if
any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder,
reversion, or expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together
with their place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the
application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in
the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the
adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the
notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after
said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the
clerk to every person named in the application whose address is known; to
cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a
conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in
a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the
land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of the
application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem
proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directed
by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such
service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and
answers, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to
the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the description in the
published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of
law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the
default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title,
as stated in his application, a decree or registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government,
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38
referred to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the
outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though
denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties
defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question
under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he
was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on
the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons,
including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the
application, notice, or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on
account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said
decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud
on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the
appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One
of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the
original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts
to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him,
must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes
has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the
Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the
word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of
title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide
purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the distinction
between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral"
fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating
to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred
to, is there any express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole
exception of that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens
System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of
certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there
mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal
fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and
every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons'
right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such
knowledge, has been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the
certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose,
the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there
absent the element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which
constitutes the essential characteristics of actual — as distinguished from
legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at
bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy
Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi,
decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to
his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be
given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within
the meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a
question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this
kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an
circumstances in each particular case. The only question we are called upon
to determine, and have determined, is whether or not, under the facts and
circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February
12, 1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property
without due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall
be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the
petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any
good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have
said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section
of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note
the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration
System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens
in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As
we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an
application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the
theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants,
and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have
a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the
proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered
by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The
interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of
private individuals.
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to
registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more
and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without
security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may
evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a
third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against
any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles,
made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings,
and the time occupied from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the
"three R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good
holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical
defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on
Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to
land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South
Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registration takes the
place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land,
for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of
title is issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain
exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein.
Under the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance,
depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a
long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system,
them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old
conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890,
pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of
transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an
absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on
Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in
which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will
always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of
registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there
were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being
only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 ½
cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in
Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the
whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has
been adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some of
the States of the American Union, and practical experience has
demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens
system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United
States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575;
People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration
Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts
of those States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we
never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110
U. S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary
requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the
power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be
impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those
who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The
Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some
particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds
his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain
persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam,
although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on
the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and
if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts
which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was
held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds
everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given is by general
notice to all persons interested.
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did
not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the
ground that the State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom
a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a
proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at
bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the
part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any
right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under
the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs.
2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment
appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment
entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower
court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
[G.R. No. L-65129. December 29, 1986.]
TOMAS AVERIA, JR., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V.
CAGUIOA, in her capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA
PADILLO, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS;
JURISDICTION OF CADASTRAL COURT; LIMITED JURISDICTION UNDER
SECTION 112 OF LAND REGISTRATION ACT SUPERSEDED BY PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. 1529). — In this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower court had
no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of
unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act. The petition cites Fojas v. Grey, 132 SCRA 76 where this
Court declared that "it has been held that summary relief under Section 112
of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is unanimity among the
parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
part in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial
which should be threshed out in any ordinary action or in any case where the
incident properly belongs." While this was a correct interpretation of the said
provisions, the same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. the
reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the land Registration Act had
been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became
effective on June 11, 1979.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN GENERAL AND LIMITED JURISDICTION,
ELIMINATED. — Section 2 of the P.D. No. 1529, has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely
as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial court
the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but
also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL COURT NOW AUTHORIZED TO HEAR AND
DECIDE CONTENTIONS AND SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES. — With reference to
Section 112 of the land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529),
the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enable
it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the
parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection."
Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not
only such non-controversial cases but even the contentions and substantial
issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence
before.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
We gave due course to this petition against a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Lucena City, 1 which is questioned on a pure questions of law,
more specifically whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the
registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an
antecedent contract to sell.
The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the
registration proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a
cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Section
112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The
respondent court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a
decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence
presented by the private respondent herein. 2
In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is
argued that the lower court had no competence to act on the registration
sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required
under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. 3 The petitioner cites Fojas v.
Grey, 4 where this Court, through Justice Serafin Cuevas,
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The aforequoted provision of the Land Registration Act (Sec. 112) was relied
upon by appellant Apolinar Fojas in petitioning the court a quo for the
annotation of the Deed of Assignment. However, while he had the right to
have the said Deed annotated in the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. T-2376,
the serious objection of Saturnina de Grey to the same raises a substantial
controversy between the parties.
"In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act, it has been held that summary relief under Section 112
of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is unanimity among the
parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial
which should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the
incident properly belongs." 5
While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the same is,
however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose
in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property
Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979.
In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. — Judicial
proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be
in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.
"Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and
interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the
Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings,
exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for
land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days
from the filing or issuance thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court.
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer
fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only
in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them
raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the
court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial
cases but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question
at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below
notwithstanding the manifestation by the petitioner of his intention to
elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he had raised. 6 The trial
court should have given him the opportunity to do so in the interest of due
process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As it happened, it arrived
at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent
and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September 23,
1983, is set aside. Let a new trial of Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record
No. 202, Lot No. 2810-B, Lucena Cadastre, M.C. No. 374-82, be held, at which
the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the
opportunity to be heard. Our temporary restraining order of October 5,
1983, is hereby lifted except as to the registration of the questioned deed of
sale which shall depend on the outcome of the said case.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28790             April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as
Executive Secretary, respondents.

Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.

Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the

Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension
by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly
appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a
position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said
Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting
forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of
district judge — P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner
a letter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why
no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-
subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that,
as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in
the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore,
the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296)
and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by
the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above
charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the
contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of
jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their
answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner
may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the
Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in
nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial
functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of
powers.
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land
Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151
and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the
Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,
specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed
from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed,
much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a
Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated
only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed
by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers
include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary
Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act
No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal
of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
(R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean
placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all
these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent
curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's
power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential
appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the
President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the
Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed
by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General
the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices
are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment
(Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the
Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges
of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is
taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said
bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125)
expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same
causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance",
or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the
Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby
shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal
procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers,
provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is
that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance"
the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N.
Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the
judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs.
General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972, —
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether
for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the
judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and
can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within
the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are
merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions
which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric
Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases
cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701,
71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273
U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep.
507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S.
469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and
its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with
the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme
Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void
in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other
executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151,
he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration.
— When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage,
or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the
party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered
lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further,
That, when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of
the notice thereof.

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of

a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with
administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the
section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon
other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose
resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's
resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative;
any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding
department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds
should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis
of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under
Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution
of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive
functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that

statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring
them in conflict with the Constitution,2 We are constrained to rule that the
grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the
"same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not
include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation
by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that
Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be
violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the
investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to
[G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988.]
sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of
discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO,
and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, Respondents.

Eduardo S. Baranda, for Petitioners.

Rico & Associates for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS;

PURPOSE. — "Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of
the party causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly
recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any
part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective
purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and
that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to
gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court;
Jamora v. Duran, Et Al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415,
footnote 3, citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-485).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE COURT TO CANCEL LIS
PENDENS; DELAYING TACTICS OF PARTY IN CASE AT BAR IS A GROUND FOR
CANCELLATION. — A notice of lis pendens of Civil Case No. 15871 was
annotated on petitioner’s Certificate of Title No. 106098 covering Lot No.
4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. It appears, however, that private respondents in
filing said case were trying to delay the full implementation of the final
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court
ordered the immediate implementation of the writs of possession and
demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving said lot. The foregoing
facts necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of
Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court
of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158),
to the effect that: "We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while
the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for
instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear
out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the
trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano v.
Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance
of Rizal, supra)"
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; ALLOWS CANCELLATION
OF LIS PENDENS UPON PROOF THAT THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE IS TO MOLEST
THE ADVERSE PARTY; FAILURE TO CANCEL NOTICE PURSUANT THERETO, AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his
discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds’ stand that
the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot
No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency
of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position
of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
"Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused the registration thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL. — Under
Sections 10 and 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrance,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL STATUTES MUST BE TAKEN TO MEAN EXACTLY WHAT IT
DAYS; P.D. NO. 1529 IS CLEAR. — The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees’ Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning
the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
6. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF WORD "SHALL." — According to Webster’s Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means
"ought to, must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation,
used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory."cralaw
virtua1aw library
7. CRIMINAL LAW; AND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; A REGISTER OF DEEDS
HAS NO LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A MOTION FOR COMMISSIONER MUST BE
SOUGHT IN CASE OF DOUBT. — The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in
pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument presented to him, he should
have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the
Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION; DELAY IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF COURT’S FINAL RESOLUTION; RESPONSIBILITY FALLS
ON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE. — In the ultimate analysis, however, the
responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court’s already
final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles
of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the
respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of
dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No.
15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No.
64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of
these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered
the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our
resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No.
4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title
No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was
issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda. The Court
issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana
Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over
the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private respondents’
opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the
writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been
denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On
August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera
filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042
before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a
resolution dated January 7, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied
in another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial
is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant
case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that
Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only
to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent
should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile
effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and
that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the
filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September
26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to maintain the
status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo. Considering that — (1) there is merit in the instant petition for
indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No.
00827 before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R.
No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition
moot and academic pending the Court’s consideration of the issues, the
Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not
to take cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly
DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of
the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered." (pp. 107-108,
Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion
for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432.
On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No.
62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of
the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment
in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the
meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated
February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same
subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited pursuant to our Resolution
dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R.
No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28,
1984:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
"(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29,
1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No.
64432;
"(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court
and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
"Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared
valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
"The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed
for." (p. 466, Rollo - G.R. No. 64432).
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of
Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case
before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under
G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which
remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional
Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the
judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be
issued:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon.
Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to
register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
"2. To cancel No. T-25772. Likewise to cancel No. T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises." (p. 473, 64432
Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17, 1986 a Resolution in
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting
on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued
another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court
Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,
1986 and January 6, 1987 respectively, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"O R D E R
"This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants
through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of
deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of
Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
"Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the
writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second
Division per its Resolution dated September 17, 1986, the present motion is
hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby
ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
prayed for.
x       x       x
"O R D E R
"This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986 in compliance with the
order of this Court dated November 25, 1986, a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on
December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its Order
dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within
the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
"WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the
date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is
ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of
petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate." (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez,
private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a
motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17,
1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following
points:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-
25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in
the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by
implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
"b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?" (p. 536, Rollo — 64432).
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating
therein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
"Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and
in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the
matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon
whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this
Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court."
(p. 615, Rollo - 64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court’s orders dated
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito
Saclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate
case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried
out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners.
This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated
February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February
12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates of titles.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice
of lis pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte
motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-
111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating
therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order
based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff
in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon
the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.’
"That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-
111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case
No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled,
‘Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maxima Provido and Perfecto Provido,
Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents.’
"That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of
subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon
the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or
proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
"Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens
was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere
cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
Pendens." (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the
Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his
February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds’ motion
for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case
No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of
Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido,
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional
Branch 23 denied the petitioners’ motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio,
order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this
the Providos’ counsel, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on petitioners’
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February 12,
Cadastre.
1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an
petitioners.
order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the
reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very
clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos
who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the
names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E,"
G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners
Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
"2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent
Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera
and her other co-owners." (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R.
No. 62042 contrary to the trial court’s findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo
in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of
Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being
fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,
1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full
implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No.
64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of
possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party
causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could
rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice
of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should
keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the
results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v. Duran,
Et Al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing
cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486).
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in
the cases of Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of
Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v.
Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has
been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending
and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it
under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his
complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal
Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)"
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to
the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfully the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds’ stand that the notice of
lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571,
Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil
Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused the registration thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have
been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when
in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No.
15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated
October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are
still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed
that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to
dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue
of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number
4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the
Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a
torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of
the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all
the requests for registration . . . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial
in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular
Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA
663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register
instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for
construction. According to Webster’s Third International Dictionary of the
English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, . . . obligation -
used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or
directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of
Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting
Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be
taken in pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument presented to him, he
should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration
now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court’s already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of
the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never
have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the
wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents
involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens
Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order
of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order
are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-20611               May 8, 1969

AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.

Vicente Llanes for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC

Consulta No. 366.

On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of

Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT
No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the
request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the
instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of
the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-
vivos an undivided two-thirds (²/³) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The
entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.

The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three
separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio
Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658.           Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of
Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu
thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all
rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument:           January 25, 1955, ...
xxx     xxx     xxx
Entry No. 5659.           Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto
Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with
respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the
vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and
interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument:           June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660.           Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana
Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to
said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is
hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the
vendor ...
Date of Instrument:           February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales
contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate
certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of
Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana
Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of
Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January,
1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of
the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the
Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in
a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in
controversy, the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property
described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold
undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three
different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to
Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are
presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to
the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-
owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for
the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was
unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent
jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been
lawfully issued.lawphi1.ñet
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners
would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in
their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any
voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive
authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under
this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies
of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and
not one whose claim to or interest in the property is merely annotated on
the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly,
because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or
unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously
assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely,
that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a
voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him
for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of
registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in
existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly
observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the
issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its
legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is
easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance,
or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others.
The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of
the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the
title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in
upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since
the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property
of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife,
Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before
the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion
may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a
previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his
aliquot share or interest therein — subject of course to the result of future
liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character
of the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband,
Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its
registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property
which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than
what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to
three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and
the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the
different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the
deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the
meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the
proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.