Kennedy School of Government CR1-96-1353.

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Case Program

Costa Rica’s Minister of Education Faces a Dilemma (B)


The Confrontation Builds

During the two weeks before the start of the strike, while school was in recess, the FOM


worked very hard to broaden its base of support, hoping to provoke a national strike that would
paralyze the country. Just about one week before the strike, the Rerum Novarum Workers’
Confederation (CTRN), the Workers’ Confederation of Costa Rica (CTRC), and the Costa Rican
Workers’ Movement (CMTC) all announced their support for the teachers’ strike, explaining that
they intended to form a united front with the teachers to combat downsizing and privatization in
the public sector. In addition, the postal service announced its intention to strike the day after the

start of the teachers’ strike, and several other unions, including the union at the National Liquor
Plant, announced that they would join the strike in its third day. The entire health sector promised
that it would join the strike at the beginning of the second week. Finally, the FOM continued to
seek the support of the most important unions of all, those of the train and dock workers of Limón.


The government came to believe that the fate of its entire reform program hung on the
outcome of the strike. If the government lost, its chance to effect major reforms in other sectors


would also have been lost. The Figueres Administration was confronted with a serious challenge to
its credibility, which, if squandered, would be very difficult to reestablish. The President, Minister
Doryan, and the cabinet were in agreement that the government should not be deterred from
reforming the teachers’ pensions, now for political as well as financial reasons. Still, they had to



decide how to respond to the strike.

The administration decided to respond to the strike with a dual-track strategy. First, it
sought negotiations. Minister Doryan and Minister of Labor Ayales publicly reiterated their interest

This case was written by Robert Taliercio, under the direction of Merilee Grindle, Edward S. Mason
Professor of International Development, Harvard Institute of International Development, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. (1096)
Copyright © 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request
permission to reproduce materials, call 617-495-9523, fax 617-495-8878, email
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Kennedy School of Government
Costa Rica’s Minister of Education Faces a Dilemma (B) ___________________________ CR1-96-1353.0

in meeting “anytime, anywhere” with the leaders of the FOM. The Ministers, however, were coolly
rebuffed by labor leaders.

Second, the administration decided to seize the initiative by acting boldly. The cabinet
resolved to send the law to the Assembly immediately. Based on the last draft that was used in the
negotiations, the administration quickly prepared to send the law to the Assembly. President
Figueres invoked the pact made with Calderón to speed approval of the reform law in the
Assembly. On July 8, while the teachers were still on vacation, the law was approved. The teachers


were presented with a fait accompli. They would now be striking to overturn the law, not to
prevent it from being introduced. As Minister Doryan said to the press, though he still wanted to
negotiate with the teachers, “Obviously, with respect to pensions, this is now the law of the
Republic. From here forward, we can converse about many themes of national interest.”


The teachers’ and their unions were outraged at the rapid approval of the pension reform
law while they were on vacation. They felt as though they had been mistreated. Sr. Bogantes said
that they “felt the entire weight of the political class,” referring to the Figueres-Calderón Pact. Sr.
Castillo said that Deputies in the Assembly reported that they were ordered by party leaders to
vote in favor of the reform, some claiming that they did not even have time to read the entire law.
To the teachers, these actions were indicative of the uncompromising tendencies of the

government.

The weekend before the strike was to begin both sides threatened to escalate the conflict.
The FOM said it would paralyze the country. The President said that the teachers were not


engaging in a protest strike, but “an abandonment of work.” As such, he said, they would be
sanctioned under the Labor Code. In the press Minister Doryan asked that parents take their
children to school on Monday to greet the teachers who, “respecting national law,” reported for


work. Mario Mondol, ex-Secretary General of APSE, responded by explaining that “The movement
transcends the struggle over the pensions; what we want is to oppose the ominous Figueres-
Calderón pact.”



The Strike

On Monday, July 17, undeterred by the government’s threats, the strike began. The press
estimated that the strike was supported by over 90% of the teachers (nearly 36,000), affecting over
600,000 students, from pre-school to the universities. On Tuesday, July 18, thousands of strikers
marched in downtown San José, surrounding the Ministry of Public Education. Placing
megaphones in front of the Minister’s office, they called for the resignation of Minister Doryan and
Vice Minister Arias. The crowd called the Minister a “traitor” and reminded him of the “juicy
pension” that his mother, a former teacher, received.

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From Minister Doryan’s point of view, the situation could not have seemed much worse.
The strike seemed to be gaining momentum as the teachers refused to speak publicly with the
government (various officials within the Ministry maintained almost constant contact with union
leaders). According to the Minister, the government was “surprised” by the obstinacy of the strike.
Given the perceived importance of defeating the strike, as well as its obstinacy, Minister Doryan
decided, after some deliberation, that a hard line against the strikers would be necessary to end the
strike as soon as possible. In a move unprecedented in recent history, the President and the
Minister decided not to pay the wages of those on strike (Tradition dictated that the government


pay striking public sector workers). In order to implement its decision to pay those who worked,
the MEP sent officials to the schools to compile lists of the teachers who came to work in spite of
the strike.

Minister Doryan commented on his controversial, hard line decision: “It was a very


difficult decision, but once made, it was very firm. It was the only instrument that could break the
strike, yet it caused me great worry. I had to balance the consequences for one sector with the
consequences for the collective, taking into account the interests of the majority. If inflation had not
been tamed, all the workers would have suffered. There are moments in which the decision maker
must balance concerns from the point of view of the heart with those from the point of view of
reason and political necessity. In these moments, we decision makers feel very alone. We are

human beings, not robots. Decisions have to be made, and it is not easy.”

The response of the teachers was one of anger and surprise. One of the union leaders
characterized the move as a “very hard blow,” and Minister Doryan as “violent.” The lists


compiled by MEP officials were perceived as a form of “blacklisting,” with the threat of future
retaliation hanging uncomfortably in the air. The unions placed advertisements in the newspapers
accusing Minister Doryan of “violating our human rights.” FOM leaders characterized the move as


“psychological warfare,” later acknowledging that the tactic weakened the strength and solidarity
of the movement. The decision not to pay the strikers was perhaps the move that most embittered
the teachers.



Still, the strike gained momentum. By Wednesday of the first week of the strike, the
National Liquor Plant, the National Council of Scientific and Technological Investigations, the
Municipal Development and Consulting Institute, the National Council of Production, and the
Institute of Agrarian Development had joined the teachers. On Friday the postal service and some
employees of the Ministry of Finance, including those from Customs, struck. A spokesman for the
Federation of Workers of Limón (FETRAL) said to the newspapers, “It has been decided. We will
paralyze the ports of the Pacific and the Caribbean starting next week.”

FETRAL had been in negotiations concerning port reform with the Ministry of Labor
before the teachers’ strike. In fact, the Minister of Labor had been handling these negotiations
gingerly, given the dock workers’ reputation as the most radical and pugnacious in the country.

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The government could ill-afford the expansion of the strike to the dock workers of Limón. It is
widely believed that the government appeased the dock workers’ unions to avoid their joining the
strike; some kind of tactical agreement seemed to have been reached. According to the newspaper
The Nation, “‘I have maintained conversations with people from FETRAL, and I do not believe that
they will support the movement,’ indicated the Minister of Labor, very sure of his words.” By
preventing the entry of the dock workers, the government deprived the teachers of the support
they needed to paralyze the country.


By the end of the first week of the strike, public opinion polls showed that the nation was
divided (See Table 2). Neither side had an overwhelming share of public support. Many felt that
the government should have been more open to the teachers’ point of view, but at the same time,
many did not want to see the strike escalate. In an attempt to sway public opinion, Figueres called a
meeting with four ex-presidents of the Republic, who jointly and publicly called for negotiations.


During the second week of the strike, the FOM also called for public negotiations with the
president. The president indicated his willingness to meet with the strikers, but insisted that he
would only do so after the teachers returned to the classroom. The teachers, however, demanded a
public meeting with the president before ending the strike.

At the same time, Minister Doryan announced that he was developing contingency plans
to see out the duration of the strike. The MEP would publish educational supplements in the
newspapers and sponsor educational television programs for primary and secondary school
children. Minister Doryan announced that President Zedillo of Mexico would send an expert to


help with emergency television programming. The Minister also announced that those teachers
electing to return to work during the second week would be paid for the previous week, even if
they had been on strike.


The FOM responded that the government had issued “a declaration of war” against them,
and that the teachers would respond accordingly. The FOM began to discuss options such as
blockading highways and other “harder actions.” Several highways around the country were



blocked by strikers for short periods. At the same time, the MEP asserted that the number of
teachers who had returned to school had increased from just over 1,000 on July 21 to over 8,000 by
July 31.

Fearing further escalation, the Rector of the National University, Jorge Mora, arranged for
a secret meeting between the leaders of the strike and President Figueres at the home of Minister
Ayales on July 30. Minister Doryan was also in attendance. The two parties began to talk about
conditions for ending the strike. The meeting ended abruptly after thirty minutes when the
president reiterated that he would not negotiate the pension reform until the teachers returned to
the classrooms. A few days later Minister Ayales declared that “vanity” and fear of losing their
positions discouraged union leaders from negotiating.

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In spite of harsh public rhetoric, the union leaders continued to meet with Ministers
Doryan and Ayales during the first week of August. The meetings moved slowly, complicated by
the fact that the unions refused to admit publicly that they were meeting with the government. On
August 6, however, the press took photos of the ministers and union leaders leaving a private
meeting held in a church. The union leaders were publicly embarrassed by the revelation.

The strike seemed to come to a climax on August 7 with the largest demonstration ever in
front of the Presidential House. The strikers surround the House all day long as the anti-terrorist


squad stood guard around the perimeter. The unions estimated the crowd at 150,000 while the
government estimated about 10,000.

The teachers demanded a meeting with the President and his ministers. Inside the House,
the President and his cabinet debated about whether to receive a delegation. Minister Doryan,


drawing on his experience as a student leader during his university days, argued that the cabinet
should not receive the strikers. He believed such a meeting would create false expectations on the
part of the teachers, and only if the government were willing to reconsider an immediate
negotiation of the pension reform should a meeting take place. If not, he argued, then the
government should remain firm.

By early evening, the strikers, disillusioned, began to disband. The union leaders charged
that never before had the teachers been denied a meeting with the President (even during a strike).
Union leaders called President Figueres “authoritarian, even military,” which is a serious insult in
Costa Rica. As the strikers left the Presidential House, several police officers, acting of their own


accord, started a melee with some strikers. One teacher was beaten severely, his bloody face
appearing in the next day’s newspapers. The government strongly condemned the violence, again
calling for an end to the strike.