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Sexuality and Aesthetics
Sexuality and Aesthetics
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LEO BERSANI
aspects of psy
of a normativ
exposure of t
already laid o
Freud should
credited wit
wonderfully
fathers and d
secular injunc
petus" is, ho
from the poin
vasive, and th
knowledge an
may have dest
attempt to m
epistemology.
to our confes
trophe: I mea
human subje
precedented s
"Nearly colla
the efficiency
suppression o
ment, a supp
contributed. I
beneficent d
stammering-
sexuality can
our reading o
treatise on hu
first essay-w
exhibitionism
different way
rations; they
certain histor
uality. This p
the "stages" o
ment in Freud
Essays was ad
organization (the sadistic-anal phase) in the 1913 paper on "The Predisposition
4. Ibid., p. 159.
ontologies of
of knowing
sexuality" (p
factorily the
confession o
sexuality. In
tween satisf
the extinctio
could also be
psychoanalys
as if infantil
ably prepara
sexuality.
Indeed, things are quite different-and much more problematic-when
Freud tries to define the pleasure of the erotogenic zones. "The fact," Freud
writes, "that sexual excitement possesses the character of tension raises a prob-
lem the solution of which is no less difficult than it would be important in help-
ing us to understand the sexual processes." The "problem" arises from Freud's
insistence, "in spite of all the differences of opinion that reign on the subject
among psychologists, . . . that a feeling of tension necessarily involves
unpleasure." The "decisive" fact here, Freud goes on, is that such feelings are
"accompanied by an impulsion to make a change in the psychological situa-
tion"; they operate, that is to say, "in an urgent way which is wholly alien to the
nature of the feeling of pleasure." And yet sexual excitement "is also undoubt-
edly felt as pleasurable" (p. 209). How, Freud asks, can unpleasurable tension
and pleasure be reconciled?
Not only is sexuality characterized by the simultaneous production of
pleasure and of unpleasurable tension; perhaps even more bizarre is the fact
that the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual stimulation seeks not to be
released, but to be increased! Generally, Freud tends to speak of sexual excite-
ment as if it were something like an itch, or an urge to sneeze. But in sex
preceding discharge, the analogy with the itch no longer holds. We scratch,
after all, in order to remove an itch, but - to hold on one more moment to the
analogy - now we are confronted with an itch that seeks nothing more than its
own prolongation, even its own intensification. If, Freud writes, you touch the
skin of an unexcited woman's breast, the contact will produce a pleasurable
feeling that "arouses a sexual excitation that demands an increase of pleasure"
(p. 210). The problem is in understanding "how it can come about that an ex-
perience of pleasure can give rise to a need for greater pleasure." The same
question is phrased more sharply in the second of the Three Essays, when, in his
discussion of infantile sexuality, Freud admits to finding it "somewhat strange"
that "in order to remove one stimulus, it seems necessary to adduce a second
one at the same time spot" (p. 185). How are we to understand this exceptional
to repeat, ev
need to find
not cruelty
forms of th
seeking out
would som
which it is
I wish to pr
only because
organism su
developmen
ment ago. M
biologically
sexuality al
already mak
ing merely
an evolutiona
Thus along
different ar
ond argume
subject to b
massive det
specificity.
it would see
that the exp
of human l
that biology
by," or "pic
sciousness o
But Freud a
control thi
distinct fro
is a kind of
undeveloped
The ontolog
manifests it
sexual acts, b
tween two a
master, and
fondled silv
the teleolog
sexuality a
object-specif
The explicit support in Freud himself for the positions which I wis
propose is very slim. This is partly because of the absence in Freud's wo
any sustained discussion of sublimation, and also because his own discus
of literature and the visual arts tend to stress either the compensatory or
symptomatic nature of art. Not only do the mechanisms of sublimation
quently seem indistinguishable from those of repression and sympto
formation; the work of art is often "treated"- interpreted and, one m
almost say, cured - as if it were little more than a socialized symptom. The
passages where Freud explicitly - and radically - differentiates sublima
from repression are therefore of particular interest. In a 1964 seminar, Lac
noted that in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud speaks of sublimatio
involving the satisfaction of a sexual drive "without repression." More rece
Laplanche has drawn our attention to Freud's remark, in his essay on Leona
da Vinci, that in sublimation a component instinct of sexual desire esc
from the sexual repression and is transformed from the very beginning int
tellectual curiosity. This libidinal energy, Freud suggests, is no longer attac
to the original complexes of infantile sexual research, which means that th
tellectual interests in whose service it now operates are not substitutive for
tions for those complexes. In this form of sublimation, sexuality would ther
provide the energy of thought without defining its terms. Or, to put this in another
we would have a nonreferential version of sexualized thought. What does this mean
Until now, the psychoanalytic criticism of art (including Freud's) has been
adept at recognizing sexually referential expression - that is, fundamen
symptomatic expression. We might now wish to devote our attention to those
moments or modes of cultural discourse (and I think that we have genera
referred to such moments or modes as signs of the "aesthetic") when t
libidinal inve
become visibl
a mobility of
tent or inope
What is per
I find this to
which, for ex
limation as d
sublimated ac
Freud calls L
treat his pain
a repetition w
elsewhere in
how less desi
development
traumatic pr
what might b
perhaps best
quotes for a
argue (this ob
ideal of aesth
hibition of se
herent in tho
be renounced
Oedipal fathe
meta-discour
ical discourse about desire which would claim to be free of the dislocations in-
trinsic to its subject-this sublime-sublimated form of expression is particularly
vulnerable to a demystifying interpretation, to the sort of "symptom-analysis"
with which psychoanalytic criticism has most frequently been associated. This
discourse of transcendence is the discourse of repression. Indeed, it can be
shown that to the extent that the Freudian text itself aims at theoretical security
or finality, it becomes the object par excellence of those analytic techniques
which it confidently elaborates for use elsewhere- for what are presumed to be
less successfully de-sexualized forms of discourse and representation.
And yet, in the case of Leonardo, Freud is obviously tempted to locate the
interest of his painting in the very "problem" which presumably crippled his
work. In a previous discussion of the Leonardo essay, I have emphasized
Freud's hesitation between a paternally centered account of da Vinci's sexual,
artistic, and scientific life, and a maternally derived traumatic model of sex-
uality. The absence of a father in the artist's early years meant, according to
Freud, that no beneficently inhibiting Law put an end to the child's in-
7. Leo Bersani, The Death of Stiphane Mallarmi, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
violence. The
It both remov
from underm
unlocatable an
The faun's m
the disguised
those impulse
what I have ju
represent a re
consciousness
In other terms
theory of sub
aesthetic wou
menaced acti
tured by a pe
psychoanalyti
ieties "behind
texts. It wou
tions and form
of art itself ex
sexual is, at t
(or psychicall
plicitly propo
replication. T
domesticatin
mutes biologi
Art interpre
we call critici
recognitions
therefore be
aggravated ir
gravated form
in a sense, to
of art represe
critical self-
itself: my di
should constan
itself. More p
those represe
should also ar
within those
sublimations, criticism is that moment of self-reflection which locates the
erasures of form in art; or, to put this even more radically, criticism makes
pressed, as th
logical fable
tween the cl
other represe
define but w
of the footno
undermining
speculation o
kind of frag
human desire
into historical narratives about civilization and about the individual.
Finally, as these two examples suggest, the conflictual models which tex-
tually represent sexuality in Freud can also be read as conflictual interpretativ
models of the collapse of representation itself. That is, each model implicitly
offers a critical procedure relevant, I believe, to the ways in which we may ta
about art. On the one hand, Freudianism could be thought of as both justifyin
and promoting a tradition of derivative criticism - that is, criticism which ha
sought to explain art as an effect or precipitate of biographical or historic
pressures, or of generic constraints, or, in the case of a critical tradition ini-
tiated by Freud himself, of long-buried desires. From this perspective, th
psychological theories of Freud culminate a philosophical tradition which goes
back to Plato, a tradition in which the visible phenomenon is devalued as
mere shadow of a hidden or profound or essential truth. The most extreme ver-
sion of this tradition in psychoanalytic therapy is probably Melanie Klein's at-
titude toward children's games in analysis: the therapist interrupts the child's
diversionary play with an interpretation as soon as she sees the "truth" behind
the play. In all these cases, the collapse of representation is of course a pseudo-
collapse: a factitious discourse is merely replaced by a more authentic di
course, and any loss of textual intelligibility is more than compensated for by
the superior intelligibility of the hermeneutic appropriation of the text.
On the other hand, Freud also provides a very different sort of interpre-
tative model. It is less explicit than the more familiar one I have just outlined,
but this is perhaps because it manifests an attempt to speak what might be calle
the return to the unspeakable. Nothing is stranger (more unheimlich) than thos
moments when Freud's very attempt to explain the eruption of an unconsciou
violence into human life takes the form of an unintelligible textuality, of
failure to proceed, of a blocked, one might almost say anxious or anguished
argument. We have seen such moments in Freud's failure to conclude abou
the nature of pleasure in the Three Essays; we might also consider, from
similar point of view, his shifting definitions of the superego's aggressiveness i
Chapter 7 of Civilization and Its Discontents, and the astonishing textual move by
which he momentarily sacrifices the explanatory virtue of the Oedipus complex
states most e
deed they ar
richly myste
Perhaps we
develop a the
extent that t
scenarios of
ductive con
developed a m
narrative of
culture is, in
having foun
grounds for
more - and n
to the alway