VILLENA v.

SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
G.R. No. L-46570
April 21, 1939

FACTS:

The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice conducted an inquiry

into the conduct of the Mayor Villena of Makati, Rizal and founded to have committed
bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law
profession.
The respondent recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension
of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was
granted. Hence, the Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office and
thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be
advised accordingly.

Secretary of the Interior wrote Villena a letter, specifying the charges against him
and notifying him of the special investigator which will investigate the charges. The
special investigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation but due
to several incidents and postponements, the same had to be set definitely for March 28,
1939.

Villena, filed an Original Action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with
the investigation until his case is finally determined by the court. However, the petition
for preliminary injunction was denied by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority:

(a) to order an investigation, by a special investigation appointed by him, of the charges

of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the
municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein; and

(b) to decree the suspension of the said mayor pending the investigation of the charges;

RULING:

(a)

Under Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code, the Department Head have a direct
control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and
may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the
decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in
the service of any bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith
may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness
by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant
to the investigation.

Likewise stated in Section 86 of the same Code that the Department of the Interior has
"executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered
cities and other local political subdivisions."

Hence, the Court ruled that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to
order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special
investigator for that purpose.

(b)

There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in
the provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code. The fact, however,
that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative
Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive
and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.
The Court sustained the contention of the government in this case on the board
proposition, that all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the
law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of
the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental
autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the
absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority
in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility.
The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts;
he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his
secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the
acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no
less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel
Webster, is the last repository of popular government.

Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning
to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos
and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening
events. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the
respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of
President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim
of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public
safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property
without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives
them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
 the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.

Ruling:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons. Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president,
this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in
the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people.
She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest.
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution, inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President and that the president has to maintain peace during times of
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.