THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 75112. October 16, 1990.]

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE , petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and the
late POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., as substituted by his heirs,
namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO, CICERO KAPUNAN, JESUS
KAPUNAN, SANTIAGO KAPUNAN, POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, JR., PAZ
KAPUNAN PUBLICO, SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO, and ERLINDA
KAPUNAN TESORO , respondents.

Aquilina B. Brotarlo for petitioner.

Rhodora G. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent.

DECISION

FERNAN , C.J : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals af rming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 14 in Civil Case No. V-
4222 which found petitioner Filamer Christian Institute and Daniel Funtecha negligent and
therefore answerable for the resulting injuries caused to private respondent Potenciano
Kapunan, Sr.
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher
(now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by
its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas
City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr.
suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.
Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of
the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving
after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him.
The two ed from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious
victim to the hospital. prLL

Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court
of Roxas City for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Kapunan, Sr.
reserved his right to le an independent civil action. The inferior court found Funtecha
guilty as charged and on appeal, his conviction was af rmed by the then Court of First
Instance of Capiz. 2
Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before
the RTC of Roxas City. Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and
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 Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian
Institute, in his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel
Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question
despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or
permit to drive said vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time of the
accident, was not impleaded as a co-defendant. 4
On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment nding not only petitioner
Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Thus:
"WHEREFORE, nding the averments in the complaint as supported by
preponderance of evidence to be reasonable and justi ed, and that defendants
Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault and
negligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to plaintiff,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
namely: Daniel Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute, the employer whose
liability is primary and direct, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:

"(1) to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY

PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P2,950.50) as medical expenses (Exh. 'A');

"(2) to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P241.00) as

doctor's fee (Exh. 'C');
"(3) to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390.00) as
additional expenses incurred for thirty-nine days at P10.00 a day, for
remuneration of plaintiff's helper while recuperating;

"(4) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation

expenses;

"(5) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as loss of

earnings capacity;
"(6) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages;

"(7) to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) as

attorney's fees;

"(8) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as insurance

indemnity on the policy contract;

and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to

demand from co-defendant Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan
Masa a full time employee reimbursement of the damages paid to herein plaintiff.
"The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute
has also failed to exercise the diligence required of a good father of a family in
the supervision of his employee Allan Masa, being his son. However, the court
absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the
complaint led against him in his personal and private capacity, cause he was
not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.

"For failure to prove their respective counterclaims led by the defendant Daniel
Funtecha, Dr. Agustin Masa, and Filamer Christian Institute, as against the herein
plaintiff, same are hereby dismissed.
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 "The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove
that there was a policy violation made by the defendant Filamer Christian Institute
which absolves them from liability under the aforesaid insurance policy. The
record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle
was having a student drivers license marked Exh. `1' and accompanied by Allan
Masa who is the authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers
license as shown by Exh. '3'

"This Court nds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is
considered as authorized driver in accordance with the policy in question marked
Exh. '2-Masa and FCI'.
"Finding the averments in the third party complaint led by defendant Filamer
Christian Institute as supported by preponderance of evidence as shown by their
exhibits to be reasonable and justi ed, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer Christian Institute as against
third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation.

"The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby ordered to

pay in favor of the defendant and third party plaintiff, Filamer Christian Institute,
the following:

"(1) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as third party

liability as provided in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy (Exh. '2');

"(2) to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral

damages;

"(3) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation

and actual expenses;

"(4) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as attorney's

fees;
"The defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and third party
defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally,
to pay the costs of the suit." 5

Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed
the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower
court's decision became nal as to Funtecha. For failure of the insurance rm to pay the
docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985, the
Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment af rming the trial court's decision in toto.
6 Hence, the present recourse by petitioner Filamer.
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious
act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship
between them. We agree.
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
"Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
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 one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

"xxx xxx xxx

"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." (Emphasis supplied).

The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180
is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7
specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads:
"Sec. 14. Working scholars. — There is no employer-employee relationship
between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the
other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free
of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity, including such
facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to nish their chosen courses under
such arrangement." (Emphasis supplied).

It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be
considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students
who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha worked for
petitioner for two hours daily for ve days a week. He was assigned to clean the school
passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with suf cient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m.
classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the
company payroll. 8

The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To
dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship"
between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved,
as espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that was not
legislated there in the rst place. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to
eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to de ne in categorical terms
the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they
work for the privilege of a free education.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary
responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain
reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was
not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the
school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the
wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving
the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were
certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time of the injury,
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 Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was
employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should
bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for
the damages he had caused.
Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable
to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they
proceeded against Allan Masa, the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an
employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the
vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to
the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But under the present set of
circumstances, even if the trial court did nd Allan guilty of negligence, such conclusion
would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the
complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's
judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to
which he is a stranger. 9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint for damages 10 is ordered DISMISSED as against
petitioner Filamer Christian Institute for lack of cause of action. No costs. LLpr

SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur but limit my concurrence on the employee-employer relationship
to labor law situations.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Desiderio P. Jurado and concurred in by Associate Justices

Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Sera n E. Camilon. Associate Justice Crisolito Pascual did not
take part.
2. Annex E of Petition, p. 49. Rollo.
3. Civil Case No. V-4222.

4. Records, pp. 1 and 3.

5. Records, pp. 572-573.

6. Rollo, pp. 177 and 21.

7. Presidential Decree No. 442.

8. Records, p. 569.
9. Church Assistance Program vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 76552, March 21, 1989.
10. Civil Case No. V-4222.

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