LHUILLIER V. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. NO.

171092, MARCH 15, 2010

Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account

of the necessity of dispensing justice. char kaau

FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent British Airways before the RTC of Makati City. She alleged
that she took respondents flight 548 from London, UK to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Halliday, one of the respondents
flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her,
and even sarcastically remarked that “If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!”
 
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from
among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to
be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan
that she knew the planes safety regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away
from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that “We dont like your attitude.”
 
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent’s ground manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the
flight stewards were only doing their job.

Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-
Philippine Airline Services, Inc.

Respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over
the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, UK or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides:
 
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the
carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or
before the court of the place of destination.
 
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondents principal place of business is in London; c) petitioner bought her ticket in Italy
and d) Rome, Italy is petitioner’s place of destination, then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts of London, UK
or Rome, Italy.

Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because the summons was
erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the Philippines.

Trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioners Arguments
 Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the tortious conduct committed by airline personnel of
respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of
carriage, petitioner asserts that she has the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

Respondents Arguments
In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioners claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such,
the same can only be filed before the courts of London, UK or Rome, Italy.

ISSUES:
WON respondent air carrier of passengers, in filing its motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over
its person may be deemed as having in fact and in law submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court

RULING:
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not deemed to have voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter stated in its
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that Defendant [is at a loss] x x x how the plaintiff arrived at her erroneous impression
that it is/was Euro-Philippines Airlines Services, Inc. that has been making a special appearance since x x x British Airways x x x has been
clearly specifying in all the pleadings that it has filed with this Honorable Court that it is the one making a special appearance.

In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals where we held that even if a party
challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other
grounds for the dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the jurisdiction over
his person.

This issue has been squarely passed upon in the recent case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, where we reiterated our ruling in La Naval Drug
Corporation v. Court of Appeals and elucidated thus:
xxx
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance
 
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
 
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
 
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the
court. What the rule on voluntary appearance the first sentence of the above-quoted rule means is that
the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed
to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared without
qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration
and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case;
and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture
II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
 
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the
purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein
that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through
improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never
abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer
Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the
other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper
substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to
service of summons.
 
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current
view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court challenging its jurisdiction over the person
through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver
by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
 
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective
substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their
persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid
substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.
And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are
null and void for lack of jurisdiction. 
xxx
 
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court cannot
be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule
that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction
over its person.