PEOPLE VS JOSE

FACTS:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design,
forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to
their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by
means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code.

“That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO,
without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused
to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and
permitting the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the
Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and
Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.

It was 6:30 o’clock—or some two hours after the abduction—when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her
mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the
house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been
raped. All four of them raped me.” The mother brought her daughter upstairs.

HELD:
Res gestae; When victim confided to her mother immediately the incident upon arrival.—Other evidence
and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four
appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva’s arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately
told her mother, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me.” This utterance, which is
part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the
complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature, was the most logical person in whom a daughter
would confide the truth. x x x Equally important is complainant’s public disclosure of her tragedy, which
led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution
of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
PEOPLE VS SAYAT

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Godofredo Sayat, alias “Bobby” or “Buboy,” was

charged with five crimes of rape in five separate criminal complaints
subscribed by eight-year old Marites Sayat.

The prosecution’s version of the incident is anchored principally on

the testimony of the offended party Marites Sayat. Born on January
28, 1982, she was only nine years old when she was made to recount
at the witness stand on May 2, 1991 the sordid details on how at age
eight she was sexually violated five times by appellant, her half-
brother (‘kapatid sa ama’) 18 years her senior. They, along with
Maribel Halino, a relative, were then the only occupants of their
house at No. 12 Camia Street, Marville Subdivision, Barangay de la
Paz, Pasig, Metro Manila. Their father was abroad working as a
seaman, while Marites’ mother, Elisa Palicdon, was also abroad, in
Hongkong, working as a domestic helper. On August 28, 1990,
appellant ordered Marites, who was in skirt and t-shirt to go to the
second floor of their newly constructed house just behind their old
house. There, appellant instructed Marites to lie down and to remove
her panty.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused

GODOFREDO SAYAT alias ‘BOBBY’ or ‘BUBOY’ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE

appellant interposed the instant appeal, faulting the court below with
a lone assigned error, that is, in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
ISSUE: WON the guilt was proven

HELD:
YES. It is a fundamental evidentiary rule that the prosecution has
the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused, as a
consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probatio non qui negat, that is,
he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. This is specially
significant in rape cases for, generally, in the prosecution thereof the
only two parties who can testify as to the occurrence are the
complainant and the accused. More often than not, their respective
testimonies are diametrically contradictory as to what really
happened.

Aware of the caveat that the testimony of a woman crying rape must
be scrutinized with extreme caution, the Court has painstakingly
assessed the records of the case and is convinced that appellant’s
guilt has been proven by clear and convincing evidence with the
requisite quantum under the law.

In sum, we find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings

and adjudicative conclusion of the trial court. However, in line with
the present jurisprudential policy whenever the crime of rape is
attended by circumstances which indicate greater perversity on the
part of the offender, the Court hereby increases the award of moral
damages to P50,000.00 for the complainant and her family.
VELASCO VS MASA

FACTS:

On the 2d of Deeember, 1902, Felix Velasco filed a complaint

against Martin Masa asking that, without prejudige to the criminal
action which. lie might bring, judgment be entered orclering the
defendant to pay 2,804 pesos, with interest thereon at the rate of 12
per cent per annum froin the 1st of July, 1899, until the full payment
of tlie principal, losses and damages, and the costs of the
proceedings. He alleged that on the 1st of July, 1898, Martin Masa
received frorn him as a loan, in the pueblo of San Kemigio, the said
amount, payable on the sanie day iu July the following year. The
debt, he alleged, was set forth in a private document signed by the
debtor, but that the defendant, Masa, taking advantage of the
conditions tlien prevailing on account of the late revolution, and by
ineans of coercion and trickeries exercised with respect to his wife,
managed to obtain possession of the document of indebtedness
while the plaintiff was detained as a prisoner in the jail at the capital
of Antique; that one year and some months after the condition of
things had becomo normal, he filed Ms claim before the provost
court for tlie robbery of the said document, but, as said court
considered that it had no jurisdiction in the premises, the plaintiff
presented an information to' the Court of First Instance, a certified
copy of whose decision is annexed; and that between the plaintiff
and the defendant interest at the rate of 12 per cent had been agreed
upon, wh'ich was to be added to the principal at the end of the year
if the defendant was unable to pay the same. The defendant in his
answer denied all the main points of the complaint, inasimich as the
aforesaid document, which was the subject of the same, had been
voluntarily handed over to him through Luis Ocsena.

ISSUE:
WON the document was voluntarily delivered to masa.

HELD:
YES. Possession by the debtor of a private document proving a
debt, raises the presumption that the creditor voluntarily delivered
the document to him, unless the contrary is proven by said creditor,
upon whom rests the burden of overcoming the presumption,
inasmuch as presumptions established by law exempt tliose favored
thereby from producing further proof.

PEOPLE VS RAMOS

FACTS: At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of May 11, 1989,

Reynaldo Punzalan and his wife arrived at their residence at Da-ang
Liit Novaliches, Kalookan City on board their car. Reynaldo blew
his carhorn to alert his household help to open the gate but despite
continued horn-blowing nobody responded forcing Reynaldo’s wife
to alight from the car and to personally open the gate. Thereafter,
Reynaldo entered and drove the car into the garage. But as Reynaldo
stepped out of the car and about five arms length away he saw two
armed men approaching him menacingly (whom he later identified
as Felimon Ramos and Antonio Contreras) while a third man was
holding his wife. Reynaldo ran outside the house to seek his
neighbor’s assistance and was pursued by Ramos and Contreras.
Suddenly, a shot rang out from inside the house and immediately
five armed men came rushing out some of whom Reynaldo saw
holding something. As the group approached Reynaldo and his
neighbors, Ramos fired at them (pp. 8-13, tsn, June 19, 1989).
Reynaldo and his neighbors when rushed inside the house were
Reynaldo saw his household help lying face down under the bed, his
two children in the corner of the comfort room and his wife hiding
under the steering wheel of his car. Reynaldo saw that some of their
household appliances were piled at the back of their house, ready to
be carried out. Subsequently, Reynaldo also discovered that some of
their personal belongings like jewelry, cash, clothing, make-up kit,
tachometer, car stereo with a total money value of P58,500.00 were
missing (pp. 14-16, supra.)

Reynaldo immediately reported this incident to the police authorities

and on the morning of May 17, 1989, Reynaldo in the company of a
police team, proceeded to a house at the Miranda Subdivision where
appellant Ramos, per the police informant, was residing (pp. 16-17,
supra). Thereat, Reynaldo saw a man at the gate of the house whom
he recognized as one of the robbers (pp. 8, 16 tsn, July 17, 1989)
and accordingly informed Pat. Rodillas, a member of the police
team who then alighted from the police vehicle, talked to the man
and afterwards frisked him. Pat. Rodillas found a gun tucked at the
man’s waist (p. 7, supra). At the police sub-station, the man who
was identified as Felimon Ramos named a certain Contreras as one
of his companions in robbing the house of Reynaldo. On May 18,
1989, the police team, accompanied by Ramos, proceeded to a shop
somewhere in Doña Rosario Subdivision, Novaliches where they
found Contreras fixing a vehicle. Contreras was invited to the police
station for investigation. Thereat, he was pointed to by Reynaldo as
one of the robbers (pp. 9-11, supra).
The gun recovered from Ramos, which was a Danao Paltik revolver,
snub nose, contained two (2) live bullets

ISSUE:

ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF

PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE
N O T W I T H S TA N D I N G T H E S E V E R A L M AT E R I A L
INCONSISTENCIES THEREIN.

HELD:
It is disputably presumed that prosecution witnesses are not actuated
by any improper motive.—Finally, the records are bereft of any
evidence which would show any ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify against the accused. It is settled that
where there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by any improper motive, the
presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

PHILAMGEN VS SWEET LINES

FACTS:

• Petitioners Philippine American General Insurance Co.

(PHILAMGEN) and Tagum Plastics (TAGUM) were the insurers
and importers, respectively, of an order of polyethylene (the basic
material for your common plastics).
• The polyethylenes are to be shipped from F. E. Zuellig in the
United States through an Indian ship, SS Vishva Yash, and are to be
received at Manila. After which, the subject matter is to be shipped
to Davao, TAGUM’s place of business.
• When the Indian vessel arrived at Manila, it sought the services of
respondent Sweet Lines, Inc. for the inter-island shipment to Davao.
• However, when the M/V Sweet Love, owned and operated by
Sweet Lines, arrived at Davao, petitioners found that the some of the
imported polyethylene were undelivered or damaged.
• For this reason, petitioners filed suit against respondent Sweet
Lines and the Davao Veterans Arrastre which handled the cargoes at
the Davao port.
o The basis for such suit are the bills of lading, which serves as the
contract between parties that the goods indicated therein are to be
delivered complete in number and in the condition specified.
o Militating against the petitioners, however, is the prescriptive
period included in the bills of lading. It states that any action arising
from shortage or damages must be brought within sixty (60) days
from accrual of right of action.
o Also, notice of claims for loss or damages is required to be given
to the carrier before the
institution of judicial claims.
• The bills of lading were not formally offered as evidence; hence it
was not shown that a contractual prescriptive period was indicated
therein.

ISSUE:
WON THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED

HELD:
Even granting that petitioners’ averment in their reply amounts to a
denial, it has the procedural earmarks of what in the law on
pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the
averment it is directed to. Thus, while petitioners objected to the
validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy, the
existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were
nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.

We find merit in respondent court’s comments that petitioners failed

to touch on the matter of the non-presentation of the bills of lading
in their brief and earlier on in the appellate proceedings in this case,
hence it is too late in the day to now allow the litigation to be
overturned on that score, for to do so would mean an over-
indulgence in technicalities. Hence, for the reasons already
advanced, the non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the
formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of this particular
case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent
carrier from raising the defense of prescription. Petitioners’ feigned
ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading, particularly on the
time limitations for filing a claim and for commencing a suit in
court, as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve
serious attention.

PEOPLE VS FERNANDEZ
FACTS:

WILFREDO FERNANDEZ Y BISCO was charged before the

Regional Trial Court of Manila with violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, for having sold and delivered to a poseur-buyer on 10
February 1987 five (5) sticks of marijuana cigarettes for P20.00
without being authorized by law, well-knowing that marijuana is a
prohibited drug.1
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment2 finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4. of R.A. 6425,
as amended, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00.
In his appeal, the accused prays for acquittal asserting that the trial
court erred (a) in convicting him solely on the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who were neither privies to the sale nor heard
the subject of sale and without the testimonies of the poseur-buyer
and the informant who were principal parties to the alleged
transaction; (b) in giving full faith and credit to the evidence
adduced by the prosecution notwithstanding its inherent
incredibility; and, (c) in not giving exculpatory value and weight to
the evidence of the accused.

ISSUE:

HELD:
As a general rule, We accord the utmost respect to the factual
findings of the trial court unless it is clearly shown that it had
overlooked certain facts of substance, which if considered, would
affect the result of the case, or arbitrarily disregarded facts and
circumstances of significance in its appraisal.
A thorough study of the records reveals that none of the exceptions
exists in the case at bar. Consequently, we have no alternative but to
affirm the judgment of conviction by the trial court.

PEOPLE VS WEBB

FACTS:

petitioners were charged with the crime of rape with homicide for
allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde and on the occasion thereof,
killing Carmela herself and her mother, Estrellita, and her sister,
Jennifer. The crime was committed in the evening of June 29 up to
the early morning of June 30, 1991 at the Vizconde residence in BF
Homes, Parañaque.6

On September 4, 1995, Gerardo Biong filed another motion to

disqualify respondent judge on the ground of bias and partiality.
This was likewise denied by respondent judge.

ISSUE:

The core issue is whether respondent judge should inhibit herself

from hearing Criminal Case No. 95-404 on the ground of bias and
prejudice.

HELD:
NO. a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of
a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case. This right must be
weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of
repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and
prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing
evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to discharge
their burden of proof.

A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce

any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge was motivated
by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed rulings. Petitioners
simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the
respondent judge which they characterized as palpable errors. This
is not enough.

PEOPLE VS LARRAÑAGA

FACTS:

On the night of July 16, 1997, Larrañaga and seven others

kidnapped the Chiong sisters near the west wing entrance of Ayala
Center Cebu, the two [women] were raped but only Marijoy's body
was found while the other sister's body, was never found.
The accused [appellants] were charged and later on convicted of the
crimes of of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention [Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño, Balansag; and
(James Andrew) Uy] ; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention [Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño, Balansag; (James
Andrew) Uy; and (James Anthony) Uy]
The case was centered on the testimony of a co-defendant, David
Valiente Rusia who only appeared 10 months after the incident. In
exchange for immunity, he [Rusia] testified against his
codefendants, he claimed that he was with Larrañaga in Ayala
Center, Cebú early in the evening of July 16.
Larrañaga raised in his defense that he was in Quezon City and not
in Cebu at the time when the crime is said to have taken place, some
thirty five witnesses, including his friends and teachers, testified
under oath to prove this, however, all were rejected by the court; he
further contended that the body found in the ravine was not
Marijoy's but somebody else's. While, Aznar, Adlawan, Balansag
and Caño, on the other hand, questioned Rusia’s testimony for being
incredible, inconsistent, and unworthy of belief.

HELD:

Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and
crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters. Being evidence that is negative
in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and
positive evidence. On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes
less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives
or close friends of the accused. This case presents to us a balance
scale whereby perched on one end is appellants’ alibi supported by
witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates,
while on the other end is the positive identification of the herein
appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way,
related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are
certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution
shows that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi,
i.e., the requirements of time and place.14 They failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong
sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that
Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew
were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the
required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was
shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila
to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the
route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several
flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening.
Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was
proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses
identified Larrañaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and
Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997.

PEOPLE VS SEQUERRA

FACTS:

In barangay Calaba in Bangued, Abra, at about ten o'clock in the

morning of March 31,1980, Renato Bonete was shot in the back
while driving his tricycle. Rushed to the hospital, he died shortly
upon arrival, of severe bleeding from the wounds he had sustained.
In the afternoon of the same day, Danilo Sequerra was picked up at
his residence and thereafter investigated for the killing. He was
subsequently charged with the murder of Bonete and convicted after
trial. The judgment1 sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to
pay the victim's heirs P14,000.00 indemnity plus P3, 000.00 for
burial expenses and P10,000.00 as moral damages is now before us
on appeal.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The Court finds that the trial judge did not err in giving credence to
the witnesses for the prosecution and in finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Against his positive identification, all he
offered was the feeble defense of alibi, which he and his witnesses
failed to substantiate. He is condemned, of course, not because he
failed to prove that he was in Tarlac but because the prosecution
succeeded in proving that he was in Abra.

Confronted by the full panoply of state authority, the accused is

accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse
the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to
convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The
evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise, he is entitled to be freed. But as solicitous as the Bill of
Rights is of the accused, the presumption of innocence is not an
automatic or blanket exoneration. It is at best only an initial
protection. If the prosecution succeeds in refuting the presumption,
it then becomes the outlook of the accused to adduce evidence that
will at least raise that inkling of doubt that he is guilty. Once the
armor of the presumption is pierced, so to speak, it is for the accused
to take the offense and ward off the attack.
The attack has not been repelled in this case. It has disarmed and
vanquished the accused and his guilt has been laid bare. In the face
of the weighty evidence against him, his invocation of the
constitutional presumption of innocence, having failed, must be
rejected.

TOLEDO VS TOLEDO

TOLEDO v. TOLEDO
7 SCRA 757
A.C. No. 266
April 27, 1963

FACTS: Paz Arellano Toledo, a dentist, alleged that she is the wife
of Atty. Jesus Toledo, that she supported and spent for his studies in
FEU but after passing the bar, he abandoned. She also alleged that
he is cohabiting with another woman and borne him 3 children. She
prayed for his disbarment from the practice of law.

Upon the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General which his

alleged wife presented pieces of evidence, respondent was charged
for abandonment and immorality and the Solicitor prayed that he be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground

"that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported
by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by
the Office of the Solicitor General." Hence, the Court set the case
for hearing. The respondent prayed that his motion be first resolved
or be denied, hence invoking Section 6, Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.

However, instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent

filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present
evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the
close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of
record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient.
The correct manner and proper time for him to make known his
intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court.

Now, to resolve the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jesus Toledo be disbarred or suspended.

RULING: Yes. The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and

cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the Bar. Hence, he is disbarred from the
practice of law.

Through a rigorous test by the Solicitor, the maid of respondent,

Marina Payot, also testified that the lawyer was living with a person
named Corazon Toledo as wife of the respondent with a child of
their own, named Angie. Lino Domingo, operator-mechanic in the
Bureau of Public Highways, also stated that he knows the lawyer
and her wife, Corazon, for he goes to the lawyer’s residence every
now and then.

The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence.

ESTABILLO VS ESTABILLO
FACTS:

In the present case the plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of a
parcel of land measuring some thirty hectares and situated in the
municipalities of Pura and Gerona, Province of Tarlac; that in the
year 1916 said plaintiffs, through their confidence in the defendant,
authorized him to represent them in cadastral case No. 4 of the
Province of Tarlac and there file a claim in their behalf ;for the
registration of the eastern portion of said parcel, which portion was
designated as lot No. 1359 in the cadastral survey and contained an
area of 117,692 square meters; that the defendant, betraying the trust
reposed in him, filed a claim in his own name and obtained a decree
in his favor for said lot in September, 1917; that the plaintiffs did
not discover the fraud committed by the defendant until the year
1919, when said defendant, taking advantage of the decree issued in
his favor, obtained possession of the lot, ousting the plaintiffs
therefrom.
The plaintiffs therefore ask that it be declared that they were the
owners of the land in question prior to the year 1917; that the decree
of registration issued in favor of the defendant be declared illegal
and fraudulent; and that the plaintiffs be awarded damages in the
sum of P23,000. The defendant's answer is a general denial.

Under the third assignment of error the appellants maintain that the
court below erred in overruling plaintiffs' objection to the admission
in evidence of the defendant's Exhibit 1, an affidavit made in May,
1908, by one Simon Estabillo, and in which the affiant states that he
is the son and only heir of Santiago Estabillo and that he knows to a
certainty that his father had sold the land here in question to the
defendant, though no document of sale was executed, and that he,
the affiant, therefore relinquished "all rights, actions and interest" in
said land. The document is signed by three witnesses, among them
one Mateo Oclaray, and sworn to before a notary public.

ISSUE: WON THE AFFIDAVIT IS ADMISSIBLE

HELD:
YES.

The document is therefore an admission against interest by the

predecessor of one of the appellants and constitutes an exception to
the hearsay rule. As such it is evidence against Simon's daughter, the
appellant Fausta Estabillo. It is further admissible to show that the
defendant has been in possession of the land under a claim of
ownership adverse to the claims of the descendants of Santiago
Estabillo. The fact that the only witness who testified to its
authenticity was not present when the document was written and
signed by the other subscribing witnesses, may lessen its probatory
value, but does not render it inadmissible as evidence.
PEOPLE VS PHOENIX

FACTS:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent

Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner
meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early
warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando
Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried
to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some
physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action
for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners
countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and
headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

ISSUE: res gestae

HELD:

We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly

smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a
sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than
reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around at
that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore
admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered
by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been
ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not,
have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix
dump truck.

PEOPLE VS GADDI

Nerio Gaddi y Catubay was charged with murder for the death
Augusto Esguerra y Navarro:
Information reads as follow:

On or about Dec. 11, 1981, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,

Philippines Nerio Gaddi with intent to kill, without any justifiable
cause, qualified with treachery and with evident pre-meditation
(sic), did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
AUGUSTO ESGUERRA y NAVARRO, by then and there stabbing
him several times with a knife, hitting him on the different parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended party in such
amount as maybe awarded under the provision of the Civil Code.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San

Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw
appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking
gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981,
appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner
Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman
advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman
went to the police and reported what appellant told him (pp. 2-3. tsn,
September 2, 1982; pp. 2-8. tsn, August 9, 1983).

At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, December

12, 1981, Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo Salamat
arrested appellant at Manrey Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he killed the victim and where
he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus Patriarca arrived. Appellant
himself led the policeman and Barangay residents to where the body
was in a toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman. The
policeman, with the help of the Barangay residents, dug out the
body. The body of the victim was Identified by Ernesto Guzman, his
wife, and Jose Esguerra, victim's brother. Pat. Patriarca took pictures
of the body (Exhibits C to C-5), noted the statements of Ernesto
Guzman and Jose Esguerra, (Exhibit D), and took down the
confession of appellant (Exhibit F). Later, the cadaver was subjected
to autopsy (pp. 3-13, tsn, August 24, 1983; pp. 3-22, tsn, January 3,
1984).

A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red
shorts, were recovered from the pit where the body of the victim
was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were Identified by Ernesto
Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with the
victim on December 11, 1981
ISSUES: Whether or not, the trial court erred in giving weight and
credence to the testimony of Ernesto Guzman and in totally
disregarding the evidence adduced by the defense.

RULING:

Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on

circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity
of such conviction that: 1) there be more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court, People v. Modesto, G.R. No. L-25484,
September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R. No.
L-38162, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.]

Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of

circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all that
is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty [People v. Constante, G.R. No. L-14639, December
28, 1964, 12 SCRA 653; People v. Caneda, G.R. No. L-19132,
September 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 9.]

In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the

prosecution sufficiently satisfies the quantum of proof necessary to
uphold a judgment of conviction. The following circumstances
proven by the prosecution indubitably point to the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto Esguerra.
PEOPLE VA CALIXTRO

FACTS:

The accused Pedring Calixtro, Celso Ferrer and Louie Ferrer were
charged with the crime of Robbery with Rape under the following
information "That on or about the 24th day of April, 1989 in
Barangay Faigal, Municipality of Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being then armed with sharp-pointed
instrument (patalim), conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, and with intent to gain and by means of force and violence
and intimidation upon person, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) gold
ring with three (3) stones of diamond and one (1) pair of earrings
with one stone diamond with a total value of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) Philippine Currency, more or less, belonging
to EDELIZA ASTELERO to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the said amount; and that during or on the occasion of the
robbery, the said three (3) accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse one after the other with said
EDELIZA ASTELERO against her will.

ISSUE:

HELD:
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness tend to
strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.—We find the alleged
inconsistencies as too trivial, insignificant and inconsequential to
merit the reversal of the trial court’s decision. The inconsistencies
pointed out by appellant can hardly affect the complainant’s
credibility. They refer to minor details or to the precise sequence of
events that do not detract from the central fact of rape, on which
complainant had consistently and candidly testified. A witness who
is in a state of fright cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or
uniformity matters connected with the main overt act (People v.
Ramilo, supra). The testimonial discrepancies could have also been
caused by the natural fickleness of memory, which tend to
strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony (People v. Cayago; 158 SCRA
586). These discrepancies on minor details serve to add credence
and veracity to her categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous
testimony (People v. Ramilo, supra).

PEOPLE VS MONTEJO

FACTS:

In a petition dated February 4, 1965, it was alleged by the City

Fiscal of Zamboanga, as counsel for the People of the Philippines,
that on September 23, 1963, Criminal Case No. 3225 was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City against a certain
Felix Wee Sit for double homicide and serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence, the trial of the case having commenced on
November 7, 1963, and thereafter continued subsequently.1 After
which, it was stated that a certain Ernesto Uaje y Salvador, “a
permanent resident of Montalban, Rizal,” then a patrolman in the
Montalban Police Department, “is a material and important witness
in the case” his affidavit having served as the basis for filing the
information as he “happened to be an eye-witness during the traffic
incident wherein a Private Jeep bearing Plate No. J-6172 driven
recklessly by the accused Felix Wee Sit on August 15, 1963, turned
turtle in the public highway in Zamboanga City causing the death of
two (2) prominent young girls and serious physical injuries to four
(4) equally prominent young girls, who are all students of a local
religious institution.

It was then alleged that at the time the case against the accused was
called for trial in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City,
then presided by respondent Judge, the witness had returned to
Montalban, Rizal; that pursuant to a formal request of the City
Fiscal, respondent Judge issued a subpoena to patrolman Uaje
addressed at his known address at Montalban, Rizal, for him to
appear at the trial of the case set for continuation on.
February 1,1965; that such subpoena was served on Uaje, the return
showing that he had received it on January 19, 1965, at Montalban,
Rizal; that when the case was called for continuation on February 1,
1965, he did not appear “ and forthwith the undersigned City Fiscal
formally moved for an order of arrest” or in the alternative “to cite
him for contempt for willful failure to appear at the trial of the case
as a material witness x x x.”3 Such a motion was formally presented
on February 3, 1965 and denied on the same day by the respondent
Judge in the Order sought to be annulled in this petition.

ISSUE: viatory right

HELD:

Section 9, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, excusing a witness from

appearance before a court, judge, or other officer of the province in
which he resides if the distance exceeds 50 kilometers from his
place of residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel,
applies solely to civil cases and not to criminal cases. Consequently,
the refusal by respondent Judge, in the case at bar, to grant the
prosecution’s motion to arrest a material witness in a criminal case,
or in the alternative, to cite him for contempt, amounted to grave
abuse of discretion.

PEOPLE VS SULTAN

FACTS:

“That on or about the 19th day of August 2005 in the City of Laoag,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously give away and deliver to a police officer who acted as a
poseur buyer one plastic bag containing metamphetamine
hydrochloride (popularly known as shabu) a dangerous drug with a
weight of .1211 gram. without any license or authority, in violation
of the aforecited law.

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the

corpus delicti. According to him, there was no showing of any
attempt or effort by the arresting officers to comply with the
requirements of Section 21 of Rep. Act No. 9165 and the
prosecution failed to present evidence on post-examination custody
as the chemist who examined the specimens did not testify in open
court. Hence, there is doubt as to the identity of the specimen
submitted in court.

ISSUE: The main issue in this case is whether or not the appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II
of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling and delivering 0.4931 grams and
0.5334 grams of shabu, respectively.

HELD:

The non-presentation of the chemist who tested the illegal drugs,

contrary to appellant’s contentions, is insufficient to acquit him. As
we ruled in People v. Zenaida Quebral y Mateo, et al., 606 SCRA
247 (2009), which dealt with a similar issue: The accused-appellants
also point out that, since the chemist who examined the seized
substance did not testify in court, the prosecution was unable to
establish the indispensable element of corpus delicti. But this claim
is unmeritorious. This Court has held that the non-presentation of
the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for
acquittal. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the
dangerous drug itself. This means that proof beyond doubt of the
identity of the prohibited drug is essential. Besides, corpus delicti
has nothing to do with the testimony of the laboratory analyst. In
fact, this Court has ruled that the report of an official forensic
chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under
Section 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official
records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts they state. Therefore, the report of Forensic
Chemical Officer Sta. Maria that the five plastic sachets PO3 Galvez
gave to her for examination contained shabu is conclusive in the
absence of evidence proving the contrary. At any rate, as the CA
pointed out, the defense agreed during trial to dispense with the
testimony of the chemist and stipulated on his findings.

PEOPLE VS ESTENZO

PEOPLE vs ESTENZO
FACTS:
• In a case "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio
Ojoy, accused", after the accused himself had testified in his
defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he
was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other
matters pertinent and material to the case.
• Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the
petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure
• Respondent Judge gave his conformity and issued the questioned
Order.
• Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of
the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge erred in sustaining the

manifestation of the defense counsel in filing only affidavits of his
subsequent witnesses.

HELD: Yes. Petition Granted.

RATIO: Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a
witness shall be given orally in open court. The afore-cited Sections
1 and 2 provide:
SEC 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The testimony of
witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or
affirmation.
SEC. 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to writing.- In
superior courts the testimony of each witness shall be taken in
shorthand or stenotype, the name, residence, and occupation of the
witness being stated, and all questions put to the witness and his
answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and
the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection and the ground
on which it was sustained or overruled must be stated, or if a
witness declines to answer a question put, the fact and the
proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript
of the record made by the official stenographer or stenotypist and
certified as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct statement of
such testimony and proceedings.
• The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear
and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
opportunity of cross-examination.
• "The opponent", demands confrontation, for the purpo

PEOPLE VS NAPAT-A

FACTS:

The accused-appellant, Susana Napat-a, was convicted of drug-

pushing by the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Baguio City, and
sentenced “to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) PESOS without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.”

The contents of the brown carton box were referred to Lt. Carlos
Figueroa, a forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp
Bado Dangwa, for examination. In his Chemistry Report No.
D-019-85 (Exh. G), Lt. Figueroa affirmed that a qualitative
examination of the specimens taken from the brown carton box
showed them to be marijuana.

ISSUE: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE THOUGH NOT

FORMALLY OFFERED
HELD:

Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in convicting her in

view of the prosecution’s failure to present to the Court the brown
carton box (Exh. B) and its contents (dried marijuana leaves) (Exhs.
C, D, E and F) is not well taken. Carlos V. Figueroa, Forensic
Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, testified that the box and its
contents were presented, identified and marked as exhibits in court
(t.s.n. November 6, 1985, pp. 3-8). The subsequent loss of these
exhibits did not affect the case for the trial court had described the
evidence in the records (t.s.n. April 13, 1988, p. 2). In People vs.
Mate, 103 SCRA 484, we ruled that “(e)ven without the exhibits
which have been incorporated into the records of the case, the
prosecution can still establish the case because the witnesses
properly identified those exhibits and their testimonies are
recorded.” Furthermore, in this case, appellant’s counsel had cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on those exhibits.

US VS CABARABAN

FACTS:

This appeal brings up for review a judgment of the Court of First

Instance of the Province of Misamis, condemning the defendant,
Andres Cabaraban, to six months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of
P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
the payment of the costs of the cause for a violation of the first
paragraph of article 491 of the Penal Code. (Trespass/entry to
dwelling)

About 12 o'clock on that night the defendant was discovered in the

room occupied by Getulia and her children, hiding behind an
"harigue." On being discovered the defendant ran down the steps
and escaped through the room below, leaving his hat upstairs by one
of the windows. A bamboo ladder was found on the outside, set up
against the house under this window. The defendant admitted that he
was in the house at the time indicated, but testified that he was there
on the invitation and by the consent of Getulia Neri. And this is the
principal question involved in this case.

In support of his defense to the effect that he was in the house on the
invitation of Getulia Neri, the defendant testified that he had been
having amorous relations with Getulia for some time; that he had.
frequently entered the house on Getulia's invitation prior to the night
in question; and that these facts were known by other people. The
defendant offered in evidence a photograph of Getulia Neri and two
documents which he claimed were letters written by Getulia to him.

The trial court sustained an objection to the admission of the

photograph and the two documents, upon the ground that the
photograph had just been turned over to the defendant by his sister-
in-law on the day before the trial and because the two documents
were neither signed, dated, nor addressed to anyone, and for the
further reason that Getulia denied all knowledge of these
documents, and the defendant failed to prove that they had been
written by her.
ISSUE: documentary/object evidence is refused admission or
excluded. Attached to the record.

HELD:

EXCLUSION OF EXHIBITS.—While it is the better practice

to attach to the record in a criminal case exhibits, to the
introduction of which objections are sustained, yet a new trial
will not be granted where it appears that the failure to so attach
such exhibits was a non-prejudicial error.

PEOPLE VS FIDER

FACTS:

Appellant Fider was charged, together with Ma. Sarah Garcia y

Francisco de Domondon, with violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

On 9 May 1991, Fider was arraigned on the amended information

quoted above and a plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf.

NBI Office, Baguio City, received information from their

confidential informant that Maria Sarah Domondon and her
companion, Renato Fider [accused-appellant herein], were engaged
in the illicit trade (sale) of drugs at her residence. After confirming
the same, a buy bust operation was planned and a team for that
purpose, composed of 8 persons, was formed.

At about 2:00 p.m. of the same day of February 26, 1990, Paul Laita
and Artemio Panganiban went to the residence of Sarah Domondon
upon instructions of Atty. Edward Villarta to make contact for the
purchase of shabu. And upon coming back that same afternoon to
the NBI Office from the residence of Sarah Domondon, Paul Laita
and Artemio Panganiban told [Atty.] Edward Villarta that Sarah
Domondon and Renato Fider agreed initially to sell shabu at P1,200
per gram but later changed their mind when they closed the deal as
the accused ultimately agreed to sell and deliver shabu in exchange
for two hand-guns (revolvers) homemade which will be available
anytime that night when the handguns are delivered in exchange.
And so, Atty. Edward Villarta asked their Chief for two handguns.

Finally, Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban, as planned, entered the

Domondon residence bringing with them the two handguns to swap
with the shabu as agreed. After a few minutes inside the house, both
Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban came out without the two hand-
guns with Paul Laita likewise already in possession of shabu of
about 50 grams wrapped in transparent plastic bag which was the
signal for the NBI team to move in.
Immediately, the NBI team waiting outside swooped down on the
Domondon residence. But before they could enter the door of the
house, Renato Fider closed the door and prevented them from
entering. So the NBI fired a warning shot and then pushed open the
door. And upon the door being opened, they all entered. Atty.
Edward Villarta stayed at the sala monitoring the operation while
Bensheen Apolinar, Paul Laita and Temy Panganiban searched the
house proceeding to the room of Sarah Domondon where they
recovered the two handguns previously swapped, another shabu
contained in a can with the label ‘blue diamond’ wrapped in white
plastic cover and shabu paraphernalia for sniffing composed of a
glass pipe and aluminum foil (Exhibit E to E-4-a).

The trial court erred in finding that there was direct as well as
circumstantial evidence showing that the accused-appellant Renato
Fider was caught in flagrante delicto delivering shabu to poseurs-
buyers Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban in the buy-bust operation
conducted on February 1990 (Decision 9-10).

ISSUE: WON the evidence is sufficient to convict fider

HELD:
No.

After careful examination of the evidence that was submitted before

the trial court, and deliberating on the arguments made by appellant
Fider in his Appellant’s Brief and those made by the Solicitor
General in his “Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief dated 22
February 1993, where he recommended that this Court acquit
appellant Renato Fider, the Court considers that the evidence against
appellant Fider is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction
and that accordingly, appellant is entitled to be acquitted on grounds
of reasonable doubt.

The Court has, in numberless instances, stressed that the burden of

proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged, lies upon
the prosecution and that burden must be discharged on the strength
of its own evidence and not upon the weakness or upon non-
existence of the evidence submitted by the defense. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is indispensably necessary if the constitutional
presumption of innocence is to be overturned in any given case and
the evidence must produce moral certainty on the part of the court,
or that certainty which convinces and satisfies the reasoning and
conscience of those who are to act upon the instance that the
accused is guilty of the crime charged.8 Thus, even if the evidence
submitted by the accused is weak, as where, for instance, it consists
merely of bare denials, the judgment of acquittal must follow if the
prosecution fails to discharge its onus probandi

PEOPLE VS DIMALANTA

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:
In the case at bar the evidence for the prosecution is concededly
weak. In such cases, even if the evidence for defense is also weak,
the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view
of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused
enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of two or more
inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt,
the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must
acquit.

Courts are mandated to “put prosecution evidence under severe

testing.” Furthermore, the constitutional presumption of innocence
requires them to take “a more than casual consideration” of every
circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused.24 The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.25 Considering the failure of the prosecution to discharge
its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence, it is not only appellant’s right to be freed; it is, even
more, this Court’s constitutional duty to acquit her.

PEOPLE VS CATANYAG

FACTS:
Ariel Catanyag and Elizabeth Calderon were legally married at
Cainta, Rizal, on August 18, 1983 by Mayor Benjamin Felix. By
1988 they had separated.

Elizabeth was engaged in the business of buying and selling ready to

wear clothes with her mother and was staying at her sister Girlie
Nery’s house in Taytay Rizal.

Sometime in December 1988, at about 4:00 in the afternoon,

respondent entered the house of Girlie without permission. Girlie,
who was fixing her wedding dress at that time, saw the respondent
and asked him what he wanted in which the respondent answered
that he was looking for Elizabeth, but Girlie denied that Elizabeth is
in the house. However, the respondent insisted and started looking
for Elizabeth around the house. The respondent chanced upon
Elizabeth’s niece who informed him that Elizabeth was upstairs.
When Elizabeth was about to go down the stairs, she saw the
respondent and turned around to avoid him. However, the
respondent followed him where they had a quarrel as the respondent
wanted to live with Elizabeth again. Elizabeth ran down the stairs
and rushed to the comfort room to hide but was again followed by
the respondent. Girlie heard Elizabeth shouting and asking for help,
however, when she tried to open the door, it was blocked by the
respondent who was stabbing Elizabeth with a “batangas knife vente
nueve.” After stabbing Elizabeth, the respondent proceeded against
Girlie and pointed the knife towards her but was prevented by
Elizabeth; however, he went back to Elizabeth and started stabbing
her again. Thereafter, the respondent chased Dante (who came for
rescue but was unarmed) out of their house and left the premises.
Elizabeth was rushed to the Angono District Hospital but later
pronounced dead due to severe hemorrhage in the emergency room.
Appellant alleges that the degree of insanity which he suffered at the
time he killed his wife was such as to override his reason and
judgment and create in his mind an uncontrollable impulse to
commit the offense.

ISSUE: is accused Insane at the time of the commission of the act?

HELD:

NO. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a

crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
burden of proving it.

In order that this exempting circumstance may be considered, it

must be clearly established that the accused was completely
deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged.

Dr. Canlas admitted that the examinations he made on the appellant

in 1990 did not show that his judgment and mental faculties were so
totally impaired as to warrant the conclusion that his mental
condition in 1988, when he committed the crime, and in 1990, when
he took the tests, was the same so that his guilt or mental
competence at the time he killed his wife may not be reasonably
doubted.

PEOPLE VS PRING
FACTS:

In an Information dated 21 February 2000, appellant Wenceslao

Espino, Jr. y Saura, alias “Joe Pring” was charged with the crime of
rape, as defined and penalized under Articles 266-A5 and 266-B6 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed against AAA with
lewd designs have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, a fourteen
(14) year old girl, against her will and without her consent.

In this case, appellant’s first assignment of error hinges on the

credibility of the victim’s testimony. The appellant sought to impugn
the credibility of the victim on the bases of her reputation as a
habitual delinquent and of her occupation as a beerhouse employee.
Similarly, the appellant firmly averred that the victim was not the
innocent, naïve and unsophisticated girl she projected herself to be.
Thus, her accusation of rape against him should not be given any
credence.

ISSUE: Should the testimony of the witness be given credence?

HELD:
YES.

Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the
credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial
court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are
often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys
the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of
testifying, her “furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath”—all of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. The trial judge,
therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must
be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were
lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

A careful perusal of the records revealed that when AAA testified in

court as regards her ordeal, she described in detail how she was
sexually abused by the appellant on that fateful day of 21 September
1999. Her testimony can be regarded as straightforward, categorical
and candid. A candid narration by a rape victim deserves credence
particularly where no ill motive is attributed to her that would make
her testify falsely against the accused. For no woman in her right
mind will admit to having been raped, allow an examination of her
most private parts and subject herself as well as her family to the
humiliation and shame concomitant with a rape prosecution, unless
the charges are true. Where an alleged rape victim says she was
sexually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that
rape has been inflicted on her person, provided her testimony meets
the test of credibility.

The appellant in this case considered his failure to give money to

AAA as the latter’s motive for charging him with the crime of rape;
such allegation, however, remained unsubstantiated; therefore, it is
self-serving. It is an accepted doctrine that in the absence of
evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely
testify against the accused, her testimony deserves credence. Thus,
the aforesaid allegation of the appellant cannot even shed any cloud
of doubt on the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Further, during
AAA’s testimony before the court a quo, there were instances when
AAA cried while narrating and testifying in court about her horrible
experience in the hands of the appellant. The fact that the victim
cried during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape
charge for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that the
victim felt when asked to recount her traumatic experience.

PEOPLE VS OLVIS

FACTS:

On September 9, 1975, authorities from the Integrated National

Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, received
a report that a certain Deosdedit Bagon is missing.

Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last
seen by his wife in the afternoon of September 7, 1975, on his way
home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided.

A search party was conducted by the authorities to mount an inquiry.

As a matter of police procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca
to question possible witnesses. There, they chanced upon an
unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was
last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein.
The authorities then thereafter picked up Sorela for interrogation.

The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with

Sorela, they were turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo the
Polanco Station Commander. The police thereafter made the three
re-enact the crime. Sorela was directed to lead them to the grounds
where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been buried.

ISSUE: Whether the statements, as any of the extrajudicial

confession can stand up in court.
(Obligation of the witness to answer questions)

HELD:

NO. Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced

confessions come within the ban against self incrimination. The
1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the
proceedings below, says: No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. This constitutional privilege has been
defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has
since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature
acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is
meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence
of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a
criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary
for his conviction." This was the lesson learned from the ancient
days of the inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt.
Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to
disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the
Constitution.

SAPUAN ET AL VS. CA

FACTS:

The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia,

Negros Oriental. It has been occupied since the last World War by
both the petitioners and the private respondents, who now mutually
assert adverse claims of exclusive ownership over the property.

The petitioners built their house near the center of the lot while the
private respondents built their house near the western boundary.
Both parties made tax payments on the lot in the name of Alfonsa
Ohoy and caused separate surveys to be made on the land.
The petitioners claim the land by virtue of separate sales made by
the original owners, namely, Alfonsa Ohoy, Luciana Ohoy, Porfirio
Ohoy and Maria Ohoy, to Candida Favor, Ceriaco Abiera, Josefa
Abiera, and Roberto (or Edilberto) Abiera, the petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest.

For their part, the private respondents claim the same land by
inheritance from their mother, Alfonsa Ohoy, who had in turn
acquired it from her mother after the land had been partitioned
among her children.
After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence of the
parties, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondents.

The petitioners contend that the respondent court failed or refused to

apply to this case the “equiponderance of evidence” rule, which
states:

When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in
the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court
will find for the defendant.

ISSUE: Is the contention correct?

HELD:
No.

The general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By
“preponderance of evidence” is meant that the evidence as a whole
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of

evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such
facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far
as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not
necessarily
with the greatest number.
We find that this case turns mainly on questions of fact, which have
been correctly appreciated by both the trial court and respondent
court. Their conclusions in favor of the private respondents are
based on the evidence of record and there is no reason for this Court
to reverse or modify them. Absent a convincing showing that the
challenged decision was reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such
evidence, our clear and only duty on appeal is to uphold the courts
below.

We so affirm.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.

MUN. OF CANDIJAY VS CA

FACTS:

The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is

within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the
Municipality of Alicia. The Lower Court ruled that Barangay
Pagahat was within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff
municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part
and parcel of its territory and further permanently enjoined
defendant municipality of Alicia to respect plaintiff’s control,
possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never
to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the
same barrio.

Court of Appeals rejected the boundary line claimed by petitioner

because it would place practically all of barrio Pagahat and other
barrios within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Candijay. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far
exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her.
After an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and
respondent submitted as exhibits, that both plans are inadequate
insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between
Candijay and the Municipality of Mabini.

After weighing and considering the import of certain official acts,

including EO 265 (creating municipality of Alicia and Mabini) dated
September 16, 1949 and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission
dated October 31, 1903, concluded that Barrio Bulawan from where
Barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios
constituted as part of the Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they
show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of Candijay. Therefore the CA,
applying the equiponderance rule, dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been rejected by the

respondent Court, petitioner came to this Court, alleging (i)
improper application by the respondent Court of Appeals of the so-
called principle of “equiponderance of evidence,” for having based
its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which,
petitioner claims, are void.

ISSUE: Is the application of the principle of equiponderance of

evidence proper?
HELD:

Yes. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the

respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter
tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to
be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.

In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in

dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402, may leave the
parties where they are or may not resolve their problem one way or
the other, is of no moment. The fact remains that, as correctly
evaluated by the respondent Court, neither party was able to make
out a case; neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail
with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they
proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can
only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but
to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

PEOPLE VS BERNARDO

FACTS:

Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision convicting

them of Kidnapping for Ransom and imposing on each of them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law and to indemnify the victim, Paul Cruz.
On September 27, 1988 at about 6 to 7 A.M., they executed the
kidnapping. Ignacio, Victoria, Pulongbarit, Borja and driver Daniel
Iral, almost simultaneously alighted from the 2 cars that blocked
Paul's car. Victoria pointed a gun at Paul and ordered him to come
with them because their boss would like to speak to him. Paul could
not but comply.

In rejecting the defense of alibi, the trial court, convicted the

accused-appellants

Accused-appellants Rodolfo S. Bernardo, Reynaldo Pulongbarit,

and Melquiades Ignacio appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
in appreciating the alleged weak evidence adduced by the
prosecution.

Bernardo, through counsel, admitted that the instructions given to

Gallarza regarding the robbery-kidnap plan, contained in a four-
page "Intropin" pad (Exh. "A"), were his own handwriting. Exhibit
"A" was presented not by the police authorities but by Gallarza who
received it from Bernardo himself.

Bernardo insists on the alleged affidavit of recantation (Exh. 8)

executed by Gallarza before State Prosecutor Brenda Lumabao. But
this affidavit was repudiated weeks later by Gallarza who said that
he was only forced to sign it.

ISSUE: is the affidavit of recantation reliable?

HELD:

No, it is not reliable. affidavits of recantation can easily be secured

from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration, and the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits
as exceedingly unreliable.