Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No.

193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group
(PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on
her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining
PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as
opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the
list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity,
which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the
private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
The CA held that Art .1333 does not violate the petitioner’s constitutional right to free speech
and expression, since the right to free speech does not guarantee an unbridled license to say
whatever one wishes, and that notoriously offending and insulting words are considered as
unprotected speech while done inside a place of religious worship. Since the freedom of speech is
not absolute, such freedom must be balanced with the requirements of equally important public
interests. Art. 133 guaranties the free exercise of one’s religion and the preservation of the sanctity
and solemnity of places of worship.
Art. 133 also does not encroach upon the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the
purpose of the provision is for the unbelievers of a religion to respect the rights and beliefs of
believers who are equally entitled to the State’s protection, and in order for them to have a peaceful
and orderly co-existence. The distinction made between those who have a religion and those who
don’t is reasonable, and Art. 133 is germane to the purpose of the law which is to protect the rights of
the religious and their free exercise thereof.
Art. 133 also does not infringe the non-establishment clause of the Constitution, as the
purposes of the provision, though beneficial and advancing the interests of those practicing religion, is
secular in nature and not violative of the non-establishment clause, because there will only be a
violation of the non-establishment clause when the State shows preference for religion over no
religion. Art. 133 addresses a crime against the free exercise of religion clause, as its purpose is to
impose measures to those who ridicule and show disdain in a place of religious worship or in
celebration of a religious ceremony.
Art. 133 cannot be held to be a shield of religion against criticism, as it does not penalize
criticisms, but only those who perform notoriously offensive acts against the feelings of the faithful
inside a place of worship or during the celebration of a religious ceremony.