Restoring Elite Accountability in Popular Government

Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular
Government
Author(s): John P. McCormick
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 2 (May, 2006), pp. 147-163
Published by: American Political Science Association
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American Political Science Review Vol. 100, No. 2 May 2006
Contain theWealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite

Accountability to Popular Government
JOHN P. MCCORMICK University of Chicago
odern republics neglect to establish formal institutions that prevent wealthy citizens from
exerting excessive political influence and they abandon extra-electoral techniques traditionally
employed to keep office-holders accountable. Inspired by GuicciardinVs and MachiavellVs
M
reflections on the Roman, Venetian, and Florentine constitutions, this article highlights three forgotten
practices that facilitate popular control of both economic and political elites: magistrate appointment
procedures combining lottery and election, offices or assemblies excluding the wealthy from eligibility,
and political trials enlisting the entire citizenry inprosecutions and appeals. I present a typology of regimes
that evaluates the wealth containment potential of various magistrate selection methods, and propose a
hypothetical reform supplying the U.S. Constitution with a "Tribunate" reminiscent of elite-accountability
institutions in pre-eighteenth-century popular governments.
The political impact of resource inequality is disproportionately or the possibility that they will ma
an
increasingly vexing problem in contempo nipulate the behavior of less-wealthy citizens who do
rary democracies, especially the United States manage to
gain office. As a result, the institutional ar
(Fraser and Gerstle 2005; Krugman 2003; Phillips rangements of modern republics may better realize the
2002). An enduring hallmark of popular government policy preferences and interests of the few than those
is the expectation that politics will be accessible and of the many.
to all citizens on a ba When the constitution-framers of modern re
responsive relatively equal
sis. Yet democratic theorists and policy analysts
cur
publics, especially the United States, did look beyond
seldom raise a that was central to the office-holders to consider so
rently question potentially pernicious
life of pre-eighteenth-century republics: what institu cial groups, they most frequently identified citizens
tions will prevent wealthy citizens from dominating with less or no
property?the masses, the mob, the
the political process? The motivations and resources multitude?as the principal threat to the stability of
of the wealthy were often considered among the chief government and the liberty of fellow citizens (Farrand
threats?sometimes, the greatest threats?to stability 1966, vol. I, 423, vol. II, 203-4; Nedelsky 1991). The
and liberty in such regimes. Unless formally restrained, preeminent dangers facing republics are avariciously
the richest citizens tended to use their privilege to mo or fanatically motivated popular majorities who ex
lest fellow citizens with impunity and direct the work propriate
or persecute vulnerable minorities. Although
ings of government toward their own benefit rather the Framers sometimes entertained the notion that
than toward that of the general citizenry. Wealthy in wealthy citizens could threaten a republic's liberty
dividuals and families would often subvert popular (Farrand, vol. I, 146-47; Meyers 1981, 395), they ex
governments, maneuvering them in more narrowly oli plicitly designed the U.S. constitution to "control the
or autocratic directions, even, on occasion, and the that is, the magistrates
garchic go government governed,"
ing so far as to deliver them over to foreign powers (see and the majority of the people (Hamilton, Madison,
Baehr 1997; Martines 1979; and Molho Raaflaub, and and Jay [1788] 2003, nos. 10 and 51).
Emlen, 1991, 251-354). I contend that the socioeconomic disposition of mod
On the contrary, modern republics conceptualize
ern republicanism and the institutional choices that
control of elites in narrowly political terms: their con follow from it have deleterious implications for con
stitutions concentrate almost on the in temporary democracies. After all, the latter are no
exclusively
appropriate power and influence that public officials, less vulnerable than their historical antecedents to cor
not wealthy citizens, might wield. Even when enacted ruption, subversion, and usurpation by the wealthy
within relatively class conscious contexts (see Hunt (Domhoff 2001). Compelling evidence suggests, on the
1984; Fitzsimmons 1994), these constitutions never ex one hand, that money more than votes, and resources
plicitly guard against either the likelihood that wealthy rather than rights decisively determine policy in the
individuals will fill the ranks of elected magistracies republics of our age (see, critically, Kersh 2003); and,
on the other, that election, the institutional centerpiece
of modern democracy, is a less than robust means
fully
John P. McCormick is Professor, Department of Political Science, of keeping public officialsaccountable (Przeworski,
University of Chicago, 5828 South University Ave., Chicago, IL 60637
(jpmccorm@uchicago.edu). Stokes, and Manin 1999). Democratic accountability
I thank the following for comments and criticisms on earlier ver may even more formal, direct, and
require vigorous
sions of this essay: Seyla Benhabib, Carles Boix, Dan Carpenter, control of political and socioeconomic elites than even,
Yasmin Dawood, Arthur Jacobson, Bernard Manin, Mara Marin, for instance, contemporary campaign finance reform
Patchen Markell, Michael Neblo, John Padgett, Alan Patten, ers propose (Behn 2000).
Nancy Rosenblum, Frances Rosenbluth, Melissa Schwartzberg, Lee
Susan Stokes, Bruce Western, Iris as well as three Reflections on the history and institutions of ear
Sigelman, Young,
anonymous reviewers for the APSR. lier republics suggest that the accountability problems
147

Elite Accountability May 2006
plaguing contemporary democracies are structural and magistrates, and it proposes that the U.S. Constitution
require substantive reforms to correct them. Inspired be amended with a hypothetical elite-accountability
by the writings of Floren institution that combines the randomization, wealth
early-sixteenth-century
tine republicans, Francesco Guicciardini and Niccol? exclusion, and use of popular denunciation/appeal so
Machiavelli, I excavate extra-electoral in pre-eighteenth-century con
techniques by prominent republican
which common citizens constrained citizens stitutions and populist reform
wealthy proposals.
and public magistrates in ancient, medieval, and Re
naissance republics, and imagine how these techniques
be reconstructed within democ
PART I.ELITE ACCOUNTABILITY IN
might contemporary
racies. This refocuses attention on the cen
PRE-EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY REPUBLICS
enterprise
trality of class in the domestic politics of republics
(see Aristotle 1997; Boix 2003, 6-16, 47-58; Yack 1993, Mixing Lottery and Election
and revives the resources
republics attempt to keep
209-31) argument that the The constitutions of modern
of the wealthy along with the wide discretion in three
enjoyed public officials accountable and responsive
by office-holders?not the purported ignorance, envy, principle ways: through the reward/sanction scheme
indifference, and of the general of election and prospective the institutional
caprice citizenry?pose reelection,
the principle threats to the liberty of such regimes.1 of powers, and,
counterposition functionally separated
The writings and interactions of Guicciardini and in extreme cases, the threat of
by removal-through
Machiavelli, who reflected at length on the political conducted
impeachment procedures by other public
history of their native city, as well as on constitutional officials. All citizens are formally eligible to hold of
arrangements in the ancient Roman and contempo fice in such schemes, and the category "elite" applies
rary Venetian mark a crossroads
technically only to those who do. These constitutions
republics, in the his
tory of Western political thought. Machiavelli is of

posit a sociologically anonymous political subject, "the
ten dubbed the "founder" of modern political science, out of which political elites are
sovereign people,"
modern or itself re made and unmade elections. These
republicanism, "modernity1' (cf., through general
spectively, Plamenatz 2006; Pocock 1975; Strauss 1958). institutional and the principles
arrangements underly
But because he recommends that class division and
ing them would strike many adherents of premodern
class conflict be built into the constitutions of popular as odd, and
popular government unjust, dangerous.
government, Machiavelli's can be read as the If wealthy citizens are free to stand for all magis
writings
most radical summation, if last gasp, of traditional pop tracies, if can in every coun
they participate public
ulist republicanism. On the contrary, Guicciardini is the cil, and if unqualified election is the only device that
largely unacknowledged father of modern democracy determines or the
office-holding assembly-attendance,
understood as elective oligarchy: it was Guicciardini would maintain distinct and persistent
wealthy political
who first theoretically combined unqualified elections, over poorer citizens. Wealth enables such
advantages
wide suffrage, and general eligibility to hold office citizens to cultivate a more distinc
greater reputation,
within a framework modern tive appearance, and (traditionally at least) better pub
anticipating representa
tive government (Gilbert 1965; Manin 1997,53-54,70). lic speaking skills such that voters almost inevitably
as one political epoch, presciently articulated choose them in electoral contests
Writing (Manin 1997, 132
summarized
by Guicciardini, eclipsed another, vividly 60). In addition, financial resources allow the wealthy
by Machiavelli, these thinkers offer fresh but histor to fund, groom, and/or bribe candidates
nonwealthy
ically informed insights into the elite accountability to serve their interests at the
expense of broader con
institutions available to republics generally. stituencies. Put election is a magistrate selec
simply,
Part I of the essay is historical and interpre tion method that directly and indirectly favors the
tive, on institutional alternatives to mod and keeps political offices from being dis
focusing wealthy
ern, election-fixated methods of and citizen tributed widely citizens of all socioeconomic
selecting among
excluding means of controlling elites. Machiavelli and
backgrounds.
Guicciardini analyzed magistrate appointment proce Ancient democracies assumed that law and public
dures combining lottery and election, considered of would not the common unless
policy express good
fices and assemblies reserved for common
exclusively large numbers of nonwealthy citizens participated in
as to wealthy and weighed the appro
opposed citizens, government by holding office themselves. Wealthy citi
priate roles of magistrates versus the general citizenry zens, to the contrary, were to
despitepromises expected
in accusing and judging public officials and/or powerful pursue own
their interests, and not those of the general
citizens suspected of political impropriety. Part II of the on ascension to office?a exacerbated
populace danger
article is analytic and prescriptive; it explicates a typol in electoral systems where the wealthy monopolize
ogy of based on the of and offices. To avoid the "aristocratic effect" of election
regimes arrangement lottery
election in the nomination and appointment of public 1997, 42-93), ancient democracies
(Manin assigned
most citizen-wide lotteries or "sorti
magistracies by
tions" and observed frequent rotation in office (Jiansen
1
The idea thai the people cannot or should not participate much 1991, 230-31; cf. Duxbury 1999). In keeping with the
beyond choosing which set of elites rule or represent them is
egalitarian aspirations and distrust of oligarchy charac
prevalent in economic models of democracy inspired by Joseph
models terizing such regimes (Ober 1993), lottery conducted
Schumpeter, neo-republican inspired by the U.S. Founders,
and approaches both: see, respectively, Przeworski over the entire ensured that the wealthy and
combining 1999, citizenry
23-55; Hamilton 1997. 1-1S; Posner 2004. notable would have little chance of to an
governing
148

American Political Science Review Vol. 100, No. 2
extent exceeding their percentage of the citizenry; it zens collected in a large assembly, the Great Council
guaranteed that offices would be distributed randomly (see Silvano 1990, 41). However, these works begin to
among all classes. Moreover, the regular and frequent reveal a preference for elections over lot in the final
turnover of office ensured that wealthy magistrates appointment of magistrates.
could deploy their greater financial resources neither In the "Discorso," Guicciardini suggests that the ap
to ensconce themselves in an office nor to influence process for the republic's executive commit
pointment
or determine the appointment of like-minded or simi tee, the Signoria (or Priorate), and for other governing
successors. As sortition be re-formed as follows: the names
larly interested straightforward committees, agreed
became increasingly rare in Western popular govern on and submitted by the lot-determined nominators
ments, republics attempted to ameliorate the aristo should be voted on in the Great Council, and those
cratic effect of elections and ensure wider distribution who win a
majority may then be voted on
again,
or
of offices in two alternate ways: by combining election submitted to sortition to determine who will actually
with lottery-like randomization measures and/or by
es fill the open position(s) (DL, 126-27). In this scheme
tablishing class-specific eligibility stipulations for spe the lot-election combination is fairly complex: lottery
cific offices. The first strategy is the focus of this section. ensures that nominators will be chosen at random and
Francesco Guicciardini [1483-1540], a patrician who hence cannot be expected to have a
preconceived bias
served Florence as a statesman and historian, first toward the kind of candidates they eventually name.
fully articulated the intuition that so disturbed ancient The presumably diverse set of candidates that results
democrats and that James Madison would later sys is then submitted to election, such that Guicciardini
tematize: elections produce virtually the same aristo likely expects the most wealthy or notable individuals
cratic effect whether or not voters are sepa to have an both demo
formally advantage. Having incorporated
rated from an electable elite (Guicciardini [1524] 1994, cratic and aristocratic elements into the appointment
[1530]. 2002, 381-438; Hamilton, Madison, and Jay process through the use of lottery and election up to
[1788] 2003, nos. 10, 37, 39, 57, 60, 63). General elec this point, Guicciardini is ambivalent in the final stage
tions, especially if conducted in a large population or about whether to use the democratic or aristocratic
over a wide tend to elevate the most virtuous, method. But when how such a combination
territory, observing
prudent, just (read: wealthy) citizens to office (in the of lot and election actually worked in reality, Guicciar
British context, see Bagehot [1867] 2001 ).On his way to dini ismore skeptical of lottery and more enthusiastic
these conclusions about election, Guicciardini critically of election as the decisive mode of appointment.
the mixing of sortition and election charac In the History, when he discusses Florence's consti
analyzed
teristic of Florentine politics in his youth, an analysis tutional innovations of 1497-99 (see Rubinstein 1954,
from which we may draw contemporary lessons. 154), Guicciardini reports that the move from election
The many different republican constitutions that to lot at the definitive stage of magistrate appoint
Florence observed from the thirteenth through much ment expanded the effectual pool of possible office
of the fifteenth century attempted to neutralize antag holders from 200 members of the best families to a
onisms corresponding with external alliances, family much wider, much less "suitable," segment of the citi
rivalries, and the like (see, chronologically, Najemy zenry (HF, 128-29). Taking into account Guicciardini's
1982; Brucker 1977; Rubinstein 1966, 1954; Butters aristocratic prejudices, we might question whether the
1985; Stephens 1983; cf., also Bock, Skinner, and Viroli, newly appointed magistrates really were unsatisfactory
1990, 1-71). But class conflict between the ottimati, (see Butters 1985, 36). More importantly, the episode
members of families with wealth and good name, and suggests that election used in tandem with lot, especially
the or the was a intense in the ultimate moment of can
pop?lo, people, consistently appointment, produce
form of competition playing itself out in the struggle much more equitable and less oligarchic effects than
for office. The ottimati preferred
a stretto or narrow election used by itself or as the final means of selection.
regime inwhich a few prominent citizens from patrician On the basis of Guicciardini's own account, it appears
families (magnati) or wealthy guilds (popolani) rotated that when election serves a
narrowing function in ad
magistracies of long duration under short reeligibility vance of lot as the definitive mode of selection, the elec
The people, lower guildsmen and workers torate is much less biased toward "distinction" when
stipulations.
not organized in guilds (pop?lo minuti or sottoposti), winnowing down the number of candidates. Although
pursued
a governo largo,
a more
widely participatory the requirement that a nominee gain an initial fifty
regime in which many more citizens held office due to percent vote of approval
ensures
against the emergence
relaxed property and residency requirements, shorter of candidates who would be completely unacceptable
terms, and stricter limits on
re-appointment. to the ottimati (Butters 1985, 36), the citizenry assem
Writing during the republic established under the bled in the Council have the opportunity to vote at the
influence of Friar Girolamo Savonarola after the ex for a group of candidates with a wide
narrowing stage
pulsion of the Medici in 1494, the young Guicciardini range of personal qualities, social backgrounds, and
discusses election and lottery
as means of nominat political opinions. We may conclude that the option
ing and appointing magistrates. In both his History of to approve more than one candidate electorally
some
Florence ([a 1508] 1970, 106, hereafter HF) and "Dis what neutralizes the impact of qualities like wealth and
corso on Order to Government" on the electorate when citizens know that
Bringing Popular notability
([1512] 1998, 126, hereafter DL), Guicciardini seems they
are
leaving the ultimate "choice" of magistrate to
content with lot as a method that draws a group of chance, that is, the In other words,
lottery. something
nominators from the 3,200 citi less than the "aristocratic effect" when, on the
among approximately prevails
149

one hand, elections a slate of candidates wider version of it as a model for and future popu
produce present
than, say, two individuals, or, on the other, when lar governments. Machiavelli in particular,
they emphasizes,
winnow down a large slate to something like half a Roman political institutions that excluded wealthier
dozen candidates who will gain office eventually on citizens, operated as much as possible beyond their
the basis of lot. influence, or focused directly
on
opposing them. As a
His critical stance in the History notwithstanding, relatively low-bornand poor official in the Savonarola
Guicciardini's relative openness in the "Discorso" to founded Florentine republic (Black 1990, 97; Gilbert
election or lot as the decisive means by which indi 1965, 172-74; Najemy 1990, 117; Ridolfi 1963, 130
viduals become magistrates such as
"priors" in the 32), Machiavelli was especially sensitive to the mo
Signoria may be explained by his lifelong campaign to tives and behavior of the wealthiest and most powerful
establish a proper senate in Florence. Like many Flo of the who the ad
segments society, grandi, acquire
rentine ottimati, Guicciardini attributed the longevity vantages they enjoy through an unquenchable appetite
and stability of Venice's "mixed constitution" to the to oppress (1.5). He distinguished the grandi from the
preeminence of its Senate over the Doge and its Great rest of the citizenry, from the people, whose appetite
Council?that is, of the constitution's "noble" over its is not to dominate others, but only to avoid oppres
"kingly" and "popular" elements (Gilbert 1968, 442 sion. In the Roman context, the grandi, the republic's
62, and 1977, 215-46; Skinner 2002, 126-30, 138-39; wealthy patricians, constituted the senate and monop
148). Once established in Florence, Guicciardini pro olized terms in Rome's major magistracies?especially
to transfer to such a senate most of the pow the consulate, its annually elected, two-member, chief
posed
ers wielded in contemporary practice by the Signoria, executive.
the Great Council, and, that constitution's life-tenured For holding back the "insolence" of the grandi,
chief executive, the Gonfalonier of Justice. In other Machiavelli lavishes his highest praise on an institu
words, Guicciardini may not mind employing lot to tion of the common people, the "tribunes of the plebs"
constitute political bodies that he hopes eventually to (1.3; cf. Coby 1999, 25-31, 60; Lintott 1999,11-15,121
emasculate. Perhaps not surprisingly then, lot plays no 28, 205-11; McCormick 2001, 299-301; Nicolet 1980,
role in determining the composition of his proposed 325, 340-59). According to Machiavelli, the grandi's
200-member senate. More than half of the senate would insolence, and the appetite for domination from which
bypass the Council's central function of directly or in it arises, are threats to the liberty of citizens, and to the
directly appointing magistrates. Although the Great stability of republican regimes: the grandi will even
Council would regularly elect 80 citizens tofinite terms tually raise up a
prince
or enlist a
foreign power to
as senators, in addition, as many as 120 former mag further their inexhaustible efforts at oppressing the
istrates and ambassadors would assume or the latter will resort to such measures them
immediately people,
lifetime membership in the senate without a Council selves for protection from or in retaliation for persis
vote (DL, 137). tent abuse. The tribunate's success in acting on behalf
A possible rationale for legitimating such appoint of Rome's plebs (plebeians) or poorer citizens earns it
ments, unstated by Guicciardini, is that the Council Machiavelli's praise as the one domestic institution
had or "selected" these individ above all others to Rome's
already "approved" contributing extraordinary
uals when they originally served in the Signoria, on ability to maintain liberty and attain glory. Over the
other government committees or as ambassadors. But a course of Roman republican history, two to five to a
cynic might read the proposal as doubly oligarchic: the dozen plebs would serve as tribunes for 1-year terms.
rotating members of the senate are "aristocratically" The plebeians elected the tribunes in their assembly,
elected, not assigned through the quasi-democratic the concilium plebis, which excluded patrician citizens
method of sortition; and they themselves are outnum (1.18, 111.30; cf., Lintott, 43, 53, 54, n. 67; Taylor 1990,
bered a set of nota
by grandfathered-in, permanent, 60-64).
bles. However, the Council would play some limited Hie tribunes conducted deliberation over the pas
role in replacing permanent members of the senate sage of law (the plebiscite) in the concilium. Then
once die or retire, to Guicciardini's bodies were "sacrosanct"; that is, patricians could not
they according
plan. By majority vote, the Great Council would choose touch them physically, and the plebs pledged to kill
one of three replacement candidates, scrutinized by the those who did. Relatedly, the tribunes wielded a power
senate and nominated by that body on the basis of an akin to habeas corpus, as
they could demand the release
internal two-thirds vote (DL, 137-38). of plebs who had been seized, for whatever reason, by
a patrician citizen or a Furthermore, the
magistrate.
tribunes vetoed laws favored by the grandi-dominated
Class-Specific and Wealth-Excluding
senate and about to be enacted by their agents, the
Institutions consuls. As I discuss in the next the tribunes
section,
Niccol? Machiavelli's the also wielded the to accuse or
[1469-1527] magnum opus, authority magistrates
Discourses,2 reconstructs the history and constitution powerful citizens of political crimes. Despite the fact
of the ancient Roman and offers his revised that the tribunate was an elected office, because
republic plebs
selected tribunes from their own ranks, class specificity
2
Machiavelli
minimized election's aristocratic effect (Lintott 1999,
[c. 1513-19] 1997, hereafter cited within the text with
book and chapter numbers in parentheses. The interpretation here 120). The wealthiest or most notable citizens among
is fully elaborated inMcCormick n.d. the plebs likely became tribunes on a consistent basis,
150

but itwas only when the republic became corrupt that Signoria, just as their Roman counterparts competed
this became over terms in the consulate, once the realize
consequential (1.4,1.6,1.37). plebeians
Quite strikingly, Machiavelli's reconstruction of Ro that the tribunate is a necessary but not sufficient guard
man
republican politics is, as it were, a tale of two cities: of their liberty against the patricians (1.47).
within the one republic there is, on the one hand, a However, general election did not determine seats
which shadows, on the other, in Florence's class-, or more
poorer, popular polity, Signoria; precisely,
an elite, more one. The former serves as the and randomization charac
wealthy occupational-specification
latter's mirror, its negative image: The grandi delib terized the appointment process. At its most widely
erate policy in the senate, the plebs in the concilium and substantively participatory (1343-48, and espe
(and both in assemblies called concioni [1.4-5, III.34]). cially 1378-82) the republic went so far as to reserve
The senate influences the consuls to enact laws that two of the six seats in the Signoria for members of the
it favors; the people press the tribunes to veto them. three sets of politically recognized guilds: in descend
The consuls wield the power of life and death; but the ing order of wealth and status, the major, minor, and
tribunes deliver plebeians from just such a threat. In minuti guilds. Without such quotas for middling and
deed, it seems that the formal separation of these two lower guildsmen, the rich pop o lani of the major guilds
polities within one allowed the less dangerous one, the and the patrician magnates (when permitted to enroll
plebeian polity that wants only to avoid domination, in the upper guilds) would have consistently dominated
to patrol the one that Machiavelli explicitly claims is offices in the priorate (Najemy 1982, 126-65, 217-63).
more dangerous, a grandi polity that seeks perpetual In the more progressive schemes, the heads of each of
oppression
over others.3 the 23 guilds nominated members of their rank-and-file
There were echoes of this sce whose names were then submitted, with those
"two-polities-in-one" along
nario in medieval Florence and throughout the other nominated by sitting magistrates and ward officials,
Italian republics of the thirteenth century: as the peo into bags (borse). Out of the latter were drawn the num
ple, organized in trade guilds, gained confidence and ber of names conforming with the number of open seats
engaged in political and even armed conflict with their in the Signoria and satisfying the equal distribution
cities' traditional aristocracies, the magnati or
grandi, requirement across higher, middling, and lower guilds.
they set up alternative institutions within the com Unlike citizen-wide general elections, or even geo
munes. Alongside the legislative and executive insti graphically demarcated ward-based ones, this proce
tutions dominated the magnates, such as the Coun dure ensured that lower tradesmen, artisans, and
by shop
cil of the Commune and the Podest?, in Florence and keepers had a relatively equal chance of holding office
elsewhere the guild-organized people established the with bankers and owners of large-scale production:
councils of the pop?lo and the office of the people's guild-specific precede a lottery, the results
nominations
Capitano (Martines 1979, 34-62). The grandi and of which met corporate quotas. Nominations supplied
pop?lo both openly competed to be priors within the by all the guilds and the allotment of seats accord
ing to classes of guilds ensured that offices were dis
tributed more among citizens. Successive waves
3 It is widely
often asserted in poststructuralist and Straussian literatures
of oligarchic or princely alterations undermined and
(e.g., Strauss 1958, 134, 169, 250; Vatter 2000, 197) that Machiavelli
understood the grandi as a class that was driven by the desire for glory destroyed the guild-basis of the early Florentine re
or honor rather than the acquisition and preservation of wealth. Yet publics (Brucker 1977; Rubinstein 1966), but the lat
Machiavelli declares quite explicitly that, in the Roman context, the ter's corporate or class specificity is very close to what
grandi "always yielded honors to the plebs without extraordinary Machiavelli to revive with his neo-Roman
it came to "property," it with
attempts
scandals," but when they defended model: socioeconomic in political institu
the utmost "obstinacy" (1.37). Because, according to Machiavelli, specificity
tions better ensures common citizens
the Roman elite cherishes their material goods much more than participation by
their reputation and prestige, economics ought not be dismissed in government than do class-anonymous institutions
too casually as a key factor in Machiavellian domestic politics. In and formally wide, general eligibility for office.
a similar vein, many read Machiavelli as a critic of "the
interpreters
However, it isworth noting that Machiavelli's Rome
Agrarian Laws," a legislative initiative aimed at distributing wealth
from rich Romans to plebeians. Because Machiavelli attributes the derived proposal for grandi- and p op o lo- specific in
seeds of the republic's destruction to the controversies that emerged stitutions in the Discourses avoids a major mistake
from the proposal and promulgation of these laws (1.37), many committed by popular republics in the history of
such interpreters understand Machiavelli to be an opponent of Florence: enemies of the
making outright magnate
redistributive politics and a critic of the deleterious "ennobling" class above the The Florentine were
of the plebeians demands for re guilds. pop?lo
supposedly signified by popular
distribution 229, 231, no. 30). However, Machiavelli's often provoked into disenfranchising the magnates be
(e.g., Vatter,
evaluation of the laws is at best ambiguous: as the previous quote cause these could not refrain from acts of
grandi phys
he understands the obstinacy of grandi to be responsible ical violence and political intimidation
suggests, (Martines 1979,
for the "scandals" that eventually Rome. In fact, he insists
destroy
48-50; Salvemini 1899,198-207). This course of action
that the grandi would have ruined the republic much earlier had
rendered Florentine popular government perpetually
they not been constrained by pro-plebeian policies precisely like the
Laws (1.37). Furthermore, Machiavelli does not denounce unstable as the disenfranchised were
Agrarian magnates always
the tribunes, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, for pursuing redistri eager: either (a) to aid an external enemy against the
as such; he only criticizes the Gracchi for their timing in
bution,
these laws, "not their intention" in proposing
city in the hopes of reassuming their political promi
introducing them, gen nence or to or
(b) co-opt collude with members of
erally (1.37). Machiavelli is by no means the steadfast opponent of
redistributive that many themselves the major, wealthier guilds, especially those engaged in
politics interpreters, perhaps
averse to class-conflict or redistribution, believe him to be. banking and finance, in shutting out the lower guilds of
151

Elite 2006
Accountability _^_May
merchants and artisans and undermining the republic Roman tribunate indispensable
to a free regime. Pop
(Martines 1979, 58-71, 94-110). Machiavelli's model ular government requires, almost paradoxically, both
assures the grandi class of its place within a republic the loyalty of the grandi and the establishment of an
and allows socially mobile upper pop?lo to integrate institution that they inherently detest. Not surprisingly
into itwithout causing the demise of republican forms.4 then, when Machiavelli a constitution for a
proposes
It also ensures that institutions not easily corrupted revived Florentine republic at the request of Pope Leo
by the nobility and "ennobled" popolani are in place X, he very subtly and almost surreptitiously incorpo
to check their privileged positions. Machiavelli slyly rates a tribunate institution, the provosts (proposa),
opens the possibility that the people may kill a class into his plan.
of ottimati who have gone too far in their efforts at In the "Discursus on
Remodeling Florence,"
or enlist a
prince to do so on the people's Machiavelli first proposes the establishment of an ex
oppression,
behalf (1.16,1.27, II.2). But if the grandi are to live and clusive class of 65 life-tenured, elite citizens to take
republics
are to endure, the former must be granted
a turns in the Signoria (Machiavelli [1519-20] 1958, 102,
prominent place in the latter lest the grandi perpetrate henceforth DR).7 He hopes that this reform will satisfy
or coups. the ottimati, the men of "ambitious spirit," who "think
oligarchic princely
In this spirit, Machiavelli often concedes that the they deserve to outrank" everyone else (DF, 738; DR,
Roman institutions dominated by the wealthy citizens, 107-08), and who actively undermined earlier republics
the senate and consuls, had because resented snaring the priorate with "men
greater agenda setting they
and proactive authority than did the tribunes or the of low station" (DR, 102). To satisfy men of "middling"
popular assemblies (e.g., 1.37). However, plebeian in rank, Machiavelli proposes the "Council of the Select,"
stitutions do protect the people from grandi domina a senatorial of 200, life-tenured members; an in
body
tion and provide them with enough negative authority stitution not unlike the one we observed Guicciardini
over grandi behavior to channel it in liberty-preserving propose. Pope Leo himself would determine the initial
ways.5 Conversely,
one
might conclude on this basis, es
composition of these bodies largely comprised of the
pecially with the hindsight provided by Western history republic's upper guildsmen. In addition, Machiavelli
since Machiavelli's day, that a more intimate mixing insists that Leo reinstitute the Great Council as the as
of the two or that the estab reserved for the or
quasi-separate polities, sembly "generality" "universality"
lishment of a
single, sociologically anonymous consti of the people (DR, 110). Although Machiavelli bla
tutional framework, would only allow the grandi to tantly advises Leo to let his "friends" (amici) secretly
overwhelm the people in a fairly unchallenged fashion. determine the results of any elections conducted in the
In fact, in his commentary on Machiavelli's Discourses, Council during the Pope's lifetime (DF, 741 ;DR, 110),
Guicciardini criticizes Rome and Machiavelli's praise subsequently the Great Council itself must appoint
of it on precisely these grounds: if only the Roman replacement members of the Signoria and the Select
patricians had allowed the plebs the formal right to Council, as well as all other officers in the new republic.
stand for offices such as the consulate from the Then, as if almost an to an
begin afterthought already
ning, the plebs would have pursued these offices rarely complete constitutional order founded on the personal
and reluctantly, and they certainly
never would have appointment and election of elite citizens, Machiavelli
agitated of their own magistracy,
for the creation the introduces the office of the provosts,
a
class-specific,
tribunate (Guicciardini 2002, reserved for common
[1530] 391-97). lottery-determined magistracy
It cannot be overstated how difficult it is to sell citizens. His discussion of the provosts is so subtle, ap
the grandi on the establishment of a tribunate, or parently, that most commentators completely ignore it
some functional equivalent thereof (e.g., Cicero 1999, (see, especially, Silvano 1990, 56-61; Viroli 1990, 154
164-67; de Montesquieu 1999, 84).6 A popular magis 55). These provosts will be a subset of 16 "Gonfaloniers
tracy for which the wealthy and well-born are ineligible of the Companies of the People." Machiavelli leaves
is a rarity in the history of republican constitutions. Yet open whether his reconstructed popular Gonfaloniers
Machiavelli considers an institution modeled on the will be selected each year by city ward, by the guilds,
the Great Council, or Leo himself as long as he lives.
But Machiavelli insists that this popular magistracy
4 own account in his Florentine
See Machiavelli's of this collusion not be held by individuals belonging to the signorial
Histories [1525] 1988. Book III, chap. 21, 134-35. Indeed, by his
ottimati or grandi effectively fused old magnate class?grandi must be excluded (DR, 111). And those
time, the Florentine
who serve as provosts must not gain reappoint
families and newer, upper-guild popolani. rapid
s
This negative check on the grandi within Machiavelli's scheme does ment "so that the office will be distributed more widely
not preclude active, positive governing by the people through legisla through the city" (DR, 111). Lottery determines which
tion proposed via the tribunes, and then discussed and voted on in the of the Gonfaloniers serve week- or
popular short,
popular assemblies (1.18). The aversion to rule by the people in post
terms as the
and Mouffe month-long provosts, attending proceed
structuralist democratic theory, generally (see Laclau
in even the best poststructuralist of ings of the Signoria, sitting in on sessions of the Select
1984), ismanifest appropriations
view of what and as members in
Machiavelli (see Vatter 2000, 91-93). But Machiavelli's Council, participating full-voting
the people should actually do?actively and institutionally?was nei the Great Council.
ther so normatively pure nor so practically enfeebled as such readings
insist.
6 7 Florentinarum Re
On Machiavelli's rhetorical strategies for inducing elite audi Italian references correspond with, "Discursus
ences to adopt policies that serve the people, see Dietz 1986 and rum Post Mortem Iunioris Laurentii Medices," inMachiavelli 1997,
McCormick 2006. henceforth DF.
152

InMachiavelli's description, it first appears as if the people, both emotionally and institutionally, to make
are "witnesses" of the two elites accountable. On the one hand, common citizens
provosts merely nonvoting
upper assemblies comprised of their social superiors. will no longer suffer from the delusion that they are
But then he insists that neither the Signoria nor the effectually eligible for higher offices that they actu
Select Council should be permitted to convene without ally seldom attain and, if they do, within which they
provosts present (DR, 111). Moreover, the provosts are
marginalized. On the other, they will not be over
can delay enactment of decisions made by these bod whelmed by the ottimati within the new magistracies
ies and appeal them to their broader, immediately created for them alone. Letting the people use offices
subordinate councils. Machiavelli explains neither why reserved exclusively for themselves in efforts to check
provosts must be designated from among the popular grandi rule and perhaps to re-attain offices from which
Gonfaloniers by lot nor why their terms in any partic they
are excluded better empowers them than formal
ular body
are as short as a week. A plausible
reason
eligibility for all offices, generally. Machiavelli insists
is that lot prevents the ottimati in the upper councils that the Pope's ottimati friends, who will "sit in the
from gaining advance knowledge of exactly which pop highest seats of government," need not fear the loss of
ular Gonfaloniers will be convocating with them as their property from this proposed constitution. Yet he
provosts, thereby thwarting their attempts to corrupt states candidly that the "generality of the citizens" will
or intimidate the beforehand. Moreover, the more allotments of power, "little little," to
provosts expect by
provosts' short terms guard against political cooptation fall into their hands over time. The Great Council, the
while they serve among the ottimati. Machiavelli clearly Gonfaloniers of the Companies of the People and the
a desire that as many citizens as are the vehicles to achieve this.
expresses nonsignorial provosts
possible take part in this office that effectively serves as Machiavellian popular government clearly requires
the people's eyes and ears in the upper coun institutions that both raise the class
republic's class-specific
cils, and that explicitly wields veto or referral power consciousness of common citizens and enable them
over the legislation proposed within them. to patrol more exalted citizens with a
vigor that elec
Machiavelli writes: it is "not good that magistrates tions alone do not provide. For Machiavelli, a basic
should not have somebody observe them and make aversion to
politics and, hence, a natural inclination
them abstain from actions that are not good" (DF, to class-quiescence and deference are attitudes con
742; DR, 112). Machiavelli expects that this popular comitant with common citizens' desire "not to be op
surveilling and vetoing of magistrate behavior will be pressed." The modern, socially homogeneous notion
particularly intense, because common citizens would of the "sovereign people" and the establishment of
now be closed off formally from the highest signorial class-anonymous government institutions play
on the
offices for which they had come to expect eligibility. But people's general disposition not to want to know, or
in taking from common citizens something for which to do anything, about their subordinate position?just
they previously competed at a disadvantage with the as Guicciardini hoped. As a result, wealthy citizens
ottimati, Machiavelli now reserves for them and are free rein to follow
exclusively public magistrates given
much more potent. In the Roman repub their natural inclinations, in Machiavellian terms, free
something
lic, the tribunate functioned as the plebeian answer to rein to oppress others. Machiavelli's constitutional
magistracies from which plebs were formally excluded analyses suggest that the supposed absence of class
initially, and then obtained only with great difficulty?it consciousness in modern republics is not the result
was a counter-consulate, if you will; the tribunes, in of a in material conditions or a
change supercession
effect, counter-consuls. Similarly, in Machiavelli's pro of class as an objective fact?empirical falsehoods, in
posed Florentine republic, the popular Gonfalonier any case (Domhoff 2001; Fraser and Gerstle 2005;
ship functions as a
"counter-Signoria;" the provosts Krugman 2003; Phillips 2002). Social mobility, for in
as
counter-priors.8 This new
popular magistracy, the stance, is too frequently underestimated in the context
Gonfaloniers/provosts, "resembling" but in practice of pre-eighteenth-century republics and notoriously
to the office taken away from the overestimated in the context of ones
counter-positioned contemporary
people, will be, according to Machiavelli, "greater, (Keller 2005; Taylor 2005)?and in neither case does
more useful to the republic, and more honorable" than it obviate the objective reality or political ramifica
was a Signoria nominally open to all citizens (DR, 112). tions of class divisions. On the contrary, Machiavelli
Provoking the people by excluding them from the would attribute the contemporary absence of healthy
most and them a sub class-consciousness and class-contestation to a failure
powerful magistracies giving
ordinate that is nevertheless theirs exclu on the of modern constitutions to re
magistracy part republican
sively isMachiavelli's way of better empowering the mind common
people of their subordination to socioe
conomic and political elites and their failure to provide
8 the people with the proper institutional techniques by
The Gonfaloniers of the Companies of the People originally led the
before evolving into one of the
which they can challenge those elites.
popular militias against the magnates
Signoria's advisory bodies. In the Florentine Histories, Machiavelli
asserts that the popular Gonfaloniers acted ''against the insolence of
the great" (Machiavelli [1525] 1988, Bk. II, Chap. 22, 76), the same
Citizen Accusations and Appeals
function he attributes to the tribunes in The Discourses. Machiavelli
as secretary to the executive
Both Guicciardini and Machiavelli frequently ac
served Florence committee, the "Ten
of Liberty," which was foundeded "to protect the weak from the knowledge the difficulty of keeping prominent citi
strong." zens from boundaries in a
overstepping appropriate
153

122; Guicciardini were denied an appeal to the Council by Savonarolan

republic (e.g., Guicciardini, DL,
[1530] 1965, 85, 130; Machiavelli, DR, 113). Ordi partisans and were summarily executed. Shortly there
of retal after, relatives of the dead Mediceans, with popular
nary citizens intimidated by the prospect
iation by those with greater economic or political support, murdered the principal Savonarolans in retal
resources will not accuse or indict ottimati iation (FH, 142; Machiavelli 1.7).Whether a reflection
readily
citizens of wrongdoing. But if "liberty" is to be more of Guicciardini's general distrust of the Great Council
than an then common citizens must in any circumstance, or a reaction to the inefficacy of
empty slogan,
a "right" of appeal to it in crisis circumstances like
be free to live unmolested and unthreatened by fel
low citizens of whatever rank (Pettit 1999). Com these, Guicciardini's reform seeks to place the appeals
mon people, as well as good-intentioned but perhaps process for all political crimes under the control of an
weak magistrates, must be willing to take steps to ottimati-dommated magistracy only slightly larger than
protect such freedom, and there must be procedures the body that made the initial judgment. This proposal
stands in marked contrast to Machiavelli's ideas on
available through which they can do so in a safe
and orderly manner. According to Machiavelli and political accusations and appeals.
Guicciardini, such procedures must distinguish cor In both the Roman republic and in Machiavelli's
rect from false charges, and provide
an
appeals pro reconstruction of it, any citizen could publicly accuse
are appropriate or malfeasance, or even
cess to insure that convictions (see de a
magistrate of corruption
in
Grazia 1989, 140; Ridolfi 1963, 112, 286n., 18; Ridolfi dict a prominent private citizen for wielding excessive
1968, 172-206). Not surprisingly, Guicciardini political influence. Such an accusation would prompt
places
or a more
the accusation and final appeal processes firmly in a
hearing in a condone formal assembly
the hands of a few public officials, thus anticipating that decides whether the individual in question should
modern retain their office, a fine, suffer exile or execu
citizen-excluding "impeachment" provisions. pay
Machiavelli's recommendations emphasize the insti tion, and so forth. However, Machiavelli emphasizes
tutions and judgment of the entire citizenry, an idea that the tribunes, given their authority with the people
and against the grandi, most effectively leveled accu
largely abandoned by modern republics.
In the "Discorso," Guicciardini assigns his proposed sations. They could compel a patrician citizen or public
senate the role of trying the republic's chief executive, magistrate to give account of their actions before the
the Gonfalonier of Justice, should he be indicted of popular assemblies, rather than allow the people to
crime: a member of the Signoria, not just any citizen "kill him in a tumult" on the street (1.7; cf. Livy 1988,
at large, could denounce the Gonfalonier to the sen Book 2, chaps. 34-39). Machiavelli argues that formal
ate and a cen and popularly accessible accusation procedures punish
request particular punishment including
sure, fine, removal, and even death. But that particular those who deserve it, deter others who might consider
launch only one accusation per term in the misbehavior in the future and prevent the escalation of
prior could
Signoria,
so as not to become a
persistent nuisance factional violence that too often results from unofficial
to the chief magistrate. A two-thirds vote in the sen and arbitrary punishments in such cases: if ambitious
ate would decide the Gonfalonier's guilt or innocence and powerful citizens are "crushed ordinarily"; that is,
and the appropriateness of the proposed penalty (DL, legally, private or foreign forces will rarely be enlisted
147). Other citizens would be tried for such crimes by their friends and family to exact vengeance (1.7).
before an ad hoc tribunal, or quarant?a. Once someone Machiavelli distinguishes accusations, corroborated
accused a citizen or either by facts and witnesses, and directed to legal author
private public magistrate,
anonymously or with personal attribution, to another ities, from "calumnies," anonymous and unsubstanti
magistrate, the latter must call a

quarant?a before which ated charges that are whispered in piazzas, loggias, and
the accused or their proxy must appear. At this point, backrooms (1.8). Although small public councils are
the accuser must come forward as a witness, and the better than no institution at all for airing political accu
tribunal must provide a written decision within one sations, Machiavelli declares a distinct preference for
month If the sentence is death, an appeal is hearing bodies of "very many judges" (1.7). Whether
(DL, 146).
handled in the same way as the Gonfalonier's trial be overly susceptible to intimidation, corruption, or self
fore the senate, mentioned earlier. Therefore, common interest, Machiavelli suggests that small trial and appel
citizens have the right of accusation against magistrates
late bodies such as Florence's Eight of Ward, usually
below the Gonfalonier of Justice, and against other comprised of ottimati, are less useful to a republic than
citizens, but not the right to serve en masse as the body larger assemblies, or the people as a whole. In this
of or to in any context, Machiavelli makes a declaration em
judgment participate appellate capacity. perhaps
When Guicciardini wrote, of death sen blematic of his theory of popular government overall:
appeals
tences for political crimes were directed to the Great such bodies are ineffective because "the few always
Council in its entirety (HF, 106; cf., Machiavelli 1.45). behave in the mode of the few" (1.7, cf., 1.49).
Savonarola, fierce ottimati insisted Both Guicciardini and Machiavelli recognize that
against opposition,
that the people, via a two-thirds vote of the whole ottimati prefer to be tried before and offer appeals
Council, be given the opportunity to commute such to small bodies of their peers rather than larger ones
sentences. But in an infamous case discussed by both composed of the people whom they consider "igno
Guicciardini (FH, 132-33) and Machiavelli (1.7, 1.45), rant" and "envious" (e.g., Guicciardini [1530] 1965,
five ottimati condemned to death for planning to over 76, 123, 125). But Machiavelli uses the Roman case
throw the republic and reinstall the Medici in 1497 of Manlius to illustrate that the people can judge
154

patricians objectively even when the people themselves Athens (Allen 2000; Forsdyke 2005): they both tighten
are a party to the controversy (1.8). When shown that the legal procedures of political trials and exclude the
their champion, Manlius, has calumniated the senate
general citizenry from them. Machiavelli, on the other
for cheating the people, the latter forsake their anger hand, offers a model for punishing prominent citizens
toward the patricians and abandon their support of and public magistrates that is both grounded in the rule
Manlius. Moreover, Machiavelli demonstrates that the of law and inclusive of common citizens.
the tribunes, do not perse
people's magistrates, simply
cute the patricians incessantly on behalf of their pleb
In an instance where the over
constituency. people PART II.RETHINKING ELITE
reacted the after the Decemvirate
against
on popular
patricians ACCOUNTABILITY TODAY
had infringed liberty, the tribunes impose
a moratorium on accusations the
1-year against grandi
Lot, Election, and a Typology of Regimes
(1.45). In other words, Machiavelli suggests that the
ottimati need fear neither a structural disadvantage in Clearly, Guicciardini, Machiavelli, and the republics
political trials where the people are judges nor perpet they analyzed,
were more attentive to the asymmet
ual persecution through accusations by plebeian mag rical power relations that exist between, on the one
istrates. But in where such institutions exist, hand, and citizens and, on the
regimes magistrates wealthy
the grandi ought to think twice about oppressing the other, common citizens, than are most modern repub
people and threatening their liberty. lican political theorists and practitioners. In particu
According to Machiavelli, the lack of legally estab lar, Machiavelli's adaptation of the Roman tribunate
lished and broadly popular accusation procedures in in his constitutional proposal for Florence goes much
Florence was one of the chief causes of the repub further than either traditional or modern attempts to
lic's instability. With an effective accusation process, make offices within republics more fully inclusive and
he avers, Florence could have avoided both the blood widely representative. Certainly, modern democracies
letting of prominent citizens in the wake of the Medici that employ proportional representation or that adopt
Five execution and the enlistment of the Spanish army corporatist
or consociationalist
arrangements are much
during the ouster of Gonfalonier Piero Soderini and better than first-past-the-post, majoritarian systems at
reinstallion of the Medici. Had their ottimati oppo providing
a voice in government to a wider array of
nents recourse to accusation social labor, and more en
appropriate procedures, groups?notably, recently,
the Savonarolans and Soderini would have been either vironmentalists (Grofman and Lijphart 2003; Lijphart
punished or absolved individually, without factional 1992). However, such arrangements are not immune to
violence or the fall of the republic ensuing. But the the criticism that they facilitate "domination by one's
Eight of Ward and the Signoria, ineffective in these own"; that is, party and union elites enjoy tremen
instances, are bodies oftentimes too small dous informational and over aver
respectively, power advantages
to be willing to hear such cases, to judge them properly age members of political organizations in such systems
or to be trusted to refer their decisions to the Great (Michels [1911] 1990). On the contrary, Machiavelli's
Council upon appeal by the convicted. One might draw tribunes cum provosts seem
designed to place mem
the conclusion from Machiavelli's analysis that a body bers of "rank-and-file" plebs in positions of political
as large as the entire citizenry should serve as both the authority
on a
regular basis.
initial judge and the appellate fora in political cases. If Returning to lottery and election as means of se
the magistrates or smaller coll?gial assemblies perform lecting magistrates, each method exhibits "negative"
the first function, matters may never get to the and attributes. In a negative sense, lot keeps
people "positive"
to perform the second one. socioeconomic elites from monopolizing the magistra
Guicciardini and Machiavelli both recognize that the cies, and elections supposedly sanction political elites
greater freedom of action enjoyed by political and so retrospectively. Conceived in positive terms, lottery
cioeconomic elites in republics than in principalities within ancient democracies realized the principle of
(where, according to republican philosophy, only one equitable political participation among citizens; it put
individual is truly "free") was a threat to the liberty of into practice the egalitarian standard of "ruling and
other citizens and to the stability of the regime itself. being ruled in turn" (Aristotle 1997, Book 8, chap. 2).
Yet Machiavelli and other populist partisans of pre For modern advocates of popular government, election
modern republics disapprove of the total exclusion of positively operationalizes the normative principles of
the general from censure, or re the do not rule but consent to
citizenry impeachment, representation: people
moval proceedings directed at suspect public officials. rule by elites whom they choose and who are assumed
Leaving such matters only to political colleagues and to be more adept than the people themselves at acting
rivals in government, as Guicciardini recommends and in the people's interest, even when that interest is best
modern republics do, is a greater invitation to corrup served by policies that defy the popular will at any given
tion than is the practice of putting the ultimate judg nonelectoral moment. The electorate purportedly de
ment in such cases to the people at large. Guicciardini ters abuse of this discretionary latitude by reconsid
and his constitutionalist heirs over an official's and
eighteenth-century ering performance voting accordingly
compensate in an antipopulist manner for the purport during the next election (Fiorina 1981; Powell 2000).
and excessive use of exile, ostracism, and This is, of course, a ancient democracies
edly arbitrary stylization:
public punishment in ancient democracies, particularly, valued expertise, often assigning military and financial
155

FIGURE 1
nominating candidates
1. lot 2. nominators
a. lot b. election c. upper assembly
popular popular oligarchy

A. lot democracy republic republic
appointing
magistrates popular oligarchic oligarchy

republic republic republic
B. election
offices via election; and modern republics value partic Guicciardini consider: identifying candidates and ap
ipation and egalitarianism, if not as much as they do pointing magistrates. In advance of the two major ap
expertise and the norm of "consent" legitimating it. pointment options, lottery and election, candidates for
office may be identified randomly within the citizenry
Ideally, each appointment method offers the follow
to via ran lot, or selected nominators who themselves may
ing advantages popular government: lot, by by
draws on a wide of perspectives be appointed through sortition, election, or by the
domization, spectrum
and talents throughout the citizenry and prevents the choice of small bodies of elites (Figure 1).
wealthy from monopolizing law- and policymaking; cor
Democracy: (1, A). The theoretical combination
election purports to fill the government with worthy uses to a set
responding with (1,A) lot establish small of
and and functions as a
competent magistrates political names (say, six to a dozen) drawn from among the citi
authorization mechanism for citizens who themselves
zenry; names that are then subjected to a second lottery,
cannot or do not wish to hold office. It must be noted assume an open
which determines who will magistracy.
that the advantages of lottery are more verifiable than a no
Indeed, nominating sortition has practical impact
those of election: lot is guaranteed to distribute offices on the overall distribution of offices among eligible
among citizens?in fact,
randomly given demographics, citizens. It might be used to focus public attention on
it is likely to place most magistracies in the hands of a narrower or discarded
group of potential magistrates
poorer citizens. On the other hand, there is no empirical
for a general sortition that fills magistracies from the
evidence demonstrating that those who win elections
whole pool of citizens in a one-stage process. In princi
are especially capable of providing good government
or are significantly constrained in their behavior ple, therefore, (1, A) conforms closely with the ancient
by model that enlists randomization to ensure equitable
We can be certain
retrospective voting patterns. only citizens. For reasons stated
participation among previ
that those who emerge victorious within electoral sys one can such a as a
ously, classify regime quite easily
tems are at winning elections. The drawbacks of
good
democracy.
each method are obvious: the inherent amateurism of
politics conducted by magistrates appointed through Popular Republics: (2, a> A)> (2, b, A), (2, a> B).
lottery and the aristocratic biases of electoral regimes. Things become somewhat murky with the mixing of
As the history of Italian peninsular republics lot and election in these cases. If election is an elite
and Guicciardini's discussion?if not endorsement?of "aristocratic" device, then how can we clas
enabling,
as a
Florence's electoral reforms circa 1497 confirm, the sify a regime that deploys it to any extent "popu
two appointment methods have been combined. One lar" or "populist" republic? This depends on how lot
might expect that various combinations of lottery and is used to mitigate election's aristocratic bias. Model
election could mitigate the respective disadvantages (2, a, A) corresponds almost identically with the demo
of each method, maximize their attributes, cratic one discussed save for the insertion
specific previously,
and possibly satisfy both major social groups who fa of the nominators' discretion over and choice of can
vor them individually. Along these lines, I introduce didates between the two moments of sortition. How
the following typology of regimes that schematizes ever, because lot determines the nominators them
lot, election, and their mixture. There are two selves, their cannot be or
stages preferences predetermined
of the process to fill public offices that we observed discerned in advance. Thus, we cannot conclude that
156

such preferences
are oligarchic
ordemocratic a priori', a result of the randomization at the beginning of the
sometimes their will be mostly one; other on the one hand, and the over
preferences process, indeterminacy
times, mostly the other; and sometimes, mixed. There is the extent of the aristocratic effect in the intervening
sufficient indeterminacy in their nominations that the nominating stage, on the other.
results drawn from the final lottery can be evaluated
as such an A Republic: (1, B). In some sense, (1, B) can be
sufficiently random. Hence, arrangement
a democratic or considered the paradigmatic case of a mixed regime,
possesses populist quality, because any
kind of citizen might hold office as a result. On the politeia or republic, which is ambiguously democratic
and aristocratic, populist and oligarchic. Because lot
other hand, the arrangement enlists the consent and
alone determines candidates, there is no agenda setting
discretion of certain citizens, such that con
cognitive
or preferences imposed by the wealthy in advance; all
siderations of quality (notability, competence, virtue,
citizens, rich or poor, have a substantive, not
factor into the selection of candidates. merely
etc.)
formal, chance to stand for office. On the other hand,
In (2, b, A), the preferences of the nominators might
because the final determination over office-holding is
be determined by the fact that they are elected; hence, one or
secured election of few
the kinds of distinctions that come into play to in through very magis
trates, and notable candidates can be confi
fluence the election of magistrates here: wealthy
may operate
because the nominators are elected the citizens at
dent that they will more often than not attain these
by
offices. This is the regime in the typology that perhaps
large, they may reflect a disproportionately wealthy
most what Aristotle identified
and/or notable segment of the citizenry. There is no closely approximates
as the most of realizable governments, and what
reason to on the basis of evidence just
suppose, provided
and Machiavelli, or the republics that Manin describes as the most stable. Aristotle deemed
by Guicciardini such a regime just because different parts of the polity
they analyzed, that voters use different criteria to
as to candidates. The nomi
contribute their different positive attributes to it (the
judge nominators, opposed
in turn, be expected to select citizens most
excellence and ability of the few versus the desire of
nators, may
as candidates, which would bias the the many for freedom and their good judgment; see
like themselves
ultimate magistracy selection in an overly oligarchic Aristotle 1997, Book 3, chaps. 11, 13, 15; Book 6,
fashion: after all, the subsequent lottery would mostly chap. 8; and Book 8, chap. 2). Manin (1997,128) deems
draw on a of wealthy or candidates.
it stable because neither the oligarchs nor the people
pool wealth-serving
on the 1497 electoral re can be sure that they could benefit from any alteration
However, recall Guicciardini
of candidates were elected in
of the constitutional status quo. The few will likely
forms, whereby slates
rule as a result of election, but because lot
advance of an ultimate lottery that performs the final provides
appointment. Ifwe apply this method to the selection of the people with candidates they can choose to elect
a whole slate of nominators rather than of only one or a candidates not necessarily of the few, if they so desire.
In this way, such a regime differs from contemporary
very few individuals, the aristocratic quality of election, recourse
without to randomization of
in fact, might be minimized in this instance as well. If republics, which,
ensure that the almost invari
election of a large slate of individuals (say, half a dozen any kind, structurally few,
too com
or more) mitigates the aristocratic effect of elections, ably, will be elected. Hence, Manin perhaps
placently affiliates contemporary, exclusively electoral,
then the nominators may reflect a broader spectrum
with the most just version
of political preferences, which might be expressed in representative government
their nominations of candidates, such that the ultimate of a mixed constitution (1997, 238). A republic that
to wealthy magistrates.9 combines lot and election like (1, B) is perhaps equally
lottery may yield alternatives as attainable, more
This would not quite be the case with (2, a, B),
stable, certainly and, arguably just.
which therefore would be the least populist of the pop The Oligarchic A
Republic: (2, b>B). regime where
ular republics: while the nominators would be selected
nominators are elected, where themselves elect a
they
through lot such that there is no a priori bias in fa slate of candidates, and where magistracies are filled
vor of the and the nominators must
through a general election
notable,
wealthy
ultimately among the cit
choose candidates in a process that may or may not,
as an aristocratic effect. More
izenry is an oligarchic republic. There is no control
indicated earlier, have even
for the aristocratic effect at any level, and the
elections make the final determination on
importantly,
softening of this effect that might take place through
the magistracies, a process that advantages candidates
the selection of a wide slate of candidates at the nom
of distinction, whether some or whether most of
only
inating stage is mitigated by the overall, thoroughly
them are in fact notable and wealthy. But this model of the framework. One would
electoral, quality expect
remains within the of a as
parameters popular republic the wealthy or their clients to enjoy disproportionate
at office over common citizens. The
advantage gaining
9 latter possess no claim on such besides hav
I do not consider the "scrutinies" that preceded lottery in the magistrates
Florentine republics to be, as they are often called, "elections," "chosen" them, and the option not
ing by reserving
because the process determining eligibility for magistracies often to reelect them at the time. A
appropriate "primary
culminated with the ratification of over 5,000 names (Brucker 1962,
convention-general election" sequence conforms well
67; Najemy 1982,177). As both Guicciardini and earlier civic human
with this abstract model.
ist, Leonardo Bruni, intuited, judgment over such a large number of
persons who might possibly hold office is not as discriminating as
the selection of one or two individuals to actually hold a specific, Oligarchy: (2> c, B)> (2, c, A), The term oligarchy
available, office. See Bruni [1442] 2004, 73. is usually reserved for a closed system of rule among
presently
157

a few individuals or families. However, this type of not to guarantee every citizen a
rotating term in of
may use constitutional and even fice, nor would that result ensue from them. However,
regime arrangements
enlist some broader segment of the general populace those citizens who are willing and able to serve and
to help sort out appointments that interelite rivalry and yet do not possess the resources to make themselves
faction has rendered controversial. Besides excluding appear "electable" (as do the wealthy and their clients)
lower classes of the regime from a share in govern might actually gain a more reasonable chance to hold
ment, the goal of the oligarchs is to confine the list of office under such reforms. Randomization in these cir
candidates for office to only those individuals among cumstances would not actualize ancient democracy's
themselves that they all can live with no matter what positive aspiration of ruling and being ruled in turn,
the result. The oligarchs may achieve this in two ways but it might help realize the negative one of keeping
that amount to the naming of candidates by an "upper the wealthy and notable from dominating a popular
assembly," "council of notables," or "selection commit government's offices and thereby disproportionately
tee": by constituting themselves formally as a "senate"
determining its policies.
that officially names candidates or by negotiating and
on a group of nominators to select candidates.
agreeing
(If they themselves could agree on candidates, there
no reason measures
The Tribunes Revived
would be to resort to constitutional
at In circumstances where a small or When contrasted with Machiavelli's neo-Roman model
all.) assembly
clique appoints the nominators, the latter presumably of popular government, and his proposal for reinstitut
know which names are acceptable to all of the wealthy ing
a
republic in Florence, contemporary representa
families and leading citizens, and which ones are not. tive democracy suffers from at least two defects: (1) the
In scheme (2, c, B), the names that the nominators pro absence of extra-electoral means by which the general
pose are then submitted to the people for an election. citizenry renders political elites accountable, especially
But such elections are not aimed at garnering popu those exercised through the tribunes and the provosts
lar consent or
encouraging wider participation; rather
(the veto, accusations, and/or plebiscites); and (2) the
they serve the primary function of arbitrating among lack of a
quasi-formal distinction between economic
competing elites (see Wantchekon 2004,17-34). In (2, political elites and common citizens (as well as institu
c, A), lot, the paradigmatic democratic device, serves tions corresponding with it, e.g., a Senate or Council
an oligarchic function because the candidates "in the of the Commune for patricians, ottimati, grandi, etc.,
bag" have already been restricted severely by the pref and a tribunate or concilium plebis for the pop?lo, ple
erences of the wealthy through the nominating body beians, multitude, etc.). Reflections on the aristocratic
that they select. This is, in fact, how lot was used by effect and the privileged access to resources and in
Venice, an oligarchy calling itself a republic, and by formation enjoyed by magistrates inmodern republics
Florence under the Albizzi and Medici regimes.10 suggest that elections are insufficient or at least incom
This Guicciardini-inspired typology puts the con plete mechanisms of elite accountability and respon
stitutions of modern popular governments into some siveness (see Bartels 2002; Przeworski, Stokes, and
institutional-historical perspective, and hopefully will Manin 1999). Moreover, the sociopolitical definition
inspire
more critical analysis
on the normative and of "the people" that includes wealthy citizens rather
practical status of magistracy distribution in such than one that sets the latter apart from or even op
regimes today. The most intriguing regimes in the ty posed to the people allows the wealthy to dominate
pology, for the purposes of this article, are those that common citizens in anonymous and uncontested ways.
combine lot and election in a populist way. If, on either Indeed, Florentine "civic humanism" or "civic repub
empirical ("territorial scale") or normative ("represen licanism," which emphasized socially holistic rather
tation") grounds, lot cannot or should not completely than class- or
guild-contestatory notions of citizenship
supplant election, the randomizing quality of sortition often to legitimate Florence's more oligarchic
served
nevertheless might be incorporated into broader elec republics (Hankins 2000, 75-178). This fact is unfor
toral schemes. Whether lot is used to broaden the range tunately lost on many contemporary political theorists
of candidates who may be voted on in an ultimate and intellectual historians who study and attempt to
electoral stage (1, B) or deployed to fill offices after revive it today, as several critics have noted (see Isaac
candidates have been elected as a slate of nominees 1988; Patten 1996; Jurdjevic 1999; McCormick 2003;
by the general populace (2, b, A), the results would Sunstein 1988).
mitigate the dominance of the privileged over mag Why did late- and post-eighteenth-century repub
istracies in most "representative democracies" (2, b, licans abandon and institutional class
conceptual
B). The intention behind such proposed innovations is specificity while drafting their constitutions? When not
in the excessively mobophobic state of mind mentioned
10 at were
See Lane 1973,110,259. The increasingly wide discretion exercised the outset, perhaps many heartened by what
by the arroti, who performed the scrutinies, and the accoppiatori, who seemed to be a dawning "pluralist" age when a wide
drew names from the bags of eligibility in the appointment lotteries, of numerous social in
spectrum groups, relatively equal
allowed the Albizzean and Mediciean to appear
oligarchy
in form. See Rubinstein
principate
power and influence, might supplant the rich/poor citi
republican 1966, 1-135. Padgett and Ansell
zen cleavage that prevailed in the republics of previous
(1993,1259-1319) suggest that the Medici maintained power in Flo
rence through the clientage system established by Cosimo de'Medici ages (Wootton 1994). Note how Madison, in Federalist
and not by control of appointment mechanisms alone. no. 10, with a discussion of "faction"
famously begins
158

understood in terms of class and inequitable property elite and an agitated, antielitist citizenry. The uni
relations, but increasingly describes factions in terms of tary notion of a
"sovereign people" and strictly elec
a of interests as the essay Cer institutional corre
multiplicity progresses. toral/representative arrangements
tainly, modern republicans fully subscribed to the re sponding with itmay be, on the contrary, inducements
cently developed political idea of absolute, indivisible, to elite insularity and popular slumber (Arnold 1993;
and in a revolution Mansbridge
unitary "sovereignty," transposed 2003).
ary age from monarch to citizenry (Morgan 1989). The Another question iswhy no one has considered buy
notion of a
"sovereign people" and, relatedly, formal ing the wealthy out of the political process altogether:
juridical equality discouraged legal distinctions among as opposed to disenfranchising the magnates without
citizens, particularly any corresponding with socioeco their consent as the early Florentine republic did with
nomic status. But whatever the reasons?sociological deleterious results, perhaps contemporary republics
presumptions of a newly emerging pluralism, politi should offer the wealthy political disenfranchisement
cal prescriptions for a more or in exchange for economic insulation. With in
homogeneous citizenry, "money
other factors entirely?modern constitutional framers politics" an increasingly troublesome issue, we might
clearly demurred from designing institutions that ac consider whether individuals earning
more than, say,
knowledged, addressed, or reflected socioeconomic $150,000 in income, or belonging to households of more
distinctions.11 than $400,000 in net wealth (income, property, and as
If the need for class-specific institutions was under sets),12 should be relieved of all tax burdens as compen
estimated in the eighteenth century, one might expect sation for giving up eligibility to vote, stand for office,
that itwould have become apparent in the wake of the or contribute funds to political campaigns. If fiscally
Industrial Revolution. Intense concentration of wealth feasible, such measures might reduce the political in
and increasing inequality reminiscent of traditional re fluence of capital without simultaneously endangering
publics reemerged as the "commercial republics" the its indispensable productive capability within market
orized by enlightenment political philosophy became democracies (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988).
the "capitalist democracies" of historical reality. Yet Because of the spectacle of the "California Recall"
in such circumstances, critics of democratic deficits in in 2004, popular accusations against sitting magistrates
modern popular governments have not availed them that result in real sanctions may have fallen to a level of
selves of the institutional lessons offered by traditional, ill-repute from which they can never be rehabilitated.13
class-based has no one for But "recall referenda," in principle, be worth re
republics. Why proposed, may
instance, in a U.S. context, the installation of a wealth considering, provided they are implemented in ways
ceiling on eligibility for the House of Representatives, that avoid two salient deficiencies of the California
and a wealth-floor in the Senate, such that national model: such measures should be insulated from efforts
coll?gial bodies better resemble traditional republican by wealthy citizens/magistrates to bankroll the ejection
assemblies? of an incumbent magistrate to take their place person
Although seeming to entrench the privilege of ally or by proxy; and they should avoid the perverse
the wealthy, such an
arrangement may spark, in a
possibility that the replacement magistrate garners less
Machiavellian spirit, sufficient resentment and class popular support than the ousted incumbent. With such
consciousness to assure a more
vigorous surveillance corrections, a accusation/sanction
popular procedure
of the upper house and its constituencies by both may prove no more prone to perversity or corrup
the lower one and the populace at large. One of tion than magistrate-controlled
impeachment proceed
Machiavelli's most profound teachings is that the in ings,
as a different recent history bears out. Moreover,
evitable power disparities between grandi and pop?lo whether there should be institutional channels through
within republics should be arranged institutionally so which popular accusations may be directed against cor
as to make the latter more not less conscious of it, porate officers or wealthy citizens for attempting to
and perhaps motivate them to attempt actively to min hijack the political process for their own purposes is an
imize such disparities. Separate institutions for wealthy intriguing question opened by Machiavelli's discussion
and nonwealthy citizens flatter the grandi and aggra of accusation procedures in republican Rome.
vate the pop?lo, thus fostering the social dispositions As a thought experiment inspired by such questions,
necessary for a
republic's stability:
a
relatively loyal I offer the following sketch of an institutional reform
that would bring the U.S. Constitution into some closer
conformity with institutional efforts to control elites
11 in premodern the establishment
Steeped in knowledge of classical theory and practice, the popular governments:
American Founders (see Richard 1994; Sellers 1994), in particular, of a Tribunate Assembly of 51, lottery chosen, non
considered but rejected such institutions: John Adams ([1790] 1805, citizens who would wield the powers held by
the idea of a Roman-style
wealthy
280) floated Senate, arguing that a body
the Roman tribunes for 1-year, nonrenewable terms.
reserved for the wealthiest citizens would minimize their influence.
Madison the idea of one This is a heuristic proposal intended for critical but not
toyed with legislative branch elected by
propertied citizens and the other elected by those without property
(Meyers 1981, 398-99). Moreover, he discussed but rejected Penn
12
sylvania's version of the Roman censors (who originally supervised The top 10% richest households, measured at $345,000, controlled
the census, taxation, voting brackets, admission to the senate, and over 70% of wealth in the United States, according to 1998 statistics:
sumptuary see Lintott to review the consti see http://www.ufenet.org/research/wealth_charts.html.
regulations: 1998,94-103)
of legislative 13 on the Recall
tutionality and executive actions (Hamilton, Madison, See the symposium and its ramifications in PS:
and Jay [1788] 2003, nos. 48 and 50). Political Science and Politics 37, no. 1 (January 2004), 7-32.
159

necessarily immediately practical purposes. Certainly, bunate term during which the veto was invoked. The
I would like to see
contemporary democracies exper tribunes need not avail themselves of this power.
iment with tribunate alternatives, but they need not h. The tribunes may call one national referendum,
take this exact institutional form.14 upon majority vote, on any issue they wish. The
A contemporary tribunate assembly might look like referendum will take place without any advertis
this: ing sponsored by parties or interest groups. A
nationally televised debate between two tribunate
a. A group of 51 private citizens, selected by lottery, approved advocates?policy experts, public officials,
for one year, nonrenewable, or
gather nonrepeatable private citizens?one in favor of and one opposed
terms. to the proposition, will precede the referendum. The
b. They will be compensated fully for a year's salary referendum, if ratified by a majority of the elec
and guaranteed the return of their jobs, as well as
torate, will take on the force of Federal statute. Only
granted added incentives such as free college tuition a unanimous vote of the Supreme Court may declare
for their children and/or a tax
full-year's immunity. the statute be unconstitutional. The tribunes need
c. Political and economic elites are excluded from eli not avail themselves of this power.
gibility: that is, anyone who has held a major munic i. Upon a minimum 38/51 the tribunes are
vote,
state or federal elected office for two consecu
ipal, empowered to initiate impeachment proceedings
tive terms at any time in their life; and anyone whose
against one Federal official during their term of
net household worth equals or exceeds $345,000 office. Apart from the initiation of the proceedings,
(i.e., members of the top 10% wealthiest families the impeachment will be conducted according to the
in the United States).15 of the US. Constitution. If convicted,
stipulations
d. Citizens must be at least 25 years old to qualify for the magistrate the sentence in a national
may appeal
the Tribunate. to which the stipulations of article (h)
referendum,
e. Besides socioeconomic and political
excluding apply. The tribunes need not avail themselves of this
elites, the pool of citizens from which the tri
power.
bunes are drawn may be adjusted in the follow
ing way: Given the particular history of the United The idea of a Tribunate Assembly resonates with
States, and the kind of extra-class forms of struc
several strands of contemporary democratic theory.
tural inequality that have plagued the polity, the Like proposals devised by Robert Dahl (1989) and
pool of citizens should be altered to give African James Fishkin this model attempts to recreate
(1991),
American and Native-American citizens a greater
the writ small?not merely to "represent" it,
citizenry
chance of as tribunes than
serving straightforward but actually, to present it in a microfunctional form.
would However, such selec
demographics yield. Dahl and Fishkin promote the establishment of small
tion must be used as ran
adjustments sparingly, bodies of citizens drawn randomly from the popula
domization must bear most of the burden of dis over policy
tion, whose job it would be to deliberate
tributing this magistracy among different kinds of issues with each other and with appointed experts. Dahl
citizens. Of course, between the sexes is
inequality would empower his "minipopulus" to make binding
addressed directly through demographics and ran decisions over its particular area of Fishkin
expertise.
domization. Thus, the Tribunate Assembly would tests the extent to which deliberation in the controlled
tend not to replicate the disparity between the num environments of his "deliberative as
polls"?or, they've
ber of women in prominent political and socioeco been operationalized, "citizen juries"?promotes bet
nomic positions and in the general population. ter informed and consensus-oriented opinions among
f. The duties of the tribunes are to study and discuss
participants (see, skeptically, Shapiro 2003, 33).
the business of the federal government, five days The neo-tribunate model also exhibits affinities with
per week, six hours per day. The tribunes may invite contestatory democratic theory: Philip Pettit and Iris
scholars and policy experts (but not sitting mag Marion Young, for instance, have also called for a
istrates) to present information pertinent to their reconsideration of and in
group-specific magistracies
deliberations.
stitutions, and in Young's case, the veto (Pettit 2000,
The tribunes are vote,
g. empowered, upon majority 105-46; Young 1990,184-85). They argue that particu
to veto one of congressional one
piece legislation, lar groups who suffer disproportionately from specific
executive order, and one Supreme Court decision in
policies should have the opportunity to contest such
the course of their term. The
one-year originating policies formally and directly.
institution may not attempt to take up this action
However, serious criticisms leveled against "real
for one calendar after the end of the tri
again year world" deliberative bodies such as town hall meetings
and juries would obtain against Dahl's and Fishkin's
models: evidence suggests that professional, white
14
In other words, it is not intended for direct implementation as males tend to dominate discussion within such fora
are the progressive reforms proposed by Bruce Ackerman, James
and/or their prot?g?s. I have not taken the same care, for
(Sanders 1997). The revived tribunate model may
Fishkin, more
render deliberative interactions equitable. The
instance, in exploring the feasibility of the model, calculating its cost,
finalizing its details, and so forth, as they do inAckerman and Fishkin historically inspired exclusion of the wealthy from the
2004. Tribunate Assembly, and the increased chances for
15
See http://tiger.berkeley.edu/sohrab/politics/wealthdist.html. citizens to serve as tribunes,
structurally disadvantaged
160

potentially ameliorates the extent to which profes with political offenses. The ramifications of such in
sional white men will monopolize proceedings: white stitutional innovations are not purely procedural.
male tribunes would tend to be of similar socioeco Machiavelli, who considered patricians not the peo
nomic backgrounds
as tribunes of color and as female ple to be the primary political problem in a repub
tribunes. The class specificity of the Tribunate also ad lic, intimated that such institutions made elites more
dresses some of the careful, as well as more content, and
perversely inegalitarian implica marginally they
tions of veto options that realist critics raise against inspire
more spirited class-consciousness and political
contestatory democrats (Shapiro 2003, 48; cf. also 16 contentiousness among common citizens. Such are the
19). Vetoes, they note, hold majorities hostage to mi forgotten preconditions of political accountability and
norities, especially in cases where the latter benefit liberty within popular government.
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Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular

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Contain theWealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite

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tory of Western political thought. Machiavelli is of

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122; Guicciardini were denied an appeal to the Council by Savonarolan

magistrate, the latter must call a

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a. lot b. election c. upper assembly

popular popular oligarchy

magistrates popular oligarchic oligarchy

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CONCLUSION Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

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