G.R. No.

122269 September 30, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-
TIGNO, represented by CAMILO TIGNO,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
- In 1988, Bustria filed with RTC Pangasinan
a complaint against Morado for illegally
occupying her property and for maliciously
applying for a fishpond permit at BFAR
despite his knowledge that said lot had
always been occupied by Bustria.
- Morado denied the allegations and
contended that the lot in question is part of
the public domain which he developed and
converted into a fishpond.
- RTC Pangasinan declared Bustria as the
owner of subject lot.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC has jurisdiction to the
disposition of lands declared suitable for
fishpond purposes.
RULING. No, the RTC has no jurisdiction. The
land involved in the case at bar was classified
as public land suitable for fishpond
development. The fact that the land in dispute
was transformed into a fully developed fishpond
does not mean that it has lost its character as
one declared “suitable for fishpond purposes”.
Since under PD 704, the disposition of lands
declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall
within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, the trial
court’s decision is null and void. The trial court
has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of
alienable public land.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v
CA
GR No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Hermosisima, JR., J
FACTS:

RA 4850 created the LLDA to promote and

Petitioners: the subject lot is within the
classified/zonified alienable and disposable land
for the fishpond development, hence, it is part
of the public domain. Under PD 704, jurisdiction
over its disposition is vested in the BFAR and
that public lands which are declared suitable for
fishpond purposes may only be disposed of by
way of license, concession, or lease; and that
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership.
accelerate the development and balanced growth
of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces, cities, and towns, and to carry out the
development for the Laguna Lake region with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and the preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems and the
prevention of the quality of human life and
ecological systems and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.

Respondents: PD 704 applies only to “lands
suitable for fishpond purposes” while the land in
dispute is already a “fully developed fishpond”
and they assert ownership of the subject lot
through open and continuous possession of
their predecessors-in-interest since the Second
World War.
"Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the
Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San
Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and
Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and
Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang
and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of
Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of
Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in
Metro Manila.
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the
authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen
permits. Big fishpen operators then took advantage
of the occasion to establish fishens and fishcages
to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated
fishpens and fishcges then occupied almost 1/3 of
the entire lake water surface area which increased
the occupation drastically from 7,000 to 21,000
hectares.
LLDA filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
injunction against the municipalities and respective
mayors of Binangonan, Taguig, and Jala-jala for
issuing permits for the construction and operations
of fishpens in Laguna de Bay.
ISSUE: WoN the towns and municipalities
comprising the region have the authority to issue
permits for the enjoyment of fishing privileges in
Laguna de Bay.
RULING: No. The towns and municipalities
comprising the region do not have the authority to
grant permits. LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction
to permits for the use of the lake waters for any
projects or activities in or affecting the said lake,
including fish corrals and the like, and to impose
necessary safeguards for lake quality control and
management and to collect necessary fees for said
activities and projects.
REPUBLIC, Drilon (USEC of DA) v ENO
Garcia, J.
FACTS:
- BFAR leased unto Cabral Fishpond
Corporation a 50 hectare fishpond pursuant
to FLA 2126 in Aklan. After several months,
BFAR leased another 50 hectare fishpond
to the same corporation under FLA 2132 in
the same sitio.
- Eventually, Cabral Corp assigned its
leasehold rights to Eno Corp
- Then ENO filed with the BFAR its own
application for the transfer of the 2 fishpond
lease agreements to which Editha Cabral
opposed because it was done without her
consent, and to which Belarmino opposed
to because such transfer would prejudice
his rights as a stockholder.
Petitioners: DA has the sole authority to decide on
the transfer of leasehold rights over fishponds, and
its office has the jurisdiction to resolve issues
relating to the application of Eno in the transfer to it
the right to leasehold rights. It denied the
application on the grounds that: it was without the
consent of Editha Cabral, and such would prejudice
Cabral and Belarmino’s shares.
Respondents: The DA denied the application
because of the intra-corporate dispute to which DA
has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WoN the BFAR gravely abused its
discretion in denying ENO’s application in transfer
of leasehold right of FLAs 2126 and 2132
RULING:
It may be true that the DA has jurisdiction over the
applications for transfer of leasehold rights,
Undersecretary Drilon indulged in whimsical
exercise of discretion when he denied the
application of Eno Corporation for the transfer to it
of the leasehold right over FLAs No. 2132 and
2126. He based his disapproval action on a ground
not contemplated under Section 33 of FAO No. 60.
Instead of public interest, his main concern was the
dilution of the value of shareholdings of Belarmino
and Editha Cabral in Cabral Corporation should the
transfer be approved. Also, it could have been
decided and resolved strictly on the basis of FAO
No. 60, but the proceedings therein got entangled
and were saddled by corporate quarrels between
and among the stockholders of the assignor
corporation, Cabral Fishpond Industry Corporation,
matters which the Court believes that it could have
been ventilated in another forum.
*************** The office of petitioner Republic
charged with the power to oversee the use of
public fishponds is the Department of Agriculture
under the Administrative Code of 1987 which (e) That any transfer or sublease without the
pertinently reads: previous approval of the Commissioner or by the
Secretary, as the case may be, shall be considered
Sec.3. Powers and Functions. – The Department null and void and deemed sufficient cause for the
[of Agriculture] shall: cancellation of the permit or lease, and the
forfeiture of the improvements and bond, in
xxx xxx xxx connection therewith, in favor of the government.

(3) Promulgate and enforce all laws, rules and ROSENDO DE BORJA, Petitioner, v.
regulations governing the conservation and proper PINALAKAS NA UGNAYAN NG MALILIIT NA
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. MANGINGISDA NG LUZON, MINDANAO AT
VISAYAS ("PUMALU-MV"), PAMBANSANG
Unquestionably, the BFAR as an agency under the KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA
DA which directly regulates transfers of leasehold KANAYUNAN ("PKSK") AND TAMBUYOG
rights over fishponds, like any other regulatory DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. ("TDCI"),
bodies of the Government, is given sufficient Respondents; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
discretion to approve or disapprove Oppositor.
applications/petitions pertaining to matters falling Jardeleza, J.
within its sphere of authority. However, that
discretion must be confined within the parameters FACTS:
set forth by law. Applications for transfer of Petitioners call upon us to disregard procedural
leasehold rights should be treated by BFAR in the rules on account of the alleged novelty and
light of the applicant’s compliance with its Fisheries transcendental importance of the issue involved
Administrative Order (FAO) No. 60, particularly here
Section 33 thereof which subjects such
applications to the following conditions: - De Borja a commercial fishing operator,
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
(a) The areas of twenty-five (25) hectares or less, the RTC of Malabon City. He asked the
covered by permits or leases, shall be approved by court to construe and declare his rights
the Commissioner of Fisheries, and areas more under Section 4(58) of Republic Act No.
than twenty-five (25) hectares shall be approved by 8550 or The Philippine Fisheries Code of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural 1998 (1998 Fisheries Code). De Borja
Resources; asked the court to determine the reckoning
point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal
(b) That the area covered by permit or lease has, waters, as provided under Section 4(58) of
upon verification, improvements equivalent to 50% the 1998 Fisheries Code, in relation with
of the required improvements for the entire area, at Rule 4.1 (a) of its Implementing Rules and
P1,000.00 per hectare; Regulations (IRR).
- He also claimed that the construction of the
(c) That the transferee or sublessee shall assume reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of
not only the rights but also the obligations of the municipal waters under the law is, in any
transferor or sublessor relative to the said permit or case, of national importance with
lease. transcendental implications because it
affects the entire local fishing industry
(d) That said transfer or sublease shall be subject because different construction of it would
to the laws, rules and regulations now existing and cause conflicts among fishermen and law
to those that may hereafter be promulgated enforcers.
governing fisheries; and
 Sec. 4(58). Municipal waters – include not only
streams, lakes, inland bodies of water and tidal
waters within the municipality which are not
included within the protected areas as defined
under Republic Act No. 7586 (The NIPAS Law),
public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or
fishery reserves, but also marine waters
included between two (2) lines drawn
perpendicular to the general coastline from
points where the boundary lines of the
municipality touch the sea at low tide and a third
line parallel with the general coastline including
offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from
such coastline. Where two (2) municipalities are
so situated on opposite shores that there is less
than thirty (30) kilometers of marine waters
between them, the third line shall be equally
distant from opposite shore of the respective
municipalities.
The OSG explained the two conflicting views on the
delineation of municipal waters, namely: (1) the
archipelagic principle espoused by the
Municipalities of the Philippines and small fisher
folk; and (2) the mainland principle favored by the
commercial fishing sector. Under the mainland
principle, the 15-kilometer range shall be reckoned
from the municipality's coastline including offshore
islands. The archipelagic principle, on the other
hand, reckons the 15-kilometer range of municipal
waters from the outermost offshore islands, and not
the mainland. The outer limits of the municipal
waters of the municipality shall be enclosed by a
line parallel to the municipal archipelagic baseline
and 15 kilometers therefrom.
The OSG argued that the mainland principle should
be adopted. It stated that the adoption of the
archipelagic principle found in Article I of the 1987
Constitution, which is utilized in defining the
Philippine territory vis-a-vis other states, is relevant
only when the issue of intrusion into Philippine
territorial water arises—that is, when foreign fishing
vessels enter Philippine territorial waters.
De Borja opines that the provision unqualifiedly
adopts only the mainland principle in defining
municipal waters. TDCI, on the other hand,
maintains that using the mainland principle in
interpreting the provision would violate the
constitutional rights of simple fisherfolk to
subsistence fishing, and of municipalities and cities
with offshore islands to meaningful autonomy in
managing their resources.
RULING
The question calling for the interpretation of the
definition of municipal waters for municipalities with
offshore islands is not a purely legal question
because the given set of facts from which the
Court’s interpretation will be based are not yet
complete.
De Borja's petition does not contain ultimate facts
to support his cause of action. De Borja merely
wants the court to give him an opinion on the
proper interpretation of the definition of municipal
waters. This is a prayer which the Court cannot
grant. Our constitutional mandate to settle only
actual controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable proscribes us from
giving an advisory opinion.
In his petition for declaratory relief, De Borja failed
to provide factual allegations showing that his legal
rights were the subject of an imminent or
threatened violation that should be prevented by
the declaratory relief sought. He simply went on to
conclude that the construction or interpretation of
the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of
municipal waters under the 1998 Fisheries Code
would affect his rights as he is "now exposed to
apprehensions and possible harassments that may
be brought about by conflicting interpretations of
the said statute x x x." As to how these
apprehensions and harassments shall come about,
De Borja did not elaborate.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES v CA, Lat
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS
- Remman and Lat are adjoining landowners.
The 1.8 hectare agricultural land of Lat is
planted mostly with fruit trees, while
Remman occupies a land of 15 heactares
 and 6 heactares of which are devoted to its Moreno: I have the authority to order the
piggery business. Remman’s land is higher removal of dams or dikes or any other works
in elevation than that of Lat’s. which obstruct or encroach public navigable
waters.
- Lat complained that Remman’s waste
disposal lagoon was already overflowing ISSUE: WoN the Sec of Public works has the
and inundation ¼ of LAt’s plantation with authority to determine a river navigable, and to
water containing pig manure which clear those the obstructions therein
increased the acidity of the water and RULING:
caused his plants to wither and die.
The Court upheld the power of the of Public
Works Secretary under RA 2056 to declare as a
public navigable stream any alleged
- REMMAN: heavy rains caused the
depressions or bodies of water even inside
overflooding and that the law imposes a
titled properties. Moreno’s act of declaring it as
natural easement on the owner of the lower
part of a public stream which plaintiffs therein
estate.
had blocked with their dams, is a fact-finding
Issue: WoN REMMAN is liable to compensate Lat power on his part that was incidental to his duty
for the withering of the latter’s plants caused by the to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized
overflowing of the former’s disposal lagoon. obstructions and hence, its grant did not
RULING: constitute an unlawful delegation of power.
The Court held that even assuming that the heavy
rains constituted acts of God, by reason of WATERSHEDS MAY BE DECLARED A
Remman’s negligence, the fortuitous became PROTECTED AREA
humanized, rendering it liable. Remman’s property In Sta Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA,
was made a catch basin of polluted water and other the Court defined watershed as “an area drained by
noxious substances emptying from its piggery, and a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent
of the lower or servient estate to compensation. watersheds. It held that watershed are important
LOVINA v MORENO not only for their ecological and environmental
Reyes, JBL, J. value but also because they constitute the most
FACTS: vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants
directly and indirectly affected since from these
- Residents of Macabebe, Pampanga
complained with the DPWH that the dams watershed come the natural God-given precious
and dikes in a fishpond owned by the resource –WATER.
Lovinos blocked the “Sapang Bulati”, a
navigable river in said town, and asked that
the obstructions be removed pursuant to RA
2056 which
- The Sec of DPWH, after notice and hearing,
ordered the removal of the 5 closures of the
Sapa as they are found to be of public
nuisance in the navigable waters, otherwise,
he would order the removal at the expense
of the Lovinos.
Lovinos: RA 2056 is unconstitutional bcoz the
Sec of Public Works and Comm has no
authority to pass upon the issues of whether a
river or stream is navigable as it is an unlawful
delegation of judicial power.