A Doctrine of ‘Harmonization of Interest’:

the Basis of the Reform Policy of the

Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz
Zoltán Györe
University of Novi Sad

Abstract
This chapter deals with the evolution of a liberal concept known as the ‘harmonization
of interests’, which appeared in Hungary during the first half of the 19th century. This
concept served as the ideological framework for the so-called Hungarian transforma-
tion by coordinating the many different social and ethnic groups seeking social and
political change. Implementing this reform policy required tackling several problems:
the resistance of the Viennese court, opposition within Hungarian society itself, and
finally, the lack of a common language for the non-Hungarian population.

Posle ponovnog ujedinjenja teritorija Kraljevine Mađarske početkom 18. veka, postale su
vidljive brojne teške posledice dugotrajnih ratova sa Osmanskom Imperijom i Austrijskom
Monarhijom i pokazalo se da njihova sanacija zahteva puno vremena, rada, inventivnosti
i odgovarajuće političke okolnosti. Elita mađarskog društva je postala svesna da se sa dubo-
kim promenama u mađarskoj državi i društvu i sa izazovima koje su nametala zbivanja
u širem evropskom kontekstu, njihovo društvo može uspešno nositi samo ukoliko je spremno
na korenite i sistemske promene. Od sedamdesetih godina 18. veka do 1830. godine is-
kristalisalo se mišljenje da je neophodna razgradnja feudalnog sklopa i promena ustavnog
uređenja, pravnog sistema i društvenih odnosa u liberlnom građanskom duhu.
Jezgro programa liberalne mađarske opozicije postao je koncept ujedinjenja interesa, ši-
roko zamišljen i dinamičan sistem liberalnih ideja, usmeren na iznalaženje teorijskih i
praktičnih mogućnosti sprovođenja građanskog preobražaja, pri čemu se težilo da se preko
ukidanja feudalnih odnosa, proširenjem individualnih i građanskih sloboda na celokup-
no stanovništvo, bez razlike na veru, naciju ili socijalnu pripadnost; putem privrednog i
civilizacijskog razvoja, ujedine interesi nacionalno, verski i socijalno veoma diferenciranog
stanovništva Kraljevine Mađarske.
Pokazalo se, da se dobro promišljenom i istrajnom političkom delatnošću može čak i u ne-
povoljnim untrašnjepolitičkom i međunarodnim okolnostima uspešno raditi na promeni
130 Zoltán Györe

ustavnog pa i društvenog sistema. Već u predrevolucionarnom periodu su ispunjeni neki od

programskih ciljeva liberala, pri čemu se pokazalo, da će ujedinjenje interesa biti najteže u
pogledu nacionalnih programa. Posebnu prepreku predstavljali su liberalna politika poste-
pene mađarizacije nemađarskog stanovništva kao i posebni, jasno formulisani nacionalni
programi nekih od narodnosti.
Revolucionarne okolnosti s proleća 1848. omogućile su ogroman uspeh liberala, ali su,
ujedno, izazvali okolnosti koje su konsekventno sprovođenje liberalnog programa onemo-
gućili i u krajnjoj instanci, prolongirali za dvadeset godina. Pri tome su liberalna rešenja
iz 1848. godine, posle 1867. postala pomalo zastarela (socijalna problematika), naročito u
nagodbaškom ambijentu koji je onemogućio razvoj demokratičnog pravnog sistema.

Freedom is such an inexhaustible treasure that it does not wither away

nor weaken but, on the contrary, grows and becomes stronger,
the greater the number of people who enjoy it.
Lajos Kossuth, 18331
Beginning in the late 18th century the problem of constitutional, social, and institu-
tional change in Hungary became one of the main items on the political and intellec-
tual agenda. The process of civic transformation in Hungary was very complex and it
was marked by significant peculiarities of its own. Also, its political and cultural impact
had far reaching consequences not only for the history of ethnic Hungarians but also
for the political and cultural development of the non-Hungarian minorities.
During the final decades of the 18th century a plethora of liberal and national move-
ments emerged in Europe. Their common aim was to reform social and political sys-
tems which they deemed no longer viable. The dynamics of change depended upon
social differentiation and the balance of power among political factions. Change also
involved confronting traditional political, economic, and civic doctrines. Finally, the
international context also directly influenced reformist activities in many countries. In
the early 19th century the bourgeoisie and the nobility were the leaders of this new
liberal spirit, although intellectuals also played a highly visible role.
The Kingdom of Hungary during the 18th century witnessed all these changes and
more. It also confronted transformations in state-law, demographic relations, admin-
istration, and in ethnic structure and minority cultures. All its territories – which had
been divided during the last century and a half – were united again in the decades after
the Treaties of Sremski Karlovci [Karlowitz] and Požarevac [Passarowitz], in 1699 and
1718, respectively. However, it was clear that, given the devastating consequences of
the wars with the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire, radical and systematic
reforms would be needed to make the new state a success. For example, between 1770
and 1830 it became crystal clear that the feudal structure needed to be abolished, a new
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 131

constitution created, and a workable legal system established. Several obstacles stood in
the way of these liberal reforms in Hungary. The Kingdom of Hungary was an integral
part of the Habsburg Empire and, therefore, it was not in a position to make decisions
relating to foreign policy and military matters. Neither was it able to generate its own
revenue. Secondly, ethnic and social differences represented a serious obstacle to form-
ing a consensus. Finally, Hungary lagged behind the counties of western Europe politi-
cally, economically, and socially.
From the 1770s on, contemporaries analyzed this situation in scientific, artistic, and
political discourse and pamphlets. The first political program to offer solutions ap-
peared in 1790. From this point until 1830, the concept of ‘harmonization of interests’
served as the basis for liberal bourgeois transformation. Hungarian liberals hoped to
change not just a few institutions in the sphere of state and politics, but also gradually
to upgrade the entire constitutional system and all the important legislative, admin-
istrative, and legal institutions, in addition to improving relations with the Imperial
court in Vienna. However, given the prevailing political circumstances these political
and social goals collided with those of the conservative elements in Hungarian society
and the Habsburg court.
The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the problems, possibilities, and limits
of political activity aimed at social and political integration in a country where these
obstacles carried great weight.

Hungarian Liberalism
While liberalism provided reformers with an ideological framework, it also interested
the general public in Hungary during the first half of the 19th century. Liberal ideas
and the need for middle-class social transformation were discussed in a wide range of
forums and were circulated by means of books, newspapers, and pamphlets and other
ephemera. Even more popular spaces and media of diffusion included sociability in
casinos, travelling theatres, and marketplaces as well as the common practice of read-
ing newspapers aloud to an illiterate audience. By such means liberal bourgeois ideas
penetrated every social layer and became the basis of oppositional political activity up
to the revolution of 1848.
It can be argued that Hungarian liberalism was the happy meeting point of domestic
traditions reaching back to the Middle Ages, the dynamic reception of foreign ideas,
and political developments within the Habsburg Monarchy under the enlightened ab-
solutism of 1765 to 1792. Nineteenth-century Hungarian liberals located the deepest
native root of liberalism in the venerable tradition of ‘freedom-loving’, as articulated
in specific aspects of the legal-political system of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary.
These included the ‘concept of the Holy Crown’ as sovereign authority; the system of
autonomous counties; the privileges of the Orthodox population; the 1571 law of the

Ideology, Society and Values

132 Zoltán Györe

State Assembly of Transylvania (in Hungarian, Erdély) that granted equality to the four
confessions (Calvinist, Lutheran, Catholic, and Unitarian); the decisions of the Hun-
grian State Assembly in 1608 that guaranteed religious freedom for Protestants; and the
protections the medieval monarchy extended to non-Hungarian ethnic communities.
The enlightened absolutism of Maria Theresa and Emperor Joseph II from 1765 to
1792 also contributed to Hungarian liberalism. Those most directly interested in re-
form included the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie, and the peasantry, while the nobil-
ity stressed the need to maintain the country’s sovereignty during a process of rapid
change. In this respect, the rapid and profound reforms of Emperor Joseph II posed the
greatest challenge. The progressive element among the nobility, along with the intelli-
gentsia and the peasants, warmly welcomed the decrees of religious tolerance, the aboli-
tion of serfdom, and other steps toward social modernization. However, the measures
which endangered Hungarian state sovereignty, or those that impinged upon the vital
interests of the nobility, led to a significant deterioration in relations with the Habsburg
court and gradually turned most Hungarians against their ruler.
One dilemma facing Hungarian intellectuals was whether to accept Joseph’s reforms,
or to oppose ‘German’ absolutism by emphasizing the importance of preserving the
national language, culture, identity, and constitutionalism. Many members of the Hun-
garian intelligentsia, such as József Hajnóczy and Gergely Berzeviczy, preferred the
path of civilized progress over protecting the nation. In time they realized that the ab-
solutist assault upon the constitutional order could be counteracted most efficiently by
broadening the constitutional base2. This was closely related to the idea of connecting
overall progress with demands for liberal reform in a joint effort to protect the nation
and its language and culture. Further development of this option evolved into one of
the basic tenets of the concept of the ‘harmonization of interests’.
The strong reform movement of 1789-92 among the nobility immediately before and
after the death of Joseph II also had its politically liberal elements. Its most promi-
nent members, including József Hajnóczy, Ferenc Verseghy, Károly Koppi, and Gergely
Berzeviczy, demanded that nobles renounce their privileges and abolish serfdom. They
also sought to encourage industry and trade, establish cottage industries, protect and
develop science and art, and abolish ‘colonial’ relations between Vienna and Hungary.
The creation of nine reform committees (deputatio regnicolaris) in the Hungarian Na-
tional Assembly in 1790/1791 had far-reaching consequences for the development of
liberalism. Their goal was to analyse and report upon the social, economic, and legal
situation in Hungary. Their extensive labors included gathering valuable information at
the territorial level and presenting a report which could be described as a proto-liberal
synthesis3. However, in 1792 the court in Vienna, feeling pressured by the changing
international situation, adopted a more conservative political stance and removed the
reform plans from the agenda. Then, following the discovery of the Ignác Martinovics
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 133

conspiracy in 1795, the government subjected Hungary to a policy of absolutist repres-

sion. During the next two decades, reformist ideas could be expressed only in the sphere
of culture, language, and literature. Reform leanings on the part of some of the nobility,
intelligentsia, and middle-class citizens thus became connected to political opposition
to the court, while liberalism became ever more closely associated with protecting the
state institutions and national law of Hungary.
There was also an economic side to these developments. In the context of the war
against France, many Hungarian nobles realised that considerably greater income could
be obtained from larger-scale industrial production than from feudal dues4. The feeling
grew that a serious reorganization of industry and trade was being blocked by a narrow
and rigid feudal system, as well as by the unequal position of Hungary in relation to
other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. Hence the growing perception that national
and economic emancipation were mutually connected5.

The Advocates of the ‘Harmonization of Interests’

One of the most interesting features of Hungarian liberalism was that its advocates
were mainly noble members of the Hungarian State Assembly who pressured for re-
form while knowing that it would mean losing some of their privileges6. These men
were, however, eager to reform the feudal state by constitutional means7. It goes with-
out saying that not all noblemen were liberals, nor did liberal aristocrats support all of
the reform proposals (for example, more of them supported official recognition of the
Hungarian language than they did the abolition of noble privileges). However, it can be
concluded that from 1830 to 1848, at least within the Lower House of the Hungarian
Assembly, most delegates supported the liberal reforms.
Nobility within the Kingdom of Hungary was a legal rather than a social category. In
terms of property, profession, social status, and access to power, Hungarian nobles were
differentiated into multiple layers that were connected only by the shared privileges
that distinguished them from the rest of the populace. In practical terms, the nobility
could be seen as a conglomerate of the individuals who possessed five privileges recog-
nized by the state – ownership of land, the right to perform public functions, exemp-
tion from taxes, the right to habeas corpus and the right to vote – and who officially
figured in the lists of noblemen organized at county level. The approximately 400,000
noblemen of this period included about 2,000 magnates, 10,000 wealthy noblemen,
and around 96,000 petty landowners. This group also comprised around 60,000 clerks,
teachers, doctors, engineers, advocates, priests and army officers, craftsmen, innkeepers,
estate owners and members of county militias, in addition to 200,000 peasants8. Cer-
tain categories of non-aristocratic population such as merchants, craftsmen, lawyers, in-
tellectuals, and even the better-off peasantry were better off in terms of material wealth
and enjoyed higher social status than many members of the petty nobility.

Ideology, Society and Values

134 Zoltán Györe

We should not forget that numerous industrialists, doctors, engineers, officers, sales-
men, plant owners, and clerks became noblemen following the Peace Treaty of Szatmár
[today’s Satu Mare, Romania] of 1711. Opening such channels for satisfying personal
ambitions did much to prevent class rivalries and potential unrest in Hungary9. In prac-
tical terms, the hierarchy of the Hungarian nobility included numerous old and new so-
cial layers and professions whose members could be found in the third estate as in other
nations, and which traditional historiography considers the bourgeois elements of soci-
ety and advocates of middle-class views. This must be kept in mind when talking about
the leading role the nobility played within the Hungarian ‘bourgeois’ transformation.
This factor must also be combined with the high regard in which the Hungarian nobility
was traditionally held. The aristocracy and upper layers of the nobility represented the
most powerful social and political group in Hungary. They owned most of the nation’s
wealth and represented political and administrative authority. One must also keep in
mind the important formal and informal contacts between the nobles and the Monar-
chy and armed forces. Apart from this, the nobles had forged their reputation during
centuries of warfare against the Ottoman and Habsburg dynasties, and they were also the
traditional sponsors of education and culture. Clearly, then, regardless of the economic
pressure that the nobility exerted on the population under its influence, its high degree
of social acceptance and prestige was recognized by the majority of Hungarians10.

Harmonizing Interests
After 1825 the Viennese court adopted a somewhat milder stance towards the demands
of the Hungarians, which led to more lively political life in Hungary following several
decades of oppression. Historians suggest that the year 1830 was the point at which
the Hungarian liberal opposition began to influence events. This opposition presented
itself to the public as a political force ready to promote middle-class reforms, includ-
ing bringing change to the country’s legal system and social structure. Its members also
argued that maintaining Hungary’s independence within the Austrian Empire required
adopting a tough line toward the Imperial court in Vienna.
The plans for reform necessarily crossed the frontiers of Hungary and unavoidably led
to tensions with the court. Emperor Francis I believed that all power should be con-
centrated at the center, and opposed Hungarian autonomy. Liberal reforms would only
increase the threat to the existing political system and to inter-ethnic relations within
the Empire. Prominent figures at the court feared that Hungarian nationalism could
enflame passions that were already developing on their own. On the other hand, after
the Congress of Vienna which eliminated the political and military threat from abroad,
the Hungarian side felt it could no longer accept the permanent violation of the Hun-
garian constitution and the postponement of national and economic emancipation.
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 135

The liberals also professed their belief that the Habsburg Empire would be strength-
ened by implementing liberal reforms within Austria as well.
The concept of the ‘harmonization of interests’ served as the ideological framework and
central idea behind planned civic reform in Hungary. Its essence was the unification or
coordination of the interests of various social groups and communities in the process of
social and institutional transformation. Emphasis was placed on preventing all possible
conflicts that could originate from differences among confessions (Catholic, Protes-
tant, Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Unitarian, and Jewish), ethnic groups (Hungarians,
Slovakians, Rumanians, Germans, Croatians, Serbs, Jews, and others) and finally social
classes. The Hungarian liberals did not want to suppress this pluralism. Instead, they
looked to unifying these different interest groups around a single vision and common
goal, that is, a program of middle-class reform.
Implementing change in this coordinated fashion would, in principle, ensure greater
support for liberal reforms and reduce the potential for opposition, above all from the
Imperial court. The liberals envisioned an almost classless society, consisting mainly of
a strong middle class, in which the great differences between rich and poor would nar-
row11. According to the program of the liberals, this middle class would be open to all,
thus maintaining the ideal of ‘one nation’12. Baron Miklós Wesselenyi’s work, Balitelétek
[Misjudgements], published in 1834, can be considered the first full-length articula-
tion of the interest harmonization concept, while the words of Ferenc Kölcsei ‘freedom
and property’ became its slogan13.
According to Ferenc Deák, the greatest national virtue of the Hungarians up to that
time was their determination to preserve the rights and liberties of their homeland,
even if it cost them their lives. Both he and other statesmen saw the concept of harmo-
nization of interests as another step in that direction. In his view, domestic industry
needed to be developed, which would lead in turn to more middle-class spirit and dili-
gence14. He argued that
property and freedom are the most powerful incentives of industry, property and freedom
are those sweet bonds that tie a city dweller most closely to the fate of his homeland...and
when they are united, rather than disunited, around common interests and watch over their
homeland, their king and laws, and when we are working together on the development of our
country, only then will the obligation that we owe to our country and ourselves be fulfilled 15.
He looked on freedom as the rationale for citizens taking responsibility for social
change. In a similar vein one of the leading Hungarian liberals, Lajos Kossuth, wrote in
his diary on 25 February 1837 that “the United States of America is fortunate because
with the unity of interests which originates in the unity of laws, they are able to find a
sufficient number of ties to connect the heterogeneous entities into a single whole”.
The concept of the harmonization of interests was promoted during the 1840s in “Pesti
Hírlap” in particular. This magazine published Kossuth’s views on the formation of a

Ideology, Society and Values

136 Zoltán Györe

new social class of nobles and non-nobles which would be bound by a common liberal
political program. He stressed that a nation is a political community, and that a self-
governing environment is the proper framework for the exercise of political freedom.
He emphasized that the basic principle of liberal government should be: “All for the
people and all by the people. Nothing about the people without the people. That is
Democracy, and that is the ruling tendency of the spirit of our age” 16.

The Legal Premises

When implementing their ideas the Hungarian liberals had to take into consideration
the opposition of conservative elements and the political mood of the Viennese court,
which tried to keep liberal ideas from spreading to other parts of the Empire. The so-
called domestic ‘noble estates opposition’, which represented the more progressive wing
of the Hungarian conservatives, considered that Hungarian national interests could be
defended without impinging upon the rights of the nobility.
In this context the Hungarian liberals opted for promoting the legal equality of all citi-
zens by extending the existing privileges of the nobility to the peasantry and the citizen-
ry at large, en lieu of depriving the nobles of their privileges. The liberals believed that
the existing constitutional framework could be expanded to include the entire popu-
lation, regardless of class, religion, or ethnicity. Moreover, by gaining these liberties,
everyone would become interested in defending the new liberal constitution17. Count
Charles La Motte, a minister of the Gömör County, stated the conservative position:
“They are saying that we will still be free even though our liberties will be extended to
the people. But what is my freedom worth, if all the people are free? There can be no
happy country without aristocracy, with the exception of the United States of America,
not a single country provides an example of a free country without aristocracy. America
is too young, so it cannot serve as an example”18.
In his effort to promote the concept of the harmonization of interests, Mihály Boross
wrote in his 1846 book Magyar panoráma árnyképekben [Hungarian Panorama in
Sketches] that a law was not like wine or bread, but rather that it was “the God-given air
which gives life to everyone even when thousands of people breathe it; it is like the sun
as it shines its life-giving rays onto the millions. The larger the number of people the con-
stitution rests upon, the greater the number of people who share the burden, the more
people can enjoy well-being: that makes the constitution stronger, the burden lighter,
and the unity and agreement greater”19. Wesselényi thought along very similar lines. He
argued for the expansion of political rights to the broadest range of persons possible by
claiming that liberties and rights were insecure if they were withheld from the major-
ity of the population. Rather, they were firm and safe only if guarded over by the ever-
watchful eye of the nation. He also tried to calm those who feared for their property. Just
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 137

because the liberals were demanding the expansion of political freedoms and rights of
ownership did not mean that they were demanding the division of property20.
The leading Hungarian liberals assumed that legal equality meant a franchise based on
popular sovereignty. They claimed that the introduction of a system of proportional
representation would have positive consequences for their plan to harmonize interests.
However, they still thought that the potential for bribery demanded a comparatively
high property threshold for voting. While accepting this, Kossuth pleaded that there
should be no limitations favouring the rich. Nor, he argued, should the minimum re-
quirement be as high as in France where, out of a total population of 32 million, only
180,000 men had the right to vote21.

The Abolition of Serfdom

The question of the serfs had been on the agenda since the time of Joseph II and his
edict of abolition. By the end of the 18th century, it was clear to the more progressive
elements within the nobility that serfdom was unsustainable from an ethical point of
view, in addition to being socially harmful and economically unprofitable. However,
Viennese absolutism blocked any progressive solution to the agrarian problem. The
peasant issue was even more significant, because, as the liberals themselves noticed,
around half of the peasantry was not of Hungarian nationality. They thus looked to
the abolition of serfdom as having the positive effect of integrating the peasantry into
Hungarian society. In a speech regarding the interdependence between the bourgeoisie
and national progress delivered in the Lower House of the Hungarian State Assembly
in 1833, Ferenc Deák claimed that “the homeland is happy and developing only where
the land is farmed by free hands; the nation is strong where free hands defend their
property and independence”. He also emphasized that the condition for national wel-
fare and greatness was personal freedom and that the progress of the entire community
began with the happiness of the individual22.
Naturally not everyone shared his opinion. When Pál Nagy suggested granting po-
litical representation to the peasants at a meeting of the Hungarian State Assembly in
1825, he was almost physically thrown out the door. One of the leading conservatives
declared that he would rather be skinned alive than accept any burden that the peasant
representatives would surely ask the nobility to assume23.
The solution to the problem of freeing the serfs was complicated and involved signifi-
cant long-term consequences. Above all, it had to be implemented in a way that would
avoid harming either the peasants or the nobles. One solution which, it was widely be-
lieved, would satisfy both sides was to free the serfs while giving them rights to the land
they worked. This would make them small landowners, who would then pay compensa-
tion to the former owners of the land. This idea prospered and a voluntary redemption
of serf obligations was established by law in 1840. Even though there were many exam-

Ideology, Society and Values

138 Zoltán Györe

ples of contracts being drawn up for the redemption of peasant obligations, especially
by members of the reformist nobility, it soon became apparent that most serfs did not
have the funds needed to redeem their obligations, and so the state had to intervene on
their behalf. The logical conclusion to this was that the obligatory eternal redemption
of serf duties (kötelező örökváltság) would be handled and financed by the state, which
would compensate the landowners for the loss of their land and workforce in the form
of one single payment.
The idea that the state would take the lead in abolishing serfdom not only ran against
the principle of laissez faire; it also ran into opposition at the Imperial court, which
favoured neither the liberal reforms nor freeing the serfs. The liberals saw clearly that
Hungary would need greater political and administrative authority in order for liberal
legislation to succeed. Loosening ties with Vienna not only ran counter to court poli-
cy; a good part of the Hungarian aristocracy and parts of the nobility also opposed it.
Moreover, it also bred mistrust among different nationalities, most notably among the
Croatians, Serbs, and Rumanians. The deep divisions over this policy became evident
in the turbulent events of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848.

The Development of Industry

Apart from the concept of equality before the law and the emancipation of the serfs, the
liberals envisioned that their policy of harmonization of interests would help develop
industry. They believed that there could be no bourgeoisie without industry, that is,
that industrialisation and urbanization were the benchmarks of middle-class society.
Significantly, there was little disagreement among the liberals over this. Rather, they
agreed that a thorough restructuring of the economy was needed. This included the de-
velopment of industry, the establishment of a modern banking system, and free trade.
Once again, however, these reforms met with resistance at the court and among the
conservative elements of society.
Lajos Kossuth emphasized that, despite good intentions, the development of industry
in Hungary would be impossible without a thorough change in public attitudes, which
were colored by stereotypes and prejudices. Kossuth devoted close attention to the con-
nection between politics and economy and he claimed that the form of government was
crucial to determining the economy of the country. Alluding to the relations of the court
with Hungary, he stressed that the policy of free trade between a country with a strong
economy and a country with a weak economy was similar to the relationship between a
barrel of wine and a waiter, who simply poured the wine out of the barrel whenever he
wanted it. Kossuth concluded that a certain protection of the weaker national econo-
mies against the stronger ones was necessary. He thought that industrialization was not
only a condition for the creation of a bourgeois society but also a condition for forming
the nation, and stressed that every nation earned its wealth by hard work24. Knowing
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 139

that capital was essential for a strong economy, the liberals founded a system of lending
banks designed to provide credit not only to businesses but also to small landowners25.

The Nationality Issue

Commenting upon Hungary in 1860, John Stuart Mill concluded that its population
was a melting pot of different nationalities: Hungarians, Slovakians, Croats, Serbs, Ru-
manians, and Germans. He concluded that these nationalities could not be territorially
separated and, therefore, the only solution was that they learn to live together under
the same laws and with the same rights26. This came to be the essence of the liberals’
approach to the nationalities question when the sheer complexity of Hungary’s ethnic
mix was brought home to liberal thinkers in the period from 1830 to 1848.
Regardless of this multinational composition, few politicians disputed the notion of
Hungarian hegemony. After all, it was the Hungarians who had created the state within
the Carpathian basin in the 9th century and they were the ones who had fought for its
survival against pressure from the Byzantine, Holy Roman, Habsburg, and Ottoman
Empires. Furthermore, the legal and political system of the state was also recognizably
Hungarian. Hungarian politicians thus argued that the state needed to preserve this
Hungarian dominance within a unitary political system. In addition, they considered
that, within the territory that belonged to the crown of Szt. István [Saint Stephen or
Stephen I, the first Hungarian king], only the Croats had the right to their own autono-
mous state. The Serbs and Romanians who had migrated into Hungary over the cen-
turies were considered nationals of their respective homelands, whereas the remaining
nations lacked statehood because they were not regarded as historical nations.
A related issue was the response of non-Hungarians to these beliefs and the extent of
their support for the idea of social and political integration within the framework of
a Hungarian ‘political nation’. Until the 1840s the answer appeared to be positive for
several reasons. Until the early 19th century, regardless of the ethnic group that they
belonged to, the majority of the population maintained the so-called hungárus tudat or
Hungarian consciousness. This meant an emphasis not on an ethnic, but rather a geo-
political and cultural sense of commonality. Furthermore, inter-ethnic relations had
been relatively calm for a long time prior to the opening decades of the 19th century.
On the other hand, several external factors aggravated circumstances. For example, the
Imperial court fomented ethnic tensions as means of maintaining its control. Hungar-
ian politicians also worried about the pan-Slavic tendencies of Russian foreign policy,
which they saw as a threat to Hungary’s survival.
Hungarian liberals faced three options. First, they could try to maintain Hungarian
hegemony. Second, they could promote some form of federalism or, third, they could
try to convince non-Hungarians that the Kingdom of Hungary was actually their home
and that they should accept the citizenship framework. The liberals opted for the latter,

Ideology, Society and Values

140 Zoltán Györe

despite its risks: given the highly developed ethnic and national consciousness of the
minority populations, it was debatable whether they would denounce their cultural and
territorial demands in favour of unity. Some certainly felt that their objectives could be
better achieved within the confines of their own communities. This was in harmony
with Bertalan Szemere’s observation in 1843 that the Slavs leaned towards the despotic
Russian Empire “because they [the Slavs] hold their nationality more important than
their own freedom, because freedom lost can be regained, as opposed to nationality,
which, once lost, disappears forever”27.
It was even questionable whether the national concept of the Hungarian liberals was
acceptable to the non-Hungarian people at all. During the reform period three interpre-
tations of the term ‘nation’ mixed together in the minds of both liberals and Hungar-
ians at large. The geopolitical understanding had been present in Hungary since the 13th
century, and it regarded the nation to be a population group endowed with statehood.
However, that definition also contained an emotional component, in that it also looked
on nationhood as a collective belief of a group of citizens who look on the territory of
a state as their own homeland and are prepared to manifest this sentiment. A second,
ethnic interpretation defined the nation in terms of the Hungarian language and the cul-
tural and ethnical distinctiveness of the Hungarian people. Historically this approach
appeared in 15th century in reaction to the dangers which threatened the Kingdom of
Hungary from the outside. Finally there was the feudal estate or public-legislative con-
ception, formulated as a political concept in the early 16th century. The nucleus of the
estate conception was the theory of the transfer of power from the people as a whole to
the estate of nobles and from it further on to the crown of Szt. István, i.e. through the
coronation of the King28. According to this definition, the nobility represents the nation
in legal and political terms, even if the nation in the broader sense comprises the entire
population of the country. The notion of a unique Hungarian (political) nation took
hold during the first half of 19th century, as a result of the fusion of all three concepts.
The Hungarian liberal opposition considered that the survival of a multinational Hunga-
ry required the successful implementation of the harmonization of interests concept. The
liberals hoped that guaranteeing individual freedoms and equality before the law would
attract non-Hungarians to these shared political and national values. They also hoped
that, in the long run, non-Hungarians would be integrated into the framework of the
Hungarian nation. Thus Wesselényi concluded that given the many prejudices among the
Hungarian people, only equality of all people before the law, regardless of their nation-
ality and religious affiliation, would create the necessary cohesion for a successful state.
He condemned propaganda and discrimination on the basis of national and religious af-
filiation, even in the form of jokes, and argued that only a mutual and conscious effort
towards toleration could counteract negative sentiments. He also emphasized that only
international unity could make Hungary a strong and prosperous country29.
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 141

Bertalan Szemere asserted that the three main goals of the liberals in the pre-revolution-
ary period were the reform of the political system, the provision of individual rights,
and the creation of conditions for the free development of nationality. In regard to the
latter, he stressed that “nationalism (the development of national emotions and virtues)
is not the goal but rather the means of freedom, just like freedom is not a goal, but a
means of perfecting bourgeois virtues; and that for the development of nationality, no
other consideration whatsoever should be limited, but the unity of the state, as well as
the provision of appropriate, rapid, and accurate public administration”30.
To secure the agreement of the court and the conservative element the liberals explained
that the constitutional borders of the country would be respected and that no one’s
rights would be revoked or limited. In the new natio Hungarica, not only the nobility
but the country’s entire population, regardless of its ethnic, religious, or social orienta-
tion, would form a part of the political nation. In this the liberals relied heavily upon
the fact that many members of the Hungarian nobility had Slav, German, Romanian,
or some other ethnic origin and had themselves assimilated into the Hungarian state on
the basis of common interests and freedoms.
It was expected that much time would be required to realize the vision of non-Hungar-
ian assimilation, but that it would in the end be a non-violent process31. Ultimately, the
liberals saw the consolidation of a middle-class society transformation as the key to creat-
ing the conditions by which Hungary could become a special melting pot for its diverse
peoples. Kossuth stressed that “the holiness of a private sphere should not be touched
with profane hands.” He also added that “any violent thoughts are to be put aside [al-
though] we have the right, in our homeland, to long for all the branches of the public
administration to develop in Hungarian. That much is enough, more than that is neither
just nor legal”32. The Hungarian liberals also hoped that providing other national groups
access to all branches of government would motivate them to learn Hungarian33.
To a great extent the hopes for the gradual assimilaton of non-Hungarians depended on
overcoming their fear of the Hungarian state and the threat assimilation posed to the
existence of their own nation. The ethnic-geopolitical position and historical experience
of the Hungarians obviously influenced liberal thought, as did Herder’s well-known
prophecies that the Hungarian language and the Hungarians themselves would disap-
pear without a trace within the next century or two, thanks to their absorption either
by their larger neighbours or by more numerous ethnic groups, such as the Germans,
Slavs, or Romanians. To be sure, attempts to Germanize Hungary were not lacking in
the past; note, for example, the impact of the migration of approximately one million
Germans into Hungary during the 18th century. Similarly, during the 17th and 18th
centuries, the Romanians conquered large areas of Hungary and became the dominant
ethnic group in Transylvania, while the Serbs conquered portions of southern Hun-
gary from the 15th to the 18th centuries. Finally, one could not overlook the influence
on Hungarian public opinion of the philo-Russian sympathies of the Slavs. All these

Ideology, Society and Values

142 Zoltán Györe

developments, along with the isolation of Croats and Serbs from the administration
of the Kingdom of Hungary, combined with the influence of Vienna to convince the
Hungarians that both they and their ancient state were endangered, and that a gradual
and non-violent process of ‘Hungarianization’ was the best means of protection.
Still, from the point of view of the non-Hungarian populace, this slow and non-violent
process could be seen as an act of aggression directed against their own national self-
determination. The Hungarian liberals did not expect any support for their harmo-
nization concept from the Croats. As for the Serbs and Romanians, whose national
elites already planned to found their states in the territory of southern Hungary and
Transylvania, they were extremely reserved, as were the Slovakian nationalists. Ongo-
ing resistance to the harmonization of interests policy found expression in the support
certain national county assemblies extended to the government or, more precisely, the
Habsburg court. It was equally telling that the districts of Bács-Bodrog, Árva, Krassó,
Túróc, Szepes, Szerém, Pozsega and Verőce never chose a liberal representative to the
Hungarian State Assembly34.
However, it should be taken into account that not everyone backed these national-po-
litical ‘management’ policies. The Jews and the Germans in Hungary mostly supported
the Hungarian liberal opposition (unlike most of the Germans in Hungary proper,
the Saxons in Transylvania demanded territorial separation)35. Even though the liberal
policy of the Hungarian opposition, as conceived from the nationalist perspective, was
always firmly against the demands of non-Hungarian groups, it still provided them
with an efficient resistance towards the Hungarianisation policy. The liberals’ insistence
upon the consolidation of middle-class society, along with civic and political guaran-
tees, opened the way for some specific gains, such as freedom of the press, conscience,
speech, public assembly, and the operation of political parties.

Achievements of the Pre-Revolutionary Period

The Hungarian liberals’ high point of success for their reform programme took place
during the revolutionary disturbances of March and April 1848. Aware of the need to
build public support, the reformers felt they had little alternative to adopting a mod-
erate, gradualist approach until late 1846. That year and the following marked a turn
toward radicalization and more determined efforts to push reforms, which culminated
in the creation of a ‘Party of Opposition’ which in turn provoked greater resistance
among conservative political forces.
Regarding the nationalist element of the reform programme, a law for the reintegration
into Hungary of a so-called Partium (a district on the western border of Transylvania)
was proposed, along with legislation which gradually introduced Hungarian into offi-
cial usage in Hungary in 1844, and in Erdély in 1847. A measure obliging even the no-
bility to pay the toll on a newly planned bridge (Lánchid) between Buda and Pest was
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 143

well-received by the public, although by undermining the century-long right of the no-
bility to avoid taxation the law had more of a psychological than a financial impact36.
Regarding the serfs, the laws the Diet issued in 1836 brought many advantages. Aliena-
tion of serf properties was authorized, certain obligations were abolished, the compe-
tence of the feudal courts (sedes dominialis) was limited, and the right of villages to be
self-governing was strengthened. In 1840, a law permitting the voluntary, permanent
ransom of peasant obligations was introduced, followed four years later by a measure
opening governmental posts to non-nobles, regardless of their religious affiliation.
Freedom of trade and industry was promoted through laws relating to: the judicial proc-
ess (1836); bonds, traffic, private businesses, the legal status of factories, merchants, and
shareholding companies (1840); the regulation of rivers (1840); and public construc-
tion (1844). 1830 saw the founding of the Livestock Farming Society (Állattenyésztő
Társaság). The following year regular steamboat service started between Vienna and
Budapest, and in 1846, steamboat traffic began on Lake Balaton. The first public sav-
ings company in Hungary – the Országos Takarékpénztár (OTP Bank) – opened in
1840, with the humanitarian goal of helping to alleviate poverty37. Two years later, the
Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank (Hungarian Trading Bank in Budapest) was founded.
Further steps promoting economic development included the foundation of the Hun-
garian Industrial Society (Magyar Iparegyesület) in 1841. Three years later, Kossuth
inaugurated the Industry Protection Association (Védegylet). A visible mark of civic
progress was the announcement of the partial emancipation of Jews, followed by the
establishment of the first telegraph line between Vienna and Pozsony (Pressburg or
Bratislava) in December 1846, as well as the opening of the Szolnok-Budapest rail-
way line in September 1847. The Lower House of the Diet endorsed the abolition of
capital punishment in 1843, which attracted considerable attention from liberal cir-
cles elsewhere in Europe38. The Hungarian Scientific Academy, the National Theatre,
the Hungarian Military Academy, and the National Museum were all founded in these
years. The renewal and standardization of the Hungarian language was also completed,
a national anthem created, and a plethora of popular and scientific magazines of major
significance began publication.
In the pre-revolutionary period count István Széchényi became especially known for
his practical measures in favour of liberal ideals. As early as 1827, at the beginning of
his exuberant political and public life, he founded the first casino (social circle) in Hun-
gary, along with other important organizations expounding liberal and reformist views.
His projects included encouraging the modernization and beautification of the capital
city. To this end he promoted the construction of the famous bridge between Pest and
Buda, as well as a tunnel in Buda. He also promoted dredging the Danube River bed in
the Đerdap Gorge, and oversaw the works regulating the flow of the Tisza River. After
inaugurating steamboat service on both the Danube and Tisza, he founded a shipyard

Ideology, Society and Values

144 Zoltán Györe

and winter harbour in Pest, encouraged the cultivation of silkworms and horse breed-
ing (and racing), the construction of railways, and the building of the Vukovar-Rijeka
railway line39.
We have listed some of the greatest achievements of the pre-revolutionary period in
Hungary, which can be attributed to the creativity, perseverance, and ability of the lib-
erals to act when needed. Numerous progressive initiatives were frustrated by opposi-
tion from the Imperial court and conservative forces, but one could hardly ignore this
flurry of initiatives and their impact on the political, social, cultural and economic life
of the Kingdom of Hungary. The revolution of 1848 was to bring even greater change.

The Revolution of 1848: the high point of Hungarian Liberalism

The culmination of Hungarian liberal activism was the Revolution and the war for in-
dependence of 1848/49. The irony here is that the liberals achieved their greatest suc-
cesses in a way they had always wanted to avoid, through revolution. The revolution in
Hungary, however, was not a product of the moment. Rather, it represented the result
of decades of persistent and well thought out liberal reform activity. Revolutionary
movements in the rest of Europe played a significant role in precipitating events, along
with the fact that the Hungarian State Assembly was in session at that precise time. The
Assembly was the scene of vigorous debate between the conservatives and the opposi-
tion over the liberal programme, but it was the liberals, helped by the revolutionary
triumphs in Paris and Vienna, who won the day.
Under the pressure of revolutionary agitation in the rest of the Austrian Empire, the Em-
peror and King Ferdinand acknowledged the reforms of the Hungarian State Assembly.
Their enforcement brought even deeper changes to the Hungarian Kingdom and altered
its relationship with the dynasty. The laws of 1848 meant in practice that the new Hun-
garian constitution was based on liberal-bourgeois and not feudal foundations. Their
enforcement opened the door to further promotion of democratic and social change.
A law for the total abolition of serfdom was approved, although the question of com-
pensation for noblemen was left for more peaceful times. Yeomen obtained their houses
and farmsteads, while serfs without homes were freed from their labor obligations. All
men were declared equal in the eyes of the law and no one was exempted from having to
pay taxes. Mandatory tithes (decima) and censorship were abolished. The people were
given the freedom to profess the Protestant and Orthodox religions, as well as the right
to education. The liberal political system was ensured by laws based upon national sov-
ereignty and the transformation of the feudal noble-county system into a civic admin-
istration overseen by a system of national representation. Laws were introduced mak-
ing government accountable to Parliament. A National Guard was formed, freedom of
speech, association, and the press was proclaimed, and censorship laws were abolished.
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 145

The Hungarian Kingdom obtained broad autonomy in its relations with the other parts
of the Austrian Empire. It was ruled that the Emperor’s orders could be implemented only
on the condition that they be endorsed by at least one Hungarian minister. The union of
Erdély and Hungary was declared, and the power of the newly formed government was
extended into Croatia. Also, during the absence of the King (i.e. while he was in Vienna),
his prerogatives were to be executed by the Palatine (at that time Archduke Stephen of
Habsburg), which practically gave Hungary its own chief of state. The statutory and legal
ties between Hungary and other parts of the Austrian Empire were reduced to a personal
union. Hungary became an independent country, with its own parliament, budget, and
ministries, including the Ministry of Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs. Plans were devised
to reform the centuries-old state governing bodies, the judiciary, the legislative branch, and
the functioning and jurisdiction of the municipalities. Under pressure from revolutionary
events both at home and abroad, Emperor Ferdinand I named count Lajos Batthyány, an
opposition aristocrat, Prime Minister of the Hungarian government. He also sanctioned
the new laws on 11 April, the day the last session of the State Assembly met40.
The so-called ‘March laws’ meant that the bloodless revolution in Hungary achieved the
social, national, and political demands for which the Hungarian liberal opposition had
fought for decades. The new legislation provided for the country’s development as an in-
dependent, liberal, and unitary state. As a result Hungary met the conditions for entry
into the club of developed European countries, even if further legislation still needed to be
passed by the future Hungarian Parliament in order to guarantee more thorough oversight
of the middle-class reform program. Other pending tasks included reimbursing the nobil-
ity and codifying the new civil law. Hungarian political circles enjoyed a brief moment of
optimism, even enthusiasm. Indeed, looking back from later events, some historians argue
that the Hungarian liberals were too successful in 184841.
Of course, it was clear even to the Hungarian liberals themselves that lasting success de-
pended not only on the course of events but also the ability of the Hungarian government
to use the moment wisely. Enforcing all these laws demanded a stable political and security
situation, as well as long months of hard work. Furthermore, the liberal leadership under-
stood that passing the reform laws did not mean the end of legislative activity, but that
additional efforts would be needed, especially measures favouring the poorer sections of
society. At the Assembly on 7 April 1848, one of the most influential Hungarian liberals,
Ferenc Deák, warned that the new government would keep the trust of the people only if
it worked to ensure investments and jobs and if it organised industry in a way that would
improve the lives of the poor42.
The liberals strongly stressed the fact that the revolution took place with no bloodshed or
internal conflict. In the early days of March the revolution was greeted by almost all the
population, even the non-Hungarians. Still, the new government realized that fulfilling
social part of its agenda required further commitment to its concept of harmonization
of interests. However, it soon appeared that precisely those revolutionary circumstances

Ideology, Society and Values

146 Zoltán Györe

that had led to such extraordinary results also made implementing the liberal programme
difficult if not impossible. Enthusiasm led some politicians to make demands that the gov-
ernment could not allow. At the same time, spokesmen for some of the non-Hungarian
national communities introduced new political and territorial demands.
Apart from agrarian and national problems, the Hungarian government had to deal with
the attitude of the Imperial court towards the enforcement and implementation of the
March laws. At a secret meeting on 26 March 1848, court circles decided that the ruling
house had no choice but to show a friendly attitude towards Batthyány’s government, but
when its position improved it would immediately launch a military attack against Hunga-
ry43. In line with that decision, the court adopted an equivocal policy towards the Hungar-
ian government until September when it started its military intervention. It more or less
openly refused to hand over jurisdiction over army and foreign affairs to the Hungarian
government. Resistance in the court and on the part of some non-Hungarian nationalities,
the desire of the poorest layers of society to further extend the revolution, as well as the
intervention of foreign political and military factors, created favourable conditions for
undermining the Hungarian liberal government. As a result, whole regions, including the
Military Frontier, Croatia, and the territories controlled by the Serbians and Romanians,
refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Hungarian government.
The greatest challenge to the Hungarian revolutionaries and their harmonization policy
came from national demands. In the first days after the revolution in Pest and Buda on 15
March 1848, the non-Hungarian population enthusiastically greeted the revolution and
its results. However, the political leaders of the nationalities judged that the revolution-
ary situation offered certain possibilities for achieving some of their most ambitious aims.
Presentation of these new demands caught the Hungarian government off guard. Most of
the demands related to national status and proportional representation in the future State
Assembly. However, the Croats and Serbs demanded administrative and territorial sepa-
ration from Hungary; while the Romanians sought territorial autonomy (some of them
even demanded union with Moldavia and Wallachia). The Jews, Germans, and Ruthenians
remained loyal to the Hungarian government. The Slovaks expressed moderate nationalist
demands and in fact more Slovaks took part in the war on the side of the Hungarians, than
as members of the Slovak Legion which fought against it 44.
The Hungarian government was ready to meet nationalist demands in the areas of culture
and religion, but refused to extend the status of separate nation to the Serbs, Slovaks, and
Romanians. The Croats were offered state ties on the level of a personal union or, at worst,
separation from the Hungarian Kingdom. Contemporary liberals believed that nations
had the right to a separate state, and that acknowledging the status of a nation required rec-
ognizing the above-mentioned nations as having the right to their own states. This raised in
practical terms the issue of the history of Hungary’s federalization, along with the possibil-
ity that the diverse national territories might, given favourable conditions, separate from
the Kingdom. But at this juncture Hungary refused to accept such a solution.
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 147

Having realized the severity of the problem, the Hungarian government promised that
the outstanding agrarian and national issues would be solved at the first session of the new
State Assembly, convoked for mid July 1848. However, Parliament had to meet under un-
expected war conditions. June saw uprisings by Serbs and Rumanians, while in early Sep-
tember, the Imperial army started its military intervention, and a year later it was joined by
a large Russian army. In this context Hungarian politicians concentrated upon the coun-
try’s defence and could not properly solve these pending issues. Hungary’s defeat in 1849
turned the wheel of history backwards, along with all plans to implement the reform of
the legal, political, and social systems. Hungarian statesmen could return to dealing these
important issues, as well as with new and pressing problems of agrarian, social, and na-
tional issues, only after the Austro-Hungarian Settlement of 1867, which was marked by
substantially more unfavourable conditions than those prevailing in 1848 and 1849.

Conclusions
Generally speaking, if the harmonization of interests concept is judged in light of the
events of 1848 and 1849, one can argue that it was partially successful. The interests of
the liberal nobility, intelligentsia, bourgeois elements of society, and the educated strata
among youth that were unified in the pre-revolutionary era weathered even the greatest
threats of the revolutionary era. Moreover, in 1848 and 1849 these foundations were fur-
ther consolidated by the revolution’s achievements, especially given the support shown by
the peasantry and by some among the non-Hungarian peoples. Political freedom, equality
before the law, a liberal administration, and the abolition of serfdom were decreed. These
and other changes in the political and social system were backed by most of the popula-
tion, except for certain parts of the nobility and aristocracy.
Agrarian issues were far more problematical. Peasant demands went beyond the statutory
abolition of feudalism. The Hungarian government responded by enacting new laws to ex-
pand the initial reforms for the benefit of the poor. However, given the conditions of the
time, it was not viable to divide up the land, as the poorest hoped for. Still, when the impe-
rial army intervened against the Hungarian government, the peasantry in Hungary did not
turn against the nobility, but massively and decisively stood in defense of liberal reforms45.
Indeed, the participation of the population in the Hungarian revolution was so strong that it
took an entire year to defeat, and only then with massive military aid from the Russians.
The harmonization of interests produced the poorest results in regard to relations between
Hungarians and non-Hungarians. However, even in this field it did not completely fail. The
main obstacles were the policy of gradual incorporation of the non-Hungarian communi-
ties and the fact that some of these, beginning in the late 18th century, developed their own
national-political programs based on the demand for separate national territories. Middle-
class reform was important both to the progressive elements of the non-Hungarian ethnic
communities and to the Hungarians. However, some of the former, such as the Croats,

Ideology, Society and Values

148 Zoltán Györe

Serbs, and Romanians, thought that it was the Hungarians who stood to gain the most
from such changes. They also believed that the reforms would only guarantee Hungarians
separate nation status within the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. For this reason the
Croat, Serb, and Romanian political elites did not promote looser ties between the Hun-
garian Kingdom and the court in Vienna. What is more, the Serbs, Croats, and Romanians
did not accept the sovereignty of the Hungarian liberal government, while most Romani-
ans opposed the union of Transylvania with Hungary. As a result, the Serbs and Romanians
organised armed resistance against the revolutionary Hungarian government. As for the
Jews, Germans, and Ruthenians, they felt that they did not meet the proper conditions
for territorial autonomy and, therefore, supported both the reforms and the revolution.
Hungarian politicians were genuinely surprised that non-Hungarian politicians superim-
posed their nationalist programme over the social and liberal one. Bertalan Szemere, in his
post-revolutionary memoirs, underscored that the newly formed Hungarian government
did not take specific steps in regard to the nationalities issue in Hungary, believing that the
abolition of serfdom, legal equality, and political freedom were sufficient guarantees and
that, therefore, specific measures for national rights were not needed46.
In conclusion, we could state that the harmonization of interests concept proved to be
a dynamic and interconnected system of liberal ideas. It developed over a long period at
the hands of at least two generations of intellectuals and politicians, who sought to dis-
cover theoretical and practical opportunities for the bourgeois transformation of society.
Its advantages and disadvantages became apparent during the Vormärz and the revolution
of 1848/1849. Then it became clear that well thought-out, persistent, multilayered, and
united political action could, even in unfavourable conditions at the national and interna-
tional level, successfully change the entire constitutional and social system. The role and
the significance of the revolution in the long term success of the liberal programme are
issues that require further research. The fact is that revolutionary conditions allowed the
liberals to succeed, but that they also unleashed a reaction that postponed reform for an-
other twenty years. However, during this intervening period, specific aspects of the liberal
programme, such as general taxation, abolition of serfdom, secure property rights, and
equality before the law were implemented even within the framework of absolutism. On
the other hand, the liberal solutions of 1848 not only became less democratic after 1867.
They even appeared somewhat obsolete in the atmosphere of the Ausgleich, which more or
less halted the development of a more democratic system.
 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 149

Notes
1
A. Gergely, A magyar reformellenzék kialakulása és megszilárdulása, 1830-1840, in Gy. Mérei (ed.), Ma-
gyarország története, 1790-1848, Budapest 1983, vol. II, p. 700.
I.Z. Dénes, Politikai szabadság és politikai közösség viszonya Kossuth értelmezésében, in “Világosság”, 2003,
2

pp. 5-6.
3
K. Kecskeméti, A magyar történelem kulcsszava: a pluralizmus, in “Magyar Tudomány”, 2007, 6, pp. 778-
779.
4
J. Veliky, A forradalomtól irtózó reformerek, in “Rubicon”, 1991, 6, p. 27.
5
Z. Györe, Gradovi i varoši Bačke početkom 19.veka, Novi Sad 2007, p. 33.
6
Z. Fónagy (ed.), Wesselényi Miklós, Budapest 1998, pp. 62-63.
7
A. Gergely, A reformkor. A polgári átalakulás programja, in “Rubicon”, 1996, 3. Note that all volumes of the
historical journal “Rubicon” from 1990 to 2000 are now available in DVD format as “DVD könyvtár III,
történelem”.
8
Kecskeméti, A magyar történelem megértésének kulcsszava cit., p. 778.
9
Ibid., pp. 777-778.
10
L. Tőkéczky (ed.), Magyar liberaliznus, Budapest 1993, pp. 511-512.
11
A. Gergely, A 19. századi német és magyar liberalizmus párhuzamai, in “Magyar Tudomány”, 2008, 1, p. 29.
12
J. Szentpéteri (ed.), Magyar kódex, Reformkor és kiegyezés, 1790-1867, Budapest - Gyula 2000, pp. 26-30.
13
L. Kiss, Deák nemzetfelfogása 1848 előtt, in “Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Agriensis Nova Series”, 2004,
XXXI, Section. Historiae Eger; Internet version at http://tortenelem.ektf.hu/efolyoirat/Kiss/6.htm.
14
I.Z. Dénes, Politikai szabadság és politikai közösség viszonya Kossuth értelmezésében, in “Világosság”, 2003, 132.
15
M. Kónyi (ed.), Deák Ferencz beszédei, 1829-1847, Budapest 1882, vol. I, p. 276; Gergely, A magyar re-
formellenzék cit., pp. 699-704.
16
This is the definition which Abraham Lincoln heard in a lecture Kossuth gave in Columbus, Ohio and
partly inspired his famous sentence in the Gettysburg Address of 19 November 1863: “Government of the
people, by the people and for the people”. See I.Z. Dénes, A magyar liberalizmus klasszikusainak szellemi
öröksége, in “Világosság”, 2003, 5-6, p. 45.
17
Id., A magyar liberálisok szellemi horizontja és értékvilága, 1830-1848, in Id. (ed.), Szabadság és nemzet,
Budapest 1993, p. 130.
18
I. Barta (ed.), Kossuth Lajos összes munkái, Országgyűlési tudósítások, Budapest 1949, vol. III, p. 719;
Gergely, A Magyar reformellenzék cit., vol. II, p. 709; Id., A reformkor cit.
19
Zs. Luchmann, A táblabírói Magyarország. A megyei közélet visszásságai a reformkori életképekben, in “For-
rás”, 1999, February; Internet version http://www.forrasfolyoirat.hu/9902/luch.html.
20
Z. Fónagy (ed.), Wesselényi Miklós, Budapest 1998, pp. 62-63.
21
Veliky, A forradalomtól irtózó reformerek cit., p. 12.
22
Kiss, Deák nemzetfelfogása 1848 előtt cit.; Kónyi (ed.), Deák Ferencz beszédei I cit., p. 99.
23
E. Niederhauser, Talleyrand, Metternich, Szekszárd 2004, p. 254.
24
J. Veliky, A polgári fejlődés fokmérője, in “Rubicon”, 1992, 2.
25
Gy. Vargha, Magyarország pénzintézetei, Budapest 1885, p. 22; A magyar korona országainak hitelintézetei
1894-ben, in “Magyar Statisztikai Közlöny Új Folyam”, 1897, XVI, p. 42.
26
M. Freeden, Szabadság és identitás, in “Magyar Tudomány”, 2008, 1, p. 12; J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty
and Representative Government, London - New York 1910, p. 363.

Ideology, Society and Values

150 Zoltán Györe

R. Hermann (ed.), Szemere Bertalan, Budapest 1998, pp. 100-101.

27

According to this concept political power has its origins in the Holy Crown, not in the person of the king.
28

Thus an individual could have power as king only after being coronated with the Holy Crown, in precisely-
defined circumstances and with the proper ceremony, and not by the dynastic right of a monarch. Thus
only the Crown is holy, not the king. One implication is that subjects pledged loyalty to the Crown, i.e. to
the state, and not to the King. This theory had far-reaching and positive consequences under Ottoman rule
and the partition of the Kingdom of Hungary into three parts (Royal Hungary, the territories annexed to
the Ottoman Empire, and Transylvania).
M. Wesselényi, Balitéletekről, Leipzig 1833; Z. Fónagy, Wesselényi Miklós, Budapest 1999, pp. 84-86.
29

Hermann (ed.), Szemere Bertalan cit., p. 113.

30

J. Galántai, Nemzet és kissebség Eötvös József életművében, Budapest 1995, p. 8.

31

“Pesti Hírlap”, 1841, 94.

32

Gergely, A. századi német cit., p. 31.

33

Kecskeméti, A magyar történelem megértésének kulcsszava cit., p. 782.

34

D. Kosáry, Újjáépítés és polgárosodás 1711-1867, Budapest 1990, p. 280.

35

T. Pal, Дуги деветнаести век, in P. Rokai, Z. Ðere, T. Pal, A. Kasaš, Историја Мађара, Belgrade 2002,
36

p. 426; B. Kálmán (ed.), Magyarország Történeti Kronológiája, Budapest 1983, vol. III, p. 646; Gergely, A
reformkor. A polgári átalakulás programja cit.
Vargha, Magyarország pénzintézetei cit., pp. 24-25.
37

Kecskeméti, A magyar történelem megértésének kulcsszava cit., p. 782.

38

P. Krestić, Мађарско-српска прожимања током прве половине века: пример Стефана Сечењија, in B.
39

Kovaček, R. Lastić (eds.), Из историје српско-мађарских културних веза. A szerb-magyar kulturális kapc-
solatok történetéböl, Újvidék [Novi Sad] - Budapest 2003, pp. 102-103.
P. Hanák (ed.), Egy ezredév, Budapest 1986, pp. 190-191.
40

Gergely, A 19. századi német cit., pp. 30-31.

41

Id., Ferenc Deák 1848-ban, in “Magyar Tudomány”, 2003, 12, p. 1544.

42

Hanák (ed.), Egy ezredév cit., p. 191.

43

Gy. Spira, Polgári forradalom 1848-1849, in E. Kovács (main editor), Magyarország története 1848-1890,
44

Budapest 1987, pp. 292-293.

Gergely, A reformkor. A polgári átalakulás programja cit.
45

B. Szemere, Szemere Bertalan miniszterelnök emlékiratai az 1848/49- iki magyar kormányzat nemzetiségi
46

politikájáról, Budapest 1941, p. 76.

 The Basis of the Reform Policy of the Hungarian Liberals in the Vormärz 151

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