Rosemary O’Leary, Editor, Public Administration and the Disciplines

Michael McGuire, Editor, Research Synthesis

Nicola Belle
Paola Cantarelli
Bocconi University, Italy

What Causes Unethical Behavior? Public

Administration
A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for and the
Public Administration Research Disciplines
& Research
Synthesis
Editor’s Note: The distinctive content of this article accounts for its dual identity as a Research Synthesis Nicola Belle is assistant professor in the
Department of Policy Analysis and Public
and Public Administration and the Disciplines feature. The meta-analysis explains the article’s inclusion Management at Bocconi University in Milan,
in the Research Synthesis feature. The articles that are the object of the meta-analysis are drawn from Italy. His research focuses on cognitive
extensive experimental research in fields outside public administration, which explains the connection to biases in managerial decision making, work
motivation, job design, and leadership.
our Public Administration and the Disciplines feature. Authors Nicola Belle and Paola Cantarelli make a E-mail: nicola.belle@unibocconi.it
case for how the meta-analysis of experimental research could begin to transform public administration
research about ethics. Paola Cantarelli holds a postdoctoral
position in the Department of Policy
JLP
Analysis and Public Management at Bocconi
University in Milan, Italy. Her research
Abstract: This article uses meta-analysis to synthesize 137 experiments in 73 articles on the causes of unethical behav- focuses on work motivation and cognitive
biases.
ior. Results show that exposure to in-group members who misbehave or to others who benefit from unethical actions, E-mail: paola.cantarelli@unibocconi.it
greed, egocentrism, self-justification, exposure to incremental dishonesty, loss aversion, challenging performance goals,
or time pressure increase unethical behavior. In contrast, monitoring of employees, moral reminders, and individuals’
willingness to maintain a positive self-view decrease unethical conduct. Findings on the effect of self-control depletion
on unethical behavior are mixed. Results also present subgroup analyses and several measures of study heterogeneity and
likelihood of publication bias. The implications are of interest to both scholars and practitioners. The article concludes
by discussing which of the factors analyzed should gain prominence in public administration research and uncovering
several unexplored causes of unethical behavior.

A
dherence to the highest standards of
ethical conduct is inherent in the mission
of government organizations, the purpose
of which is to serve the public interest. Indeed, a
long-standing tradition in the public administration
literature suggests that ethics and morality are
two founding principles of civil service. Using
normative approaches, scholars have specified
what civil servants should do and how they
should behave (e.g., Cooper 2012; Perry 2015;
Pugh 1991; Rainey 2009; Rohr 1986, 1998).
The members of the American Society for Public
Administration (ASPA) have committed themselves
to the demonstration of personal integrity and the
promotion of ethical organizations, two principles
in the Code of Ethics approved by the ASPA
National Council in 2013 (ASPA 2016; Svara
2014). Nevertheless, daily news uncovers major
and minor acts of dishonesty by public officials.
The relevance of this concern is demonstrated
by the fact that one stream of research in public
administration is focused on investigating
administrative evil and how it threatens traditional
public values (e.g., Adams and Balfour 2015).
Despite the importance of ethics in government,
which remains “at the heart of what we are about
as a professional field” (Perry 2015, 187), public
administration research in this area has been scant
(for a review, see Menzel 2015). Adams and Balfour’s
search for “scholarly articles on ethics topics in leading
public administration journals indicates that, at
their zenith in the last two decades of the twentieth
century, ethics topics hovered around 5 percent of
all articles. In addition, their topical coverage is slim”
(2010b, 781). Also, a recent virtual issue of Public
Administration Review containing selected studies
that the journal has published since 2002 on the
topics of “corruption, unethical behavior, and ethics,”
included only 13 articles. In short, “studies addressing
this topic are needed, important, and long overdue”
(Adams and Balfour 2010b, 783). The paucity of
public administration scholarship on ethics contrasts
with a spurt in other disciplines within the social
sciences, such as business, economics, management,
and psychology, in which the investigation of the
Public Administration Review,
determinants of unethical behavior has drawn Vol. 77, Iss. 3, pp. 327–339. © 2017 by
increasing attention among scholars in recent years The American Society for Public Administration.
(e.g., Moore and Gino 2015). DOI: 10.1111/puar.12714.

What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research 327
The public administration research on ethics is characterized by
a methodological delay relative to other fields. To the best of our
knowledge, unlike the evidence available in public administration
journals to date (for reviews, see Menzel 2015; Von Maravić 2008),
it has become standard practice in other disciplines to investigate
the causes of unethical behavior using randomized experiments
(e.g., Moore and Gino 2015). Because the public administration
literature on unethical behavior has relied almost exclusively on
observational designs, our field still lacks a solid understanding of
the causal mechanisms underlying unethical behavior in public
organizations.
The primary aim of our work is to help fill this gap by providing
a comprehensive synthesis of the experimental literature in this
area. We collected data from 137 experiments in 73 articles and
identified 12 causes of unethical behavior. To address brevity
concerns, this article report results in full detail for the seven factors
(social influences, greed, egocentrism, monitoring, moral reminders,
self-justification, and self-view) for which we meta-analyzed more
than 10 primary experiments. Findings for the remaining five
factors (self-control depletion, slippery slope effect, loss aversion,
goal setting, and time pressure) are summarized in table 1 and made
available in the online supplement (tables S8–S12 and table S15).
To identify the factors for which we report fully detailed analyses,
we used the 10-study cutoff that is usually suggested as a threshold
for conducting meaningful publication bias analyses (e.g., Banks,
Kepes, and Banks 2012; Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2016;
Kepes et al. 2012).
from other disciplines is to inspire public administration scholars
to conduct randomized controlled trials on samples of public
administration students and employees, which may help nurture
the resurgence of public ethics research in our own field. Indeed,
Adams and Balfour talk about “the complicity of academic research
in perpetuating the ethical theory/ethical practice disconnection by
marginalizing the study of public service ethics” (2010b, 767).
Because almost a decade has passed since the last research synthesis
on the determinants of unethical conduct (Kish-Gephart, Harrison,
and Treviño 2010), and experimental research has grown fast,
we believe the time is ripe for a comprehensive meta-analysis of
experimental literature on the causes of unethical behavior. We are
convinced that our study substantially advances previous meta-
analytic work on the same topic. In particular, we depart from
Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño (2010) in several important
ways. For instance, those authors analyzed only two out of the 137
experiments included in our sample. This lack of overlap is not
surprising if we consider that the spurt of experimental scholarship
on the determinants of unethical conduct is a very recent
phenomenon. Indeed, 86 percent of the experiments on unethical
behavior that we meta-analyze were published after 2008, which
is the last year covered by Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño’s
meta-analysis. The novelty of our meta-analytic synthesis is also
demonstrated by a striking discrepancy between the determinants
of unethical behavior identified by Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and
Treviño and those resulting from our comprehensive meta-analysis
of experimental work on this topic.

We limited our meta-analyses to experimental research for two main
reasons. First, we are interested in investigating the causal mechanisms
that drive unethical behavior; randomized trials best serve this
purpose because “no other scientific method regularly matches the
characteristics of causal relationships so well” (Shadish, Cook, and
Campbell 2002, 7). Second, we hope to motivate scholars in our
field to conduct future experimental research on the determinants
of unethical behavior that will capitalize on what we know now,
complement normative debates, and triangulate observational
findings. The ultimate goal of presenting experimental meta-evidence
Ethics Literature and Research in Public Administration
Normative debates about public administration ethics focus on two
sets of administrative values: bureaucratic ethos and democratic
ethos (Pugh 1991). One key element of the former is that in
providing public services, civil servants have to consider managerial
values such as efficiency, effectiveness, loyalty, and accountability
(Pugh 1991). Without an explicit reference to public ethics values,
and with the prominence of technical rationality, bureaucratic ethos
can turn into administrative evil (Adams 2011; Adams and Balfour
2010a, 2015; Zanetti and Adams 2000), under which “ordinary

Table 1 Meta-Analytic Estimates of the Effects of the 12 Factors on Unethical Behavior

Summary effect size Treated Control
Factor N SE Lower Limit Upper Limit Z-Value p
(Hedges’s g, random effects) Sample Size Sample Size
Social influences 33 0.48 0.04 0.39 0.57 10.73 1,866 1,815 .000
Greed 26 0.45 0.09 0.28 0.63 5.11 1,451 1,325 .000
Egocentrism 20 0.58 0.07 0.45 0.71 8.47 1,529 1,241 .000
Monitoring 19 –0.84 0.14 –1.11 –0.57 –6.05 1,356 1,220 .000
Moral reminders 15 –0.43 0.07 –0.56 –0.29 –6.30 704 788 .000
Self-justification 13 0.88 0.14 0.59 1.16 6.05 632 563 .000
Self-view 12 –0.56 0.07 –0.70 –0.42 –8.09 433 427 .000
Self-control depletion* 8 0.22 0.18 –0.13 0.57 1.24 363 365 .215
Slippery-slope effect* 7 0.53 0.08 0.38 0.68 6.88 368 369 .000
Loss aversion* 5 0.50 0.14 0.22 0.78 3.51 156 156 .000
Goal setting* 4 0.29 0.08 0.13 0.45 3.50 272 309 .000
Time pressure* 4 0.64 0.12 0.40 0.89 5.17 142 127 .000

Notes: Data from one experiment can be included in more than one factor. Factors marked with the asterisk indicate meta-analyses for which we do not provide fully
detailed results in-text but we provided all analyses and information in the online supplement (Tables S8–S12 and Table S15).

328 Public Administration Review • May | June 2017

people, within their normal professional and administrative roles, published in Public Administration Review and Public Integrity
can engage in acts of evil without being aware that they are doing between 2005 and 2014. All 109 articles analyzed in the review
anything wrong. Under conditions of moral inversion, people employed an observational and cross-sectional research design,
may even view their evil activity as good” (Adams 2011, 275). either using a qualitative or a quantitative approach or both. None
Two instances of administrative evil from the twentieth century of this empirical work in public administration ethics employed
include the systematic planning, execution, and perpetuation of experimental techniques.
the Holocaust by German bureaucrats and the 1986 NASA space
shuttle Challenger disaster (Adams and Balfour 2015; Adams, Method
Balfour, and Reed 2006; Zanetti and Adams 2000). Early evidence Search for Primary Data
of administrative evil can also be found in Stanley Milgram’s (1963) We completed our search for primary data in July 2015 using a
work. Participants in his experiments hurt others in obedience to three-step procedure. First, we identified articles by applying a
the instructions of an authority that had no real power to enforce snowball technique, starting with the references of two seminal
commands, notwithstanding the absence of punishment for studies that have theoretically and methodologically informed
noncompliance and despite their self-reported disapproval of the most recent research into the determinants of unethical behavior:
action (Milgram 1963). Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Mazar, Amir, and Ariely
(2008). In particular, we read the title and abstract of all articles
Unlike bureaucratic ethos, democratic ethos (Pugh 1991) stresses included in the references of those two studies, and we retrieved in
political and regime values. The democratic ethos serves as the Google Scholar all manuscripts citing the two seminal studies and
moral foundation of public ethics by promoting, for example, the including terms “unethical” and “experiment” anywhere in the text.
public interest, citizens’ empowerment, social equity, justice, and
benevolence (e.g., Pugh 1991). Rohr (1986, 1998) argued that The second step of our search for primary data entailed repeating for
democratic ethos should be a part of the training for civil servants the meta-analysis of Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño (2010)
and that emphasis should be put on developing virtues rather than the same process that we followed in the first step. To the best of
avoiding moral scandals and corruption. In particular, the two our knowledge, this is the most recent and most relevant research
regime values that public administrators should abide by are the U.S. synthesis available for the purpose of our investigation, despite
Constitution and the Supreme Court cases that interpret and apply it. substantive differences in theoretical framework and final sample of
primary study searching criteria as compared
Very recently, prominent scholars in public with our work.
administration and public service ethics
Very recently, prominent schol-
started investigating how the New Public ars in public administration Lastly, we performed a search in Google
Governance arrangements, characterized and public service ethics started Scholar using “unethical behavior” and
by a decline of the nation-state and the rise investigating how the New Pub- “dishonest” as keywords to be found in
of market-based governments, threaten lic Governance arrangements, the title. Our three-step procedure led to
ethical public organizations and public characterized by a decline of the identification of 2,306 English-written
values. For example, the focus on economic records potentially of interest for our meta-
rationality and the outsourcing of basic public
the nation-state and the rise analysis. Upon the elimination of redundant
administration functions may have fueled the of market-based governments, records and further analysis of the articles’
disconnect between ethical theory and ethical threaten ethical public organiza- abstracts, 172 articles were retained for
practice (Adams and Balfour 2010a, 2010b). tions and public values. in-depth consideration and potential
inclusion in our research.
Scholars also have developed models of ethical
decision making and investigated how human beings increase the Decision Rules
morality of their behaviors over time. Kohlberg (1980) proposed a Of the 172 articles identified through our search, we retained those
six-step model to describe how individuals develop as moral persons. that met two criteria. First, the independent variable(s) had to be
While individuals are only self-interested in step one, by step six, experimentally manipulated. Second, the dependent variable(s) had
they aspire to ethical behaviors that focus on universal principles of to be (a) measure(s) of unethicality. This included actual behavior,
justice and are capable of high moral reasoning and ethical analysis. self-reported intention to behave, and self-reported judgment of
Neo-Kohlbergian models of moral reasoning (e.g., Rest et al. 1999) the degree of unethicality. Most experiments in our final sample
have also nurtured this debate in the social sciences. Scholars in employed measures of actual behavior (table S15). We assessed
public administration have built on Kohlberg’s work to investigate each of the 172 articles in the initial list for inclusion separately.
the moral reasoning of civil servants in several cultural contexts We discussed our individual decisions until reaching consensus. As
(e.g., Lim Choi 2006; Rizzo and Swisher 2004; Stewart, Sprinthall, mentioned earlier, we only meta-analyzed experiments because they
and Kem 2002). are best suited for establishing causal relationships and because our
findings can inform the much-needed future experimental research
Applied research in public administration ethics recently has been in public administration ethics.
summarized by Menzel (2015). Building on his previous research
syntheses (i.e., Menzel 2005; Menzel and Carson 1999), Menzel Coding
(2015) identified several research themes on ethics and integrity Using the software Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 2.0 (http://www.
in public administration, referencing 109 articles on the topic meta-analysis.com/index.php), we created a data set reporting the
What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research 329
following information for each of the primary studies retained experimental conditions, and the two pairwise comparisons that we
through the previous phases of our analysis: (1) author(s), (2) combined share the same treatment group.
year of publication, (3) manipulated variable(s) and concrete
experimental intervention, (4) outcome variable(s), (5) sample When the comparison column in tables S1–S12 displays the word
size, and (6) any measures useful to estimate the effect of the blank, no combinations were calculated. Similarly, combined under
experimental manipulations. Examples of (6) included means, the outcome column in tables S1–S12 indicates that multiple
standard deviations, p-value, t-value, F-test, and χ2-test. We first standardized outcome measures were averaged. Blank indicates
coded about 10 primary studies separately, then checked each that only one outcome measure was imputed. How to include a
other’s work adopting a critical approach, solved any discrepancies study with multiple intervention groups in a meta-analysis is still
through discussions, and then each coded half of the remaining debated: scholarship does not yet provide definitive instructions
studies independently. but rather describes several approaches
and generally recommends the one that we
Lastly, we together checked the final data In grouping primary studies, we adopted (e.g., Borenstein et al. 2009; Higgins
set twice and used the information in (3) to tried to balance two conflicting and Green 2011). We partially mitigated the
classify the records in the data set into unique goals: the minimization of the legitimate concerns that may arise from our
factors determining unethical behavior. In number of factors, so to make judgment call in this regard by running a
grouping primary studies, we tried to balance series of robustness checks, which included
two conflicting goals: the minimization of
the meta-analysis as parsimoni- computing weighted averages, calculating
the number of factors, so to make the meta- ous as possible, and the maximi- unweighted averages, running meta-analyses
analysis as parsimonious as possible, and zation of homogeneity among with one study removed at a time, performing
the maximization of homogeneity among manipulations within each cumulative meta-analyses, and picking one
manipulations within each factor. factor. comparison only per experiment. None of the
robustness checks that we employed revealed
We labeled the 12 factors discussing different variation in the findings.
alternatives and selecting the final label by consensus. Agreeing with
an anonymous reviewer, our meta-analyses share with comparable We used the d/g framework for effect sizes because the primary
work (e.g., Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2016; Gerrish 2016) studies included in our meta-analyses are experiments. In fact,
the limitation of variable coding by authors. However, we are d-based effect sizes are more appropriate when primary studies
convinced that the procedures that we adopted in the study and the perform difference of means tests or analysis of variance (e.g.,
postestimation analyses presented here not only partially address Ringquist 2013). Also, we used Hedges’s g to take advantage of the
this concern but also provide enough information to the readers to fact that it is scale free. We preferred expressing the effect size in
make informed assessment and use of our work. Nevertheless, we terms of the number of standard deviations by which the means
fully acknowledge that using independent coders would have been differ because the scales used in the primary studies to measure
superior. The coding process led to a final sample comprising 137 the dependent variable were not necessarily inherently meaningful
experiments from 73 articles and 12 causes of unethical behavior. or comparable. We preferred the Hedges’s g over Cohen’s d, as the
The descriptive characteristics of each experiment are reported in latter may overestimate the population effect size in small samples
table S15 of the online supplement. Results are presented in full (e.g., Ringquist 2013). According to Cohen (1988), a standardized
detail for the seven determinants of unethical behavior with more summary effect size of .2 is small, of .5 is moderate, and of .8 is
than 10 experiments meta-analyzed. Findings for the five factors large.
with 10 or fewer experiments meta-analyzed are shown in table 1
and in the online supplement. Fixed-effects estimations are based on the assumption that the true
effect size is identical across all studies. Scholars have argued that
Analyses this assumption may be implausible in most meta-analytic reviews
We used Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 2.0 to estimate the and suggested that random-effects models should be generally
Hedges’s g effect size of the factors leading to unethical behavior preferred (e.g., Borenstein, Hedges, and Rothstein 2007). Public
that we identified through the steps described earlier. We employed management scholars have recently provided similar advice (e.g.,
combined comparisons (table S1–S8 and table S15) to account Gerrish 2016; Homberg, McCarthy, and Tabvuma 2015; Ringquist
for two circumstances. One case is for experiments that could 2013). Following these indications and the suggestion of an
contribute several independent comparisons to the same meta- anonymous reviewer, we focused our analyses on the random-effects
analysis. Here, the combined pairwise comparisons do not have estimations.
any intervention group in common. An example of this is Erat and
Gneezy’s (2012) study 1 in the meta-analysis of social influences: Following the recommendations to provide heterogeneity measures
subjects were randomized in five experimental conditions, and in order to help readers put the point estimate into context (e.g.,
the two pairwise comparisons that we combined refer to four Aguinis et al. 2011), we tested the statistical significance of the
independent groups. The other case of combined comparisons is Q-value and computed I2 and T2. A significant p-value for the
for experiments in which several comparisons are correlated because Q-statistic provides evidence that the true effect sizes vary across
they have intervention groups, and hence participants, in common. studies. The I2 represents the proportion of observed variance that is
One example of this is Ploner and Regner (2013) in the meta- real. The T2 is an absolute measure of the variance of the true effect
analysis of monitoring: subjects were randomly assigned to three sizes (Borenstein et al. 2009).
330 Public Administration Review • May | June 2017
To further help readers contextualize the findings, we explored the
heterogeneity of results across disciplines, types of experimental
settings (laboratory, online, field), types of participants (students,
workers, general population), types of observed outcomes (actual
behavior, self-reported intentions, self-reported judgments about
unethicality of someone else’s behavior), and sources (peer-reviewed
journal, Social Science Research Network, conference proceedings).
More precisely, we conducted subgroup analyses anytime the
foregoing variables varied within a factor and anytime there was
at least one experiment per category within variables (table S15).
To make subgroup analyses by discipline manageable, we merged
subdisciplines into disciplines and made judgment calls in the
case of multiple attributions. We computed mixed-effects analysis,
which uses a random-effects model to combine studies within each
subgroup and a fixed-effects model to combine subgroups and yield
the overall effect.
Lastly, we addressed concerns of publication bias by analyzing the
funnel plots (table S13), the Duval and Tweedie’s trim and fill
procedure (table S14), and the Egger’s test of the regression intercept
(table S14). The Duval and Tweedie’s trim and fill procedure assesses
the symmetry of funnel plot distributions. When asymmetry is
present, the trim and fill procedures (1) iteratively trim extreme
effect sizes until reaching symmetry, (2) add back the trimmed effect
sizes together with imputed effect sizes of the opposite side, and (3)
reestimate the meta-analytic parameters. Publication bias is unlikely
if the meta-analytically derived effect sizes and the trim-and-fill-
adjusted effect sizes are identical or comparable (Duval and Tweedie
2000a, 2000b). The Egger’s test of the regression intercept indicates
the absence of publication bias when the regression intercept is
statistically indifferent from zero (Banks, Kepes, and McDaniel
2012; Borenstein et al. 2009).
Results
In this section, we report the results of the meta-analyses for seven
of the 12 factors influencing unethical behavior that we identified
through our systematic literature review. Adopting the 10-study
cutoff that is usually suggested as a threshold for conducting
meaningful publication bias analyses, the meta-analyses of these
seven factors included more than 10 primary experiments. For each
of those seven factors, we summarize the corresponding relevant
theories, indicate the number of experiments included in the meta-
analysis, and describe the experimental manipulations employed
in primary studies. Accordingly, we report (1) Hedges’s g summary
effect sizes under the random-effects model; (2) heterogeneity
measures; (3) findings of subgroup analyses by discipline,
experimental setting, participants, and observed outcomes, when
applicable; and (4) measures of publication bias (funnel plot, Duval
and Tweedie’s trim-and-fill procedure, and Egger’s regression test),
when applicable. For the five meta-analyses with fewer than 10
primary experiments, we report summary results in table 1 and all
analyses and information in the online supplement.
Social Influences
Scholars have recently begun to investigate how social influences
determine unethical behavior. Within this branch of studies,
researchers have indicated three primary drivers. First, social identity
theory suggests that individuals abide by social rules that provide
them with the opportunity to maintain or enhance their in-group
What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research 331
social identity (Rubin and Hewstone 1998; Tajfel 1982; Tajfel
and Turner 1986). This mechanism holds even when applied to
unethical examples. In fact, scholars have suggested that individuals
will imitate unethical examples if the actor is an in-group member
but not if the actor is an out-group member (Gino, Ayal, and Ariely
2009). Second, interdependence theory (Insko et al. 2011) and
self-serving altruism (Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013) suggest that
individuals are able to rationalize their dishonesty if the unethical
behavior also creates benefits for others, regardless of whether they
are group members or strangers.
Finally, along the same lines, the empathy-altruism hypothesis
posits that empathic emotions increase the willingness to help a
victim (Batson et al. 1991). The willingness to help the victim will
be greater when the victim is identified rather than nonidentified
because in the former condition, people are more likely to adopt the
perspective of the identified person (affect-based mechanism) and/
or overestimate the relevance of a singular victim (cognitive-based
mechanism) (Kogut and Ritov 2005; Small and Loewenstein 2003).
Thus, when the victim of the wrongdoing is identified, individuals
are likely to judge the unethicality of others more severely and/or
refrain from engaging in unethical conduct that might harm the
victim (Gino, Shu, and Bazerman 2010; Yam and Reynolds 2014).
We identified 33 experiments testing the effects of social influences
on individuals’ unethical behavior. The first type of experiments
in this meta-analysis tested the effects of the exposure to unethical
behavior on participants’ unethicality (e.g., Paternoster et al. 2013).
The second type of studies compared the degree of unethicality
between individuals acting as part of a group and individuals acting
alone (e.g., Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013). The third type consisted
of experiments contrasting unethical behavior of participants willing
to benefit others with the levels of unethicality of subjects acting
just in their own interest (e.g., Rigdon and D’Esterre 2015). The
fourth group of experiments compared the effects of being exposed
to an identified victim as opposed to an unidentified victim on
individuals’ unethicality (e.g., Yam and Reynolds 2014).
The results from the meta-analysis of the 33 independent
experiments (n = 3,681) showed a significant effect of social
influences on individuals’ unethicality. The Hedges’s g was .48
(p < .001) (table S1). The heterogeneity test indicated significant
variability among studies (Q-value (32) = 57.15 (p = .004); I2 = 44.01
percent; T2 = .028). We conducted a subgroup analysis to test for
heterogeneity across disciplines. Hedges’s g point estimates of the
effect sizes were .37 (p = .002, N = 2) for business, .53 (p < .001,
N = 6) for economics, .25 (p = .008, N = 2) for operations, and
.49 (p < .001, N = 22) for psychology (Q-value = 5.87, p = .118).
Therefore, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that effect sizes
were the same across disciplines. In other words, we did not find
clear evidence that summary effect sizes are different in different
disciplines.
We also conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity
across experimental settings. Hedges’s g point estimates of the
effect sizes were .55 (p < .001, N = 22) for experiments conducted in
laboratory settings and .30 (p = .001, N = 4) for online experiments
(Q-value = 5.18, p = .075). Thus, we failed to reject at the .05 level
but not at the .10 level the null hypothesis that effect sizes were the
same across experimental settings. In fact, we found that the effect .62 (p < .001, N = 15) for psychology (Q-value = 6.72, p = .081).
size was marginally greater for laboratory experiments compared Therefore, we failed to reject at the .05 level but not at the .10 level
with online experiments. the null hypothesis that effect sizes were the same across disciplines.

Lastly, we conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity We also conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity
across types of outcome observed in primary studies. Hedges’s g across experimental settings. Hedges’s g point estimates of the
point estimates of the effect sizes were .50 (p < .001, N = 25) for effect sizes were .52 (p < .001, N = 16) for experiments conducted
experiments measuring actual behavior, .41 (p < .001, N = 4) for in laboratory settings and .53 (p < .001, N = 2) for online
experiments measuring intentions to behave, and .47 (p = .009, experiments (Q-value = .002, p = .966). Thus, we found no evidence
N = 3) for experiments measuring judgment of the degree of of heterogeneity of the summary effect sizes across experimental
unethicality (Q-value = .79, p = .852). Therefore, we found no settings. Publication bias analyses returned mixed results (table
evidence of heterogeneity of effects sizes across types of outcomes S14).
being measured in original studies. Evidence of publication bias was
mixed (table S14). Egocentrism
Self-construal theory suggests that one way in which individuals
Greed define themselves is through their unique traits and independence
Recent experimental work drawing on distributive justice (Deutsch from others. In the state of independent self, individuals are less
1985), equity theory (Adams 1965), and social comparison likely to update their self-concept when acting unethically and less
processes (Festinger 1954; Wheeler, Koestner, and Driver 1982) likely to consider the degree to which their behaviors violate social
suggests that individuals are more likely to engage in unethical norms and/or affect others (e.g., Cojuharenco et al. 2011; Sedikides
behavior if they perceive that they are treated unfairly relative to and Brewer 2001). Along the same lines, social value orientation
their peers (e.g., Gino and Pierce 2011; Houser, Vetter, and Winter (Messick and McClintock 1968; Van Lange 1999) argues that
2012; Yam, Reynolds, and Hirsh 2014). Individuals compare pro-self-oriented individuals care about maximizing their benefits
their input-to-output ratio with a referent other around them, and are not concerned about the outcomes they cause onto others.
and whenever perceptions of inequity arise, they will tend to take Thus, they are expected to have less stringent moral standards and
actions to restore equity (Adams 1965). This includes engaging to be more likely to undertake an unethical conduct (Folmer and
in unethical behavior (Gino and Pierce De Cremer 2012). Interdependence theory
2009, 2011). Scholars have suggested that Individuals may become greedy also claims that the desire to maximize one’s
perceptions of inequity may be triggered and engage in unethical behav- own outcome allows individuals not to update
by the mere presence of abundant wealth their self-concept when behaving unethically
available in the environment, even in the
ior to restore fairness in the (Insko et al. 1990; Wiltermuth 2011).
absence of differentials in the input-to-output presence of both pay differen-
ratio (Gino and Pierce 2009). In other words, tials and wealth abundance in We retrieved 20 experiments testing whether
individuals may become greedy and engage the environment. individuals who perceive themselves as
in unethical behavior to restore fairness in the independent rather than related to others
presence of both pay differentials and wealth tend to be more dishonest. The first type of
abundance in the environment. experiments in this meta-analysis tested whether unethical behavior
increases with competition (e.g., Rigdon and D’Esterre 2015). The
We identified 26 experiments testing the effects of greed on second type of studies investigated whether the conflict of interest
individuals’ unethical behavior. The first type of experiments in causes higher levels of unethicality (e.g., Sah and Loewenstein
this meta-analysis tested the effects of inducing individuals to 2015). The last type of experiments tested whether individuals who
think about money or exposing them to wealth abundance in the are more focused on their own self-interest tend to behave more
environment on their unethicality (e.g., Gino and Mogilner 2014). dishonestly (e.g., Winterich, Mittal, and Morales 2014).
The second type of studies investigated the causal effect of offering
individuals a monetary incentive on their levels of dishonesty The results from the meta-analysis of the 20 independent
(e.g., Sharma et al. 2014). The third type of studies tested whether experiments (n = 2,770) showed a significant effect of egocentrism
individuals are more likely to engage in unethical behavior when on unethicality. The Hedges’s g was .58 (p < .001) (table S3). The
they are worse off relative to their peers (e.g., John, Loewenstein, heterogeneity test indicated significant variability among studies
and Rick 2014). (Q-value (19) = 51.54 (p < .001); I2 = 63.13 percent; T2 = .054).
We conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity across
The results from the meta-analysis of the 26 independent disciplines. Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect sizes were .83
experiments (n = 2,776) showed a significant effect of greed on (p < .001, N = 3) for business, .27 (p = .082, N = 3) for economics,
individuals’ unethicality. The Hedges’s g was.45 (p < .001) (table and .60 (p < .001, N = 11) for psychology (Q-value = 4.80, p = .091).
S2). The heterogeneity test indicated significant variability Therefore, we failed to reject at the .05 level but not at the .10 level
among studies (Q-value (25) = 139.00 (p < .001); I2 = 82.02 the null hypothesis that effect sizes were the same across disciplines.
percent; T2 = .164). We conducted a subgroup analysis to test for
heterogeneity across disciplines. Hedges’s g point estimates of the We also conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity
effect sizes were .28 (p = .574, N = 2) for business, .20 (p = .342, across experimental settings. Hedges’s g point estimates of the
N = 7) for economics, .34 (p = .001, N = 2) for operations, and effect sizes were .48 (p < .001, N = 10) for experiments conducted in
332 Public Administration Review • May | June 2017
laboratory settings and .64 (p < .001, N = 8) for online experiments analysis exposed participants either to a code of ethics (e.g., Mazar,
(Q-value = 1.65, p = .199). Thus, effect sizes did not seem to vary Amir, and Ariely 2008) or to ethical priming exercises (e.g., Welsh
by experimental settings. Lastly, we ran a subgroup analysis by type and Ordóñez 2014).
of participants. Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect sizes were
.87 (p < .001, N = 3) for alumni, .48 (p < .001, N = 4) for the general Meta-analytic results showed a significant effect of moral reminders
population, and .46 (p < .001, N = 11) for students (Q-value = 19.09, on individuals’ unethical behavior. The Hedges’s g was –.43
p < .001). Thus, effect sizes significantly varied across types of (p < .001) (table S5). The heterogeneity test indicated that the
participants. Measures of publication bias suggested that it is variability among studies is not significant at the .05 level (Q-value
unlikely (table S14). (14) = 21.66 (p = .086); I2 = 35.35 percent; T2 = .023). We conducted
a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity of summary effect sized
Monitoring across disciplines. Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect sizes were
The extant literature has suggested that monitoring individuals’ –.37 (p < .001, N = 8) for business and –.43 (p = .003, N = 4) for
behavior reduces unethicality in two ways. On the one hand, psychology (Q-value = .16, p = .694). Therefore, there is no evidence
monitoring decreases the perceptions that unethical acts go of heterogeneity of summary effect sizes across disciplines.
undetected (Welsh and Ordóñez 2014) and that the unethical actor
will not be held responsible (Mazar and Aggarwal 2011). On the We also conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity
other hand, monitoring draws individuals’ attention to their moral across experimental settings. Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect
standards and encourages self-awareness. In particular, individuals sizes were –.54 (p < .001, N = 10) for experiments conducted in
who are aware of being watched are less likely to engage in unethical laboratory settings and –.34 (p = .002, N = 2) for online experiments
actions without updating their self-concept (Alge, Greenberg, (Q-value = 2.08, p = .149). Thus, effect sizes did not seem to vary
and Brinsfield 2006; Welsh and Ordóñez 2014). We identified by experimental settings. Also, we ran subgroup analyses by type
19 experiments that tested the effects of monitoring individuals’ of participants. Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect sizes were
behavior on their levels of unethicality. Most experiments in this –.34 (p = .002, N = 2) for the general population, –.47 (p < .001,
meta-analysis investigated whether individuals are more likely to N = 7) for students, –.72 (p < .001, N = 4) for students and university
engage in unethical behavior when they are not being monitored employees, and –.07 (p = .58, N = 2) for workers (Q-value = 13.87,
compared with when they are controlled (e.g., Rixom and Mishra p = .003). Thus, we found strong evidence that effect sizes differed
2014). The remaining studies compared unethical behavior under by type of participants.
higher or lower degree of visibility of the dishonest actor or action
(e.g., Ploner and Regner 2013). Lastly, we ran a subgroup analysis by observed outcome. Hedges’s
g point estimates of the effect sizes were –.45 (p < .001, N = 13) for
The results from the meta-analysis of the 19 independent actual behavior and –.34 (p = .002, N = 2) for intentions to behave
experiments (n = 2,575) showed a negative effect of monitoring (Q-value = .59, p = .444). Thus, effect sizes did not vary by outcomes
on individuals’ unethicality. The Hedges’s g was –.84 (p < .001) measured in primary studies. Measures of publication bias suggest
(table S4). The heterogeneity test indicated significant variability that it is unlikely (table S14).
among studies (Q-value (18) = 178.03 (p < .001); I2 = 89.89 percent;
T2 = .32). We conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity Self-Justification
of summary effect sizes across disciplines. Hedges’s g point estimates Social cognitive theory (Bandura 1986) suggests that the availability
of the effect sizes were –.61 (p < .001, N = 6) for business, and of justifications encourages unethical behavior through an increased
–.99 (p < .001, N = 12) for psychology (Q-value = 1.94, p = .163). moral disengagement. The disengagement of moral standards and
Therefore, we did not find convincing evidence that effect sizes self-sanctions can occur, for example, when justifications make
varied across disciplines. Publication bias analyses revealed that it is
the conduct looks less immoral; consequences of the dishonest act
unlikely (table S14). are minimized, ignored, or misconstrued; responsibility for the
dishonest act is displaced or diffused; or victims of the wrongdoing
Moral Reminders are devalued or blamed (Bandura 1999). Similarly, self-concept
Self-concept maintenance theory suggests maintenance theory (Mazar, Amir, and
that reminding individuals about their moral Self-concept maintenance theory Ariely 2008) argues that the availability of
standards may be an effective way to reduce justifications for dishonest conduct leads
unethical behavior. When reminded about
suggests that reminding individ- to increased unethical behavior by allowing
their moral standards, individuals cannot uals about their moral stand- individuals not to update their self-image
get away with behaving unethically without ards may be an effective way to as honest and good. The mechanism of
updating their self-concept (Mazar, Amir, reduce unethical behavior. self-justifications seems to hold regardless
and Ariely 2008; Shu et al. 2012). Focus of the fact that the justification is relevant
theory of normative conduct suggests that or irrelevant for the unethical choice at
injunctive messages set behavioral expectations (Cialdini 2007; hand (Hsee 1996; Schweitzer and Hsee 2002). We identified 13
Cialdini et al. 2006). Codes of ethics can communicate injunctive independent experiments (n = 1,195) testing whether the availability
messages by detailing behaviors that will be judged acceptable versus of self-justifications leads to greater unethical behavior.
nonacceptable (Bing et al. 2012; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2009). We
identified 15 experiments (n = 1,492) that tested the effects of moral Meta-analytic findings showed a significant effect of the availability
reminders on individuals’ unethicality. Experiments in this meta- of self-justifications on unethicality. The Hedges’s g was .88
What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research 333
(p < .001) (table S6). The heterogeneity test indicated significant
variability among studies (Q-value (12) = 70.89 (p < .001); I2 = 83.07
percent; T2 = .214). We conducted a subgroup analysis to test for
heterogeneity across disciplines. Hedges’s g point estimates of
the effect sizes were .86 (p < .001, N = 3) for economics and .92
(p < .001, N = 9) for psychology (Q-value = .04, p = .840). Therefore,
we found no evidence of heterogeneity of summary effect size across
disciplines.
Furthermore, we ran a subgroup analysis by observed outcomes.
Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect sizes were .92 (p < .001,
N = 10) for actual behavior and .77 (p < .001, N = 3) for intentions
to behave (Q-value = .34, p = .56). Thus, effect sizes did not vary by
outcomes measured in primary studies. Publication bias is unlikely
in this case (table S14).
Self-View
Self-concept maintenance theory suggests that individuals strive
to create and maintain an image of themselves as good and ethical
persons. On the other side, though, it recognizes that dishonesty
pays and individuals are not immune to the temptation of
benefiting from misconduct. To solve the tension, individuals tend
to engage in unethical behavior only up to the point at which they
are not forced to weaken their self-concept (Mazar, Amir, and
Ariely 2008). The theories of de-individuation (Zimbardo 1969)
and objective self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund 1972) suggest
that individuals who are more aware of the link between themselves
and their actions are less capable of engaging in unethical behavior
without updating their self-image. We identified 12 independent
experiments (n = 859) testing the effects of higher concerns for an
honest and good self-view on individuals’ unethical behavior.
Meta-analytic results showed a significant effect of concerns for self-
view on unethicality. The Hedges’s g was –.56 (p < .001) (table S7).
The heterogeneity test indicated that the variability among studies
is not significant at the .05 level (Q-value (11) = 10.18 (p = .515);
I2 = 0.00 percent; T2 = 0.00). We conducted a subgroup analysis to
test for heterogeneity of summary effect sizes across disciplines.
Hedges’s g point estimates of the effect sizes were –.48 (p = .010,
N = 2) for business and –.58 (p < .001, N = 10) for psychology
(Q-value = .21, p = .648). Thus, no evidence of heterogeneity of
summary effect size is apparent across disciplines.
Next, we conducted a subgroup analysis to test for heterogeneity
across experimental settings, Hedges’s g point estimates of the
effect sizes were –.64 (p < .001, N = 7) for experiments conducted in
laboratory settings and –.45 (p < .001, N = 4) for online experiments
(Q-value = 1.67, p = .197). Therefore, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that effect sizes were the same across experimental
settings. In other words, we found no evidence of significant
differences between laboratory and online studies.
Lastly, we ran subgroup analyses by types of participants. Hedges’s
g point estimates of the effect sizes were –.45 (p < .001, N = 4)
for the general population, –.68 (p < .001, N = 6) for students,
and –.52 (p = .006, N = 2) for students and university employees
(Q-value = 2.18, p = .337). Thus, we found no evidence that effect
sizes differed by type of participants. Lastly, we did not find any sign
of publication bias (table S14).
334 Public Administration Review • May | June 2017
Discussion
We conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of 137 independent
experiments from 73 articles to identify the determinants of
unethical behavior. Our results (table 1) supported the previous
literature, suggesting that specific types of social influences
(such as examples of unethical behavior by in-group members
or interdependence with other individuals benefiting from our
unethical actions), greed, egocentrism, self-justifications, exposure
to incremental dishonesty (slippery-slope effect), loss aversion,
challenging performance goals, and time pressure increase unethical
behavior. Moreover, in line with theoretical predictions based on
the research, our meta-analytic findings revealed that monitoring of
employees, providing moral reminders (e.g., exposing subjects to a
code of ethics), and individuals’ willingness to maintain a positive
self-view decrease unethical conduct. We did not find clear evidence
that self-control depletion increases unethical behavior.
Heterogeneity measures (Q-value, I2, T2) indicated significant
variability among primary data for the following factors: social
influences, greed, monitoring, egocentrism, and self-justification.
Significant levels of heterogeneity are frequent in meta-analyses of
social science research (e.g., Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2015;
Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño 2010) and sometimes are used
to justify the preference for random-effect models (e.g., Gerrish
2016).
The nature of our primary data prevented us from running meta-
regressions, which are commonly used to test the moderating effect
of primary studies’ features such as discipline, publication status,
experimental design, and type of participants (e.g., Gerrish 2016;
Homberg, McCarthy, and Tabvuma 2015). Of the 137 experiments
included in our meta-analyses, about 97 percent were published in
peer-reviewed journals; 63 percent were conducted in the laboratory
and 12 percent online (for about 23 percent of the experiments
in our final sample, we could not specify the experimental setting
due to the lack of enough details in the primary study); and 77
percent used samples of students (table S15). Furthermore, the
number of experiments in each meta-analysis did not provide the
degrees of freedom recommended in the literature to run meta-
regressions (Borenstein et al. 2009). For instance, while the articles
in our meta-analysis were published in several disciplines, including
business, ethics, management, economics, and psychology (table
S15), the sample size of each of our meta-analyses did not allow
us to run meta-regression with discipline as a covariate. However,
we conducted subgroup analyses within the factors influencing
unethical behavior considering discipline, types of experimental
setting, types of participant, types of outcome observed in primary
studies, and sources as eligible grouping variables. Out of all the
subgroup analyses that we ran, we found evidence of significant
heterogeneity among summary effect sizes at the .05 level in two
cases. Specifically, effect sizes varied across types of participants for
the meta-analysis on egocentrism and moral reminders. Following
recent recommendations and practice (e.g., Cantarelli, Belardinelli,
and Belle 2016; Kepes et al. 2012), publication bias plots (table
S13) and indices (table S14) were computed for the meta-analyses
based on at least 10 primary experiments. We found no evidence
of publication bias for four factors (egocentrism, moral reminders,
self-justification, and self-view) and mixed evidence for three factors
(social influences, greed, and monitoring).
The evidence from the experiments included in our meta-analyses
apply equally to public and private settings. In fact, 134 out of
137 primary studies were designed to investigate the behavioral
mechanisms that drive unethical behavior across human relations,
situations, time, and without reference to any specific jobs,
professions, and types of organization. In the two experiments
by Brief et al. (1996), participants were asked to play the role of
a top-level executive making decisions about financial reporting.
Ponemon (1992) used a sample of auditors of a public accounting
firm undergoing training. We acknowledge that results from
laboratory experiments may raise concerns about the generalizability
of findings to real public administration settings. However, existing
evidence indicates the external validity of experiments employing
samples of students in laboratories may be stronger than expected
(e.g., List and Levitt 2005).
Implications for Public Administration Research and
Practice
Among the factors that our meta-analyses
identified as determinants of unethical
behavior, the following may be elevated
Our meta-analytic evidence
to prominence for public administration indicates that goal setting and
research and practice. First, results from the time pressure might increase
meta-analyses on social influences suggest unethical behavior.
that being exposed to corrupted colleagues
may enhance the likelihood that one engages
in unethical conduct. These findings are particularly relevant
because “[c]orruption in the public sector hampers the efficiency of
public services, undermines confidence in public institutions and
increases the cost of public transactions” (OECD 2015). Moreover,
corruption “may distort government’s public resource allocations”
(Liu and Mikesell 2014, 346).
Second, meta-analytic evidence that monitoring reduces unethical
behavior provides support for government initiatives around the
globe aimed at increasing monitoring of public service providers
through transparency and openness. For instance, U.S. president
Barack Obama introduced his open government initiatives
by saying, “My Administration is committed to creating an
unprecedented level of openness in Government” (White House
2009). Indeed, we agree with an anonymous reviewer that this can
have a potentially broader implication for theory and practice in
public administration. Namely, the search for institutional designs
for accountability in which the inclusion of monitoring mechanisms align with Kohlberg’s stage four, duty and social order. Thus, public
into structures could affect ethical behavior.
Third, one of our meta-analyses showed that moral reminders can
be a useful tool to prevent and reduce unethical behavior in the
workplace. This finding speaks to the debate on the effectiveness
of codes of ethics in promoting ethical competence (e.g., Meine
and Dunn 2013; Svara 2014) and supports the introduction
of codes of ethics for government service worldwide. Examples
include the Code of Conduct for Commissioners adopted by the
European Commission and the Standards of Ethical Conduct for
Employees of the Executive Branch published in 1992 by the U.S.
Office of Government Ethics. Professional organizations have also
been active in promoting high standards of ethical conduct among
practitioners in the public sector. For instance, ASPA recently
revised its Code of Ethics for public servants and established an
What Causes Unethical Behavior? A Meta-Analysis to Set an Agenda for Public Administration Research 335
Ethics Committee (ASPA 2015). Similarly, the International
City/County Management Association’s Code of Ethics aims at
“providing principles of conduct to members” (Eskridge, French,
and McThomas 2012, 127). Svara (2014) recently summarized
the historical development of arguments in favor and against the
adoption of a code of ethics for public administration; discussed
code of ethics’ usefulness, content, and enforcement; and made
suggestions about how ASPA can help civil servants address ethical
challenges. Indeed, our meta-analytic findings leaves unanswered
questions about how effective codes of ethics serve as moral
reminders. For example, future work should investigate whether
a code needs to emphasize positive or negative behaviors and
consequences or both or how employees can be best reminded of
ethics in the context of implementing and using the codes.
Some of the additional analyses whose details are not included in
the printed version of the manuscript due to length constraints also
provide relevant insights for public administration. For instance,
our meta-analytic evidence indicates that
goal setting and time pressure might increase
unethical behavior. These findings raise
potential concerns about the unintended
consequences of performance management
reforms on public service providers’ ethical
conduct. In fact, commitment to reach
unfeasible goals may well enhance the
likelihood that employees use task strategies to achieve them that
disregard ethical standards (Grant and Shin 2012). Indeed, Bevan
and Hood (2006), Le Grand (2010), and Hood (2012) show that
the adoption of a target and terror regime may lead public servants
to cut corners and game performance measurement systems.
Relatedly, Lavertu (2016) argues that pressures to increase the
availability of performance data for public organization may lead to
misperceptions and biased decisions by policy makers and citizens.
At the aggregated level, the majority of the factors that we identified
through the extensive literature review as encouraging or reducing
unethical behavior align nicely with Kohlberg’s (1980) six stages of
moral development. Monitoring refers to Kohlberg’s first stage of
moral development, that is, obedience. Greed, egocentrism, self-
justification, self-view, and goal setting pertain to Kohlberg’s stage
two, instrumental egoism. Social influences fall under Kohlberg’s
stage three, interpersonal accord and conformity. Moral reminders
organizations interested in making good use of Kohlberg’s work to
assess and promote the moral development of their employees can
also capitalize on the findings of our meta-analyses.
Advancing Research and Practice in Public
Administration
Our comprehensive meta-analyses revealed several gaps in the
experimental research on the causes of unethical behavior, thus
pointing to directions that public administration scholars could
take to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in this area.
First, to the best of our knowledge, no experimental study has been
published on the causal effects of ethical leadership on followers’
unethical behavior. Joining recent calls to address this issue (e.g.,
Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014), we urge public administration
scholars to spearhead experimental work in this area. Research on
ethical leadership is flourishing in our field (e.g., Downe, Cowell
and Morgan 2016; Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014) and in the
social sciences (e.g., Yukl et al. 2013). However, most of these
studies rely on correlational designs that are subject to questions
about the internal validity of the findings. The use of randomized
experiments might help validate the results of extant observational
work showing that ethical leadership promotes ethical conduct
among followers (e.g., Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014). We
acknowledge that conducting experimental research on unethical
behavior may be a daunting effort (e.g., Hassan, Wright, and
Yukl 2014). Nevertheless, the richness of our data set, which
includes peer-reviewed studies published in the top journals of
several disciplines (e.g., Academy of Management Journal, Journal of
Applied Psychology, Journal of the European Economic Association),
demonstrates that experimental work in this area is possible
and widely accepted. The parallel advancement in observational
research (e.g., Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015) can make up for the
limitations that are inherent to artificial manipulations of ethical
conduct in an experimental setting (Wright and Grant 2010). As a
general rule, it seems always desirable to triangulate findings using
different methodologies.
Second, as suggested by one reviewer, public administration
scholars should explore how the interface between political and
career employees may produce unethical behavior. For instance, do
corrupt politicians help breed corruption among others, elected and
nonelected, by their example? In general, is the ethical behavior of
public servants influenced by exemplars—good and bad—to whom
they are exposed in their work? While a group of studies in our
meta-analysis tested the role of bad examples on other individuals’
unethicality (e.g., Paternoster et al. 2013), none explored the
influence of ethical examples on an individual’s conduct. Therefore,
studying the effects of being exposed to good examples (whether
from leaders or not) maybe particularly interesting from a
theoretical perspective. As an initial step to fill this gap, scholars can
replicate the numerous studies that manipulate unethical behavior
by reversing the experimental interventions.
Third, research on empathy and altruism suggests that the desire to
help others may trigger unethical behavior, in particular when the
beneficiary is identified (e.g., Batson et al. 1991). This finding has
potential implications for the study of unethical behavior by street-
level bureaucrats and case managers who might be tempted to bend
the rules to help clients to whom they are emotionally bound (e.g.,
Bozeman and Su 2015; Perry and Vandenabeele 2015).
Lastly, scholars in our field should study behavioral mechanisms
driving unethical behavior using field experiments. To the best of
our knowledge, no experimental research on unethical conduct
has been carried on outside a laboratory setting, with real workers
performing activities that are part of their real jobs. Compared with
laboratory experiments, which are best suited to establish causality
in a highly controlled environment, field experiments score higher
in terms of realism. “Field experiments are … attractive to the
practitioner because the setting is one that the consumer of the
research understands and trusts” (Perry 2012, 480). Moreover, to
address concerns of external validity when employing laboratory
experiments, we urge colleagues in our discipline to use samples
of public administration students and colleagues in any discipline
336 Public Administration Review • May | June 2017
to always describe the distribution of students by their major area
of study. In addition to field experiments, public administration
scholars should take full advantage of quasi-experimental
methodologies. For instance, when an intervention (e.g., the
adoption of a new code of conduct) is introduced in only one of
several regions, areas, districts, or organizations that are otherwise
similar, difference-in-differences is superior to correlational
studies when it comes to internal validity. Public sector reforms
often provide naturally occurring experiments that can be wisely
exploited to investigate the causes of unethical behavior in the
workplace. As an example, the devolution of powers involving the
delivery of public services that occurred in the 1990s in the United
Kingdom provides a natural experiment with which to compare the
likelihood that civil servants would try to game the system under
different public service delivery models (Bevan and Hood 2006; Le
Grand 2010). Regression discontinuity designs might be effective
to understand the determinants of unethicality in the context of
naturally occurring experiments.
Conclusion
In line with previous literature, our meta-analyses of 137
experiments show that specific types of social influences, greed,
egocentrism, self-justifications, exposure to incremental dishonesty,
loss aversion, challenging performance goals, and time pressure,
increase unethical behavior. On the opposite, monitoring of
employees, providing moral reminders, and individuals’ willingness
to maintain a positive self-view decrease unethical conduct.
Our systematic review points to ways in which scholars can
advance understanding of ethics in public administration. In
particular, we urge researchers in our field to use experimental
methodologies to address a number of unanswered questions.
For instance, future work should explore the determinants of
unethical behavior at the nexus between politicians and career
employees. Moreover, we encourage public administration
scholars to test whether being exposed to good examples and
ethical leaders may affect civil servants’ unethicality. Finally, our
results suggest that unethical behavior by street-level bureaucrats
who empathize with their clients is another area that deserves
research attention.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Paul Battaglio, Doug Goodman, L. Douglas
Kiel, Young-joo Lee, and Jim Perry for their comments on previous
versions of this work.
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