O 6, R, 1] Order 6 799

city, town or place where the Court is
situate and the said address of the
pleader shall be the address for service
on the party represented by the said
pleader for purposes of all notices and
processes issued in the suit. All such
notices and processes in the suit or
in any interlocutory matter in the suit
shall be sufficiently served if left by
a party or pleader or by a person
employed by the defendant or by an
officer or employee of the Court at
the said address for service on the
party intended to be served.
33. Unless the Court otherwise directs,
notice of an interlocutory application
in the suit need not be served on a
party who having been duly served
with summons in the main suit has
failed to appear and has been declared
ex parte by the court:
Provided that the Court shall direct
such notice to be issued and served
on any such party in applications for
the amendment of any pleading in the
suit, if the Court is of the opinion that
such party may be interested in or
affected by the proposed amendment.
34. The provisions of Rules 32 and 33
shall also apply mutatis mutandis to
appeals and revision petitions.’

COMMENT
Where Defendant is Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the State in which
the Court having powers to issue summons is situate, the Presiding Officer of such
Court may send letter under Rule 30 of this Order V instead of issuing summons.

Order VI
Pleadings Generally

1. Pleading.—
“Pleading” shall mean plaint or written statement.

Case Cited
1. Ladli Prasad v. Karnal, AIR 1963 SC 1279.
2. Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181.
3. Ram Sarup v. Bishan Narain, AIR 1987 SC 1242.
4. R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352.
5. Kamla Bai v. Arjun Singh, AIR 1991 MP 275.
6. B. M. Singhavi v. Anand Purohit, AIR 1988 SC 1796.
7. O. P. Jain v. Avinash Chandra, AIR 1968 SC 1083.
8. Vinod Kumar v. Surjit Kaur, AIR 1987 SC 2179 : (1987) 3 SCC 711.
9. Prabhawati v. Mahendra, AIR 1981 Pat 133 : 1981 BLJR 323; State of W. B. v. Fakir Mia,
AIR 1977 Cal 29; Babu Lal v. Ram Harsh, 1968 All LJ 774; Gangadhar Rao v. Gollapalli,
AIR 1968 AP 291; Hazar Khan v. Keshar Khan, AIR 1968 Guj 229.
10. J. M. S. Pinto v. A. C. Rodrigue, AIR 1976 Goa 8.
11. Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh, AIR 1980 SC 727 : 1980 (2) SCR 628 : 1980 (3) SCC 72.
12. Sunder Singh v. Raja Ram, AIR 1991 MP 52.
13. Abubakar v. Harun Inamdar, AIR 1996 SC 112 (114) : 1995 (5) SCC 612.

®
799
800 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 1

SYNOPSIS
1. Pleadings generally .................... 800 2. Pleadings and proof .................... 800

1. Pleadings generally.
The broad meaning of ‘pleadings’ is the formal exchange of allegations between
parties to a suit with a purpose of keeping them more or less confined to it. In England
before 15th century pleadings also used to be oral. The object of pleadings is to
narrow down the parties of suit to definite issues. To attain that object, the facts
stated in plaint relating to cause of action and relief claimed are called pleadings of
the Plaintiff, while the facts stated and objections of law and fact raised in reply to
the plaint are the pleadings of the Defendant. Rule 1 defines pleadings as plaint or
written statement. Apart from the object that parties should narrow down their disputes
to points in controversy, the other purpose of pleadings is that the parties may get
notice of the nature of testimony they are required to adduce in support of their
respective claims against their opponents (Ladli Prasad v. Karnal).1 The points of
facts are not only to be pleaded but should also be proved (Bharat Singh v. State of
Haryana).2 In interpreting the pleadings no pedantic approach should be adopted to
defeat the justice by taking hair splitting technicalities into consideration (Ram Sarup
v. Bishan Narain).3 Since law does not permit a person to approbate and reprobate,
no party can accept and reject the same instrument by relying on it for taking
advantage and challenge the same for avoiding disadvantage (R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal
Dhir).4
Where suit is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court in which it is instituted or some
illegality is apparent in the matter in controversy even if the plea is not taken, the
Court may take judicial notice of it (Kamla Bai v. Arjun Singh).5 The documents in
evidence are not part of pleadings and their evidentiary value is not to be pleaded in
the plaint or written statement (B. M. Singhavi v. Anand Purohit).6

2. Pleadings and proof.

A party can lead evidence to prove a fact alleged in pleadings and cannot go against
his own pleadings (O. P. Jain v. Avinash Chandra)7 e.g. where the Defendant has
averred in his written statement that he took the tenancy for residential purposes, he
cannot be allowed to lead the evidence that house was let out to him for commercial
purposes (Vinod Kumar v. Surjit Kaur).8 General rule is that variance between pleadings
and proof is not permissible (Prabhawati v. Mahendra; State of W. B. v. Fakir Mia; Babu
Lal v. Ram Harsh; Gangadhar Rao v. Gollapalli; Hazar Khan v. Keshar Khan).9 But
every variance between pleadings and proof is not fatal (J. M. S. Pinto v. A. C.
Rodrigue)10 e.g. where the Plaintiff claimed the title of house in question on the basis
of lease deed for which he paid the consideration, he can be allowed to prove that
though the consideration was not paid but he still has the title of the house (Bhim
Singh v. Kan Singh).11 Similarly where evidence adduced is at variance with pleadings
on the point of bona fide need of landlord in matter of release of his house the
variance is not necessarily material (Sunder Singh v. Raja Ram).12 Where plea of
adverse possession not raised in the pleadings, no amount of proof can substitute
the pleadings (Abubakar v. Harun Inamdar).13

®
800
O 6, R, 2] Order 6 801

2. Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.—

(1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only a statement in a concise
form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim
or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are
to be proved.
(2) Every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered
consecutively, each allegation being, so far as is convenient, contained
in a separate paragraph.
(3) Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in a pleading in figures as
well as in words.

ANNOTATIONS

Amendments contain, and contain only, a statement

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1999 omitted Rule 2 of Order 6.
Effective date of Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977
Prior to Amendment
Rule 2 of Order 6 use to read as under:
2. Pleading to state material facts and
evidence.– Every pleading shall
in a concise form of the material facts
on which the party pleading relied for
his claim or defence, as the case may
be, but not the evidence by which
they are to be proved, and shall, when
necessary, be divided into paragraphs,
numbered consecutively. Dates, sums
and numbers shall be expressed in
figures.

Case Cited
1. K. Kanakarathnam v. A. Perumal AIR 1994 Mad 247, MANU/TN/0040/1994.
2. Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, 2005 Indlaw SC
512; Chanumolu Radha Rani v. Thota Vishnu Rao and Anr. 2005 (6) ALD 458, MANU/
AP/0663/2005 Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assitant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 2 S.C.C.
137, Sri Bapu Lal Mansukh Lal Thakkar v. The Additional District Judge. MANU/UP/
1034/2005; Sandeep Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd.. AIR 2007 SC 2656, MANU/
SC/3031/2007.
3. Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express AIR 2006 SC
1828, MANU/SC/8083/2006.
4. Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi MANU/SC/0551/2001 Rhodia Limited v. Neon
Laboratories Limited MANU/MH/0464/2004.
5. Ladli Prasad v. Karnal, AIR 1963 SC 1279.
6. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Mauji, AIR 1978 SC 484 : 1978 (2) SCC 91.
7. Manjushri v. B. L. Gupta, AIR 1977 SC 1158 : 1977 (2) SCR 944 : 1977 (2) SCC 174.
8. Pen Choden v. Rinchen, AIR 1986 Sikkim 22.
9. Udhav v. Madhav, AIR 1976 SC 744 : 1976 (2) SCR 246 : 1977 (1) SCC 511.
10. Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express AIR 2006 SC
1828, MANU/SC/8083/2006.
11. Mehagu v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1970 SC 1818 : 1970 (2) SCR 677 : 1969 (3) SCC 24.

®
801
802 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 2

12. Kunjabihari Pradhan v. Jayanti Pradhan 96 (2003) CLT 151, MANU/OR/0104/2003.

13. Hari Chand v. Daulat Ram, AIR 1987 SC 94 : 1986 (4) SCC 524 (2).
14. Alka Bakre v. Bhaskar S. Bakre, AIR 1991 Bom 164.
15. C. S. Das v. Girdhari Salm, AIR 1990 Ori 129.
16. State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2018 : 1972 (4) SCC 165.
17. Niranjan Kumar v. River Steam Navigation, AIR 1967 Ass 74 : ILR (1964) 16 Ass 395.
18. Kedar Lal v. Harilal, AIR 1952 SC 47 : 1952 SCR 179 : 1952 SCJ 37.
19. Lalta v. Ambika, 1968 All LJ 1133.
20. State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2018 : 1972 (4) SCC 165.
21. R. S. Gupta v. B. N. Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242 : (1987) 2 SCC 555.
22. Saling v. Munshi, AIR 1961 SC 1374 : 1962 (1) SCR 470 : 1962 (1) SCJ 130.
23. Kochan Rani v. Methawan, AIR 1971 SC 1398 : (1971) 2 SCC 345.
24. G. Nagamma and Ors. v. Siromanamma and Anr. ( 1996 ) 2 SCC 25 MANU/SC/1067/
1996; Abdul Mateem v. Mehandi Hasan and Anr. 2006 (3) AWC 3101, MANU/UP/1184/
2006.
25. Madan Lal v. Bhanwar Lal, (1987) 2 Cur CC 474 (MP); M. Mohd v. A. Narayan Rao,
1973 Ker LT 511.
26. Indubai v. Jawahar Lal, AIR 1990 MP 80.
27. Premraj v. D. L. F. Housing, AIR 1968 SC 1355 : 1968 (3) SCR 648 : 1968 Cur LJ 871 :
1968 (2) SCWR 482.
28. Bibi Salima v. Janaki Devi, AIR 1986 Pat 321 : 1986 Pat LJR 93 : 1985 BBCJ 777.
29. C. B. P. Khatri v. H. N. Khatri, AIR 1991 All 72.
30. Nand Lal v. Mira, AIR 1981 Cal 83.

SYNOPSIS
1. Fundamental rules of pleadings 3. Law and evidence need not be
under Rule 2 ................................ 802 pleaded ......................................... 804
2. Material facts alone .................... 803 4. Alternative and inconsistent
pleadings ...................................... 804
1. Fundamental rules of pleadings under Rule 2.
It is settled law that as per this rule, necessary and material facts should be
pleaded in support of the case set up and that in the absence of pleadings, evidence
if any produced cannot be considered. The object of the rule is that in order to have
a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts
so that the other party may not be taken by surprise (K. Kanakarathnam v. A.
Perumal).1
As per law of pleadings under Order VI Rule 2 of the Code, every pleading should
contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on
which the party relies for his claim or defence as the case may, but not the evidence
by which they are to be proved (Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India
Staff Association; Chanumolu Radha Rani v. Thota Vishnu Rao and Anr.; Sopan
Sukhdeo Sable v. Assitant Charity Commissioner; Sri Bapu Lal Mansukh Lal Thakkar
v. The Additional District Judge.; Sandeep Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd.).2
Thus, the facts on which the Plaintiff relies to prove his case have to be pleaded
by him. Similarly, it is for the Defendant to plead the material facts on which his
defence stands (Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune
Express).3 The Court held that under Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

®
802
O 6, R, 2] Order 6 803

every pleading shall contain a statement in concise form of the material facts relied
on by a party but not the evidence nor the law of which a Court may take judicial
notice (Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi;Rhodia Limited Vs Neon Laboratories
Limited).4
Following four fundamental rules of pleadings are contained in Rule 2 of this Order VI:
(a) Pleadings must state facts not law,
(b) Pleadings must state material facts and material facts only,
(c) Pleadings must state the facts on which party relies claim or defence but
not the evidence by which they are to be proved, and
(d) Pleadings must be stated in concise form.
The above four rules are necessary to narrow down the parties to the issues of
controversy between them and to give notice to opposite party about the facts on
which evidence may be adduced (Ladli Prasad v. Karnal).5 The pleadings based on
above rules also help the Court in determining the real issues involved in the suit
before it and the Court may prevent the parties from deviating from the course of
litigation (Ganesh Trading Co. v. Mauji).6 However, pleading should be interpreted
with latitude, keeping in mind low awareness of legal literacy of poor people and not
with formalistic rigour (Manjushri v. B. L. Gupta)7 particularly where rigid interpretation
is likely to cause injustice (Pen Choden v. Rinchen).8

2. Material facts alone.

The expression ‘material facts’ has not been defined anywhere, but from the
wording of Order VI Rule 2 the material facts would be, upon which a party relies
for his claim or defence. The material facts are facts upon which the Plaintiff’s
cause of action or Defendant’s defence depends and the facts which must be
proved in order to establish the Plaintiff’s right to the relief claimed in the plaint
or the Defendant’s defence in the written statement. All those primary facts which
must be proved at the trial by a party to establish his cause of action or defence
as the case may be are material facts (Udhav v. Madhav). 9 Which particular fact
is a material fact and is required to be pleaded by a party, would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case (Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners and Parties,
Vessel M.V. Fortune Express). 10
Exactly what facts are material facts depends on each case. The purpose to state
material facts alone in pleading is to tell the opposite party what case exactly it has
to meet. If a material fact is left out of pleadings, no evidence can be permitted to
be led on it nor can the Court examine such issue (Mehagu v. Ram Prasad).11 It can
be ascertained from a fact pleaded and evidence tendered as to whether that particular
evidence should have been a fact to be pleaded (Kunjabihari Pradhan v. Jayanti
Pradhan).12
The ultimate result would be that a party not pleading material fact would not be able
to establish his case on that score (Hari Chand v. Daulat Ram)13 e.g. if a husband has
not taken the plea of cruelty in his divorce petition he cannot establish his case on
the ground of cruelty (Alka Bakre v. Bhaskar S. Bakre).14 Similarly, where a
Defendant challenges the title of the Plaintiff who has claimed it on the basis of a
sale deed, if failed to take plea that land was Brahmottar Niskar land (for which

®
803
804 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 2

permission of State Government was necessary) cannot be permitted to attack the

sale deed on this ground (C. S. Das v. Girdhari Salm).15 However, plea of maintainability
of suit is a legal plea and even if not pleaded, the suit can be attacked on this ground
(State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan Singh).16

3. Law and evidence need not be pleaded.

Only facta probanda should be pleaded and not the facta probantia. Rule 2 makes
it clear that evidence is not to be pleaded e.g. in a suit for damages for loss of
consignment, the allegation that protest note kept by godown keeper would show
how the loss occurred is not to be pleaded (Niranjan Kumar v. River Steam
Navigation).17 Similarly, in a suit against Insurance Company, the Defendant wants
to rely on the condition of policy that in case of suicide, the Defendant-Insurance
Company is not liable to pay the claim, it need not be pleaded that policy holder
bought a pistol and shot himself with it as these facts are facta probantia and not
facta probanda. Law should not be pleaded in the pleadings (Kedar Lal v. Harilal).18
Provisions of law under which the suit is being instituted need not be pleaded in
the plaint (Lalta v. Ambika). 19 A plea of maintainability of suit is a legal plea and
can be raised even without being pleaded (State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan
Singh).20 The inferences of law can be drawn at any time from the pleaded facts
and such inferences also need not be pleaded. However, the Courts should be
slow to throw out a claim or reject a defence on mere technicality of non adhering
to the rules of pleadings (R. S. Gupta v. B. N. Inter College). 21
In case of customs having force of law it is sufficient to plead the custom without
giving all the details but the custom must be pleaded (Saling v. Munshi)22 and be
proved (Kochan Rani v. Methawan).23

4. Alternative and inconsistent pleadings.

The Court held that in an application under Order VI, Rule 17, even an alternative
relief can be sought; however, it should not change the cause of action or materially
affect the relief claimed earlier (G. Nagamma and Ors. v. Siromanamma and Anr.;
Abdul Mateem v. Mehandi Hasan and Anr.). 24 There is nothing in the Code which
prevents a party from taking alternative pleas even if they are inconsistent against
each other (Madan Lal v. Bhanwar Lal; M. Mohd v. A. Narayan Rao). 25 However,
totally inconsistent pleas destructive of each other cannot be permitted to be
taken (Indubai v. Jawahar Lal)26 e.g. a relief for specific performance of contract
cannot be sought in a suit for rescission of a contract under Specific Relief Act
(Premraj v. D. L. F. Housing). 27 Inconsistent pleas like claiming ownership by
adverse possession and alternatively easementary right can be allowed to be
taken (Bibi Salima v. Janaki Devi).28 Similarly, inconsistent pleas of benami transaction
in Defendant’s favour and his long possession of twelve years can be taken in the
written statement so long as they are not destructive of each other (C. B. P. Khatri
v. H. N. Khatri).29 Also, Plaintiff landlord may plead that the tenant Defendant is
liable to be ejected on the ground of default of payment of rent, sub-letting and
damaging the accommodation of tenancy. But allegations of forgery and undue
influence do not go together in one suit (Nand Lal v. Mira). 30

®
804
O 6, R, 4] Order 6 805

3. Forms of pleading.—
The forms in Appendix A when applicable, and where they are not applicable forms
of the like character, as nearly as may be, shall be used for all pleadings.

Case Cited
1. K. Kesavan v. K. Karunakaran, AIR 1988 Ker 107.
2. Ganesh Sahu v. Dwarka Sahu, AIR 1991 Pat 1.

COMMENTS
The forms of pleadings in Appendix A give only guiding idea of drafting. It is not
necessary that word by word the drafting be the same (K. Kesavan v. K. Karunakaran).1
While interpreting the pleadings and their forms too technical approach should be
avoided (Ganesh Sahu v. Dwarka Sahu).2

4. Particulars to be given where necessary.—

In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach
of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars
may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars
(with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.

ANNOTATIONS

State Amendments Karnataka

Madhya Pradesh Renumber Rule 4 as its sub-rule (1) and

insert the following as Sub-rule (2):
Madhya Pradesh Act No. 29 of 1984
inserted Rule 4A after Rule 4, as under:
4A.– Particulars of pleading for
agricultural land.–– In any suit or
proceeding contemplated under Rule
3B or order 1, the parties, other than
the State Government, shall plead
the particulars of total agricultural land
which is owned, claimed or held by
them in anhy right and shall further
declare whether the subject matter
of suit or proceeding is or is not
covered by Madhya Pradesh Ceiling
on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960
(20 of 1960), and whether any
proceedings in relation to such
subject matter are to the knowledge
of the party pending before the
competent authority.
‘(2) In a suit for infringement of a
patent the plaintiff shall state in his
plaint or annex thereto the particulars
of the breaches relied upon and the
defendant if he disputes the validity
of the patent shall state in his written
statement or annex thereto the
particulars of the objections on which
he relies in support of such invalidity;
at the hearing of any such suit no
evidence shall, except with the leave
of the Court (to be given upon such
terms as to the Court may seem
just), be admitted in proof of any
alleged infringement or objections
not raised in the particulars of
breaches or objections respectively.’

®
805
806 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 4

Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Kerala
After Rule 4, insert Rule 4A as follows:
‘4A. (1) In a suit for infringement of a
patent, the plaintiff shall state in his
plaint or annex thereto the particulars
of breaches relied upon.
(2) In any such suit the defendant if
he disputes the validity of the patent
shall state in his written statement or
annex thereto the particulars of the
objections on which he relies in support
of such invalidity.
(3) At the hearing of any such suit no
evidence shall, except by leave of
the Court (to be given upon such terms
as to the Court may seem just), be
admitted in proof of any alleged
infringement or objections not raised
in the particulars of breaches or
objections respectively.’
Effective date of Amendment
Madhya Pradesh: 14.08.1984
Karnataka: 30.03.1967

Case Cited
1. Bijendra Nath Srivastava (Dead) through LRs. v. Mayank Srivastava AIR 1994 SC
2562, MANU/SC/0519/1994.
2. Afsar Sheikh and Anr. v. Bibi and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 163, MANU/SC/0001/1975.
3. Ladli Prasad v. Karnal, AIR 1963 SC 1279 : 1964 (1) SCR 270 : 1963 (33) CC 593 .
4. Ram Kishan v. Mast Ram, AIR 1986 P&H 61; 1985 Pun LJ 574 : ILR (1986) 2 P & H 103.
5. Smt. Sukhdei (Dead) by L.RS. v. Bairo (Dead) & Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 262, MANU/SC/
0256/1999.
6. Bishnudeo Narain and Anr. v. Seogeni Rai and Ors. AIR 1951 SC 280, MANU/SC/
0059/1951; Kisan v. Kausalyabai W/o Gangaram and Ors. 2007 (4) MhLj 43, MANU/
MH/0137/2007; Union Bank of India v. Avinash P. Bhonsle 1991 (2) Maharashtra Law
Reporter 858.
7. Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta AIR 2006 SC 3672, MANU/SC/2996/2006;
Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash (D) MANU/SC/7734/2008.
8. R. N. Tewari v. R. K. Tewari, AIR 1991 Pat 145.
9. G. S. Mishra v. F. M. Dash, AIR 1989 Ori 201 : (1989) 1 Ori LR 49 : (1989) 67 Cut LT 697.
10. Syed Sultan Pai v. Syed Bikhu Saheb (Deceased by LRs) AIR 1986 AP 342, MANU/AP/
0112/1986.
11. Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., Karnal AIR 1963 SC 1279.
12. Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai AIR 1951 SC 280.
13. Premnarayan and Anr. v. Kunwarji and Anr. AIR 1993 MP 162, MANU/MP/0040/1993.
14. Subhash Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib AIR 1967 SC 878.
15. Afsar Sheikh v. Soloman, AIR 1976 SC 163 : 1976 (2) SCR 327 : 1976 (2) SCC 142.
16. Padma v. Kripasindhu, AIR 1986 Ori 97 : (1985) 2 Orissa Law Rev 391 : (1985) 60 Cut LT
531 : (1985) 2 Civ LJ 546 : (1986) 1 Cur CC 3; Swarn Lata v. Krishna Iron, AIR 1974 Cal
393 : 78 Cal WN 1031; Dinbai v. Dominion of India, AIR 1951 Bom 72 : 53 Bom LR 229.
17. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Andrew Vivera AIR 1990 Ker 139, MANU/KE/
0027/1990.
18. Union of India v. Pandurang, AIR 1962 SC 630 : 1961 (2) LLJ 427 : 1961 (3) FLR 323
: 1961-62 (21) FJR 5.
19. S. Sultan v. S. Bikku, AIR 1986 AP 342 : (1985) 2 Andh WR 3.
20. New Marine Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 152 : 1964 (2) SCR 859 : 1964 SCD 595
: 1964 (1) SCA 491.
21. Nagubhai v. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593; 1956 SCR 451 : 1956 SCJ 655.
22. Vat Lal v. R. Dayanand, AIR 1975 SC 349 : 1975 (2) SCR 384 : 1975 (4) SCC 127 : 1975
(2) SCJ 254.

®
806
O 6, R, 4] Order 6 807

23. Abdul K. Rowther v. P. K. Sarabhai, AIR 1990 SC 682 : 1989 (4) SCC 313 : 1989 (3) JT
527 : 1989 (2) Scale 1464.
24. Hari Chand v. Ishar Singh, AIR 1986 P&H 151 : (1985) 2 Ren CJ 407 : 1985 HRR 555.
25. Lalji v. Sat Narain Bhagat, AIR 1962 Pat 182.

SYNOPSIS

1. Scope ............................................ 807 3. Other cases where particulars are

2. Misrepresentation, fraud, undue needed to be given ..................... 808
influence ,etc. ............................... 807

1. Scope.
Under Order 6 Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure particulars have to be furnished of the
plea of fraud or misconduct raised in accordance with Order 6 Rule? Code of Civil
Procedure and it is not permissible to introduce by way of particulars a plea of fraud
or misconduct other then that raised in the pleadings (Bijendra Nath Srivastava
(Dead) through LRs. v. Mayank Srivastava).1
The Court held that it is true that ‘undue influence’, ‘fraud’, ‘misrepresentation’ are
cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct
categories, and are in view of Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity
and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the Plaintiff was a simple old
man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the Defendant, was much too
insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court
could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was
raised on that point at any stage in the Trial Court, or, in the first rounds even
before the first Appellate Court (Afsar Sheikh and Anr. v. Bibi and Ors.).2
The object of Rule 4 is that the opponent must know what case he has to meet
(Ladli Prasad v. Karnal)3 and the party may not be taken by surprise. A plea that
a transaction is vitiated because of undue influence of the other party thereto,
gives notice merely that one or more of a variety of insidious forms of influence
were brought to bear upon the party pleading undue influence, and by exercising
such influence, an unfair advantage was obtained over him by the other. The rule
is based on principle of natural justice (Ram Kishan v. Mast Ram).4 The rule does
not permit the parties to plead unnecessary details. What it intends is in cases
of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, undue influence etc. the
facts should be pleaded with dates and items. What particulars are to be given
depends on facts of each case.

2. Misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence etc.

Order VI Rule 4 merely requires that if fraud is being pleaded, the particulars
necessary for establishing the fraud should be stated in the pleadings (Smt. Sukhdei
(Dead) by L.RS. v. Bairo (Dead) & Ors.).5 The particulars of fraud are required to be
stated in order to verify whether the evidence led by the concerned party is in
keeping with such particulars (Bishnudeo Narain and Anr. v. Seogeni Rai and Ors.;
Kisan v. Kausalyabai W/o Gangaram and Ors.; Union Bank of India v. Avinash P.
Bhonsle).6 The particulars of alleged fraud, which are required to be stated in the

®
807
808 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 4

plaint, will depend upon the facts of each particular case and no abstract principle
can be laid down in this regard (Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta;
Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash).7 In cases of fraud it should be specifically
pleaded what fraud is committed by the opposite party (R. N. Tewari v. R. K. Tewari).8
Also particulars are needed to be given in the pleadings wherever collusion, conspiracy
or coercion is alleged. However, mere want of full particulars is not necessarily fatal
(G. S. Mishra v. F. M. Dash).9
A plea of undue influence must, to serve that dual purpose, be precise and all
necessary particulars in support of the plea must be embodied in the pleading;
if the particulars stated in the pleading are not sufficient and specific, the Court
should, before proceeding with the trial of the suit, insist upon the particulars with
necessary details thereof in the pleading (Syed Sultan Pai v. Syed Bikhu Saheb
(Deceased by LRs).).10, which give adequate notice to the other side of the case
intended to be set up (Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd.)11 and
provides for particulars of such plea being given so as to enable the plea being
tried.
In (Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai),12 the Court held that “In cases of fraud, undue
influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the
case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be departure from
them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to, an averment
of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice however strong the language in
which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and
coercion (Premnarayan and Anr. v. Kunwarji and Anr.).”13 Before, however a Court
is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercised or not, it must
scrutinise the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that
full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud (Subhash
Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib).14
General allegations as to misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence, wilful default
breach of trust etc. if permitted to be taken each one of them should be pleaded
separately (Afsar Sheikh v. Soloman),15 no specific reply can be expected from
other side and without particulars on above points parties may weave any kind
of story at the time of evidence on the point alleged as there is generally oral
evidence on these matters and they relate to state of mind (Padma v. Kripasindhu;
Swarn Lata v. Krishna Iron; Dinbai v. Dominion of India).16 A party cannot shirk that
responsibility and shelve it to be adduced in evidence at a later stage. If the
pleadings are vague and not specific no amount of evidence can salvage the
position (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Andrew Vivera).17 Where
Plaintiff himself has not given particulars on above allegations he cannot complain
about specific denial by the Defendant (Union of India v. Pandurang). 18 If a party
fails to plead necessary particulars of fraud, undue influence etc., it takes the risk
of Courts’ taking inference that no fraud, undue influence etc. was played with the
party alleging them (S. Sultan v. S. Bikku).19

3. Other cases where particulars are needed to be given.

Like misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence, breach of trust and wilful default,
the parties must give necessary particulars on the points of negligence (New
Marine Co. v. Union of India),20 coercion, conspiracy, collusion (Nagubhai v. Shama

®
808
O 6, R, 5] Order 6 809

Rao)21 and corrupt practices (in election petitions) (Vat Lal v. R. Dayanand). 22
Where a party relies on a part performance of contract it must state in the
pleading which part remains to be fulfilled (Abdul K. Rowther v. P. K. Sarabhai).23
Where the particulars are lacking the Court may direct a party to furnish better
particulars (Hari Chand v. Ishar Singh).24 Plea of estoppel, plea of local customary
right and plea of non-compliance should also be specifically pleaded (Lalji v. Sat
Narain Bhagat).25

5. Omitted —

ANNOTATIONS

Amendments fixed for hearing after the filing of the

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1999 omitted Rule 5 of Order 6.
Effective date of Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1999 w.e.f. 1.7.2002
Prior to Amendment
Rule 5 of Order 6 use to read as under:
5. Further and better statement, or
particulars.–– A further and better
statement of the nature of the claim
or defence, or further and better
particulars of any matter stated in any
pleading, may in all cases be ordered,
upon such terms, as to costs and
otherwise, as may be just.
High Court Amendments
Bombay
Renumber Rule 5 as its Sub-rule (1) and
insert the following as Sub-rules (2) and (3):
‘(2) No application for further and better
particulars from the plaintiff or the
defendant except the one given by
the defendant on or before the
returnable date of the summons or by
the plaintiff on or before the first date
Karnataka: 30.03.1967
written statement, shall be entertained,
unless the plaintiff or the defendant
assigns good cause for the same.
(3) After filing the written statement,
the Court shall fix a date for (i)
reception of documents other than
those in possession or power of
parties, and (ii) applications for
interrogatories, discovery of
documents and the inspection thereof.
Such applications should not be
entertained thereafter, unless good
cause is shown to the satisfaction of
the court.’
Karnataka
Renumber Rule 5 as its Sub-rule (1) and
insert the following as Sub-rule (2):
‘(2) In a suit for infringement of a trade
mark or copyright, the Court may either
on its own motion or on the application
of any party apply the provisions of
Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of this Order so
far as the circumstances of the case
may allow.’ (30.03.1967).
Effective date of High Court
Amendments
Bombay: 01.10.1983

®
809
810 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 7

6. Condition precedent.—
Any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence of which is intended to be
contested, shall be distinctly specified in his pleading by the Plaintiff or Defendant,
as the case may be, and, subject thereto, an averment of the performance or occurrence
of all conditions precedent necessary for the case of the Plaintiff or Defendant shall
be implied in his pleading.

Case Cited
1. Binami Properties v. M. Gulmali, AIR 1967 Cal 390.
2. Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas, (1978) 1 Ren CR 408 : (1978) 1 Ren LR 516 (HP).
3. Unity Co. v. Diamond Sugar Mills, AIR 1971 Cal 18 : (1970) 2 Comp LJ 64 : ILR (1969)
2 Cal 546.

COMMENTS
Rule 6 requires that if a party intends to contest the performance of any condition
precedent, he must ‘distinctly’ specify the condition. Rule does not require pleading
of performance of condition precedent rather it is implied in every pleading e.g., notice
under Section 13 (6) of W. B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 is a condition precedent
and should be implied in pleadings (Binami Properties v. M. Gulmali).1 But when a
party wants to contest the condition precedent it must specify in his pleading. For
example in a suit for ejectment where notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property
Act is necessary, and the Defendant wants to raise the objection that the suit has
been instituted without service of notice he must specifically state in his pleadings
so (Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas).2 Similarly objection as to illegality of a transaction on
the ground of non-compliance of Sections 77 and 108 of Companies Act, 1956 cannot
be raised in the absence of pleadings (Unity Co. v. Diamond Sugar Mills).3

7. Departure.—
No pleading shall, except by way of amendment, raise any new ground of claim or
contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party
pleading the same.

Case Cited
1. Vishwapati v. Venkata, AIR 1963 AP 9 : (1962) 2 Andh WR 119.
2. Satyanarayan v. Birendra, AIR 1979 Cal 197.
3. Ramanigrah v. State, AIR 1966 Pat 97.
4. Hindustan Com. Co. v. B. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1991 Cal 88.

COMMENTS
Rule 7 incorporates the principle of departure of pleadings. According to this rule no
party can be allowed to depart from its pleadings later on except by way of amendment.
In other words where a Plaintiff wants to file replication or rejoinder to written statement;
or where the Defendants wants to file additional written statement, no inconsistent
plea can be taken in replication, rejoinder or additional written statement to one’s own
pleadings given earlier in the form of plaint or written statement as the case may be

®
810
O 6, R, 9] Order 6 811

(Vishwapati v. Venkata).1 No new case can be allowed to be taken up at the stage

of arguments (Satyanarayan v. Birendra)2 nor can be permitted at the stage of appeal
(Ramanigrah v. State).3 Where the proceedings are ex parte against the Defendant,
the Plaintiff need not serve copy of amendment application or formally amended
plaint to the Defendant (Hindustan Com. Co. v. B. Bhattacharjee)4 as the Rule permits
to take inconsistent pleas by way of amendment if these are not destructive of each
other. Also see—’Alternative and Inconsistent pleas’ under Rule 2 of this Order.

8. Denial of contract.—
Where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the opposite
party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract alleged or
of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied, and not as a denial of
the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract.

Case Cited
1. Union of India v. Surjit Singh, AIR 1979 SC 1701 : (1979) 2 SCR 1002 : (1979) 1 SCC 520.
2. Sursai Balini v. Phanindra, AIR 1965 SC 1364 : 1965 (1) SCR 681 : 1965 (1) ITJ 526.
3. Apanna v. Kodandaramma, AIR 1960 AP 190; Sheo Sagar v. Satyanarain, AIR 1960
Pat 145 : 1959 BLJR 549 : 1959 Pat LJR 219.

COMMENTS
Rule 8 provides that if a contract is barely denied by a party in his pleadings this
would not mean that he challenges the enforceability or legality of the contract. What
such denial means is that according to the party it did not enter into the agreement
and nothing more e.g. in a suit on contract with Government of India, bare denial of
contract would not permit it to raise the plea that compliance of Section 175 (3) of
Government of India Act or Art. 299 of Constitution of India is not made (Union of
India v. Surjit Singh,).1 However, where the contract is illegal on the face of it or its
object is against the law or if such agreement is prohibited by law, the Court on its
own motion take notice of the illegality (Sursai Balini v. Phanindra)2 and it can not shut
its eyes to such illegality (Apanna v. Kodandaramma; Sheo Sagar v. Satyanarain).3

9. Effect of document to be stated.—

Wherever the contents of any document are material, it shall be sufficient in any
pleading to state the effect thereof as briefly as possible, without setting out the
whole or any part thereof, unless the precise words of the document or any part
thereof are material.

Case Cited
1. Hai v. Ashwani, AIR 1958 Cal 269.
2. Ram Kumar v. Chelu Ram, (1987) 1 Cur CC 529 (Punj).

COMMENTS
Wherever a document is relied in the plaint itself or in the written statement a
document is made ground of defence, it is sufficient to state the effect of such
®
811
812 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 11

documents and its contents need not be disclosed in the pleadings. But where
particular contents of a document itself are material the relevant portion thereof may
be made part of the pleadings e.g. In a defamation suit defamatory words must be
set out in the plaint (Hai v. Ashwani).1 However, where precise words are not material
but document as a whole is material. Mere effect of document is sufficient to mention
and for the contents of documents, appending or filing of the document with plaint or
written statement as the case may be is sufficient and proper (Ram Kumar v. Chelu
Ram)2 or the document may even be filed at the time of framing of issues with the
permission of the Court.

10. Malice, knowledge, etc.—

Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge or other
condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact
without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.

Case Cited
1. Dinbai v. Dominion of India, AIR 1951 Bom 72 : 53 Bom LR 229.
2. Nagubai v. Shamarao, AIR 1956 SC 593 : 1956 SCR 451 : 1956 SCJ 655.

COMMENTS
In cases of malice, fraudulent intention, collusion etc., facts relate to the state of mind
of the persons involved in it and if facts as to these are material it is sufficient to allege
them in the pleading without setting out circumstances and details thereto from which
such malice etc. is to be gathered. In such cases it is difficult to give particulars
regarding state of mind of others (Dinbai v. Dominion of India).1 e.g. collusion requires
secret arrangement between two minds and it is not possible for others to state when
and how the involved persons entered into a collusion (Nagubai v. Shamarao).2

11. Notice.—
Wherever it is material to allege notice to any person of any fact, matter or thing, it
shall be sufficient to allege such notice as a fact, unless the form or the precise terms
of such notice, or the circumstances from which such notice is to be inferred are
material.

COMMENTS
Rule 11 provides that wherever it is material to allege notice to any person, it is
sufficient to allege so as a fact in the pleadings, e.g., in a suit against Government
mention in the plaint about notice under Section 80 of this Code or in a suit against
Railways regarding notice under the Indian Railways Act. Similarly in suits for Judgment
of a lessee to which Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is applicable mentioning
that required notice has been served on the Defendant and time allowed to deliver
possession has expired is sufficient. However, where particular term of the notice is
material that can be specifically pleaded. For cross reference see Order VI Rule 6.

®
812
O 6, R, 14] Order 6 813

12. Implied contract, or relation.—

Wherever any contract or any relation between any persons is to be implied from
a series of letters or conversations or otherwise from a number of circumstances,
it shall be sufficient to allege such contract or relation as a fact, and to refer
generally to such letters, conversations or circumstances without setting them
out in detail. And if in such case the person so pleading desires to rely in the
alternative upon more contracts or relations than one as to be implied from such
circumstances, he may state the same in the alternative.

Case Cited
1. Haji Mohd. v. Mohd Iqbal, AIR 1978 SC 798 : (1978) 2 SCC 493 : 1978 (3) SCR 571.

COMMENTS
Contract between parties may be express or implied. When the contract from the
breach of which cause of action arose it is sufficient to allege the contract was
entered into and opposite party committed breach of it. But when the contract in
question is an implied one, Rule 12 says it is sufficient to allege it briefly in the
pleadings without giving all the details e.g. it is sufficient to allege that the Defendant
wanted to have a supply of 100 bags of wheat from the Plaintiff and sent a word
for it which the Plaintiff supplied but the Defendant made only part payment (Haji
Mohd. v. Mohd Iqbal).1

13. Presumptions of law.—

Neither party need in any pleading allege any matter of fact which the law presumes
in his favour or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other side unless the
same has first been specifically denied (e.g. consideration for a bill of exchange
where the Plaintiff sues only on the bill and not for the consideration as a substantive
ground of claim).
COMMENTS
A party need not plead a matter of fact which the law presumes in his favour e.g.
every bill of exchange is presumed to be made for consideration under Section 118
of Negotiable Instruments Act and Plaintiff need not to set out consideration for which
it was given. However, in cases where consideration is made substantive ground of
claim all material fact thereto must be mentioned. For cross reference. See Sections
79 to 90 of Indian Evidence Act.

14. Pleading to be signed.—

Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any):
Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good
cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorized
by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf.

®
813
814 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 14

ANNOTATIONS
High Court Amendment
Karnataka
Renumber Rule 14 as its Sub-rule (2) and
insert the following as Sub-rule (1):
‘(1) Every pleading shall contain the
party’s full address for service, that
is to say, full address of his place of
residence as well as place of
business, if any, in addition to his
pleader’s address for service as
required by Rule 32 of Order V of this
Code. Such address for service
furnished by the party, unless a change
therein has been notified to the Court
by filing a memorandum to that effect,
shall be presumed to be his correct
address for service for purposes of
the suit, any appeal or revision or other
proceeding directed against the decree
or order passed in that suit. When a
memorandum of change of address
is filed by any party, a notice to that
effect shall be made in the cause title
of the pleading and if the pleading
happens to be the written statement
also in the cause title of the plaint.’
Effective date of High Court
Amendment
Karnataka: 30.03.1967

Case Cited
1. United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar (1996) 6 SCC 660 , MANU/SC/0002/1997.
2. All India Reporters v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1961 Bom 292.
3. U. C. Mishra v. State Bank of India, AIR 1987 Ori 67 at 70 : (1986) 2 Ori LR 89 : (1986)
62 Cut LT 137.
4. Nagendra v. Baldevji, AIR 1952 Cal 352.
5. Clara Auroro v. Sylvia Angela, AIR 1985 Bom 372.
6. Sapna Ganglani D/o Shyam M. Ganglani and Smt. Tamanna Moolchandani W/o Sanjay
Moolchandani represented by their POA Smt. Geeta Gangalani v. R.S. Enterprises, A
registered partnership firm represented by Authorized Signatory, Mr. L. Jagadeeswaran
S/o Loganathan and Mr. N. Madhusudhan Reddy, Proprietor of Sapna Deepam
Developers MANU/KA/0210/2008.
7. Dayabhai v. Babaji, AIR 1953 Bom 28.
8. Radha Kishan v. Wali Mohd., AIR 1956 Hyd 133 : ILR (1956) Hyd 514.
9. Prince Line Ltd v. Trustees, AIR 1950 Bom 130 : 51 Bom LR 1004; All India Reporter v.
Ram Chandra, AIR 1961 Bom 292.
10. United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 3 : 1996 (9) SCC 221 : 1996 (5) JT 459.

COMMENTS
Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed
by the party and its pleader, if any (United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar)1 and also
provides that in case of absence of party pleading or for any other good reason, a
person duly authorised may sign the pleading on behalf of the party concerned. It is
not necessary that such duly authorised person should be holder of power of attorney.
A Managing Director of a Company who has power to institute or defend a suit on behalf
of company, under Articles of Association, can sign the pleading (All India Reporters
v. Ram Chandra).2 Similarly where a suit is filed by a Bank, its Branch Manager’s
signature in pleading does not make the plaint defective (U. C. Mishra v. State Bank
of India).3 Likewise signatures and verification can be made an agent on behalf of

®
814
O 6, R, 14A] Order 6 815

Shebait (Nagendra v. Baldevji).4 Where a partition deed is challenged by minor of

unsound mind, his father who is natural guardian can also authorise someone to sign
the pleading on behalf of such minor (Clara Auroro v. Sylvia Angela).5
As per Rule 14 of Order 6, Code of Civil Procedure, if a party pleading is, by reason
of absence and for other good causes, unable to sign the pleadings as per the rule to
that effect, then the pleadings in his behalf may be signed by any other person duly
authorized by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on behalf of the former (Sapna
Ganglani D/o Shyam M. Ganglani and Smt. Tamanna Moolchandani W/o Sanjay
Moolchandani represented by their POA Smt. Geeta Gangalani v. R.S. Enterprises, A
registered partnership firm represented by Authorized Signatory, Mr. L. Jagadeeswaran
S/o Loganathan and Mr. N. Madhusudhan Reddy, Proprietor of Sapna Deepam Developers).6
Signature on pleading, by a person not authorised can be set right by amendment and
permitting the authorised person to sign it (Dayabhai v. Babaji).7 Omission to sign the
pleading can also be cured at any time before the disposal of the case (Radha Kishan
v. Wali Mohd.).8 Such defects can be remedied even after expiry of period of limitation
(Prince Line Ltd v. Trustees; All India Reporter v. Ram Chandra).9 Under Order VI, Rule
14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and
its pleaders, if any. A company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to
sign the plaint or written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient
compliance with the provisions of Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A
person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company,
for example, Board of Directors by passing a resolution or by power of attorney being
executed in favour of any individual (United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar).10

14A. Address for service of notice.—

(1) Every pleading, when filed by a party, shall be accompanied by a statement
in the prescribed form, signed as provided in Rule 14, regarding the address
of the party.
(2) Such address may, from time to time, be changed by lodging in Court a
form duly filled up and stating the new address of the party and accompanied
by a verified petition.
(3) The address furnished in the statement made under sub-rule (1) shall be
called the “registered address” of the party, and shall, until duly changed
as aforesaid, be deemed to be the address of the party for the purpose
of service of all processes in the suit or in any appeal from any decree
or Order therein made and for the purpose of execution, and shall hold
good, subject as aforesaid, for a period of two years after the final determination
of the cause or matter.
(4) Service of any process may be effected upon a party at his registered
address in all respects as though such party resided thereat.
(5) Where the registered address of a party is discovered by the Court to be
incomplete, false or fictitious, the Court may, either on its own motion, or
on the application of any party, Order:
(a) in the case where such registered address was furnished by a Plaintiff,
stay of the suit, or
®
815
816 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 14A

(b) in the case where such registered address was furnished by a Defendant,
his defence be struck out and he be placed in the same position as if he
had not put up any defence.
(6) Where a suit is stayed or a defence is struck out under sub-rule (5), the
Plaintiff or, as the case may be, the Defendant may, after furnishing his
true address, apply to the Court for an Order to set aside the Order of stay
or, as the case may be, the Order striking out the defence.
(7) The Court, if satisfied that the party was prevented by any sufficient
cause from filing the true address at the proper time, shall set aside the
Order of stay or Order striking out the defence, on such terms as to costs
or otherwise as it thinks fit and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the
suit or defence, as the case may be.
(8) Nothing in this rule shall prevent the Court from directing the service of
a process at any other address, if, for any reason, it thinks fit to do so.

ANNOTATIONS
Amendments
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1976 inserted Rule 14A of Order 6.
Effective date of Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977
High Courts Amendments
Bombay
For Rule 14A, substitute the following:
“14A. Address for service of notice.—
(1) Every pleading, when filed by a
party, shall be accompanied by a
statement in the prescribed form,
signed as provided in Rule 14,
regarding the address of the party.
Parties subsequently added shall
immediately on being so added file a
memorandum in writing of this nature.
(2) Such address may, from time to
time, be changed by lodging in court
a form duly filed up and stating the
new address of the party and
accompanied by a verified petition.
Notice of such change shall be given
to such other parties as the Court
may deem it necessary and the form
showing the change may be served
either on the pleaders of such parties
or be sent to them by registered post
pre-paid for acknowledgment as the
Court thinks fit.
(3) The address furnished in the
statement made under Sub-rule (1)
shall be called the “registered
address” of the party, and shall, until
duly changed as aforesaid, be
deemed to be the address of the
party for the purpose of service of
all processes in the suit or in any
appeal from any decree or order
therein made and for the purpose of
execution, and shall hold good,
subject as aforesaid, for a period of
six years after the final determination
of the cause or matter.
(4) (i) Where a party is not found at
the registered address and no agent
or adult male member of his family,
on whom a notice or process can be
served is present, a copy of the notice
or process shall be affixed to the outer
door of the house. If on the date fixed
such party is not present, another date
shall be fixed and a copy of the notice,
summons or other process shall be
sent to the registered address of that

®
816
O 6, R, 14A] Order 6
party by registered post pre-paid for
acknowledgment (which pre-payment,
shall be made within one month from
the date originally fixed for hearing)
and such service shall be deemed to
be as effectual as if the notice or
process had been personally served.
(ii) Where a party engages a
pleader, notice of process
issued against the party shall
be served in the manner
prescribed by Order III, Rule
5, unless the Court directs
service at the registered
address of the party.
(5) Where the registered address of a
party is not filed within the specified
term or is discovered by the Court to
be incomplete, false or fictitious, the
Court may, either on its own motion,
or on the application of any party, order:
(a) in case where the default in
furnishing registered address
is by the plaintiff or where such
registered address was
furnished by a plaintiff, rejection
of the plaint, or
(b) in case where the default in
furnishing registered address
is by the defendant or where
such registered address was
furnished by a defendant, his
defence is struck out and he
be placed in the same position
as if he had not put any
defence.
(6) Where a plaint is rejected or defence
is struck out under Sub-rule (5), the
plaintiff or as the case may be, the
defendant after furnishing his true
address, apply to the Court for an
order to set aside the rejection of the
plaint or as the case may be, the
orders striking out the defence.
(7) The court if satisfied that the party
was prevented by any sufficient cause
®
817
from filing the true address at the
proper time, shall set aside the
rejection of the plaint or order striking
out the defence, on such terms as to
costs or otherwise, as it thinks fit and
shall appoint a day for proceeding with
the suit or defence as the case may
be.
(8) Where a party is not found at the
registered address and no agent or
adult member of his family on whom
a notice of process can be served
is present, a copy of the notice or
process shall be affixed to the outer
door of the house. If on the date
fixed such party is not present,
another date shall be fixed and copy
of the notice, summons or other
process shall be fixed and a copy
of the notice, summons or other
process shall be sent to the registered
address of that party by registered
post pre-paid for acknowledgment
(which pre-payment shall be made
within one month from the date
originally fixed for hearing) and such
service shall be deemed to be as
effectual as if the notice or process
had been personally served.
(9) Where the Court has struck out
the defence under Sub-rule (5) and
has consequently passed a decree
or an order, the defendant or the
opposite party as the case may be,
may apply to the Court by which the
decree or order passed for an order
setting aside the decree or order and
if he files a registered address and
satisfies the Court that he has
prevented by any sufficient cause from
filing the address, the Court shall make
an order setting aside the decree or
order against him upon such terms
as to costs or otherwise as it thinks
fit and shall appoint a day for
proceeding with the suit or proceeding
provided that where the decree or order
817
818 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 14A

is of such a nature that it cannot be
set aside as against such defendant
or opposite party only, it may set aside
as against all or any of the defendants
or opposite party.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall prevent
the Court from directing service of a
process at any other address, if for
any reason it thinks fit to do so.
(11) Where a party engages a
pleader, a notice or process issued
against the party shall be served in
the manner prescribed by Order III,
Rule 5 unless the Court directs
service at the registered address of
the party.”
Calcutta
After Rule 14, insert the following:
“14A. Every pleading when filed shall
be accompanied by a statement in
a prescribed form, signed as
provided in Rule 14 of this Order, of
the party’s address for service. Such
address may from time to time be
changed by lodging in court a form
duly filled up and stating the new
address of the party and
accompanied by a verified petition.
The address so given shall be called
the registered address of the party
and shall, until duly changed as
aforesaid, be deemed to be the
address of the party for the purpose
of service of all processes in the
suit or in any appeal from any decree
or order therein made and for the
purposes in the suit or in any appeal
from any decree or order therein
made and for the purposes of
execution, and shall hold good
subject as aforesaid for a period of
two years, after the final
determination of the cause of matter.
Service of any process may be
effected upon a party at his registered
address in like manner in all respects
as though such party resided thereat.’
Effective date of High Court
Amendments
Bombay: 01.10.1983
Calcutta: 25.07.1928

Case Cited
1. R. N. Seth v. S. C. Das, (1989) 1 Cal LJ 57.
2. Yellappa by his LRs v. Smt. Yashodabai AIR 2004 Kant 388, MANU/KA/0419/2003.

COMMENTS
Rule 14A requires a party to suit to file his address which is known as ‘Registered
address’ for the purposes of the service of summons and notices and shall remain
operative till the expiry of two years after the disposal of suit. The Rule also allows
the parties to file fresh address in case of change in address. In case the address
supplied by the party is found false or fictitious the Court can stay the suit in case
of fault on the part of Plaintiff and may strike out defence if such address is
supplied by the Defendant. The rule does not bar the Court from serving the
processes on the party on some other address if for reasons it is found that such
party can be served at such other address (R. N. Seth v. S. C. Das).1 The provisions
of Rule 14-A are mandatory and postulate a disastrous consequence to the party
who does not furnish a correct and a proper address (Yellappa by his LRs v. Smt.
Yashodabai).2

®
818
O 6, R, 15] Order 6 819

15. Verification of pleadings.—

(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every
pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties
pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court
to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs
of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies
upon information received and believed to be true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the
date on which and the place at which it was signed.
(4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support
of his pleadings.

ANNOTATIONS

Amendments Bombay City Civil Court such

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1999 added clause (4) to Rule 15 of
Order 6.
Effective date of Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1999 w.e.f. 01.07.2002
High Court Amendments
Bombay
Patna and Orissa
(a) In Sub-rule (1), at the end,
For Sub-rule (1), substitute the following:
substitute a colon for the full
stop and insert thereafter
‘within the local jurisdiction,
before one of the officers of
the Court empowered to
administer oath, and elsewhere
in India, before the officers
indicated by 139 of the Code’;
and
(b) insert the following proviso at
the end of Sub-rule (1):
‘Provided that in respect of
pleadings to be filed in the
verification shall, within the local
jurisdiction of the court, be
made before one of the officers
of the said court empowered
to administer oath, and
elsewhere, before any officer
mentioned in section 129 of
the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.’
‘(1) Save as otherwise provided by
any law for the time being in force,
the facts stated in every pleading shall
be verified by solemn affirmation or
on oath of the party or of one of the
parties pleading or of some other person
proved to the satisfaction of the Court
to be acquainted with the facts of the
case, before any officer empowered
to administer oath under section 139
of the Code.’

Case Cited
1. Vidyawati Gupta and Ors. v. Bhakti Hari Nayak and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1194, MANU/SC/
0921/2006.
2. Salem Advocates Bar Assocation, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3353.

®
819
820 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 15

3. Regu Mahesh @ Regu Maheswar Rao v. Rajendra Pratap Bhanj Dev and Anr. AIR
2004 SC 38, MANU/SC/0852/2003.
4. R. K. Dhar v. A. Stuart, AIR 1958 Cal 104 : 61 Cal WN 445.
5. Dr. (Smt.) Shipra v. Shri Shanti Lal AIR 1995 Raj 50 , MANU/RH/0020/1995.
6. T. K. Rao v. P. Narayanamma, AIR 1978 Ori 186 : (1978) 45 Cut LT 568 : ILR (1978) 1 Cut 610.
7. Premier Chemical Industries and Anr. v. Member Convener and Joint Director (M and
HC) and Ors. AIR 2006 AP 242, MANU/AP/0364/2006.
8. G. Mallikarjunappa and Anr. v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa and Ors. AIR 1999 Kant
241, MANU/KA/0581/1998.
9. Purushottam v. Mani Lal, AIR 1961 SC 325 : (1961) 1 SCR 982 : 1961 (1) SCJ 283.
10. Prabhawati v. Kaiser, AIR 1959 Cal 642.
11. All India Reporter v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1961 Bom 292.
12. Surendra Nath v. Mahendra Pratap Singh, AIR 1986 All 290.
13. Sarat C. Sinha v. Phani, AIR 1974 Pat 40 : 1974 Pat LJR 1 : 1973 BLJR 796.
14. Bhikaji v. Brijlal, AIR 1955 SC 610 : (1955) 2 SCR 428 : 1955 SCJ 658.
15. R. P. Nautiyal v. Chandra Mohan Singh Negi, AIR 1985 All 118.
16. Qamarul Islam v. S. K. Kanta, AIR 1994 SC 1733 at 1746 : 1994 (1) JT 452 : 1994 (1)
Scale 129.

SYNOPSIS

1. Amendment .................................. 820 3. Defective verification or omission to

2. Who can verify ............................ 821 verify ............................................. 821

1. Amendment of 2002.
The insertion of Sub-rule 4 in Rule 15 done by the Amending Act of 1999 has been
retained by Amending Act of 2002. This new rule provides that the person verifying
the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of its pleadings and is in
consonance with the amended Section 26 which requires that in every plaint fact
shall be proved by affidavit. Prior to such amendment, there was no general
provision regarding verification of pleadings in a plaint also by way of an affidavit,
though such a practice had been introduced and followed in some of the High
Courts in India (Vidyawati Gupta and Ors. v. Bhakti Hari Nayak and Ors.).1 By the
present insertion of sub-rule the requirement of affidavit is not limited only to
plaint but extends to written statement as well. The Law Commission had strongly
recommended this amendment in its present format.
It was held by the Supreme Court (Salem Advocates Bar Assocation, Tamil Nadu v.
Union of India)2 that the requirement of filing an affidavit as per the amended Section 26 (2)
and Order VI Rule 15 (4) is not illegal and unnecessary as was contended in view of
the existing requirement of verification of pleadings. The Court held that the affidavit
required to be filed under amended Section 26 (2) and Order VI Rule 15 (4) of the Code
have the effect of fixing additional responsibility on the deponent as to the truth of
the facts stated in the pleadings.
It is respectfully submitted that this amendment has not given the desired effect
which the Law Commission or the Supreme Court had in mind while discussing the
present amendment. The affidavit which is filed with the pleadings either the plaint or
written statement does not really serve any useful purpose and an affidavit by way
®
820
O 6, R, 16] Order 6 821

of evidence is still required to be filed by way of examination in chief. Therefore, the

affidavit filed with the pleadings is just another exercise which the counsel for the
parties undertakes without actually applying their mind in it and it does not really
prove any facts stated either in the plaint or written statement.

2. Who can verify?

Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 prescribes that a person making a verification is required to
specify by reference to the numbers of paragraphs of the pleadings what he believes
on his own knowledge, and what he reveals upon information received and believed to
be true (Regu Mahesh @ Regu Maheswar Rao v. Rajendra Pratap Bhanj Dev and Anr.).3
The object of verification is to ensure that untrue allegations are not made in the
pleadings (R. K. Dhar v. A. Stuart)4 and to fix responsibility for the allegations made
on the person who verifies it and to ensure that false allegations are not made
recklessly (Dr. (Smt.) Shipra v. Shri Shanti Lal).5
In fact verification can be made by the person who is acquainted with the facts
alleged (T. K. Rao v. P. Narayanamma)6 and the verification shall have to be signed
by the person making it (Premier Chemical Industries and Anr. v. Member Convener
and Joint Director (M and HC) and Ors.).7 Rule 15 provides that verification may be
made by the party or one of the parties or by some one about whom the Court is
satisfied that he is acquainted with the facts of the case. It is generally provided that
the affirmation is required to be done before a designated authority (G. Mallikarjunappa
and Anr. v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa and Ors.).8
Even the counsel of the party may verify the pleadings. In a suit by a partnership firm,
plaint can be verified by the person holding power of attorney executed by only one
of the partners of the firm (Purushottam v. Mani Lal).9

3. Defective verification or omission to verify.

Omission to verify or defective verification is a mere irregularity and covered under
Section 99 of this Code (Prabhawati v. Kaiser).10 Verification can be permitted even
after the expiry of period of limitation (All India Reporter v. Ram Chandra).11 It makes
no difference if the verification is made on separate sheet attached to plaint (Surendra
Nath v. Mahendra Pratap Singh).12 If the substantive compliance of rule is made, the
Court should not go for literal compliance (Sarat C. Sinha v. Phani).13 An election
petition cannot be dismissed for defective verification (Bhikaji v. Brijlal).14 Verification
made by a person acquainted with the facts of the case even if not party can be
treated to be sufficient compliance of the rule (R. P. Nautiyal v. Chandra Mohan Singh
Negi).15 But a fact which has been verified in a pleading or affidavit by a party on the
‘belief’ or ‘information’ cannot be permitted to be verified by another affidavit on
‘personal knowledge’ (Qamarul Islam v. S. K. Kanta).16

16. Striking out pleadings.—

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings Order to be struck out or amended
any matter in any pleading:
(a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or
(b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or

®
821
822 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 16

(c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

ANNOTATIONS
Amendments Prior to Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rule 16 of Order 6 use to read as under:
Act, 1976 substituted Rule 16 of Order 6. 16. Striking out pleadings.–– The Court may
at any stage of the proceedings order to be
Effective date of Amendment
struck out or amended any matter in any
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) pleading which may be unnecessary or
Act, 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977 scandalous or which may tend to prejudice,
embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit.
Case Cited
1. Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi AIR 1987 SC 1577, MANU/SC/0378/
1987; Iqbal Singh v. Avtar Singh AIR 1993 P&H 314 , MANU/PH/0084/1993.
2. SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Kara Mara Shipping Co. Ltd. 2000(1) Mh.L.J.699;
Prafullchandra S/o Bajranglal Agrawal v. Omprakash 2007 (109) Bom.L.R. 529, MANU/
MH/0099/2007.
3. Sathi Vijay Kumar v. Tota Singh and Ors. 2006 (14) SCALE 199, MANU/SC/8762/2006.
4. Rooplal v. Nachhatar, AIR 1982 SC 1559 : 1983 (1) SCR 702 : 1982 (3) SCC 487.
5. Dal Chandra v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1983 Raj 23; 1982 Raj LR 681.
6. Dharti Pakad Madan Agrawal v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1987 SC 1577: 1987 (3) SCR 369 :
1987 Supp SCC 93.
7. J. B. Patnaik v. Bennett Coleman & Co., AIR 1990 Ori 107.
8. Madhav Kurup v. Muralidharan, AIR 1991 Ker 20.
9. Udhav v. Madhav, AIR 1976 SC 744 : 1976 (2) SCR 246 : 1977 (1) SCC 511.
10. Singhai v. Kesari Dal Mill, AIR 1976 MP 54 : 1975 Jab LJ 696 : 1975 MPLJ 676.
11. Manohar Joshi v. N. B. Patil, AIR 1996 SC 796 : 1996 (1) SCJ 359 : 1996 (1) SCC 169.
12. K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi, MANU/SC/0092/1998: AIR 1998 SC 1297 (1308) : 1998 (3)
SCC 573.
13. K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1297, MANU/SC/0092/1998.
14. Ram Autar Shastri v. Khurshid Alam Khan and Anr. AIR 1987 All 279, MANU/UP/0191/
1987; Shri Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia AIR 1976 SC 744, MANU/SC/0302/
1975; Hameed and Ors. v. Kanhaiya AIR 2004 All 405, MANU/UP/0649/2004;
Bimalangshu Roy v. Kamaaalendu Bhattacharjee AIR 2004 Gau 107, MANU/GH/0464/
2003; Mahendra Pal v. Ram Dass Malanger AIR 2000 SC 16 MANU/SC/0689/1999;
Smt. Patil Vaishali Ashok v. Digambarrao Yashwantrao Patil and Ors. AIR2006Kant205,
MANU/KA/8218/2006.

SYNOPSIS
1. Scope ............................................ 822 3. Abuse of process of the Court . 824
2. Scandalous frivolous or vexatious
pleading to be struck of ............. 823

1. Scope.
The provision empowers a Court to strike out any pleading if it is unnecessary,
scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay fair trial
of the suit or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. The underlying object

®
822
O 6, R, 16] Order 6 823

of the rule is to ensure that every party to a suit should present his pleading in an
intelligible form without causing embarrassment to his adversary. The power under
this rule may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings which may even be before
the filing of the written statement by the Respondent or commencement of the trial
(Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi; Iqbal Singh v. Avtar Singh).1
The Court in a case held that the Order 6, Rule 16, Civil Procedure Code empowers
the Court to strike out the pleading if it is an abuse of the process of the Court.
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure retains the inherent jurisdiction which
every Court possesses to strike out from its record a suit which is frivolous, vexatious,
malicious or tantamount to abuse of the process of the Court or tends to bring the
administration of justice to ridicule by persistently and consistently filing proceedings
and suits though the matter has been settled finally by the highest Court of the land.
Such power of striking of the plaint from the record of the Court on the ground of
abuse of process is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rarest
of rare cases but when the conduct of a litigant is so glaringly contumacious intended
to keep a matter alive in a Court having no jurisdiction, such litigation deserves to
be dealt with sternly. Re-litigation is one of the examples of an abuse of the process
of the Court and a party if advised to reagitate the same issue which has already
been decided earlier against him, it is contrary to justice and public policy and is,
therefore an abuse of process of the Court. It is an abuse of the process of the Court
and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which
has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may
not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a
collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given
set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious
proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the Court especially
where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to
stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court
from wasted (SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Kara Mara Shipping Co.; Prafullchandra
S/o Bajranglal Agrawal v. Omprakash).2
Bare reading of Rule 16 of Order VI makes it clear that the Court may Order striking
off pleadings in the following circumstances;
(a) Where such pleading is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
or
(b) Where such pleading tends to prejudice, embarrass or delay fair trial of the
suit; or
(c) Where such pleading is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court
(Sathi Vijay Kumar v. Tota Singh and Ors.).3

2. Scandalous frivolous or vexatious pleading to be struck of.

Where in a pleading the Court finds that whole or a part of it is unnecessary,
scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise tends to prejudice, embarrass or
delay the fair trial, or which is otherwise an abuse of process of the Court, it may
strike out such pleading or may direct the party to amend it (Rooplal v. Nachhatar).4
The difference between Order VI, Rule 16 and Order VI, Rule 17 is that in case

®
823
824 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 16

of former generally a party seeks amendment in the pleading of other party while
under Rule 17 amendment is sought in one’s own pleading. Whether a plea is
embarrassing or not depends on facts of each case. A plea which is not open to
a party to be taken or irrelevant allegations can be struck out on the ground of
being embarrassing (Dal Chandra v. Satish Chandra).5 It is not necessary to wait
for written statement for striking out the objectionable portion from plaint (Dharti
Pakad Madan Agrawal v. Rajiv Gandhi).6 The Court has power to strike out any
scandalous allegations whether it is contained in pleadings or in affidavits (J. B.
Patnaik v. Bennett Coleman & Co.).7 Where vague allegations are made in the
pleadings without any basis and are also irrelevant, such allegations are liable to
be struck out (Madhav Kurup v. Muralidharan). 8 In cases of election petitions,
Representation of Peoples Act, provides specific corrupt practices and if the
petitioners makes wild allegations against opponent which do not constitute any
corrupt practice such allegations can be struck off (Udhav v. Madhav).9 Where
allegations in written statement do not constitute a defence and would unnecessarily
delay the suit even if issue is framed on it, such allegation is liable to be struck
off (Singhai v. Kesari Dal Mill).10
In Manohar Joshi’s case only allegation of corrupt practice in the election petition
which raised a triable issue was that the first Hindu State will be established in
Maharashtra and in various other public meetings the Respondent made objectionable
appeals. Some of the meetings were reported in newspapers and the rest of the
general averments deficient in requisite pleadings of all the constituent parts of the
corrupt practice did not constitute a pleading of the full cause of action and therefore
Ordered to be ignored, and struck out in accordance with Order VI, Rule 16, Code of
Civil Procedure (Manohar Joshi v. N. B. Patil).11

3. Abuse of process of the Court.

A pleading even if not scandalous or vexatious but which still amounts to the abuse
of the process of the Court can be struck of. However, after filing arbitration petition,
instituting simultaneous suit with alternative relief that if the impugned Order was not
held an arbitration award it be set aside, cannot be said to be abuse of process of
Court (K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi).12 Power under Clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the
Code is confined to cases where the abuse of the process of the Court is manifest
from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 where
the Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings
which are an abuse of their process (K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi & Ors.).13 Prejudice, delay
or embarrass the trial failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete
cause of action, and incomplete allegation of such a charge are liable to be struck
off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure. If the petition is based solely on
these allegations which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be
summarily rejected for want of a cause of action (Ram Autar Shastri v. Khurshid Alam
Khan and Anr.; Shri Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia; Hameed and Ors. v.
Kanhaiya; Bimalangshu Roy v. Kamaaalendu Bhattacharjee; Mahendra Pal v. Ram
Dass Malanger; Smt. Patil Vaishali Ashok v. Digambarrao Yashwantrao Patil and
Ors.).14

®
824
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 825

17. Amendment of pleadings.—

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend
his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such
amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the
real questions in controversy between the parties :
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has
commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due
diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement
of trial.

ANNOTATIONS

Amendments in the absence of the defendant the Court

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2002 substituted Rule 17, earlier
omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 2002 of Order 6.
Effective date of Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01.07.2002
Prior to Amendment
Rule 17 of Order 6 use to read as under:
17. Amendment of pleadings.–– The
Court may at any stage of the
proceedings allow either party to alter
or amend his pleadings in such manner
and on such terms as may be just,
and all such amendments shall be
made as may be necessary for the
purpose of determining the real
questions in controversy between the
parties
High Court Amendments
Bombay
At the end of Rule 17, insert ‘Where,
however, an application for amendment
is made by the plaintiff in a suit in which
the defendant has not appeared though
served with summons and where in the
opinion of the Court the amendment applied
for is material one, the Court shall give
notice of the application to the defendant
before allowing the amendment; and where
grants any amendment in a form materially
different from that of which notice has
been given to the defendant, a copy of
the amended plaint shall be served on
the defendant.’
Gujarat
At the end of Rule 17, insert ‘Where,
however, an application for amendment
is made by the plaintiff in a suit in which
the defendant has not appeared though
served with summons and where in the
opinion of the Court the amendment applied
for is a material one, the Court shall give
notice of the application to the defendant
before allowing the amendment; and where
in the absence of the defendant the Court
grants any amendment in a form materially
different from that applied for, a copy of
the amended plaint shall be served on
the defendant.’
Orissa
Renumber Rule 17 as its Sub-rule (1) and
insert the following as Sub-rule (2):
‘(2) Every application for amendment
shall be in writing and duly verified in
the manner laid down in Rule 15 and
shall state the specific amendment
which is sought to be made, indicating
the words or paragraphs to be added
to, omitted from or substituted in place
of, the original pleading.’

®
825
826 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana specific amendments which are

and Chandigarh
Renumber Rule 17 as its Sub-rule (1) and
insert the following as Sub-rule (2):
‘(2) Every application for amendment
shall be in writing and shall state the
sought to be made indicating the
words or paragraphs to be added,
omitted or substituted in the original
pleading.’

Case Cited
1. H.P. State Civil Supplies Corpn. v Palli Banal Co-op. Agri.Services Society Limited AIR
2003 NOC 551.
2. Inderjit Grover v Indrawati AIR 2004 NOC 193.
3. Purshottam v A.N. Jog. MANU/MH/0879/2004: 2005 (1) MahLJ 426 (432) (Bom).
4. Ram Kishore v Sunder Singh MANU/HP/0057/2004: AIR 2005 HP 21.
5. Neelakandan Nair v Parmeshwar Kurup 2003 (3) KLT 900.
6. Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (UOI) MANU/SC/0912/2002: AIR
2003 SC 189.
7. E. Prasad Goud v B. Lakshmana Goud MANU/AP/0239/2003: (2003) 3 AndhL.T (386).
8. L. Narayan Reddy v. P. Narayan Reddy AIR 2005 MAD 66.
9. Ajendraprasadji N. Pande and Anr. v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. and Ors. MANU/
SC/8760/2006: AIR 2007 SC 806.
10. Jeet Ram Kishore v. Sunder Singh MANU/HP/0057/2004: AIR 2005 HP 21.
11. Sri Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani and Ors. v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani MANU/SC/
0891/2003: (2004) 1 SCC 497; Virender Gopal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi MANU/
DE/7314/2007: AIR 2007 Delhi 183.
12. Amod Prakash Gupta v. Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of
India MANU/UP/0514/2005: 2005 (4) AWC 3249.
13. Shri R.P. Kapoor v. Holiday Home MANU/DE/9029/2006.
14. Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha MANU/WB/0284/2002: AIR 2003 Cal 148;
Bhaskaran Nair v. Chandramathiyamma MANU/KE/0544/2005: 2006 (1) KLT 53.
15. Pokarmal Agarwalla v. Madhoram Thakursidas (1983) 1 GLR 194.
16. B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai MANU/SC/0775/1999; Bank Kreiss AG
v. Ashok K. Chauhan and Ors. MANU/DE/0332/2003: AIR 2004 Delhi 42; Rajesh
Kumar Aggarwal and Ors. v. K.K. Modi and Ors. MANU/SC/8043/2006: AIR 2006 SC
1647; Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors. MANU/SC/0057/2001: AIR 2001
SC 699; Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha AIR 2003 Cal 148, MANU/WB/0284/
2002; Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana Stores AIR 2004 All 82,
MANU/UP/0606/2003; Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri Balram Saini
MANU/DE/2362/2007; Sabharwal Brothers Security Corporation v. The Workman
Shri Munshi Ram, and Ors. 141 (2007) DLT 417, MANU/DE/8048/2007; Shri Chet
Ram Gupta v. : Shri Motian Devi and Ors. MANU/DE/8622/2006; Rajiv Goel and Anr.
v. Krishna Kumari Goel and Ors. 98 (2002) DLT 91, MANU/DE/0453/2002;Shri
Dharam Chand v. Shri R.K. Jha 97 (2002) DLT 639, MANU/DE/0336/2002; Kannu
Exports v. Banque Nationale De Paris (Suisse) and Ors. MANU/DE/8455/2006; Anil
Nanda and Anr. v. Escorts Limited and Ors. MANU/DE/0934/2006; Shri Gurcharanjeet
Singh Anand v. Shri Pritam Singh Anand and Anr. MANU/DE/1624/2006; Mrs. Binu
Anand Khanna v. Mr. Ratan Tata, MANU/DE/2976/2005; Mrs. Sarabjit Singh v. Mr.
Gurinder Singh Sandhu and Ors. MANU/DE/8478/2006; Davinder Singh v. Surjit
Malhotra 126 (2006) DLT 102, MANU/DE/1755/2005; Mrs. Abha Chhabra and Anr.
v. Mr. V.K. Jetly and Ors. MANU/DE/2695/2005; Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and
Ors. v. Kishore Washwani MANU/MH/0026/2005; Bharat Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. v. Precious Finance Investment Pvt. Ltd. MANU/MH/0729/2006: 2006 (6) BomCR
510; Vojjala Jayamma v. Vojjala Pullaiah MANU/AP/0516/2007; Meenashi and anr

®
826
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 827

v. Selvaraj and Ors. MANU/TN/7338/2007; Bhajan Singh v. Sati Brahamana MANU/

PH/0687/2005; Smt. Natho v. Kanwal Singh and Ors. MANU/PH/0613/2003;
Bhikhabhai Lallubhai Sonavia v. Nanduben alias Revaben MANU/GJ/0577/2002.
17. Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh AIR 2006 SC 2832, MANU/SC/3519/2006.
18. Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 3353, MANU/SC/
0450/2005.
19. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram AIR 1978 SC 484, MANU/SC/0018/1978.
20. Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu AIR 2002 SC 3369, MANU/SC/0812/2002; S. Ahamed
Meeran and Ors. v. S. Kumaraswamy, 2006 (1) CTC 55, MANU/TN/1683/2004; T.
Gunaseelan v. M. Thamilselvi 2004 (5) CTC 729, MANU/TN/0964/2004; Deepali v.
Pankaj Gupta (2006) 144 PLR 449, MANU/PH/0581/2006.
21. T. Gunaseelan v. M. Thamilselvi 2004 (5) CTC 729, MANU/TN/0964/2004; Smt. Basanti
Satapathy and Ors. v. Rakesh Kumar Satapathy 2003 (I) OLR 516, MANU/OR/0390/2003.
22. Rajiv Goel and Anr. v. Krishna Kumari Goel and Ors. 98 (2002) DLT 91, MANU/DE/0453/
2002; Shri Dharam Chand v. Shri R.K. Jha 97 (2002) DLT 639, MANU/DE/0336/2002.
23. Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand (2008) 5 SCC 117, MANU/SC/7310/2008.
24. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana Stores AIR 2004 All 82, MANU/UP/
0606/2003.
25. International Tract Ors. Ltd. v. Punjab TractOrs. Ltd. MANU/DE/3023/2005.
26. Smt. Rekha Bansal v. Mr. Ajay Kumar Bansal and Ors. MANU/DE/8621/2006; Pradeep
Singhvi v. Heero Dhankani (2004) 13 SCC 432.
27. Baldev Singh and Ors. v. Manohar Singh and Anr. AIR 2006 SC 2832, MANU/SC/3519/2006.
28. Shriram Sardarmal Didwani v. Gourishankar alias Rameshwar Joharmal AIR 1961
Bom 136, MANU/MH/0035/1961.
29. Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly and Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 85, MANU/SC/7401/2008
30. Bibhas Chandra Bose v. Sm. Dolly Bose nee Dutta AIR 1989 Cal 190, MANU/WB/
0032/1989.
31. Shri Vasudev v. Smt. Rupkumari @ Banarso Devi MANU/DE/7056/2007
32. Lucy Narona v. Raghunath Jew Bije AIR 1993 Ori 153, MANU/OR/0040/1993; Shri Yumnam
Ibobi Singh v. Shri Yumnam Yaima Singh AIR 1993 Gau 42, MANU/GH/0010/1993.
33. Usha Balashaheb Swami and Ors. v. Kiran Appaso Swami and Ors. AIR 2007 SC
1663, MANU/SC/7318/2007.
34. B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai MANU/SC/0775/1999; Bank Kreiss AG v.
Ashok K. Chauhan and Ors. AIR 2004 Delhi 42, MANU/DE/0332/2003; Rajesh Kumar
Aggarwal and Ors. v. K.K. Modi and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1647, MANU/SC/8043/2006;
Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 699, MANU/SC/0057/2001;
Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha AIR 2003 Cal 148, MANU/WB/0284/2002; Fertilizer
Corporation of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana Stores AIR 2004 All 82, MANU/UP/0606/
2003; Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri Balram Saini MANU/DE/2362/
2007; Sabharwal Brothers Security Corporation v. The Workman Shri Munshi Ram,
and Ors. 141 (2007) DLT 417, MANU/DE/8048/2007; Shri Chet Ram Gupta v. : Shri
Motian Devi and Ors. MANU/DE/8622/2006; Rajiv Goel and Anr. v. Krishna Kumari
Goel and Ors. 98 (2002) DLT 91, MANU/DE/0453/2002; Shri Dharam Chand v. Shri
R.K. Jha 97 (2002) DLT 639, MANU/DE/0336/2002; Kannu Exports v. Banque Nationale
De Paris (Suisse) and Ors. MANU/DE/8455/2006; Anil Nanda and Anr. v. Escorts Limited
and Ors. MANU/DE/0934/2006; Shri Gurcharanjeet Singh Anand v. Shri Pritam Singh
Anand and Anr. MANU/DE/1624/2006; Mrs. Binu Anand Khanna v. Mr. Ratan Tata,
MANU/DE/2976/2005; Mrs. Sarabjit Singh v. Mr. Gurinder Singh Sandhu and Ors. MANU/
DE/8478/2006; Davinder Singh v. Surjit Malhotra 126 (2006) DLT 102, MANU/DE/
1755/2005; Mrs. Abha Chhabra and Anr. v. Mr. V.K. Jetly and Ors. MANU/DE/2695/2005;
Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and Ors. v. Kishore Washwani MANU/MH/0026/2005;
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Precious Finance Investment Pvt. Ltd. 2006 (6)
BomCR 510; Vojjala Jayamma v. Vojjala Pullaiah MANU/AP/0516/2007; Meenashi

®
827
828 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

and anr v. Selvaraj and Ors. 2007 MANU/TN/7338/2007; Bhajan Singh v. Sati
Brahamana MANU/PH/0687/2005; Smt. Natho v. Kanwal Singh and Ors. MANU/PH/
0613/2003; Bhikhabhai Lallubhai Sonavia v. Nanduben alias Revaben MANU/GJ/
0577/2002.
35. Gurdial Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja AIR 2002 SC 1003, MANU/SC/0077/2002
36. Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and Anr. AIR 2002 SC 3369, MANU/SC/0812/2002;
Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani v. Shri Balram Saini MANU/DE/2362/2007.
37. Shri Yumnam Ibobi Singh v. Shri Yumnam Yaima Singh AIR 1993 Gau 42, MANU/GH/
0010/1993.
38. Chintaparthi Venkataramana Reddy v. Nallam Rajamma AIR 1988 AP 40 MANU/AP/
0205/1988; Pothineni Venkateswarlu v. Bodempudi Kotamma AIR 1994 AP 40, MANU/
AP/0012/1994.
39. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 3295, MANU/SC/0558/2001;
Sabharwal Brothers Security Corporation v. The Workman Shri Munshi Ram, Steel
Authority of India Ltd., and Ors. 141 (2007) DLT 417, MANU/DE/8048/2007; Smt. Rekha
Bansal v. Mr. Ajay Kumar Bansal and Ors. MANU/DE/8621/2006; Rasiklal Manikchand
Dhariwal and Ors. v. Kishore Washwani and anr, 2005(3)BomCR104, MANU/MH/0026/
2005; Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri Balram Saini MANU/DE/2362/
2007; D. Krishna Moorthy v. D. Rangaswami Naidu 1968 (2) ALT 119; Rahimmunnisa
Begum and Ors. v. Mohd. Mohammadulla Khan Durrani (died) by LRs. and Ors. MANU/
AP/0053/2004.
40. Pankaja and Anr. v. Yellappa (Dead) by LRs and Ors.MANU/SC/0590/2004.
41. Mohan v. Pashupatinath, MANU/SC/0382/1969: AIR 1970 SC 42 : 1969 (2) SCC 258.
42. Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust, MANU/SC/0613/1972: AIR 1972 SC 2091: 1973 (2)
SCC 127.
43. K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. v. Alliance Ministries, MANU/SC/0339/1995: AIR 1995
SC 1768: 1995 Supp (3) SCC 17.
44. SH. Madhu Sudan Gupta v. SH. Dinesh Gupta MANU/DE/9523/2006; Rajesh Kumar
Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi MANU/AP/1002/2005 Future Builders Co-operative Housing
Society v. S. Malla Reddy and Ors. 2008 (2) ALT 520, MANU/AP/0998/2007.
45. Smt. Natho v. Kanwal Singh and Ors. MANU/PH/0613/2003; Om Parkash Gupta v.
Ranbir B. Goyal (2002)130 P.L.R. 799 (S.C.).
46. Sreedharan v. P.S. Job, 1968 KLT 479, Balasubramanian v. Narayanan Nair, 1985 KLT
374;Suri Films v. Govinda Prabhu, 1987 (2) KLT 145, Thomas v. Saidalavi 2005 (2) KLT
724, MANU/KE/0152/2005.
47. Ajarjeet Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1992 Delhi 317, MANU/DE/0050/1992.
48. Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala; Ratan Singh and
Anr v. Ram Prasad and Ors. RLW 2003 (1) Raj 463, MANU/RH/0573/2002, Radhika
Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and others MANU/SC/0594/1996: AIR 1996 SC 2358.
49. B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai MANU/SC/0775/1999; Bank Kreiss AG
v. Ashok K. Chauhan and Ors. AIR 2004 Delhi 42, MANU/DE/0332/2003; Rajesh
Kumar Aggarwal and Ors. v. K.K. Modi and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1647, MANU/SC/
8043/2006; Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 699, MANU/
SC/0057/2001; Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha AIR 2003 Cal 148, MANU/
WB/0284/2002; Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana Stores AIR
2004 All 82, MANU/UP/0606/2003; Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri
Balram Saini MANU/DE/2362/2007; Sabharwal Brothers Security Corporation v.
The Workman Shri Munshi Ram, Steel Authority of India Ltd.and Ors., 141 (2007)
DLT 417, MANU/DE/8048/2007; Shri Chet Ram Gupta v. : Shri Motian Devi and Ors.
MANU/DE/8622/2006; Rajiv Goel and Anr. v. Krishna Kumari Goel and Ors. 98
(2002) DLT 91, MANU/DE/0453/2002;Shri Dharam Chand v. Shri R.K. Jha 97 (2002)
DLT 639, MANU/DE/0336/2002; Abdul Mateem v. Mehandi Hasan and Anr. MANU/
UP/1184/2006, State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders, A.P. AIR 2007 SC 113, MANU/SC/

®
828
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 829

8520/2006.
50. Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by LRs. AIR 2005 SC 3708, MANU/SC/0549/2005.
51. Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu AIR 2002 SC 3369, MANU/SC/0812/2002.
52. Varanasi Vital Rao v. Jallepalli Janardhanarao and Anr. MANU/AP/0129/2006
53. Vanimisatti Anil Kumar and others v. Jayavarapu Krishna Murty and others AIR 1995
AP 105, MANU/AP/0018/1995.
54. Dalip Kaur v. Major Singh AIR 1996 P&H 107, MANU/PH/0016/1996, Kulwant Singh v.
Sher Singh 1971 Puni LJ 218; Sardar Hari Bachan Singh v. Major S. Har Bhajan Singh
and Anr. AIR 1975 P&H 205, MANU/PH/0038/1975.
55. Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) thr. L.Rs. v. S.K. Sarwagi and Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. MANU/
SC/7703/2008.
56. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Precious Finance Investment Pvt. Ltd. MANU/MH/
0729/2006: 2006(6)BomCR510.
57. Ramesh Ramanujam v. Varadammal and Ors. MANU/TN/0422/2005: (2005) 2 MLJ
382; Jeya v. Sundaram Iyyar MANU/TN/2209/2005.
58. Baldev Singh etc v. Manohar Singh MANU/SC/3519/2006.
59. B.K.N. Pillai v. D. Pillai, MANU/SC/0775/1999: AIR 2000 SC 614 : 2000 (1) SCC 712;
1999 (7) Scale 463.
60. B. Kandasamy Reddiar v. O. Gomathi Ammal, MANU/SC/0207/2001: AIR 2001 SC
1931 : 2001 (4) SCC 394.
61. Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan, MANU/SC/0057/2001: AIR 2001 SC 699: 2001 (2)
SCC 472.
62. Gurdial Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja, MANU/SC/0077/2002: AIR 2002 SC 1003.
63. M/s. Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd., MANU/SC/0558/2001: AIR 2001 SC
3295 : 2001 (8) SCC 97.
64. Fritig T.M. Clement v. Sudhakaran Nadar, MANU/SC/0143/2002: AIR 2002 SC 1148.
65. Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Ors. MANU/SC/0002/1957:
AIR 1957 SC 363; North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das
(D) by Lrs. 2008 (6) SCALE 254, MANU/SC/7481/2008
66. Peres and Sons v. Puravath, 1960 Ker LT 731; Suri Films v. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and
Brother AIR 1989 Ker 28, MANU/KE/0005/1989.
67. Vijendra Kumar Goel v. Kusum Bhuwania (1997)11SCC457, MANU/SC/1770/1997;
Shri Chet Ram Gupta v. Shri Motian Devi and Ors. MANU/DE/8622/2006.
68. Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad AIR 2005 SC 809, MANU/SC/
0052/2005; Pfizer Inc.V Pifer Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. MANU/DE/1077/2007.
69. Britannia Industries v. Punjab National Bank, MANU/WB/0058/1986: AIR 1986 Cal 296.
70. Prem v. Jyoti, MANU/DE/0035/1971: AIR 1971 Del 282.
71. Mathew Alexander v. Bhaskran Pillai, MANU/KE/0018/1990: AIR 1990 Ker 96 at 100;
Shanti v. Homes Insurance Co., MANU/SC/0017/1974: AIR 1974 SC 1719.
72. D. L. F. United Co. v. Prem, MANU/SC/0093/1980: AIR 1981 SC 805: 1981 (1) SCC 433.
73. Hola Ram v. Kewal Krishna, MANU/PH/0041/1990: AIR 1990 P&H 156.
74. Roop Chand v. Ranjit Kumari, MANU/PH/0049/1991: AIR 1991 P&H 212.
75. Ansal Properties v. Dr. Anand Nath, MANU/DE/0025/1990: AIR 1990 Del 151.
76. Munni Lal v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co., MANU/SC/0162/1996: AIR 1996
SC 642 (643) : 1996 (1) SCC 90; Radhika v. Bajrangi, AIR 1996 SC 2358 : 1996 (7)
SCC 486.
77. Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., MANU/SC/0558/2001: 2001 SCC 97; Mohinder
Singh v. Bir Singh and Ors. MANU/PH/0052/2002.
78. Heera Lal v. Kalyan Mal, MANU/SC/0829/1998: AIR 1998 SC 618 (621) : 1998 (1) SCC 278.
79. Phoolrani v. Naubat, MANU/SC/0421/1973: AIR 1973 SC 2110: 1973 (1) SCC 688.
80. Municipal Corpn. v. Pancham, MANU/SC/0284/1964: AIR 1965 SC 1008.

®
829
830 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

81. O. P. Goel v. O. P. Mehra, MANU/DE/0006/1992: AIR 1992 Del 16.

82. Modi Spg. & Weaving Mills v. Ladha Ram, MANU/SC/0012/1976: AIR 1977 SC 680.
83. Natrajswamy v. Goenambal, MANU/TN/0005/1992: AIR 1992 Mad 25.
84. Lekhi Ram v. Trikha Ram, MANU/SC/0117/1998: AIR 1998 SC 1230: 1998 (2) SCC
720.
85. Santokh Singh v. Mahant Eqbal Singh, MANU/SC/0565/2000: AIR 2000 SC 3155:
2000 (7) SCC.
86. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Rajkishore Singh, MANU/SC/0980/2000: AIR 2000 SC
3577(1): 2000 (9) SCC 174.
87. Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy, MANU/SC/0503/
2001: AIR 2001 SC 3685 : 2001 (8) SCC 115.
88. Canara Bank v. Standard Chartered Bank, MANU/SC/0730/2001: AIR 2002 SC 132.
89. V. Ramsabhya v. B. Sarojini, (1976) 1 AndhWR 332.
90. Srikant Raghubir v. Jaidev Saunio, AIR 1975 Goa 24.
91. Rajendra Prasad v. Allahabad Bank, MANU/WB/0055/1987: AIR 1987 Cal 262.
92. Netramani Dibya v. Dasharathi Misra, MANU/OR/0080/1986: AIR 1986 Ori 235.

SYNOPSIS 6. Consideration while deciding

amendment .................................. 837
1. Amendment .................................. 830
7. Proviso to Rule 17 ...................... 839
2. Object ............................................ 831
8. Amendments when allowed ....... 843
3. Scope ............................................ 833
9. When amendment refused ......... 843
4. At any stage of the proceedings .. 835
5. Delay .............................................. 836

10. Amendment in execution

application .................................... 845

1. Amendment.
Rule 17 of Order VI was deleted by the Amendment Act of 1999 and was restored
by the Amending Act of 2002 with effect from 1st July 2002. ,By the Amendment Act
of 2002 a new proviso has been added to Rule 17, namely that no application for
amendment of pleading shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the
Court comes to the conclusion that inspite of due-diligence the party could not have
raised the matter before the commencement of trial. Thus after the trial of the case
has commenced, no application for amendment of the pleading shall be allowed
unless the Court comes to the conclusion that inspite of due diligence, the party
could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. Whether the party
seeking amendment as acted with due-diligence or not would depend upon the fact
and circumstances of each case (H.P. State Civil Supplies Corpn. v. Palli Banal Co-
op. Agri.Services Society Limited).1 Though the power of amendment of pleadings
has been restored to the Court however, it comes with certain limitation. Thus the
amended Rule 17 lays down two conditions for exercise of power of amendment
namely:
a) the trial in the suit has not commenced
b) if the trial has commenced, the party seeking amendment had been diligent
and could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial
®
830
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 831

Where amendment sought was necessary for just and proper adjudication of the
case, the Court would not reject the same merely on the ground of some mistake,
inadvertent or infraction of the procedure rules (Inderjit Grover v. Indrawati).2 An
amendment which is necessary to decide the real question in controversy is normally
to be allowed. However, when such an application is made with the intention or
purpose to defeat the right already accrued in favour of the other side, not only the
point of limitation but also even the justification for the delay, if any, disclosed by the
applicant ought to be considered and in the absence of any such justification, an
adverse inference will have to be drawn against the applicant which could even justify
the rejection of the application for amendment (Purshottam v. A.N. Jog.).3 Amendment
would not be allowed after trial has commenced if the party fails to show cause as
to why even after exercise of due-diligence it could not have moved amendment
before the trial had commenced (Ram Kishore v. Sunder Singh).4 Trial in Order VI Rule
17 means the commencement of actual trial or adducing of evidence (Neelakandan
Nair v. Parmeshwar Kurup).5
The proviso, to some extent, curtails the absolute discretion to allow amendment at
any stage. The object is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay the
trial (Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India 8 E. Prasad Goud v. B.
Lakshmana Goud).6 With a view to shorten litigation and speed up the trial of cases
Rule 17 was omitted by the Amendment Act of 1999. Its omission led to protest,
strikes, boycott of courts all over the country. In view of all this, the rule was restored
in its original form by amending act of 2002 with a rider in the shape of the proviso
limiting the power of amendment to some extent. A perusal of the provision discloses
that the restrictions placed on amendment, through Rule 17 of Order 6 the Code of
Civil Procedure do not operate in respect of a pleading, be it plaint or written statement,
if it was filed into court, before 1st July, 2002. Even where a suit is filed before 1st
July, 2002, the bar applies, if the written statement is filed subsequent to that date.
The new proviso has been subject to judicial scrutiny in several cases. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court has held that the amended rule is not a complete bar nor shuts
out entertainment of any later application, otherwise the proviso would be in direct
conflict to the provision “at any stage” used in the Rule (E. Prasad Goud v. B.
Lakshmana Goud).7 The Madras High Court has held that in a suit filed in the year
1996, i.e., before the introduction of the amendment under 2002, the proviso cannot
be an impediment or bar in allowing the application for amendment of pleadings if it
otherwise deserves on merits to be allowed (L. Narayan Reddy v. P. Narayan Reddy).8

2. Object.
The amended Order VI Rule 17 was due to the recommendation of the Law Commission
since Order 17 as it existed prior to the amendment was invoked by parties interested
in delaying the trial. To shorten the litigation and speed up disposal of suits, amendment
was made by the Amending Act, 1999, deleting Rule 17 from the Code (Ajendraprasadji
N. Pande and Anr. v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. and Ors.)9 and curtail delay (Jeet
Ram Kishore v. Sunder Singh).10 The object of the rule is that Courts should try the
merits of the case that come before them and should, consequently, allow all amendments
that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the
parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This means
the parties have to be given a chance to contest the questions in controversy and

®
831
832 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

the Court has to give its decision ultimately on such contested issues (Sri Ramnik
Vallabhdas Madhvani and Ors. v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani; Virender Gopal v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi).11 The power of amendment is granted to the Court in
the larger interest of doing full justice to the parties. Courts exist for the purpose of
doing justice between the parties and not for punishing them (Amod Prakash Gupta
v. Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India).12 It is, however,
observed at the same time that the rule of amendment is essentially a rule of justice,
equity and good conscience and an exception to the general liberal view is where a
party applying is acting mala fide (Shri R.P. Kapoor v. Holiday Home).13 It has been
held that the whole object and purpose of introduction of Order 6 Rule 17 in the Code
of Civil Procedure is to avoid multiplicity of proceeding and/or to shorten the litigation
and to settle the entire dispute at rest, though, however, any amendment should not
or must not jeopardize the case of the other side in such a manner which goes to non-
suit the other side (Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha; Bhaskaran Nair v.
Chandramathiyamma).14
The object of Order 6, Rule 17 is to do justice and not to shut out justice merely
on technicalities of the pleadings and the power to amend written statement even
at the appellate stage can be allowed if the delay in taking up the point is
explained and the Appellate Court cannot refuse to permit amendment of written
statement to raise a vital issue or plea merely because the necessary material
is not before it (Pokarmal Agarwalla v. Madhoram Thakursidas).15 The purpose is
to allow either party to alter or amend his pleading in such manner and on such
terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be
exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis
of guidelines laid down in various precedents. Though the amendment cannot be
claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances but the Courts while
deciding such prayer do not adopt a hyper technical approach. Liberal approach
is the general rule particularly, in cases where the other side can be compensated
with costs. Technicalities of law cannot be permitted to hamper the Courts in the
administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the
pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. It is also no more res
integra that pretrial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are
sought to be made after the commencement of trial or after conclusion thereof.
Mere delay usually cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment
because merits of amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendments
are not to be Judged at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment (B.K. Narayana
Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai; Bank Kreiss AG v. Ashok K. Chauhan and Ors.;
Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and Ors. v. K.K. Modi and Ors.; Ragu Thilak D. John v.
S. Rayappan and Ors.; Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha; Fertilizer Corporation
of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana Stores; Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri
Balram Saini; Sabharwal Brothers Security Corporation v. The Workman Shri Munshi
Ram, and Ors.; Shri Chet Ram Gupta v. : Shri Motian Devi and Ors.; Rajiv Goel
and Anr. v. Krishna Kumari Goel and Ors.;Shri Dharam Chand v. Shri R.K. Jha;
Kannu Exports v. Banque Nationale De Paris (Suisse) and Ors.; Anil Nanda and
Anr. v. Escorts Limited and Ors.; Shri Gurcharanjeet Singh Anand v. Shri Pritam
Singh Anand and Anr.; Mrs. Binu Anand Khanna v. Mr. Ratan Tata,; Mrs. Sarabjit
Singh v. Mr. Gurinder Singh Sandhu and Ors.; Davinder Singh v. Surjit Malhotra;
Mrs. Abha Chhabra and Anr. v. Mr. V.K. Jetly and Ors.; Rasiklal Manikchand
®
832
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 833

Dhariwal and Ors. v. Kishore Washwani; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v.

Precious Finance Investment Pvt. Ltd.; Vojjala Jayamma v. Vojjala Pullaiah;
Meenashi and anr v. Selvaraj and Ors.; Bhajan Singh v. Sati Brahamana; Smt.
Natho v. Kanwal Singh and Ors.; Bhikhabhai Lallubhai Sonavia v. Nanduben alias
Revaben).16

3. Scope.
This rule was omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999.
However, before the enforcement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1999, the original rule was substituted and restored with an additional proviso. The
proviso limits the power to allow amendment after the commencement of trial but
grants discretion to the Court to allow amendment if it feels that the party could not
have raised the matter before the commencement of trial in spite of due diligence.
The proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any
stage. It is this proviso which falls for consideration (Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh).17
Now, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite
of due diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier. The object is
to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay the trial. There is no illegality
in the provision (Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India).18 The
provisions of amendment are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for
defeating them (Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram).19
The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not
by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference
to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. In this context it was held
that pre trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to
be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. It was held
that in cases where amendment is sought at a pre-trial stage it can be safely
assumed that the Defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity
of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended (Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu; S.
Ahamed Meeran and Ors. v. S. Kumaraswamy; T. Gunaseelan v. M. Thamilselvi;
Deepali v. Pankaj Gupta).20 Despite restricting the right to amend to pre trial stage only
by proviso, there is no restriction imposed in the main provision. For amendment in
the matter where the trial has commenced, the amendment has been permitted in
such post trial cases where despite due diligence a party is not able to take a plea,
which is sough to be raised by way of amendment.
The only embargo as per the proviso to that Rule is that no application for amendment
be allowed after the trial has commenced. Even here, if the Court comes to the
conclusion that in spite of due diligence party could not have raised a matter before
the commencement of the trial, the Court is empowered to consider such request
depending on the merits of the claim (T. Gunaseelan v. M. Thamilselvi; Smt. Basanti
Satapathy and Ors. v. Rakesh Kumar Satapathy).21 Even a delayed amendment, if
required for just decision of the question involved and which does not cause irretrievable
injury to the opposite party may be allowed to be made in the pleadings, in case the
Court is satisfied that the party applying for amendment is not guilty of gross delay
and laches and the amendment is not sought for malafide reasons and ulterior
motives (Rajiv Goel and Anr. v. Krishna Kumari Goel and Ors.; Shri Dharam Chand
v. Shri R.K. Jha).22

®
833
834 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

It is true that the power to allow amendment should be liberally exercised. The liberal
principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing the amendment are that
multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided, that amendments which do not totally
alter the character of an action should be granted, while care should be taken to see
that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted upon the
opposite party under pretence of amendment (Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder
Singh Anand).23 It is a settled law that at the time of allowing of amendment, the Court
has only to look as to whether the ingredients of Order VI Rule 17 are satisfied or not.
Rule 17 is very much clear it provides that amendment can be allowed at any stage
of proceedings on such terms as may be just (Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v.
Prabha Kirana Stores).24
The law of amendment has received liberal interpretation in the recent times, but
in view of the amended provisions of Order 6 Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure,
the Courts have been cautioned by the Legislature so as not to exercise the
discretion vested in the Court too liberally and literally (International Tract Ors.
Ltd. v. Punjab Tract Ors. Ltd.).25
Where the proposed amendment neither drastically altered nature of defense nor
withdrew admissions made earlier by the Defendants. Despite the commencement
of trial, it was held that the proposed amendment will not irreparably prejudice the
Plaintiffs as, at most the Plaintiff would have to be re-examined and consequently,
the amendment even after commencement of trial was allowed (Smt. Rekha
Bansal v. Mr. Ajay Kumar Bansal and Ors.; Pradeep Singhvi v. Heero Dhankani).26
The Supreme Court (Baldev Singh and Ors. v. Manohar Singh and Anr.)27 has held that
Order VI Rule 17 including the proviso is a procedural provision relating to amendment
of plaint or written statement and the limitations in respect thereof and, therefore, the
same should be interpreted to advance and not retard or defeat justice. In case of an
amendment of the plaint, an amendment to the plaint should not be granted if it would
convert the suit or the claim into one of a different and inconsistent character. In the
case of an amendment of the written statement, an amendment should not be granted
if it would convert the defence into another of a different and inconsistent character.
An amendment to the written-statement can never affect the nature of the suit; it can
only alter the nature of the defence (Shriram Sardarmal Didwani v. Gourishankar alias
Rameshwar Joharmal).28
Order 6 Rule 17 consists of two parts, whereas the first part is discretionary (may) and
leaves it to the Court to Order amendment of pleading. The second part is imperative
(shall) and enjoins on the Court to allow all amendments which are necessary for the
purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties (Gautam
Sarup v. Leela Jetly and Ors.).29 The Court held that the first part of Order 6 Rule 17 of
the Code of Civil Procedure providing that “the Court may” allow either party to amend
his pleading, has given rise to a general impression that amendments of pleading always
rest in the discretion of the Court. The user of the two words “may” and “shall” in such
close proximity would therefore, must be that while the first part of Rule 17 dealing with
amendments in general vests the Court with discretion, the later part, dealing with such
amendments as are necessary for the purpose of determining the real controversy
between the parties, imposes an obligation on the Court, and not merely a discretion, to
allow such amendments (Bibhas Chandra Bose v. Sm. Dolly Bose nee Dutta).30

®
834
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 835

The law of amendment has received liberal interpretation in the recent times, but in
view of the amended provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, the Courts have been
cautioned by the legislature so as not to exercise the discretion vested in the Court
too liberally and literally (Shri Vasudev v. Smt. Rupkumari @ Banarso Devi).31

4. ‘At any stage of the proceedings’.

Rule 17 of Order 6 confers a discretionary jurisdiction on the Court exercisable at
any stage of the proceedings, which include the first and second Appellate stages
(Lucy Narona v. Raghunath Jew Bije; Shri Yumnam Ibobi Singh v. Shri Yumnam
Yaima Singh),32 to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner
and on such terms as may be just. The rule goes on to provide that all such
amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining
the real questions in controversy between the parties (Usha Balashaheb Swami and
Ors. v. Kiran Appaso Swami and Ors.).33 The power to allow the amendment is wide
and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on
the basis of guidelines laid down in various precedents. Though the amendment
cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances but the Courts
while deciding such prayer do not adopt a hyper technical approach. Liberal approach
is the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated
with costs. Technicalities of law cannot be permitted to hamper the Courts in the
administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings
to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation. It is also no more res integra that
pretrial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be
made after the commencement of trial or after conclusion thereof. Mere delay
usually cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment because merits of
amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendments are not to be judged
at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment (B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran
Pillai; Bank Kreiss AG v. Ashok K. Chauhan and Ors.; Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and
Ors. v. K.K. Modi and Ors.; Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors. Ajit Kumar
Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha; Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana
Stores; Shri Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri Balram Saini; Sabharwal
Brothers Security Corporation v. The Workman Shri Munshi Ram, and Ors.; Shri
Chet Ram Gupta v. Shri Motian Devi and Ors.; Rajiv Goel and Anr. v. Krishna Kumari
Goel and Ors.; Shri Dharam Chand v. Shri R.K. Jha; Kannu Exports v. Banque
Nationale De Paris (Suisse) and Ors.; Anil Nanda and Anr. v. Escorts Limited and
Ors.; Shri Gurcharanjeet Singh Anand v. Shri Pritam Singh Anand and Anr.; Mrs.
Binu Anand Khanna v. Mr. Ratan Tata,; Mrs. Sarabjit Singh v. Mr. Gurinder Singh
Sandhu and Ors.; Davinder Singh v. Surjit Malhotra; Mrs. Abha Chhabra and Anr. v.
Mr. V.K. Jetly and Ors.; Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and Ors. v. Kishore Washwani;
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Precious Finance Investment Pvt. Ltd.; Vojjala
Jayamma v. Vojjala Pullaiah; Meenashi and anr v. Selvaraj and Ors.; Bhajan Singh
v. Sati Brahamana; Smt. Natho v. Kanwal Singh and Ors.; Bhikhabhai Lallubhai
Sonavia v. Nanduben alias Revaben).34 Unless and until the Court is told how and
in what manner the pleading originally submitted to the Court is proposed to be
altered or amended the Court cannot effectively exercise its power to permit amendment.
An amendment may involve withdrawal of an admission previously made and may
attempt to introduce a plea or claim barred by limitation or, as to deprive the
opposite party of a valuable right accrued to him by lapse of time and so on (Gurdial

®
835
836 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

Singh v. Raj Kumar Aneja).35

5. Delay in filing the application for Amendment.

The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not
by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference
to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are
allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement
of the trial or after conclusion thereof (Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and Anr.; Shri
Shilwanti Kewal Ramani v. Shri Balram Saini).36 If there is any delay in making the
prayer for amendment of pleadings either in the trial Court or at the appellate Court
the delay must be explained to the satisfaction of the Court and in case of such
prayer before the Appellate Court it must also be explained as to why such prayer
could not be made before the trial Court (Shri Yumnam Ibobi Singh v. Shri Yumnam
Yaima Singh).37
The Supreme Court has held that delay in itself shall not be a ground for rejection
of the application unless serious prejudice would be caused to other party or if
accrued rights are taken away by such an amendment. The Court further held that
it is fairly settled law that the amendment of pleadings under Order 6, Rule 17 is to
be allowed if such an amendment is required for proper and effective adjudication of
controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings,
subject to certain conditions such as allowing the amendment should not result in
injustice to the other side; normally a clear admission made conferring certain right
on a plaintiff is not allowed to be withdrawn by way of amendment by a defendant
resulting in prejudice to such a right of the plaintiff, depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. In certain situations, a time-barred claim cannot be
allowed to be raised by proposing an amendment to take away the valuable accrued
right of a party. Mere delay in making an amendment application itself is not enough
to refuse amendment, as the delay can be compensated in terms of money. Rule 17,
Order VI confers a wide discretion upon the Courts to allow the amendment of the
pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and even after the case has been adjourned
for arguments (Chintaparthi Venkataramana Reddy v. Nallam Rajamma; Pothineni
Venkateswarlu v. Bodempudi Kotamma).38 Amendment is to be allowed when it does
not cause serious prejudice to the opposite side (In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate
(P) Ltd.; Sabharwal Brothers Security Corporation v. The Workman Shri Munshi Ram,
Steel Authority of India Ltd., and Ors.; Smt. Rekha Bansal v. Mr. Ajay Kumar Bansal
and Ors.; Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal and Ors. v. Kishore Washwani and anr; Shri
Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri Balram Saini; D. Krishna Moorthy v. D.
Rangaswami Naidu; Rahimmunnisa Begum and Ors. v. Mohd. Mohammadulla Khan
Durrani (died) by LRs. and Ors.).39
In (Pankaja and Anr. v. Yellappa (Dead) by LRs and Ors.)40 it was held that there is
no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation, an
amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being
discretionary, the same will have to be exercised on a judicious evaluation of the
facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an
amendment really subserves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation
the same should be allowed. There can be no straitjacket formula for allowing or

®
836
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 837

disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background

of that case.
The power to allow amendment is a discretionary power and where the delay is too
inordinate, the amendment can be refused (Mohan v. Pashupatinath)41 e.g. the Supreme
Court refused to allow the amendment application moved by defendant after eight
years to raise the plea that notice terminating tenancy was not valid (Gauri Shankar
v. Hindustan Trust).42 Where delay is so much that the relief sought to be added is
barred, the amendment should not be allowed (K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. v. Alliance
Ministries).43

6. Considerations while deciding application for Amendment.

While considering whether an application for amendment should or should not be
allowed, the Court should not go into the correctness or falsity of the case in the
amendment. Likewise, it should not record a finding on the merits of the amendment
and the merits of the amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendment
are not to be adjudged at the stage of allowing the prayer for amendment. It is also
well established that the endeavor of the courts ought to be to decide the rights of
the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes, oversights and negligence.
Conversely, amendment should be refused where it is not necessary for the purpose
of determining the real question in controversy between the parties; is merely technical
or useless or of no substance or where the plaintiff’s suit will be wholly displaced or
it would take away the legal right which has accrued in favor of the parties or it would
introduce a totally new and inconsistent case and where the application for amendment
is made at a late stage of the proceedings or not made in good faith (SH. Madhu
Sudan Gupta v. SH. Dinesh Gupta; Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi Future
Builders Co-operative Housing Society v. S. Malla Reddy and Ors.).44
A subsequent event may be one purely of law founded of facts. The court may take
judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how
the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify
or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the
law. The Court may permit such subsequent event being introduced into the pleadings
by way of amendment as it would be necessary so to do for the purpose of determining
the real questions in controversy between the parties (Smt. Natho v. Kanwal Singh
and Ors.; Om Parkash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal).45
It was held that in a case where the amendment sought after is relating to the
valuation of the suit happens to exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction; the proper procedure
is to return the plaint for presentation in the proper Court in case the amendment is
allowed (Sreedharan v. P.S. Job Balasubramanian v. Narayanan Nair;Suri Films v.
Govinda Prabhu, Thomas v. Saidalavi).46
The scope of amendment is that the bona fide amendments necessary for the
purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties should
be allowed, how so ever negligent the first omission and how delayed the proposed
amendment, if the opposite party can be compensated with costs or other terms to
be imposed in the Order. Conversely, amendment should be refused where it is not,
necessary for the purposes of determining the real question in controversy between
the parties; is merely technical or useless or of no substance or where the plaintiff’s

®
837
838 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

suit will be wholly displaced or it would take away the legal right which has accrued
to the defendant by lapse of time or it would introduce a totally new and inconsistent
case; and the application is made at a late stage of the proceedings or the application
for amendment is not made in good faith (Ajarjeet Singh v. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi).47 But this rule can apply only when either fresh allegations are added or fresh
relief sought by way of amendment. Where, for instance, an amendment is sought
which merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter
it, it has never been held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the questions
to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the
original pleading.” (Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala;
Ratan Singh and Anr. v. Ram Prasad and Ors.; Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and
others).48
It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all
circumstances but it is equally true that the courts while deciding such prayers
should not adopt a hyper technical approach. Liberal approach should be the general
rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs.
Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the courts in the administration
of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid
uncalled-for multiplicity of litigation (B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai;
Bank Kreiss AG v. Ashok K. Chauhan and Ors.; Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and Ors.
v. K.K. Modi and Ors.; D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors.; Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit
Kumar Saha; Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Prabha Kirana Stores; Shri
Shilwanti Kewal Ramani and Anr. v. Shri Balram Saini; Sabharwal Brothers Security
Corporation v. The Workman Shri Munshi Ram, Steel Authority of India Ltd.and Ors.;
Shri Chet Ram Gupta v. Shri Motian Devi and Ors. ; Rajiv Goel and Anr. v. Krishna
Kumari Goel and Ors.;Shri Dharam Chand v. Shri R.K. Jha; Abdul Mateem v. Mehandi
Hasan and Anr.; State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders, A.P.).49
The court is required to apply its mind on several factors including viz. whether by
reason of such amendment the claimant intends to resile from an express admission
made by him. In such an event the application for amendment may not be allowed
(Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by LRs.).50 However, if the basic structure of
the suit is not altered by the proposed amendment, it should not be declined (Sampath
Kumar v. Ayyakannu).51 The cross-objections also can be amended at any point of
time under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code (Varanasi Vital Rao v. Jallepalli Janardhanarao
and Anr.).52 The provisions of Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure will not apply
to the case of a minor filing a separate written statement, on attaining majority
(Vanimisatti Anil Kumar and others v. Jayavarapu Krishna Murty and others).53
On the basis of the different judgments it is settled that the following principles should
be kept in mind in dealing with the application for amendment of the pleadings:
(i) All amendments should be allowed which are necessary for determination
of the real controversies in the suit;
(ii) The proposed amendment should not alter and be a substitute of the
cause of action on the basis of which the original suit was raised;
(iii) Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted
position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts would not be
allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment;

®
838
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 839

(iv) Proposed amendments should not cause prejudice to the other side which
cannot be compensated by means of costs;
(v) Amendment of a claim or relief barred by time should not be allowed;
(vi) No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or results in defeating
a legal right to the opposite party on account of lapse of time;
(vii) No party should suffer on account of the technicalities of law and the
amendment should be allowed to minimize the litigation between the parties;
(viii) The delay in filing the petitions for amendment of the pleadings should be
properly compensated by costs;
(ix) Error or mistake which if not fraudulent should not be made on ground for
rejecting the application for amendments of pleadings (Dalip Kaur v. Major
Singh , Kulwant Singh v. Sher Singh; Sardar Hari Bachan Singh v. Major
S. Har Bhajan Singh and Anr.).54

7. Proviso to Rule 17.

The first part of the rule makes it abundantly clear that at any stage of the proceedings,
parties are free to alter or amend their pleadings as may be necessary for the purpose
of determining the real questions in controversy. However, this rule is subject to
proviso appended therein. The said rule with proviso was again substituted by Act 22
of 2002 with effect from 1st July, 2002, makes it clear that after the commencement
of the trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if the parties to
the proceedings are able to satisfy the Court that in spite of due diligence they could
not raise the issue before the commencement of trial and if the Court is satisfied with
their explanation, amendment can be allowed even after commencement of the trial.
To put it clearly, Order VI Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction on the
Court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the
proceedings on such terms as may be just. Such amendments seeking determination
of the real question of the controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be
made. Pre-trial amendments are to be allowed liberally than those which are sought
to be made after the commencement of the trial. As rightly pointed out by the High
Court in a former case, the opposite party is not prejudiced because he will have an
opportunity of meeting the amendment sought to be made. In the latter case, namely,
after the commencement of trial, particularly, after completion of the evidence, the
question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and in such event, it is incumbent
on the part of the Court to satisfy the conditions prescribed in the proviso. (Rajkumar
Gurawara (Dead) thr. L.Rs. v. S.K. Sarwagi and Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.).55
On careful reading of the language of the proviso to Rule 17 Order 6 of the Code, it
is clear that it casts an obligation on the party applying for amendment, after
commencement of the trial, to offer an explanation to the satisfaction of the Court
so as to come to the conclusion that inspite of “due diligence”, the party could not
have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The proviso does not deal
with the power of the Court and also does not specifically take away the power of the
Court to allow the amendment after the commencement of trial. It empowers the
Court to reject the application if it comes to the conclusion that inspite of “due
diligence”, the party could not have sought the amendment before the commencement
of trial. The provision contained in Order 6 Rule 17 is procedural. It is not a part of

®
839
840 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

substantive law. The object behind introducing the proviso in the present shape is to
curb the mischief of unscrupulous litigant adopting dilatory tactics to delay the disposal
of the cases and to defeat the right of opposite party approaching the Court for quick
relief and also to cause serious inconvenience of the Court faced with frequent
prayers for adjournment. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the
same. The purpose of such like amendments is stated in the statement of objects
and reasons as “to reduce delay in disposal of civil cases” (Bharat Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. v. Precious Finance Investment Pvt. Ltd.).56
If it is made out that the party who seeks amendment had no occasion or opportunity,
in spite of due diligence, to raise this plea, then, irrespective of the bar imposed
under the proviso, that ‘no application for amendment shall be allowed, after the trial
is commenced’, applying the exception built therein, the Court can permit the party,
to amend the plaint, exercising its wide discretionary power. But, the said power is
curtailed or it could be said, a ban is imposed, and therefore, the wide discretion,
which was available originally under Order 6 Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure,
cannot be invoked, as a matter of right, that the amendment shall be allowed for
the purpose of determining the real question in controversy, between the parties,
in the same suit (Ramesh Ramanujam v. Varadammal and Ors.; Jeya v. Sundaram
Iyyar).57
In (Baldev Singh etc v. Manohar Singh)58 the Court has made the following observations:
(i) The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 is procedural and not a part of substantive
law. It does not deal with the power of the Court and also does not
specifically take away the power of the Court to allow the amendment
after the commencement of trial. It only empowers the Court to reject the
application if it comes to the conclusion that inspite of “due diligence”,
the parties could not have sought the amendment before the
commencement of trial.
(ii) The proviso to Rule 17 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the
present form and context, is directory and not mandatory. While dealing
with the application under Order 6 Rule 17, courts can apply the principles/
guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court and High Courts before the
Amendment Act of 2002 came into force, if the amendment is found to be
necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy
between the parties even after the commencement of trial.
(iii) While dealing with the application under Order 6 Rule 17 made after
commencement of the trial, the Court should, all the time and at all the
stages, bear in mind the force, impact and vigor of the provision and see
that it is maintained and not nullified and that the application is not filed
to delay the trial.
(iv) The commencement of the trial as mentioned in proviso to Order 6 Rule
17 of Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in the limited sense as
meaning the final hearing of the suit, examination of witnesses, filing of
documents and addressing of documents.
(v) Once a prayer for amendment is allowed the original pleadings should
incorporate the changes in a different ink or an amended pleading may be

®
840
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 841

filed wherein with the use of a highlighter or by underlining in red the

changes made may be distinctly shown.
(vi) The applicant should specifically set out which portions of the original
pleadings were sought to be deleted and what were the averments which
were sought to be added or substituted in the original pleadings.
(vii) The applicant, seeking amendment, should offer sufficient and proper
explanation mentioning the particular circumstances against which an
amendment was sought to enable the Court to reach the conclusion that
inspite of due diligence the applicant could not have raised the matter
before the commencement of trial.
(viii) Once a prayer for amendment is allowed the party should incorporate the
amendment in the pleadings within the time limited for that purpose or else
within 14 days as provided by Order 6 Rule 18 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. As far as possible the courts while allowing the amendment
should direct the party to carry out amendment within timeframe.
(ix) When one of the parties has been permitted to amend his pleading, an
opportunity has to be given to the opposite party to amend his pleading.
The opposite party shall also have to make an application under Order 6
Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, of course, would ordinarily
and liberally be allowed. Such amendments are known as “consequential
amendments”. However, a new plea cannot be permitted to be added in the
garb of a consequential amendment, though it can be applied by way of
an independent or primary amendment.
(x) An amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written statement are
not necessarily governed by exactly the same principle. The plaintiff
cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or
substitute his cause of action or the nature of his claim. However,
adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence
does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a
new cause of action. The courts are, therefore, required to take more
liberal view in allowing amendment of written statement than of plaint
and question of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in
former than in latter case.
(xi) The courts while deciding the application for amendment should not adopt
a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule
particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the
costs. Amendment need to be allowed to avoid uncalled-for multiplicity of
litigation.
(xii) The defendant has a right to take an alternative plea in defence which,
however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the
other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission
made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn and it should not result in
defeating a legal right accruing to the plaintiff on account of lapse of time.
(xiii) The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be
properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent,

®
841
842 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment
of plaint or written statement.
(xiv) If it is permissible for the plaintiff to file an independent suit, the same
relief which could be prayed for in a new suit should be permitted to be
incorporated in the pending suit by way of an amendment. Such amendment
would curtail multiplicity of legal proceedings.
(xv) Inconsistent plea, in a given case, can also be allowed to be raised by the
defendants in the written statement. However, an inconsistent plea which
would displace the plaintiff completely from the admissions made by the
defendants in the written statement, however, cannot be allowed. If such
amendments are allowed the plaintiff will be irretrievably prejudiced by
being denied the opportunity of extracting the admission from the defendants.
(xvi) The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be
decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit
alone but by reference to the stage to which the hearing in the suit has
proceeded. Pre-trial amendments should be allowed more liberally than
those which are sought to be made after commencement of the trial and
after conclusion thereof.
(xvii) The court can allow amendment of pleadings even at the appellate stage
for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between
the parties or if it is necessary for the effective decision of the case.
However, the delay in seeking an amendment must be explained satisfactorily
and that it should not cause injustice to the other side or it should not
affect the right already accrued to the other side. At appellate stage none
of the parties could be allowed to withdraw the admissions or pleadings,
if the rights are accrued to the other side.
(xviii) If the application for amendment is allowed after the commencement of
trial and if the proposed amendment has the effect of altering the nature
of the defence the plaintiff can claim re-examination of the witness/es and
if he makes such claim the Court should allow such prayer.
(xix) While considering whether an application for amendment should be allowed,
the Court is not expected to go into the correctness or falsity of the case
in the amendment. Likewise, it should not record a finding on the merits
of the amendment and the merits of the amendment sought to be incorporated
by way of amendment are not to be adjudged at the stage of allowing the
prayer for amendment.
(xx) An Amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit.
However, the doctrine of “relation-back” in the context of amendment of
pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the
Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the
amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and
to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before
the Court on the date on which the application seeking amendment was
filed.
(xxi) An application for amendment of the pleading should not be disallowed

®
842
O 6, R, 17] Order 6 843

merely because it is opposed on the ground that the same is barred by

limitation. On the contrary, application will have to be considered bearing
in mind the discretion that is vested with the Court in allowing or disallowing
the amendment in the interest of justice. The plea of limitation being a
mixed question of law and fact can be made a subject matter of the issue
after allowing the amendment prayed for.

8. Amendments when allowed.

All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not
working, injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of
determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. In an eviction suit
the appellant-defendant wanted to amend the written statement by pleading that in
case he is not held a lessee, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 60(b) of the
Indian Easements Act. This is neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the plea already
raised in defence. Held, the application cannot be rejected merely on ground of
prolonged delay in filing specially when plaintiff can be compensated by costs (B.K.N.
Pillai v. D. Pillai).59
In a suit respondent has made specific pleadings about the additional accommodation.
Held, amendment of eviction petition sought on grounds of requirement of additional
accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control
Act is valid (B. Kandasamy Reddiar v. O. Gomathi Ammal).60 The dominant purpose
of allowing the amendment is to minimise litigation. A plea of limitation being disputed
can be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment (Ragu Thilak
D. John v. S. Rayappan).61
While granting leave to amend a pleading the Court shall see that the plea sought
to be introduced is by way of an answer to the plea previously permitted to be
incorporated by way of amendment by the opposite party (Gurdial Singh v. Raj
Kumar Aneja).62
The proposed amendment does not have effect of displacing the plaintiff from admissions
made in his favour by the defendant the amendment can be allowed (M/s. Estralla
Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd).63
Where the original plaint is rather cryptic about the undisputed agreement between
the parties and proposed amendment seeks incorporation of averments about agreement,
the amendment is allowed (Fritig T.M. Clement v. Sudhakaran Nadar).64

9. When amendment refused

The Supreme Court has held amendments should be refused only where the other
party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally
correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated
in costs (Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Ors.; North
Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das (D) by Lrs.).65 In allowing
or rejecting the application for amendment the Court should not go into the merits of
the case or the rival claims (Peres and Sons v. Puravath,; Suri Films v. S.N. Govinda
Prabhu and Brother)66 or where the claim becomes barred by limitation during the
pendency of the proceedings (Vijendra Kumar Goel v. Kusum Bhuwania; Shri Chet
Ram Gupta v. Shri Motian Devi and Ors.).67

®
843
844 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 17

The Court held that Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure postulates
amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings but before an amendment
can be carried out in terms of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court
is required to apply its mind on several factors. including viz. whether by reason of
such amendment the claimant intends to resile from an express admission made by
him. In such an event the application for amendment may not be allowed (Sangramsinh
P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad; Pfizer Inc.V Pifer Pharmaceuticals Pvt.
Ltd.).68
Where the amendment sought is mala fide and purpose is to delay the disposal
of the case, it should not be allowed. Entirely new cause of action, inconsistent
to original claim cannot be allowed (Britannia Industries v. Punjab National Bank).69
Where the amendment if allowed would take away the legal right already accrued
to the other party not to be allowed (Prem v. Jyoti)70 except in cases of bona fide
mistakes (Mathew Alexander v. Bhaskran Pillai,; Shanti v. Homes Insurance Co.).71
An amendment which has been disallowed earlier should not be permitted when
moved afresh (D. L. F. United Co. v. Prem).72 Where plaintiffs originally claimed to
be tenants of equal shares, after the death of one, remaining plaintiff cannot be
permitted to amend plaint to claim that he alone was the tenant of whole land
(Hola Ram v. Kewal Krishna).73 In a suit for refund of earnest money an amendment
for including claim of specific performance of contract cannot be allowed (Roop
Chand v. Ranjit Kumari).74 Similarly in a suit for specific performance, relief of
partition cannot be added (Ansal Properties v. Dr. Anand Nath).75 An amendment
introducing new case of adverse possession abandoning earlier plea of permissible
possession cannot be allowed. Amendment should be refused when it is not
necessary for deciding a real question in controversy. A party cannot be permitted
to introduce a claim or relief by way of amendment which otherwise has gone time
barred (Munni Lal v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co.; Radhika v. Bajrangi).76
It is also observed that a time-barred claim cannot be allowed to be raised by
proposing an amendment to take away the valuable right accrued to a party
(Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.; Mohinder Singh v. Bir Singh and Ors.).77
Where a defendant seeks an amendment in his written statement withdrawing the
admission earlier made, it cannot be allowed (Heera Lal v. Kalyan Mal).78
New cause of action or new case by way of amendment cannot be allowed to be
set up, (Phoolrani v. Naubat)79 particularly when pleadings are sought to be
undamentally altered (Municipal Corpn. v. Pancham).80 Where the defendant seeks
amendment in written statement whereby he wants to withdraw clear admission,
it amounts to setting up completely a new case and such amendment cannot be
allowed (O.P. Goel v. O.P. Mehra).81 Similarly where a defendant wants to substitute
a new case which would displace the plaintiff completely from admission made
by the defendant, the amendment cannot be allowed (Modi Spg. & Weaving Mills
v. Ladha Ram).82 Where a debt cannot be separated from a pronote, an amendment
converting a suit on pronote into one on original cause of action after the pronote
is found unstamped and invalid cannot be allowed (Natrajswamy v. Goenambal).83
However, where in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff seeks to introduce
averments regarding his readyness and willingness to perform his part of contract,
it cannot be said that it amounts to changing the cause of action (Lekhi Ram v.
Trikha Ram).84 Even though there was no prayer that the Lease Deed was not valid

®
844
O 6, R, 18] Order 6 845

necessary averments were there in the plaint. The appellants met the challenge
in their written statement. Thus even though there was no formal prayer but no
prejudice has been caused to the appellants, it is not necessary to interfere
(Santokh Singh v. Mahant Eqbal Singh).85 Order granting amendment and further
interim Orders based on amendment petition were quashed where an arbitration
agreement was sought to be filed in Court drastically changing the nature of
dispute (M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Rajkishore Singh). 86
A suit for partition was filed on basis of will, the defendant did not dispute existence
of will in his written statement subsequently the defendant sought amendment in
written statement for challenging genuineness of the will. The prayer for amendment
was rejected as the Court even otherwise was obliged to decide validity of the will
which is the basis of the suit (Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana
Reddy).87 Amendment of written statement cannot be allowed at the stage of appeal
before the Supreme Court when the same was not filed before the Special Court
(Canara Bank v. Standard Chartered Bank).88

10. Amendment in execution application.

Order XXI, Rule 10 of the Code permits successive execution applications as
such amendment cannot be made in execution applications (V. Ramsabhya v. B.
Sarojini).89 But in exceptional cases amendment can be permitted e.g. when there
is a decree for recovery of possession, mesne profits and costs, execution
application for recovery of rent only can be amended to add the ejectment of
judgment debtor (Srikant Raghubir v. Jaidev Saunio). 90 Similarly in execution
application if any particulars of immovable property or wanting, by way of amendment
same can be filled or new property too can also be added (Rajendra Prasad v.
Allahabad Bank).91 Also where decree is modified by the Appellate Court, the
application for execution already pending on the basis of decree passed by Trial
Court can be amended in the light of the modified decree (Netramani Dibya v.
Dasharathi Misra).92
For cross references see Sections 151, 152, 153 Order I, Rule 10, and Rules 16
and 18 (of this Order) of the Code.

18. Failure to amend after Order.—

If a party who has obtained an Order for leave to amend does not amend accordingly
within the time limited for the purpose by the Order, or if no time is thereby, limited
then within 14 days from the date of the Order, he shall not be permitted to amend
after the expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such 14 days, as the case
may be, unless the time is extended by the Court.
Rule 18 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure which was omitted by the Amendment
Act 46 of 1999 which was in force at that time provided that if a party who has
obtained an Order for leave to amend the pleading does not amend accordingly within
the time limited, for the purpose by the Order, or if no time is thereby limited then
within 14 days from the date of the Order, shall not be permitted to amend after the
expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such 14 days, as the case may be,
unless the time is extended by the Court. Therefore, the effect of Rule 18, is that if
the amendment allowed under Rule 17 of Order VI was not carried within the time or

®
845
846 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [O 6, R. 18

extended time granted, has to be treated as not available to the party (Thomman
Joseph v. Parameswaran Namboothiri).1
The Court held that “.......The first part refers to carrying out amendment of plaint
after obtaining leave for the same within time specified in the Order granting leave
to amend or, if no such time has been fixed then within 14 days from the date of the
Order. The second part imposes a penalty upon the party who has obtained the leave
to amend the plaint but has failed to do so within the time specified in the rule, by
debarring him from amending the plaint unless time is further extended for the
purpose by the Court.” (Dandapani Goudu v. Khetrabasi Gouda; Darshan Singh v.
Kewal Krishan and Anr.).2

ANNOTATIONS

Amendments High Court Amendment

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2002 substituted Rule 18, earlier
omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 1999 of Order 6.
Effective date of Amendment
The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1.7.2002
Prior to Amendment
Rule 18 of Order 6 use to read as under:
18. Failure to amend after order.–– If
a party who has obtained an order for
leave to amend does not amend
accordingly within the time limited for
that purpose by the order, or if no
time is thereby limited then within
fourteen days from the date of the
order, he shall not be permitted to
amend after the expiration of such
limited time as aforesaid or of such
fourteen days, as the case may be,
unless the time is extended by the
Court.
Orissa
For Rule 18, substitute the following:
‘18. Failure to amend after order.—
Where a party has obtained an order
to amend and the amendment is
extensive, within a time limited for
that purpose by the order, or if no
time is thereby limited, then, within
fourteen days from the date of the
order, he shall file a consolidated
pleading incorporating the
amendments, and he shall not be
permitted to amend after the expiration
of such limited time as aforesaid or if
such fourteen days, as the case may
be, unless the time is extended by
the court.
In all other cases, the Bench clerk shall
carry out the amendment.’
Effective date of High Court
Amendments
Orissa: 25-5-1984

Case Cited
1. Thomman Joseph v. Parameswaran Namboothiri MANU/KE/0270/2007.
2. Dandapani Goudu v. Khetrabasi Gouda, (1972) 2 Cut WR 1428; Darshan Singh v.
Kewal Krishan and Anr. AIR 2003 Raj 313, MANU/RH/0854/2002.

®
846