The Great Tradition: I.

Law and Power

Author(s): Hannah Arendt
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Social Research, Vol. 74, No. 3, Hannah Arendt's Centenary: Political and Philosophical
Perspectives, Part I (FALL 2007), pp. 713-726
Published by: The New School
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Hannah Arendt
The Great Tradition
I. Law and Power

SINCE PLATO, ALL TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE

varioustypesof government have restedon two conceptualpillars:
law and power.The differences betweenthevariousformsofgovern-
mentdependedon thedistribution ofpower,whetherone singleman
or themostdistinguished citizensor the people possessedthe power
to rule.The goodor bad natureofeach ofthesewas judgedaccording
to theroleplayedbylaw in theexerciseofpower:lawfulgovernment
was good and lawlessbad. The criterionof law, however,as a yard-
stickforgood or bad government was veryearlyreplaced,alreadyin
Aristotle'spoliticalphilosophy, bythe altogetherdifferent notionof
interest, withthe resultthatbad government becamethe exerciseof
power in the interest
of the rulers,and good government the use of
powerin theinterestofthe ruled.The typesofgovernment, enumer-
ated accordingto the powerprinciple,did not changein eithercase:
therewerealwaysthethreebasicformsofmonarchy, aristocracy,and
democracy and the corresponding threebasic perversions oftyranny,
and
oligarchy, ochlocracy(mob-rule).Still, modern politicalthought
is liableto over-emphasize and misconstrue Aristotle'sconceptionof
interest:dzênVaieudzênis notyetthe rulethat"commandsthe king"
(as CardinalRohan put it much later),but designatesthe different
concernsofthe richand the poorwithwhichthe laws oughtto deal
accordingto the principleofsuumcuique.Rule in the interestof all,
therefore, is notmuchmorethana particular interpretation ofrulein
accordancewithjustlaws.
© HannahArendt
Copyright Bluecher Trust2007
literary

social research Vol 74 : No 3 : Fall 2007 713

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 A curiousequivocality concerning therelationshipbetweenlaw
and powerhas remainedhiddenin thesewell-known clichés.Almost
all politicaltheoristswithoutnoticingit use twoaltogetherdifferent
similesin thisregard.On one side,we learnthatpowerenforceslaw
in orderto bringaboutlawfulness;on the other,thelaw is conceived
as the limitationand the boundaryof power,whichmustneverbe
overstepped. In thefirstcase,powercouldconceivably be understood
as a necessaryevil,whereasin the secondcase thisrolewouldmuch
ratherfallto thefunction ofthelaw,whichseemsto owe itsexistence
to the necessityof hedgingin an otherwisefreeand "good" force.
Followingthe traditionalcategoryof means and ends,powerin the
firstinstanceappearsas an instrument to executethe law,and in the
second instancethe law appears as an instrument to hold power in
check.One consequenceofthisequivocalunderstanding ofthe rela-
tionshipbetweenlaw and powerappears obviousat firstglance. If
poweris onlythereto enforceand executethe law, it cannotmake
muchdifference whethersuchpowerresidesin one man,or in a few
-
people,or in all ofthem.Therecan be onlyone essentialdifference
the differencebetween lawfulor constitutionalgovernmentand
lawlessor tyrannical government.
The termtyranny, therefore,fromPlato onwardwas used not
onlyfortheperversion ofone-manrule,but also indiscriminately for
anylawlessgovernment, thatis, anygovernment thatin itsdecisions
-
was boundonlybyitsownwilland desires evenifthesewerethewill
and desiresofa majority - and notalso bylawsthatcouldnotbecome
subjectto politicaldecisions.We findthelastconsequenceofthisline
ofthought inKant'sZumEwigen wherehe concludesthatinstead
Frieden,
ofdistinguishing manyformsofgovernment, one couldsaythatthere
are onlytwo,namely,constitutional or lawfulgovernment, irrespec-
tiveofwhoorhowmanypossesspower, and domination or despotism.
Alltraditional formsofgovernment are forKantformsofdomination;
theyare despoticbecause theyare distinguished in accordancewith
thepowerprinciple,and in themwhoeverpossessespowerpossesses
itas a "sovereign,"undividedamonganduncheckedbyothers.Against
monarchy, aristocracy,anddemocracy, Kantsetsconstitutional govern-

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ment,wherepoweris alwayscheckedby othersand whichhe calls
"republican," ofall othercriteria.
irrespective
Butifwe turnto the secondsimilein the relationship between
law and power,accordingto whichthe law is seen as a hedgeor wall
surrounding powerfulmen who withoutthislimitationmightabuse
theirstrength, thedifferencesbetweentraditional formsofgovernment,
betweenmonarchies, aristocracies,and democracies,becomeall impor-
tant.The questionis now whetheronlyone man,or the mostdistin-
guishedfew,orthewholepeopleshouldbe permitted to exercisepower
withinthelimitations ofthelaw.In thiscontext,it is obviouswhythe
ruleofone manshouldbe identified withtyranny or,at anyrate,be the
closestto tyranny, and whydemocracy shouldbe regardedas thebest
formofgovernment. Monarchy nowcomestomeanthatonlyonemanis
free,aristocracy thatfreedom is grantedonlytothebest,anddemocracy
alonecan be considered freegovernment. We findthelastconsequence
ofthislineofthoughtin Hegel'sphilosophy ofHistory, in whichworld
history is dividedintothreeeras:theorientaldespotism whereonlyone
wasfree,theancientGreekandRomanworldwheresomewerefree,and
finallytheChristian Occidentinwhichall arefree,becausemanas such
is free.Themoststriking aspectofthiseverrecurring equivocalityinthe
concepts of law and power is that we do notdeal heresimply withtwo
different strandsofourtradition, butthat,on thecontrary, almostall of
thegreatpoliticalthinkers use bothsimilesindiscriminately.

I HAVE ENUMERATED THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE WAY THEY Were

formulated and definedin thetradition, whosefoundation was estab-
lishednotthrough historical
curiosity aboutthemanifold waysoflifeof
different
peoples,butthrough Plato'ssearchforthebestformofgovern-
ment,a searchthatsprangfromandalwaysimpliedhisnegativeattitude
totheAtheniancity-state.
Eversince,thequestforthebestgovernment
has servedto conceptualizeand to transform all thosepoliticalexperi-
encesthatfoundtheirhomein thetradition ofpoliticalthought, which
nowhereelse perhapsshowsitscomprehensiveness moreimpressively
thanin theastounding factthatnota singlenovelformofgovernment
has been added for2,500years.Neitherthe RomanRepublicnorthe

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RomanEmpire,neitherthe medievalkingshipnorthe emergenceof
thenation-state was feltto warranta revisionor additionto whatwas
alreadyfamiliar to Plato.Surprisingly enoughin viewofitstremendous
consequences, thedistinction betweenrulingandbeingruledas a condi-
tionforall organizedsocietywas introducedby Platoin an offhand,
almostimprovisational manner,whilethe conceptoflaw assumesits
centralplaceas theverycontentofall politicallifeonlyin hislasttrea-
tise,theNomoi (Thelaws)- which,bytheway,was lostand rediscovered
onlyin thefifteenth century - and therethelawsare understood to be
thevisible,politicaltranslation oftheideasoftheRepublic.
Yet,ifin thequestforthebestgovernment thequestionoflaws
originally playeda subordinaterole,itsrolewas alwaysmajorin the
definition oftyranny as theworstformofgovernment. The reasonfor
thisearlyconstellation lies in the specificpoliticalexperienceofthe
polis,whichPlatoas well as Aristotlecould notbut takeforgranted.
The pre-philosophical Greekpoliticalexperiencehad understoodlaws
to be the boundariesmen establishbetweenthemselvesor between
cityand city.Theyhedgedin the livingspace thateach was entitled
to call his own,and theyweresacredas the stabilizersofthe human
condition, ofthechangingcircumstances and movements and actions
ofmen.Theygavestability to a community composed mortals,and
of
therefore continually endangeredin its continuity by new men born
intoit.The stability ofthelawscorresponds to theconstantmotionof
all humanaffairs, a motionthatcan neverendas longas menareborn
and die. Each newbirthendangersthecontinuity ofthepolisbecause
witheach new birth a new world potentially comes intobeing.The
lawshedgein thesenewbeginnings andguaranteethepre-existence of
a commonworld,thepermanenceofa continuity thattranscends the
individuallifespanofeach generation, and in whicheach singleman
in his mortality can hope to leave a traceofpermanencebehindhim.
In thissense,whichasserteditselfwiththeriseoftheGreekpolis,the
lawsconstitute thecommonpublicworldoutsideofwhich,according
to theGreeks,humanlifewas deprivedofitsmostessentialconcerns.
The greatadvantageofthe polis organizationofpubliclifewas
thatthepolis,becauseofthe stabilizingforceofitswall oflaw,could

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imparttohumanaffairs a soliditythathumanactionitself, in itsintrin-
sic futility and dependenceon the immortalizing praiseofpoets,can
neverpossess.Becauseit surroundeditselfwitha permanentwall of
law,thepolisas a unitycouldclaimto ensurethatwhateverhappened
or was done withinit would not perishwiththe lifeof the doer or
endurer,but live on in the memoryof futuregenerations.Its great
meritover kingship,the reasonwhy,mythologically speaking,the
Greekssaw in KingTheseus'sfounding ofAthensthelastand greatest
kinglyenterprise, was candidlyand succinctly givenbyPericles,who
praisedAthensbecauseitdidnotneeda Homerto leave,forbetterand
forworse,"innumerable monuments" ofthedeedsofitssons.
This earlymeaningof nomosis stillpresentin Plato when he
evokesZeusas theGodofboundariesat thebeginningofhisdiscourse
on TheLaws,as itwas presentin Heraclitus whenhe statedthata people
mustfightfortheirlawsas theyfightforthewall (teichos) oftheircity.
Just as a city could come into beingphysicallyonly after the inhab-
itantshad builta wall aroundit, so the politicallifeof the citizens,
politeuesthaU couldbeginonlyafterthe law had been positedand laid
down.The fenceofthelaw was neededforthecity-state becauseonly
herepeoplelivedtogether in sucha waythatspaceitselfwas no longer
a sufficient for
guarantee assuringeach ofthemhis freedomofmove-
ment.So muchwas thepositingofthelawfelttobe a conditionofpolis
lifethatlegislation,law makingitself,was not considereda political
activity: thelawmakercouldbe a mancalledinfromtheoutsideor,like
Solon,someonewho afterlayingdownthelaw retiredfrompublic-po-
liticallife,at leastfora time.So muchwas lawthoughttobe something
erectedand laid downbymenwithoutanytranscendent authority or
sourcethatpre-Socratic philosophy, whenitproposedto distinguish all
thingsbyaskingwhethertheyowe theiroriginto menor are through
themselveswhattheyare,introducedthe termsnomoand physei, by
law or bynature.Thus,the orderofthe universe,the kosmos ofnatu-
ral things,was differentiated fromtheworldofhumanaffairs, whose
orderis laid downbymensinceit is an orderofthingsmadeand done
bymen.Thisdistinction, too,survivesinthebeginning ofourtradition,
whereAristotle expressly statesthat science
political dealswiththings

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thatare nomoand notphysei. It is in thiscontextthatthe tyrantwho
razestheboundariesofthelawsdestroys thepoliticalrealmaltogether.
He is nota rulerbut a destroyer, destroying thewalls ofthe city,the
pre-political conditionofitsexistence.
Veryearly,however,and evenbeforethebeginningofourtradi-
tion, there alreadyexistedanotheraltogether different understanding
oflaw.When Pindarsays:nomobasileus we
pantôn maybe justifiedto
translatehiswords:"thelaw is therulerofall things," and understand
thisto mean thatjust as the kingholdstogetherand givesorderto
whateveris begununderhisleadership, so thelaw is an orderinherent
in theuniverseandgovernsitsmotion.Thislawis notlaiddown,is not
positedbyeithermenorgods;ifitis calleddivine,itis so onlybecause
it ruleseventhegods.Thislaw,obviously, couldnotbe conceivedas a
wall or boundaryerectedbymen.Lawsderivedfromor nourishedby
it had a validitythatwas notrestricted to one community, norto the
publicrealmas such,norgenerally to matters that happen betweenmen
as distinguished fromthosethathappenwithin men.The cosmiclaw
wasuniversalin everyrespect,applicabletoall thingsandtoeveryman
in everysituationand conditionoflife.The distinction betweenphysei
andnomo, betweenthingsthatgrownaturally andthingsthatowetheir
its
existencetomen,loses relevance, because one lawpresidesandrules
overboth.Thelaterconceptofnaturallaw,as itwas developedin Greek
Stoicism, is clearlyalreadyindicated, butforan understanding thatsaw
lawsin theimageoffencesand boundariesthathedgein,protect, and
establishthevariouscommonworldsofthepolis,theveryterm"natu-
ral law" wouldhave been a contradiction in terms,sinceit assumed
thatthingsarewhattheyareeitherbynatureorlaw,butnotboth.
Of even greaterimportanceforthe traditionis thatunderthe
assumptionthatone law rulesoverall thingsmoraland political,the
privateand thepublicrealmoflifeare no longerclearlydistinguished,
but are bothembeddedin and ruledoverbythe eternalorderofthe
universe. Menbelonginthisuniversebecause,inthewordsofKant,"the
starry heavenaboveme" corresponds in itsorderedlawfulsublimity to
"themoral law within me." This law has lost the character oflimitation
manifest in all positivelaw codesthatcontainprohibitions ratherthan

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prescriptions, and thattherefore leave everything thatis not clearly
prohibited to the freedecisionofthosewho are subjectto them.The
conflictbetweenprivateand publicmorality, betweenthingspermit-
tedand demandedin personalintercourse and thosethatare required
bythenecessitiesofpolitics,whichnaturally arisesfromthe assump-
tionofa universallaw,couldbe decidedeitherway:in conformity with
thenecessities ofpoliticallifeat theexpenseofprivatemorality - as for
instancein Hobbeswho,starting fromthepublic-political realmwhere
poweroriginates, concludesthatthenatureofmanis thatofa "power
thirsty -
animal" or,on thecontrary, in conformity withthebehaviorof
eachmaninhisindividual privacy,as intheinstanceofKant,wherethe
lawwithinme elevatesme intoa universallegislator. In eithercase,the
universality ofone law is saved:thosewho obeyand submitmeeklyto
thelawsofpowerarebynaturepowerthirsty; thosewhoobeythelaws
ofthecityrecognizein themselves thenatureofmorallawfulness.
However,throughout our traditionthe distinction betweenthe
cosmiclaw in itsuniversal validityand the rules and prescriptionsvalid
onlyamonga clearlydefinedgroupofmenwas keptand theirrelation-
shipseen moreor less in the imagethatwe findforthe firsttimein
Heraclitus: "Allhumanlawsarenourished bytheone divinelaw;forthis
holdsswayas faras itwill,andsuffices forall,andprevailsineverything"
(Frag.114). It is decisive
that our legal traditionalwaysheldthatpositive
manmadecodesoflawswerenotonlyderivedfrombutalso depended
upontheone universally validlaw as theirultimatesourceofauthority.
It is thissame distinction and relationship thatwe laterfindbetween
theiuscivileand theiusnaturale, betweenpositivelaw and naturallaw
or divinecommand.In each instance,theearliernotionofthelaw as a
fencesurvives inthecodesofpositedlawsthrough whichtheoneuniver-
sal lawis translated intohumanstandards ofrightandwrong.
The one universallaw,or laterthe Commandof God,is under-
stoodto be eternaland unmovableand fromthiseternity thepositive
manmadelaws derivetheirrelativepermanencethroughwhichthey
can stabilizetheeverchangingaffairs ofmen.Whathappenswhenthis
distinction betweenuniversaland positivelaw is no longerupheld-
thatis,whentheuniversallaw in the modernformofa law ofdevel-

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opment,naturalor historical,has becomea law ofmovementwhich
cannotbut constantly overridepositiveman made codes ofrulesand
prescriptions - we have seen in the totalitarian formsofdomination.
Thereterror, as thedailyexecutionofan ever-changing universallaw
ofmovement, makesall positivelaw in itsrelativepermanenceimpos-
sibleanddrivesthewholecommunity intoa floodofcatastrophes. This
danger is latent whereverthe old concept of a universallaw is deprived
of its eternityand, on the contrary, is combinedwiththe modern
conceptof developmentas the ever-progressing motionsof nature
or history. Ifone considersthisprocessfromthe pointofviewofthe
history ofideas one can easily,albeitfallaciously, cometo the conclu-
sionthattotalitarian dominationis notso mucha breakwithall tradi-
tionsofWesternmanas theoutgrowth ofa philosophical"heresy"that
culminatedin Hegel and was practically appliedby Darwinor Marx,
whomEngelscalledtheDarwinofhistory.
The idea ofone universallaw remainedmoreor less a concern
ofthephilosophers whilethejurists,eventhoughtheyagreedon the
necessity ofan ultimate(andeventranscendent) authority to givetheir
lawslegitimacy, continuedto thinkoflawsas boundariesand relations
betweenpeople.Thisdifference is verymarkedin thetwofoldoriginof
naturallaw thatalso and independently developedfromtheRomanius
gentium, a lawerectedbetweendifferent peopleswhosecitiesprescribed
different civil laws. Here,the naturallaw is neitherunderstoodto
springfromand operatewithineach humanbeingnorto presidefrom
aboveand rulesupremeoverall happeningsin theuniverse, butas the
specificchannelsofcommunication and intercourse thatare necessary
betweencityand city,betweenone legalcodeand another - unlessone
citywants,in Greekfashion,to liveisolatedagainstordestroy another.
TheRomaninfluenceremainedstrongin thestrictly legaltradition; in
thephilosophical of
tradition politicalthought, it remained as uninflu-
entialas otherRomanexperiences.
The standardsofrightand wrongas theyare laid downin posi-
tivelaw have,as itwere,twoaspects:theyare absoluteinsofaras they
owe theirexistenceto a universally validlaw,beyondthe powerand
the competenceofman;buttheyare also mereconventions, relative

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to one people and validwithinlimitations, insofaras theyhave been
positedand framedby men.Withoutthe first,the universallyvalid
law would remainwithoutrealityin the worldof men; withoutthe
second,the laws and regulationslaid downby men would lack their
ultimatesourceofauthority and legitimation.Becauseofthisrelation-
ship and itstwofold the
aspect, specificlegalityofgovernment, which
historically is characteristic onlyforthepolisand thevariousrepubli-
can formsthatarederivedfromtheit,couldbecome,in theframework
ofthetradition, themainstayofall bodiespolitic.Enforcement oflaw
finallyis seenas thechiefdutyofgovernment and lawfulgovernment
is consideredgood no matterhow manypeople or how fewsharein
and enjoythepossessionofpower.Attheend ofthistradition, we find
Kant'spoliticalphilosophy, wheretheconceptoflaw has absorbedall
others.Herethe law has becomethe criterion forthewholerealmof
politicsto thedetriment ofall otherpoliticalexperiencesand possibili-
ties.Lawfulness is theonlylegitimate contentofhumanlivingtogether
and all politicalactivity is ultimately devisedas legislationor applica-
tionoflegalprescriptions.
We havesketchedthismuchlaterdevelopment in orderto arrive
as thoughthrough a short-circuitat a positionwhereruleand law actu-
allycoincide; where constitutionalgovernment is no longerone among
variouspossibilities toruleandactwithintheframework ofthelaw,but
a government wherethelawsthemselves ruleandtheruleronlyadmin-
istersandobeysthelaws.Thisis thelogicalconclusionofthelaststageof
Plato'spoliticalthought as we knowitfromtheNomoi.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS SEEMED NECESSARY FOR AN UNDERSTANDING

ofthelastthinkerwho,stillin thelineofthegreattradition, inquired
intothenatureofpoliticsand askedtheold questionsaboutthediffer-
entformsofgovernment. Montesquieu,whosefamerestssecurelyin
thediscovery ofthethreebranchesofgovernment, thelegislative,the
executive, -
and thejudiciary thatis,in thegreatdiscoverythatpower
-
is notindivisible was a politicalwritermuchratherthana systematic
thinker.Thisenabledhimto touchfreelyon and reformulate almost
the of as
unintentionally greatproblems politicalthought theyhad

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comedownto him,withoutencumbering his newinsightsbymaking
one workingwholeofthem,and withoutdisturbing theinnerconsis-
tencyofhisthoughtwithulteriormotivesofpresentation. Hisinsights
are in substancemuch more "revolutionary" and at the same time
moreenduringly positivethanthoseofRousseau,whois hisonlyequal
in the weightof sheerimmediateimpacton the eighteenth-century
revolutions and ofintellectual influenceon thepoliticalphilosophy of
the nineteenthcentury. His lack of systematic concern,on the other
hand,and theloose organization ofhis materialhavemade it deplor-
ablyeasyto neglectboththeinnerconsistency ofhiswidelyscattered
thoughts and thedistinct unity ofhis approach all politicalmatters,
to
whichseparateshimonlyslightly less fromhis successorsthanfrom
hispredecessors.
Hidden beneath the discoveryof three branchesof govern-
ment(whichonlyKantrightly understoodas the decisivecriterion of
trulyrepublicangovernment and which only in the constitutionof
theAmericanRepublicfoundan adequaterealization)lies a visionof
politicallifein whichpoweris completely separatedfromall connota-
tionsofviolence.Montesquieualone had a conceptofpowerthatlay
absolutelyoutsideofthetraditional categoryofmeansand ends.The
threebranchesofgovernment represent forhimthethreemainpoliti-
cal activitiesofmen:the makingoflaws,the executingofdecisions,
and the decidingjudgmentthatmustaccompanyboth.Each ofthese
activitiesengendersits own power.Powercan be divided- between
thebranchesofgovernment as well as betweenfederatedstatesand
betweenstate and federal governments - because it is not oneinstru-
mentto be appliedto onegoal.Itsoriginslie in themultiplecapacities
ofmenforaction;theseactionshaveno endas longas thebodypolitic
is alive;theirimmediatepurposesare prescribed bytheever-changing
circumstances of human and politicallife, which by themselvesand
becausetheyoccurwithindefinedcommunities or givencivilizations
constitute a realmofpublicaffairs arisingbetweencitizensas individu-
als,bindingtogether or separating themas sharedor conflicting inter-
ests.Interests in thiscontext have no connotation ofmaterial needs or
greeds,butconstitute quiteliterally theinter-esse,thatwhichis between

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men.Thisin-between, commonto all and therefore ofconcernto each,
is thespacein whichpoliticallifetakesplace.
Montesquieu'sdiscoveryofboththe divisiblenatureof power
and thethreebranchesofgovernment sprangfromhispreoccupation
withthephenomenonofactionas thecentraldataofthewholerealm
ofpolitics.His own inquiriesled himto make a distinction between
the natureofgovernment, "cequilefaitêtretel,"and its principle,"ce
quilefaitagir"(L'EspritdesLois,Bookiii,chap.I). He definedthenature
ofgovernment in onlyslightly changedterms - he neglectsthe form
ofaristocracy and statesthata republicis constitutional government
withsovereignpowerin thehandsofthepeople,a monarchy a lawful
government with sovereignpower in the hands of one man, and
tyranny a lawlessrulewherepoweris wieldedbyone manaccordingto
hisarbitrary will.Hismoreprofound discovery is hisinsightthatthese
"particularstructures" need each a different "principle"to set them
intomotion,or in otherwords,thatthese structures in themselves
are dead and do notcorrespond to therealitiesofpoliticallifeand the
experiences ofactingmen.Asa principleofmotion,Montesquieuintro-
ducedhistory and historicalprocessintostructures that- owingtheir
existenceto Greekthought - had originally been conceivedas immo-
bile. Or rather,priorto Montesquieu,the onlypossibilityof change
hadbeenthoughtofas changefortheworse,thechangeofperversion
thatcould transform an aristocracyinto an oligarchy,a democracy
intoan ochlocracy, or a monarchyintotyranny. Thereare of course
manymorepossibilities ofsuchperversions; itwas,forinstance,noted
veryearlythatmajority rulealso has a particularinclinationto end in
tyranny. to
Compared Montesquieu'sprincipleofactionas thedriving
motorofchange,all suchperversions are ofa physical,almostorganic
nature.Plato'sfamouspredictionthateven the bestpossiblegovern-
mentcouldnotlast forever, and his accountingofits eventualdoom
through some inevitable mistakes in thechoiceofsuitableparentsfor
a desirableoffspring, is onlythemostplausibleexamplefora mental-
itythatcouldconceiveofchangeonlyin termsofruin.Montesquieu,
on the contrary, recognizedmotionas the veryconditionof history,
precisely because he understoodthatactionis the essentialfactorof

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all politicallife.Actiondoes notmerelybelongto governments,does
not onlyshow itselfin the recordeddeeds of nations,and is never
exhaustedin the processof rulingand beingruled:"Onjugemaldes
choses.Üy a souventautantde politiqueemployée pourobtenirun petitbéné-
ficeque pour obtenirla papauté" ("De la Politique"in Mélangesinéditesde
Montesquieu, 1892.) He recognizeswiththe traditionthe permanent
characterofgoodgovernment foundedon lawfulness; buthe sees this
structure of laws onlyas the framework withinwhichpeople move
and act,as the stabilizingfactorofsomething whichbyitselfis alive
andmovingwithoutnecessarily developingintoa prescribed direction
ofeitherdoomor progress.He therefore does notonlytalkaboutthe
natureor essence,butalso aboutthe structure ofgovernment as that
whichin relativepermanenceharborsthe changingcircumstances
and actionsofmortalmen.
Correspondingto his three chief forms of government,
Montesquieudistinguishes threeprinciples "whichmakea community
act":these are virtuein a republic, honor in a monarchy, and fearin
a tyranny. Theseprinciplesare notthe same as psychological motives.
Theyare ratherthe criteriaaccordingto whichall publicactionsare
judgedandwhicharticulate thewholeofpoliticallife.As such,theyare
thesameforbothgovernments and citizens,forrulersand subjects.If
theprinciple of fearinspires all actionsin a tyranny,thismeansthatthe
tyrant actsbecausehe fearshissubjectsandtheoppressedbecausethey
fearthetyrant. Justas itis theprideofa subjectin a monarchy to distin-
guishhimself andbe publicly honored, so itis theprideofthecitizenina
republic nottobe greater inpublicmatters thanhisfellow-citizens, which
is his"virtue."Fromthisitdoesnotfollowthatthecitizensofa republic
do notknowwhathonoris,or thatthesubjectsofa monarchy are not
"virtuous,"northatallpeoplehaveatalltimestobehaveaccording tothe
rulesofthegovernment underwhichtheyhappen to live.
It only means
thatthesphereofpubliclifeis alwaysdetermined by certain rulesthat
aretakenforgranted byallwhoact,andthattheserulesarenotthesame
forall formsofpoliticalbodies.Iftheserulesare no longervalid,ifthe
principlesofactionlosetheirauthority so thatno oneanylongerbelieves
in virtuein a republic,or in honorin a monarchy, or if,in a tyranny,

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thetyrant ceasesto fearhissubjects,orthesubjectsno longerfeartheir
oppressor, theneachoftheformsofgovernment comestoitsend.
BeneathMontesquieu's unsystematic and sometimesevencasual
observationsabout the relationshipbetweenthe natureof govern-
mentsand theirprinciplesofactionlies an even deeperinsightinto
the essentialsof unityin historicallygivencivilizations.His "esprit
generaris whatunitesthestructure ofgovernment withitscorrespond-
ingprincipleofaction.As such,it laterbecamethe inspiringidea of
the historicalsciencesas well as the philosophyof history.Herder's
"spiritof the people" (Voïksgeist) and Hegel's "world-spirit" (Weltgeist)
showcleartracesofthisancestry. Montesquieu'soriginaldiscovery is
less metaphysical thaneitherofthose,and perhapsmorefruitful for
thepoliticalsciences.Writingin the midstofthe eighteenth century,
he was stillblissfully unawareof "worldhistory," whichone hundred
yearslater- in Hegel'sphilosophyand also in theworkofthe leading
historians - will have arrogatedto itselfthe businessof worldjudg-
ment:"DieWeltgeschichte istdasWeltgericht" His generalunifying spirit
is firstof all a basic experienceof men livingand actingtogether,
whichexpressesitselfsimultaneously in the laws ofa countryand in
theactionsofmenlivingunderthislaw.Virtuein thissenseis based
on "loveofequality"and honoris based on "loveofdistinction." The
laws of a republicare based on equality,and love of equalityis the
sourcefromwhichtheactionsofitscitizensspring;monarchicallaws
arebasedon distinction, so thatloveofdistinctions inspiresthepublic
actionsofthecitizenry.
Bothdistinction and equalityare basicexperiencesofall human
communallife.We can say withequal validitythatmen are distin-
guishedand different fromeach otherbybirthand thatall men are
"bornequal" and are distinguished bysocialstatusonly.Equality, inso-
faras it is a politicalexperience - as distinguished fromthe equality
beforeGod,an infinitely superiorbeing before whom all distinctions
and differences -
becomenegligible has alwaysmeantthat,regardless
of existingdifferences, everyoneis of equal value because each one
receivedbynaturean equal amountofstrength. Thefundamental expe-
rienceupon whichrepublicanlaws are foundedand fromwhichthe

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actionsofcitizensspringis theexperienceoflivingtogether with,and
being members a of
of, group equallypowerful men. Laws in a repub-
lic,therefore, are not laws of distinctionbut of restriction; theyare
designedtorestrict thestrength ofeachcitizenso thatroommaybe left
forthestrength ofhisfellowcitizens.The commongroundofrepubli-
can law and actionwithinit is theinsightthathumanstrength is not
primarily limited by some superiorpower - God or -
nature but bythe
powerofequals,and thejoythatspringsfromit.Virtueas loveofequal-
ityspringsfromthisexperienceofequalityofpowerthataloneguards
menagainstthedreadofloneliness."Oneis one and all aloneand ever
moreshallbe so,"as theold Englishnursery rhymedaresto indicateto
human minds what can only be the supremetragedy ofGod.
Distinction, on whichmonarchies(and all hierarchical formsof
government) are based,is no less an authenticand originalpolitical
experience.Onlythroughdistinction can I becometrulymyself, this
one,uniqueindividualthatneverwas beforeand neverwillbe again.
I can establishthisuniquenessonlyby measuringmyselfagainstall
othersso thatmyrole in publicaffairswill ultimatelydependupon
the extentto whichI can win recognitionfromthem.It is the great
advantageofmonarchical government whohavetheir
thatindividuals,
socialand politicalstatusaccordingto thedistinction theywinwithin
theirrespective walks of life,are never confronted withan undistin-
guishedand undistinguishable massof"all others,"againstwhichthe
singleman can summonup nothingbut a desperateminority ofone.
It is the specificdangerofgovernments based on equalitythatwithin
thestructure -
oflawfulness inwhoseframework theequalityofpower
receivesitsmeaning,direction, - thepowersofequals
and restriction
can cancel each otherout untilthe exhaustionof impotencemakes
everyonereadyto accepta tyrannical government. Forgood reasons,
Montesquieu failedto indicatethecommonground thestructure
for of
lawlessnessand fearas theprincipleofactionsin tyrannies.

- Tobe continued
inthenextissueofSodai Research.

726 social research

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