Republic of the Philippines stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents.
SUPREME COURT The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C.
TOLENTINO, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding
Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City:
HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan
Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and
mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners
will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-
ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the
year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in
Criminal Case No. 
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still
at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO
were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the
intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The
beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an
allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In
their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search
was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno
of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon.
Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City,
determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after
almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a
"suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE
has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be
stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No.
80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos
Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application
in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Paño.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A
Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Paño but
only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The
latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the
premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the
CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support
money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the
following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was
arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of
arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written
materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden
boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in the presence of Dra.
Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay
Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The
list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was
signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE,
NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City
Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by
the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of
Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos,
presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be
charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in
the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be
allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in
connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila
Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to
comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on
October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence
obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended
Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to
disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in
the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431
items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos
denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the
validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge
Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to
annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent
RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of
respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to
Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the respondents or their duly authorized
representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search
Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void
because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe
with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and
that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The
respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend
otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in
this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal
of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities
to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic
Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and
instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and
support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion.
There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what
items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken
also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized.
In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.
Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines.
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent
judge were described as 'subversive documents, propaganda
materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive
materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the
search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized thereunder.
Said description is no different from if not worse than, the
description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the
Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too
general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge
allowed the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of
whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the
witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed
by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you
affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)—
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the
application for search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were
so many suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New
People's Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National
Democratic Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings,
Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available
to the public and support money from foreign and local sources. 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge
to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance
of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as
will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to
Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The
6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be
seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers
from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning
the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it
instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records
show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact,
they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained
under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation on
August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they
filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially,
therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners
had questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS
CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a
Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a
criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a
result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the
Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal
case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and
although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search
warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the
case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made
without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court,
explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the
search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search
without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the
individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6,
1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby
annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant
to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby
made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in
Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military
commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque
objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to
her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and
Patajo concur.
Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.
Aquino, J.; took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.
 

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion,

which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest
has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was
arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the
search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we
are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible
effective results in the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by

CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case,
leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask
Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles.
 G.R. No. 138881               December 18, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  Upon
vs.
LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
1  incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side,
This is an appeal from the decision, dated May 14, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accused-
appellant Leila Johnson y Reyesguilty of violation of §16 of R.A. No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of ₱500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, each bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams,
respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty,3 whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic
Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, duty frisker Olivia
Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented accused-
appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the
California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been
working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and
those with Alzheimer’s disease, in convalescent homes in the United
States.4
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s
family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine
Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next
day, June 26, 1998.5
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a
lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to
frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and
explosives.6
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-
912, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an
ectopic pregnancy.7
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to
her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako
naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." ("Sir, I do not believe that it is just
a panty.") She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest
women’s room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the
rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed
outside.8
Inside the women’s room, accused-appellant was asked again by
Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accused-
appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez
then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Accused-
appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then
turned over to Embile, outside the women’s room. 9
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3,
contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by
NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shabu."10
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st
Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area
of the NAIA, where accused-appellant’s passport and ticket were
taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized.11
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in
line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile
and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken
to the women’s room. There, she was asked to undress and was then
subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on
her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage,
and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and
some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to
her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a
certain Col. Castillo.12
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security
guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told
her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge
and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO
office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal
for inquest.13 She claimed that throughout the period of her
detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never
allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S.
Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. 14
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:15
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended
and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net
weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits "G", "C-2" and "C-3") are hereby
confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court
is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at
the City Jail of Pasay City during the pendency of this case provided
that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1)
"despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative allegation
in the information;" (2) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving
the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride;" (3) "despite
violation of her constitutional rights;" and (4) "when guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt."16
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained
in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the
"shabu" confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she
was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was
detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel
and without having been informed of her constitutional rights.
Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu,"
should have been excluded from the evidence. 17
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from
accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence against
her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellant’s invocation
of Art. III, §12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this
case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made
on her person.
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was
never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested
without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175
SCRA 230 as "the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is
trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls
in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the
allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is
far from being accurate.18
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the
routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 19 Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. 20 Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in
her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits
C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been obtained while she was in the
custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel,
the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records
is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her
signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and
Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were
presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-
appellant’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal
effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as
are the girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126,
§2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search
and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. 3/4 A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should
be returned to her.
Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully
ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify
the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of
The Proceeds or Instrument Of The Crime – The penalties for offenses
under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;
6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements as determined and promulgated by
the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for her possession of
580.2 grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative
and a qualitative examination of the substance contained in Exhibits
C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted by the
NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded
positive findings for shabu, but failed to establish its purity; hence,
its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted
would have indicated the presence of impurities if there were any. He
testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any
adulterants or impurities, it will be discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a
thin layer chromatographic examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr.
Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears
one spot which resembles or the same as the Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride sample
....
PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants
present in the chemicals you have examined, in chemical
examination, what color it will register, if any?
WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it
will not react with the reagent, therefore it will not dissolve. In my
examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir.
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in
layman’s term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas.
....
COURT In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or
tawas in the specimen?
WITNESS None, your Honor.
....
ATTY. AGOOT I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams of tawas,
you will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your
findings, negative or positive, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
ATTY. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.
WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate. 21
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material,
whereas a quantitative analysis requires the determination of the
percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a
qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the presence of
heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative analysis
may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent
quinine.22
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine
the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. Chromatography is a
means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a
mixture. It is particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent
specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. For example,
illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any
material that is at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the
quantity of the product that is made available to prospective
customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation
would be an arduous one without the aid of chromatographic
methods to first separate the mixture into its components. 23
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were
thorough, but also that the scientifically correct method of obtaining
an accurate representative sample had been obtained. 24 At any rate,
as the Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was
not satisfied with the results, it would have been a simple matter for
her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by
another chemist. This she did not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove
the negative allegation in the information that she did not have a
license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu."
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.  - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.1âwphi1
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu,"a regulated drug, is not
unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required
license or prescription. She points out that since the prosecution
failed to present any certification that she is not authorized to
possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the
quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United
States v. Chan Toco.25 The accused in that case was charged with
smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the
information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of
opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and
practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to
penalize generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. But the
legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a
limited class of smokers who smoked under the advice and by
prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence where
one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the Opium
Law, it is more logical as well as more practical and convenient, if he
did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he
should set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution
should be called upon to prove that every smoker, charged with a
violation of the law, does so without such advice or prescription.
Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any person may, in
case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a physician to
use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of things
no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to
be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and
absurd to impose on the prosecution the burden of alleging and
proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of a
physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a particular case,
that one using opium does so without the advice or prescription of a
physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without
the aid of the defendant himself, while a defendant charged with the
illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact
that he used it under the advice and on the prescription of a
physician, if in fact he did so.26
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the
State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the
State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he
owes to himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do, he
has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is
nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended,
which requires the prosecution to present a certification that
accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere
possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a
license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding
that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects
prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers.1âwphi1 When police not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered
officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts returned to her.
are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence
has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of SO ORDERED.
the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
accords great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter
concur.
of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or
arbitrariness in its findings.27

It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no

other witness was presented in her behalf. Her denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 28 As has
been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly
when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The
defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed
by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and
is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.29

The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that
a person may be validly charged with and convicted of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, have been complied with by the prosecution in this case.
The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.

As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that
courts may fix any amount within the limits established by
law.30 Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams of
shabu were confiscated from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by
the trial court may properly be reduced to ₱50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,

Branch 110, finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of §16 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to ₱50,000.00.
Costs against appellant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123872 January 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a
vs.
RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula alias "Joy," was
charged on August 22, 1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, of Dasmariñas, Cavite in an information which alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran,
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver
twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are
considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A.
6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public interest. 1
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994
elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant who was assisted therein
by his counsel de parte.2 Trial was held on scheduled dates
thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the
trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme
penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in
the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 3
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was
apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting
shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas, Cavite by SPO1
Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of
the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in
Dasmariñas. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught
carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an
informer in the arrest of appellant. That informer, according to
Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June
19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said
informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay
Salitran, Dasmariñas from Baguio City with an undetermined
amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to
the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a
passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place. 4
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the
prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial that while he indeed
came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmariñas, Cavite
with only some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole
purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier
offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after
which he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing
so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at
Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in
Dasmariñas, Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional
rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with
him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony
about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly
worked as a supervisor,5 although, as the trial court observed, she
never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's
finding that he was legally caught in flagrante transporting the
prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive
review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the
factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of
the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to
whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's
fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in
convicting him on the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was
proffered showing that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana
leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged
transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian
informant is supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside
from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality in the
operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting
testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by
them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of
Article II thereof, as amended, is as follows:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, some of the various modes of commission 6 being the sale,
administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of
said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive
scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by
including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions," Section 4
could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified
therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering,
delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or
transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section
4, the transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant
being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana.
The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be
committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an
indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been
committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as
allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the
offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and
the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness. 7 In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced
evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from
Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit
drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of
the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the
civilian informer should have been produced in court considering
that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential
in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional
right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him
These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from
compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the
non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and
cannot be faulted as error.
For one the testimony of said informer would have been, at best,
merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and
SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay
as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken
part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with
by the prosecution,8 more so where what he would have corroborated
are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties
regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants
are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their
identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police.9 Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in
court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that
course.10 Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the
coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear
before the court below,11 but which remedy was not availed of by
him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in
the course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls
the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the
preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already
been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending
arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the
opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance
should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the
marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn.
Once again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule
that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.12 Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however,
an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; 13 (2)
searches of moving vehicles, 14 (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view;15 (4) consented searches;16 (5) searches incidental to a
lawful arrest;17 and (6) "stop and frisk" measures 18 have been
invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed
by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that there would
be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming
from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even
assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would
be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information
relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of
the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an
indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not
reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact
name of the subject of the warrant applied for, there is the additional
problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would
be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there
would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time
of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container
or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the
same were arriving together with, or were begin brought by someone
separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have
properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have
access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could
make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no
evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity
for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling
but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be
considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a
surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry
points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding
the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their
leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around
the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and
the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up,
and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is
not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting
recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations.
Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and
passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal,
and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from
a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as
it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of
justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement
agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the
physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically
viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial
chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted
on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the
search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the
illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to
a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Under the provision, a peace officers or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and
seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 19 On the other
hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable
cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section
5(a).20 These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on
persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that
probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of
which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is
understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe
and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.21
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the
evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges and,
correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence
required  prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or
quantum,22 and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to
"probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which
we derived the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to
merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts
warranting the proceedings complained of,23 or an apparent state of
facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a
reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused
person had committed the crime.24
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified
and set aright, at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985
amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is
such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable
guilt thereof.25 It has the same meaning as the related phraseology
used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, the investigating fiscal
"finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable
cause exists."26 It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the
right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the
passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that
their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed.
SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box
which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized
that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly
innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly,
they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and
requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling
bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory
inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so,
without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant
and his luggage to their headquarter for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a
traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest
suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But,
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being
illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and
concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume,
and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by
their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in
appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not
downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable
to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the
quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure
that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of
probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in
the minds of the officers a well grounded and reasonable belief that
appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally
transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is
ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his
arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant
were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne
out by the evidence. To repeat, when the officers approached
appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him
about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they
contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the
traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all
likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his
criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
other rights, be waived either expressly or impliedly. 27 Thus, while it
has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless
search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a
demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the
law,28 the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself
opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which
acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. 29
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to "legally, properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of
marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed,
the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks
seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It
should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below
and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana
together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same
were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated
evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the
marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which
subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken
from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in
evidence, satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than
those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1
Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who categorically related that when they
had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant
appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had
come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus
confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other
conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had
transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City.
Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the
crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being
indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited
drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police
authorities, claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with
anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities
here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No.
743830 which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or
under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting,
detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding
penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the
proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be struck down.
Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his
custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the
nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was
elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in
evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was
clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and
admitted in evidence in the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the
penalty of death on appellant. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter
alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or
marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of
prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present
case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the
rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law,
hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in
which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper
imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a
quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity
of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20,
the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the
amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion
may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code,31 the rules wherein were observed although
the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity
provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a
specific penalty where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form
as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby,
regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. 32While the minority or the death of the
victim will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not
constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply
provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if
the offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that
situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in Article
63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a
minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic
rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
of the Dasmariñas, Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby
MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y
Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other
respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Francisco and Martinez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous
vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his
acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
66, finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal
authority, the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride,
in violation of Section 15, 1 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further
amended by R.A. No. 7659, 2 and sentencing him to "die by lethal
injection." In view thereof, the judgement was brought to this Court
for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter
ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According
to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily
used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao
shores. CID and six of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1
Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to
Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. CID then
observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was
routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing
with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions
thirty meters from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the
male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road.
in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the
man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon
seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man
from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced
themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking
in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem
not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano,
but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed "sign
language;" he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag.
This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the
request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then
gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to
proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the
latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the
shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial
features of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then
"recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response
from the man, CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who
spoke Chinese to act as an enterpreter. In the meantime, BADUA
opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substance which he and CID
suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally
arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional
rights." The police authorities were satisfied that the man and the
interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty
as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the
man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and
merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for
laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the
Bacnotan Police Station.
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police, Region
I, received a letter request 3 from CID — incidentally her husband —
to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic
packets placed inside a multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry
Report No. D-025-95, 4 she stated that her qualitative examination
established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos,
to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the
case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, La Union,
that the facts of the case could support an indictment for illegal
transport of a regulated drug, the information was subsequently
amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride
(shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to transport the
same" in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended
by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not
guilty. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended
information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking
interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a
Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of
Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that
interpreters were assigned to CHUA.
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to
establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from
the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn,
was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her
chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets
weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure,
unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also
explained that they were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter
Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed
in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was
instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board
the latter's 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port,
Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their
destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with
two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG
then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them
authority to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the
Philippines and reached Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At
around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small speedboat with the
two bags RONG brought with him from China. While, sailing, RONG
made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard
RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see
the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the person on shore
could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five
hours more when finally, low on fuel and telephone battery, they
decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the
bags to shore. The tasks completed, RONG left to look for a telephone
while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from
one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was
missing much to RONG's dismay when he learned of it. When a
crowd started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then
realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The police immediately
approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures
and hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where he
was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer
who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor
engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him,
opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed
them as methaphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth.
He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his
"constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel.
Consequently, his arrest was tainted with illegality and the
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been
regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID
never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at
Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from
running away, as such thought failed to make an impression in his
mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the
contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone exercised
dominion over the same.
Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member,
recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with
the police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also
remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that
CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had
chased the latter's car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd
became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police
headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation — he
opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a
forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of
the bag, and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter.
Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy taking
pictures to document the event.
Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of
Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the
beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a
bag situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local
police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and
PARONG at the beach but not CID.
In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that
the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that
CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride
without legal authority to do so. Invoking People v. Tagliben5 as
authority, the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid
in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also
noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, considering the language barrier and
the observation that such irregularity was "rectified when accused
was duly arraigned and . . . (afterwards) participated in the trial of
this case." The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
these referred to minor details which did not impair the credibility of
the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the testimonies
thus delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged
employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal
trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several other
members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit
traffic. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive
portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and
established by convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused
had conspired and acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to
mention Chen Ho Fa, the Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in
coming to the Country from China and Taiwan, this Court finds the
accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659 as charged in the Information, and
considering the provisions of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the
maximum penalty shall be imposed if the quantity
sold/possessed/transported is "200 grams or more" in the case of
Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity involved in this
case is 28.7 kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling
specified in said Act, coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that
accused is a member of an organized syndicated crime group, this
Court, having no other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty
to accused, this Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho
San @ Tsay Ho San to die by lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to pay the costs.
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the
Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating
Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity,
who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to
determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape
of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who
approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan,
La Union, and attempted to take the remaining bag from accused, as
well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this Court a
copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show
compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine Hydrochloride or
Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for destruction in accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government and to be turned over to the
Philippine National Police, La Union Command, for use in their
Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal seaborne activities.
SO ORDERED. 6
Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as
competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2)
granting weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on material points; and in
(3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized syndicate
in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged
in the information.
The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting
that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of
search and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately
preceding to and comtemporaneous with the search necessitated and
validated the police action; and (2) that there was an effective and
valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures since he consented to the search.
We reverse the RTC.
Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home
and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.7 Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceedings.8
The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and
seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable
search in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved.9 Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to
a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by
virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with
the procedure outlined on the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court; "otherwise such search and seizure become
"unreasonable" within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision."10 This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence11in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or
consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), 12 and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuan to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests  in
flagrante delicto,  (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners. 13
This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless
arrest, search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at
bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
Expectedly and quite understandably, the prosecution and the
defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident. But this
Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched
without the benefit of a warrant.
In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts 14 or as
recent case law15adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.16 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. 17 In People v. Montilla,18 the Court
acknowledged that "the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing
criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest,
has been reduced and liberalized." Noting that the previous statutory
and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence"
and that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause, the
Court explained:
[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring
to prima facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set
aright, at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985
amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is
such evidence as suffices to "engender as well founded belief" as to
the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent's
probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related
phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the
investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or
where "a probable cause exists." It should, therefore, be in that
sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be
considered as legally authorized." (emphasis supplied) 19
Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts
on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's
participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred
police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never
took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its
decision on the finding that was "accused was caught red-handed
carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended." In short, there is
no probable cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed
with the lower court's finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused
was acting suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant
that accused was transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of
the situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers
from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the
Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm
and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he
lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's suspicious
behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities,
and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate
his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable
cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the
pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same,21 suspicious demeanor
behavior   and suspicious bulge in the waist 23 — accepted by this
22
Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case.
There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark
at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore
bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee,
ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to
any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him. This
cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim, thus:
Q: How far were you when the accused put the bag on his sholder?
A: We were then very near him about three meters away from the
male person carrying the bag.
Q: To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his
shoulder?
A: To the east direction.
Q: In relation to you, where were you.
A: With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached
the accused and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in
Tagalong, English and Ilocano which accused did not understand
because he did not respond.
Q: When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that
time?
A: He was walking.
Q: To what direction he was walking?
A: He was walking to the east direction. (sic)
Q: He was walking away from you or going near you?
or A: He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the
right arm of the accused.
Q: Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?
A: Yes sir and he stopped.24
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not
obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception
and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking
casually towards the road, and CHUA carrying a multicolored
strawbag. These acts did not convey any impression that he illegally
entered Philippine shores. Neither were these overt manifestations of
an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA's criminal behevior as
clearly established in CID's testimony, thus:
Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced
yourselves:
A No, sir.
Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused
because he was not doing anything wrong?
A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever or
whatever assistance that we can give we will give. 25
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an
arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be
effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used
in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the
area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of
a weapon or evidence he can destroy, 26 a valid arrest must precede
the search. The process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In
this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 27
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court 28 as already shown. Fom
all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It is
worth mentioning here that after introducing themselves, the police
officcers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. What
else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate
interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony
had indeed been committed by CHUA — in effect to "retroactively
establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure."
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a
consented search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 29 CHUA never
exhibited that he knew, actually or constructively of his right against
unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same.
This can be inferred from the manner by which the search
performed, thus:
Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing that
you did when you approached him (CHUA)?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.
Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?
A That is normal practice in our part, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves what
did you do?
A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word,
Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?
A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir.
Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to
open his bag?
A No, sir, there is no answer.
Q No answer?
A Yes, sir, no answer.
Q And when there was no answer what did you do next?
A I used sign language sir.
Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you
demonstrated that sign language of opening the bag mr. (sic)
witness?
A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this
sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
SHERIFF:
The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and
then manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving
his right hand from left to right or from the opening to the end of the
zipper.
COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end
of the zipper.
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.
(The witness repeating the motion described on record.)
COURT: Did you open that personally?
WITNESS:
A No, your honor.
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open
the bag?
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir.
Q Why, why was it — no, I reform my question your honor. Is it
normal procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody
to open his bag?
A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect
the baggage, it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir.
Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to
open his bag?
A yes, sir.
Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to open
his bag?
A No, sir.
Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?
A Yes, sir.30
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and
overwhelmed him. The police officers already introduced themselves
to CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan.
The police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the
three languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the police's
request to open the bag, they resorted to what they called "sign
language." They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand
motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not
understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he
understand the police's "sign language." More importantly, it cannot
logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign
language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived
his right against such an intrusive search. This Court is not
unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless
searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request
to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and
in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused
even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also
understood the nature and consequences of such request. 31
It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated
subtance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an
illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial
information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the
fruit of a poisonous trees32 how much more of "forbidden fruits"
which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as
in this case — because the police admitted that they never harbored
any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as
evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble
and ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction.
Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported
methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded, as overzealous police
officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the Constitution and the
rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise
their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have
blundered. "There are those who say that . . . 'the criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.'. . . In some cases this will
undoubtedly be the result. But . . . 'there is another consideration —
the imperative of judicial integrity . . . The criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 33

As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the

posecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer
to insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case.
On a passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court
regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating
circumstance is without question unsupported by the records.
Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the
pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. It is also fundamental
that conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal
accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt. 34

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No.
4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged, the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing,

Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Santiago, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Panganiban., on leave.