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usually limited. The RCM group should therefore be sober determine if there are failure causes that may affect that
with respect to what to look into, realizing that analysis cost particular failure mode’*. Therefore only the failure
should not dominate potential benefits. modes and effects of the analysis items need to be analyzed
in the FMECA in Step 6.
Step 2: System selection and dehltion By the RCM approach all maintenance tasks and
maintenance intervals are decided for the analysis items.
Before a decision to perform an RCM analysis at a plant is When it comes to the execution of a particular maintenance
taken, two questions should be considered. task on an analysis item, this will usually involve repair,
replacement or testing of a component or part of the analysis
1. To which systems are an RCM analysis beneficial
item. These components/parts are identified in the EMECA
compared with more traditional maintenance planning?
in Step 6.
2. At what level of assembly (plant, system, subsystem
The RCM analyst should always try to keep the
...) should the analysis be conducted?
analysis at the highest practical indenture level. The
All systems may in principle benefit from an RCM lower the level, the more difficult it is to define performance
analysis. With limited resources, we must, however, make standards.
priorities, at least when introducing RCM in a new plant. It is important that the analysis items are selected and
We should start with the systems that we assume will benefit defined in a clear and unambiguous way in this initial
most from the analysis. phase of the RCM analysis, since the following steps of
Most operating plants have developed some sort of the analysis will be based on these items. If the 0REDA13
assembly hierarchy. In the offshore oil and gas industry database is to be used in later phases of the RCM analysis, it
this hierarchy is referred to as a tug number system. is recommended to define the analysis items in compliance
The following terms will be used in this article for the with the ‘equipment units’ in OREDA.
levels of the assembly hierarchy:
Plant is a set of systems that function together to provide Step 3: Functional failure analysis (FFA)
some sort of output. An offshore gas production platform is
for example considered to be a plant. A specific system was selected in Step 2. The objectives of
System is a set of subsystems that perform a mainfunction this step are as follows;
in the plant (e.g., generate el. power, supply steam). The gas
(i) to identify and describe the system’s required
compression system on an offshore gas production platform
functions and performance criteria,
may for example be considered as a system. Note that the
(ii) to describe input interfaces required for the system
compression system may consist of several compressors
to operate, and
with a high degree of redundancy. Redundant units per-
(iii) to identify the ways in which the system might fail
forming the same main function should be included in the
to function.
same system.
The system level is recommended as the starting point for
the RCM analysis5*9.This means that on an offshore oil/gas Step 3 (I): Identitication of system functions
platform the starting point of the analysis should for
example be the gas compression system, and not the The system will usually have a high number of different
whole platform. functions. It is essential for the RCM analysis that all the
The systems may be broken down into subsystems, and important system functions are identified. The analyst may
subsubsystems, etc. For the purpose of the RCM analysis, benefit from using a checklist or a classification scheme like
the lowest level of the hierarchy will be the so-called the one presented later”. The same classification may also
analysis items: be used in Step 6 to identify functions of analysis items. The
Analysis item is an item that is able to perform at least one term item is therefore used to denote either a system or an
significant function as a stand-alone item (e.g., pumps, analysis item.
valves, and electric motors). By this definition a shutdown
valve is, for example, an analysis item, while the valve Essentialfunctions - These are the functions required to
actuator is not. The actuator is a supporting equipment to fulfill the intended purpose of the item. The essential func-
the shutdown valve, and only has a function as a part of the tions are simply the reasons for installing the item. An
valve. The importance of distinguishing the analysis items essential function of a pump is for example to pump a fluid.
from their supporting equipment is clearly seen in the
FMECA in Step 6. If an analysis item is found to have no Auxiliary functions - These are the functions that
significant failure modes, then none of the failure modes or are required to support the essential functions. A failure
causes of the supporting equipment am important, and of an auxiliary function may in many cases be more
therefore do not need to be addressed. Similarly, if an analy- critical than a failure of an essential function. An
sis item has only one significant failure mode, then auxiliary function of a pump is for example containment
the supporting equipment only needs to be analyzed to of the fluid.
hf. Ruusand
Protectivefunctions - The functions intended to protect functional block diagrams, reliability block diagrams, and
people, equipment and the environment. An example of a fault tree~‘~.
pmtective function is the pmtection provided by a prossum
safety valve on a pressure vessel. Step 3 (iit): Functional failures
Znfonnation functions - These functions comprise The next step is a functional failure analysis (RFA) to iden-
condition monitoring, various gauges and alarms etc. tify and describe the potential system failure modes. In most
of the RCM references the system failure modes are denoted
- These fu~ons fu~tio~Z failures.
Znte~ace~tio~ apply to the inter-
faces between the item in question and other items. Tbe A variety of classifications schemes for failure modes
interfaces may be active or passive. A passive interface is have been published16. Some of these schemes may be
for example present when an item is a support or a base for used to secure that all relevant functional failures are
another item. identified.
We will need to classify failures as follows.
Supetjhousjknctions - According to Moubray4: “Items
Sudden failures - Failures that could not be forecast by
or components are sometimes encountered which are
prior testing or examination.
completely superfluous, This usually happens when
equipment was modified frequently over a period of years,
Gradual failures - Failures that could be forecast by
or when new equipment has been overspecified”.
SuperiIuous functions are sometimes present when the testing or examination. A gradual failure will represent a
item was designed for an operational context that is different gradual ‘drifting out’ of the specified range of performance
from the actual operational context. In some cases failures values. The recognition of gradual failures requires compar-
of a superfluous function may cause failure of other ison of actual device performance with a performance spe-
functions. cification, and may in some cases be a difficult task.
The various functions may also be classified as follows.
An important type ‘of failures is the so-called aging fail-
ures, i.e., failures whose probability of occurrence increases
On-line ~~~~~ - These are functions operated either
with time, as a result of processes inherent in the item17.
continuously or so often that the user has current knowledge
Aging failures are also called weurout failures.
about their state. The termination of an on-line function is
The aging failure is sometimes a gradual failure, meaning
called an evident failure.
that the performance of the item is gradually drifting out of
the specified range. In other cases the aging failure will be
Q&line functions - These. are functions that are used sudden. The inherent resistance of the item may gradually
intermittently or so infrequently that their availability is not be reduced until a failure occurs. The performance of the
known by the user without some special check or test. An item may in such cases be perfect until the failure occurs.
example of an off-line function is the essential function of The functional failures may be recorded on a specific
an emergency shutdown (EBD) system. The te~ination of FFA work-sheet, which is rather similar to a standard
an off-line function is called a hidden failure. FMECA work-sheet. An example of an FFA work-sheet is
shown in Fig. 2.
Items with bidden failures are often protective devices, In the first column of Fig. 2 the various operational modes
whereas those with evident failures are the protected ones. of the system are recorded. For each o~~~on~ mode, all
Note that this classification of functions should only be the relevant system functions are recorded in column 2. The
used as a checklist to ensure that all important functions are performance requirements to each function, like target
revealed. Discussions about whether a function should be values and acceptable deviations are listed in column 3.
classified as ‘essential’ or ‘auxiliary’ etc. should be avoided. For each system function (in column 2) all the relevant
The system may in general have severa operational functional failures are listed in column 4. In columns 5-8
modes (e.g., running, and standby), and different functions a criticality ranking of each functional failure in that par-
for each operational mode. ticular operational mode is given, The reason for including
the criticality ranking is to be able to limit the extent of the
Step 3 (ii): I~en~~~tion of interfaces further analysis by ~s~g~~ng insigni~c~t functional fail-
ures. For complex systems such a screening is often very
The various system functions may be represented e.g., by important in order not to waste time and money.
functional block diagrams, to illustrate the input interfaces The criticality must be judged on the plant level, and
to a functiorP4. should be ranked in the four consequence classes:
In some cases we may want to split system functions into
subfunctions on an increasing level of detail, down to func- 0 S: Safety of personnel
tions of analysis items. This may be accomplished by both 0 E: Environmental impact
Reliability centered maintenance 125
l A: Production availability The various steps of the RCM analysis require a variety of
l C: Material loss (costs) input data, like design data, operational data, and reliability
data’,“. In this section we will only briefly discuss the
For each of these consequence classes the criticality may necessary reliability data input.
be ranked as for example; high (H), medium (M), low (L), or Reliability data is necessary to decide the criticality, to
negligible (N), where the definition of the categories will mathematically describe the failure process and to optimize
depend on the specific application. the time between PM-tasks. Reliability data include a.o.15:
If at least one of the four entries are medium (M) or high
l mean time to failure (MTTF)
(H), the c~ticali~ of the functional failure should be classi-
l mean time to repair (MTTR)
fied as signiftcant, and be subject to further analysis.
0 failure rate function z(t)
The frequency of the functional failure may also be clas-
sified in e.g., four categories. The frequency classes may be In many cases the failure rate will be an increasing func-
used to prioritize between the significant functional failures. tion of time, indicating that the item is deteriorating. In other
If all the four criticality entries of a functional failure are cases the failure rate may be decreasing, indicating that the
low or negligible, and the frequency is also low, the failure item is improving. There are also cases where the failure
is classified as insignificant, and disregarded in the further rate is decreasing in one time interval and increasing in
analysis. another. For repairable systems, the situation may be even
more complex with a time de~ndent rate of occurrence of
Step 4: Crtticai &em selectbn failures (rocof)t5.
Several life models are available. Among these are;
The objective of this step is to identify the analysis items the Weibull distribution, the lognormal distribution, the
that are potentially critical with respect to the functional Bimbaum-Saunders distribution, and the inverse Gaussian
failures identified in Step 3 (iii). These analysis items are distribution15. All of these distributions are rather flexible,
denotedfunctional signijcunt items (FSI). Note that some of and may be used for detailed modeling of specific failure
the less critical functional failures were disregarded at this mechanisms. However, for most applications the class of
stage of the analysis. Weibull distributions is sufficiently flexible to be the pre-
For simple systems the FSIs may be identified without ferred dis~bution. In the rest of this article we will therefore
any formal analysis. In many cases it is obvious which assume that the time to failure follows a two-parameter
analysis items that have influence on the system functions. Weibull distribution with shape parameter cx and scale
For complex systems with an ample degree of tedun- parameter @15.In some cases the value of the shape param-
dancy or with buffers, we may need a formal approach to eter (Y may be estimated based on knowledge about the
identify the FSIs. Depending on the complexity of the sys- relevant failure mechanisms, i.e., based on expert judgment.
tem, importance ranking based on techniques like fault tree The operational and reliability data are collected from
analysis, reliability block diagrams, or Monte Carlo simula- available operating experience and from external files
tion may be suitable15. In a petroleum production plant there where reliability information from systems with similar
is often a variety of buffers and rerouting possibilities. For design and operating conditions may be found (e.g., data
such systems, Monte Carlo simul~on-by using computer banks, data h~d~ks, field data from own data storage,
programs like M~AM or MAROS-may often be the rn~uf~~r~‘s r~ommendations). The external informa-
only feasible approach. tion available should be considered carefully before it is
In addition to the FSIs, we should also identify items with used, because such information is generally available at a
high failure rate, high repair costs, low maintainability, long rather coarse level.
lead time for spare parts, or items requiring external main- In some situations there is a complete lack of reliability
tenance personnel. These analysis items are denoted muin- data. This is the fact when developing a maintenance program
tenance cost significant items (MCSI). for new systems. The maintenance program development
126 M. Rausand
starts long before the equipment enters service. Helpful measure. A failure of an MS1 will not necessarily give a
sources of information may then be experience data from ‘worst case’ outcome resulting from e.g., redundancy, buf-
similar equipment, directions from manufacturers and fer capacities, etc. Conditional likelihood columns are there-
results from testing. The RCM method will even in this fore introduced.
situation provide useful information.
‘Worst case’ probability
Step 6: Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis The ‘worst case’ probability is defined as the probability
that an equipment failure will give the ‘worst case’ out-
The objective of this step is to identify the dominantfailure come. To obtain a numerical probability measure-, a system
modes of the MSIs identified in Step 4. model is required. This will often be inappropriate at this
A variety of different FMECA work-sheets are used in the stage of the analysis, and a descriptive measure may be used.
main RCM references. The FMECA work-sheet used in our
approach is presented in Fig. 3, and is more detailed than
MlTF
most of the FMECA work-sheets in the main RCM refer-
Mean time to failure for each failure mode is recorded.
ences. The various columns in our FMECA work-sheet are
Either a numerical measure or likelihood classes may be
as follows:
used.
The information described so far should be entered for all
MS1 failure modes. A screening may now be appropriate,
The analysis item number in the assembly hierarchy (tag giving only dominant failure modes, i.e., items with high
number), optionally with a descriptive text. criticality.
Failure mechanism There are generally three main reasons for doing a PM
For each failure cause, there is one or several failure task;
mechanisms. Examples of failure mechanisms are fatigue,
corrosion, and wear. 0 to prevent a failure
l to detect the onset of a failure
%IUlTF
l to discover a hidden failure
The M’ITF was entered on an MS1 failure mode level. It is The following basic maintenance tasks are considered:
also interesting to know the (marginal) M’ITF for each fail-
ure mechanism. To simplify, a per cent is given, and the 1. Scheduled on-condition task
(marginal) MTTF may be ‘calculated’ for each failure 2. Scheduled overhaul
mechanism. The BMTTF will obviously only be an 3. Scheduled replacement
approximation since the effects of the various failure 4. Scheduled function test
mechanisms usually are strongly interdependent. 5. Run to failure
Performance
4
100%
0%
Thea&l-
elII0 befom
functions, A scheduled function test task is applicable to an task that has to be based on information about the failure
item under the following conditions3. rate function, the likely consequences and costs of the fail-
ure the PM task is supposed to prevent, the cost and risk of
1. The item must be subject to a functional failure that is
the PM task, etc.
not evident to the operating crew during the perfor-
A huge number of maintenance optimization models have
mance of normal duties.
been published, see reviews e.g, by Pierskalla and
2. The item must be one for which no other type of task
Voelker’*, Valdez-Plores and Feldman’9, Cho and Par&‘,
is applicable and effective.
and Dekker”. A general framework for maintenance opti-
Run to failure is a deliberate decision to run to failure mization is presented in a recent article by Vatn et al**.
because the other tasks are not possible or the economics are Many of the articles on maintenance optimization were
less favorable. written by statisticians and scientists in operations research
PM will not prevent all failures. Consequently, if there is with limited knowledge about the practical context in which
a clear identifiable failure mode that cannot be adequately their models are supposed to be used, and in a language that
addressed by an applicable and effective PM task that will is more or less inaccessible to maintenance practitioners.
reduce the probability of failure to an acceptable level, then Another problem is that the vast majority of the models
there is need to redesign or modify the item. If the conse- are based on the assumption that; (1) only single units are
quences of faihue relate to safety or the envi~~ent then considered, and that (2) the cost of a single unit failure can
this redesign ~co~en~tion will no~ally be rn~~to~. easily be qu~tified in (discounted) rnone~~ units.
For operational and economic consequences of failure this A general problem with most of the models is that the
may be desirable, but a cost-benefit as~ssment has to be necessary input data is seldom available - or, not in the
performed. format required by the models.
The criteria given for using the various tasks should only In practice the various maintenance tasks have to be
be considered as guidelines for selecting an appropriate grouped into maintenance packages that are carried out at
task. A task might be found appropriate even if some of the same time, or in a specific sequence. The maintenance
the criteria are not fulfilled. intervals can therefore not be optimized for each single
A variety of different RCM decision logic diagrams are item. The whole maintenance package has-at least to
used in the main RCM references. Some of these are rather some degree-to be treated as an entity.
complex. Our decision logic diagram is shown in Fig. 5, and Many practitioners have found these problems so over-
is much simpler than those found in other RCM references. whelming that they do not even try to use models to opti-
The resulting maintenance tasks will, however, in most mize the maintenance intervals. They rely on the
cases be the same. It should be emphasized that such a logic manufacturers’ recommendations and past experience -
can never cover all situations. For example in the situation and therefore end up with too frequent maintenance. The
of a hidden function with aging failures, a combination of remark made by Smiths (p. 103) is typical: “...it is the
scheduled replacements and function tests is required. author’s experience mat any introduction of quantitative
reliability data or models into the RCM process only
Step 8: Determination of maintenance intervals clouds the PM issue and raises credibility questions that
are of no constructive value.“.
The RCM decision logic in Fig. 5 is used to decide PM In most cases we have to adopt a pragmatic approach.
tasks. Many of these PM tasks are to be performed at regular According to the RCM Handbook”: “The best thing you
intervals. To determine an optimal interval is a very difficult can do if you lack good information about the effect of age
Reliability centered maintenance 129
No
Is the functiin YW
hiin?
No
m7p
I------ -----I
Nodal ;
: found
I 1
L--___-____-I
on reliability is to pick a periodicity that seems right. Later, * the unavailability of physical resources elsewhere
you can personally explore the characteristics of the hard- while in use on this task
ware at hand by periodically in~e~~g the periodic@ and l pr~uction unav~lability during m~nten~ce
finding out what happens.“. l unavailability of protective functions during main-
tenance of these
Step 9: Preventive maintenance comparison analysis
In contrast, the ‘cost’ of a failure may include:
Two overriding criteria for selecting maintenance tasks the consequences of the failure should it occur (i.e.,
are used in RCM. Each task selected must meet two loss of production, possible violation of laws or
requirements: regulations, reduction in plant or personnel safety,
or damage to other equipment)
l it must be applicable
the consequences of not performing the PM task
0 it must be effective
even if a failure does not occur (i.e., loss of warranty)
Applicability - meaning that the task is applicable in increased premiums for emergency repairs (such as
relation to our reliability knowledge and in relation to the overtime, expediting costs, or high replacement
consequences of failure. If a task is found based on the power cost).
preceding analysis, it should satisfy the applicability
criterion. A PM task is applicable if it can eliminate a Step 10: Treatment of non-MSIs
failure, or at least reduce the probability of occurrence to
an acceptable levelz3 - or reduce the impact of failures! In Step 4 critical items (MSIs) were selected for further
analysis. A remaining question is what to do with the items
Cast-e~ectjvene~~ - meaning that the task does not cost which are not analyzed. For plants already having a main-
more than the failure(s) it is going to prevent. tenance program, a brief cost evaluation should be carried
The PM task’s effectiveness is a measure of how well it out. If the existing maintenance cost related to the non-M%
accomplishes that purpose and if it is worth doing. Clearly, is insignificant, it is reasonable to continue this program.
when evaluating the effectiveness of a task, we are balanc- See Paglia et al. I2 for further discussion.
ing the cost of performing the maintenance witb the cost of
not performing it23. Step 11: Implementation
The ‘cost’ of a PM task may include:
A necessary basis for ~pl~n~ng the result of the RCM
l the risk/cost related to maintenance induced failures analysis is that the organizational and technical maintenance
* the risk the maintenance personnel is exposed to support functions are available. A main issue is therefore to
during the task ensure that these support functions are available.
l the risk of increasing the likelihood of failure of Experience shows that many accidents occur either dur-
another component while the one is out of service ing maintenance or because of in&qua& maintenance.
l the use and cost of physical resources When implementing a ~~~ program it is therefore
130 M. Rausand
of vital importance to consider the risk associated with the We see the RCM concept as a way to reduce this isolation
various maintenance tasks. For complex maintenance by building ‘bridges’ over the gap between the maintenance
operations, like for example offshore well workovers, it practitioners, the reliability engineers, and the statisticians
may be relevant to perform a task analysis” combined and operation researchers working with maintenance opti-
with e.g., a Human HAZOP to reveal possible hazards mization models.
and human errors related to the ~te~ce task. See An RCM analysis provides a thorough un&~~~ng of
also Hochz3 for a further discussion on omening the system lotion, functional ~ui~~n~, unction fail-
RCM analysis results. ures, and causes and consequences of fun~on~ failures.
This knowledge is established and documented through a
Step 12: In-service data cokction and updating teamwork and cooperation between various disciplines in
the company. This teamwork may bridge existing gaps
The reliability data we have access to at the outset of the between disciplines within the company. In some cases an
analysis may be scarce, or even second to none. In our external consultant may also be involved in the RCM pro-
opinion, one of the most significant advantages of RCM is cess. This consultant may sometimes have a contact with the
that we systematically analyze and document the basis for research world, or themself be a researcher.
our initial decisions, and, hence, can better utilize operating It should, however, be realized on both sides of the gap
experience to adjust that decision as operating experience that RCM only is a minor part of a total ~nten~~.sys-
data become available. The full benefit of RCM is therefore tern. The PM tasks that come out of the RCM decision logic
only obtained when operation and maintenance experience are only broad classes, like ‘scheduled function test’. This
is fed back into the analysis process. task description does not say how the task is to be per-
The updating process should be concentrated on three formed, by whom, or how the results from the task are to
major time perspectives’. be reported. To be applicable, the RCM analysis must fit
into the company’s total maintenance system.
l Short term interval adjustments
The main RCM message: “cost reduction while main-
l Medium term task evaluation
taining (or improving) production regularity and safety
l Long term revision of the initial strategy
and environmental protection,” is generally appealing to
For each signifi~t failure that occurs in the system, the the top pageant. It is therefore rather easy to sell the
failure ch~act~stics should be compared with the main RCM idea to the top plant m~age~nt, and also to the
FMEC!A. If the failure was not covered adequately in rn~n~n~ce managers.
the FMECA, the relevant part of the RCM analysis should, The main steps of the RCM analysis are easy to com-
if necessary, be revised. prehend and perform by practitioners. They will easily
The short term update may be considered as a revision of realize benefits from the analysis process. The only really
previous analysis results. The input to such an analysis is problematic step is the selection of maintenance intervals.
updated failure information and reliability estimates. This This step relies on a number of complex probabilistic
analysis should not require much resources, as the frame- concepts that are usually difficult to fully understand and
work for the analysis is already established. Only Steps 5-8 interpret.
in the RCM process will be affected by short term updates. By making the other steps of the RCM process, the prac-
The medium term update will more carefully review the titioners may, however, realize the irn~~ce of using
basis for the selection of m~nten~ce actions in Step 7. models and data to select optimal intervals. This may create
Analysis of maintenance experience may identify signifi- a good climate for fruitful communication with reliability
cant failure causes not considered in the initial analysis, engineers, statisticians, and operations researchers.
requiring an updated FMECA in Step 6. Although a huge number of articles have been written
The long term revision will consider all steps in the about maintenance optimization, most of these missed the
analysis. It is not sufficient to consider only the system target-at least from a practitioner’s point of view. RCM
being analyzed, it is required to consider the entire plant provides a means for communication, and hence a possible
with its relations to the outside world, e.g., contractual con- bridge over the gap between theory and practice. By
siderations, new laws regulating environmental protection using this bridge, the statisticians and operations researchers
etc. may get help to establish more realistic models and
methods, and ~~sfo~ these into practical tools for the
maintenance practitioners. Application of their models in
4 GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE a real situation will certainly be an incentive to improve
their research.
It has been claimed that2? “...there is more isolation Many companies have skilled reliability engineers and
between practitioners of maintenance and the researchers statisticians among their own staff, who may support such
than in any other professional activity”. A number of a bridge, or act as a supplementary bridge. This is the case
aspects influencing this isolation-or, gap between theory for many of the oil companies operating in the North Sea,
and practice-are discussed by Dekke?’ . and especially in Norway.
Relia~ili~ ce~ered ~in~e~nce 131
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multi-unit systems. Europeon Journal of Operations ment, Taylor & Francis, London, 1994.
Research, 1991,51, 1-23. 26. Mahk, M. Reliable preventive maintenance scheduling. AZEE
21. Dekker, R. Application of maintenance optimization models: Trans., 1979, 11.221-228.
a review and analysis. Reliability Engineering and System 27. Nakajima, S., Introduction to TPM: total productive main-
Safety, 19%, 51,229-240. tenance, Productivity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988.
22. Vatn, J., Hokstad, P. & Bodsberg, L. An overall model for 28. Willmott, P., Total Productive Maintenance: the Western
maintenance optimixation. Reliability Engineering and way, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 1994.
System Safety, 1996, 51,241-257. 29. Suzuki, T., ed., TPM in process industries, Productivity
23. Hoch, R., A Practical Application of Reliability Centered Press, Portland, Or., 1994.
Maintenance. The American Society of Mechanical Engi- 30. MIL-STD 1388, Logistic Support Analysis, US Department
neers, 90-JPCXYPwr-S1, Joint ASMEIJBEE Power Genera- of Defense, Washington DC 20301, 1983.
tion Conference, Boston, MA, 21-25 Oct., 1990. 3 1. Dekker, R. & Smeitink, E. Preventive maintenance at oppor-
24. Kit-wan, B. and Ainswortb, L. K., A Guide to Task Analysis, tunities of restricted duration. Naval Research Logistics,
Taylor & Francis, London, 1992. 1994,41,335-353.