immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
TAÑADA V. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners
filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision
is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA V. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to
the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because
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they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However,
despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax
from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue
officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown
complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review
in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive
period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the
two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final
adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731
days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period.
Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without
regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987
impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the
refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.
ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in applying Article 13 of the Civil Code in the computation of
the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims?
HELD: No. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood
to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, the Supreme Court ruled that a
year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, in
1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
thereof provides that a "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months and the number of
days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme
Court hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more
recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. Applying Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive
period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months. Respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last
day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent led its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.

G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: This is petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals which applied Article 13 of the Civil Code in the computation of the two-year prescriptive
period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims. On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap,
Vice Chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income
tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable
for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR. On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer
Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for
review in the Court of Tax Appeals. On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was
led beyond the two-year prescriptive period for ling a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit
under Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent led its final adjusted return on April
14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied
Article 13 of the Civil Code. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the ling of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year
2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was led 731 days after respondent led its final
adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The respondent appealed to the CA
which reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA, the rule that a year has 365
days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.

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