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8/28/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 336

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
*
G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000.

AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE,


LETICIA T. ENDOMA, ARISTIDES A. RAMOS, PANCHO M.
RIVERA, TERESITA A. DE CASTRO, CANDIDA C. HABANA,
AZUCENA C. FALCON, MARIA LUZ P. CAEDO, YOLANDA V.
RIO, RUBEN S. ANIEVAS, LELISA L. SANCHEZ, VILLARDO
A. TRINIDAD, ENRIQUE CH. ZUNIGA, ROMEO A.
GONZALES, CASIANO G. ATUEL, JR., GEMMA L. BANARES,
PERFECTO T. CAMPOS, ARNULFO A. AGUILAR, RUDOLPH
R. MELON, MAGDALENA M. LAO, MARINA GERONA,
FLORIANA O. DE GUIA, EMETERIO B. BRUCAL, NILDA C.
CONCHA, YOLANDA P. FERMA, TEOTISTA C. ANGKIKO,
FRANCISCO V. TRIAS, JENELYN E. ESTERNON, MILAGROS
M. ABELLAR, ALICIA T. MOJICA, ELVIRA E. BAYBAY,
PRICILLA P. GOLFO, ELISEA M. HIERCO, TERESITA L.
DIMACUHA, MYRNA GUILLERMO, GRACIANO R. SAMELA,
JR., NIMFA M. LAGASCA, JOSEFINA P. JARENO, NORMA V.
ORDENES, FRANCISCO T. SERVANDO, VIOLETA M.
ANONUEVO, ALFREDO O. BAYANI, MARIO J. RAMOS, EME
FEROLINO, LEONIDES P. COMIA, MILAGROS E.
GENEBLAZO, LORNA L. MENORCA, REYNALDO DE LA
CRUZ, ROMULO A. FAZ, LIMUEL G. GADO, REY G.
FABELLA, DOMINGUITO G. TACASA, IMELDA R.B. ROTONI,
TITA FOJA, NOEMI F. CASTRO, LILIA B. CAWALING,
ROBERT A. REYES, CONCEPCION H. PARRENO, SERAFIN L.
OLMEDO, ADOLFO L. ALLAN, PROSPERO D. CASTRO,
ROSELLER C. GAPULAO, GLICERIO B. LAURENTE,
BERNICE E. BERNABE, ADINA L. FERNANDEZ, ANITA M.
PAALAN, ROSA P. PINOON, INOCENCIA P. DANGUE, JULITA
E. MENDOZA, ELENA O. RAMOS, GENE BE BARTE,
FLORENCIA Z. MAGANITO, PABLO A. ARGA, PEDRO S.
LUNA, CARMELITA P. LAUREL, VICTORINO I. MARASIGAN,
ROMEO M. MENDOZA, JUAN C. MALABANAN, MANUEL B.
ABRELI, JOSEPH T. MACAHIYA, LEONOR P. ARADA, JULIA
G. PEREZ, MODESTO M. VILLADELREY, ARNULFO Y.
FAJILAN, MARLON P. HERRERA, JAIME A. BISCOCHO,
MICHAEL D. CASTILLO, MILAGROS H. BAYLOSIS, AR-

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_______________

* EN BANC.

189

VOL. 336, JULY 19, 2000 189


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

SENIO T. GUSTE, ALFREDO V. ORAYANI, DANTE A.


PENAMANTE, ROMEO A. DE CHAVEZ, MANUEL M.
ILAGAN, ALFREDO O. MANZA, JR., DOMINGO B. GUNIO,
FIDEL V. PALERACIO, VICENTE V. DEL MORO, JUSTINO R.
DEQUILLA, ERNESTO A. RUZOL, ROMEO D. DELGADO,
ERLINDA P. MAGSINO, VERONICA R. CAMBRONERO,
NORMA A. DEQUINA, WELLIE R. RAVINA, CORAZON T.
LOPEZ, REMEDIOS R. QUIZON, LORETA E. VERGARA,
MELECIA M. ASTRERA, VICENTA R. SAMANTE, HELEN M.
CUENTO-BUENDICHO, ANICIA V. MORALES, RISALINA C.
GONZALES, ROSARIO CHARITO R. PABELLON, LOLITA L.
MALADAGA, MAXIMO A. GLINDO, WILFREDO A.
RODELAS, CELSO O. ROGO, RAMON C. VALENCIA, FELIPE
R. FRANDO, ADEN B. DUNGO, OFELIA N. QUIBEN, LIGAYA
S. VALENZUELA, EUNICE S. FAMILARIN, MARCELA DE
LEON, ADELA M. JAMILLA, RENY ABLES, ADELA E.
FABERES, ALICIA P. BALDOMAR, EDNA C. GARCIA,
ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, ELOISA P. TORRENO, CHARITO M.
LACAMENTO, CLARENCIA M. AQUINO, HILDA
DIMALANTA, ELSIE SIBAL, PURIFICACION TANGONAN,
AMELITA FERNANDEZ, TEDDY C. MARIANO, LORETO
SANGGALANG, GERARDO GONZALES, FEDERICO ONATE,
JR., ARTURO BALIGNASAY, FELIX M. CABARIOS, JR.,
NORBERTO PUNZALAN, JAIME G. ALCANTARA, ERNESTO
VILLANUEVA, ESTANISLAO SANCHEZ, ADORACION L.
PINEDA, LUCILA S. DUNGCA, ADELAIDA B.
LAOIJINDANUM, ROLANDO A. BALUYUT, FRANCISCO M.
DAVID, LEONELLE S. MENDOZA, MA. LUZ A. BASILIO,
NESTOR J. TIMBANG, HILDA P. DIZON, EMMANUEL E.
IGNACIO, RAMON S. ABELLA, JOSELITO MATIAS,
HEZEQUIAS B. GALANG, ERLINDA C. ZAPATA, IMELDA R.
MANALASTAS, PEDRO L. PALO, AURECIO C. TRASPE,
JOSEPHINE GALANG, FLORINDA R. MADULID,
MAGDALENA W. SADI, NYDIA V.A. BOLISAY,
PRESENTACION A. PALOM, ANTONIO B. ANCHETA,
MACARIO L. SADI, PACIFICO E. GISAPON, FELICIANO C.
CRUZ, IMELDA A. QUIMEL, LINDA D. SANDOVAL,
MARILOU R. ORTIZ, NORMA F. SANTOS, MAGPAYO V.

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ABESAMIS, BONIFACIO B. VILLAFLOR, DANIEL O. TABIOS,


CONSTANTE T. CATRIZ, JESUS E. ALICANTE, FEDERICO
SACLAYAN, JR., NOLY G. UMINGA, FE FRAELI L. DE GUZ-

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190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

MAN, RODRIGO S. WYCOCO, JOVEN HERMOGENES,


RODOLFO D. BANAWA, ABELARDO O. CAPANZANA,
ERNESTO Q. TIONGSON, ROSANNA CRUZ, OSCAR C.
ONGOCO, CONSUELO A. KABIGTING, JULITA V.
PASTELERO, ARSENIA V. BONDOC, ISIDRO A. TOMAS,
ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, CONSOLACION N. LABOG,
ELENITA A. RIVERA, SOCORRO NOCES, RODOLFO
GALLARDO, CARMENCITA M. ONGEO, CAMILO L.
SEDURIFA, ARLEEN VIC B. OCHANDRA, EDGARDO E.
APOSTOL, CLOTILDE C. CANETE, ALEJANDRO B. DEL
AGUA, PILAR R. BUENO, TEODOICO C. MAGALLANES,
PETRONIO N. PIANGCO, JR., JOSE M. FLORENDO, BIBIANO
A. CAGNAN, ALICIA A. TUBI, RODOLFO C. NATAN, JAIME
B. MENDONEZ, EDILBERTO EDANG, ROSENDA T.
JENOVEVA, VEDASTO B. ELIZAN, JR., MILAGROS P. DE
LUNA, ATILANO L. ISAAC, CORAZON L.J. PEPITO, LUCILA
S. PINEDA, ROCHE B. CERRO, JOCELYN KL LIBUT,
REMBERTO L. GUTIERREZ, NAZARIO A. TRASMONTE,
REYNALDO O. MACARAT, FLORENCIA M. MALIBAGO,
IMELDA G. TUYAY, JUAN A. GIBA, JR., JOSE M. CAPACITE,
ARCITA M. GARCIA, ANGEL G. DACUNO, RITA M.
BEDIANG, RENATO L. CANDIDO, NESTORIO B. BOCO,
JONATHAN C. AMBIDA, MONICA MACABARE, BENITO A.
MONTALLANA, CLOTILDE C. APURA-VALDEMORO,
CIRIACO J. ARCENO, PABLO L. FORMARAN, JR., PROSPERO
S. OLMEDO, IGNACIO V. CASCANO, SERAFIN L. CLUTARIO,
ARTURO L. DIN, JUCHITA C. SY, RODOLFO L. ASUERO, PIO
T. PORTES, MARILOU F. TAMAYO, MILAGROS P. LAMBINO,
ESTANISLAO A. ESPINA, RENERIO D. ENGO, FERNANDO A.
MOSCARE, CONCHITA A. PICARDAL, ELIAS T. TURLA,
BONIFACIO T. LIM, JOSEFINA A. AGUILAR, ANTONIO O.
TEPACE, GAVINO S. ASOTES, RENE P. MAGBUTAY,
NICOLAS C. UY, JR., JESUS B. LAVA, SENORA C. CALAGOS,
RAFAEL A. PAYOD, MACARIO L. CIEGO, SALVADOR T.
CRUZ, VIRGINIA V. BESAS, RAUL S. FIGUERDA, EDGAR R.
DELOS REYES, TERESO R. ROSEL, JOSE J. MABANGUE,
PRIMO D. PALOMO, JOHN C. YANGZON, ROMULO D.

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8/28/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 336

JABON, FIDENCIO Z. LA TORRE, JR., LETICIA R.


MACARIOLA, CARLOS P. VARELA, JR., ANTONIO L.
PEDRAZA, SALVACION A. LAMBAN, LINO L. JAPSON,
EUNIA H. VACAL, ANTONIO F. VALDEZ, NATIVIDAD E.
PRADO, LORENZO C. MERKA, GAUDIOSO A. RUEGO, ETE-

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VOL. 336, JULY 19, 2000 191


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

RIO Z. ABOCEJO, DEMETRIA O. COROLLO, MARIA S. OBEN,


ARTHUR V. LEYSON, PEDRO L. AVILA, DOMINADOR S.
RODILLA, MARCIAL MAGPATOC, FEDERICO D. BARCELON
EVANGELINE DELA ROSA, ELENO GIL, ARSENIA GARCIA,
HUMILDA ALICUM, DIOSDADO CAS, ABRAHAM MASAOY,
SAMUEL ORALLO, AMELIA OLORES, CANDIDO URBANO,
LOURDES FRIAS, ROEL SORIANO, EMELDA AGUSTIN,
PAQUITO SORIANO, GERMAN BALOLONG, BENJAMIN C.
ROSARIO, EFREN BUYA, LEONIDA LEGASPI, TOMAS
ABELLA, JR., JOVENCIA CANTO, JUAN DACONO, MIGUEL
BAUTISTA, LORNA PASCUAL, FERDINAND BRAGANZA,
PRISCILLA PEREZ, ALMA LUZ SORIANO, JUAN VALENCIA,
JR., JULIAN APOSTOL, ROSARIO GUICO, BONITA VIDAL,
GUIA GARCIA, LEOCADIO GINEZ, CATALINA BANEZ,
VERONICA TABILIN, ELVIRA CALSADO, ALIPIO LOPEZ,
JOSEPHINE MALANA, PIO ANONUEVO, ELMA DEL
ROSARIO, RUFINO FLORES, ANTONIO ORDONEZ, CARMEN
CLAVERIA, ESTRELLA RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; Requisites for Valid


Classifications.—The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ arguments. The
“equal protection clause” of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest
on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the
purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members
of the same class.
Same; Same; Election Law; The singling out of election officers in
order to “ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment”
does not violate the equal protection clause.—After a careful study, the
ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189
satisfies the aforestated requirements. The singling out of election officers in

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order to “ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them


from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment”
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

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192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; The legislature is not required by the Constitution to


adhere to a policy of “all or none”—underinclusiveness is not an argument
against a valid classification.—In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that “the
legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of ‘all or
none.’“ This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid
classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC
referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the
legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served
by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up
each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election
officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the
COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the
complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of
voters can hardly be carried out.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Civil Service; Security of Tenure;
Transfers; Due Process; The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as
anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed—
not merely assigned—to a particular station.—Neither does Section 44 of
RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive
them of due process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, “x x x the rule
that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies
only to an officer who is appointed—not merely assigned—to a particular
station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign
the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency, x x
x”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The guarantee of security of tenure under
the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment—it only means
that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process has been
accorded the employee, but where it is the law-making authority itself which
furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such
capriciousness can be raised.—The guarantee of security of tenure under
the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means
that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded

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the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to


dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no

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De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure
a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.
Statutes; Title of Bills; Objectives of the Constitutional Requirement on
Titles of Bills.—The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof,” are: 1. To prevent
hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; 2. To prevent surprise’ or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no
information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and 3. To fairly apprise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so
desire.
Same; Same; Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
sufficiently complied with where, the title is comprehensive enough to
embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve; In determining the
constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is
in favor of its validity.—Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is
comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve,
and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject
matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject and title. Section 44 of RA 8189 is not
isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter
stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is “The Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996” with a subject matter enunciated in the
explanatory note as “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF
CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES
THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS
THEREFOR.” Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election
officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure
the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an
alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of

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continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the


Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue,
all the contents and the minute details therein. In determining the
constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is
in favor of its validity.

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De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Respect due to co-equal


departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the
Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.—As regards the issue raised by
petitioners—whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance
with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not
convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress.
Respect due to co-equal departments of the government in matters entrusted
to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and


Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & Martinez
Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer


for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act
No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as “The Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996.”
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof
provides:

“SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers.—No Election Officer shall


hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years.
Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or
subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city
or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a
new station outside the original congressional district.”

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By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission


1
on
Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-0002 and

_______________

1 Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 49-50.

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De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
2
97-0610 for the implementation
3
thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC
issued several directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either
City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and
resolutions, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present
petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending
that:

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE ‘EQUAL


PROTECTION CLAUSE’ ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION;

II

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE


CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF
CIVIL SERVANTS;

III

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A


DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;

IV

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE


CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND
COMELEC’S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME,
DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER
ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE


BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil.
Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL
EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN
THE TITLE THEREOF; and
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VI

SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE


TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
[ARTICLE

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2 Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 52-53.


3 Annexes “C,” “D” and “E” of Petition, pp. 58-101.

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De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS


AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM
THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE.

Petitioners’ contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether


Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional.
The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the
presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to
invalidate it.
Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the
“equal protection clause” of the 1987 Constitution because it singles
out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as
prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for
more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial
distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and
therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of
the provision of law under attack.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ arguments. The “equal
protection clause” of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;


2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. The classification must not be limited to 2 existing
conditions only; and
4. The classification
4
must apply equally to all members of the
same class.

After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the


classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated
requirements.

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The singling out of election officers in order to “ensure the


impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment” does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

_______________

4 The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. Philippine Overseas


Employment Administration, 243 SCRA 666, 677 (1995) citing: People vs. Cayat, 68
Phil. 12, 18 [1939].

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De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
5
In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that “the legislature is not required
by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of ‘all or none.’ “ This is so
for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid
classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC
referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned
that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be
sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily,
under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest
officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or
municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such
officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can
hardly be carried out.
Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees
(connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least
four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of
administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.
Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of
tenure of petitioners nor unduly 6deprive them of due process of law.
As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez:

“x x x the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of


tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed—not merely assigned—to
a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out
under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency, x x x” (italics supplied)

The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a


guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes

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other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded
the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exer-

_______________

5 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955).


6 31 SCRA 637, 653 (1970) citing: Ibañez vs. Commission on Elec-tions, L-
26558, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 1002, 1012 and Section 12 of the Tax Code.

198

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

cise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making


authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class
of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as
the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the
purposes of the law.
Untenable is petitioners’ contention that Section 44 of RA 8189
undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials
and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section
44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section
provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an
election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to
appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees.
As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and
directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the
power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a
government agency tasked with the implementation and
enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to
comply with the laws passed by Congress.
The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is
no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own
officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the
COMELEC’s power of appointment, as the power to reassign or
transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.
Petitioners’ contention that Section 44 has an isolated and
different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not
expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable.
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof,” are:

1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;


2. To prevent surprise’ or fraud upon the legislature by means
of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no

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information, and which might therefore be overlooked and


carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are

199

VOL. 336, JULY 19, 2000 199


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

being considered, in order that they may have opportunity


of being heard
7
thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall
so desire.

Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently


complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive
enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if
all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject
matter embodied in the title or so long as the same 8 are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. Section
44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and
germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title
of RA 8189 is “The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996” with a subject
matter enunciated in the explanatory note as “AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS,
ADOPT-ING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION,
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS
THEREFOR.” Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of
election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it
seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing
a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of
election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related
to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In
this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully 9
index or catalogue, all the contents and
the minute details therein. In determining the constitutionality of a
statute dubbed
10
as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its
validity.

_______________

7 Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883, 891 (1920) citing: Cooley’s
Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.

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8 Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208, 213 (1987) citing:
Sumulong vs. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10, 1941, 73 Phil. 288 and Cordero
vs. Hon. Cabatuando, et al., L-14542, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 418.
9 Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 496, 501 (1967).
10 Insular Lumber Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 710, 717 (1981).

200

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

As regards the issue raised by petitioners—whether Section 44 of


RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not convincingly shown
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-
equal departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by
the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing
11
of grave abuse
of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the
constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,


Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., No part.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—Mediatior Arbiters who have been appointed as such in


the National Capital Region are not considered appointed to a
specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can
always be reassigned from one organizational unit to another of the
same agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their
services may be used more effectively. As such they can neither
claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor to
security of tenure thereat. (Fernando vs. Sto. Tomas, 234 SCRA 547
[1994]
An employee’s right to security of tenure does not give him such
a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its
prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will
be most useful. (Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 306 SCRA 631 [1999])

——o0o——

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_______________

11 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628, 646 (1995).

201

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