THE NAVYA-NYAYA DOCTRINE OF NEGATION ‘The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyaya Philosophy BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL Cambridge, Massachusetts HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1968EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION yylya (“The New Method,” “The New Logic”) exerted for many cen- ‘profound influence on Tndian thought. In metaphysics and epistemology ged other schools; its benefits to others in these fields lay in its forcing {0 organize their views rationally and systematically in order :o oppose mer, Navya-nyaya logic, on the other hand, being found unassailable, en over by others, so that one finds Mimamsskas and Vedintins coming ‘Navya-nyaya logic even in their diatribes against the Nyaya school. Thus who would gain a thorough understanding of any school of Indian yy since the time of Udayana (eleventh century), or at the very least the time of Garigefa, must concern himself with Navya-nyaya, especially logic. the author and the editor of the present book hope that a concern for iya may spread further, We believe that if its works are :ranslated ned they will furnish matter of interest to Western philosophers as Indian. Especially important, we believe, is an interest in Navya-nyaya who would gain a view of philosophy as a whole, for in this school we ng from the Indian culture, which has been too one-sidedly characterized and spiritual, a school of analysis as rigorously rational and unswayed ion or mystical experience as the analytic schools of the modern West. antidote to the one-sided view of Indian thought might be furnished ily of the Indian grammarians. But one cannot understand the Indian ans without understanding Sanskrit. It is our hope that non-Sanskrtists ‘will come to understand something of Navya-nyaya lavya-nyaya is to be understood by Western philosophers, its expositor ‘beyond the word-for-word translation of texts. He must try—and no ‘of theoretical difficulty should dissuade him — to translate from system ‘That is to say, he should render Navya-nyaya arguments that are in an intensional logic of abstractions into arguments phrased in an ‘of the terms present radical differences as between the two systems, the ‘of argument is often very similar. The expositor should warn the reader incompatiblities; still, those incompatibilities will not hinder the ip understanding if he is given a “systematic” as well as a literal cransla~ itis only by such systematic translation that men trained in the one ‘ean be brought to understand the other. Matilal has gone further in systematic translation than the editor was go when he published his Malerials for the Siudy of Navya-nsiya Logic series sixteen years ago. The advance is not merely welcome, itis neces-sary; for the subject of Matilal’s work presents peculiar problems to a Western understanding, ‘The doctrine of negation in Navya-nyaya is like a keystone that holds in place the interlocking voussoirs of an arch. It is essential to Navya-n) aya metaphysics, which hypostatizes ‘absence’ into a category. It is the peculiar mark of Nyaya epistemology, for the Nyay: sisted, against the opposition of all other schools, that one can see the absence of an object in a given place. And itis a keystone of ‘Navya-nyaya logic, for in this system which presents a rarchy of abstractions rather than a hierarchy of classes it is only by the use of negation that universal laws can be framed. There is an absence of occurrence of humanity in such a locus as is not a locus of mortality. That is to say, all men are mortal. Thus the Navya-nyaya doctrine of negation meets and reinforces other Navya-nyaya con- cepts at every angle. If one is to explain it satisfactorily, one must explain the Navya-nydya system as a whole. ‘The divisions of the present work are arranged to suit that need. The first half of the book is taken up by systematic translations of Navya-nyya concepts. ‘The greater part of the second half is given over to literal translations of two standard works of Navya-nyya on negation, the chapter on Abldea from Garigesa’s Tattsacint@mayi and Raghundtha’s independent monograph, the Naa-vada. The former represents what one might call the orthodox wing, the latter the radical wing, of the Navya-nyaya school, As editor T am responsible for two matters which should be brought to the reader's attention: the use of punctuation and the reproduction of the Sanskrit texts ‘The double quotation mark, besides its common functions such as the mark- ing off of passages quoted from other texts, is given in this book the duty of ‘enclosing exemplar propositions and verbalized cognitions (jndnani). Fragments ‘of & proposition or of a verbalized cognition, and hence single words and terms, Aare enclosed in single quot Both editor and author have been at pains to pre- ‘Yen quotation marks of either sort from stealing into the explanations of a ‘Nyliyi analysis where they would be misleading. Thus, given the Nyaya cogni- Mion "The mountain is fiery,” one may say that the word ‘fiery’ forms part of he predicate of the verbal expression of the cognition. But in the cognitio cand mountain, Fire and mountain here go without. fire is a qualifier of the q if quotes because what are meant by the Nyya are actual substances, not words. ‘he texs of Gagesa and Raghunatha have been reproduced photographically from the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Tatvint@mani with the commentary of Mathurinatha (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1884-2001). Wherever the translator has found fault with the reading of these texts, his correction will be found in the notes. Dastex H. H. Isoats Editor, Harvard Oriental Series Cambridge, Massachusetts November 1966 PREFACE this book I have stopped to ask myself lng. Much as I have pondered the question, I have not yet ity answer. I believe now that this is a healthy state of find no prejudices. T very much hope that Sanskeitits and long with all the various combinations that these two clasieh Homething to interest them within these pages. I am myself atari: and philosophy, and I believe that 1 have) ehglall vs their integration. The age of my material seems to ju nent, whereas the content of the material pleads for the Ui Ws this method of combined philology and loyed here. Pretend that my method is unexceptionable, It takes sa ‘novell that neither the writer nor the reader need fall it he who would study Navya-nyaya must accustom him ‘advantages, on the other hand, of such a mixed method Many of the traditional puzzles of Navya-nyfiya ceuse (0 fre transposed into the more austere forms of symbole l {igenstein’s famous pronouncement to the Navya-ny‘ya and | the apparent oddities and philosophical embarrassments ARG the evaluation or appreciation of Navya-nytya, For ined pandit has been able to derive any enjoyment from farely had cither the inclination or the equipment 10 {0 the international world of philosophy. By employing f Jogic I hope T have aided the sortie of Navya-nyilya, ay be disappointed not to find here more study of problems. Iam aware of the importance of such pi have included within these pages the small amount @ KT have done. Considerations of time have preven in the future to deal with those problems at length, hye in order concerning my general appreciation of Nb fahove, I believe that there are in Navya-nyilya € {ate easier to spot from the vantage point of five h progress and with the resultant refinement of logical that I feel a great admiration for the Navy [means at their disposal set out in search of what we may thelr schoo, it seems to me, this search was morex PREFACE pursued than in any other philosophical tradition of India. The masters of Navya-nydya did not lay down conclusions first and justify them later with theory. They were seriously engaged in following reality wherever it might lead them, imposing as softly as possible their own prejudices. I have admired this trait greatly. It is precisely the same trait that I find admirable among the crea- tive workers of modern science and philosophy. Besides my personal interest, there is another value to this study in the his- torical perspective that such studies offer. I believe that India should not, indeed ‘cannot, be left out of any general study of the history of logic and philosophy. take this opportunity to record my debt to those who have substantially: improved this book. To begin chronologically, I wish first to thank Principal ‘Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, who has proved to be my nydyakalyOuamitra, for it was hhe who first encouraged me to enter the dense and thorny world of Navya-nyéya when T was considering more favorably the sunny world of Kavya and Alarhkara Dr. Sastsi kindly introduced me to the late Anantakumar Tarkatirtha, who for one intensive year taught me the rudiments of Navya-nyaya. Later in my career ‘as a student I would often return to this brilliant and critical-minded pandit for stimulating discussions that caused many a sleepless night. At this point I was working toward my M.A, at Calcutta University, where I was fortunate enough to be able to take courses under Taranath Tarkatirtha, with whom I did my special paper on Navya-nyfya. When I began teaching at the Government Sanskrit College in Calcutta, I continued my studies under the expert guidance fof two remarkable pandits, Sri Kalipada Tarkacarya and Sri Madhusudana Nyayacarya. During this period, by a fortunate coincidence, the four teachers Thave mentioned were all at the Sanskrit College, and the discussions that re- ‘sulted proved of inestimable value to my pursuit of Navya-nyaya. Encouraged by Sri Madhusudana Nyayacarya and by Sri Bisvabandbu Tarkatirtha, T com- pleted a traditional degree, that of Tarkatirtha in the Anumanakhanda. Shortly ‘after that I decided upon a course of action that [ had long been contemplating. For some time I had been in correspondence with Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls, ‘whose pioneer book on Navya-nyiya had revealed to me new facets of Indian logic. In one of his letters he asked me to consider the possibility of coming to Harvard in order to introduce myself to the work being done there by Professor Willard Van Orman Quine on the borderlines of philosophy and mathematical logic. I perceived the value of such an extension of my studies and discussed the matter with my teachers. For the most part they showed themselves to be extremely broad-minded where one would expect tradition to be opposed. I de- ‘cided then to enter the graduate school of Harvard University. ‘My expectations were far surpassed, and I found myself eagerly swept into the middle of Ja nuove logica. After taking Professor Quine’s courses, I continued iy studies in mathematical logic with the help of Professor Dagiinn Fyllesdal, who was ready to take time from a very full teaching schedule to guide me in the subtleties of this technical field. But it is especially to one man that I owe the limited ability I now have of PREFACE ing Navya-nytya to modern logic, and that is Professor Ingalls into thank lly this lively, learned, and humane scholar for encouragement. To anyone reading this book it wil be immediat deep my debt to him is. Especially in the matter of transla sas been of invaluable ai, for be has read though each li with the original and making substantial changes both in idiom ay Th the summer of 1964 1 was at the University of Hawall toa West Philosophers’ Conference, where T met Professor ryyn of Visva-Bharati University. He was kind enough to read ‘the first draft of this book and to make some important fing it. I also take this opportunity to thank Professor A. K. ted some important corrections. T want to thank, 10 fy Masson, who was at Harvard when T vas preparing my’ here and’who constantly encouraged me. Thrcugh long ‘come to share certain common attitudes toward Sanskrit Tefected in the present book, which is based upon my dl to thank the Harvard-Venching Institute fr making myCONTENTS WF I. ‘The Basic Concepts of Navya-nyaya Philosophy Introduction On Jaana or Cognition ‘4: The Content of Cognition and the Meaning Problem ‘4, On Relation 'g. [entity and the Puzzle “a pot = a blue pot” 1. The Counterpositive of an Absence 4. The Ontological Status of Visayata (Content-ness) 8, ‘The Relational Adjuncts ‘9, ‘The Limitors and Quantificational Logic 10, Circularity, Laghova (Parsimony), and Anugama (Consecutive Character) ji 44, On Negation uP II, Gautama and Gages 2. A Glimpse of the Background . Gautama and Vatsyayana on Absence (4b/asa) Tottoacintamayi, Part T: Abhdva-sada (A Discourse on Ah translation and explanatory notes uP IIT, Raghunatha 5. Introduction to Raghunstha’s Naf-edda Nafi-xada (A Discourse on the Significance of Negative ‘translation and explanatory notes (DIX. Sanskrit texts The Abkava-vada of Gages ‘The Nof-xada of Raghundtha CITEDPART I The Basic Concepts of Navya-nyidya PhilosophyKKh NK NS PIN rc TCA TCD TCDG Teby TCM ABBREVIATIONS Sciharsa. Khaydanakhondakhadya. Edited by Laxmana Sastri Dravida, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 21. Benares: Chowkhamba Book Depot, 1914. Sridhara. Nyayakandali. A commentary on Pratastapada-bhasya. Edited by Vindheswariprasad Dvivedin. ‘The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series 6, vol. 4. Benares: E. J. Lazarus and Co., 1895. Gautama. Nyayasdira. In Nydyadarsana, vol. I. Edited with the Bhagya of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara’s Varttita, Vacaspati Misra’s Taiparya-(kO and Visvanatha’s Viti by Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Taranath ‘Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18. Calcutta: Metropolitan Pub- lishing House, 1036. Raghunatha Siromani. Poddrtha-tattea-nirapaya, Edited with the com- ‘mentaries of Raghudeva and Ramabhadra by Vindheswariprasad Dvi- vedin. Reprinted from the 1903-1905 issues of The Pandit, Benarest E. J. Lazarus and Co., 1916. Gaiigesa Upadhyaya. Tatteacintamani. Edited with Mathuri in TCM, — Edited with Gadadhari and Didhiti in TCDG. Edited with Jagadisi and Didhiti in TCDJ, Jayadeva (Paksadhara) Misra. Tatteacinidmany-dloka. A commentary ‘on TC. Portions printed in TCM. Raghundtha Siromani. Tattvacintamapi-didhiti. A commentary on TC. Edited with Jagadist in TCDJ. Edited with Gadadhari in TCDG. Gadadhara Bhajtacaryya. Gadadhart. A commentary on TCD. Edited with TC and TCD by Pandit Bamacharan Bhattacharyya and others. ‘Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 42. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1913-1927 ‘Jagadi&a Tarkalatikara. Jagadisi, A commentary on TCD. Edited with 7C and TCD by Somanatha Nyayopadhyaya and others. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 29. Benares: Chowkhamba Book Depot, 1906-1908. Mathurdndtha, Mathur? or Tatteacintamai-rahasya. A commentary on TC. Edited by Kamakhyanatha Tarkavagisha. Bibliotheca Indica edi tion. 4 parts. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1884-1991. INTRODUCTION ‘The concept of absence (abkdva) plays a larger part in ‘Nyliya) literature than comparable concepts of negation play of logic. Its importance is apparent from a consideration of jel applications. Navya-nyaya, instead of using universal ‘every’, is accustomed to express such a proposition as “All notions of absence and locus. Thus we have: “Humanity 4 Jn which there is absence of mortality.” An understanding of is crucial to the understanding of Navya-nyliya, 4 Absence was accepted as a separate category ( school. The philosophers of that school tried ties or attributes (to-use their own terms: guna ‘quality’, ‘goneric property’, viéega ‘differentia’, etc.) as separate the substrata or loci, ie, the things that posses them. They’ ‘endency in their interpretation of negative cognitions oF er of absence asa property by a hypostasis of denial. The | "There is no pot on the ground” or “A pot is absent from ted as “There is an absence of pot on the ground.” It sich an absence as the object of negative cognitions = te entity. Moreover, cognitions like “A cloth is nat & p ‘und “This is different from that” were also treated in th is not a pot” was explained as “A cloth has a mulual from pot.” And a mutual absence was regarded as «. In the above we have analyzed cognitions instead of ‘he concept of cognition (jana) is another basic «i of cognition. Thus, an examination of the nature of us in Chapter 3. * tive cognition (a cognition that takes cognizance of antothe category of cognition that Nyaya character or determinate cognition’ (see §§ 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 for an explanation of thi cept). A cognition ofthis type involves the notion ofa relation relating a qualifiee to a qualificand (see § 2.6). In conformity with this view, an absence is regarded as a qualifier and is said to be related to its locus, the qualificand, by what Nyda calls a svardpa relation. The notion of svardpo relation raises many interesting problems in Nydya as far as its concept of relation in general is concerned. ‘Thus the next two sections of our exposition (Chapters 4 and 5) are devoted to a clariis cation of the Nydya concept of relation. ‘The concept of svartpa relation is alsa crucial to the understanding of the Navya-nyaya discussion of some important relational abstracts — content-ness (eigayu/2), counterpostive-ness (pratiyogi) limitorship (aracchedakata), etc. Accordingly, we shall proceed to a discussion: of such concepts. Tn speaking of an absence, Nya asserts, we implicitly stand committed (0 the following concepts. Whenever we assert that an absence of an object « (sayy pot) occurs in some locus (say, on the ground), it is implied that @ could have ‘occurred in, or, more generally, could have been related to, that locus by some definite relation. In recognizing an instance of absence (say, the absence of a), We ‘actually presuppose the following counterfactual conditional: If a were notabsent {@ would have occurred in or would have been related to that locus by suche Such a relation. Thus, in speaking of absence of 2, we should always be prepared tospecify this such-and-such relation, that is, we should be able to state by which: relation ais said to be absent from the locus. This relation should not be confused with the relation by which the absence itself, as an independent property, occurs in the locus. The latter relation is called, as we have already noted, a svarfipa relation, The first relation is described in the technical language of Navya-nyaya ‘as the ‘limiting or delimiting relation of the relational abstract, counterpositive: hess; involved in the instance of absence in question’ (protivogitavacchedakas tambondha), Ts, a pot usually occurs on a ground by samyoga or conjunction felation, When itis absent there, we say that a pot does not occur on the ground by conjunction or that a pot is not conjoined to the ground. By this simple state= tment we actually imply, according to Nyaya, that there is an absence on the round —an absence the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of which isa pot, and the Uelimiting relation of being the counterpositive (Le., counterpositive ness = ‘pratisogitd) of which is conjunction, While giving the identity condition of a instance of absence, Nyaya demands that we should be able to specify this limiting relation whenever necessary. The following inequality statements indicate the importance of considering such a relation: (a) “Absence of pot x absence of cloth.” (2) “‘An absence of pot by the relation of conjunction » an absence of by the relation of inherence.” "The clas ofthe loc ofthe fist absence hee is the lass of all objects except thase which {ncontact witha pt (euchas piece of ground). But the cas ofthe oof the second ance the clas ofall objects exept the parts (oayaz0) of a pot where the pot i present hy inh fare already using the notion of delimitor (avacchedaka). A part of times described with reference to the whole object in the fash ‘ws delimited (avacchinna) by its part py. ‘Taus “tis mount {is top’ actually refers to the top of this mountain, Besides th ¢ locushood (adhikarayatd) is often tg property or limitor. In understanding or in expres acts, we must understand or express their limitors (thelt di i delimiting relations), In short, a relational abstract usually Modinary” property lke cow-ness or pot-ness as its lilo, Ae {o read a serious text in Navya-nyaya without constantly ‘concepts such as pratiyogitd (counterpositive:ness) and itorship). ‘Thus we shall examine the nature of these a ‘point, Ny’ya often mentions the defects of circularity or of (iinasraya, anyonyasraya). Simplicity of assumptions. (hi jdored to be decisive in favor of a theory as against hea nptions (Aalpandgourava). ‘The search for & 69M ladhorma) that may tie different instances of manifold that our speech behavior or our understanding of them ‘Always welcome in Nyaya discourse, It was believed that ty helps in theorizing about those manifold instances ng contexts. ‘These important concepts are briefly problem of negation in philosophy and logic is very briefly 14 with some references to relevant Western theories. To I hackground of the problem in Nyaya, we gve, in Part I, felevant portions of Gautama and Vatsyayana, the eaiest fs ychool, with explanatory notes. A brief historical survey 0 ka literature dealing with negation (or, to be precio, Selected passages of the two major Navya-nyaya (New Nj ‘and Raghunatha, with translations and notes, constitute2 ON JN4NA OR COGNITION § 21 In the West logic has been primarily concerned with propositions or sentences. Navya-nyaya, like the older Indian systems of logic, deals rather with what it calls jndna, by which it means something close to ‘particular instances of cognition’. An instance of cognition, it is true, can be shown to be ultimately related to some verbal form, namely, to a statement or sentence. In the case of a determinate or qualificative cognition (savikalpa or visisla jana), with which Navya-nylya is chiefly concerned, the relation is very close. But the jana itself is not a form of language, and scholars have differed in their English translations of the term; it has been rendered as ‘knowledge’, ‘cognition’, ‘awareness’, ‘appre= hhension’, and ‘judgment’, In selecting ‘cognition’ or ‘particular instance of cog nition’ asa translation, I am aware that the ordinary sense of the English word must be modified to adjust it to the concept designated by jndna, a concept I shall try to explain here. $2.2 Jnana, as it has been understood in both the Old and the New Nyaya Schools, is given a wider usage than in other Indian philosophical systems like Slipkhya or Vedanta. Thus Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya system, asserted that jndna ‘instance of cognition’, buddhi, and wpalabdhi ‘apprehension’ are but diferent names for an identical object? In the Nydya school, therefore, to be conscious means to be conscious of something, there being no such thing as “pure consciousness”; and this, again, means to cognize, that is, to have a jadna of Jing. The conscious subject, or self, is analyzed as the subject that has cognition or jndna, the obvious conclusion being that a jfidna or a cognition- 1D. HLH. Ingalls in Materials forthe Study of Nonya-Nydye Logic wses the translation ‘knowl. ‘ge’ He tells me that he chose that translation chiely for etymological reasons, the Sanskrit ‘oot jad being cognate with Old English hnawan, and that he holds no further beef frit JN. ‘Mobanty, in “On the Nature of the Primsaya-Theory.” Our Heritage, 8 (1060). 27 feels that ‘rami (true ja) is closet than jfdne to ‘knowledge’, T euppore, because ‘knowledge? ia ‘nglsh caries with ia sense that what is bnown is true. ANS 11s. The stra is clearly directed against the Simya school where jdna was de- scribed as the modification of buddli. Vetsyayana remarked “Duddheh soibhésitoy caitonyom ‘utheyam,” which may’ be interpreted to support the equation, “jing = consciousness.” Se also KK. Bhattacharyya, “The Indian Concept of Knowledge and Self,” Our Heritage,» (2054), 228 isa quality (gun) or a qualifier (dharma)? of the self, Thus ‘posited dna as something belonging to the self (actually it was ‘Of the sel), which is its substrate or locus. A jadna isa particulate oF & tone is particular. It can very well be viewed as an (4 particular tone or sound can be thought of a a physical ss much a product of a collocation of causal conditions as ore, a jada is a momentary event, being in this respect al Il | A nana cannot be said to bea modification of anything in the Ws taken as the modification of a lump of clay. It can be called & # ly in the sense that what the Naiyayikas call mind (manas) i {actually the instrument)* in the production of a jadna, Again, We { fan act if we would thereby imply that there is always 4 this act is directed. But since it has been the convention to Arisa (which in the Nyaya system means only physical unt of material bodies, including atoms) by the teem ‘act? OF {qualify the term ‘act’ when applied to jada with the word [parallelism between a sound and a jana can be carried furthen By clr psitin, and soon. But how can ferent lingushed from each other? The Naiyayikas’ answer fs quite iion-particulars are to be distinguished by their reference to. s Cognitions are always cognitions of or about . . . , and whit to be taken ab the ob Bf Tacan pilosophy) they do not belleve that (jnatata = known-ness) in the object. notion of dherma and dharmin is explained in § 2.10. some controversy over the correct interpretation of the Potter, “Are the Vatesika“Gupas? Qualities?” Philosophy ast and Well scion that followed in subsequent fase ofthe same jurnal, Yeyon a0 Tahal use the term heres something having a temporal oorinae, Not also that Tam excluding Go's cogiton fs this Is good eeaon for emphascing this pnt. Since the natn of ell We ‘of mind was rather insgniant. It was taken a a oatrament for instrament for writing. Ths the expresion “Mind thinks sloked fexptession “The pen writes” marian hel, as opposed tothe Nyy view, that «rid veal rot ahitotha bis), Jayanta (N3Syamanjrh, dl 2) argue et that dna ie phaarabhive (ofthe nate ofa proky) rather ure of an act oF proce). The notion of an instrument, howeve 1 the eseiption of = physical act, ng, “fos chin Ct ict here is the fling of «tee, whore the axis the nateumen: Silay init” (Hl knows with the mina”) or “eau pat” (Me eh ‘ye athe inatrursent, jie the product ive ite i nnGkratay dhs,” Udayana. Nyiyabumial so occurs in Saikanata's Protorevaponcib, p. 15.It may be well to enumerate some of the nonphysical acts that the Naiyayikas wish to include under the term jana and to enumerate some other nonphysical acts to which they will not apply the term jadna. Perceiving, inferring, knowing, doubting, wondering, guessing, remembering, dreaming, etc., can be put in the first list. Desiring, willing, hoping, rejoicing, suffering, etc., can be put in the second list §23 ‘The Nytya considers that the self-transcending reference to some object, or the object-directedness, or the property of being related to some object or other (savisayakatea), is the distinctive character of a jadna. One may point out (Gadie dhara has actually done so in a different context) that the said property is not peculiar to jaiana but belongs to some other nonphysical acts. However, the pres vailing opinion among the Naiyayikas is that other nonphysical acts such as desite and aversion refer to objects only indirectly,’ that is, they all ensue upon some kind of jdna or have as their basis some cognition. Hence the sisayald (intens tionality?) that pertains to them is borrowed, in some sense, from a jana. Thus it is that only a jana has a primary or “‘unborrowed” visayala. One may decide, by now, that “primary” visayaid is the distinctive proper cf the nonphysical acts mentioned in the first list (§ 2.2) and that “borrowed” igayata distinguishes the mental acts of the second list from those of the first But an important exception is to be made. Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow) though they are mental states, do not have any visayo/@ at all. They proceed, according to Nyaya, from some instance of jAdna or other nonphysical acts whi have an objective reference, but they are themselves only the results of such nonphysical acts. They are mere feeling without any self-transcendental reference, ‘Thus, not all mental phenomena have sisaya!@ as their distinctive mark. It isy furthermore, very difficult to specify the condition of borrowed vigayat@ as dis tinguished from primary visaya/d. Perhaps the theory is based upon the common- ‘sense argument that one cannot desire or hate something unless one has some faequaintance, directly or indirectly, with that thing or has formed an idea of that thing, however vague that idea may be. But, in any case, such a distinction is not ‘crucially important for the Naiyayikas and so has often been ignored. §24 Before proceeding further with an exposition of the concept of jf ‘we will do well to make clear the meaning of various Western terms that have been ‘used in comparable contexts. Since a jadna is called a mental phenomenon ‘opposed to a physical phenomenon like sound, we may begin by considering the terion by which Franz Brentano tried to distinguish mental phenomena Ii ing, believing, desiring, loving, and hating from physical acts like riding He proposed the concept of “intentional inexistence” as a means of commentators. Franz Brentano, Peychologie som empirschen Stondpunkt, 1874, vol. I, book 1H, chap, ‘The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena,” trans. D. B. Terrell in R Chisholm, ei, Realism ond the Background of Phenomenology, Pp. $@f ‘cannot infer from it either that a thing exsts or that a {not the case with the object of a physical act, We enn ‘oF even perceive, in hallucination or in a dream, & winged ‘only real horses. Some, however, argued that there fi ‘of mental phenomena in general and that only thinking and hich a property." Brentano argued that all mental ph Joy and sorrow (affirmation and denial, love and hate d iipon some preseniation and refer to what ls present lai Aed toward some object that significant contrast with the Nyaya concept ofa wigayoll per ‘other nonphysical acts. the problem posed by Brentano a litte further because ft ical importance, Since imaginary objects like Pegasus and the objects of mental acts) do not have a counterpart in th maintained that such objects have the property of “ink Hut perhaps he did not imply that they belong to a sep Iapart from the real world. Later on, Frege tied to expla use of the dichotomy of Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung iences.!” Names like Pegasus have sense but no reference i i, according to Frege, in an indirect context (comparable’ ‘mental acts) a name refers to its sense, ‘Thus Pegasus i ‘ct cannot be said to have an ordinary reference in the problem of modern logic may be linked to the problem of omology in the following way (see also § 3.2), The Nyaya ‘e101 OF false cognition as follows. What does afalve cognition ‘1 & false cognition does not exist, whereas the objects of do exist and hence are identifiable with some entity in the says that an instance of a false cognition has a vijay of & 60 Which is analyzable into constituent parts and that theve identifiable as real objects. In other words, they alto ‘avoid positing a world of subsistent entities ar of us fe have noted that Navya-nyaya analyzes ja oF analytic philosophy in general, under the influence ip formulate its questions in linguistic of quaslinguiatll ents or propositions rather than in terms ol psycho es. Thus the logical positivists formulated the ically and tried to avoid the traditional inal bodied spirit,” some world-cognizing ego, as the cent smological problems. It may be noted that the Nydya ” ays "We then defined mental phenomena as presentations und Wie resenttions; all the rest belong to the physica.” LB Pg Frege, “Uber Sinn und Bedentung,” pp. 86-93.to ee TT ee (atman) is not exactly equivalent to that of a world-cogn to the Naiyfyikas, is a substance that is the legitimate substrate of the cogn! particulars, just as a particular color has, as its substrate, a colored pot. In Western logic the need has been felt for redefining propositions as in pendent of their subjective concomitants in order to free logic from the defee of “psychologism.” Even so, a proposition in modem logic is not considered id tical with its linguistic counterpart. Rather, we now have an abstract sense of ‘word ‘proposition’ * which can be described, following Frege, as being ‘the ol jective content of thought which is capable of being the common property many.” # In Frege's analysis a meaningful sentence has a proposition as its mé ing (Sinn) and a truth value (truth or falsity) as its reference (Bedeutung). S meanings or senses are, in Frege’s view, abstract entities. Alonzo Church suggested that the sense of a sentence “may be described as that which is gras ‘when one understands the sentence, or that which two sentences in different {guages must have in common in order to be correct translations each of other.” According to his proposal, a proposition is to be regarded as a ¢ fof some truth value. To quote Church: “Therefore a proposition, as we tse term, is an abstract object of the same general category as a class, a number, OF function. Tt has not the psychological character of William of Ockham’s propo ‘mentalis or of the traditional judgment: in the words of Frege, explaining his Gedanke, itis ‘nicht das subjective Tun des Denkens, sondern dessen object Inhalt, der fhig ist, gemeinsames Eigenthum von Vielen zu sein.’ ”# Chi also points out that in asserting a proposition we need not make any reference to particular language, whereas in asserting a sentence we do use an actual langui Modern “non-Platonic” philosophers do not wish to accept such abstract tities, They contend that a problem arises under the Frege-Church theory propositions when we inquire about the criterion for the identity of a proposi ‘One may explain the identity of propositions by an appeal to the synonymity sentences. But this problem of synonymity has been difficult for modern phil ‘ophers. It is finally related to the problems of intentionality and of indi (ungerade) context.* W, V. Quine has proposed to take instead of propositions what he calls ‘et ‘sentences? as the vehicles of truth values in logic.” He rejects the notion of jroposition as the translational constant, for according to his theory of the i terminacy of translation there is no uniquely correct standard of translati ‘Again, he does not regard a proposition as a constant of the so-called philosopl Compare Frege's ‘Gedanke’. Alzo compare Bernard Bolzano's ‘objective proposition! ‘objective proposition is nota combination of words, but ony the sense which a certain com tion of words may expres!” (Wissenchafiselre, §28)- For a good discussion of the notin proposition, sce also Alonzo Church, “Propositions and Sentences” in T. M. Boch Problem ef Univesus. Tune this lforsation about Belaune to Professor Daginn Pal "8 Frege, “Sinn,” p 89 4M Alonzo Church, Introduction fo Mathemetiea! Loi, p. 25. Tales are mine 10 Thi, p. 26. Fora diferencein his sense of proposition? and Frege's use of Gedanke’ se a7, especially note 72 See W. V. Quine, Word and Objep. 202 1 Toi, $842 and 43. For ‘eternal sentence! se especially p. 208. for, according to him, in philosophic parap led, A sentence as @ repeatable sound pattern ing, what admits of truth and falsity: an individual event of ice or what may be calle | A sentence-type, unless itis relativized to some time ps {ty truth values. But in order that the laws of loge ronces of the sentence-type without being unrewardingly Hy that a sentence-type that is true in one occurrence be cel with such problems, some philosophers posit the abst ditions as ‘surrogate truth vehicles’. But Quine thinks that, its by using an eernatized sentence in place of the ordinary Wernal sentence, according to Quine’s definition, is simply Gr in this mouth.” ® ‘A similar spirit, P. F. Strawson has proposed to take whit ‘f# the standard possessor of truth values, Statements, wes Hive sentences “imbedded in the context.” They are to be telerence to the words used, but also by reference to the leh they are used, and, sometimes, by the identity of ML, J. Cohen has given another suggestion. He ertilaes con the ground that neither of them considers that & {is truth value because of what he calls the feature of ‘has proposed that the concept of saying may well replace the | A ying, according to him, is that which “a man repeats to others, or treats now as a premise and now as & 60 Helurn to our origina issue. In Navya-nydya, members of Mlclars which the Naiydyikas call wtiya jnana or ‘quali Awkon as the constant for philosophic analysis, One may particulary are incurably private and are also moment it of an utterance of a sentence-token, Utterance ean at ty and hence can admit of a general structural analyst wm the person who utters it. But of a private cognitio fltempt a philosophic analysis? From the Nyaya point 10 be simple. All qualifcative (oisita or savikalpa) {0 some linguistic form, i, to some actual or possible ‘unlyzing such a sentence (actual or possible) from the) Naiylyikas consider themselves to have analyzed the cular. The problem of privacy is thus avoided, for Nimyeant” (to use a highly provocative term) by the treated as intersubjective. 1 fully clarify the issues involved here, but I shall try ‘hem, In the epistemological event connected with & «9 ” Introduction t» Logical Theory, 4 214 Diversity of Meaning. Fora exticim of Quire and Strawsan ‘saying see § 19. qparticular, let us distinguish between what X shall eall the epistemic attitude and what may be taken as the objective content of that event. The epistemic attitude is what is private to each individual, but the objective content may very well be a public property. It is dificult to specify the epistemic attitude in each case, but wwe can describe the epistemic attitude as an inclination to or even to doubt the objective content of the assertion, provided that a given cognition is of an assertive or qualificative type. While we may note in passing that according to the Nyaya not all jadna-particulars are of the q i type, in those that are, the epistemic attitude may fairly be described as above. What is important for the purpose of analysis in Nyaya is not the epistemic atti- tude but the objective content of a qualifcative cognition-particular. Now we must consider the problem of how far cognition-particulars can be regarded as bearers of truth values. In most textbooks of Western logic a proposi- fr a statement is defined as that which can be significantly said to be true or false. Ina similar vein, we might say that a qualiticative (vista) cognition can be said to be either true of false. But one should note that the Naiyayikas do not use this characteristic as @ definition. A qualificative cognition may indeed be discursively formulated as a declarative sentence, but this linguistic formulation felt by the Naiyayikas to be inessential to the cognition-particular. One and the same cognition may be expressed in different natural languages. What is essential is the meaning (to use again this provocative term), or the concept 45 a whole, of the possible formulation. It is possible also for one to cognize a thing or things together without having a possible formulation in any language. We can regard such cognitions as simple awareness or as mere acquaintance with the object. The Naiydyikas class them as nirsikalpa (nonqualificative or prejudg- mental) cognitions. We may think of a cognition as the result of a mental process in the person cognizing, And this process is directed toward an object (in the widest sense ofthe word). Furthermore, the process may or may not make one or more of the features of the object appear more distinctly than the other features to the cognizer. If it does so, which is not possible in the case of a nonqualificative cog- nition, then the object toward which the process is directed is called by the Naiydyikas the diarmin or the qualificand (sifegya) of the cognition, and the feature or features emphasized are called the visesapas or qualifiers of the cognition. In other words, the qualifier and the qualificand are taken to be the constituents of the eognition-particular in question. We shall use the convention that the quali- ficative cognition “has” the qualifier and the qualiicand. For convenience, we use ambiguously the expressions: ‘the qualifier ofthe cognition c, the qualificand 5 of the cognition c’ and ‘the qualifier a of the qualificand 8, where the differences in the meanings of the preposition ‘of’ are, hovrever, clear. It goes without saying that the qualifier is cognized as belonging to the qualificand and that the quali- ficand is cognized as poscessing the qualifier. 11 am referring to the nirstalpa perception here. Lam avoiding the term ‘indeterminate’ (rhich is uually ofered asthe translation of wiritalp) because that wil not clarify the issues involved here. ee TT i We may now proceed to anal of a given qu lion, ‘The content, taken as a whole, isthe given totality to whieh refers. Thus, if the cognition is expressed as “This pot is blue," the not simply the pot present before me, but something that fs ‘cognition, then, taken as a whole, is articulated insuch a way tha ‘or features of it will be emphasized as features of, or occurrent iy remaining portion or portions of the content. What feature oF fi ned depend partly on the person cognizing and partly on the. las the presentation involved. We can then describe a qualificative raining by means of a more or less thoroughgoing analy that 90 6 or “has” a certain feature or features, eg. a certain quality, |, certain magnitude, a certain denomination, a certalt st sense), or a certain relation. Thus a qualifcative cognition) wer to questions of the form: “What is this?” “What 2?” “When or where does it occur?” But it is not ions actually precede every act of a qualificative cognition, for fceur so immediately that a state of uncertainty does nol Rssother point of view, we can decibe « qa ble. To communicate it, one usually gives it a verbal form ks on the structure ofthe Sanskrit language may be in order, Uses the verb ‘tobe’ to connect a noun with is adjective, ‘convention regarding the order of words like nouns and uite frequently meet such expressions of qualificative eo ,” which can be translated either as “The pot [is] blue!” or aa! PiNyaya, in this case, usually regards ‘the pot? as express tht ‘Dhue’ as expressing the qualifier. This raises no problem, app keeps in mind the scheme of the Vaisesika categories, a ‘substance and blue-color is its quality. itis more likely that the qualiicand-qualifier distinetion is distinction rather than a metaphysical one, In other ological concepts rather than metaphysical (or even li lwo § 2.8). Consider the cognition whose verbal expression it stalf-bearer the umbrella-bearer"). Here the linguistic ex us much to distinguish the qualificand from the qualifier. ‘The ological situation involved is, perhaps, our chief guide i the qualficand from the qualifier. Because of the amb ‘expression, we can translate it either as “The stafl-bearer “The umbrella-bearer has a staf.” But each episten nin the Western tradition is similar to this qualif janyaya. The subject-predicate distinction at theLal ee eT ably supplied the basis for the metaphysical distinction between un ular in the West. The philosophic doctrine of the subject-predicate distine- tion as noted by the Scholastics in the West roughly states that particulars cam appear in a discourse as subjects only, never as predicates, whereas universals or nonparticulars generally can appear either as subjects or as predicates. Such a theory might have its genesis in the paradigm of simple sentences like “Socrates is wise.” But this becomes more and more obscure as we apply it to more complix cated sentence forms. Consequently this theory has been criticized by some modern philosophers.** Although the subject-predicate distinction (even at the ‘metaphysical level) might be philosophically important, I shall not enter into this intricate problem here. ‘As far as Navya-nyfya is concerned, I do not think that the qualificand and the qualifier are grammatical categories, as the subject and the predicate, in some ‘contexts at least are thought to be in the West. They are logical or epistemological categories, as are the subject and the predicate in many contexts in the West. In modern terminology, they might be called semantic or metalinguistic concepts. For convenience, I shall us, following the Navya-nyaya writers, such expressions as “the qualificand is a particular pot,” which might be taken as abbreviations for “the qualificand is expressed by ‘a pot’ ”, etc It should be noted that although the qualficand-qualifier distinction is not ‘grammatical, the grammatical structure of the sentence expressing a qualificative ‘cognition helps us to note this distinction, more often than not. A probable excep- tion to this has been noted in § 2.7. It might also be noted that the subject predicate distinction at the grammatical level was not unknown in the Indian tradition (cf. the terms uddesya and vidheya; also such rules as “uddesyam ante a na sidheyam udirayet”). This distinction was also applied at the epistemological level by the philosophers. But itis interesting to note that even at the epistemo= logical level the uddesya-vidheya distinction (i., subject-predicate distinction in the Sanskrit tradition) does not always coincide with the qualificand-qualifier distinction. As Jagadi‘a remarks in TCDJ in the chapter “Paksata,” qualifiers and predicates (vidheya) do not always go together (“idheyatsam tw na prakaras ‘aniyatam . . . kvacid-vifesya-ertir api”). When we infer, for example, the pres tence of fire on the mountain, the epistemological predicate is fire, but the qualifier will be sometimes fire and sometimes the mountain or occurrence-on-the-mountain (parvata-oyttitea), depending, in this case, upon the grammatical structure of the linguistic expression of the inferential cognition. ‘The linguistic expression might be either “The mountain is fiery” (“parsato vahniman”) or “(There is) fire on the mountain” (“‘parvate sahnih”), depending upon the whole process of inference, vviz., the structure of the premises, ete From a different point of view, the Nyaya qualificand-qualifer distinction ight be said to have originated from the problem of the substance-quality dichotomy of the earlier school. But it nevertheless crystallized, in the later school, % Fora severe attack on this distinction see F. P. Ramsay, “Uaiversals” (2929), in R. Be Braithwaite, ed, The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 116-117 B. , Strawson, Zndiniduls, parti, § fo] and § 66) Amportant methodological procedu te further disc in this procedure alittle more. Consider the followings "Socrates is wise.” predicate is said to be the predicate. This comes close to the Nyaya view which Wu the qualifier and Socrates as the qualficand in this context, 80 this qualiicative cognition as W) “(Socrates Wisdom)” or “Q(Socrates Wisdom),” ; m i tor, and it ean bet itor on the two constants. Aisual convention will be to place the qualificane first and the, ‘Accordingly, we can present the following analyses He isa king.” (2) “Q(The-person-the-speaker-has-ia Kingship).” ) HA pot.” (3) “Oot Pot-ness).” A pot is blue.” (4’) “Q(Pot Blue-eolor)” {hat (5) also forms a part of (4). Thus (4!) can be further Pot-ness)" and “Q(Blue-color Blue-ness),” whish an be {) "0(0(Pot Pot-ness)(Blue-color Blue-ness))."7 it becomes clear that Blue-color, although it occurs in the lifer with respect to Pot and a qualficand with respect 10 he first grand analysis of (4) is given by (4), the Naiydyika {qualificand” (mubhya-rigegya). (See also § 37.) ‘The Nyaya holds, as we have seen, that a qualficative rue or false. But the Naiyayikas do not define it by this é they fee! that the definiens, viz. the alternative characte ‘merely gives an “extensional” characterization of the defi Aggregate of the two different classes, each of which is to be way, One may better define a qualificative cognition as ai thing (the qualificand) as containing such and such feat |, however, can also be either true of false fone point needs to be stressed. According to the Nyilya & ‘ean also be taken as a qualificative cognition. ‘The usual tant cognition can be given with the help of two ineompatil Pethaps that is a man; perhaps that is a tree.” But ord ng capital eters in words ike ‘Wisdom in order to show that I Hers or proper names purporting to refer to only one objets am ier. But Tam extending his taage to include words like “PO fora po. clr nuns the instance of auch a color and may be Weal (Word and Ose, pp 971). And “Rhienea! names Hue niet 8 yall blue patches Nyaya pats inthe following way: Mieco a fom nes). ("in Sanskrit wl be “ilatestita-nl ripe Tigorous Nyda deinion has, however, been given nthe following tio jxGnatsam” — roughly, something that hat rlatlona cognition.‘ascertain such a cognition to be true or false. Nyaya logic, nevertheless, holds ‘hat the dichotomy of truth and falsity should exhaust the domain of qualificative cognition. So, to fill the “truth-value gap,” the dubitant cognition is ruled ag false.® Definitions of truth and falsity are also adjusted to cover the cases off ubitant cognition. ‘A qualifcative cognition can be true if and only if it agrees with reality. But the word “reality” is proverbially ambiguous. We shall avoid such words. Follow ing Gatigeta, we can define truth and falsity as follo Da. A qualifcative cognition is false ifthe qualifier does not occur in, or fs not contained in, the qualificand; otherwise it is true.* We have already mentioned qualificand and qualifier (see § 2.8) as the consti uuent elements of a qualifcative cognition. In a more thoroughgoing analysis yaya talks of three elements instead of two: the qualifand, the qualifier, and: link oF relation connecting the two. These elements are brought under one cate gory, which is technically called visayatd.®® Thus, the eigayaf@ of a given qual cative cognition is a complex composed of three elements which have three differ ent denominations: viSesyutd, qualficand-ness; prakdrat2, qualifer-ness; samsargatO,relation-ness or, better, relational vigayal@. Obviously, these are venient abstractions from the corresponding descriptions, the qualificand, ualfier, and the relational tie. The usual procedure is that if xis described as. ualifier of some cognition, then + is said to have or possess the abstract, qualifier ‘ness; and so on. tis to be noted further that Ny@ya develops a language which can perhap be given the appellation of a ‘property-location’ language (a term which Stra uses to describe a similar language)."* The model sentence of such a l contains the introduction of general concepts and “the indi dence.” Under this interpretation, the qualifier can be viewed as the fe universal (with due modification of the Strawsonian sense of the term), and th qualificand can be viewed as the locus where the qualifier is said to occur. Ward like ‘locus’, ‘occurrence’, ‘location’, and ‘resident’ will be used from now on in, very general sense following the Naiylyikas, and the meanings of such should not be taken to be concerned only with spatial location or physical occu rence or residence. Instead of saying that humanity or man-universal is in fiated in a particular man, Nyaya says that the property humanity occurs in man or that a particular man isa locus of humanity. ‘The relation of occurrence regarded as a very fundamental concept in Nyaa. We can call it a “primi in the construction of Nyaya logic. ‘Property" is here used in the broadest sense Nyaya also asserts that to call something ‘property’ is not to say that itis realy 2 Ct. “tat-prapatcoviporytsah sam eyo'piprokrtital," Vigvandtha,B also Praastapida’s division of ja into siya and ori 2% T shall abbreviate Sf and only "ad if hencefor ward Yatra yon nds lara tanya jainam,lad-abhioa-al lt-prakirakom vd eprom tad-on saly onwbhoseteom exo vi pramatsam,” Gadgets, TC, in TCM, Pat I, p. 4 There has been much speculation regarding the ontological status of rif ‘school of Navya-nyiya. I shal discuss the matter in Chapter 7 * Stramson, Individuals, p, 203. there are fictitious or unexampled (aprasiddha) properties, hey | jos that have no locus to occur in. ‘Thus to say that x fettious is to iy possesses x as its property, ie. = Gy) (x occurs in y)." In the light ofthese remarks, the schema for a qualifca:ive cognition, 9 {ts qualificand and bas its qualifier and ras the relation connecting itten as “b occurs in a by the relation ror “a has through #” oF ort,“ oceurs i has 8” (when we do not want to specify ther mote careful formulation of Dx will be: Da, A cognition ‘b occurs in a’ is false if & does not occu in aj is true, \Wsing the notion of relation: Dg. A cognition occurs in a by 1’ is false if does nol oceut Ih otherwise itis true. ; ‘ay remind one of Tarsk’s formulation ofthe semantic definition of the difference is also obvious. For one thing, truth and falsity ‘of the qualficative cognition, while for Tarski uth is & we in the object-language. The portion set off by quotation 10 be viewed as the sentence-token by which the cognition is ther a quasi-sentence, or the intensional form of that cognition, I the abstract notion of proposition, which is what “two sente ages must have in common in order to be correct transla "In this connection one may also be reminded of Aris Metaphysics (so1vba6-38): “To say of what is that itis not, OF Of AL it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what Is NO Is true.” Sometimes attempts are made to label the Nyaa hat is called ‘the correspondence theory of truth’” in trad ophy. T have avoided such a procedure since it may obscure) lies of the Nyaya theory of truth.” @ later Naiyayikas developed the notion of truth and falsity, ‘of qualifier and qualifcand in a more thoroughgoit mat j But one thing is certain: a qualifier must have a qualifiand, uy qualifier does not occur in the corresponding qualifcand, . Thus we can rephrase D2 as follows: dh aprasidlia terms were always viewed as suspect in a fa sentence dealing with some logical definition or the dda by Nyya. See the Notes to passage r4 of Chapter 4and 1 1.25. (See § 2.5 above) or somewhat diferent exposition of Gaige'a's definition of trath se lentally,{ must acknowledge that Ido not understand the pon: he wishes stence that Gages’ concept of truth is a “hybrid” entity, wing (ashe teen'sD4. A cognition ¢ is false iff @s)(3y)(« “appears” as a qualifier of y in € = does not occur in 9) Note that we have not applied the adjective ‘quaificative’ to cognition « here since in a nonqualificative cognition nothing appears as qualify hence it is, by definition, neither true nor false. §2.10 It has been indicated above that ontological ideas of substance attribute, and grammatical distinctions of substantive and adjective, are to distinguished from this qualifier-qualificand distinction. Nyaya introduces ane other pair of terms, viz., dharma ‘property’ and dharmin ‘property-possesson's This might be called an ontological distinction corresponding to the epistemo- logical distinction between the qualifier and the qualficand. When we say, The! table has four legs,” we can describe, according to Nyfya, the four legs as the! 4ualifier of the table, which is its qualificand in regard to the cognition concerned, Apart from the context of a cognition, we can describe the four legs as the dharma or property (using the English term in a very broad sense) of the dharmin oF. locus (literally, property-possessor), the table. Although all cognitions that have verbalized forms are qualifcative, itis to be! noted that the qualifier may not always be explicitly mentioned in words in such ‘verbal forms. This is clear in example (3) of § 2.8. The general principle uphel by Nyaya is roughly that anything that appears ina qualificative cognition mus appear as something, i, with some feature (Kincit-prakireya), unless itis ap ing only relationally, .¢.,as a mere connector. But there are two important exe tions to this rule. A generic property (ati) or an unanalyzable ordinary prop (akhada upadhi) can appear as such, i., without any further reference to vo feature of it in a cognition, when and only when such a property is not mentior in words in the corresponding verbalized form of such a cognition.” Note that usually a generic property or an imposed property (comparable to the universal) ioned in words in ordinary sentences expressing cognitions, (See ample (3) of § 2.8.) Thus in “This is a pot” the entity pot appears as a pot, i 488 qualified by pot-ness, a generic property, and thereby pot-ness also appears 4an object of that cognition, although it has not been mentioned in its verbal pression. By contrast, when we say in reference to a pot, the entity pot appears there as ¢ substance and not a3 a pot, ie., as qualified substance-ness and not by pot-ness. Properties like held to be the objects of the respective cognitions. Nyaya also states that if fi any verbal expression of a cognition such a property as pol-ness, which we usta take to be a qualifier, is mentioned in words, it will refer back to another unmet oned qualifer or feature. Thus, if the verbal expression is “This has pot-ness! Pot-ness is, here, not only a qualifier but also a qualificand which refers back to unmentioned qualifier, vis., ghafateatva (pot-ness-ness), which is but a conventent Note the following remark of Gaigeéa: “irsbalpobon co prandpramdbohirblatom ‘uahirinengetsit oryspedciya-padensladupagrahsya ndmojdtyidsejntrunion opt 0m ostity ora latparyom,” Gadgesa, TC, in TCM, Part poe, (© "Jatyubhoudopidhinim anuiliblyemininim stort pate thinepagomt.” liar property cognized to occur only in pot-ness (ql 0 be stressed, simply because it implies that given a eognlt ly one way of formulating the discursive symbol of ity Tanguage. And given the sentence, we can decide how lilicands are involved in that particular cognition. ‘THis ed in ordinary language, ie., in the object-language, iy Airletly identical with another cognition that J" for their interpretations in ins an additional quali lacking in the formers ualificative cognition is always expressible in words, But 4 cognition that an observer will have ater listening (0 Words or this utterance is not identical, although it th the cognition which gave rise to the utterance. The st ood by comparing it with the distinction made in movlerh ‘observer's viewpoint and the participant's viewpolnty speaker's attitude and the hearer’ attitude (both beg le event that ensues after the utterance is made is eet omic event that leads to such an utterance, NyAya of fabdabodha, ie. a cognition arising from listening 60 (allowing, however for one-word sentences) ae the unit tO ommunication holds between the speaker and the here we certain factors that are auxiliary to the understand Although the sentence is constituted only of words, ‘They. Mcompetency), ataitya (eyntactcal expectancy) AM (speaker's intention). I shall only very roughly sketeh competency is the relatedness of different entities OF Individual word-components of the sentence. Consid {I Thuthdvena orion kyntaté”™ ute utter for ‘an ax’, the resulting sentence, though onsensical; i. the desired communication fails, becAlse ‘cannot be instrumental in the activity of cutting a t Hy such a sentence structure. The desired commune because of the absence of the feature called semantical ounce, we are indulging in some wild poetic metapho) Is said to be that feature of the syntax the absence of ition of two or more words unintelligible, Thus in (9) or if we drop ‘with’, the resulting expression is connection Quine, From 4 Logical Pint of View p18 Matra tadvattd yoxyatd parikiti,” Visvandtha, Bhiydpariceheday, “imuparot hy akin” (“syntactical expectancy Us theconcepts by using the notions of meaningfulness and grammaticalness. Consider the following two examples: sates (the field) with water.” It is argued that sentence (6) lacks yogya/@, semantical competency, whereas Sentence (7) has it. It may be noted that both (6) and (7) are grammatically acceptable, but while the latter is also semantically acceptable, Le, meaningful the former fs not. Without risking mich, one can say that semantical competency isa property that turns a grammatically acceptable but semantically nonaccepte, able sentence into a semantically acceptable one. Or, to give examples in am English setting, ths isa property that sentences such a8, (8) “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” and (6) “Dead linguists smoke buildings” do not possess. Almost a similar point can be made with regard to the inconceivable combinas Sons like ‘sandhya-sufa’ (son of a barren woman’) or ‘the circular square? opposed to the conceivable combinations like Saso-rigo’ (the rabbit’s horn’) of ‘the winged hors’. In short although grammar allows inconceivable combinatio such combinations lck Jopyaf@ and hence do not generate any cognitivemeaningy With regard to akaitlya or syntactic expectancy, one might say that itis syntactic property that an utterance lacks when itis nota grammatically accepts able sentence. Consider the following sentenc (10) “phatam anaya” = “Bring a pitcher.” ‘This is said to have the property of syntactic expectancy because the verb ‘anaya! ( Bring’) is accompanied by an accusative ‘ghatam’ (‘a pitcher’). Syntactic exe Pestancy is also said to be fulfilled (according to some) because the word.base none: 2, ea arisen in modern philosophy concerning the use ofthe word ‘denote’. Tn the tea. of John Stuart Mil !and his followers, not only a singular name but also ago In ery.” or general name is said to denote. But the difference lies in the fact that really be rewritten as the former denotes one thing and only one thing, the latter denotes many’ tedicolo.” For instance, the common name ‘pot’ is said to denote this pot, that pot, & as fire (or, fiery-ness?).” poh tel ont a any trouble, red-color can be said to qualify some There is some ambiguity in the use of the word ‘denot Geach to qualify same mountain, Pointed out, and sometimes it is used inthe sense of ‘refer (o'. The term ing’, to quote Geach, “covers up a fundamental confusion, between the relat of @ name to the thing named and of a predicate to what itis true of” Ia above, T have followed Church,? who has used ‘denote’ to render I ‘tedeuien.* Tt may be noted here that in natural languages, howevety § John Stuart MA Spt of Lge boo Tchap. i ios ening se that of «singular mane ete ta eae Se ten: hy the pnbty a ious value otha ara + Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, pp. 3-9. tre Steve! Char eae “CE. Gottlob Frege, “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.” seni os‘and one will decide to talk directly of fire present on the mountain. Actually the paradigm case of the Sanskrit propositions (with which Nyaya is chiefly concerned) supports the latter usage. But in this case it would be odd to say in English that fire qualifies some mountain. In other words although ‘fre’ has the look of a general term, it applies to the object present on the mountain, and not to the mountain itself. The general term ‘fiery’ can, however, be said to apply to the mountain. But what I have in mind is that terms like ‘fre’, as used in (4) and (6), do not behave like ordinary general terms. Comparing their syntactie Properties with terms like ‘red-coloe’ in (3), Nyaya translates (3) and (4) as (3) “An apple isa locus of red-color.” (6) “A mountain isa locus of fre.” Now, as in the above, general terms like ‘fire’ used after ‘of’ ean also be said to behave like dummy singular terms in such a context. Expressions like ‘a cognition of pot’ can be read as ‘a cognition of x, and = =a pot’. And ‘an absence of pot’, too, can be read as ‘an absence of #, and = a pot’. But to avoid unnecessary complications, I shall use expressions like ‘a cognition of pot’, ‘an absence of pot’, and ‘a locus of pot’ instead of using the extended translations. As far as I can see, these are faithful renderings of the corresponding Sanskrit expressions in the majority of cases. It may also be noted that ‘a cognition of 2” is itself but a dummy singular term. To put it in another way, expressions like ‘a cognition of 2” or ‘xC” behave somewhat like the “forms!” in Church’s vocabulary." Church obtains a “form” from a complex singular name by replacing one of the constituents with a variable. In our case, we get ‘xC’ or ‘~2" only from indefinite singular terms which are also complex in char acter. Forms, like variables, have values. And the value ofa form with a variable is obtained by substituting a constant for 2. Apart from talking about the reference as well as the sense of some expressions (using these terms almost in Frege's manner), I shall also use the verb ‘to mean’, but this I want to reserve for general use in reference to possible diferent kindy ‘of meaning. $84 Although I shall not develop here the theory of meaning’ in Nyaya in 2 Inirodacton to Methematcat Loic, p- 1. Some authors use the term function’ in such casey, but this may be misleading to some extent (eee Church's note 26). "Church also talks about the denotaion-value and the sease-value of a form (iid, p. 114 ‘note 27); this is not relevant to our purposes here Various aspects of the problem of meaning and the theory of language have been discussed by Indian scholars of liferent disciplines from a very early period. The grammariane, the ‘Mimamsakas, the Alakirikas or the rhetoricans, the Naiyayikas, the Buddhist shown interest in one or another aspect of the problem, The literature on the topic ls rch and vatied. To mention some of the modern works, John Brough has contibuted tree papersi (4) “Theories of General Linguistic inthe Sanskrit Grammmarians” 195; () “Audumbartyaoa's ‘Theory of Langusge,” 1952; (©) “Some Indian Theories of Meaning,” s933. Gaurinath Sas {in The Philsophy of Word ond Meaning, has made laudable attempt to present the philosophy, of Bhartshari in a systematic manner. Chapters visit of his book are especially important foe ‘those interested in Indian theories of meaning. David S. Rucge, Conribtions & Phstire de la PhilocphieLinguistiue indienne also deserves special mention in this connection. Quite recently view of the discussion in the Nafeada of Raghundtha Ibe considering in Chapters 15 and 16, I shall outline ff the Nyaya theory. The Indian theorists ate divided into fing primacy either to a sentence or to an individual word Droblem is concerned. One group, called abhayda the yentence, while the other, called Khowfapakga regards ilonomous units having isolated meanings and a sentence The Nyaya school belongs to the latter With the khonJapaasa is that an isolated word here is Bigs Gant esgic hcl denen or of common experience that in natural languages the Hot always understood if we take into account only such fine uent words. This problem may sometines be eSOeaiall wes of speech like metaphor or zeugma in rhetoric som ‘of homonyms in linguistics, and sometimes with the pro Jud ambiguity of ordinary language. Nyaye states tht £0 fone needs to understand the individual meanings of the that one understands these meanings from the words lr ett or functional relation." The opti of a word is the telation and the Zekgaya relation." The Saki relation tional meaning, whereas the laksoya relation relates & {oF metaphorical meanings. i isery ere is bao on a vey simple pare fui recollection!" When one of the two relia, vin, the other relatum, viz, the meaning, i recalled to the mind Of uch relatedness is acquired fundamentally through the i depends, in the majority of case, on certain relations of Ott Borde and on appropriateness to the ciscunsiiaiaaaaaan Instead of asking for the meaning we should look for the # language is nothing but a set of rules comparable to & ‘Dhue’ (nila) as an isolated word denotes blue-color, but in Pol’ it denotes something that is blue. Nyaya say's that Hetween the word ‘blue’ and the color blue in the fits {the conventional function or power of a word). The in Fadion Thereof Meaning, bas attempted comparin a ele hero, Ts Uk, ng wetin ley aal ing Information about the Hterature of Tada then wipadirhsmernam sySpirah” (Gibiabodh), ibanatha, ili padsjonyatvam bolhyom,” tid p. 208 a abttabyapinyatorah sombandhal” iithrough such a relation is called the conventional meaning or express meaning (akyartha or vaeydrtha). One can also cal it the primary meaning (mukhydrtha), for such a meaning is the first recalled when the corresponding word is heard ia) isolation. But in the second case, the functional relation between the word ‘blue! and the object that is blue is called latsand. ‘ ing obtained thereby called Jatsy@rtha, or a secondary meaning, a metaphoric meaning, or an indicative ‘meaning. For the sake of convenience, I shall call the first functional relation, ‘Sakti, the ‘denotative function’, and the second, laksaya, the ‘indicative function’, Notice that both the indicative and the denotative functions are really nothing but different relations relating a word to its meaning. One has to resort to Jaksay, the indicative function, when and only when the Primary meaning of the word imbedded in a sentence cannot be fitted to the meaning or import of the sentence as a whole. A significant sentence uttered bya. speaker is intentional and purposive. If the hearer does not understand the syntactic relation between the words through the ordinary semantic correlation. with their primary meanings, he has to look for some implied semantic correlation of some word or words with such meanings as are related in some way or other to their primary meanings. Recourse to this implied semantic correlation becomes, obligatory, for otherwise the purpose or the intention of the speaker will not be served."7 §3.5 It has been remarked by some modern interpreters that Nyda never distinguishes between the denotation and the sense of an expression.!* But it seems to me to be highly rewarding to compare and contrast the implicit dist tion between what is Satya and what is the Sokyaldvacchedaka of an expression with a somewhat parallel sense-denotation distinction familiar in the West since Frege. The sense of a term denoting an object is, according to Frege, the way in which the object is given by it This can be explained by the following ‘examples: (2) “The two expressions ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ have the same denotation.” (8) “The expressions ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ do not have the same sense.” Here (7) holds because of an astronomical fact. But (8) also holds at the same time. This isso because the two expressions, as Frege says, refer to their common denotation in different ways. If we understand the language, we can grasp the sense of the expressions. To apply the Nyaya conceptual scheme to this ease, even. if the morning star is the same as the evening star, the cognition expressed a “the morning star’ and the cognition expressed as ‘the evening star’ are different. in the structure of their sigayaids (the totality of contents). To put it roughly, the two cognitions differ with respect to the structures of their intentional com. tents, Using the convention of § 2.8, we can represent them as follows 8 “Labjond fokyasambandiastparyinupapaltith,” Vigvanstha, Bhigipariccheda, verse Sam See Mohanty, p. 39. 2 See note 4 inthis chapter, * See Rudolph Carnap, Meoning and Necessity, p. 119 ‘The-property-of-belonging-to-the-evening-time).”” ‘he-property-of-belonging-to-the-morning-time) speculation also becomes pertinent when we see that Frage: mh with the meaning of ye object. But later on, in Navya-nyya, this term has bee ledoka “he limiting property of the denotatn? OF ly of being the denotatum (aby). Nyaya say HA pot is the denotatum or denotation (akya) of the (phous photo padasokyoh).” i ithe ambiguity in the expression ‘a pot,’ one may the Nyaya, as Phe word ‘pot’ denotes what is delimited by the prop (phatapodon ghatatvasacchinne sakyam).” (12), we can describe pot-ness as the delimiting prop the limitor of the property of being a Sakyo (la oae as the prarinimita of the word ‘po’, One may does pot-ness fare vis-A-vis the sense (Sinn) of the ‘potness’ should be taken, according to the Nydiya ce that makes a pot a pot, ie, the necessary property Instrumental in our recognizing an entity os a pots One ls the sense of the word ‘pot’, because itis perhaps nok Ihe sense of « term with the essence ofits denotatum, ($60 ‘the Notes to passage 22 of Chapter 16.) ‘The erm vigayatd is obtained from the term visaya ‘object! By tive suffix a", and it belongs to a group of terms which I the viewpoint of semantical analysis in Navyacnyfiya I} . following Ingalls,* as ‘relational abstracts’, Ou tl 138 (visayatd) arises, as we have seen (§ aig), n ot, more generally, in the context of a meni | Oudinarily, if something is supposed to constitute the in tion, which means that the cognition is about x, then ls Materials, pp. 48-48. Ts sometimes been characterize by its modern interpreters ts are express whether that characterization is correct Lat wt school is realistic Yrom at least two diferent viewpoint: (0) these that itis posable to have falthful and dreet fl maintains the reality of eelation as distinet from ihe relat in ak i (nherence) anv somyegs (conjunction). This view ea thi {0 vubjectvism or idealism. (b) From another point of view, ic oF Platonic iit concedes realty to abstract entities ikealways “reals” or existent things. Or, to put it in another way, the content of each cognition is analyzable in such & way that its constituents are identifiable with some entity or other (see § 3.2) Content-ness asa relational abstract can be described as being resident (nist) in some object x and as being conditioned (nirnpita) by a cognition (cf. § 4.3). From this, a converse relation, vigayia, is also devised; and this relation is des scribed as being resident in a cognition and as being conditioned by some object ‘The simplest form of cognition, say a cognition of po, is described in Navya-nyaya 4s ‘a cognition that conditions (nirdpayeti), or that has its content-ness resident in, a pot’ ‘A quilificative cognition is usually said to have a plurality of content-ness, ‘Thus, a cognition whose verbal expression is “This isa blue pot” may be said to have one content-ness in what is indicated by ‘this’, another content-ness i blue-color, and a third content-ness in potness, for, according to the “property location’ language of Navya-nyaya, “This is a pot” is read as “This has pot-ness” Gee § 29). ‘The above qualiticative cognition also has another kind of content-ness whi ray be said to be resident in what is meant by “This isa blue pot.” This last kind. of content-ness should better be called a “complex” content-ness. If the sai cognition isa true one, the complex content-ness in such cases can be said to be resident in the object, which is indicated by ‘this’ and which has blue-color and which has pot-ness at the same time. Nydya calls this kind of content-ness of a {rue cognition a siist-vigayata, which I shall call content-ness, Ifthe cognition isa false one, a problem of how to specify this complex contents ness arse, for it cannot be said to be resident in any object in such eases. This problem may very well remind one of the problem of finding an explicalum of the nsion of a false statement in modern semantics." Nydya says that such @ complex content-ness of a false cognition is, nevertheless, conditioned (nirpita) by what may be called @ function of two or more simple content-nesses, which , in turn, resident in different objects. Thus, the complex conten false cognition “This is. blue pot” can be described as one tha is conditioned by 4 contentness resident in the object indicated by ‘this’ and by another content= ness in blue-color and by a further content-ness in pot-ness.* Nyaa calls this contrasted with the nominalism and conceptalism of the modern philosophy of mathematic, A realist in modern semantics tris to explain the applicability of x general term by positing the ‘existence ofa generic unity, universal. In this context, to, one can say thatthe earlier Nyaya seemed to subscribe to ths view without much reservation. Later to avoid many logical paradones and inconsistencies, this vew was modified in many respects, But the reality ofa generie property (ati) was accepted in many eases. ‘Many moder analytic philosophers with positivist backgrounds regard universals as “the shadows cast by names in a twilight of philosophical confusion.” That many universls are just Hingustc confusions was perhaps realie by some later Nalyaylhas, Notice that most of the relations in Nyaya are not universal. And ther doctrine of ssrdpasombondha was probably an attempt to get out of the maze of unnecesary univers a independent entities (see $$.48. and 4). ™ See Carnap, p. 29 % Ghajato-nigthasgoyolt-niaptenllarapa-nigha-isayoti-nirapiis idampaddrtha-nisfh-sigar Went-ness « nirapya-nirapakabhoraponna-sitayatd, which T » Tt may be noted that content-ness, also be said to cognition that is true, Buta fase cognition cannot have bess, may also be taken asa diferentiating mark of {6 Ung the term content ness, we can alo describe e ition by using ‘qualfierness? and “qualifeand-nes! in the Illustrate very briefly how a cognition expressed in a sen ig is described in what may be called the Nyfiya m the following Wyahta-puspavat lta” = “The exeeper possesses (a) red fl ly speaking, the qualificand is expressed by ‘the ere A(a) red flower’. But ‘(a) red flower’ also expresses able into a flower as the qualificand and red-color at ‘even further and analyzes the concept expressed by 4 #) into a flower-individual (or a creeper-individual) as Igenetic property flower-ness (or creeper-ness), which it to flover-universal (or creeper-universal), as the qUl 1Q(ay)' for ‘x qualified by »’, the letter + expressing the 4 4 the qualifier, the structural analysis of (13) can be HO(OCAd) OOO)” 1, ic, ‘@, “¢, and *f' express, respectively, the creepy flover-ness, red-color, and red-nes, ie, red-universall ups, one might say that a’ ete. express respectively Me crevper, the content-ness in ereeperness and $0 on) the structure of (3) diagrammatically as follows 0. ee as oe bisa prokiratd-niapits nila nigtha-proklrtd winapi | Mannirapahe jAdnam, this symbolic translation instead of the rather ghastly ooking Txpression: “robiaba-isifah yb reklah tad-eligom yab im lake sitigtatomabhye-siteatam jxinam” Moe "abla nisthe gaya 98 raka-(nigha)siyayald aS yx ae.) can be obtained by manipulating symbols and using the principle of substitution of elementary loge from the intial formula: (13) “QGy).” Now let us consider a false cognition expressed as (16) “irado sobimdn’” = “The lake has fie.” Here we have to speak in terms of content-ness and not content-ness,. The component elements of content-nessy combine themselves with the help of the relation of conditioning (nirapatoid). ‘Thus one might express the analytical structure here with the predicate ‘conditioned by". Using the notation ‘C(xy)" for ‘x conditioned by 3’ (16) can be described a5 (17) “C(C(ad)C(ed)).” Here ‘a’, *,‘c, and ‘2 express, respectively, the content-ness in the lake, the ontent-ness in lake-ness, the content-ness in fire, and the content-ness in fre: In Navya-nyaiya the concept of relation (sambandha)* ness.) ® Note also that the structure of the false cognition when we mistake a rope fn the structural analysis of sentences and cognitions, ‘Th6 fora snake can be described ina similar way, ie, as Ifthe world to consist of many discrete individu, whieh (18) “C(ab)” he known. They also maintain that anything in this where ‘a’ and ‘b” express respectively the object presented (purovariln), ie the be taken as related to anything (same or different), no rope, and snake-ness i, snake-universal ct or strange the relation may turn out to be. It is the ‘There has been much speculation about the ontological status of the relational lyst to specify such relations whenever a sentence OF & abstract content-ness among the later exponents of Navya-nyaiya. I shall postpone ibn presents a problem, Consideration oftheir remarks until Chapter 7, for T must fist discuss the Nyaya modern Western logic general terms like ‘man’ and notion of svaritpa-sambandia, led absolute general terms in order that they may be dist It might be relevant here to note that, according to Nyaya, any significant Bpither of, “opponent of, and ‘cause 66 iia Part of a sound sequence is a word (pada), and that the simplest type may even is. A term of the former group is true of objecis be a suffix or prefix or what Edward Sapir has called a grammatical element fm of the latter group is true of objects in paity (compare ‘Saklam padam").** Worties about the clear formulation of the notion ome object = (same or different) and of :y with respeet Of @ word are well known in modern linguistics. If the linguists’ morphemes are defined as classes of minimal meaning-bearing units, eg, ‘think’, “of “un $42 Asa general rule, every relation can be sail to have hi! spins’ then the Nyaya concept of word (pada) will be their nearest analogue.®? Wit may be takeh as pointing from one relatum to the For contrast, one may note thatthe expression “unthinkable” (which Sapir and es relation simply as a relation between « and 9 We others want to take “as an integral whole”) willbe described by the Naifayikes tion” involved; that i, we do not specify whether tI 854 function of three words, eu, ‘think’, and ‘able’. The feature of depend 0 a rlaon ofyo tis evident tat oa ency of the first and the last upon the second is what Nyaya calls ‘syntactical fn general the same as that involved in (b). Henee, ‘expectancy’ or akaiikya (see § 2.11). juately, itis necessary to specify its sale pe avs a distinction between 8, a tn ACCA nb ming 0)" wt“ co ee for and then aba (4 from “QC” by subtting “OC)” fa asd “CLO ns of the two rlata are given, for ‘y. " coe, meee wae wrned. In other words, to give the condition for the i J Vainio nishaitayad-nirepitecohni(nish)-sizeyatEniraptd. 98 bradatealnifhe) ipa ld not only mention the two relata but also! ‘elé-nirtpita-hradasitayatdlonnrdpokomjténam. % Edward Sapir, Language, pp. 26-33, ‘Annambhatta, Torkasamgrato, in A. Foucher, Le Compendium des Naiydyikas have been laughed at for their predilection fr * Annambhatta, Tor In A. Foucher, Le Compendium der topiques @Annambhata, Se lvtyibas ave been angie at for thelcp Por tr, one may reer tal i lbh yadi nitrite sombandbibhi stkrivatepodltha ‘Tor contrat, one may refer to ZeligS. Hares’ notion of morpheme alternants in Methods a ahs sn Structural Linguistics, $13 ini protyvgStnyom Srteksmayabtauelpater salah kim. ete is evidently by « Vedantn of Bengal. The trm sembandhin but is also used as aterm of insult in Bengal. From being vile, it comes in slang to be applied to any’ man of obnexious W. V. Quine, Word and Object, p. 10s.they are related. To do so, the Naiyayikas follow this procedure. If a rela described as “the relation of x toy,” the relatum xis called the pratiyogin (adjunel and the relatum y is called the amwyogin (subjunct) of the relation in questio In ordinary Sanskrit, the genitive case ending usually marks off the adjun and the locative case ending the subjunct. §4.3 Let us consider the following matrices or open sentences: * (@) risa man, (2) xis the father of y. (3) = opposes 3. G4) = causes 9. ‘The Naiyayikas used an intensional languaget and, in doing so, exploited: power of abstraction of the Sanskrit language in which they wrote.® Moreovdl they tended, as we have already noted, to speak in terms of dharma (proper and dharmin (property-possessor or locus af property). Besides the di disarmin concept (property-location concept), they also sometimes used a by pair of concepts, i., sambandha (relation) and sambandhin (relatum). ‘Thus Nyaya language the locution “. . . is a man” will denote an abstract proper that is regarded as residing in or occurring in some locus or loci. These loci the values of the variable x in (x). Moreover, as we have seen, ‘kas did not deal directly with sentences or propositions as stich. Rat they would reduce a sentence expressing a cognition to a composite term ar using the notions of occurrence and locus. Hence, according to their conventi (2) will be reduced to what I shall call an “ascriptive” expression, e.g., (5) Humanity (occurs) in x (0) Humanity in 2. ‘The difficulty with (6) is that it does not contain an assertion. The commol opinion that making a judgment consists in combining (or separating, as negative judgments) the two different data of a presentation his not always. ‘maintained by philosophers. The NySya probably held that in a declaratiy sentence what we assert or affirm is a single object. Thus, we may translate categorical sentence “John is a man” into the existential sentence® “There is * Fora definition of “open sentence,” see Quine, Mahods of Logic, pp. 90-92. ‘ce I. M. Bochefisk Formate Logit, p. 517. See also Matilal, “The Inensional Character Lakgena and Sombars," Indo-Tronion Journal, 8 (4964-65), 85-95. ‘Ingalls, “The Comparison of Indian and Western Philosophy," Journal of Oriental Rese (Madras), 22 (1954), 14. ‘Translation of categorical into ex:tentials fs reminiscent ofa similar method used by F Brentano in “Presentation and Judgment.” His scheme was a follows A. All men are mortal. — There is no imortal man. EE. Some men are sick, —There isa sick maa, L. No stones living. — There is no living atone ©. Some men are not learned. — There fsa non learned tran. ‘But Brentano didnot interpret existential like “A exist” asa judgment about A and existent According to him, “A exist” means that we arm A. And ssilarly “A does not exis” m that wedeny A. The Nyaya method of reduction is, however, dsferen from this as T have nol above John, of humanity.” But at the next step, following the Nj IFreference to existence and translate the existential into Ay lumanity in John.” (See also § 11.10.) logy of (6), (2) through (4) can also be reduced to aseriptive Js, locutions like ““— is the father of . .." ean also ba abstract relations residing in some locus and at the fr ascertained (nirapita) by some entity. Such relations ff fatherhood! (pitt), “the relation of opponency” (ral of being the cause’ (barayata), ‘the relat aya), etc. Although they are called relations Je convenient to call them ‘relational abstracts! We fs follows wthood resident in x and conditioned by y. mency resident in x and conditioned by 9. ess resident in x and conditioned by y. (from the structure of these expressions tht we cin ue the place of the relations (or relational abstracts) and ons as relation ¢ resident in x and conditioned by ys Jing the concept of residence and conditioner (Araya the concept of adjunct and subjunct (praiiogin and haa. Thus we can rephrase (to) as s subjunet and yas its adjunely concept of locus is assimilated into that of subjunel Kept of conditioner (wirapaka) unt point about relational abstracts is thet, eomteany (8 they were not treated in Navya-nydya as Universal forms of in entity). Rather, they were taken as liar to each occurrence. Such particulrization of by the specication, in each occasion, of their lol and Aivwpaka), or, what amounts to the same thingy of unuyogin and pratiyogin). In this way we shall Si Gondition of cach relation (sce § Sa)s hand, those nonrelational abstracts like humanity construed under the Nyaya principle as jl oF fone and unchangeable, and in that respect they. Wersls of European philosophy. Only those no srued as upadhi or imposed properties (because the ‘mich stricter in the latter school —see § 4.9, Note § the fashion of the relational abstract, 7 Jain our point in another way. Let us eall a term ih lent term was fist used inthis sense by Ingalls in Matera. ‘Variable’ I mean the variable that ranges over the domain of w individualsit is possible to abstract a property or dharma from it by the usual substanti sulies ‘fra’ of 10" (ness, ity’) or by using such phrases as “the property: being such and such’. Thus even terms like ‘man’ or ‘pot? wil be called adjecth under this convention. Terms like ‘brother’, ‘cause’, and locus’ are also to called adjectives, but if we compare their roles in such expressions as “x ig cause of y” with the roles of the terms of the former class (e.g, ‘man’) in ex sions like “x is a man,” we may call them ‘relational adjectives’ or ‘transit adjectives if Properties from such so-called ‘relati adjectives’. An analysis of this procedure also reveals that such relational abs can always be treated as properties (used in the widest sense of the term and ‘5 a translation of the term diarma in Sanskrit), and that one of the two rel of such a relation (or, relational abstract) must be its locus or substratum, where it is said to reside or occur. Just as from “x is a man” we can assert humanity occurs in x, so from ‘‘r is the brother of y” we can assert that relation of brotherhood as conditioned by y occurs in x. Or, to use the adj subjunct concept, we can say “the relation of brotherhood having y as its adj ‘occurs in the subjunet x.” Thus, the function of the adjunct here is so to 4 ‘the relational abstract that it can be treated as a nonrelational or ordi Property like humanity. Accordingly, ‘fatherhood as conditioned by Rama? said to occur in Dasaratha (Rama-nirapite-piirram Daoratha-cpti), and 4 ence as conditioned by color’ is said to occur in the first three substances, arth, water, and fire, which have color (ripa-nirapita-samavdyo drosyadi sy Note that since relations are mostly particulars, fatherhood speciied by Ri and Dasaratha as adjunct and subjunct is regarded by Nyaya as distinct f fatherhood specified by John and Joseph as adjunct and subjunct."* $44 We shall now attempt to formulate @ general definition of relat {Thave borromed this phrase from W. B. Johnson, Loic, part I, chap xi, p. 263, Ho on such types of “adjectives” may be of some interest in the present contexts “We tm chi ferie a certain child by the adjective iking a certain hook,’ or a certain book by the eaeat ‘pleasing a certain child’ These adjectives predicated respectively ofthe child and of the beak ‘omplexi and when we take the substantival reference out of this comple, there remain terms ‘liking’ or ‘pleasing’ Such terms do not function as completed adjectives and wil be relative adjectives." He also called them “transitive adjectives.” Although then isc ee resemblance between our preset scheme of relation and Johnson's scheme dexsibed ator dilerence should not be overlooked First, e are talking only of dyadic relations, Seconds we ting the term ‘adjective’ in a much broader sense; ordinary noun phrase, for inatanee Included in our domain of adjective. Tir, from reational adjectives we are deriving ‘sponding relational abstract, and are actualy calling them “lation” proper ‘There is good reason to emphasize ths point. In ordinary language such relations are treat as universal, Even Nyaa would agree to this, But not ao inthe strict language of Nop demanding that subjunct and adjunct be mentioned inorder fully ta understand « ogy ‘Nalyayikas actually imply that such relations arc so many particulars Ths thee sl at, the defect of dnantys Gnumerablenes) in the contet of a ssaraps relation, The sam Gaberence) relation is, however, construed asa univer the Nytya tradition, ‘The simplest definition, and the one with, cher usually begins, runs as follows His a relation ig x governs a qualifcative cognition ( Niyimakatsom sambandhatsam) lent of a qualificative cognition, as we have seen in Chapters f2.7), can be expressed inthe form: ‘a as qualified by B's MHI hing is cognized as qualified by some other entity, or, fn ol pition some entity appears as qualified by any other ently Jusion will be that one is retated to the other. Thus relation Ting so cognized, and hence a relation can be said 0 Oven live cognition, ‘This elementary definition of rat Hhtoughout Navya-nyaya literature.t élementary definition becomes inadequate when examined iicative cognition one element is known as the qualifies Ws the qualiticand (sisesya), and there is als a thitd {o join them, This third element is called samsarga literally WF ‘relation’. Speaking with care, one must siy that ina the governing factors are all three elements considered joi Merdependent concepts. The concept of a qualifier, for A qulificand as well as a qualification (i. east, call relation’). Furthermore, we have used the term which at best is ambiguous. “Government? or ‘nym aighundtha suggests that we can explain the concep ihout using this concept of niyama, ‘Thus he remarks, Milam opi sambandhatvam.* So Jagadia, in commenting OW ha, improves upon the simple definition as follows! a relation iff xis the object of a qualificative cognition fame time is neither a qualifier nora qualificand, A definition cast be taken as valid for practical purpose A fault of circularity (atmaéraya) when subjected t erie tive cognition itself cannot be explained witheut recoutse (| lon oF qualification (saitistya). ara follows Raghunatha more closely in attacking the ‘governing’ (niydmaka). A ‘governing’ factor, he 8 & causal factor (janakav), for in that case the caus lificative type would not be possible for a reation that I Perception. If such relations are excluded, the dein (oxyapia). Moreover, the concept of a cause lnilio-protyoye janana-yogytatingite ssoraparye sambindhatsld Uy ia dh-nisimatasyave tathdeds” TCI, p. 252, Pe 356 filer uatsnyeviifedit-siayatsam eva sambandaatrom ii bah vibifa-buddhiniyimakoteom, afbndria-sombondh TCDG, p 434.fore also involves some ambiguity since ‘cause’ may mean either actual ca (phalopadhayaka) or potential cause (seardpayogya). On the other hand), if ‘g cerning a cognition’ is explained as ‘being the object of a cognition’, the sa ‘qualified by y, and at the same time « is not . (Literally, relation-h with respect to yis that content-ness ofa cognition which is condition by the qualfier-ness in y and at the same time is different from qualificand-ness of that cognition.) A dificulty still arises in the ease of erroneous cognitions. A patch of cok that actually inheres in a substance according to Nyaya may conceivably erroneously thought to be in conjunction with some substance. For example, I have a cognition that the pot has blue color by the relation of conjunction. Bul although such a conjunction becomes an object of the erroneous cognition, i should not be mistaken as a relation actually belonging to that patch of color and yet it would be so if one followed D3. One might try to avoid the difficult by saying that a conjunction, although it is not a relation of color in the give stance, is still a relation (relating two substances, for example, pot and grou and hence belongs to the domain of our definiendum. But that path of esc hhas no appeal for the Naiyayikas. Nyiya demands that the definiendum no include a nonentity. Here our definiens does not apply to simple conjunction bu to the conjunction of a patch of color, and that is an unexampled (aprasiddha) term and hence refers to a nonentity (Gee § 11.8 and also § 2.9). We can meet this objection squarely by inserting ‘valid cognition’ (prama) in place of simple ‘cognition’ in D. But we are still in a position which is vulnerable to the charge of circularity (see Chapter 10). The notion of a be explained, in turn, only with the help of the notion of relation." Gadladhara concludes his discussion with two alternative suggestions,” whi 1 shall interpret with the notations of the class logic: Dg (1). @ is a relation of x if @ ¢ &(¢ is the adjunct of 2). (Literally, relation-hood with respect to x is a specific type of property having + as its adjunct.) Dg (2). @ is a relation in y if # « #(y is the subjunct of 2). (Liter relation-hood in y is a specific type of property having y as i subjanet.) Here the concept of relation is defined with the help of the concept of adj or subjunct. The obvious suggestion is that adjunct-hood (the concept of adjunct) silesytinye-atprakiralé-nirapte-sitayotiyih evabgapiyatayd . . ." TCDG, areas. “Boum opl samyogadind drasyaradt Drama rgayatam adaye t25y8pi ta sombandhabp a ca sizoyeyim promd-pratiogitato-nsetin ndyam atiprasange ii sicyom, promieasya sambandidnuyog sideyohatdeaccinna tl-prabirakatoer@patays sambandi- halted” TCI pals Tat pratiyoihata vies xa tat-sembondhatzom,” TCDG, p. 474; “eam tad-onnsor iteya ea tara sambandhateam ii Bhieab” TCDG, . 475 Inet-hood (the concept of subjunct) may be construed ay 1 recent work the following specific d tions an ajune A subjunct-hood 6 such that a and b are of speciic type and one of them d Iso we use two predicates (relative terms), ‘con nes) ancl ‘delimits’; evidently this definition presupposes that are more fundamental and can tentatively be understood Wi to relation as such. If this seems odd, Ny&ya will say thal gyone who wants to define such fundamental concepts fla her way, we can start with the notions of adjunct and ives" and then construct the definition of relation using tlons 6” and ‘a deli Navya-nyaya concentrates its attention on four types ya (conjunction), (2) samardya (inherence), (3) srardpa ia (identity) or ableda (nondifference). Samyoga or conjunction isa w f may be good reasons for criticizing the svarsipa relation And censuring samardya or inherence as something unin is very familiar notion. By samyoga the Nyhya of two “embodied” objects of any magnitude from the tous. Word “embodied” needs some explanation. The NyAya ealls ly (gu), and a quality, by definition, can ocear only in WhAb ie (dratya). A substance is defined as that waich can be Ths it can be asserted that foreach thing » if sa locus (OF in) of conjunction, then x must be a substance, But ati only this conditional but also the corresponding biscond the Nyaya theory, viz., for everything x, + isa relatum of conjunction iff «is @ {0 understand more clearly what Nyaya meaas by subst lowing considerations. If anything is a substance under the i necessarily has a magnitude or size (parimdea), lis Mt ‘or medium-sized (madhyama) or ubiquitous. Not only th lo be countable by numbers and must also have nun ess from other things. To put it in the traditional N ‘must alvays have (or, must have the potentiality to ha Raghunathn actolly thinks that adjncthod and anlar ns tparate entities. atom es porspartacchedsivecchedababldspom im,” Anantakumara Bhattacharyya, Vimortin, D3 allowances to be made because of the odd Nyy view that at the ction (u/ptttzapo) a substance (say, a pot) remains untouched by (motion).qualities: sambhya (countability by numbers), parimaya (a magnitude of an kind), prthakieo (numerical difference or distinctness), samyoga. (conjunction) and vibldga (disjunction). ‘Thus, by an embodied object I mean a substance tha possesses at the same time the above qualities. Thus not only the well-kna bodily contact of a pot and the ground (gha(a-bhatala-somyoga) but also contact ofthe atomic mind with the ubiquitous self or soul (ahma-manak-semyoga) and the contact of the medium-sized pot with the ubiquitous sky (ghalaka samyoga) are cited as examples of conjunction in Nyaya. 'amyoga oF conjunction is generally conceived to be produced through som motion (ériy®) of one relatum or of both the relata, and hence presupposes prior state of disconnection (aprapti) of the relata*! Certain types of conjunctia are, however, thought to be produced not directly by a motion but by anothel conjunction (samyoraja-sam yoga); eg, the contact of the book and the badly Devadatta is due to the contact of the book and Devadatta’s hand —a part the body. But conjunction, as the Naiyayikas conceived it, presents some obvious calties. As defined above, it cannot be an uncaused event. In other words, {s no conjunction which is not produced. But the Naiyayikas do talk abo conjunction between tio eternal (nitya) entities, e., atoms on the one hi ‘and physical space or sky (gogona) on the other. This situation seems to hat troubled Pratastapada, who asserted that theze cannot be any uncaused conjune tion since Kanada did not mention it (cf. “ndsly ajah samyogo nilya-porimanda sat prihag anabhidhandt,” WK, p. 140). Srdhara remarked on this that unea conjunction is an impossibility like a sky-lower (cf. “afah samyogo nadsti ‘buspa-sat,” NK, p. 149). Praéastaptida argued that conjunction of the atom with the ubiquitous entities like physical space (2a) is due to the movement on the part of the atoms, cit is produced by the movement of one of the relat ©, atoms.* And he rejected the notion that there can be conjunction betw two ubiquitous entities because, according to him, two ubiquitous entities do nd satisfy the prerequisites of a conjunction relation. The prerequisite for conjune tion, he said, is that at least one of the two relata must be able either to mo about or to occur in some locus without depending upon the other.** The conditio is technically called ‘yuta-siddh’. This characteristic of conjunction sharply di {inguishes it from inkerence, because inherence, according to Nyaya, is sup to be eternal. §4.7 The relation of samavadya or inherence has been accepted explicitly the traditional school of Nyaya as a separate category (paddrtha) — a. pee instance of construing a relation as a separate category. It has been described ‘relation connecting the whole (asayurin) with the parts (aseyaea), gue (quali and arma (action or motion) with their respective substances, the enfya-i 2 Ch.“A priptayes tu 38 prdpib cone somo ria **Pramlenbir bikin prodseiranyearchrmajah somege px = Vibhande tu parasparaohsompogo nis, ytsiddhy alist! si punordasor on Pring stimatvon pih-direitraitean cl” iid W eternal substances, and the jai or generic property with ity neeived as a permanent relation in the sense that it conneety fubjunct in such a way that the adjunct can never occ Of from the subjunct.** It may be noted in this conneetion that Inherence relation can, however, continue to exist even Whe Ao exist, ic., ceases to occur in the subjunct by inherenoe, to do with the supposed permanence of the relation off tht the motion or movement (briya) of a body is sl th Wud when the body is at rest, the motion being destroyed, Wontinues to exist even without the adjunet, mot he adjunct of an inherence relation cannot continu 6 Df A ibjunct is destroyed. Moreover, Nyaya posts that the Ke relation, eg, a substance, can conceivably exist evi | fh sty, « particular color. But the opposite is not tr A ‘Conceivably exist without occurring in a substance, It ih ee should be regarded as permanent (nilya or aynlasiddi) octrine of samardya is connected with the metaphyslet ditional Nyaya-Vaitesika school. ‘The Nydya-Vaitesn fundamental assumption that properties like gua aii us, i, the substance. Then in the next step by what We Abstraction the relation of samasdya was construed as the). This step was strengthened by other ontological = the doctrine of jas oF generic property as distinct from (kt), the doctrine of ocayasin or the whole as distinct lion of the constituent parts, and the doctrine of le diflerentia of the eternal substances (nitywdranya), such connecting each of these entities to its locus was Wel ulate of samacdye, sine al of them obviously shared the being permanently (in the specific sense of the word ji to the locus Hk the question may aise here regarding the relation Ao its locus. How is samasaye or inherence, which is & d with its locus? To avoid a possible ininite regres Was given: samandya relates itself to its locus (ity It i ly amounts to saying that itis related to its locus byw Wy be quite possible that the problem of relating absence in ves what seems to be intended as a definition of samandy sapida defines it more cleatly. A good survey ofthe NyAyaa lem of semardya can be found in G. Patti, Der Soma fm Nj nlamubtéal, Vigvanatha, following the new school of NyAVa, undhorsam” (under verse 11). Kalipada Tarkacharyya alo raul U4 nityasambaxdhok semasdyah, ayesha te 5 “sala ev ayom stir iti" (VK, p. $20). Valli 8; “samandre tu vitesanavieryebhioap” (Nyylilst, p72was also considered together with this problem of relating samavdya to its locus. Tt may be noted, however, that with the advent of the searapa relation in this way, the position of samavaya itself in the Nyaya system was left dwindling. We shall discuss that in connection with the ssarapa relation. §48 There is a very familiar way to criticize the Nyaya concept of relation, Something analogous to Bradley’s argument™ can be directed against it. This well-known critique (famous also in the idealistic tradition of India, eg, in Buddhism and Vedanta) has sometimes been called the paradox of relation, The paradox may be briefly stated in the following manner. When we talk of # as being related to y by the relation r, we have first to relate x to y by r, and then relate r (which is also a property) to x by, say, r, and r to y by, say, r", another relation. This again may require that x should be related to »’ by a further relae tion 1’. This process can be repeated without end. And thus we find ourselves faced with a regressus ad infinitum. The Naiyayika averts the difficulty by pointing out that it arises because of the tacit assumption that all relations are essentially diferent from the relata and hence should be tied by a second relation. There is, however, no a priori necessity, so claims Nyaya, for the relation to be taken as numerically different in all cases from its relata. Nyaya thus postulated a “peculiar” kind of relation, a seariipa relation, which is not to be taken as different from its relata, Thus when we come to a svarmpa relation, the repeating relations r', 7, etc., are not different from the first relation r, nor are they different from the relata. Through other relations the adjunct is tied to the subjunct, but through the searfipa relation not only the adjunct but also the relation itself is tied to the subjunct, Besides avoiding the paradox, there is another advantage of this expedient of n. Nyaya thus avoided the danger of the multiplication of through what we have called “hypostatic abstraction” of any further relation, I shall pursue this case a little further. The Nydya doctrine of the svaripa or self-inking relation to solve the above paradox may seem to be alarmingly simple, Conventionally, a relation is taken as different from its relata. The Nyaya ‘Thus Uddyotakararemazks while dealing with sense-object contact as the basa of perception ‘samaviye cable sderayasiterye-bhdele” (Npéyasrtibo, p. 97). *1F.H. Bradley, Appearance ond Reality, pp. v6-17, 1 have borrowed this expression from Manley Thomson, though it was orginally wsed by ©.S, Peirce ina somewhat diferent sense; sce Manley Thomson, “Abstract Terms,” Philosophie Review, 68 (1950), 28-302. He distinguishes this from what he ealls the “directive absteaetion?™ He argues thatthe latter only “directs our attention but does not presuppose separation in stence” (p. 288) “When we say ‘Consider his relation to his father? we ae not presppeaing thre separate existing entities, the father, the son, and the relation between them we ‘supposing only that one can pay attention tothe relation without paying ntention tot {oF to the son a8 he wold in responce to ‘Conair the father ot “Conter the son” (p. 289 According to Thomson itis in “hypostatic abstraction” (which may be exemplied by talking of certain color or shade asthe one missing from a given representation of a color sie") that we presuppose further entities. % Compare Jayadeva's remark: “ta cea sambondhesys sombondhibhinnctsoniyamens sarlpac sambandham fare dayayonitibhdeab,” TCA, p 715 uggestion goes directly against this. But perhaps we can also ask It be so odd if something connects itself to something else or even 10 it sound as paradoxical as one’s being his own father or one’s el wn shoulders? Part of the oddity arses because we think of relations repeatable entities. But Nydya does not think of relations way go to the other extreme and ask: If concrete entities Hke nnecting, what harm is there if an abstract relation is thought he whole we can regard the Nyaya doctrine of the sari relatio levice to explain certain epistemological facts." Tt also provided lay out of a maze of unnecessary abstract entities. $4.9 ‘The Naiyayikas talk of different kinds of searipa relat following three are prominent: temporal ssardpa relation tial svar@pa relation (daisika-visesana/@), and absential labhaviya viSesayata). Besides these, most of the relational ab olved as some kind of searapa relation We shall indicate, however roughly, the condition under w We recourse to the last type of relational ti, Let us eal 4p it is denoted by a term abstracted from what we have 6) rm (se the last paragraph of § 4.3) by adding sufixes of he general tendency of the Naiydyikas was to constive any lenoted by such a substantivized term as a separate entity, Iso aided by the easy grammatical device of the Sanskrit Abstract terms can be formed even out of already altract niyayikas also saw the danger of unnecessarily multiplying ties. Thus to avoid this obvious charge, they had to stipulat Yirinsic property, unless itis construed as a jail or genode Aimples that it isa separate real), is related to its locus Misameness, ie. a seerdpa relation. This stipulation impli f int of view, that we can, for the sake of convenience and. spressions without committing ourselves to the existence intities. To push the point a little further: the class of the so-called (is Lam using the term here) can be divided into two groups 6 what Nyaya calls jai ‘generic properties’ and the other the d ls upadhi ‘imposed properties’. To avoid unnecessary ompl ipulating that gupa or qualities like guruisa (weight) and, kd not be included in our class of intrinsic properties | iyiya-Vaigesika system a jai was accepted as a separate kd be ontologicaly different from its locus or its manifest 4 Kaci Potter has argued ina sinlar manner fora e-lnking conn ete Connectors" Tie Jornal of Philosphy, Febroaty 1h he not be pressed too fa. Te only serves tora te pt th We pv of cu wl ete gt hp y soma (funn at, according to them, substances Compare Gaigea’s remark: “sembondhntorom anor iif 0 soriptambondbte,” TCA, 718‘part from these, all other intrinsic properties are earmarked as “imposed? vocabulary; see Chapter 10) is often offered in favor of inherence (oupadhita), and ontologically each of them is to be identified with its locus oF favor of svarapa, Inherence is regarded as one entity repeatedly subjunct. It may incidentally be noted that the old doctrine of jati was seriously tlferent cases, and hence itis on a par with a universal. But a criticized by the Buddhists and that as a result while the later orthodox school is « particular and hence necessarily differs from one occasion {0 built up a strong defense against the criticism of the Buddhist, they also tended nothing but the selfsame nature of the subjunct or locus, Since gradually to narrow down the scope of jain such « way that finally only a small difler on each occasion (being sometimes a piece of ground, some subclass of our intrinsic properties could be regarded as jai. For example, the ‘nd so on), the nature of the relation will change accordingly. doctrine of ji-badhoka or obstacles to being a jl, as expounded by Udayana, talled the defect of anantya or innumerableness. Thus in certain can be regarded as an attempt to this effect * {wo relata are construed as two separate entities having ap ‘The Nyfya position with regard to diferent kinds of ordinary abstract propere tic, itis simple to consider such a relation as a separate entity lity ties can be demonstrated in the following way: A jali is an entity that can be Fepeated on all such occasions. But the revisionists may point substituted for 2 in the following proposition of parsimony actually helps their own ease, because according, (22) “Gs) Qs) Ge) (Raye wx # yoy ee x x63)” the fewest assumptions are to be made in the attempt to exp where ‘R’ stands for ‘. . is related to . . . by the relation . . ” Thus here facts. Thus by dropping one item, e.,a separate entity like Nydya conceded reality to the three elements, the two relata and the relation, Conceptual scheme, they claim to simplify the conceptual appara Abkise (absence), on the other hand, and also samavdya (inherence) can be It should also be noted here that, for Raghundtha at leaily substituted for + in the followin ‘avoiding the defect of dnantya has no appeal, for he pleaded for (13) “Gz) @y) (Rity « x = 9)” (ndnatva) of inherence. where‘ sands for‘. related... by the relation, Thus hee the rele se ton involved isnot costrust sx separate clit over ad abe tt $4 et uum o other nei of ort aE Coming to the case of upadhi (imposed property), Nyaya made further conces. 5 a ark eee 8 oi Ae a i sion Tt dd not accept the elit of tho ropes inependentlyo ice oe aeiieeer or traye. Thus an upd canbe substituted for in the lowe, po ih e mve e (24) Ge) Gy) Raty)” poral svartpa relation, and being a svartpa relation it can Gee ean. Bake ntologically construed as a different entity from its sub ey % sense of eternal time (mahdkdla) seldom enters into Our 0 §4.10 We can now at last take up the question of the relative advantages of ‘Our usual practice is to refer to the imposed divisions or él samavaya and svar@pa. The later Naiyayikes took great pains to show the di ‘Time, and to connect an entity to one calibration or another, Ii P tinction between samavaye and svardpa. But, as I have already noted, the intro- the imposed divisions,we generally mention other finite entities of ‘duction of the concept of the stariipa relation into the Nyaya system makes the tion. Conventionally we use the apparent motion of the sun oF th iy n , Position of samasaya itself very precarious. Raghunatha tried to reshuffle the hhands of a watch. The Naiyayikas take any such finite entity Vaigesika categories (padartha) in many ways in his PT. He and some others (time segment or calibration), and then assert that any other ent {0 before him saw the obvious inconsistency involved in the concept of somaxdya_ 4 somewhat unusual extension of the sense of ‘occur) in or inherence. Although in the first step of hypostasis we get the permanent conceived as time segments. Here the notion of space also e¢ relation of inherence, in the second step we have to resort to a searipa relation, words, any kalopadhi may be looked upon as a time But in the case of absence (abhdea), particularly in the case of constant absence dimensional material world, exhaustive spatially and p (atyantabhava), which is regarded as permanent (nitya), we do not care for such axis. Thus at the next step the Naiyayikas asserted tht each 4 first hypostasis of the relation involved. In other words, we do not construe for permanent) has the potentiality to be considered as oc hhere the relation that connects absence with its locus as a separate entity as we entity, interpreted as a slice of time, through a sear relat hhave done in the case of inherence (connecting color, for example, with its sub- Its to be noted that apart from Time or mahakdla only stratum). The question naturally arises: why do we not omit also the frst relation, 4 pot or a mountain can be the subjunct of a tempera i.e, inherence or samaedye (and thereby omit also a separate paddrtha ot entity entities like space or sky or self, although they are eternal from the conceptual scheme) and insert just the sserpa relation in all the above cases? The common argument of laghava (lightness ie. simplicity or economy of "“Somandyo'pi maiko jlider candiddimatnoprasoagtt poran tw nduaia unorobhondepiir i," FTN, p. 76. CL "Janyindejonaho blo agai dirayo matah,” Vidvandtha, Bi See Udayana, Kircgdvoli(Benares Sanskrit Series), p. 33cannot be the subjunct of such a temporal sardpa relation. Thus by virtue temporal searipa relation we can relate a teapot in New York to a table Calcutta provided that the duration of time of the one coincides (either w ‘or partially) with the duration of time of the other. In the usual course, subjunct of the temporal svardpa relation should be time itself. But al here a noneternal object like a table is taken as a subjunct, that table is thought to possess a temporal constituent in the manner described above, and is that temporal constituent (or, in other words, that particular calibration time) which becomes the subjunct. (See also § 9.2) ‘The spatial searape relation (daisika-sifeganat@) can be explained in a sit way. Just as finite entities are construed as calibrations of time (kalopadl ‘objects of limited size or magnitude (Nyfya calls them the class of marta entiti can also be construed as “imposed” space segments or calibrations of (digupadhi). And then at the next step, any other object can be conceived “occurring” (in a very wide sense of the term) in such calibrations through spatial searape relation. Here, to0, eternal objects such as atoms cannot be as calibrations of space. But the most interesting kind of ssarape relation isthe absental one ( vigesayald). The Navya-naiyayikas, following the earlier school, regarded absence of something as a separate category. Just as an ordinary term de an entity that can be treated as a property (diarma) occurring in some locts, absence of that entity is also regarded as a single “whole” property occuttt some locus, But while in the former case the relation connecting the property (i “positive” property) to its locus can be different, tion, sometimes inherence, and so on, depending upon the nature of the subj as well as the adjunct of the situation concerned, in the latter case (Le, in case of absence) the relation is always called a svarapa relation or vifesagald relation of qualifer-ness). Scarpa relation is sometimes called viéesapatd (qualifier-ness) relation ( also my Notes to passage 42 of Chapter 14). The idea behind this is, ho simple. An absence of something is looked upon as the qualifier of the locus Parallelism being obviously dravn from the cases of “positive” properties, wh are regarded as the qualifies of the loci. Thus, to avoid multiplication of enti simply by hypostatization of relations, Nyaya calls such relations relations qualifier-ness. This is merely a stylistic method Nyaiya adopts to describe su “supposed” relation without committing itself to the reality of such a relat as a separate entity over and beyond the relata It may sound paradoxical, but it seems to me that the introduction of sea relation into the Nyaya-Vaisesika system is a little like the proverbial camel hhead under the tent (one might call it, facetiously, a Vedantin’s head): cart toiits logical conclusion, the doctrine destroys the traditional system of catego (See also $§ 8.6 and 8.7.) Thus see Jagadkia’s remark: “nityindm oxpitortaketsdj jonyindm exo martinis d ++ TCDI, pt, ) NTITY AND THE PUZZLE “A POT = A BLUE: Ithough the notion of identity is fundam« Bence, tins bon ons of the ox pepe a nally, identity has been looked upon as & relation, but Just marks the beginning of our difficulties. Most relations aie y discourse to obtain between objects, i.,relata, which are the case of identity, because to say that identity {objects isto make a self-contradictory statement. Anothee jection is this: to say of two things that they ace related by. I, is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical nern logic, true identity statements may be interpreted ie homey deter mo Ipine! by "=" Tis perison, however, extends only 0 BE: oes not extend to oblique or opaque ofan ac modal contests, For latance, he tus ang colt = the author of Woseey" eo hcdinne ace es (0) “King George IV didnot know that Scott was the aul fe such suet ulin lends to an obvious gm I) "King Goong 1d not know tat Seat al toi ies, Pee epouns har Ppanigtal symbol or cep Sint Don and ese® Ths acorn o Foe 2 an el Js, their denotations are identical, But the sense of © 0 Bring sr so cifer fom th arte ot Terma an ibstitutable for one another in ordinary contexts But it ke “he asthor of Worley’ do nat have the Of i oblige desolation thats the same os tha rare Ludvig Wittgenstein, Tracts Loyce Phere, $8980) ibis seret cote bakes on WV. Laie Pi his Word end Objeh, § 35 1s ilar to Frege's inet (wera) i rns, “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung” p86identity condition for such symbols or expressions should be much stricter. F distinction dispels the charge of triviality brought against identity statement but his theory suffers from one obscurity, for it is not clear just what sort entity the sense (Sinn) of a symbol may be. His theory of sense faces platonis encumbrances. A statement of identity need not be trivial. True identity statements d consist of unlike singular terms or names (e.g., a = 8) denoting the same entit are informative. The sentence (4) “Gaurigaikara = Mt, Everest”” states the result of an empirical discovery.* Quine has pointed out that the of our worries over identity as a relation is our fundamental “confusion of s and object.” According to him, “What makes identity a relation, and ‘=? relative term, is that ‘=’ goes between distinct occurrences of singular te same or distinct, and not that it relates distinct objects.” * Without ent further into the philosophic disputes over identity, we can accept the above vie as tolerably intelligible. $6.2 The Nyaya concept of identity agrees with the modern concept as oul lined above only in that Nyaya conceives of identity as obtaining between objec not between symbols. In seeking to explain identity, Nyaya usually appeals the notion of an indefinable property of objects, their purely numeral dfferene ‘To deny that an object 4 is numerically different from an object B is tantamout to saying that A is identical with B. Thus the Naiydyika speaks of ‘numeri identity’, or more clearly ‘numerical nondifference’. This concept can best exemplified with reference to physical objects. The pot is identical with ft because it is not different from itself, or perhaps, to rephrase the same j because it is different from anything that is different from it. It goes without saying that this theory simply makes use of the truism that a thing is identi with itself One may criticize it as being too easy to be helpful or, if apparent helpful, as being incomprehensible since the notion of difference remains i explicable. ‘The best one can say for the Nyaya view is that it does no violence to co sense. It also makes use of the “useful” kind of identity statement in which ‘= goes between two unlike singular terms (at least one of them being complex) that refer to the same thing. Thus, (3) “A body of fire = the probandum of this inference.” (6) “A pot = the counterpositive of an absence of pot.” But identity as a relation becomes more important to Nyaya when it tries explain what it calls mutual absence (anyonyabhdva) or difference (bheda). Differ. ‘ence or otherness is exemplified in denials such as “A pot is not a cloth.” Nya explains that in such expressions a cloth, called the counterpositive (pratiyogin)) {sdeclared ot tobe related toa pot by identity (ef, 14dalmya-sambandiseacch bratiyogitakabhaval onyonyabhdcah”). This comes from the commonsense ni 4 See Quine, Word and Object, p 4. “Bid, p36, otherness is but « denial of identity. Nyaya explains this as ty is related by identity to something. Moreover, from such cause (for the production) of a pot! iya_goes on to explain that the potter’ stick becomes such & identity relation.* ‘he concept of identity as it is used in identifying a tree that I that I saw some ten years ago presents a great philosophie tion may be asked, for example, why we do jis exclusively particular to each moment of its niko) in the sense that they are in universal flux, each moment lich means the same thing for the Buddhists, being ient From the point of view of modern logic, as Quine suggests, We ake either of the two courses. We can identify the tre of today’ wnted ten years ago, and in that case our appropriate general tern ‘iree’. Or we can regard them as numerically diferent, where inte predicate becomes ‘tree stage’ (a term denoting brief tree) In Navya-nyaya Raghunatha indicated « solution in the ysical objects like a human body, a tree, or a mountain are 10) having a spatial spread and a temporal spread alike, In other be thought of as extended in both space and time. The m sical objects thus conceived cannot be easily disputed, The fers from the tree of yesterday in the same sense in which tht fers from the root af the tree. According to the Navyanylyit i offer the following equivalents: (8) ‘The tree of today’ means ‘the tree delimited (avacehinna) time ty (0) ‘The tree of yesterday’ means ‘the tree delimited by & ve are parallel with the following two:* ' (10) ‘The top of the tree’ means ‘the tree delimited by (11) ‘The root of the tree” means ‘the tree delirited by & It this is equivalent to saying that the whole tree is const 1s. Thus, by reference to the Nyaya distinction of the whole * Thus Nyaya says, “‘ghafatsdvacchinname Prati thddumyena dosdah hirawam / jombandlah tdatmyam.” Quine, Word and Objet, pp. s1-s2. Nee 8 o.2and 93.(12) “A pot = a blue pot.” * Karl Potter described it asa confusion of the Naiyayikas.” But pethaps ths i not so foolish as it looks. Among Western authors, Ingalls was the fie to nore this paradox, and he attempted to explain it by saying that the Naiytyikas were talking about entities and not words and that the relation of identity was hee taken as connecting only the qualiicands, not the whole complexes J. Steal sought rather to explain the paradox by refering tothe structural pecaity of Sanskrit noun-compounding. "Inthe compound nla-ghala‘blue-pot'the element shato ‘pot’ is said to be structurally predominant. Only that clement com be syntactically construed with expressions that lie outside the compound, But pethaps there is a mach simpler explanation. This may be just an appraisal of the commonsense view thatthe thing itself and the thing itself with an ansltnes are in a sense the same. By simply mentioning an extra attribute, ne do age essentially change the pot itself. Thus, as Nytya would say, it express truism, viz. a thing is identical with itself, no matter whether you refee to it ia. 8 general way (eBnnyena) by calling i ‘a pot’ or in a special way (oiejeye) by calling ita blue pot’ There are atleast two ways of misconstruing such a statement. It doesnot, ag one may think, asert the identity ofthe general terms or predicates (to spe modern logical terms) like ‘pot’ and ‘blue pot’; nor does it imply the entity of the clas of pots withthe class of blue pots. Obviously it would be wrong undey Such construction. Also it doesnot allow us, as the statements of (tut) slentity do under ordinary circumstances, to substitute one term forthe other ins sentents ithoutaflecting its truth value This called the “substieutvity test” of identity in modern logic: ‘The Navya-nydya was quite well aware of the confusion to which such assere tions might lead, and it seems to me that the only reason why they did nob Sfininate them from their discourse was that such asertons had the sanctity of antiquity. Thus, the Navys anyya rephrased such identity statements in terms _ of implication. Their basic principle became the following: ‘When we assert that some property pis attributable to a viesyo (an object mentioned without any qualification), we cannot at the same time deny that the same property p is attributable to the sisigta (the same object mentioned with some qualification), Compare “iberyertidharnasya sifiannyoptabldednaigthral," Le, “(p) (poo curs in a pot 5 p occurs in a blue pot)” There is still another way of explaining the problem. As Tearcfully examine all the instances in which Navya-nytya dealt witha statement like (12), I sometimes feel that they were appealing to some form of the principle of “the identification {See Ingalls, Moterits forthe Study of Neoyo-Nybya Losi, p. 6 11 Sez hip review of Ingalls’ book in Philsophy East and Weal (1984-88), 2780 12 Sez his review of Ingalls! book in Indo-dranion Journal, ¢ (robs) sa the coating Hk the layman's saying that a man and white man are the sme thing segbe emark in Aristotle, Mataphysics rosiaa3-24 “ora man and white ar ave the eal thing, as people say...” (Basie Werks, p. 78s) cernibles.” This principle has been the subject of much ert I. Soastananperd sine ses iersietin possibility that ight agree in al properties and still be distinct, and hence that theif Would not be fully justified. But « “mild form” of this priniple ft Plilosophical discourse for useful purposes. Such «mill form of Formulated by Quine as follows: “Objects indistinguishable fro within the terms of a given discourse should be construed as Id Sis cso venom of the principle is always relative to a enables one, as Quine has shown, to construct the foomula 4 = 9 nite vocabulary of general terms. Th fly ve prt ny ed Cad a for all values of x and y, then it is convenient to functional conjunction of the above two bi-conditional Argument for asserting (12) can sometimes be demonstrated (0 a given domain of discourse, where the vocabulary of pred not only is finite but consists ony of such absolute general fo both pot ands be pot aie spot nd ie ER hence interchangeable. Loosely speaking, the situation 0 [procedure in which the possession of a valid passport taken (stablishing personal identity, orto the situation in whic ha nount is taken as enough ground for identifying two d discourse when we are interested only in learning the incom Ie §54 In Navyanyaya, relations are usually divided (occurrence-exacting) and ily-aniydmake (non-occurnene ing to whether the adjunct can be said to occur in the subj implication is that, given a relation, it will be possible (0 Whether its adjunct can be described as being occurrent int locus. It follows that not every subjunct is a locus ofthe adj Adjunct occurs in (or isa superstratum of) the subjunct In ot of loci is a subclass of the class of subjuncts, and the class of subclass of the cass of adjuncts. } Samavay of inherence, some cass of samoga oF conjunc connecting sumasdya as well as absence to thee respective lod seardpa relation" are generally held to be occurrence-exsel Fi, ventiy, sconce a effect, etc, are to be taken as non-occurrence-exactng rela An imposed property (upadhi) such as adjunct-hool) al related to its locus by a searipa not held to be dl 2 From a Laicol Point of View, p. 71 80 also p17, and Word and 4 Se Quine Logical Pott of View, chap 1 See Ingalls, Meters, pp ‘Te realy cl tein why temporal rap lato held rencexacting. The only explnation is that a Gime eens regarded a8 & 4 spl leu (ee Ingalls, Matra, p. 7)It may be asked, how does it differ from the identity relation? We may now to distinguish them by appealing to the notion of occurrence-exacting and non ‘occurrence-exacting relations. Identity is a non-occurrence-exacting relation st that, given a = 6, we cannot use the expression ‘a occurs in 8” or “a is a loc of 5.” But a searapa relation, holding between an imposed property and ity possessor, is said to be occurrence-exacting in the sense that, given such a relatio relating @ and 6, we can use the expression “a occurs in 8” or “ is a locus of a although in the final analysis ie., when we talk in terms of categoria predica to be attached to a or 6, acan be identified with b. I under tion is not very illuminating unless we have some intuit conception of locus. Nyaya puts great emphasis on the simple empirical fact @ the Sanskrit language that in the case of a svardpe relation between and ‘one can construe } as a locus of a and accordingly use the locative case for b, bul in the case of identity of a and 8 one cannot do so. It should also be remembere that part of our dificulty with abstract properties like upadhi arises from th Nyaya’s predilection for lst of six or seven categories which provide the pi holes into one or another of which every term used or usable in phil Aiscourse must be lodged. But from another viewpoint, the Nyaa doctrine of svariipa relation and imposed property is merely a heuristic device necessary the semantic analysis of certain types of cogni One must also note that there are a few exceptions in which the of locus and the use of the locative case in Sanskrit do not go together, in othe words, in which the object denoted by the term having a locative case endin ‘cannot be described as a locus, For instance, we say, “mokse icckd asti” (Ther is desire for [literally ‘in'] salvation”) where ‘mokga’ (‘salvation’) is used in th locative case. From this one cannot describe moksa or salvation as a locus of i (desire), unless of course, we use ‘locus’ in a figurative sense. Thus, the relat isayatd (content-ness or the relation of being the content of), which conn desire to salvation (because the above sentence means that there is desire abo salvation), is described as a non-occurrence-exacting relation. The grammari noted that this type of locative case indicates that salvation here may be called ‘aigayika (an objective) locus of desire ‘The distinction between occurrence-exacting and non-occurrence-exacting tions becomes relevant to the Nyaya distinction between relational absen (samsorgdbhdca) and mutual absence (anyonydbhdva). Nyya asserts that in cases of relational absence the relation through which the adjunct, i.e ‘counterpositive, is denied to occur in the subjunct must be an occurrence-exacti relation. That is to say, the limiting relation of being the counterpos (protiyegitacacchedakacambandha; see § 9.5) must be occurrence-exacting. In 2 Luse this term as Morton White uses it in Tetward Reunion in Philsophy, Fora good cussion of the notion of categories and why the datnction between extegorial predicates a ‘oncategorial predicates is dubious, see his ehap v. Also see G. Ryle, Dilemmas, pp. 9-10, See further remark on the notion of eatgory in §86 {absence the counterpositive is said to be not identical with the Finplies thatthe limiting relation in such cassis a non-occurren hamely, identity. nner that all negative statements shouldbe interpreted on ‘wo models: (i) “x does not occur in y through relation 1," oF (i) Iwith y.’ To put itin another way, negation na sentence ean sh fun absence of something x if and only if the corresponding ful (although it might be false) when {of the two forms: () “x occurs in something y by some {s identical with something y.” It follows that Nyfya docs fof x where the counterpositive «is such that the limiting counterpostive is neither an : Iny Notes to passage 4 of Chapter 16). In Nyda te is unexampled (aprasiddhe), a nonentity (see § 18.8).‘connection’, ‘effort’, ‘in’ (possesive sulix oF "ia! (abstract suffix), in its etymological sense (Giadha) Tn logical context this ‘hostility my Ba erent (noncoesstent) in the same loci, We EM 6 4 definition applies to all cases or not. ‘To. GOH tks. For instance, x eannot occur in the lacs Whe to occur, so is called the prativogin of absence of w elational abstract pratiyegta (counterpostive-nest), much a definition fails when x takes as its vale a hat is called ‘pervasive occurrence’ (eyapya-nptiita) fF pot-ness occurs pervasively in a pot in the sense ‘here an absence of such property. Nyya says that occurrence (eyBpya-oti’ dharma). Other proper distinct contexts: one in describing an absence (abldta), and the other in dese find or tre and hence are called propertio f RO ing a relation (sambandha).* Since it will ultimately be clear that the two om dharma). The following two cases may be consliett Alifer very largely in sens, I shall discuss them separately as abhviya-pratigo Bthe same tree as locus, monkey-conleeiaiaaal (absential adjunet-ness or, better, counterpositive-ness) and sdmsargiba-pralyo Bitince of monkey-contact occurs at its root. BENE (telational adjunct-ness or countercorrelate-ness), iefintion we cannot take monkey-contact as the $6.2 Whenever we talk of negation or ‘absence, it is relevant to ask of wh Absence. This is a fault of avyapti or too narrow def the absence or negation is that we are talking about. Nyaya does not accept With the same potter's wheel as locus, the pot thats such thing as “pure negation.” Thus, an ‘absence, it claims, must be an abser ‘Oceurs in this moment, and the prior absence of that of something. This something is termed the pratfyogin (the counterpostive) the preceding moment. The given definition will not the absence in question In this respect the term ‘absence’ is comparable to [ot as the counterpositive of the said prior absence ‘term ‘cognition’ (dna). An instance of cognition is also a cognition of someth We have noted above that Nyaa arrives at absence asa property by ay Fc is the counterpositive of an absence y if forall tasis of denial It interprets denials like “ais not there” or “ais absent there then it is not the case that 2 occurs in at the sume “there is an absence of a there.” Thus the absence of a is asserted as a se Part as y occurs, i.e., in s as delimited by the same ‘entity, and o, the object of denial, is called the ‘counterpositive’ the same spatial part that delimited 2 in the ease of Here I shall concentrate my attention on the nature of the absential count ‘attempt to define counterpositive along this line it Positive. Two other relational abstracts, however, limitor-ship (evacch nical sense ofthe term is adopted for reasons that wil And conditioner-ship (nirapakai2), are so intimately related to the notion ese counterpositiverness that I shall be forced at times to anticipate some of ‘An absence of cow-ness is a counterpositive of an al Problems of later chapters. of cow-ness, but horse-ness is not a counter sositive of the logicians assert the principle that if etymological sense fits with the signifi iain and ify takes absence of Sea uses of a ical . But since jorse-ness does not occur in cow, which ts Philosophical term, itis unnecessary to look for an artificial or tech sense.t ‘Pratiyogila’, consisting of the four elements ‘prati? (‘counter.’, ‘anti Bee pbsence of the absence of cow-ness, Di slag eam , nts ‘pro ‘counter-’, ‘ant horse-ness as its value and when y takes absence of {Taells Materials for the Sid of Nersa-Nyoye Loti, pp 4 and ssn, hes as its, value. This illustrates the fault of Spal rac Cron nt he inc sen al definition. oo fe the erie" Batiste ot ppc tothe teal caer Sp ts! abeence of pot: (holerseea a {2788 radi bli yass" (he established sens of «words stronger than the cipnologealon (oer & Decne the technical sense (pribdybirth) is something created by thane teas oe tc yan, ns 8m nil,” TCDG, yp. 357-358. THE COUNTERPOSITIVE OF AN ABSE [Thereas the established sense (rdhdrtia) is warranted by the convention of the language,is also regarded as an absence in Nyaya and is thus interpreted aft the paradigm case of an ordinary absence of pot. Thus a pot isa count positive of the mutual absence of pot. The ground is not a pot. Thus ‘mutual absence of pot can be said to occur on the ground. Neverthel ‘pot may occur on that ground. Now, Dx comes out false when 4 pot as its value and y takes mutual absence of pot as its value illustrates the fault of aey@pti or too narrow definition. GaiigeS™ notes these two difficulties as reasons for rejecting the etymol definition. Raghunétha, however, thinks that the second dificulty is loose formulated and can be avoided easily by taking into consideration the relat through which «is denied to be related to the subjunct, ie, the limiting relations its counterpositive-ness.” Thus we can rephrase Dr as Da: xis the counterpositive of an absence y if forall s, ifs isa locus of then = is not related to = through the relation r, where ris the relat through which the counterpositive of zy is denied to be related to i subjunet Now to consider (4). In a mutual absence of pot, he relation r would be, definition, identity. A pot may occur on the ground, or may be related {0 through some suitably chosen relation, but never through identity. Thus Da come out true when # takes a pot as its value and y takes mutual absence of as its value. Garigesa finally expresses his view that pratiyogt@ should be taken as a spe ind of searapa relation (self-linking relation) comparable to the seardpa relat between an absence of + and the locus of such absence. But, keeping in mind supposed definition of pratiyogiva offered by Udayana in’ NydyakusumaAj Gatige&a gives an alternative suggestion," which may be presented as foo Dg: xis a counterpositive of absence y iff xis identical with the absence the absence y, ‘Raghundtha remarks here that D3 is also defective in its present form, since: does not apply to the counterpositive of mutual absence. For instance, absence of mutual absence of pot is identical with pot-ness, and not with ‘Protiyogitom na srodhitvow, sahinovothdnaniyomalatjoyon.gatdéatoyor onyonylDhisapratizoginy aatede e,” TCDG, p. 337, 74, «ila co tene sambandhendsambaddhatolian niyom desoh enyondbhdsasyo sombandidsacchinneprtiygidbatey3. tadvati ena sombendhens pot TCDG, p. 358 “Kin tu yathidhiboronithisayoh sorapasitegeh sambandhah lalhé pratiogisam onuyo pi," TCDG, p. 357 "Nyda inssts that the negate ofa negation, ie, the counterposiive ofan absence, must an unexampled term. In other words, we cannot simply negatea term whiel has no de ‘To puttin another way, we cannot have an absence whose counterponitve is fit ‘Thus Udayana says in NydyokusumiAial, chap i, verse ‘dearly WBideasatiaiea BaiiAt hi sfeyald ebisavirahtimatom satunah prtiyegi.” Abhivovirakitmotvam s8;” TCDG, p. 357 A pot fs actually the counterpositive of the mutual ly applies to pot-ness, but does not apply, as it this dificulty, Raghunatha’ applies the wellknown meth ral places to Solve similar difficulties presented in the n Dg in the following manner:* nas is contradictory oF mn of the absence y. at the cognition of a mutual absence of pot cs is contradicted or destroyed by the cognition of a Wblocus. The hostility or contradiction (pratibandhahuld) {01 ‘explained as ‘nonconcurrence (of the two) in the same fis matter of common experience that ote individual sll omething both as a pot and not as a pot! Th Wand the cognition “It each the other. A pot here becomes the object of cont fan Mlentty relation. Note that although the cognition Hye sid to be contr some way (o the ‘of pot, and pot-ness is an object of that cognition, tit relation Gaiigesa himself has acknowledged his discomfort ‘oa! after it. Some, however, contend that in the ‘of 4 pot the relational abstract pratiyogita resides bot Alike; s0 the above definitions can be maintained in some junta notes several objections to D4. One is that itis taining an unexampled (aprasiddha) term in regard to lefiniens consists of two contradictory cognitions, ane of {Ao make the other true. In the case of certain examples it ‘he said false cognition may actually be an unexampled lilied by any fact of the universe. That is, it may re ever has that type of false cognition, Thus if we 5 of counterpostive we face the change of using & been shown above, a vacuous term must be avoided theory of absence holds the following: (a) an absence of im-caehobilisacchedenaiktrdartaminatvam,” TCDG Ys ( Raghunitha: “sHabdo'rivoracastcandya,” TCDG, 9. $90:procedure if itis to be made logical. Raghundtha also argues that, in order th ‘13 or D4 may not include pot-ness, we have to explain the absence finally as} absence of x. Thus we run into circularity, because the particle ‘of actually refer to a pratiyosila. The only way out of this difficulty is to interpret this s ‘pratiyogila or counterpositive-ness as a kind of scart relation. This only amount to saying that the attempt to define counterpositive-ness in the above line is successful. Raghundtha thus favors the first altemative of GaiigeSa, because define counterpositive-ness even in terms of absence or hostility (sirodha) involve circularity.#* It is obvious that to define even the notion of absence-ne or hostility we must use the notion of counterpositive-ness in turn. §64 Whenever an entity is taken as a kind of soartpa relation, two thi are implied, First, the entity acts as a self-linking relation relating itself (as) property) to the other relatum. It is thus that Nydya meets the objection infinite regress against its concept of relation.1° Second, ontological question about the said abstract property are avoided. Thus, if « is described as bearin such a svarmpe relation to a, then zis declared to belong to the category to @ happens to belong. Counterpositive-ness is a starapa relation relating the counterpositive to th absence. But this eventually leads to other questions. “What is it that counterpositive-ness is the same as?” “Is it the same as the counterpositive oF the absence or both?” Stardpa literally means ‘the selfsame’. Hence the questions are relevant. We shall examine the three possible alternatives () Ibis the same as x, the counterpositive. i) It is the same as the absence (Gil) It is the same as, or it amounts to, both the absence and the counter positive Tt should be noted that the concept of absence and the concept of count ive-ness are related in such « way that if the counterpositive-ness invoh instance of absence is asserted as identical with that involved in anoth absence, then the two absences are indistinguishable from each other. In othe words, to distinguish one absence from the other, Nyaya demands that one must distinguish its counterpositive-ness from that of the other. Keeping this in mind Jagadisa rejects alternative (i) for the following reason. A large section of Ny speaks of a generic absence (sdmdnydbidea) as distinct from what may be eal ‘a specific absence (sisesabhava). The generic absence of pot and a specific ab of pot have one feature in common: the counterpositive in both the cases is But the limiting character or the limitor (asacchedaka) of the property of bein the counterpositive is different in each case. In the former case it is the gener character pot-ness, while in the latter it is the individual character of a given py “-abhisatespraibondhakawayoh_ prtiyegighatatst, tlkseihoryahdrogocorasyBpi bratisogitim nirsakium adokyatli." TCDG, p. $39. See § 48. * “Tatapratiygimiiressarapatse siminySbhivasiteyEbhieayohpratiogitayereviteySpater yeyom,” TCDI, p. 258 iva), X can illustrate the point more clearly with another {0 instances of absence, viz, §) "Rama is absent,” Whe great king of Ayodhy& is abse ime object as counterpositive. But {n one cassia tis ‘Rama’ while in the other case as ‘the great king Of A Wyill assert that the counterpositi ality (lad-eyaktitca) in Rama, whil iy of being the great king of Ayodhya. Jaga Aion will be hard to maintain if we accept alternative i), G Jument and goes on further to show that Nyda distingul ‘oven when itis only the imiting relations ofthe eount Hut under alternative j) such fundamental differences ible. ‘objection to alternative (i) is to be framed ina different a postulates that two absences which are coextensive (h fense that one occurs in a locus if and only if the other onstrued as identical. But the counterpositivesness im the maintained as distinct from that in the other, bee ing absurdity will occur. ‘The two absences exemplified ‘ean be taken as identical under this view sine» they Ae suense). Now the contradictory cognitions of (a) and (b) (@) “Rama is present,” (a) “The great king of Ayodhya is present.” simple logic of relations it follows that if () is eomtead lence expressed by (a) is identical with that expresiedl ilo be contradictory to (b). But actually ft canaeiail fs that cognitian (c) is quite compatible with (>), To aval iveiness in (b) is ruled by Nyaya to be di 10 accept alternative (i), this necessary distinction could cither counterpositive-ness, being the same as its have to be construed as identical with the other iidhara is a little more cautious in framing his object that ~(~(~a)) = ~a.® But the counterpositive ~). Therefore, the counterpostive of ~a, which is identical (ma) as well as a. Nyaya grants this deduction, Dut ali jent in a must be distinguished f j), But under (ii) we cannot maintain such a distineth ne in both the cases. Thus, we must reject (li), ee Inga, aerials p68, note 135, Tus the igs HaeJagudita, in his commentary on the Avacchedakata-nirukti appacently gi his verdict in favor of alternative (i),* in spite of the evident awkwardn Under (ii) it is clear that one has to admit two different types of counterposit ness: one being the same as the counterpositive and the other the same as abs For otherwise, by applying the simple law of the transitivity of identi ‘alb + bic + D + ale, it can be argued that the counterpositive and its absence ‘identical, an obviously absurd conclusion, To postulate two types of counterpositive-ness in a simple case of absence however, not a happy solution. Thus we are led to a fourth alternative, that counterpositive-ness i neither the same as the counterpositive nor the same the absence, but « different entity. Here we come quite close to the final noted by Raghunatha. In defiance of the traditional Vaisesika system of categories (padartha), some maintain that counterpositive ness may be taken a separate category. In the concluding line of his Siddhntaleksana-didhili (a of TCD), Raghunitha mentions this view as being held by a section (ead of the Naiyayikas.® Ramabhadra, in his commentary on Raghundtha’s PT} states clearly that, among many other categories, counterpositive-ness is one has been accepted by Raghunstha.* T have already indicated my attitude toward these abstracts. They may taken as heuristic devices that await further explanation. The different catego that Raghunatha and some other Naiyayikas recommend for our acceptance be viewed as mere posits for a consistent building up of the Navya-nyaya tl Whether they are real or not can perhaps be construed as a separate questi (Gee also § 7.6 for a somewhat diferent explanation.) $6.5 Another interesting question is often asked about this peculias pro pratiyogita (counterpositive-ness): Through which source of knowledge do come to cognize it? The apparent answer that may be offered is as follows. Si the Naiyayikas of the later school accept that an absence of is cogat through perception provided that the counterpositive = is a perceptible enti the property counterpositive-ness involved in the said absence (which is pr ably a relation between x and that absence) is also said to be cognized thro perception. In other words, the percept expressed as “an absence of” is anal able into three constituents: the qualifer 2, the qualicand absence, and relation counterpositive-ness linking them. But it may be argued that in such Percept we cognize only a relation (sombondka) as we doin all other qualific cognitions. We do not cognize that relation as a pratiyogit2. So the above ques {s answered ina diferent way. Pratiygita i cognized through inference. One proceed as follows. First infer that a cognition of an absence of z involves cognition ofa relation r from the premises: * Srorapasambandhasmiboya 1s pratesotibhinnae beta, lolldabide-prlgory sarapiya ii adaihob,” TCDI, p. 238 *Viayo atin proliyognsdhitaragat-atre-sembonditsdeye'y tira ee Ath ity ehadelinah” TCDG, 9478 Viqaytadipaddd stays prtyoptdnusopinSvadhisnadhimatsdhiratsidhyoee dil laniapiteieovaaviteyohivecchedababdnschedgueadayoh" PTN, p 127, |All qualificative cognitions involve the cognition of a relatlony | ‘The cognition of an absence of x is a qualifcative cognition, — the additional premise that the relation r thus obtained ia lth the wel-known relations like conjunction and inhereneey type of relation called pratiyogta F the status of counterpositive-ness, one thing is clears ely dependent upon the concept of absence, This si” is interpreted in Nydya language as ‘an absence whieh Wi) 4 counterpositive-ness resident in 2’. Gedadhara hi gt! He thinks that the concept of pratiyogita is not indi Js theoretically replaceable by another and probably more fanuyogita or subjunct-hood. In the cognition “is abent! Wappears only as a qualifier of the qualifcand absence. ‘Of the (magic) gem is held to be the cause of burning by ft am is regarded as the kdrayatdvacchedaka (the limitor of cause-ness). Thus if we are to speak of asel-inking to speak of a self-linking relation that is resident y the counterpositive 2. This sellinking. te {he onuyositd or subjunct-hood, the property of being the ind, we do not usually cognize a counterpestive 2 Aa | This means that the concept of a subjunct-hood is more of absence. Thus we speak of a pratiyogita only as a t in terms of anuyogita, which, in tur oncept. Gadadhara makes a concession, however, t0 Jol absence as destruction (dheamsabhdca) 4 and therefore the property counterpostivesness in a play four cognition and use of the notions of the destruction OF pots namely, the event in which a pot is destroyed), This shows t ‘ounterpositive pot in such eases of absence Here I shall note, in brief, the wellknown controversy bel esa over the division of pratiyogita (counterpositive nest) of pratiyogita. ‘that occurs in the same locus with the pratiyogit it fn avodheyom, ghofo nistity abhisabuddhds abide Ima yobhdnddeh btrogatve prtiyegnevocchedokatade60 BASIC CONCEPTS: o harmacacchinna-pratiyogita). The other type is supposed to be delimited nonconcurrent property, ie & property that does not occur in the same loc the prativogita (eyadhikaraya-dharmdvacchinna-pratiyogia). The first type i il trated in a cognition like “A pot as qualified by pot-ness (or, by substances tc) is absent here.” What appears as the qualifier of pot in the cogniti actually the delimitor (or limiting property) of the counterpositive-ness in Pot-ness or substance-ness occurs in pot and hence is concurrent (samanadhiihan with the counterpositive-ness. The second type is illustrated in a cognition A pot as qualified by cloth-ness (pafaiva) is absent here.” Here cloth-ness ‘comes the delimitor of the counterpositiveness in pot, and hence it is ‘concurrent (syadhikaraya) with such counterpositive-ness. Note that the coun Positive in both eases is the same, ie, a pot. But the subjunct or lacs of absence illustrated in the fist case is any entity in which a potis absent, wh the locus of the second absence would be any entity in the universe, beea pot as qualified by cloth-ness exists nowhere. A more familiar example of second type would be, “There is no rabbit here as qualified by horns.” Gat accepts the frst type of absence but rejects the second type." The issues invol here are ultimately related to the problem of the negation of sel-contradic terms in logic" or to the problem of the truth value of the proposition wh subject has no denotatum.® To modify Russel’s example in order to check nylya theory on the problem in general: “The present king of France ondala will analyze this as speaking ofan absence whose counterpositl is the king of France as qualified by the property present-ness. That i, iti absence where the counterpositve-ness in the king of France is delimited by property present-ness. Gaigeca, however, will analyze tas speaking ofan abse of the property present-ness inthe king of France. Note that ‘the king of Bran {snot an empty term, but has denotation, ie., denotes any such king of the and the property present-ness is exemplified by present objects ‘There isan epistemological reason for Gatigeta’s rejection of the Sondala tion, Nyaya asserts that a qualificative cognition, in which b appears to qualify self being qualified by another property c, is produced by a prior cognition which ¢ appears to qualify 6. We may express this in symbols by writing *“Q{00))” is produced by the prior cognition “Q(). Thus the cognition “T} aground possesses a blue pot” needs a cognition “a blue pot" as its cause, Un Sondala’s interpretation, the above sentence expresses a cognition in which counterpositive, the king of France, appears to qualify absence, itself bei ‘qualified by the property present-ness; and hence this will need another cogniti where present-ness should appear to qualify the king of France. But this seco cognition is not possible unless it happens to be an error of false cognit ‘which means that the resulting cognition will so be false, And false cog 8 “Prativogyonti ea dharma no prativogtieachedabah,” TCDL, p. 121 ™ Thave dscussed this matter from a slightly diferent point of view In “A Discourse on Self Contradictory Terms in Nyiya,” The Caleta Review, 258 (1g61), 10-16. * See Russel, “On Denoting.” ntee that there is such counterpositive-ness which is d rent property.” Pe noted here that, under the section *Vyadhibaraya! of We remarked that the problem connected with the concept of relation may also be settled in the following wayé!! Th see (sdmanyabhava) of x, the counterpositive-ness of th Iuken to be the same as its delimitor or Himiting property] Js the counterpositive, pot-ness would be such « delimit Htive-ness would be nothing more than this. property fof a specific absence of x-as-qualifel-by-a-genetle Ihormena vifeabkdea), the counterpositiveness should be th fle property that appears to be qualifying the counterposl Gqualifed by substance-ness (draxyatea), i & pot in Ne Iibstance (drarya) is said to be absent, the eounterpositives is fotness, not the generic property subsance-ness altho Wdelimitor in this case. But in the case of an absence jtive-ness is said to be delimited by a nonconcuerent ro} Ys case), the supposed counterpositive-ness must be take Iuither the same as the counterpositive nor the same As Wie net claim of Sondala amounts to accepting dil jtive-ness and accepting it also as a separate entity pare Gatgesa: “tadviiajAdnasytbhtoadHeulehd anya Wrist, xi taieigigom nisi pratter apres Ml be iiorol,* TCDG, p.s18. Raghunatha makes thisclat Du tliosiiispratseyaieads abkivaprataye i ofa Mvocdlumina ‘isegooasyipigholtsesfadavocchedakavam aga ye prt,” TCDG, pp. 318-310 , Pater i srnpsebendee, oo shal ips to, nu tu pratigorsarapy nanagemd Adhd pilelbkiastate ca pratiyogyomse rakiribiale vieradlarme e8 WM Ika; eyoditorevedhermdvachinndbhvatile co jay Dine tiitom .-- sidds'pyoiikyim pratioytiyim ex" TODD