SUMMARY:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. O.G. HOLDINGS CORPORATION

RULE 65

Q: EMB issued an ECC to a beach resort project owned by OG Holdings. EMB

then sent a notive of violation of the ECC. The project was suspended. Upon an
adverse decision against OG Holdings, OG Holdings no longer moved for a
motion for reconsideration; instead, it filed a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA found merit in the prayer. Did the CA err
in granting OG Holdings petition for certiorari under rule 65 despite the lack of
a motion for reconsideration?

A: Yes. A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an

aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65.

Q: Why is there a need to move for a motion for reconsideration before one can
file a petition for certiorari under rule 65?

A: This well-established rule is intended to afford the public respondent an

opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.

BERNARDO ZAMORA v. EMMANUEL QUINAN, JR, et. al.

FORUM SHOPPING

Q: Petitioner, on June 19 2006, filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of

Real Properties fraudulently obtained with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City. Pending the resolution of petitioner's complaint, he commenced
another action before the Court of Appeals for the Annulment of Judgment of
the RTC of Cebu City. Then, again, on June 5, 2009, petitioner commenced
another civil action before the CA for the Annulment of Judgment of the RTC of
Cebu City. Thereafter, the respondents filed with the CA a motion to dismiss
the complaint filed on June 5, 2009 claiming that petitioner has resorted to
forum shopping. Did the petitioner commit forum shopping?

A: Yes. Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more

suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask
the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action. The general rule is that compliance with the
certificate of forum shopping is separate from and independent of the
avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself.

A comparison of the reliefs sought by petitioner in the reconveyance case

and the annulment of judgment case under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
confirms that they are substantially similar on two points: (1) revocation and
cancellation of the new certificate of titles granted in the name of herein
respondents and (2) the recovery or consolidation of title in petitioner's favor. In
other words, the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for are being founded on
the same facts. The identity of the two cases filed is such that a favorable
judgment rendered in the lower court for the case of reconveyance will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration of this Court.

GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL v. ANIANA LAWAS SON

JURISDICTION

Q: Aniana Lawas Son (respondent) instituted an action for reconveyance and

damages, before the RTC, against Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging
that, for twelve and a half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor
of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from a certain
Eleno T. Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a sum of P200,000.00. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the market value of the property, as per tax
declaration, is P2,830.00. Thus, jurisdiction lies over the MTC. Is the RTC
correct in ruling that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case?

A: Yes. The respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of
the subject property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its
market value amounting to P200,000.00.  In the course of the trial, the
petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
Settled is the requirement that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, required the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the
complaint. The complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of
the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed because
the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be
identified.

JOLO’S KIDDIE CART v. EVELYN CABALLA and ANTHONY BAUTISTA

RULE 65

Q: Respondents filed a case against petitioners before the LA. The LA dismissed
the case insofar as Colisao is concerned for failure to prosecute. However, the
LA ruled in favor of respondents. NLRC modified the LA ruling, finding no
illegal dismissal nor abandonment of work. Dissatisfied, petitioners directly
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, without moving for reconsideration
before the NLRC. CA denied the petition due to petitioners' failure to file a
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari before the CA. Is the contention of the CA correct?

A: No. petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA even

without first moving for reconsideration before the NLRC. As a rule, the filing of
a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a
petition for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is that "the law
intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the
errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of
justice can be had." Notably, however, there are several recognized exceptions
to the rule, one of which is when the order is a patent nullity. In here, NLRC
committed an oversight that amounted to patent nullity.

POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL COMPANY

DEVELOPMENT

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION UNDER RULE 65

Q: In the early sixties, NDC had in its disposal a ten (10)-hectare property
located along Pureza St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. The estate was popularly known
as the NDC Compound. NDC entered into a contract of lease with GHRC over a
portion of the property. Later, a second contract of lease covering additional
portions of the property was executed between NDC and GHRC where the latter
was also given the option to purchase the leased area on the property. On
August 12, 1988, before the expiration of the ten-year period under the second
contract of lease, GHRC informed NDC of its desire to renew the contract and
thereafter exercise the option to purchase the leased areas. NDC, however, gave
no reply thereon. Later, GHRC discovered that NDC was trying to dispose of the
property in favor of a third party. GHRC filed with the trial court, a complaint
for specific performance and damages against NDC. Meanwhile, on January 6,
1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 214,
ordering the transfer of the whole NDC Compound to the National Government,
which in turn would convey the said property in favor of PUP at acquisition
cost. Such order would automatically cancel NDC’s obligation in favour of the
National Government. RTC rendered a Decision sustaining GHRC's right to
purchase the leased areas on the subject lot. NDC and PUP interposed their
respective appeals before the appellate court. On June 25, 2008, the appellate
court rendered judgment affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. PUP filed a
Manifestation claiming that instead of NDC, it was entitled to the purchase
price of the leased premises. RTC ruled in favour of PUP. the RTC explained
that upon verification with the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered by
the NDC and the Republic of the Philippines, it appeared that there are indeed
properties of NDC which were not transferred to the National Government.
Aggrieved, before the appellate court, PUP filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure invoking grave abuse
of discretion resulting in lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC. The CA dismissed the petition. Is there grave abuse of discretion on the
part of RTC?

A: No. The appellate court's decision affirmed the RTC's finding that because
the leased subject properties were under litigation at the time of the
implementation of Memorandum Order No. 214, the ownership thereof was
never transferred to the National Government, thus, it necessarily follows that
the same were never conveyed to PUP.
We, thus, conclude that the appellate court correctly found that no grave abuse
of discretion attended the RTC's issuance of the February 2, 2012 resolution as
the same merely clarified what was seemingly confusing in the November 25,
2004 decision of the RTC.

SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (DECEASED) SURVIVED AND ASSUMED BY

HIS HEIRS v. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES AND MARIANO BOBILLES

RULE 3

Q: Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an

absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and
Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in
Piedad's favor and declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery.
Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on September
15, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial
court ruling. On July 12, 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying
that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the Unfinished
Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, Toledo City. Regional Trial Court, Toledo City denied the motion.
Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to institute the case
on Piedad's behalf. Did the petitioners establish their personality to file the
petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad?

A: Yes. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad's rightful heirs

not only by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. Rule 3, Section 2 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may be a party in interest in a civil
action:

Section 2. Parties in interest - A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Rule 3, Section 16 then provides for the process of substitution of parties when
the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the
claim.

JOHN DENNIS CHUA v. PEOPLE

CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65

Q: Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
On 16 September 2004, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." The MeTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing Judge
Santos' authority to render the decision. Is certiorari the proper remedy to
question the MeTC decision?

A: No. Appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy to question the MeTC
decision. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil
action of certiorari will not be entertained - remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. The proper remedy to
obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.
This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is
its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in
excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set
out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.

YOLANDA VILLANUEVA-ONG v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

COUNTERCLAIM

Q: Juan Ponce Enrile (respondent) filed a civil Complaint for damages against

Yolanda Villanueva-Ong (petitioner) for libel before the Regional Trial Court.
petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. The respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss, which argued that petitioner's counterclaims are
actually permissive, and hence should have complied with the requirements of
an initiatory pleading, specifically the payment of docket fees and certification
against forum shopping. Are petitioner’s counterclaims compulsory in nature?

A: Yes. Jurisprudence has laid down tests in order to determine the nature of a
counterclaim, to wit:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants'
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the defendants'
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory.

The counterclaims, set up by petitioner arises from the filing of

respondent's complaint. "The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case
that it is incapable of proceeding independently." We find that the evidence
supporting respondent's cause that malice attended in the publication of the
article would necessarily negate petitioner's counterclaim for damages
premised on the malicious and baseless suit filed by respondent.

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 52)

Q: The Court issued a resolution on January 27, 2015 denying the

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner has filed its so-
called Manifestation with Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for
Reconsideration. Should the second motion for reconsideration be denied?

A: Yes. It is a prohibited motion. The Court shall not entertain a second motion
for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the
higher interest of justice by the Court en bane upon a vote of at least two-
thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest
of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is
likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.

 UNITED INTERIOR MANGGAHAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. HON.

DE LUNA

RULE 41

Q: Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint  for Specific Performance with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction with Damages against respondents Spouses Edilberto Villon and
Helen Pe-Villon. Spouses Villon’s demurrer to evidence was granted.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Consequently, petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal. For their part, Sps. Villon filed an Omnibus Motion to
Strike Out Notice of Appeal and Issue Certificate of Finality. Should petitioner’s
notice of appeal be expunged from the records of the case?

A: Yes. The mere filing of a notice of appeal does not automatically divest the
trial court of its jurisdiction, since the appeal is deemed perfected as to the
appellant only; it is not "deemed perfected," for purposes of divesting the court
of its jurisdiction, "before the expiration of the period to appeal of the other
parties." Thus, contrary to petitioner's position, the RTC has yet to lose its
jurisdiction over the case when it filed its Notice of Appeal as respondents'
period to appeal had not yet expired by then.

DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY v. GINA BUTLER

RULE 3

Q: Donald Francis Gaffney filed a Complaint against Gina V. Butler for sum of
money. Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony
Richard Butler under the original Complaint, private respondent filed a Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate
or the heirs of the late Anthony Richard Butler [as additional party-
defendant], allegedly represented by petitioner as his surviving spouse.
Petitioner opposed the motion primarily on the ground that "only natural or
juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action." Is the petitioner
correct?

A: Yes. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
be made a defendant in a case. Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a
party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal
entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute
cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's
estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is
not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend.