ART 306
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO
y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-
appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the
Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of
simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-
57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom
allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away
one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose
of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial
which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September
26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed
on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with
this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance
with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion
perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally
the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a
quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532
since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in
applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the
charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval
the following counter-statement of facts in the People's brief5
which adopted the established findings of the court a quo,
documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of
the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on
January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta
Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver
of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused
Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's
husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of
local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro
that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take
his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so
she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic)
the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta
Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front
seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He
poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced,
"ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has
money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go.
The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma.
Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas
station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went
about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her
Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her
soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and
threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There
Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand.
Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he
changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma.
Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to
the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored
her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress
had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the
ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress
was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to
CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying
to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn,
Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said
narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno,
he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as
he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride,
and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway.7

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz
car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a
barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and
divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial
of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by
explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of
his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this
opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was
committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping
for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law
that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should
be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the
nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to
the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable
aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion
thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be
relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the crime
as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the
furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former,
or whether the accused had his own personal motives for
committing the murder independent of his membership in the
rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would
constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted
on a person in authority who was not then in the actual
performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender
assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority,
the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be
physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants
had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his
need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the
way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very
well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you
doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had
an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our
office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge
that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial
rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must
be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended
party of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom
of action was merely an incident in the commission of another
offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as
United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter,
15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away
of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of
time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they
committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the
victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap
or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly
demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant
Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when
the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that
you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you
already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she
signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle
Verde when she is (sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my
mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along the way
we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa
Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to
get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as
equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy
of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally.
Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can
hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash
and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under
the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely
amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion
of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants.
Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as
defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of
the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery
contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from
the allegation in the information that the victim was carried away
and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the
robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North
Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they
intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with
her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash,
drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes
committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to
the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a
modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary
submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct
interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No.
532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which
matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as
yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential
Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of
Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact
that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in
line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal
law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous.
20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo)
in order to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and
perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary
robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early
part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery
are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of
continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation
of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the
formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to
constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show,
in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose
attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band
of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the
band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis
supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no
indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule
on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the
time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be
construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction
is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from
the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace,
order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against
a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim
could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single
act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and
social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway
robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.
This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to
Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated
therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to
the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree
does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming
a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said
accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer
obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the
essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation
wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific,
intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they
may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which
is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as
it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that
matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to
the fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should
be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been
stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which
thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview
and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to
adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property
committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of
the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it
may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that
he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin
deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal
justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of
doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a
highway would be the determinant for the application of
Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect
mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive
criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum
line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory
adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the
interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For,
if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is
forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a
fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the
unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the
categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if
the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful
asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along
and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by
the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and
completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact
that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car
which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the
decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision
precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and
committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway
robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is
simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph
5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their
concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the
aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against
both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further
applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in
favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been
made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the
maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the
conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an
information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the
former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the
latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former
offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with
intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the
owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the
case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be
alleged in an information where it is charged that there was
unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender
of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the
information filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege
that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and
extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not
expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly
convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks
(inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain,
and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a
charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate
the presence of any of the elements of robbery through
intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET
ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants
Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as
Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of
the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party,
Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual
damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
581 Phil. 211
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner People of the
Philippines (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the Order[2] dated May
18, 2007, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of
Surigao City, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter the criminal case for estafa filed by private complainant
Veneranda S. Paler (Veneranda) against respondents Samuel
Vanzuela (Samuel) and his wife, Loreta Vanzuela (Loreta)
(respondents). The case ostensibly involves an agrarian dispute,
hence, according to the RTC, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
The antecedents are as follows:
Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr.[3] who is the
registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, containing an area
of more than four (4) hectares, situated in Barangay Mabini (Roxas),
Mainit, Surigao del Norte, and covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 5747.[4] One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject
property) was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants
for more than ten (10) years, with an agreed lease rental of twelve
and one half (12½) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per
harvest. The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since
1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the matter before the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del
Norte, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus,
Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the
respondents.
Consequently, respondents were charged in an Information[5]
dated February 28, 2002 which reads:
That in about and during the period from 1997 to 2001 in Brgy.
Roxas, Mainit, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said spouses Samuel and Loreta
Vanzuela, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, having leased and occupied the farmland of Veneranda S.
Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr., and having
harvested and accounted for a total of 400 sacks of palay for the
past 10 harvest seasons of which 25% thereof were hold (sic) in
trust by them or a total value of P80,000.00, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert said sum of P80,000.00 to their own use and benefit to the
damage and prejudice of said Veneranda Paler and other heirs of
the late Dionesio Paler, Sr. in the aforementioned sum of
P80,000.00.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial,
the parties agreed that the respondents had been the agricultural
tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and that the
palay was harvested twice a year on the subject property.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After the prosecution rested
its case, the respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence,[6] praying
that the criminal case be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to
establish the culpability of the respondents beyond reasonable
doubt. Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition[7] arguing that the
respondents, as agricultural tenants, were required by law to hold
the lease rentals in trust for the landowner and thereafter turn over
the same to the latter.
In an Order[8] dated May 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed the criminal
case ratiocinating, thus:
From the averments of the information, the admissions of the
parties and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is easily
discernable (sic) that the instant case pertains to the non-payment
of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a
lease of an agricultural land by the former from the latter. This
being so, the controversy in the case at bench involves an agrarian
dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New
Rules of Procedure, x x x.
Citing our ruling in David v. Rivera[9] and Philippine Veterans Bank
v. Court of Appeals,[10] the RTC opined that it had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case because the controversy had the
character of an "agrarian dispute." The trial court did not find it
necessary to rule on the respondents' Demurrer to Evidence and, in
fact, no mention of it was made in the assailed Order of May 18,
2007. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 30, SURIGAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHARGE
FOR ESTAFA EVEN IF IT INVOLVES AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT; [AND]
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEEMING "EXEMPTION" FROM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANTS FOR ESTAFA WOULD
CONTRAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY THE "EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE."[11]
Petitioner, on one hand, contends that, under Section 57 of
Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law" (CARL), Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) were
vested with limited criminal jurisdiction, i.e., with respect only to
the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the said Act; that the
only penal provision in RA 6657 is Section 73 thereof in relation to
Section 74, which does not cover estafa; that no agrarian reform
law confers criminal jurisdiction upon the DARAB, as only civil and
administrative aspects in the implementation of the agrarian reform
law have been vested in the DAR; that necessarily, a criminal case
for estafa instituted against an agricultural tenant is within the
jurisdiction and competence of regular courts of justice as the same
is provided for by law; that the cases relied upon by the RTC do not
find application in this case since the same were concerned only
with the civil and administrative aspects of agrarian reform
implementation; that there is no law which provides that
agricultural tenants cannot be prosecuted for estafa after they have
misappropriated the lease rentals due the landowners; and that to
insulate agricultural tenants from criminal prosecution for estafa
would, in effect, make them a class by themselves, which cannot be
validly done because there is no law allowing such classification.
Petitioner submits that there is no substantial distinction between
an agricultural tenant who incurs criminal liability for estafa for
misappropriating the lease rentals due his landowner, and a non-
agricultural tenant who likewise incurs criminal liability for
misappropriation.[12]
Finally, petitioner posits that, at this point, it is premature to discuss
the merits of the case because the RTC has yet to receive in full the
evidence of both parties before it can render a decision on the
merits. Petitioner also claims that it is pointless to delve into the
merits of the case at this stage, since the sole basis of the assailed
RTC Order is simply lack of jurisdiction.[13]
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that share tenancy is now
automatically converted into leasehold tenancy wherein one of the
obligations of an agricultural tenant is merely to pay rentals, not to
deliver the landowner's share; thus, petitioner's allegation that
respondents misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest
is not tenable because share tenancy has already been abolished by
law for being contrary to public policy. Accordingly, respondents
contend that the agricultural tenant's failure to pay his lease rentals
does not give rise to criminal liability for estafa. Respondents stand
by the ruling of the RTC that pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the
DARAB New Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over
agrarian disputes; and that respondents did not commit estafa for
their alleged failure to pay their lease rentals. Respondents submit
that a simple case for ejectment and collection of unpaid lease
rentals, instead of a criminal case, should have been filed with the
DARAB. Respondents also submit that, assuming arguendo that they
failed to pay their lease rentals, they cannot be held liable for
Estafa, as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, because the liability of an agricultural tenant is
a mere monetary civil obligation; and that an agricultural tenant
who fails to pay the landowner becomes merely a debtor, and, thus,
cannot be held criminally liable for estafa.[14]
Ostensibly, the main issue we must resolve is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa, because the assailed order is
premised on the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
However, should our resolution be in the affirmative, the more
crucial issue is whether an agricultural tenant, who fails to pay the
rentals on the land tilled, can be successfully prosecuted for estafa.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we find it appropriate to
reiterate the doctrines laid down by this Court relative to the
respective jurisdictions of the RTC and the DARAB.
The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire
criminal jurisdiction are (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must
have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[15]
First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. It
is determined by the material allegations of the complaint or
information and the law at the time the action was commenced.
Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter
of an action, cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even
by express consent of the parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a
motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.[16]
In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases
involving estafa. In Arnado v. Buban,[17] we held that:
Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, "the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed if the amount of the fraud is over
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00; and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided x x x shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for its additional
P10,000.00 x x x." Prision mayor in its minimum period, ranges from
six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Under the law, the
jurisdiction of municipal trial courts is confined to offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective
of the amount of the fine.
Hence, jurisdiction over the criminal cases against the [respondents]
pertains to the regional trial court. x x x
The allegations in the Information are clear Criminal Case No. 6087
involves alleged misappropriation of the amount of P80,000.00.
Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since
the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's
authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed
within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.
[18]
Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information
filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely
an agrarian dispute. The cases relied upon by the RTC, namely,
David v. Rivera[19] and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals,[20] are of different factual settings. They hinged on the
subject matter of Ejectment and Annulment of Certificate of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs), respectively. It is true that in Machete
v. Court of Appeals[21] this Court held that RTCs have no
jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals filed against
agricultural tenants by their landowners. In that case, however,
what the landowner filed before the RTC was a collection suit
against his alleged tenants. These three cases show that trial courts
were declared to have no jurisdiction over civil cases which were
initially filed with them but were later on characterized as agrarian
disputes and thus, within DARAB's jurisdiction. No such declaration
has been made by this Court with respect to criminal cases.
Instead, we have Monsanto v. Zerna,[22] where we upheld the
RTC's jurisdiction to try the private respondents, who claimed to be
tenants, for the crime of qualified theft. However, we stressed
therein that the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are
beyond its competence. Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to
the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of
the crime. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the
criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that
relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter
is beyond its jurisdiction and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive
domain.
In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged
before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an alleged
misappropriated amount of P80,000.00 -- a subject matter over
which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has
criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other
hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-
isa Vda. de Villena,[23] we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to
wit:
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2)
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional
trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform
matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all
agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision reads:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance
with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end,
it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding before it.
xxxxxxxxx
Subsequently, in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the
DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A[24] was issued; it created the
DARAB to assume the adjudicatory powers and functions of the
DAR. Pertinent provisions of Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure read:
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. The
Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate the following cases:
1.1.
The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural
lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related
agrarian laws;
xxxxxxxxx
1.4.
Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants
and/or leaseholders;
x x x x x x x x x.
Section 3(d) of RA 6657, or the CARL, defines an "agrarian dispute"
over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as:
(d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements
including
any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee.[25]
Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly silent on the
conferment of any criminal jurisdiction in favor of the DARAB. It is
worth stressing that even the jurisdiction over the prosecution of
criminal offenses in violation of RA 6657 per se is lodged with the
SACs and not with the DARAB.[26] While indeed, the parties admit
that there is an agricultural tenancy relationship in this case, and
that under the circumstances, Veneranda as landowner could have
simply filed a case before the DARAB for collection of lease rentals
and/or dispossession of respondents as tenants due to their failure
to pay said lease rentals, there is no law which prohibits landowners
from instituting a criminal case for estafa, as defined and penalized
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, against their tenants.
Succinctly put, though the matter before us apparently presents an
agrarian dispute, the RTC cannot shirk from its duty to adjudicate on
the merits a criminal case initially filed before it, based on the law
and evidence presented, in order to determine whether an accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
However, we must reiterate our ruling in Re: Conviction of Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles,[27] that while we do not begrudge a party's
prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his opinion, may
have wronged him, we now remind landowners that such
prerogative of instituting a criminal case against their tenants, on
matters related to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised with
prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the
pursuit of truth and justice.
Thus, even as we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject
matter of the instant criminal case, we still deny the petition.
Herein respondents were charged with the crime of estafa as
defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, which refers to fraud committed
By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
We viewed the cases invoked by the petitioner, namely, People v.
Carulasdulasan and Becarel[28]and Embuscado v. People[29] where
this Court affirmed the conviction for estafa of the accused therein
who were also agricultural tenants. In People v. Carulasdulasan and
Becarel,[30] this Court held that -
From the facts alleged, it is clear that the accused received from the
sale of the abaca harvested by them a sum of money which did not
all belong to them because one-half of it corresponds to the
landlord's share of the abaca under the tenancy agreement. This
half the accused were under obligation to deliver to the landlord.
They therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of turning it over
to him, they appropriated it to their own use and refused to give it
to him notwithstanding repeated demands. In other words, the
accused are charged with having committed fraud by
misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money
received by them in trust or under circumstances which made it
their duty to deliver it to its owner. Obviously, this is a form of fraud
specially covered by the penal provision above cited.
In Embuscado v. People,[31] the accused appealed to this Court his
conviction for the crime of theft by the Court of First Instance even
as the information charged him with Estafa and of which he was
convicted by the City Court. This Court ruled that the accused was
denied due process when the Court of First Instance convicted him
of a crime not charged in the information, and then reinstated with
modification the ruling of the City Court convicting him of estafa.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, these cited cases are inapplicable.
People v. Carulasdulasan and Becare[32] involved a relationship of
agricultural share tenancy between the landowner and the accused.
In such relationship, it was incumbent upon the tenant to hold in
trust and, eventually, account for the share in the harvest
appertaining to the landowner, failing which the tenant could be
held liable for misappropriation. As correctly pointed out by the
respondents, share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary
to public policy as early as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844.[33]
What prevails today, under R.A. 6657, is agricultural leasehold
tenancy relationship, and all instances of share tenancy have been
automatically converted into leasehold tenancy. In such a
relationship, the tenant's obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to
deliver the landowner's share. Given this dispensation, the
petitioner's allegation that the respondents misappropriated the
landowner's share of the harvest - as contained in the information -
is untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be held liable
under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
It is also worth mentioning that in Embuscado v. People,[34] this
Court merely dwelt on the issue of whether the accused charged
with estafa could be convicted of the crime of theft. Issues of
tenancy vis-a-vis issues of criminal liability of tenants were not
addressed. Thus, the dissenting opinion of then Justice Teodoro R.
Padilla in the said case is worth mentioning when he opined that:
It is also my opinion that the petitioner cannot be found guilty of
estafa because the mangoes allegedly misappropriated by him were
not given to him in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, as provided for in Art. 315, par. 4, No. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. What was entrusted to him for cultivation was
a landholding planted with coconut and mango trees and the
mangoes, allegedly misappropriated by him, were the fruits of the
trees planted on the land. Consequently, the action, if any, should
have been for accounting and delivery of the landlord's share in the
mangoes sold by the petitioner.
In fine, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the
criminal case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
However, we find no necessity to remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings, as it would only further delay the resolution
of this case. We have opted to rule on the merits of the parties'
contentions, and hereby declare that respondents cannot be held
liable for estafa for their failure to pay the rental on the agricultural
land subject of the leasehold.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for
violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was
committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was
denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the
Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it
was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the
orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme
Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's
denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper

exercise of police power of the State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power

and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society
as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
the exercise of its police power.