Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.
The Supreme
G.R. No. L-12191, 14 October 1918
FACTS:
Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He
lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by
train to the company’s office in the city of Manila where he worked, he
used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the
company’s trains free of charge.
During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way to
the exit while the train is still on travel. When the train has proceeded a
little farther Jose Cangco step down into the cement platform but
unfortunately step in to a sack of watermelon, fell down and rolled under
the platform and was drawn under the moving car which resulting to his
arm to be crashed and lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and sued
the company and the employee who put the sack of watermelon in the
platform.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that
time of the year that may we considered as season to harvest watermelon
explaining why there are sacks of watermelon in the platform. The plaintiff
contends that it is the negligence of the Manila Railroad Co. on why they
let their employees put a hindrance in the platform that may cause serious
accident. The defendant answered that it is the lack of diligence on behalf
of the plaintiff alone on why he did not wait for the train to stop before
alighting the train.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory negligence
on behalf of the plaintiff.
RULING:
There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff.
Court provides some test that may find the contributory negligence of a
person. Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff
at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions
then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common
practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering
injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by
no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also
ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no
appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of that persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of
the company to inform their employees to not put any hindrance in the
platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and
to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally
imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company is liable for
damages against Cangco.
Del Prado v. Meralco
Facts:
Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was driving the company’s
street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the
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street to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into
complete stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot
when the car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the
ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint
for culpa contractual.
Issues:
(1) Whether the motorman was negligent
(2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage
(3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
Held:
(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of
a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at
other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although
the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it
was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the
plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature
acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is
of a contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due
care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa
contractual). Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to
its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom.
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a
breach of positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate
himself by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the
damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master
arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual). In the case
before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by
the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced
testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing
the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in
view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
obligation.
(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the
moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and
proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in
putting on the power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is one
where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent
act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered
the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be
analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as
the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it
be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the
accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor
to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but
one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there
were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the
rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side
pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the
testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
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hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at
about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what
extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work; and Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the
car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to
constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American
rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they
not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the
general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to
the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the
liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not
necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the
employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil
action may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility
of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where
the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of
the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso + CA (1966) / Sanchez
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
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DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts
with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected
him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless,
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to
be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Singson v. BPI
Facts:
Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI
Manila. Judgment was rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants
Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to
Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the decision
became final and executory as to Villa-Abrille. A writ of garnishment was
issued to BPI against the Villa-Abrille’s account.
The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s name and,
without reading the full text, wrote a letter for the signature of the bank
President, informing Singson of the garnishment. Subsequently, Singson
issued two checks. The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was
dishonoured, and so petitioner’s account with the latter was closed.
Singson wrote a letter to the bank, claiming that his account is not included
in the writ of garnishment. Having confirmed so, the bank President
Santiago Friexas apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson
filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled that damages for quasi-
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delict cannot be sustained because the relationship between the parties is
contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.
Issue:
Whether damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contract
Held:
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent
recovery of damages therefor. The act that breaks the contract may also be
a tort.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA,
respondents
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986
Facts:
Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio
Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram sent
through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK
FER LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-
PER 115 PMSA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-
WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to
him wounded his feelings, caused him undue embarrassment and affected
adversely his business because other people have come to know of said
defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was
a private joke between the sending and receiving operators, that they were
not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part
of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person
reading the same would logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus
RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40, 000.00. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the company was
negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of
the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is filed
among other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication;
however reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00
Issue:
Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily for the
civil liability arising from the criminal act of its employee.
Ruling:
Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and
20 of the New Civil Code, as well as on respondent’s breach of contract
thru the negligence of its own employees. By adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent, there is a
clear breach of contract; for upon payment of the fixed rate, the company
undertakes to transmit the message accurately.
In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of
the employer (master). This is the master and servant rule. As a
corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the
acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts
of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive
the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective
and adequate remedy.
In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may
recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some
cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing
speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances
surrounding the injury.
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The judgment of the CA is affirmed.
Far East Bank and Trust Company, petitioner
vs Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna, respondents
Ponente: Vitug
Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig
branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to
private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and
submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant,
Luis' credit card was not honored.
Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the
humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank expressed bank's
apologies to Luis
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December
1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings,
rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a)
P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c)
P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court,
FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach
of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in
case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed)
of the common carrier.
Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-
delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit
the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-
existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly
govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an
actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-
delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated
thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act
or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact
that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of
quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage
claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such
agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to
stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and Francisco
Salva
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
332 SCRA 356
FACTS:
Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with
passengers so she was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a
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wooden stool at the back of the door. As she was seated at the rear end of
the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Unfortunately, a
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped
the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the
diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand,
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
truck.
RTC’s decision: Absolved Calalas of liability and ruled that Salva as third-
party defendant was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
CA’s decision: reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga’s cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for
quasi-delict.
2. Whether or not respondent carrier is responsible for the injury caused to
its passenger when the accident was caused by another vehicle.
3. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito.
4. Whether or not respondent passenger is entitled to moral damages.
RULING:
1. No. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a
pending case was never a party in a previous one. And besides, the issues
in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue
in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable
for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other
hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
2. Yes. The liability of petitioner arises from his negligence in the
performance of his contractual obligation or breach of contract of carriage.
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death or injuries
to passengers, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is now the
duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. However, in this case, petitioner failed to prove that
he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It was
found that the jeepney was not properly parked and he took more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity.
3. No. The taking of an “extension seat” is not an implied assumption of
risk on the part of the passenger. A caso fortuito is an event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires
that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the obligor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the obligor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the obligor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen
the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.
4. No. Petitioner did not act in bad faith in the performance of the contract
of carriage. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
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enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occured.
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 641 SCRA 326 [2000])
the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be liable in case of
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
collision, the driver of a moving vehicle who had no opportunity to avoid
NOTES: the collision due to his own making is not relieved of liability, such as
when his negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
(Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 [2000])
because it s the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the LRTA vs NATIVIDAD
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier failed to transport his
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (transportation)
passenger safely to his destination.
Laws Cited: Art. 1755,Art. 1756,Art. 1759,Art. 1763
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
FACTS:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered
delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”.
Presumption of Negligence
While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once Junelito Escartin approached him.
arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he
Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a
Bad faith
moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman
The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver failed to
December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a
assist the injured passenger in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org.
construed as an admission of bad faith.
Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband.
The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common carriers remain
LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim
basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tort although
against Escartin and Prudent
noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as
also forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence in
Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996]) the selection and surpervision of its security guards
Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic, LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
common sense, policy and precedent, is that cause which, in natural and

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Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task
RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint
against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit
CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract
of carriage
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is
DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is
absolved.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature
of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty
off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers
Civil Code:
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers
This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of
injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon
the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure
Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier
is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage
GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related
provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which
breaches the contract)
EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee,
employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee
Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor
for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability
Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet.
Nicanor and Roman
Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence
TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. ANZEN DY
KMC LPU LAW 2020 | 9