G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 Union Bank of The Philippines, Petitioner, Edmund Santibañez and Florence Santibañez Ariola, Respondents

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
1
48831 affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional
2
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
3
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in the
4
amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the
said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
5
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981,
6
testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
7
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
8
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding
to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
9
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
10
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
11
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence
12
S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
13
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the
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court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. 15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money
being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in
effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering
that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after
the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was
the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of
assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly
refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and
void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola
must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA),
assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A)

SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION

AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING. 16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their
personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court for
approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-
litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner
should have been presented before the probate court. 17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph
(e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the
deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of respondent
Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF ₱128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE
FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK. 19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided
in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint
agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without
any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also
points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation
and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s
claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and
to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves
to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibañez
and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated
May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his
heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing
guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must
be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its
money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are
being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to
recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been
filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement
there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to
avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted
to require them to execute the said agreement. 1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement
was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her
brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice
the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated
in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the
petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased. 1awphi1.nét
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the
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administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced
in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will which
23 24
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he
was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three
(3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
25
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without
the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
26
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any

other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
27
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is
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no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola
to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs
as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of
29
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive
any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor
l^vvphi1.net
of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased
in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we
30
held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: 31
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its
assets and liabilities. The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
33
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation
and Union Bank of the Philippines…" However, the documentary evidence clearly reflects that the
34 35
parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioner’s participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact,
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised
by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504). 36
This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it
failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and
the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant.

DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge
Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing its claim against the Estate of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-
293) for failure to state a cause of action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H.
Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of having
guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity
agreements, all contained the following stipulations: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
“Premiums. — As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree to pay
the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines Currency, in advance as
premium there of for every __________ months or fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or
substitution thereof is in effect.
Indemnity. — The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify the COMPANY and
keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and against any and all damages, losses, costs,
stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY
shall or may, at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or any
extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of the undersigned or any of
them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any of them; and to pay, reimburse and
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
make good to the COMPANY, its successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its
representatives shall pay or cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or
any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount involved in the litigation or
other matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorney’s fees, but in no case less
than P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we equally
bind ourselves for the payment thereof under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned
without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement for the purpose and that we hereby
equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which may be
granted under this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company. — Any and all sums of money so paid by the company shall
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not paid, will be accummulated and added
to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as the capital and the total sum thereof, the
capital and interest, shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable
therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or not.
x x x x x x x x x
Waiver. — It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question which may arise
between them by reason of this document and which has to be submitted for decision to Courts of
Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this
purpose any other venue. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity
agreement is hereby likewise waived.
x x x x x x x x x
Our Liability Hereunder. — It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the principal
upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the
undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary one, the same as that of the principal,
and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such default.” (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it
had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid
premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s estate, the lower court, by
order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two grounds: (1) that the chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity
agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities
incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that “whatever losses may occur after
Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.”
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the reasoning of the court
below ran as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor
terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the claim
cannot be considered contingent. This Court believes that there is merit in this contention and finds
support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been
added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out by the chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of
Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss therefore, may
occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate because upon his death he ceased to be a
guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the personality,
character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the fact that in the printed
form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled ‘Security by way of first mortgage, which
was expressly waived and renounced by the security company. The security company has not demanded
from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of first mortgage. In the
supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company, no real property was mentioned in
the list of properties mortgaged which appears at the back of the indemnity agreement.” (Rec. App., pp.
407-408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil
Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that —
“Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or
by provision of law.”
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the
New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming
Article 1311 already quoted.
“ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.”
“ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.”
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary
“Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the rights and
obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a
contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2
Phil. 44).
x x x x x x x x x
“The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new Code of Civil
Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be
“third persons” in relation to any contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to
their hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting
thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.”
(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before
the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made
from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim
in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive “depersonalization” of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has
evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative
position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is
marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor
does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal
inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it
accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that
the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This
reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some
one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being
exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but
must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract
itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
“(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. — Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y obligaciones; le chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la

transmision, como elemento natural a toda relacion juridica, salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no
transmision, es menester el pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus
herederos.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los efectos de los
vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se quiere, es indespensable
convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir más allá de las personas que les dieron vida, y a
ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona; cuando no se quiera esto, se impone una
estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la

concresion del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon.” (Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-
542) (Emphasis supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have contracted
for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; chan
hence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death.
roblesvirtualawlibra ry
Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates
nothing more than the company’s faith and confidence in the financial stability of the surety, but not
that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are “not
transmissible by operation of law”. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law
expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article
300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726),
partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that
regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is
extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that “one who is obliged to
furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and
sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees”. It will be noted, however, that the
law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty.
It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of
the guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; and if chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
that be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality
mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 2057. — If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving dishonesty or
should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another who has all the qualifications required in
the preceding article. The case is excepted where the creditor has required and stipulated that a
specified person should be guarantor.”
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the guarantor
(that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not terminate the
contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step
remains optional in the creditor: it is his right, not his duty; he may waive it if he chooses, and hold
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is incompatible with the trial
court’s stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latter’s undertaking
strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being
rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts
themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death
to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under
section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814). chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
“The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as
surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship
the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by way of
satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of
the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed
something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he
has no right of action against anybody — no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15
Pla., 553; Gibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; Maxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves vs. Pulliam,
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; Ernst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)”

For Defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the surety files
claims against the estate of the principal debtor; and it is urged that the rule does not apply to the chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
case before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal debtor. The argument evinces a
superficial view of the relations between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as
guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if the latter should
die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim against the estate of Hemady, since
Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of
a principal debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing
solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against the
principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate’s liability for premiums and stamp
taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Surety’s claim did state a cause of
action, and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of
origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law. Costs against the
Administratrix- Appellee. SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA
YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the
decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally
the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of
Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as
actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying
the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which
were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with
an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds
of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the
other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived
by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
1
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she
could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four
hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of
the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a
result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace
time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went
there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. TCT No. RF 2694
3
describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally
registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the
name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). Said 4
transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally
registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291
5
and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia
R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. By virtue of a
7
court order granting said motion, on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
8
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering
9
Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint
against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also
prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be
made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent
due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as
damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B
and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920
12
were issued to Siason, who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment
13
purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other
plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the
therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the
defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in
Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to

reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and
T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of
said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the
aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of
service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been
subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had
purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was
"not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private
respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-
23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to
18
produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not
Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien
or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding could not
19
be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022
could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also
because it had long become final and executory. Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the
20
cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to
surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the
22
lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in
question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a
party in the case.
23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with
damages. Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,
24
Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs
return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the
Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be
made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00.
They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961
until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral
damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B,
having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res
judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. On their part, the Alvarez
26
stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of
limitation and estoppel."
27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the
properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was
a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their
failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to
protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they
recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason
was without court approval. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
28
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in

the following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are
(sic) hereby dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the
legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum
of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00
representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal
rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants,
Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby
ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31,
1983 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly
30
and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar
as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages
and attorney's fees, respectively." The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
31
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered

defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded
the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied
the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and
properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if
ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has
been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by
statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022,
supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit
4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents
had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged
rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia
Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962
(Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly
denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of
Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is
any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the
petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme
Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute
to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the
possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No.
5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to
appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate. As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation
35
must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a
litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by
subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in
number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence
presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in
question. In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil
37
Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the
same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who
did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was
also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr.
Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo
Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount
of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order
defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. "It is one thing to protect
39
an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would
be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly
revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality
is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No.
5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext
that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court.
Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed
their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the
enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or
of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.
Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of
law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady
vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is
ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim
in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial
rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history
of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person,
the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the
persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences
of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did
not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that
the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.
42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other
properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario
and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda,
who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario
took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that
Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With
this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot
be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the
latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of
pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that
they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that
this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a
donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or
in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been
followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate
of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special
Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his
first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in
said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen
(18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone
has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations,
a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, by and between "[T]he heir and
2
son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her
lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as
follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality,
the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them
in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without
any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms
and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del

Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los
herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la
Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment
and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well
as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No.
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The
funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full
payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that

particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share
of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or
the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to

Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name
of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors,
executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause
or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims
and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or
may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and
1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI
Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to
completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and
assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from
the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of
the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de
Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically
renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said
heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND
VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966,
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement,
but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case
No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the
Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule
74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion
of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the
parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will
is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary

share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis
Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
3
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the
4
effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving
order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it
serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon
the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by
the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is
explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no

definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that
such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde
and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no
sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification
clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2
heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja"
which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is
proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the
other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1)
not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is
moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly
omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was
to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days
counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the
terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not
bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could
not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it
amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point
is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as
the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in
L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by
the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval
of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse
of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de
Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the
widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately
entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief
for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21
September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the
original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order
for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore
described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of
the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order
should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should
be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the
value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of
the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And
as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly
opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is
the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to
overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil
Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible
creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco
de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena

Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7
and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of

Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452)
against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first
wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary,
as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question
as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco
de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the
same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O.
Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory
dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of
the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as
administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed
the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of
judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of
the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the
strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,

337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala,
Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de

Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions
in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not
finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio
de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private
funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as
exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not
clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two
real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In
addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-
serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7")
are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they
are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-
serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should
be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166236 July 29, 2010
NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES HENRY and LIWANAG ANDRES, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.
In the present petition for review, petitioners assail the August 10, 2004 Resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 78362, which dismissed the appeal before it for failure of
petitioners to file their brief within the extended reglementary period.
Factual Antecedents
The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by respondent
spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda
Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal.
On July 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of
the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants and all persons claiming rights under them who are ordered:
1. to vacate the premises located at 236 General Luna St., Dulongbayan 11, San Mateo,
Rizal;
2. to jointly and severally pay the sum [of] ₱100.00 as reasonable compensation for the use
of said premises commencing from 04 September 1995; [and]
3. to jointly and severally pay the sum of ₱10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay
the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioners,4 thus, appealed to the CA.
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
On November 5, 2003, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief
within 45 days from receipt of the notice. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003.
But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners' former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appearance. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal.
On December 19, 2003, petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or until January
21, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. Then on March 3, 2004, petitioners themselves
again moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3, 2004 or until April 18, 2004 within which to
file their appellants' brief.
On March 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution: 5 a) noting the withdrawal of appearance of
petitioners' former counsel; b) requiring petitioners to cause the Entry of Appearance of their new
counsel; and c) granting petitioners' motions for extension of time to file their brief for a period
totaling 75 days, commencing from December 21, 2003 or until March 5, 2004.
Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004. By that time, the
extension to file appellants' brief had already long expired.
On April 14, 2004, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), having been approached by petitioners,
entered6 its appearance as new counsel for petitioners. However, on August 10, 2004, the CA issued
the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal, to wit:
FOR failure of defendants-appellants to file their brief within the extended reglementary period which
expired on March 5, 2004 as per Judicial Records Division report dated July 26, 2004, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
On September 6, 2004, the PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration 7 which requested for a fresh
period of 45 days from September 7, 2004 or until October 22, 2004 within which to file appellants'
brief. On October 21, 2004, the brief 8 was filed by the PAO.
On November 26, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution9 which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS'

APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO FILE THEIR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ BRIEF, DESPITE
THE ATTENDANCE OF PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
SUCH FAILURE, LIKE THE GROSS AND RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR FORMER
COUNSEL, THE ABSENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT TO CAUSE DELAY, THE SERIOUS
QUESTIONS OF LAW POSED FOR RESOLUTION BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT,
AND THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANTS' BRIEF HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND ALREADY FORMED PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE
CASE.
II
THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' APPEAL BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS IS HIGHLY UNJUSTIFIED, INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE BECAUSE
IT OVERLOOKED AND/OR DISREGARDED THE MERITS OF PETITIONERS’ CASE
WHICH INVOLVES A DEPRIVATION OF THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS.10
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due to
their indigency and poverty. They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal
specially since the PAO had just entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners as directed
by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend that appeal should be
allowed since the brief had anyway already been prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought
reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend that
the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances so that the case may be
decided on the merits and not merely on technicalities.
Respondents’ Arguments
On the other hand, respondents contend that failure to file appellants' brief on time is one instance
where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised
sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners’ failure to file their appellants' brief
within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period expired.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Failure to file Brief On Time
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the Court
excused the late filing of a notice of appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's brief. They
further cite Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 11 where the late filing of the
appellant's brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest.
The cases cited by petitioners are not in point. In the present civil case which involves the failure to
file the appellants' brief on time, there is no showing of any public interest involved. Neither is there a
showing that an injustice will result due to the application of technical rules.
Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass
by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for
delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners,
but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay.
Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and
not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their
poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first
lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late.
It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their
original lawyer or consent to let him go. They could also have requested the said lawyer to file the
required appellants' brief before consenting to his withdrawal from the case. But they did neither of
these. Then, not having done so, they delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor
choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty, are the main culprits for the situation they now
find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to
respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements,
which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the delay, and
hence frustration of justice, in the present case.
No compelling reason to disregard technicalities
Petitioners beg us to disregard technicalities because they claim that on the merits their case is
strong. A study of the records fails to so convince us.
Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino
Alfonso is required before their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly transfer the subject property.
We are not convinced. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed
of extrajudicial settlement that was neither notarized nor published.
Significantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his
heirs. Such transmission is subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken
from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. 13 The deed of
1avvphi1
extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their
intention to partition the inherited property. It delineated what portion of the inherited property would
belong to whom.
The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not published, being deemed a
partition14 of the inherited property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion of
the property that was assigned to him.15
The records show that Jose did in fact sell to respondents the subject property. The deed of sale
executed by Jose in favor of the respondents being a public document, is entitled to full faith and
credit in the absence of competent
evidence that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a
declaration of nullity. As found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in
the execution of the deed of sale. They failed to prove
by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the sale of the subject real property. As
found by the RTC, although Jose was suffering from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his
name, there is no showing that his mental faculties were affected in such a way as to negate the
existence of his valid consent to the sale, as manifested by his thumbmark on the deed of sale. The
records sufficiently show that he was capable of boarding a tricycle to go on trips by himself.
Sufficient testimonial evidence in fact shows that Jose asked respondents to buy the subject
property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was mortgaged. This fact evinces that
Jose’s mental faculties functioned intelligently.
In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to overturn the assailed CA resolution. We
find no injustice in the dismissal of the appeal by the CA. Justice dictates that this case be put to rest
already so that the respondents may not be deprived of their rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV. No. 78362 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856,
1
entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its
order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and
wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title
over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of
the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include
certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975,
plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was
heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata
Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein;
but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person
cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint
and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16
and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff
for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased
mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the
deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the
same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While
it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata
Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means
that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding
can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending
case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives."
This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the
respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution
of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a
grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
3
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the
4
deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in
5
litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question
as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally
6
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of
action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased
7
plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is,
therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff
to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by
the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This
should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even
the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court
did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them
because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court
refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue
in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under
the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has
suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad
litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the
substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to
appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,

vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR.,
GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG
CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-
PTGWO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines assailing the
Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan in connection with an alleged portion of the Marcoses’
1
supposed ill-gotten wealth.
This case involves ₱200 billion of the Marcoses’ alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also
includes the alleged use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos family’s
personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal
acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco).
The Facts
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon
C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was given the following mandate:
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located
in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.
(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be repeated in
any manner under the new government, and the institution of adequate measures to prevent
the occurrence of corruption.
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building
or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining
thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would
frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from
accomplishing its task.
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation,
business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos
Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the
transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate
authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of facts by any person or entity
that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of
the Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and/or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of
accounts and other documents as may be material to the investigation conducted by the
Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties,
following the same procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality of the
government.
(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose
of this order.
Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the civil cases filed before
the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now
subject of this Petition.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting
and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death;
Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong
Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
On 1 October 1987, the PCGG filed an amended Complaint to add Constante Rubio as defendant.
Again on 9 February 1988, it amended the Complaint, this time to include as defendants Nemesio G.
Co and herein respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho, and Yeung Chun Fan.
For the third time, on 23 April 1990, the PCGG amended its Complaint, adding to its growing list of
defendants Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc. 2
The PCGG filed a fourth amended Complaint, which was later denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated 2 September 1998.
The allegations contained in the Complaint specific to herein respondents are the following: 3
29. Defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic)
Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among others, in confiscating and/or
unlawfully appropriating funds and other property, and in concealing the same as described above.
In addition, each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue advantage of their relationship with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the above-described active
collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of stocks in corporations, illegal
payments such as commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of improper privileges,
income, revenues and benefits. Defendant Araneta in particular made use of Asialand Development
Corporation which is included in Annex "A" hereof as corporate vehicle to benefit in the manner
stated above.
31. Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan are the
controlling stockholders of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.). Through
Glorious Sun (Phils.), they acted as fronts or dummies, cronies or otherwise willing tools of spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the family, particularly of Defendant Imelda (Imee) Marcos-
Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign exchange by importing denim fabrics from only one supplier
4
– a Hong Kong based corporation which was also owned and controlled by defendant Hong Kong
investors, at prices much higher than those being paid by other users of similar materials to the
grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff.
Thus, petitioner set forth the following causes of action in its Complaint: 5
32. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST – A public office is a public trust. By 1avvphi1
committing all the acts described above, Defendants repeatedly breached public trust and the law,
making them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The funds and other property acquired by Defendants
following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, some of which are mentioned or described
above, estimated to amount to ₱ 200 billion are deemed to have been acquired for the benefit of
Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people. Consequently, Defendants are solidarily liable to restore or reconvey to Plaintiff all such
funds and property thus impressed with constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
33. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER –
(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of right
and power which caused untold misery, sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants
violated, among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial interest in
funds and other property and concealed such title, funds and interest through the use of
relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or dummies. Defendants are, therefore,
solidarily liable to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other property unlawfully
acquired by them estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or alternatively, to pay
Plaintiff, solidarily, by way of indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the
amount of such funds or the value of other property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus
interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.
34. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT –
Defendants illegally accumulated funds and other property whose estimated value is ₱ 200 billion in
violation of the laws of the Philippines and in breach of their official functions and fiduciary
obligations. Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and irreparable
damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation at law, independently of breach of
trust and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative, to solidarily return to Plaintiff such funds
and other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad faith, have unjustly enriched
themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of such funds and the value of the
other property including those which may have been wasted, and/or lost estimated at ₱ 200 billion
with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.
35. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING –
The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the applicable law, believe that Defendants,
acting singly or collectively, in unlawful concert with one another, and with the active collaboration of
third persons, subject of separate suits, acquired funds, assets and property during the incumbency
of Defendant public officers, manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful income
and income from legitimately acquired property. Consequently, they are required to show to the
satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and
property which are in excess of their legal net income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that
the Defendants are under obligation to account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial
interests in funds, properties and assets of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the
lawful earnings or lawful income from legitimately acquired property.
36. Fifth Cause of Action – LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES –
(a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have
suffered actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by the
latter as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful acts, the approximate value and interest of
which, from the time of their wrongful acquisition, are estimated at ₱ 200 billion plus
expenses which Plaintiff has been compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort
to recover Defendants’ ill-gotten wealth all over the world, which expenses are reasonably
estimated at ₱ 250 million. Defendants are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff
for actual damages in an amount reasonably estimated at ₱ 200 Billion Pesos and to
reimburse expenses for recovery of Defendants’ ill-gotten wealth estimated to cost ₱ 250
million or in such amount as are proven during the trial.
(b) As a result of Defendants’ acts described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had
painfully endured and suffered moral damages for more than twenty long years, anguish,
fright, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock as well as
besmirched reputation and social humiliation before the international community.
(c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino people are entitled to temperate damages for their
sufferings which, by their very nature are incapable of pecuniary estimation, but which this
Honorable Court may determine in the exercise of its sound discretion.
(d) Defendants, by reason of the above described unlawful acts, have violated and invaded
the inalienable right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people to a fair and decent way of life befitting
a Nation with rich natural and human resources. This basic and fundamental right of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people should be recognized and vindicated by awarding nominal damages
in an amount to be determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound
discretion.
(e) By way of example and correction for the public good and in order to ensure that
Defendants’ unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts are not repeated, said Defendants
are solidarily liable to Plaintiff for exemplary damages.
In the meantime, the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO (PEA-PTGWO), a union of

Pantranco employees, moved to intervene before the Sandiganbayan. The former alleged that the
trust funds in the account of Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco) amounting to ₱ 55 million
rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees, pursuant to the money judgment the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) awarded in favor of the employees and against Pantranco. Thus,
PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation of petitioner that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten
because, otherwise, these assets would be returned to the government and not to the employees.
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents.
However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on the ground that the documents violated the best
evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner
had not provided any reason for its failure to present the originals.
On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting the pieces of evidence while
6
expressing some reservation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, taking note of the objections of accused Marcoses and the reply thereto by the
plaintiff, all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution are hereby admitted in
evidence; however, their evidentiary value shall be left to the determination of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Imelda R. Marcos; Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III; Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-
PTGWO subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.
On 6 December 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, which granted all the
7
Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendant Imelda R. Marcos

is hereby DENIED. The Demurrer to Evidence filed by defendants Maria Imelda Marcos Manotoc,
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos Araneta, Gregorio Maria Araneta III, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung
Chun Fan, Yeung Chun Ho, and intervenor PEA-PTGWO, are hereby GRANTED. The sequestration
orders on the properties in the name of defendant Gregorio Maria Araneta III, are accordingly
ordered lifted.
SO ORDERED.
The Sandiganbayan denied Imelda R. Marcos’ Demurrer primarily because she had categorically
admitted that she and her husband owned properties enumerated in the Complaint, while stating that
these properties had been lawfully acquired. The court held that the evidence presented by
petitioner constituted a prima facie case against her, considering that the value of the properties
involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’ lawful income. Thus, this admission
and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was the compulsory heir and administratrix of the Marcos estate
were the primary reasons why the court held that she was responsible for accounting for the funds
and properties alleged to be ill-gotten.
Secondly, the court pointed out that Rolando Gapud, whose deposition was taken in Hong Kong,
referred to her as one directly involved in amassing ill-gotten wealth. The court also considered the
compromise agreement between petitioner and Antonio O. Floirendo, who disclosed that he had
performed several business transactions upon the instructions of the Marcos spouses.
With regard to the siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., the court noted that
their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established. In fact, they were never
mentioned by any of the witnesses presented. Neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint any
specific involvement of the Marcos children.
Moreover, the court held that the evidence, in particular, exhibits "P," "Q," "R," "S," and "T," were
8 9 10 11 12
considered hearsay, because their originals were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner
failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were
supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and
RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These exhibits also sought to prove
her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.
Finally, the court held that the relationship of respondents to the Marcos spouses was not enough
reason to hold the former liable.
In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court similarly held that there
was no testimonial or documentary evidence that supported petitioner’s allegations against the
couple. Again, petitioner failed to present the original documents that supposedly supported the
allegations against them. Instead, it merely presented photocopies of documents that sought to
prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus
13
company Pantranco.
Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court found the allegations against them
baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate how their business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments
Manufacturing, Co. Phils. (Glorious Sun), was used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that
they themselves were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary
evidence relevant to this allegation was inadmissible for being mere photocopies, and that the
affiants had not been presented as witnesses.
Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-PTGWO. While the court held that there
was no evidence to show that Pantranco was illegally acquired, the former nevertheless held that
there was a need to first determine the ownership of the disputed funds before they could be ordered
released to the rightful owner.
On 20 December 2005, petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that there was
a preponderance of evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III had
connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that respondents were
compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged to render an accounting and to
return the ill-gotten wealth.
Moreover, petitioner asserted that the evidence established that the Yeungs were dummies of the
Marcoses, and that the Pantranco assets were part of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Finally, petitioner questioned the court’s ruling that the evidence previously admitted was later held
to be inadmissible in evidence against respondents, thus, depriving the former of due process.
Inadvertently, petitioner was not able to serve a copy of the motion on respondents Imee Marcos-
Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. But upon realizing the oversight, it immediately did so and filed
the corresponding Manifestation and Motion before the court. Nonetheless, this inadvertence
prompted Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. to file their Motion for Entry of
Judgment.
On 2 March 2006, the court issued the second assailed Resolution, denying petitioner’s Motion. The
14
court pointed out its reservation in its Resolution dated 12 March 2002, wherein it said that it would
still assess and weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. Furthermore, it said that even
if it included the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses, these were not substantial to hold respondents
liable. Thus, the court said:
WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient reason to set aside the resolution dated December 6, 2005,
the plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The plaintiff’s Motion and
Manifestation dated January 18, 2006 is GRANTED in the interest of justice. The Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by defendants Imee Marcos and Bongbong Marcos is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the
Sandiganbayan, to wit: 15
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED

BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG)
R. MARCOS, JR., CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON
RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER
PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED
THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN UNLAWFULLY AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE
NATIONAL TREASURY.
II. PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT

RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA
CONNIVED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRING
BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND
ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.
III. RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY
HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER
AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE
MARCOSES.
IV. THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG

CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES FOR
THE MARCOSES, AND USED THE CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A CONDUIT IN
AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN
ERRED IN GRANTING THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
V. THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH

RESPECT TO THE PANTRANCO ASSETS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE
AMPLE EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE SAID ASSETS INDUBITABLY FORM PART OF
THE MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO WHOM THESE ASSETS
RIGHTFULLY BELONG.
VI. THE SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING WHICH REJECTED PEITITONER’S

DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING "INADMISSIBLE" DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTS ITS EARLIER RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE AND WAS RENDERED IN A MANNER THAT DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
There is some merit in petitioner’s contention.
The Marcos Siblings and

Gregorio Araneta III
Closely analyzing petitioner’s Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear that the
Marcos siblings are being sued in two capacities: first, as co-conspirators in the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand E.
Marcos. 16
With regard to the first allegation, as contained in paragraph 29 of its Third Amended Complaint
quoted above, petitioner accused the Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated in,
and/or benefitted from their parents’ alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In particular, as far as
Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to
import denim fabrics from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other users of
similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted from the sequestered
media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a substantial interest.
Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having conspired with her husband,
respondent Gregorio Araneta III, in his being President Marcos’ conduit to Pantranco, thereby paving
the way for the President’s ownership of the company in violation of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
2 of the 1973 Constitution.17
To prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner primarily relied on the Sworn
Statement and the Deposition of one of the financial advisors of President Marcos, Rolando C.
18 19
Gapud, taken in Hong Kong on various dates.

Meanwhile, to prove the participation and interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in De Soleil Apparel
and the media networks, petitioner relied on the Affidavits of Ramon S. Monzon, Yeung Kwok
20
Ying, and Rodolfo V. Puno; and the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the PCGG
21 22
hearing held on 8 June 1987. 23
As to spouses Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Araneta III, petitioner submitted the Articles of
Incorporation of Northern Express Transport, Inc.; the Memorandum of Agreement and the
24 25
Purchase Agreement between Pantranco and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc.
26
(BLTBCo.); the Confidential Memorandum regarding the sale of the Pantranco assets; the 27
Affidavit and the letter to the PCGG of Dolores A. Potenciano, owner of BLTBCo.; the Affidavit and
28 29 30
the Memorandum of Eduardo Fajardo, who was then the Senior Vice-President of the Account
31
Management Group of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was in turn the creditor for the
Pantranco sale; and the Affidavit of Florencio P. Lucio, who was the Senior Account Specialist of the
National Investment and Development Corporation. 32
Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rule’s third exception, that is, these
documents are public records in the custody of a public officer or are recorded in a public office. It is
its theory that since these documents were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the conditions
for the exception to apply had been met. Alternatively, it asserts that the "documents were offered to
prove not only the truth of the recitals of the documents, but also of other external or collateral
facts."33
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner failed to observe the

best evidence rule.
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the
operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from
the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should
petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left with no choice but to
uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents
themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s
allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document
itself. The origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as early as the 18th century in
Omychund v. Barker, wherein the Court of Chancery said:
34
The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of
evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.
The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by
those witnesses.
The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict
necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all
are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is lost,
a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have heard the deed, and yet it is
a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented,
or any compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence
absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130,
which states:
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ─ When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved be a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ─ For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,

documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
SECTION 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does
not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the
course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However,
given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness
who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are
of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could
35
only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted
to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The
reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who
uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 36
As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a
public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGG’s exercise of its mandate, it was not
attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the
requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court. 37
In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Further, again contrary to the theory of the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the aforesaid
exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court.
Under paragraph (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office,’ presentation of the original thereof is excepted. However, as earlier
observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were not necessarily public
documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the
PCGG, the plaintiff’s exhibit "Q", may be a public document, but what was presented by the plaintiff
was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide that when the original document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and
it was not even signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings.
The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 3. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that ‘when the original documents has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.’ Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by
satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all
such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the
original. None of these requirements were complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit ‘Q’,
exhibits ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did
not testify before the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter which is clearly a private document. Not only does it
not fall within the exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere photocopy. As We previously
emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered
hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them. 38
Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove that
the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos and participated in the first couple’s alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as
the specific allegations herein were concerned.
The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.

To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos respondents be made
to (1) pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of acquisition; (2)
render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of property legally or
beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest therein; (3)
pay actual damages estimated at ₱200 billion and additional actual damages to reimburse expenses
for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at ₱250 million or in such amount as may
be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages amounting to ₱50 billion; (5) pay temperate and
nominal damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in an amount to be proven
during the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in the amount of ₱1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial
costs.39
It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and the
extent of the properties involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis that
the Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the accounting of
alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the allegations of the Complaint,
the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos estate that
constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3) issuing the
appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these properties; and,
finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is proper.
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is
imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the
protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. On that note,
40
we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II, we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
41
letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as

executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their
right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession,
control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before
the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-interest without
whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts
cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.
42
In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos –
that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth – the present case must be maintained
against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., as executors of
the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision,
actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest
therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.
We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Irene
Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended
Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos and their immediate family. It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the
43
Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten
or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven
that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership
or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus,
their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten
and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.
Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos
properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death. In this
44
concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties
that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution
of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols, we said:
45
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to
be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent,
in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect
to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being
thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357;
Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner
may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or
mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where
some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their
deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that
the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted
to the vendors upon the partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, petitioner’s prayer in its Third Amended Complaint directly refers to herein respondents, to
wit:
1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION – To return and
reconvey to Plaintiff all funds and other property acquired by Defendants during their
incumbency as public officers, which funds and other property are manifestly out of
proportion to their salaries, other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired
property which Defendants have failed to establish as having been, in fact, lawfully acquired
by them, alternatively, to solidarily pay Plaintiff the value thereof with interest thereon from
the date of acquisition until full payment.
2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – to individually render to this Honorable

Court a complete accounting and inventory, subject to evaluation of Court-appointed
assessors, of all funds and other property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by
them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest in such funds and other property.
(Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action pending before
the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly
protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement
in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.
Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Ho And Yeung Chun Fan
It is worthy to note that respondents draw our attention to American Inter-Fashion Corporation v.
Office of the President in which they contend that this Court considered the allegation of dollar
46
salting as baseless. The cited case, however, finds no application herein as the former merely ruled
that Glorious Sun was denied due process when it was not furnished by the Garments and Textile
Export Board (GTEB) any basis for the cancellation of the export quota because of allegations of
dollar salting. That Decision did not prevent petitioner from adducing evidence to support its
allegation in Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan under a different cause of action.
Nevertheless, the allegations against Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan in
the case at bar were also proved to be baseless. Again, petitioner failed to illustrate how
respondents herein acted as dummies of the Marcoses in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. This Court
notes that the Complaint against the Yeungs alleges that the Marcoses used Glorious Sun – the
garment company in which the Yeungs are controlling stockholders – for illegal dollar salting through
the company’s importation of denim fabrics from only one supplier at prices much higher than those
being paid by other users of similar materials. Notably, no mention of De Soleil Apparel was made.
To prove its allegations, petitioner submitted the controverted Exhibits "P," "Q," "R," "S," and "T." As
earlier discussed in detail, these pieces of evidence were mere photocopies of the originals and
were unauthenticated by the persons who executed them; thus, they have no probative value. Even
the allegations of petitioner itself in its Petition for Review are bereft of any factual basis for holding
that these documents undoubtedly show respondents’ participation in the alleged dollar salting. The
pertinent portion of the Petition reads:
To illustrate, the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987 executed by Mr. Ramon Monzon which was submitted
as Exhibit P, showed that respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc owns and controls IBC-13, BBC-2 and
(R)PN-9, and has interest in the De Soleil Apparel. The testimony of Mr. Ramon Monzon during the
hearing on June 8, 1987 before the Presidential Commission on Good Government as shown in the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes also affirmed his declarations in the Affidavit dated May 29, 1987.
The Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated June 8, 1987 was presented as Exhibit Q. Moreover,
the Affidavit dated March 21, 1986 of Yeung Kwok Ying which was presented as Exhibit R disclosed
that Imee Marcos-Manotoc is the owner of 67% equity of De Soleil Apparel. The letter dated July 17,
1984 signed by seven (7) incorporators of De Soleil Apparel, addressed to Hongkong investors
which was presented as Exhibit S confirmed that the signatories hold or own 67% equity of the
corporation in behalf of the beneficial owners previously disclosed to the addressees. In addition to
the foregoing documents, petitioner presented the Affidavit of Rodolfo V. Puno, Chairman of the
Garments and Textile Export Group (GTEB) as Exhibit T wherein he categorically declared that the
majority of De Soleil Apparel was actually owned by respondent Imee Marcos-Manotoc. 47
The foregoing quotation from the Petition is bereft of any factual matter that warrants a consideration
by the Court. Straight from the horse’s mouth, these documents are only meant to show the
ownership and interest of Imee Marcos Manotoc in De Soleil – and not how respondent supposedly
participated in dollar salting or in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
PEA-PTGWO
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as a consequence of the

prosecution’s failure to establish that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten, as discussed earlier.
Thus, we find no error in the assailed Order of the Sandiganbayan.
A Final Note
As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been recognized as an evidentiary standard since
the 18th century. For three centuries, it has been practiced as one of the most basic rules in law. It is
difficult to conceive that one could have finished law school and passed the bar examinations
without knowing such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply disturbing that the PCGG and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) – the very agencies sworn to protect the interest of the state and its
people – could conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To emphasize, the PCGG is a
highly specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, while the OSG is the principal
legal defender of the government. The lawyers of these government agencies are expected to be the
best in the legal profession.
However, despite having the expansive resources of government, the members of the prosecution
did not even bother to provide any reason whatsoever for their failure to present the original
documents or the witnesses to support the government’s claims. Even worse was presenting in
evidence a photocopy of the TSN of the PCGG proceedings instead of the original, or a certified true
copy of the original, which the prosecutors themselves should have had in their custody. Such
manner of legal practice deserves the reproof of this Court. We are constrained to call attention to
this apparently serious failure to follow a most basic rule in law, given the special circumstances
surrounding this case.
The public prosecutors should employ and use all government resources and powers efficiently,
effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage of public funds and revenues.
They should perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill.
48
The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and secure justice for those seeking its
aid. In order to do this, lawyers are required to observe and adhere to the highest ethical and
49
professional standards. The legal profession is so imbued with public interest that its practitioners
are accountable not only to their clients, but to the public as well.
The public prosecutors, aside from being representatives of the government and the state, are, first
and foremost, officers of the court. They took the oath to exert every effort and to consider it their
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause
50
of the client and should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Hence, should
51
serve with competence and diligence. 52
We note that there are instances when this Court may overturn the dismissal of the lower courts in
instances when it is shown that the prosecution has deprived the parties their due process of law. In
Merciales v. Court of Appeals, we reversed the Decision of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case
53
for rape with homicide. In that case, it was very apparent that the public prosecutor violated the due
process rights of the private complainant owing to its blatant disregard of procedural rules and the
failure to present available crucial evidence, which would tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the
accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that the trial court was gravely remiss in its duty to
ferret out the truth and, instead, just "passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case."
However, it must be emphasized that Merciales was filed exactly to determine whether the
prosecution and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in the proceedings of the case, thus
resulting in the denial of the offended party’s due process. Meanwhile, the present case merely
alleges that there was an error in the Sandiganbayan’s consideration of the probative value of
evidence. We also note that in Merciales, both the prosecution and the trial court were found to be
equally guilty of serious nonfeasance, which prompted us to remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings and reception of evidence. Merciales is thus inapplicable to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, given the particular context of this case, the failure of the prosecution to adhere to
something as basic as the best evidence rule raises serious doubts on the level and quality of effort
given to the government’s cause. Thus, we highly encourage the Office of the President, the OSG,
and the PCGG to conduct the appropriate investigation and consequent action on this matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed

Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6 December 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For the
reasons stated herein, respondents Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as defendants in Civil Case No. 0002 pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the President so that it may look into the
circumstances of this case and determine the liability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the manner by which
this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.** JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set
aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4
in Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus.
Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or
less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded
on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-
13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x 2
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On
November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale 3 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The
property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction,
or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale 4 in the Bank's favor. Thereafter,
a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate5 adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of
10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that
they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land 6 was
executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-39,484(a.f.)7 was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession
of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint8 for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new
owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same
to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of
the case, but to no avail.
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision9 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in
favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by him,
and described in the deed of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of
Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at
Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino
Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661,
consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of ₱6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered
delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed
property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties
had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside
the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the subject
property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the
subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS

OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF
TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE
REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S
ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS
(PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE. 11
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the
subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred
to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed
property was already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the property together with
petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between him
and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-
ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This
agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents.
As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank
without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the
property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid
to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to
which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject
property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court
on October 28, 1996.12 Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale 13 was issued in favor of the
Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that
a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no
question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. 14 In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at
the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the
subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the
contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not
pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in
time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the
issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is
an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the
disputed lot bought by respondents. 1avvphi1
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere
consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any
express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-ownership of
the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any
way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject
property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal
rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial
consideration.16 It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended
to serve.17 Such intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical interpretations should also be
avoided.19
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings
to continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after the same had
been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to
partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their
supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition that on
several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused to do so.
In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him
but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to
purchase the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to
re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the
execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject property was already exclusively
owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents
that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the
Bank does not give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of
the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief
and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence
applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-
ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by
assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls
for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It
seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate
in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or
interference from the other.20 In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
ownership,21 an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills
1
of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming
private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal
funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for
2
the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment
thereto." According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from
3
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate."
4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement
provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL
TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all
money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our
joint savings current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime,
and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of
the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by
such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either,
any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors,
for any payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid
and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the
6
estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis
causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the
Civil Code," and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation
8
under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II,
petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell
certain properties of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged
advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In
addition, respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in
Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of
actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With
costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. and Macam v. Gatmaitan in which we
11 12
sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after
his death." In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the
14 15
monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case
relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement
16
purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint
holdings:
xxx xxx xxx

... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was
the exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in
turn based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the
deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank
in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera
served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from
him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name of
himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in
question although there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of
master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we
must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which recites in effect that
the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were
joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part or
the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon
the death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, it was held:

18
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according
to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is
to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen
at an indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house
and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C,
Juana would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and
Leonarda would become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were
to die first. In this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death
determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other
depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto.
Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the
ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the
ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to
take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because
it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership,
as held by the Court of Appeals, by "mere stipulation" and that it is no "cloak" to circumvent the
21 22 23
law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal
property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking
parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings
account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making
venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one
spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality,
that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are
permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or
do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A
survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. In 25
either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or
effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that
such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property
in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and
annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established
against the agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such
unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its
resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and
October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition
for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-
90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian
ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage
and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a
certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings
take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa
akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396
were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily
on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which
would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority
of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply
because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he
other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir
in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100
(1987)] has made its position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE
76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR
INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED
THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO

RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be
published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator
Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with
the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate
case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and
will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did
not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention

of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In
effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and
that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under
Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such
child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert,
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name
of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to
reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of
the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the cases
were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 Union Bank of The Philippines, Petitioner, Edmund Santibañez and Florence Santibañez Ariola, Respondents

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G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 Union Bank of The Philippines, Petitioner, Edmund Santibañez and Florence Santibañez Ariola, Respondents

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A)

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION

The petition is bereft of merit.

administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21

contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any

held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: 31

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la

estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la

7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; Ernst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)”

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6

Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to

produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered

The petition is devoid of merit.

xxx xxx xxx

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Bidin J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.

Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.

Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.

Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.

Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.

Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.

Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del

3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that

4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to

5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary

It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no

The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —

Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena

On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of

He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,

Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de

The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

xxx xxx xxx

Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 166236 July 29, 2010

NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, Petitioners,

Petitioners,4 thus, appealed to the CA.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals