MARCH 10 CASES

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COLEGIO DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO v. ROJO G.R. No. 170388| 4 September
2013Employer-Employee Relationship

DOCTRINE: Full-time teachers become regular or permanent employees once they have
satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three school years.

FACTS:
•Colegio del Santisimo Rosario (CSR) hired Rojo as a high school teacher on probationary
basis for the school years 1992-1993, 1993-19947 and 1994-1995.
•In 1995, CSR decided not to renew Rojo’s services.
•Rojo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. He alleged that since he had served three
consecutive school years which is the maximum number of terms allowed for probationary
employment, he should be extended permanent employment.
Citing paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1970 Manual), Rojo
asserted that “full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory
services shall be considered permanent.”
•CSR argued that Rojo knew that his Teacher’s Contract for school year 1994-1995 with CSR
would expire in 1995. Accordingly, Rojo was not dismissed but his probationary contract merely
expired and was not renewed.
CSR insists that a teacher hired for three consecutive years as a probationary employee does
not automatically become a regular employee upon completion of his third year of probation. It
is the positive act of the school—the hiring of the teacher who has just completed three
consecutive years of employment on probation for the next school year—that makes the teacher
a regular employee of the school.

ISSUE: Whether or not a teacher in secondary level (high school) hired for three (3) consecutive
school years as a probationary employee automatically becomes a permanent employee upon
completion of his third year of probation.

HELD: Yes, cases dealing with employment on probationary status of teaching personnel are
not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is supplemented, with respect to the period of
probation, by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (the Manual)
3
NEGROS SLASHERS, INC., RODOLFO C. ALVAREZ AND VICENTE TAN VS. ALVIN L.
TENG [G.R. No. 187122]

Facts:

Respondent Alvin Teng is a professional basketball player who started his career as such in the
Philippine Basketball Association and then later on played in the Metropolitan Basketball
Association (MBA).

Some time in one of his games, particularly Game Number 4 of the MBA Championship Round
for the year 2000 season, Teng had a below-par playing performance. Because of this, the
coaching staff decided to pull him out of the game. Teng then sat on the bench, untied his
shoelaces and donned his practice jersey. On the following game, Game Number 5 of the
Championship Round, Teng called-in sick and did not play.

On March 16, 2001, because of what happened, the management of Negros Slashers came up
with a decision, and through its General Manager, petitioner Rodolfo Alvarez, wrote Teng
informing him of his termination from the team.

Issue:

Whether or not Teng’s dismissal from the Negros Slashers Team was unjustified and too harsh
considering his misconduct.

Ruling:

YES.

As ruled in Sagales v. Rustan’s Commercial Corporation, while the employer has the inherent
right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees, this prerogative is subject to the
regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.

In this regard, it is a hornbook doctrine that infractions committed by an employee should merit
only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The penalty must be
commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed
in connection with the disciplinary authority of the employer.

In the case at bar, the penalty handed out by the petitioners was the ultimate penalty of
dismissal. There was no warning or admonition for respondent’s violation of team rules, only
outright termination of his services for an act which could have been punished appropriately with
a severe reprimand or suspension.
5

G.R. No. 169434 March 28, 2008

LAZARO V. DACUT, CESARIO G. CAJOTE, ROMERLO F. TUNGALA, LOWEL Z. ZUBISTA,

and ORLANDO P. TABOY, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division), STA. CLARA INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, and NICANDRO LINAO, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners Lazaro V. Dacut, Cesario G. Cajote, Romerlo F. Tungala, Lowel Z. Zubista,
and Orlando P. Taboy were crew members of the LCT “BASILISA”, an inter-island cargo vessel
owned by private respondent Sta. Clara International Transport and Equipment Corporation.

Dacut discovered a hole in the vessel’s engine room. The company had the hole patched up
with a piece of iron and cement. Despite the repair, Dacut and Tungala resigned in July 1999
due to the vessel’s alleged unseaworthiness.

On the other hand, Cajote went on leave from April 12-28, 1999 to undergo eye treatment.
Since then, he has incurred several unauthorized absences. Fearing that he will be charged as
Absent Without Leave (AWOL), Cajote resigned in June 1999.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for constructive dismissal amounting to illegal

dismissal (except for Zubista and Taboy); underpayment of wages, special and regular holidays;
xxx

Dacut and Tungala contentions: that they resigned after Reynalyn G. Orlina told them that they
will be paid their separation pay if they voluntarily resigned. They also resigned because the
vessel has become unseaworthy after the company refused to have it repaired properly.

Cajote alleged that he resigned because the company hired a replacement while he was still on
leave. When he returned, the Operations Manager told him that he will be paid his separation
pay if he voluntarily resigned; otherwise, he would be charged for being AWOL.

Zubista claimed that his wage was below the minimum set by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board. Finally, petitioners alleged that they were not paid their rest days, sick and
vacation leaves, night shift differentials, subsistence allowance, and fixed overtime pay.

Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint; NLRC affirmed; CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) whether Dacut, Tungala and Cajote voluntarily resigned from their employment;
and (2) whether petitioners were entitled to their monetary claims.
HELD:

YES

A petition for review on certiorari shall only raise questions of law considering that the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and binding on this Court.
This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases where the factual findings of the labor
tribunals are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Here, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding that the
primary reason why Dacut and Tungala resigned was the vessel’s alleged unseaworthiness as
borne by their pleadings before the Labor Arbiter. Dacut and Tungala never mentioned that they
resigned because they were being harassed by the company due to a complaint for violation of
labor standards they had filed against it. This ground was alleged only before the NLRC and not
a single act or incident was cited to prove this point. Even the alleged assurance by Orlina, that
they would be given separation pay, served merely as a secondary reason why they resigned.
In fact, we doubt that such assurance was even made considering that as secretary of the
Personnel Manager, it was not shown under what authority Orlina acted when she told Dacut
and Tungala to resign

Likewise deserving scant consideration is Cajote’s claim that the Operations Manager told him
that he will be paid separation pay if he resigned voluntarily; otherwise, he would be charged as
AWOL. Although the company already hired a replacement, Cajote admitted that he was still
employed at the time he resigned. In fact, the company tried to give him another assignment but
he refused it. Thus, the only reason why Cajote resigned was his long unauthorized absences
which would have warranted his dismissal in any case.

NO

Apropos the monetary claims, there is insufficient evidence to prove petitioners’ entitlement
thereto. As crew members, petitioners were required to stay on board the vessel by the very
nature of their duties, and it is for this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they
are given free living quarters and subsistence allowances when required to be on board.

It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to give them overtime
pay or night shift differential, even when they are not actually working. Thus, the correct criterion
in determining whether they are entitled to overtime pay or night shift differential is not whether
they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but
whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours.15 In this case,
petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof that overtime and night shift work were actually
performed to entitle them to the corresponding pay.
7
NORMAN YABUT VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY AND MANUEL M . LOPEZ; G.R.NO.
190436, JANUARY 16, 2012

FACTS:

Meralco Inspection Office claimed discovering shunting wires installed on the meter base
registered under petitioner Yabut’s name. These wires allegedly allowed power transmission to
the petitioner’s residence despite the fact that Meralco had earlier disconnected his electrical
service due to his failure to pay his electric bills. LA said he was illegally dismissed since the act
imputed upon Yabut was not related to the performance of his duties as a Meralco employee,
but as a customer of the company’s electric business.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an employee is illegally dismissed when the act he has done which caused his
dismissal benefited him as a customer and not as an employee.

RULING:

No. While the installation of the shunted wires benefited the herein petitioner as a customer of
Meralco, his act cannot be fully severed from his status as the respondent’s employee.

The requirement for a just cause was satisfied in this case for violation of Meralco’s Company
Code on Employee Discipline for his act is classified as an act of dishonesty, and for the
existence of just cause under Article 282 (a), (c), (d) and (e) of the Labor Code.

The act clearly relates to the petitioner’s performance of his duties given his position as branch
field representative who is equipped with knowledge on meter operations, and who has the duty
to test electric meters and handle customers’ violations of contract. Instead of protecting the
company’s interest, the petitioner himself used his knowledge to illegally obtain electric power
from Meralco. His involvement in this incident deems him no longer fit to continue performing his
functions for respondent-company.

We emphasize that dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the best interest not only of the
management but also of labor. As a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its
interest, a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees. An employer cannot be
compelled to continue employing an employee guilty of acts inimical to the employer’s interest,
justifying loss of confidence in him.
8
G.R. No. 163431 : August 28, 2013

NATHANIEL N. DONGON, Petitioner, v. RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC.,

AND/OR NICANOR E. JAO, JR., Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Nathaniel Dongton is a former truck helper leadman of Rapid which is engaged in the hauling
and trucking business. His area of assignment is the Tanduay Otis Warehouse where he has a
job of facilitating the loading and unloading of the petitioners' trucks.

On 23 April 2001, private respondent and his driver, Vicente Villaruz, were in the vicinity of
Tanduay as they tried to get some goods to be distributed to their clients. The security guard
called the attention of private respondent as to the fact that Mr. Villaruz was not wearing an
Identification Card (I.D. Card). Private respondent, then, assured the guard that he will secure a
special permission from the management to warrant the orderly release of goods.

Instead of complying with his compromise, private respondent lent his I.D. Card to Villaruz; and
by reason of such misrepresentation, private respondent and Mr. Villaruz got a clearance from
Tanduay for the release of the goods. However, the security guard, who saw the
misrepresentation committed by private respondent and Mr. Villaruz, accosted them and
reported the matter to the management of Tanduay.

After conducting an administrative investigation, private respondent was dismissed from the
petitioning Company. Private respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against the company.
LA dismissed the complaint. On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter, and
held that Rapid Movers had not discharged its burden to prove the validity of petitioners
dismissal from his employment and that his dismissal was a penalty disproportionate to the act
of petitioner complained of. It awarded him backwages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.

Rapid Movers brought a petition for certiorari in the CA, averring grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. The CA promulgated its assailed decision reinstating the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, and upholding the right of Rapid Movers to discipline its workers. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied hence, petitioner appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid?

HELD: No. CA decision reversed and set aside. NLRC decision reinstated.

Labor Law- The prerogative of the employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of willful
disobedience to company policies must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the
rights of labor.
Petitioner maintains that willful disobedience could not be a ground for his dismissal because he
had acted in good faith and with the sole intention of facilitating deliveries for Rapid Movers
when he allowed Villaruz to use his company ID.

Willful disobedience to the lawful orders of an employer is one of the valid grounds to terminate
an employee under Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code. For willful disobedience
to be a ground, it is required that : (a) the conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional;
and (b) the order the employee violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties that he had been engaged to discharge.

Under the foregoing standards, the disobedience attributed to petitioner could not be justly
characterized as willful within the contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code. He neither
benefitted from it, nor thereby prejudiced the business interest of Rapid Movers. His explanation
that his deed had been intended to benefit Rapid Movers was credible. There could be no
wrong or perversity on his part that warranted the termination of his employment based on willful
disobedience.

Dismissal should only be a last resort. Considering that petitioners motive in lending his
company ID to Villaruz was to benefit Rapid Movers as their employer, and considering also that
petitioner had rendered seven long unblemished years of service to Rapid Movers, his dismissal
was plainly unwarranted.

GRANTED.