PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP v.

ALCUAZ
Dec. 19, 1989 // J. Regalado

FACTS: RA 5514 granted Philcomsat a franchise to operate international satellite

communications and it installed several provisional stations and antennae in Rizal. As the sole
signatory of the Philippines to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization and
the International Maritime Satellite Organization, it leased out its satellites to several telcos
including PLDT, Globe, and Globe Mackay. EO No. 196 of 1987 placed it under the jurisdiction
of the NTC, which required it to file for a certificate of public convenience.

The NTC initially gave Philcomsat a provisional authority to operate for six months and issued
another order after the initial six months, giving it another six months with the added condition
that Philcomsat reduce it rates for specific services by 15%, with the reservation to make further
reductions on the part of the NTC later, and with said reductions based only on the NTC’s own
evaluation on Philcomsat’s financial statements. Philcomsat filed a petition seeking to annul the
order issued by Luis Alcuaz as NTC Commissioner for (1) being violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and (2) a denial of procedural and
substantive due process of law.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was a valid delegation of legislative power (YES, EO No. 546 [EO
creating the NTC] and EO No. 196 fix a standard for the exercise of power therein conferred,
the standard being the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility,
and reasonable rates.)
1. General Rule: Delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation
has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. When the administrative
agency concerned establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have
been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature. In the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
a. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
2. Pursuant to EO Nos. 546 and 196, NTC is empowered to determine and prescribe rates
pertinent to the operation of public service communications which include the power to
promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith.
a. Under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of
maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and
broadcasting facilities.
b. In Section 6(d), it is provided the national economic viability of the entire network or
components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained
at reasonable rates.

Whether or not rate-fixing is a quasi-judicial or a quasi-legislative function, which does not

necessitate notice and hearing (Rate-fixing is a quasi-judicial function which requires notice
and hearing. The Public Service Act provides that in exercising its power to fix rates, it must
do so after notice and hearing.)
1. The Court cited Vigan Electric Co v. Public Service Commission and The Central Bank of the
Philippines v. Cloribel to reiterate the rules in determining whether the exercise of power was
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.
a. Vigan Electric Co v. PSC: Rule-making power and the power to fix rates, when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to one particular enterprise are not legislative
in nature. Such enterprise must be given the power to cross-examine the maker of
the report on which the rates are based.
b. The CB of the PH v. Cloribel: Where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law. Aside from
statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends
on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved.
i. GR: Notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
administrative, or legislative functions
Exception: Where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-
judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general
and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the
action is entitled to notice and hearing.
2. The order in question contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Said order
pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. It is premised on a finding of fact,
although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged-
based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording
petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the
financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was
offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted NTC to
impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that
petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its
business requirements.
3. NTC itself admitted it was a quasi-judicial function.
4. A rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of
reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in
an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature
does not entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by
the applicable law. The applicable law is the PSA which provides that rate-fixing shall be
done with notice and hearing.

Whether or not the rate fixed is confiscatory in nature which would result in a closure of
business and cessation of operations (YES, but only because these rates were fixed based on
respondent’s own evaluation, without affording petitioner the benefit of notice and hearing)

NTC: Since petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a legislative
franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or
license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily violating any
vested property right of herein petitioner.
1. GR: The power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited
by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the
general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to
such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to
regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation which operates
as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional
guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
2. The inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates
charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so
fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which are
unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness
comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. 16
3. What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence. It is a question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. In determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation,
requirements and opportunities of the utility.
4. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of
the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining
the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to
meet competition.
5. The order reveals the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation
made on the financial statements of petitioner. It did not make an attempt to elaborate on
how it arrived at the prescribed rates.
6. Philcomsat may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment to the
public service, should the order of NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The
business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and equipment have
always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the transmission
arrangement.

HELD: Petition GRANTED, Respondent’s order SET ASIDE

J. Gutierrez, concurring:
In the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice and hearing must also be required. In the
exercise of quasi-legislative powers by administrative agencies, such agencies are manned by
people selected via political appointment or personal considerations. They are not appointed
based on competency and qualifications and need to be guided by expertise and experience.