NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D.

| BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

SOURCES OF OBLIGATION (ARTICLE 1157 - 1162)

1. SAGRADA ORDEN v NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION

[91 Phil. 503]

Facts: Plaintiff Sagrada Orden owned a piece of real property in Pandacan, Manila.
During the Japanese occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation
Taiwan Tekkoshho. After the liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of the United
States took possession, control, and custody of the real property.

During the year 1946, the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management
Company under the custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property
Custodian, and when it vacated, the property occupied by defendant National Coconut
Corporation.

Sagrada Orden made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the
United States but was denied. So plaintiff brought an action in court to annul the sale of
property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession.

The case did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it
is claimed by Sagrada Orden that the sale in favor of Taiwan Tekkosho was null and
void because it was executed under threats, duress, and intimidation, and that the title
be re-issued to Sagrada Orden.

The court rendered judgment releasing the defendant from liability, but reversing to the
plaintiff the right to recover from the defendant reasonable rentals for the use and
occupation of the premises. The present action to recover the reasonable rentals from
August 1946, the date when defendant began to occupy, to the date it vacated it. The
defendant did not contest its liability for the rentals at the rate of P3, 000 per month from
February 28, 1949, but resisted the claim therefore prior to that date.

Defendant contends that it occupied the property in good faith, under no obligation to
pay rentals for the use and occupation. Judgment rendered for the plaintiff to recover
from the defendant the sum of P3, 000 a month, from August, 1946, to the date the
defendant vacates the premises. Thus this appeal made by defendant.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant company is liable to pay rentals from August 1946
to the date it vacated.

Decision: NO. If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any
of the four sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or
negligence.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises
and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and
administration thereof, the Alien Property Administration. Neither was there any
negligence on its part.

There was also no privity between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan
Tekkosho, which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee
by the use of duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-
appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the
property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho.

The Alien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not
as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho.
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of
then Government of the United States, in its own right, to the exclusion of, and against
the claim or title of, the enemy owner.

From August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of judgment
on February 28, 1948, Alien Property Administration had the absolute control of the
property as trustee of the Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it
by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner.

Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien Property Administration

for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but
to the United States Government.

2. ARTURO PELAYO v MARCELO LAURON ET AL.

[G.R. NO. L-4089 | Jan. 12, 1909 | 12 Phil. 453]

Facts: On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu,
filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about
the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the
defendants, situated in San Nicolas, he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; after
consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on
account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation
was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth.

The just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefore.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants are liable to pay the professional fee.

Decision: YES. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly
determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones.

Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The
rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and
143.)

If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that,
when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation
which the law has expressly established between the married couple.

3. LEUNG BEN v P. J. O'BRIEN

[G.R. No. L-13602 | April 6, 1918 | 28 Phil. 182]

Facts: PJ O’ Brien instituted an action for recovery of the money in the amount of
15,000 which he won from Leung Ben in a series of gambling, banking and percentage
games conducted ruing the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit.

In his verified complaint the O’Brien asked for an attachment, under section 424, and
412 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the property of Leung Ben, on the
ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine islands with intent to
defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued; and acting under the authority
thereof, the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by the
herein plaintiff with the International Banking Corporation.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at
gaming is that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is no such an action
as is contemplated in this provision, and he therefore insists that the original complaint
shows on its face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the
Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of
attachment.

Issue: Whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming an
obligation arising from "contract, express or implied.”

Decision: YES. In the common law, the duty to return money won in this way is an
implied contract, or quasi-contract. It is no argument to say in reply to this that the
obligation here recognized is called an implied contract merely because the remedy
commonly used in suing upon ordinary contract can be here used, or that the law
adopted the fiction of promise in order to bring the obligation within the scope of the
action of assumpsit. Such statements fail to express the true import of the phenomenon.

Before the remedy was the idea; and the use of the remedy could not have been
approved if it had not been for historical antecedents which made the recognition of this
remedy at one logical and proper. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the
question is not how this duty but what sort of obligation did the author of the Code of
Civil Procedure intend to describe when he sued the term implied contract in section
412.

Upon general principles, recognize both the civil and common law, money lost in
gaming and voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner cannot in the absence of statute,
be recovered in a civil action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission, which
defines and penalizes several forms of gambling, contains numerous provisions
recognizing the right to recover money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain
games (secs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11).

The original complaint in the action in the Court of First Instance is not clear as to the
particular section of Act No. 1757 under which the action is brought, but it is alleged that
the money was lost at gambling, banking, and percentage game in which the defendant
was banker. It must therefore be assumed that the action is based upon the right of
recovery given in Section 7 of said Act, which declares that an action may be brought
against the banker by any person losing money at a banking or percentage game.

In the case now under consideration the duty of the defendant to refund the money
which he won from the plaintiff at gaming is a duty imposed by statute. It therefore
arises ex lege. Furthermore, it is a duty to return a certain sum which had passed from
the plaintiff to the defendant. By all the criteria which the common law supplies, this a
duty in the nature of debt and is properly classified as an implied contract.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

It is well-settled by the English authorities that money lost in gambling or by lottery, if

recoverable at all, can be recovered by the loser in an action of indebitatus assumpsit
for money had and received.

4. PEOPLE’S CAR INC. v COMMANDO SECURITY

[51 SCRA 40]
Facts: People’s Car Inc (People’s) contracted Commando Security Agency
(Commonado) under a Guard Service Contract. A guard under contract, while on duty,
took out a customer’s car [Joseph Luy’] for a joyride. While driving along JP Laurel St,
Davao City, the guard lost control of the car and the car fell into a ditch. The car guard
was charged with qualified theft and the car and company sustained damages
amounting to P8,489.

People’s Car Inc claims that the security agency is liable under paragraph 5 of their
contract as they assumed the “sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch
hours” by the guards. Commando countered that under the contract their liability shall
not exceed P1,000.00 per guard post (par. 4).

Davao RTC held for Commando and limited award of damages to P1,000.00 based on
the contract. RTC also commented that if the situation was one falling on par. 5,
People’s should have insisted and not paid the damages to Luy, and told him instead to
bring a case where Commando would be become a party through a third-party
complaint or as a co-defendant.

Issue: Whether or not the award of P1,000.00 was proper.

Decision: NO. Court reversed and awarded the full amount of actual damages. The
limited liability is only applicable is loss or damage was through the negligence of
Commondo’s guards, not when the guards deliberately disregarded his duty to
safeguard People’s property by taking a customer’s car out on a joyride.

Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car,
which had been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in
making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and
indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly by the
unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of their contract. As
ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."

Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the
Guard Service Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" — since the
customer could not hold defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

contract with defendant. Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court,
notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among others,
could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff's business, in the same way that
defendant's baseless attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff
cannot be expected to have brought it more business. Worse, the administration of
justice is prejudiced, since the court dockets are unduly burdened with unnecessary
litigation.

A party under contract is, in law, liable to its customer for the damages caused the
customer's car, which had been entrusted into its custody. The party is therefore
justified in law in making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor
its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused
directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of
their contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith."

5. LUIS PICHEL v PRUDENCIO ALONZO

[G.R.No. L- 36902 | 30 January 1982]

Facts: Respondent Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of
land in Basilan City in accordance with Republic Act No. 477. The award was cancelled
by the Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto,
plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 1972,
plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated.

On August 14, 1968, plaintiff and his wife sold to defendant Luis Pichel all the fruits of
the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land in question for the period,
September 15, 1968 to January 1, 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the
date of sale, however, the land was still under lease to one, Ramon Sua, and it was the
agreement that part of the consideration of the sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be
paid by defendant directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of
the latter. Pending said payment plaintiff refused to allow the defendant to make any
harvest. In July 1972, defendant for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale
in his favor, caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land.

Alonzo filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the
provisions of R.A. 477, which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation, otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

to apply for another piece of land. The lower court ruled that the contract, which it held
as a contract of lease, is null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent had the right or authority to execute the "Deed of
Sale" in 1968, his award having been cancelled previously by the Board of Liquidators
on January 27, 1965

Decision: YES. The RTC erred in constructing the deed of sale as a contract of lease.
There was no need on the part of the RTC to interpret the contract, since there was no
ambiguity, it merely contracts the sale of the fruits of the land, not the land itself.

The S.C. relied upon ART 1370 of the Civil Code, regarding the rule on interpreting
contracts. Its interpretation in express form is the preferred. Construction shall be
employed when such literal interpretation is impossible.

The possession of the coconut fruits for 7 years is different from possession of the land,
since the coconut fruits are mere accessories and the land is the principal- a transfer of
accessories does not necessarily mean a transfer of principal, it is the other way
around.

The vendor after having received the consideration for the sale of his coconut fruits
cannot be allowed to impugn the validity of the contracts he entered into, to the
prejudice of petitioner who contracted in good faith and consideration

Difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things: that the delivery of the thing
sold transfers ownership, while in a lease no such transfer of ownership results as the
rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.

Contract of Lease- defined as giving or the concession of the enjoyment or use of a

thing for a specified time and fixed price.

6. BENIGNO DEL RIO v CARLOS PALANCA TANGUILAY

[G.R. NO. L-1271 | May 31, 1949 | 83 Phil. 867]

Facts: This suit was brought to recover money which plaintiff alleges to have furnished
from December 1942 to February 1945 for the support and subsistence of defendant's
five minor natural children.

Analysing the foregoing provision, this Court observed in Ramirez vs. Redfern, 49 Phil.,
849, that "For one to recover under the provisions of article 1894 of the Civil Code, it
must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one
bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied by a
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

stranger and third, that the support was given without the knowledge of the person
charged with the duty."

With reference to the first requisite, the record reveals that in a case for support
instituted by Maria Dolores Cuartero in behalf of her children against the defendant, the
Curt of First Instance of Manila handed down a decision on September 22, 1943,
approving an agreement by the parties whereby the defendant promised to pay the
mother of the minors P1,500 a month for their maintenance. It is also appearing that
before that date — on May 9, 1942 — the parties had signed a carta-convenio for the
same purpose but for a lower rate of allowance per month.

It is not denied that the defendant more than complied with the terms of the above
decision. Besides P1,500 a month, he sent the children extra cash and foodstuffs,
shoes, and clothing.

Issue: Whether or not the P 1,500 a month was sufficient and an increase for allowance
can be demanded by the mother.

Decision: YES. The defendant contends that the P1,500 a month was utterly
insufficient. The remedy in that case was to ask the court to increase the allowance. It
may be said in this connection that if the value of the prevailing Japanese currency had
deteriorated, the court, retained the jurisdiction to increase or diminish the allowance as
the circumstances might justify.

However, P1,500 a month was deemed by the court as late as August 8, 1944, to be
adequate. In denying a motion of the children mother to raise the allowance, the court
stated that P1,500 was sufficient to pull the children through those critical days in
comparative comport.

In the face of this attitude of the defendant, the plaintiff was not justified in continuing
supplying money to the mother of the children, unless he wanted to give it out of charity
or without the expectation of recovering it from the defendant. His remedy is against
Maria Dolores Cuartero.

This conclusion makes unnecessary a discussion of the second requirement. It suffices

to estate that the plaintiff and one of the children were engaged and were married
afterward.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HEINRICH S. RITTER

[194 SCRA 690]

Facts: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario.
Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario.
The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that
Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said
that the object has already been removed from her vagina.

On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was
brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove
the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded
and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis.

She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months
ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with
homicide.

Issue: (1) Whether or not was liable for rape and homicide.

(2) Whether or not Ritter is civilly liable despite his acquittal.

Decision:

(1) NO. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender
age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning.

A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot
by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie
the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor
that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.

(2) YES. It does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award
to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from
civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

8. NATIVIDAD ANDAMO AND EMMANUEL ANDAMO v INTERMEDIATE APELLATE

COURT [191 SCRA 195]

Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our
lady of La Salette, Inc.

Within the land of the latter, water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of the petitioners and their laborers and some other
destructions.

This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction
caused by respondent’s water paths and contrivances.

Decision: YES. A careful examination of the afore-quoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by
respondent’s corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is,
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these water
paths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault
or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.

9. Federation of Free Farmers vs. CA, GR L-41161, Sept. 10, 1981

Facts: Federation of Free Farmers maintains that the plantation laborers, its members,
have not only not been fully paid the amounts indisputably due them from crop year
1952-1953 to November 1, 1955, during which period all the parties are agreed that
Section I of Republic Act 809 was fully applicable.

It also contends that in 1956, VICTORIAS and the PLANTERS entering into an
agreement had no legal right to enter into the way they did, (providing for a 64-36 ratio)
that is, in a manner that did not conform with the ratio of sharing between planters and
millers specified in the just mentioned legal provision, (which correspondingly provides
for a 70-30 ratio)

The Federation maintains that after the enactment of Republic Act 809, all planters and
millers in all the sugar milling districts in the Philippines were deprived of the freedom to
stipulate any ratio of sharing of the proceeds of sugarcane milled by the respective
centrals, as well as their derivatives, in any proportion different from, especially if less
for the planters, than that listed in Section 1 of the Act.

Assuming that the planters and VICTORIAS had the legal right to enter into any such
agreement, the 60% of the increase given to the PLANTERS under said agreement has
not been paid up to now to the respective laborers of said PLANTERS.

With this, the FEDERATION further urges, in this instance, that the Court of Appeals'
decision is correct in holding that under the law on torts, the PLANTERS and the
CENTRAL are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amounts thus due
them.

Issue: Whether or not VICTORIAS and the planters have a joint and solidary liability on
the amounts due to the laborers.

Decision: NO. The court states that Republic Act 809, does not impose upon the
centrals, whether expressly or impliedly, any joint and several liability with the planters
for the share which the Act apportions for the laborers of the planters, since it is the
responsibility exclusively of the planters to pay their laborers after they have been given
by the central what is due them.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

The inherent nature of the obligation of the planters, that of paying their own laborers,
has never been from the inception of the sugar industry up to the present, solidary with
the Centrals.

Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides in this respect thus: The concurrence of two or
more creditors or two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply
that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is
bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity.

In these premises, the court cannot see how VICTORIAS may be held jointly and
severally liable with the PLANTERS, contrary to what has been held by the Court of
Appeals.

10. CLEMENTE BRINAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND C.A.

[G.R. No. L-30309. November 25, 1983]

Facts: The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of January
6, 1957, Juanita Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan,
Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter.Emelita
Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong, same province.

At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and her
granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were
relieved, with Victor Millan... taking over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor,
and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio
Lagalag in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down, and the
conductor shouted 'Lusacan', Lusacan'.

Thereupon, the... old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of
Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand, and holding her baggage with the other. When
Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a
result, the old woman, and the child... stumbled and they were seen no more. It took
three minutes more before the train stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims
were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat.

Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found along
the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to the scene to investigate, they found
the lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from the railroad tracks, sprawled to
the... ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the forehead, and with the back
portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the corpse of an old woman
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about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the
left hand missing. The head was located farther west between the rails. An arm was
found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old woman. Blood, pieces of
scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the scene. Later, the bodies were
identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Among the personal effects
found on Martina was a train ticket.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas

for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino
and Victor Millan. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the lower court.

During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court a separate civil
action for damages against the Manila Railroad Company.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting petitioner-appellant

under the facts found by said court.

Decision: YES. It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where
the petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened
its speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they... stood up and
proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed
its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled, and they were
seen no more."

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains
and buses that before reaching a station or flag stop, they slow down, and the
conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience
that as the train or bus... slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and
proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop.
This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run
before, they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.

It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop
was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly
observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous." That the
announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that immediately
after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed. Petitioner-
appellant failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed its regular speed.
The announcement was made while the train was still at Barrio Lagalag.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court that
the negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erron¬eously announcing the
next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo. Any negligence... of the victims was at most contributory and does not
exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the heirs
of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate civil
action for damages in the same trial court during the pendency of the criminal action,
the said court had no more power to include any civil liability in its judgment of
conviction. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is
culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the
appellant's arguments and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is the
Manila Railroad Company... and not petitioner appellant Briñas. Culpa contractual and
an act or omission punishable by law is two distinct sources of obligation.

It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the
following items of damages may be recovered:
(1) an indemnity for the death of the victim;
(2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
(3)... moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.

11. LUIS TAN, WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN, VICENTE TAN v HON. DAVID
NATIFAN [G.R. No. 76965 | March 11, 1994]

Facts: Florentino Lim, a scion of the wealthy Limketkai family of Cagayan de Oro City,
was shot dead in his office on 25 August 1973. The Constabulary, the NBI and the
police conducted a joint investigation of the case. As a result, on 17 April 1975, the
brothers Luis, William, Joaquin, Vicente, Alfonso and Eusebio, all surnamed Tan, and
Go E Kuan, together with eight (8) others, were charged with murder, and unlawful
possession, control and custody of apistol before Military Commission No. 1.

Incidentally, Alfonso, Eusebio and Go E Kuan died even before the instant petition could
be filed. Thereafter, William also died.On 11 June 1976, after trial, Military Commission
No. 1. convicted Luis and Five (5) of his co-accused of murder, while the gunman was
also found guilty of illegal possession of firearm. The other brothers of Luis were simply
declared "not guilty" in both cases.

On 11 February 1983, private respondent Rosita B. Lim, together with her minor
children, Jennifer, Lysander and Beverlie, all surnamed Limketkai, commenced in the
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

Regional Trial Court of Manila a civil action for damages against all those charged with
the slaying of Florentino Lim. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge
David G. Nitafan.

On 10 May 1983, instead of filing an answer, the Tan brothers filled a motion to dismiss
contending that venue was improperly laid, and that private respondents' cause of
action was already barred or extinguished by the acquittal of William, Joaquin, Vicente,
Alfonso, Eusebio and Go E Kuan by Military Commission No. 1.

Respondent Judge disagreed and denied petitioners motion, prompting the latter to
elevate the issue to the then Intermediate Appellant Court (now Court of Appeals) by
way of certiorari,9 which likewise rejected their arguments and denied their plea. Then
they came to this court raising the propriety of the denial of their motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not the issue on prescription may no longer be re-litigated on the
ground that the court has already resolved the same in G.R. 69418.

Decision: (NO/YES). On the contrary, the applicable prescriptive period in this case is,
at most, dubitable. While petitioners contend that it is four (4) years hence the cause of
action of private respondent already prescribed, the trial court rules that it was
coterminous with the crime so that, in this case where the accused were charged with
murder, the prescriptive period for the offense being twenty (20) years, the action had
not yet prescribed it having been instituted less than ten (10) years from the time the
cause of action accrued.

Be that as it may, in G.R. No. 69418 we already affirmed the ruling of the trial court that
prescription had not yet set in, albeit in a minute resolution. But it is axiomatic that when
a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for lack of merit, the challenged
decision or order, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed
sustained.

Correspondingly, the impression that no legal rule was enunciated in G.R. No. 69418,
as espoused by petitioners, is wrong and must be corrected. Petitioners motion to
dismiss made at the pre-trial stage did not contain any new allegation on lack of
jurisdiction or lack of cause of action, which are the only grounds allowed for such a
motion.

On the other hand, all the grounds raised by petitioners were mere reiterations of issues
already settled by the trail court and affirmed in G.R. Nos. 67029 and 69418.
Consequently, the only recourse open to the Court is to dismiss the petition. A contrary
ruling of respondent Judge would have, instead, easily subjected him to certiorari on
grave abuse of discretion for gross disobedience to settled pronouncements of this
Court.
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

Wherefore, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge,

this Petition for Certiorari is dismissed. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,
or whichever branch of the same court this case may now be assigned, is directed to
proceed with the least disposition of Civil Case No. 83-15633 with the least possible
delay. This decision is immediately executory.

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEDRO ABUNGAN, RANDY PASCUA AND

ERNESTO RAGONTON JR. [G.R. No. 136843 | September 28, 2000]

Facts: The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the
criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed.

Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased. In an Information3 dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista
charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at
large), with murder committed as follows:

"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan, Municipality of
Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honourable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, armed with long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation and superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, Sr. y Pajarito, inflicting upon him
wounds on the different parts of his body injuries which directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Issue: Whether or not the death of appellant Abungan extinguished his criminal and
civil liability.

Decision: YES. The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his
appeal extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil
liability ex delicto).

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.'
NAVARRO, ANTONETTE D. | BAPS3A | CIVIL LAW 2 ( PS 120) Module 1

In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the death
of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the
pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil
liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It
must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his
estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of
the criminal case against him. Necessarily, the lower court's Decision -- finding him
guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased -- becomes ineffectual.