Admin Case Digest Compilation - Paolo Javier

CENTRAL BANK VS ABLAZA
L-33022, 22 April 1975
Facts:
This is a petition made by the Central Bank which sentenced to pay Ablaza
Construction for damages of breach of contract. Central Bank awarded to Ablaza a
construction contract. Central Bank refused to proceed with the project unless Ablaza
revised the plan and agreed to a lower price. Central Bank then rose the issue that there
was no perfected contract there were no compliance with the admin code. Central Bank
alleged that there were no authority from the Auditor General thus the contract is void.
Issue:
Whether or not CB is a government entity to apply the provisions of the code.
Ruling:
No. The contracts entered into by the CB are not within the purview of the Admin
Code. CB is not a government entity since according to its charter it may acquire and
hold assets and incur liability as result directly from operations authorized by RA 265. It
has capital of its own and does not depend on the National Government.
1|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

BACANI AND MATOTO VS NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION
L-9657, 29 November 1956
Facts:
Plaintiffs are stenographers of Branch 6 of the RTC of Manila. Counsels for the
defendant asked for a copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the case of
Sycip vs NACOCO.
Plaintiffs complied and submitted the bills for the payment of fees.
NACOCO paid however Auditor General required the reimbursement of the fees
since NACOCO is a government entity by virtue of DOJ circular.
For the reimbursement of the fees, it was ordered that P25 per day be deducted
from the salary of Bacani and P10 per day to Matoto.
Issue:
Whether or not NACOCO performing certain functions of government, makes

them part of the Government of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. NACOCO do not acquire the status of being a government entity for the
simple reason that they do not come in the classification of municipal or public
corporation. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government,
as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other
private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

MCIAA vs. HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS
G.R. No. 120082; September 11, 1996
Facts:
Under its charter, the MCIAA shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the
National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
In 1994, the Local Government Unit (LGU) of Cebu City demanded payment for realty
taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA.
MCIAA objected to the same as baseless and unjustified, claiming its exemption
under its charter. Also, it cites the LGC stating that LGUs taxing power does not extend
to taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.
Cebu City countered, however, citing Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC which
withdraw tax exemptions of GOCCs and realty tax exemptions previously granted to ore
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.
MCIAA paid tax under protest. It insisted that the taxing powers of LGUs do not
extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national
government. It also insisted that while it is indeed a GOCC, it nonetheless stands on the
same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very
nature of its powers and functions.
Issues:
1. Whether or not MCIAA a taxable person.
2. Whether or not MCIAA exempt from realty taxation.
Held:
1. Yes, although it previously enjoyed exemption from realty tax under its charter
(which has already been withdrawn by the LGC), this exemption extended only to
said tax, not to other taxes. Hence, MCIAA is still a taxable person.
2. No, MCIAA is not exempt from realty tax by the City of Cebu. First, its tax
exemption under its charter has already been withdrawn. Second, while it is true
that LGUs cannot levy tax on property of the Republic of the Philippines or the
National Government (outside Metro Manila), the beneficial use of property
should not be given to a taxable person.
Here, MCIAA is already the owner of the parcels of land in question. Hence, even the
exemption under the LGC cannot apply.

MIAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006
Facts:
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the
City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax
delinquency was estimated at P624 million. MIAA sought to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax.
Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code

expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-
controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the
express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international
airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government
Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic.
The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public
property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a
case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Issue:
Whether or not Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt fromreal
estate tax under existing laws.
Held:
Under the Local government code, (GOCCs) government owned and controlled
corporation are NOT exempted from real estate tax.
MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one
MIAA should either be a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non-stock corporation
since it has no members.
MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and

government functions. Under the civil code, property may either be under public
dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State
and are utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national
wealth. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service,
they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

ERNESTO M. MACEDA vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR
G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991
Facts:
On 1986, CA No. 120 created the NPC as a public corporation to undertake the
development of hydraulic power and the production of power. On 1949, RA No. 358
granted NPC tax and duty exemption privileges. On 1974, PD No. 380 amended it - the
exemption of NPC from such taxes, duties, fees, imposts and other charges imposed
"directly or indirectly," on all petroleum products used by NPC in its operation. On
1984, PD No. 1931 withdrew all tax exemption privileges granted in favor of
government-owned or controlled corporations including their subsidiaries. However,
said law empowered the President and/or the then Minister of Finance, upon
recommendation of the FIRB to restore, partially or totally, the exemption withdrawn,
or otherwise revise the scope and coverage of any applicable tax and duty. On, 1986, the
FIRB issued resolution No. 1-86 indefinitely restoring the NPC tax and duty exemption
privileges effective July 1, 1985.
However, effective March 10, 1987, EO No. 93 once again withdrew all tax and
duty incentives granted to government and private entities which had been restored
under PD Nos. 1931 and 1955 but it gave the authority to FIRB to restore, revise the
scope and prescribe the date of effectivity of such tax and/or duty exemptions. On June
24, 1987 the FIRB issued Resolution No. 17-87 restoring NPC's tax and duty exemption
privileges effective March 10, 1987.
Issues:
Whether or not NPC has ceased to enjoy indirect tax and duty exemption with the
enactment of P.D. No. 938 which amended P.D. No. 380.
Held:
It is noted that in the earlier law, R.A. No. 358 the exemption was worded in
general terms, as to cover "all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, etc. . . ." However, the
amendment under RA No. 6395 enumerated the details covered by the exemption.
Subsequently, P.D. No. 380, made even more specific the details of the exemption of
NPC to cover, among others, both direct and indirect taxes on all petroleum products
used in its operation. PD No. 938 amended the tax exemption by simplifying the same
law in general terms. It succinctly exempts NPC from "all forms of taxes, duties, fees,
imposts, as well as costs and service fees including filing fees, appeal bonds, and
supersedes bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings."
The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes demonstrate the intention of the law to
give NPC all the tax exemptions it has been enjoying before. The rationale for this
exemption is that being non-profit the NPC "shall devote all its returns from its capital
investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion.
Petitioner cannot invoke the rule on strictissimi juris with respect to the
interpretation of statutes granting tax exemptions to NPC.
Moreover, it is a recognized principle that the rule on strict interpretation does

not apply in the case of exemptions in favor of a government political subdivision or
instrumentality.

FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMAN
G.R. Nos. L-55963 H 61045, February 27, 1991
Facts:
A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially

by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla,
which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages
against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court awarded actual,
moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor
General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special
agent.
Issue:
Whether or not NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused
by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent?
Held:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

Iron and Steel Authority v. CA
65 SCAD 261
Facts:
P.D. 272 was issued creating Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA"). National
Government embarked on a program which is the construction of NSC which is an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of
the Philippines withdrawing from sale or settlement tract of public land and reserving
that land for the use and occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the public land
subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by private respondent Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"). LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC
and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60)
days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent
domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings. The negotiations
failed thus, Petitioner commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in RTC.
While the trial was ongoing, the statutory existence of ISA expired. The trial court
dismissed the case which was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court that “only
natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in civil case.”
Issue:
Whether the President has the power to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Ruling:
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as
an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its
authority under P.D. No. 272. In addition to his general supervisory authority, the
President of the Philippines shall have such other specific powers and duties as are
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987
currently in force has substantially reproduced the foregoing provision in the following
terms: "Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it is
necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action
advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court." (Italics supplied)
In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly delegated under both
the1917 and 1987
Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was

necessary and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
Government of the Republic and accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed
with the suit.

GATCHALIAN VS OMB
GR NO 229288, 01 August 2018
Facts:
Gatchalian was one of the respondents in OMB-C-C-13-0212. The said complaint

arose from the sale of shares in ESBI, in which Gatchalian was a stockholder, in 2009, to
LWUA, a government-owned and controlled corporation.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian since he profited

from the transaction. The Ombudsman held that in view of ESBI's precarious financial
standing at the time of the transaction, the windfall received by Gatchalian and the other
stockholders must be deemed an unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference within
the ambit of R.A. 3019. The respondents filed separate motions for reconsideration
denied by the Ombudsman. Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The OSG argued that the CA had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, as the decisions of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases were unappealable and may thus be assailed only through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court. On the merits, it maintained that
the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order were based on evidence, and were thus issued
without grave abuse of discretion.
The CA however ruled on the case to which Gatchalian filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On January 13, 2017, the CA issued another Resolution where it
upheld its earlier Resolution.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under

Rule 65 for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the said case.
Ruling:
The petition is unmeritorious. The Court held that "appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.”

VILLA VS LAZARO
G.R. NO. 69871 AUGUST 24, 1990
Facts:
Anita Villa was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago
Boulevard in Gen. Santos City. In October of that same year, as the funeral parlor was
nearing completion, a suit for injunction was brought against Villa by Dr. Jesus
Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital, standing about 132.36 meters from the
funeral parlor.
Veneracion’s complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa was

dismissed by the court. Veneracion did not appeal from this adverse judgment which
therefore became final. Instead, he brought the matter up with the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission.
Two months after the rendition of the judgment against Veneracion, Villa
received a telegram dated from Commissioner Dizon of the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. On June 2, 1982 a “Show Cause” Order dated April 28,1982,
signed by one Ernesto L. Mendiola in behalf of the Commission, requiring her to show
cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and-desist order issued
against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. On July 27, 1982, she
received an Order of Commissioner Dizon dated June 29, 1982 imposing on her a fine of
P10,000.00 and requiring her to cease operations until further orders from his office
The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Her
appeals to the Commission, and subsequently to the Office of the President, were
likewise denied. It must be stressed that neither the respondent nor the Commission
ever made known the complaint lodged by the respondent to the petitioner until much
later, after the Commissioner has rendered several adverse rulings against her.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner denied of due process against which the defense of
failure of AV to take timely appeal will not avail.
Ruling:
Yes. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain
basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as thedue process requirements in
investigations and trials. An earlier judgment on the merits by a competent court cannot
be negated by a result of administrative proceedings.

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-49711, November 7, 1979
Facts:
Secretary Gozon while he was still the director of mines dismissed the case filed
by herein petitioner Zambales Chromite Mining which sought to have the petitioner
declared as the rightful and prior locator of certain mining claims.
The said decision was appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. While the appeal was pending, Gozon was appointed as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself from exercising
appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of mines, he
consequently affirmed the said decision. The decision of Gozon as Secretary was then
assailed by Zambales but the RTC dismissed such on the basis that disqualification of a
judge to review his own decision under the rules of court does not apply to
administrative proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not Gozon can validly decide on a case on his appellate jurisdiction
which he also had decided while he was still Director of Mines.
Ruling:
It was void. The rationale behind it is the same as the prohibition of a judge
which was later on promoted to the CA to decide in its appellate jurisdiction a decision
he made as a trial judge. There can be no real review of the case as being human; a
person is presupposed not to admit that he committed an error.
In this case, the petitioners were deprived of due process, which means
fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of
Mines.
10 | A d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d E l e c t i o n L a w s | p e e j a y n o t e s
SINGSON vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PAL
G.R. No. 122389, June 19, 1997
Facts:
Miguel Singson lodged a complaint against PAL for illegal dismissal. Then Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino declared petitioner's dismissal illegal and ordered his
reinstatement with backwages. Respondent PAL appealed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter to the 2nd Division of NLRC which composed of Commissioners Calaycay,
Rayala and Raul T. Aquino himself. The 2nd Division reversed the decision of then
Labor Arbiter Aquino and dismissed the complaint against PAL. When petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, the 2nd Division with only two commissioners taking part,
namely, Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala, denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not Singson was deprived of due process on account of Raul T.

Aquino’s participation as commissioner of the 2nd division of the NLRC in reviewing his
own decision as a former labor Arbiter.
Ruling:
Commissioner Aquino cannot be considered as impartial since he was the arbiter

who decided the case under review. Furthermore, the resolution of the respondent
NLRC is also void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three
impartial commissioners. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that
the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by commissioners and
without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The denial of petitioner’s right to an
impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due
process.
In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations the court already ruled
that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose
decision is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled that "the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. LUCAS
GR NO. 127838, 21 Jan 1999
Facts:
Raquel Linatok filed with the office of filed with the Office of the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose Lucas, a
photographer of the same agency for misconduct. The complaint stemmed from the
alleged act of Jose Lucas of touching and caressing complainant's thigh running down to
her ankle. After a formal investigation by the Board of Personnel Inquiry, it issued a
resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty
of suspension for one month and one day. The CSC, however, found him guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court of
Appeals set aside the CSC resolution and reinstated that of the board and ruled that
respondent was denied due process as he came to know of the modification of the charge
against him only when he received notice of the CSC resolution dismissing him from the
service. In its petition to the Supreme Court, petitioner contended that a formal charges
in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a
criminal prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found
him guilty of grave misconduct on the charge of simple misconduct
Ruling:
Yes. As Lucas was merely charged with simple misconduct but was convicted of
grave misconduct, he was deprived of his right to due process. In which the Court held
that “We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due
process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a
person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. Administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as
the right to due process in investigations and proceedings.”
MWSS VS OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 109113 January 25, 1995
Facts:
Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s

Association (PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on the
public bidding conducted by MWSS for projects APM-01 and APM-02 of its Angat
Water Supply Optimization Project (AWSOP), which aims to provide 1.3 million liters of
water daily to about 3.8 million residents in the metropolitan area. The letter of
complaint accused the MWSS of an apparent plan even before the bidding to favor
suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urged the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation to
hold in abeyance the award of contracts.
The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued
an injunction directed to the Board of Trustees of the MWSS (1) to set aside the
recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids, and Awards Committee for Construction
Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE) that contract no. APM-01 be given to a
contractor offering fiberglass pipes and (2) to instead award the contract to a complying
and responsive bidder.
Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman over PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the challenged order
contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in cases
involving government infrastructure projects.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint and
has the power to issue orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside
the recommendation of PBAC-CSTE and to instead award the contract to a complying
and responsive bidder.
Ruling:
No. While recognizing the investigatory and public assistance duties of the
Ombudsman, the assailed orders were an undue interference in the adjudicatory
responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the
proper observance of and compliance with the law. The Fact finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals a predisposition against the use of
fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal matter.
As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation

of waterworks system to insure uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of
potable water. Therefore, it is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate
the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible
with its development plans. The exercise of this discretion to reject a bid and to award
contracts, which is a purely technical matter, is vested in the MWSS entrusted with such
function that even courts or the Ombudsman cannot unduly interfere from.
CRUZ V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 144464, 22 November 2001
Facts:
In 1994, the Civil Service Commission discovered that pettioner Zenaida Paitim
(municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan) took the non-professional examination for
Gilda Cruz, after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The
CSC found after a fact-finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against Paitim
and Cruz. A “Formal Charge” for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. The petitioners, in their answer, entered a general
denial of the formal charge. The petitioners declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
averring that if the investigation will continue ,they will be deprived of their right to due
process because the CSC was the complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge, all at the
same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an investigation report and
recommendation finding the petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their
dismissal from the government service. The report was forwarded to the CSC for its
consideration, and likewise found the petitioners guilty and ordered the same to be
dismissed from government service. Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance
with Sec. 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the
CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the
penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was
filed by a private citizen against the government employee.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the CSC acted
as an investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge all at the same time.
Ruling:
The SC ruled in the negative. Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The
provision is applicable to instances where administrative cases are bled against erring
employees in connection with their duties and functions of the office. This is, however,
not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the acts
complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Sub
professional) examination. The examinations were under the direct control and
supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government employees
over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the
petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed guilty of
dishonesty, the penalty meted was dismissal from the office. Section 28, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides that the CSC can
rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to the
examinations.
Lacson v. Executive Secretary
G.R. Nos. 165399, May 30, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners were non-presidential appointees and career service officials of

respondent Philippine Estates Authority. Tagud filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Office of the Ombudsman accusing petitioners for overpricing, by P600 million the
contract for the construction of the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard. The
Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the criminal and the
administrative aspects of the case. The Presidential Anti-Graft Commission requested
the Ombudsman for authority to conduct administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioners. The administrative case charged them with Dishonesty, Serious
Misconduct and Acts Inimical to the Interest of the Public Service in violation of Section
52A (1), (3) and (20) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. The basic complaint
has not been further docketed as an administrative case. Thus, the same did not
preclude the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an administrative complaint against the
concerned PEA officials. A formal complaint was filed by the Investigation Office of
PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including petitioners. During the preliminary
conference, petitioners raised the lack of jurisdiction of PAGC over the complaint
against them considering that they were not presidential appointees and there was no
allegation that they had conspired with the presidential appointees who were charged
with them. PAGC issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of petitioners with
the imposition of the corresponding accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
benefits and disqualification from employment in the government. The President
approved the recommendation. Millan and Viray, together with Beriña filed a motion for
reconsideration. This motion was not acted upon. Aggrieved, they filed their Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA dismissed the
consolidated petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the investigation on the
charge of overpricing of the Project against petitioners.
Ruling:
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies.

Petitioners argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it is only the
Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over them. In this regard, the petitioners are not
correct.
The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense charged. Therefore,
with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an
investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies.
Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 147096, 15 January 2002
Fact:
Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a CPCN to install, operate and
maintain Cellular Mobile Telephone Service. But before Bayantel could complete
presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an order to archive the case without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency became available. In
later years, the NTC issued memorandum circulars reallocating additional frequencies
for CMTS, hence, Bayantel filed an ex-parte motion to revive its case citing availability
of new frequency bands. The NTC granted the motion. Extelcom filed its opposition and
prayed for the dismissal of the application. The NTC, however, favored Bayantel by
granting a provisional authority to operate CMTS. Extelcom filed with CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. CA rendered its decision annulling the orders of the NTC.
Bayantel filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision. The NTC
also filed its own motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied all the
motions, hence, the NTC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling:
The general rule is that purely administrative and discretionary functions may
not be interfered with by the courts. Thus, in Lacuesta v. Herrera, it was held: . . . (T)he
powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (natural resources) by law
regarding the disposition of public lands such as granting of licenses, permits, leases
and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or canceling applications, are all
executive and administrative in nature. It is a well recognized principle that purely
administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts.
(Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No. L-5750, April 20, 1953) In general, courts
have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact. (54 Am. Jur. 558-559) . . .. The
established exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. This Court has consistently
held that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. It has also been
held that the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that
can best be discharged by the government agency concerned, and not by the courts. In
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, it was held that findings of fact which are supported by
evidence and the conclusion of experts should not be disturbed. This was reiterated in
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission wherein it
was ruled that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality and are binding even upon the Supreme Court if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in
the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of its adjudicative functions. This latitude
includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within its special competence.
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN v. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL.
GR No. 150178 NOVEMBER 2004
Facts:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with CHED against Florian
Gaoiran. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal complaint filed by
Castillejo against petitioner and the sworn statements of his witnesses.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Atty.
Felina S. Dasig, then OIC of the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service,
conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling incident. After the fact-finding
investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case against the
petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension dated
July 27, 1998.
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the
charges against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain enforcement of the preventive
suspension order. Having served the suspension, the case was dismissed for being moot
and academic. Petitioner then sought reconsideration of the formal charge and
preventive suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath
and that he was not informed nor apprised of the complaint against him.
Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of CHED,
issued a Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint was not under oath.
However, Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of CHED, unaware of the existence of
Mayo’s resolution, issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Petitioner was dismissed form service.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Alcala in issuing the Resolution despite that a previous Resolution already dismissed the
administrative complaint against him. The RTC sided with the petitioner and declared
the Resolution of Alcala null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of RTC. It declared as valid Alcala’s Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the letter-complaint should be deemed inexistent as it was not
made under oath.
Ruling:
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of
administrative complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in
Book V of EO No. 292, Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A. It must
be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint was not verified, appended thereto were
the verified criminal complaint that Castillejo filed against the petitioner, as well as the
sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be considered as
constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court
Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even
anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations of the
Code of Ethical Conduct. It is not totally uncommon that a government is given wide
latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. Administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
CSC vs. Albao
472 SCRA 548 G.R. No. 155784 October 13, 2005
Facts:
The Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines issued an
original and permanent appointment for the position of Executive Assistant IV to
respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. In a letter addressed to the Director of the Civil Service
Commission Field Office, Manila, the Office of the Vice President requested the retrieval
of the said appointment paper. Instead of heeding the request, petitioner CSC-NCR
disapproved the appointment.
Thereafter, petitioner CSC issued an Order holding that it has found, after a fact-
finding investigation, that a prima facie case exists against respondent Albao for
Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents (He stated in his PDS that he took
and passed the Assistant Electrical Engineer Examination with a rating of 71.64%;
supported by report of rating purportedly issued by PRC. However, PRC informed CSC
that the name of respondent does not appear on the masterlist of examinees.)
Respondent questions the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative case.
Issue:
Whether or not CSC has original jurisdiction to institute the administrative case
against respondent.
Ruling:
It is true that Section 47 (2), Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads of
government offices original disciplinary jurisdiction over their own subordinates. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. It is only when the
penalty imposed exceeds the aforementioned penalties that an appeal may be brought
before the CSC which has appellate jurisdiction over the same in accordance with
Section 47 (1) Title 1(A), Book V of EO No. 292
The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity
of the civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions
under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases
instituted by it directly. Sec. 12, par. 11 thus states:
Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
. . . (11)Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it

directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. . . .
This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil
service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to
discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.
TEJANO V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005
Facts:
On 08 November 1994, Aniano Disierto, then Prosecutor, concurred in the

approval of his subordinates on the filing of the proper information for violation of Sec 3
of RA 3019 against Tejano. Afterwards, the case was filed with the Sandiganbayn,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Reinvestigation.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
conduct the reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation, convinced that no probable cause
existed to indict Tejano, Special Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal of the
case. On 10 December 1999, now Ombudsman Aniano Disierto, disproved the
recommendation for dismissal of the case with marginal note “assign the case to another
prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.
Issue:
Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Yes, - Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not
review his decision on appeal. Having participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the instant case having recommended the filing of appropriate
information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to refuse himself from participating in
the review o This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and

prosecutor powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of public service.”
Such discretionary power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court
to review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the latter. Grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of
his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial
tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner’s right to an impartial
review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. f the
same during the investigation.
OMB VS ESTANDARTE
Facts:
People’s Graftwatch, referred to the Office of the Ombudsman, for immediate

investigation, a complaint of the Faculty Club and Department Heads of the Ramon
Torres National High School against Heidi Estandarte, the school principal. The
complaint consisted of 33 allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of
school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. However,
the complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by the complainant, and not supported
by the sworn statements of witnesses. The complaint also lacked a statement of non-
forum shopping as required. The Ombudsman treated the matter as a request for
assistance, and docketed the complaint.
Ombudsman found Estandarte guilty of grave misconduct and is meted the

penalty of Dismissal from Service, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office
and forfeiture of all benefits and cancellation of Civil Service eligibilities.
Estandarte filed a petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction with the CA. She alleged that the
Ombudsman violated her right to due process when her request for a formal
investigation was denied and that the DECS-Region VI has jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
Whether or not DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
By virtue of RA 4670, original jurisdiction belongs to the school superintendent.

Jurisdiction is a matter of law. And a subsequent openness by the OMB to transfer the
case to its office, despite the acquiescence of the DECS RO6, will not divest the DECS of
jurisdiction already acquired. It is not lost upon instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated.
Ruivivar v OMB
565 SCRA 324 September 16, 2008
Facts:
Dr. Connie Bernardo is the President of the Association of Drug Testing Centers
that conducts drug testing and medical examination of applicants for driver’s license. In
this capacity, Bernardo went to the LTO to meet with representatives from DOTC and
some other errands. Before proceeding to the office of the LTO Commissioner, Bernardo
passed by the Office of Ruivivar to conduct a follow up on the status of her company’s
application for accreditation. While there, Ruivivar shouted at her in a very arrogant and
insulting manner, hurled invectives upon her person and prevented her from entering
the office of LTO Commissioner. This prompted Bernardo to file an Affidavit-Complaint
charging Ruivivar before the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct unbecoming
of a public official, abuse of authority and violations of the RPC and of the Corrupt
Practices Act. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding Ruivivar administratively
liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and imposed on her the
penalty of reprimand. Ruivivar filed an MR arguing that she was deprived of due process
because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of Bernardo’s witness. The
Ombudsman responded to the motion by ordering Bernardo to furnish Ruivivar with
copies and directed the latter to file, within 10 days from receipt of the order, such
pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances. On petition for Certiorari,
the petition was dismissed on the ground that Ruivivar used the wrong legal remedy and
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the Ombudsman. The CA posits that
the remedy should have been an appeal to the CA by way of petition for review, citing
the case of Fabian v. Desierto.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when she was deprived of her
right to confront the evidence submitted before the office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
"Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been furnished by this Office with
copies of the affidavits, which she claims she has not received. Furthermore, the
respondent has been given the opportunity to present her side relative thereto, however,
she chose not to submit countervailing evidence or argument. The respondent, therefore
(sic), cannot claim denial of due process for purposes of assailing the Decision issued in
the present case. A party cannot feign denial of due process where he had the
opportunity to present his side. This becomes all the more important since, as correctly
pointed out by the complainant, the decision issued in the present case is deemed final
and unappealable. Despite the clear provisions of the law and the rules, the respondent
herein was given the opportunity not normally accorded, to present her side, but she
opted not to do so which is evidently fatal to her cause."
Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioner’s
cause is a lost one, not only for her failure to exhaust her available administrative
remedy, but also on due process grounds. The law can no longer help one who had been
given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered
chance.
Hadji-Sirad v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 182267, [August 28, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner, who was an employee of COA in the ARMM, was charged with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service,
for the anomaly found in her examination files for the Career Service Personal
Examination held on Oct.1993, where she passed with a 88.31% score. The examination
files (1993) were compared with her personal data sheet (1994). I t was found (1) that
the image included in the personal data sheet of petitioner bears no resemblance with
the examinee petitioner. The signatures were also vastly different. (2) Based on these
facts, it was then alleged that petitioner allowed a different person to take the exam for
her.
A full investigation followed. The hearings were repeatedly postponed as per

Petitioner’s request, but eventually the hearing materialized and both sides (the
prosecutor and petitioner) were able to present their evidence. CSCRO found petitioner
guilty of the charges and was meted with dismissal from service. CSC affirmed the
findings and the resolution of CSCRO.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was afforded due process.
Ruling:
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the

opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to

include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings, which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee
of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties affected.
Alcala vs. School Principal Villar
Facts:
Perla Alcala et. al., filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative
complaint against Villar for dishonesty. Complainants alleged that on August 18-22,
1997, they attended a mass training/seminar at the Consolacion National High School,
Consolacion, Cebu. Respondent asked them to submit their respective Certificates of
Appearance for the preparation of the vouchers for the refund of their expenses during
the said training/seminar but all of them were not able to receive the right amount for
reimbursement which is P312.00. Furthermore, complainants alleged that sometime in
November 1997, Melecio Alcala, Diosdada Borinaga, Helen Lendio, and Rolando
Torceno received from respondent P1,500.00 each representing Loyalty Benefits. They
learned, however, from the DECS Division Office that they were entitled to receive
P2,000.00 each,
On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissing him from service.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without jurisdiction over
administrative complaints against public school teachers.
Issue:
Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman amply afforded Villar due process in
administrative proceedings which set aside the jurisdictional infirmities raised by Villar
before the CA.
Ruling:
Yes. Since respondent was amply afforded due process in an administrative

proceeding, the essence of which is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not only did
respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion for reconsideration, he also
participated in the hearings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and was given
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Verily, participation in the
administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of
jurisdictional infirmities.
In the same vein, respondent in this case should be barred under the principle of
estoppel by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals should have resolved the appeal on its merits, considering that
respondent’s right to procedural due process was properly observed.
DOH vs Camposano
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the DOH resident Ombudsman against the
respondents arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles
of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules.
The OMB recommended the filing of a formal administrative charge against the
respondents for dishonesty and gave misconduct.
The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their
co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019 as
recommended by the Ombudsman. An ad-hoc committee to investigate the case was
created through an Administrative Order issued by then Executive Secretary Torres. The
said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption.
After the investigation, the PCAGC it issued a resolution finding the respondents guilty
as charged. The resolution further recommended to the President that the penalty of
dismissal from the government service be imposed.
President Ramos also found the respondents guilty and recommended the case to
the DOH Secretary for appropriate action. The DOH Secretary subsequently ordered the
dismissal of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case.
Ruling:
The SC held that the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case.
Executive Order (EO) No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate
administrative complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft
and corruption. EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against
presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. The EO specifically tasked the PCAGC
investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption. Further, Section 3
of the same EO states that the “Commission shall have jurisdiction over all
administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner
against presidential appointees”.
Emin v. De Leon
G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Martin S. Emin was a Non-Formal Education (NFE) Supervisor of the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) of Kidapawan, Cotabato. He was
dismissed from the service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. His dismissal was
based on the testimonies of teachers who pointed to him as the person who gave them
the fake R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility that they attached to their appointment for
fee. Thus, Emin filed the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over the case against him as a
public school teacher, and whether or not he was accorded due process.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that as petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670 (Magna Carta of Public
School Teachers), it is the Investigating Committee that should have investigated his
case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by Section 2,
Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of
Procedure. However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public
respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle
of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC's jurisdiction
over his case.
Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that he was denied due process.

He averred that he was not allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in the
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. Nothing on record showed that he asked for cross-examination, as
most of the submissions were written. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that he had
been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place.
Fabella v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110379, November 28, 1997
Facts:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return to
work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walkouts and strikes.
Secretary Cariño filed administrative charges against the striking teachers. The
Secretary also placed the teachers under preventive suspension. The teachers filed an
injunctive suit with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City charging the committee
appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit. However, the trial court did not
issue a restraining order. The teachers amended their complaint and made it one for
certiorari and mandamus. The DECS Secretary through the Solicitor General, contended
that in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not
interfere in the administrative proceedings. Meanwhile, the DECS investigating
committee rendered a decision finding the striking teachers guilty as charged and
ordered their dismissal. The trial court also dismissed the petition for certiorari and
mandamus for lack of merit. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court which issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court's order of
dismissal and reinstating the action, even as it ordered the teachers' reinstatement
pending decision of their case. The trial court rendered its decision declaring the
dismissal of the teachers null and void. The trial court held that Republic Act No. 4670,
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers," is the primary law
that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public
school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. As a result, the
committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against the teachers was illegally
constituted and all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. From this
adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary Cariño filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision holding in
the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative
proceedings instituted against them.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the various committees formed by DECS to hear
the administrative charges did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher's organization as required by Section 9 of RA
4670. Accordingly, said committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction and
all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to
ensure an impartial tribunal and gives substance and meaning to the fundamental right
to be heard. Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no
amount of delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. The
Court ordered the DECS to reinstate the private respondents and award all monetary
benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension
or dismissal.
MANUEL LAXINA vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
Evangeline Ursal, a barangay Clerk of Batasan Hills, Quezon City filed with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for attempted rape against Laxina, a
Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Ursal filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman and DILG similar complaint-affidavits charging petitioner with grave
misconduct for the alleged attempted rape. The Office of the Ombudsman exonerated
petitioner from the charge, dismissing the complaint for lack of substantial evidence but
upon review, and with the approval of the Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of
grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of material
benefits. Petitioner is that he was deprived of his right to administrative due process
when he was dismissed from service without substantial evidence and without
consideration of the evidence he proffered.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.
2. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman.
Ruling:
Petitioner is stopped from questioning the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. He

participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit and he also did not inform
the Ombudsman that there was another existing administrative case at the time the
proceedings in the Ombudsman was on-going. Petitioner’s participation in the
administrative proceedings without raising any objection bars the parties from raising
any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.
Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer

the formal charge and given a chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not
denied due process. More importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well
supported by substantial evidence.
Malinao vs Reyes
Facts:
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz,

Marinduque. Respondent Mayor Wilfredo Red filed a case against her in the Office of
the Ombudsman for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence. While the case
was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner.
Petitioner Malinao filed an administrative case, against respondent Mayor in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and
denial of due process. Subsequently, the case was taken up in executive session of the
Sanggunian. The Sanggunian, by the vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found respondent
Mayor guilty of the charge. The result of the voting was embodied in a “Decision” signed
by only one member of the Sanggunian, who did so as “Presiding Chairman, Blue
Ribbon Committee.”
Respondent Mayor filed a manifestation before the Sanggunian, questioning the
“Decision” on the ground that it was signed by only one member. He contended that the
decision could only be considered as a recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee
and he was not bound thereby.
The Sanggunian on October 21, 1994, voting 7 to 2, acquitted respondent Mayor
of the charges against him. The vote was embodied in a Decision and signed by all
members who had thus voted.
Malinao argued that the first Sanggunian decision had already become final and
executory for failure of Mayor Red to appeal. Petitioner further complains that no notice
of the session by the Sanggunian on October 21, 1994 was given to her.
Issue:
Whether or not the first “Decision” has become final and executory for failure of
respondent Mayor to appeal. Whether or not the second Sanggunian “Decision” which
in effect reversed the first decision is valid.
Ruling:
The SC found the petitioner’s contention to be without merit.
In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local
officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be “in writing stating clearly and distinctly
the facts and the reasons for such decision.” The SC ruled that what the Sanggunian, did
during the executive session was not to render a decision.
Neither may the so-called “Decision” prepared by Sanggunian Member and
Presiding Chairman of the blue ribbon Committee be regarded as the decision of the
Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. The voting following the
deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their
decision unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by one of them and concurred
in by the others.
The Sanggunian, at its session on October 21, 1994, took another vote and, 7 to 2,
decided to dismiss the case against respondent Mayor. This time its decision was made
in writing, stating the facts and the law on which it was based, and it was signed by the
members taking part in the decision. This, according to the SC, is the decision of the
Sanggunian.
The SC ruled that no notice of the session by the Sanggunian is required to be
given to the petitioner since the deliberation of the Sanggunian is an internal matter.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr.
G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010
Facts:
Delijero was a public school teacher at Burauen Comprehensive National High

School and was administratively charged for grave misconduct for courting his student
Myra Dela Cruz who was 12 years old at the time.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered decision finding respondent guilty of

grave abuse of misconduct and meted him the penalty of dismissal. Respondent
appealed to the CA which ruled in favor of him.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was afforded due process.
Ruling:
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to

explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and
attached annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for
affirmative relief from the Ombudsman. Verily, these suffice to satisfy the requirements
of due process because the opportunity to be heard especially in administrative
proceedings (where technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied) is
not limited to oral arguments. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written
pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS MASING
Facts:
Masing and Tayactac, the principal and office clerk respectively, of Davao City
Integrated Special School were administratively charged before the OMB for Mindanao
for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees and to account
for public funds.
Respondent cited the ruling in Fabella v. Court of Appeals to be applicable in
their case.
In Fabella, the SC ruled that Section 9 of RA 4670 reflects the legislative intent to
impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with
administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Right to due process of law
requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670.
Issue:
Whether or not public school teachers pursuant to the ruling in Fabella v. Court
of Appeals can only be proceeded against administratively through the “committee”
under section 9 of RA No. 4670.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public
schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and
regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In the case at
bar, respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively charged in letter-
complaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges
were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting unauthorized fees,
failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious
misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental
incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and
omissions complained of relate to respondents’ conduct as public official and employee,
if not to outright graft and corruption.
Further, the SC ruled that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to
conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. As the principal and primary
complaints and action center against erring public officers and employees, it is
mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction
therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on
all administrative complaints, viz:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints.— The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with due process.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO
Facts:
Dumalaog (Ma. Ruby), a teacher at Jacobo Z. Gonzales Memorial National High
School in Biñan, Laguna filed a sworn letter-complaint before the OMB for Luzon
charging her superior–herein respondent, Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the school and
concurrently the principal of San Pedro Relocation Center National High School in San
Pedro, Laguna, with (1) violation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 and (2)
grave misconduct. Medrano allegedly made sexual advances on Ma. Ruby and abused
her sexually. The OMB found petitioner guilty and imposed the penalty of dismissal.
Medrano contends that under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, his case
should be heard by an investigating committee of the DepEd.
Issue:
Whether or not OMB has jurisdiction over Medrano’s case.
Ruling:
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some "proper

disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as the investigating committee of the DepEd mentioned
in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner "may refer certain complaints to the
proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees."
The administrative authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is

not exclusive but concurrent with the proper committee of DepEd. The administrative
complaint against Medrano should have been referred to the proper committee of
DepEd for the institution of administrative proceedings. However, Medrano is now
barred from assailing the act of the OMB because the OMB had already concluded the
proceedings and rendered a decision. He had actively participated in the administrative
proceedings before petitioner. Medrano only questioned the jurisdiction of OMB after
the latter rendered an adverse decision.
Padua v. Ranada
G.R. Nos. 141949 & 151108, October 14, 2002
Facts:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway, effective January 1, 2002.
Petitioners assailed before this Court the validity and legality of the TRB Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without the required
publication and in violation of due process.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A expressly
allowed the TRB to grant ex-parte provisional or temporary increase in toll rates. It
directs, orders and instructs the TRB to issue provisional toll rates adjustment ex-parte
without the need of notice, hearing and publication. All that is necessary is that it be
issued upon (1) a finding that the main petition is sufficient in form and substance; (2)
the submission of an affidavit showing that the increase in rates substantially conforms
to the formula, if any is stipulated in the franchise or toll operation agreement, and that
failure to immediately impose and collect the increase in rates would result in great
irreparable injury to the petitioner; and (3) the submission of a bond. The Court has
ruled in a number of cases that an administrative agency may be empowered to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities without a
hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their
nature temporary, and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates
approved after final hearing. The Court likewise ruled that in the case at bar the initial
proper recourse is to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The
TRB, as the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of
toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously decide
matters of this kind.
Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.
G.R. No. 92008, [July 30, 1990], 266 PHIL 166-173
Facts:
Herein petitioner Binamira was designated as General Manager of the Phil.

Tourism Authority (PTA) by the minister of tourism, Gonzales. The minister
subsequently sought approval from Pres. Aquino of the composition of the Board of
Directors of the PTA which included Binamira as Vice-chairman in his capacity as
General Manager. The approval was given.
Petitioner claims that his resignation was demanded by Garrucho as the new
Secretary of Tourism. On Jan. 4, 1990 Pres. Aquino sent a letter to Garrucho which was
copy furnished to Binamira that the latter was designated as Gen. Manager by the pta
and not by the president as required by P.D 564. Such designation was invalid.
Garrucho was taken over as Gen. Manager of the pta.
Issue:
Whether or not Binamira was removed from office without just cause/ Whether
or not his designation was temporary or permanent in character.
Ruling:
No. He was removed from office with just cause. PD. 564 provides that the Gen.
Manager of the PTA shall be appointed by the President. It appears that the petitioner
was not appointed by the Pres. but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is
a clear distinction between appointment and designation.
Appointment is defined as the selection, by the authority vested with power, of an

individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually
with its confirmation. It results in the security of tenure. Designation connotes merely
the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. Appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
The implication that a person holds an office in a temporary capacity is that the
person may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
The doctrine that presumes the acts of the Dept. Head to be acts of thr president
when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business shall be considered
valid only if not disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive which what happened
in this case. The approval of the president on the composition of the board of directors
of the pta was merely provisional.
Perez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 166062, [September 26, 2006], 534 PHIL 357-381
Facts:
Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel, Pangasinan
respectively. They “willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1
computer costing P120,000.00 acquisition by personal canvass”, violating Sec 362 and
367 of the LGC. No bidding occurred and no Committee of Awards constituted to
approve the procurement. Salvador and Juanita gave Mobil Link Enterprises and
Starlet Sales Center undue advantage through manifest partiality, showing evident bad
faith, and gross, inexcusable negligence, but this was not included in the original
information, so it was recommended by the Special Prosecutor that the information be
amended to show the manner of the commission of the offense based on the
Ombudsman’ s margin notes in the original information. The amended information was
admitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of qualified political agency applies.
Ruling:
Springing from the power of control is the doctrine of qualified political agency,
wherein the acts of a subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless
actually disapproved by the latter. 42 Thus, taken with the powers of control and
supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in the performance of their duties are
presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until the President alters, modifies,
or nullifies the same. By arguing that "[w]hat is important is that the amended
Information has not been withdrawn, and or recalled by the Honorable Ombudsman,
[a] clear showing that the latter acknowledged/upheld the act of the Special Prosecutor
in signing the Amended Information," 43 respondent People claims that the doctrine of
qualified political agency should be applied as well to the relationship between the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.
Petitioners counter that the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply
to the Office of the Ombudsman, since the latter is an apolitical agency, and is far
different from the bureaucracy to which said doctrine applies.
Joson v. Torres
G.R. No. 131255, [May 20, 1998], 352 PHIL 888-927
Facts:
Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint

charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents
prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner.
The letter-complaint was sent to Secretary Robert Z. Barbers, who directed

petitioner to submit his answer, not a motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed several motions
for extension of time. Petitioner failed to file his answer within the period given him, so
that three months later, petitioner was declared in default. On recommendation of
Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the
President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty days pending
investigation of the charges against him. STcEIC
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default.
In the DILG proceedings, meanwhile, Undersecretary Sanchez denied petitioner's

"Motion to Dismiss." He likewise required the parties to submit their position papers
within the inextendible period of ten days from receipt of the order after which the case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Petitioner filed his Answer Ad Cautelam claiming that there was nothing in his
conduct that threatened the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm
to the employees. His Answer Ad Cautelam having been admitted by Undersecretary
Sanchez, petitioner claimed his right to a formal investigation.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition.
Issue:
Whether or not DILG may investigate administrative complaints.
Ruling:
The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the

alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus: "Under this
doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive."
Province of Camarines Norte v. Province of Quezon
G.R. Nos. 80796 & 132885, [October 11, 2001], 419 PHIL 372-391
Facts:
On June 16, 1922, the then Chief of the Executive Bureau rendered a decision
(1922 EB decision) delineating and describing that portion of the boundary comprising a
land area of approximately 8,762 hectares as belonging to Camarines Norte, not to
Quezon Province. On November 8, 1989, this Court, in G.R. No. 80796, upheld the 1922
EB Decision. In its decision, the Court furnished a copy to the Secretary of the Local
Governments and the Office of the President with a request that surveyors of the
appropriate government agency be forthwith designated to survey . . . and to
monuments the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig line described in the 16 June 1922 decision of the
Chief of the Executive Bureau. The decision became final and executory on March 19,
1990. Thereafter, the then DENR Secretary issued Special Order No. 1179 to conduct the
survey and delineation of the boundary separating the two provinces. A monument
marker was installed along the boundary line determined in the survey. The marker
indicated that the barangays of Kagtalaba, Plaridel, Kabuluan, Don Tomas, Guitol,
Tabugon, Maualawin, Patag Ibaba and Patag Iraya fell within the territorial jurisdiction
of Camarines Norte. However, Quezon Governor Eduardo T. Rodriguez and Mayor Julio
U. Lim of Calauag, Quezon caused the removal of the boundary marker. This became the
basis of the contempt charge filed by Camarines Norte Gov. Roy Padilla, Jr. against
them. Meanwhile, several government agencies, including the COMELEC, recognized
the jurisdiction of Camarines Norte over the nine (9) barangays. The COMELEC issued
two (2) resolutions directing inter alia the Office of the Election Officer of Calauag,
Quezon from exercising supervision relative to the nine (9) barangays and authorizing
the Election Officer of the newly created Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte to change the
address in the Voter Registration Records of the subject 9 barangays. These resolutions
were also assailed in this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of the Secretary is valid.
Ruling:
The destruction of the monument marker openly disobeyed this Court's final and
executory decision resolving the boundary dispute between Camarines Norte and
Quezon Province. The same constitutes indirect contempt.
The power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle. However, where, as here, there was a clear and
contumacious defiance of, or refusal to obey this Court's decision, it will not hesitate to
exercise its inherent power if only to maintain respect to this Court, for without which
the administration of justice may falter or fail.
The acts of the Secretary of the DENR in issuing the Special Order directing the
technical team to conduct the survey and the placing of monument were presumed to be
the acts of the President and unless repudiated by him, the same were valid and legal.
The technical team was precisely created in compliance with the 1989 SC Decision to
conduct the survey. Thus, the DENR technical team's authority was beyond question.
NPC Driver v NAPOCOR
GR. No. 156208 Nov. 21, 2017
Facts:
On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001. Under Section 48 of
the EPIRA Law, a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy
restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the
privatization and the restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Corporation (PSALC). On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the
EPIRA Law and Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation
Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under this
Resolution, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31,
2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the
NPB approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage
and implement the NPC’s Separation Program Contending that the assailed NPB
Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their individual and representative
capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from
implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002- 125.
Issue:
Whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were properly
enacted.
Ruling:
The Resolutions were invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes
for their adoption. Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in
running the affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing
the National Power Board of Directors. When applied to public functionaries, discretion
refers to a power or right conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially in
certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Presumably, in naming the
respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose
these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal
qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their present positions
as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as
members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions.
Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the fulfillment of their
responsibilities. There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions
involved the exercise of discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a delegate.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. DENR Region 12
Employees
G.R. No. 149724, [August 19, 2003], 456 PHIL 635-648
Facts:
Pursuant to DENR Adm. Order No. 99-14, a Memorandum was issued directing
the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato.
Issue:
Whether DAO No. 99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were
valid and, whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the positive on both issues. Applying the doctrine of qualified
political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may
validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular
executive department. Hence, the exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as
an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly
repudiated the same.
Demaisip v CA
GR No. 89393, 25 Jan 1991
Facts:
Johnny Demaisip’s residence was searched by authorities where the former

readily admitted to the possession of the alleged Marijuana. Petitioner waived the
assistance of a counsel (his father, Atty. Peter Demaisip) during his extra-judicial
confession. Petitioner was eventually tried for and convicted of illegal possession of
marijuana. The Court of Appeals admitted in evidence the marijuana seized from him
and affirmed his conviction. Petitioner now stresses the fact that the alleged search
warrant was never produced in court, and that in the absence thereof, it was as if the
authorities were armed with none at the time of the search.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may object to the admissibility of the evidence against
him during this appeal.
Held:
NO. It is a fact that no warrant was shown in court, although there were supposed
testimonies of its existence. The Court is of the opinion nonetheless that this is not
necessarily fatal. As found by the Court of Appeals.
At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby were deemed waived when no objection
to the legality of the search warrant was raised during the trial of the case nor to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained through said warrant.
CALO VS FUERTES
GR no. 28266, 29 June 1962
Facts:
In a Cadastral Case, Calo was ordered by the Director of Lands to vacate the
premises in favor of Fuertes.
Calo filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Director of Lands.
He filed an appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who

modified the opinion of Director of Lands and ordered Fuertes reimbursement to Calo
the difference between the values of the improvements that the latter introduced on the
land.
Calo being dissatisfied appealed to the office of the President but withdrew it
before it was acted upon.
He later filed a case in the RTC, a petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction enjoining the order of the Director of Land and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action, jurisdiction, and failure
to exhaust all administrative remedy.
Issue:
Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeals of

Courts of Justice.
Ruling:
Yes. The contention of the appellant that the Secretary being the alter ego of the
President has the same acts and decisions, thus, he has exhausted all administrative
remedies is untenable. The withdrawal of the appeal tantamount to not appealing at all
thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to the President is the last step he
should take in an administrative case.
HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING vs. HON. MANUEL LUIS GUMBAN,
G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991
Facts:
On or before 1979, private respondent Esther B. Yap was appointed District
Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools and assigned to the District of Glan, South
Cotabato. On 1987, then Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing issued a Memorandum Order,
directing Regional Director Teofilo E. Gomez to reassign or transfer Esther B. Yap to
another district. The latter in turn issued a Memorandum Order to the principals and
head teachers of different public schools at Glan informing them of his assumption of
office. However, private respondent Esther B. Yap defied the orders of her superiors and
she continued to perform the functions of public school district supervisor of Glan.
On February 20, 1987, Yap filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction/restraining order with the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City against the Hon. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, et al. who filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss, which was denied by respondent Judge Manuel Luis Gumban in his order. On
August 25, 1987, said Judge issued another order granting the Writ of Preliminary
injunction and denied Quisumbing et al.'s motion for reconsideration. Quisumbing, et
al. assailed the aforesaid orders on the ground that Esther B. Yap failed to exhaust all
available administrative remedies. On the other hand, Yap argued that the doctrine of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to the case at bar as the
Memorandum Order issued by the petitioners, Lourdes Quisumbing and Teofilo Gomez
dated February 11, 1987 and February 12, 1987, respectively, would readily show that the
basis for the issuance of the orders are the unverified demands of alleged concerned
citizens without the benefit of investigation.
Issue:
W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in the
case at bar.
Ruling:
Negative. After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the
appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the
Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a specific station. As such, she could
be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific
station. Finally, the lower court did not err in taking cognizance of the case. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fact rule. It has been
repeatedly held that the requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one: where the controverted
act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent
has acted in utter disregard of due process. The rule does not apply where insistence on
its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
In the instant case, We deem it more felicitous and expedient to resolve the same
on the merits to avoid multiplicity of suits since after all the circumstances warrant a
final disposition of this petition, namely the granting thereof because private respondent
had previously been appointed as district supervisor, without indicating any specific
place as her permanent station. Her status was therefore akin to that of a district
supervisor at large. Her transfer was neither whimsical, arbitrary, nor capricious.
Almine v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80719, [September 26, 1989], 258 PHIL 595-599
Facts:
On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her
riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tabaco, Albay. After due
hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report dated
June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private
respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the
Ministry to take the necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application sometime in
1979-1985 alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her
landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the filing of the said application and that
the latter had distributed his landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was
conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31, 1985 filed his report
recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT. Said report was elevated to
the MAR. In an endorsement dated November 25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo
manifested his concurrence with the report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of
the petitioner consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 27167, 27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation Land Transfer
Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred
therewith. However, in the order dated February 13, 1986, then Minister Conrado
Estrella denied petitioner's application for retention.
On April 17, 1986, petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC). The case was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as AC-G.R. SP
No. 08550. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. However, it was
denied in an order dated May 28, 1986. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
likewise denied. After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision dated June 29, 1987 dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be
allowed to retain his landholdings, if administratively decided by the Minister of
Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated October 22, 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not failure to appeal to the president is a violation of exhaustion of

administrative remedies.
Ruling:
Minister is an alter ego of the president. — the failure to appeal to the office of the
president from the decision of the minister of agrarian reform in this case is not a
violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter
ego of the president.
Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs Court of Appeals
GR number 167324, July 17, 2007
Facts:
DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda. It provided for five general
areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure
funding for priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health
regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP). President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the
DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being
the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and
technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government
units. Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local
Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the
local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related
functions and responsibilities.
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects
the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been
issued in excess of the President’s authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the President was empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102.
Ruling:
The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the

reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. This is also
sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, clearly states: "The president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices."
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated

under Book IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional
distribution of the work of the President. Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is
under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the
President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code,
granting the President the continued authority to reorganize the Office of the President,
extends to the DOH.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing
Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.
Francisco I. Chavez vs National Housing Authority
GR number 164527, August 15, 2007
Facts:
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No.

(MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a
wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a
subhuman state.
The SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the
current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a
fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA
was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and
additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500
units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling
component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the
issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for
the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During
this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent
housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in
PEA as claimed by the petitioner.
Ruling:
Executive order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the
National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The
requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President,
favourable recommendation of PEA and undertaken either by PEA or entity under
contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no
longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be
“disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under BOT law.
BIRAOGO VS PH TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R. No. 193036 December 7, 2010
Facts:
Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC).
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President, which is
tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable

cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it violates
the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable. It does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that
the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object makes the PTC
an “adventure in partisan hostility.
They argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and
corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of
former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the “same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have been committed
against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall
under the recognised exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction
between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and
other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second,
the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption.”
Issue:
WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause.
Held:
Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration” The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
Buklod ng Kawaning vs Zamora
G.R. Nos. 142801-802 July 10, 2001
Facts:
On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued EO No. 127
establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the
structural organization of the Ministry of Finance. The EIIB was designated to perform
particular functions on intelligence and investigation of matters affecting the national
economy.
Eleven years after, President Joseph Estrada issued EO No. 191 entitled
"Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau." He ordered the
deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued EO No. 1968 creating the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force "Aduana."
Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. President Estrada issued EO
No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be
deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of
positions.
Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before this
Court invoking our power of judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223.
Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is:
(a) a violation of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were
not actually intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task
Force "Aduana," the functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that
of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to
abolish the EIIB.
Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the
President enjoys the totality of the executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7,
Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos.
191 and 223; (b) the said executive orders were issued in the interest of national
economy, to avoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy;
and (c) the EIIB was not "abolished," it was only "deactivated."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may directly seek redress from the Court
Ruling:
Yes.Despite the presence of some procedural flaws in the instant petition, such
as, petitioners' disregard of the hierarchy of courts and the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, we deem it necessary to address the issues. It is in the interest
of the State that questions relating to the status and existence of a public office be
settled without delay.
DOMINGO v. ZAMORA
GR No. 142283. February 6, 2003
Facts:
President Estrada issued EO entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and

Activities of the DECS to the Philippine Sports Commission in School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued a Memorandum which
temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other
divisions or bureaus of the DECS.
Issue:
Is the reassignment valid?
Ruling:
Yes. Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31

(2) and (3) of EO 292, it is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to
reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command
post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS vs. DANES B. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010
Facts:
This case began with a Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Sanchez
against the UST and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST
College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to
release the respondent's ToR.
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST in 2002 with a
Bachelor's Degree of Science in Nursing. When respondent sought to secure a copy of
his ToR with the UST Registrar's Office, UST refused to release his records despite
repeated attempts secure the same making it impossible for him to take the nursing
board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The
respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they

claimed that they refused to release respondent's ToR because he was not a registered
student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters.
Petitioners also filed a Supplement to their Motion Dismiss, alleging that respondent
sought administrative recourse before the CHED through a letter-complaint. Thus,
petitioners claimed that CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to
school controversies, and the filing of the instant case in the RTC was premature.
Issue:
Whether or not the CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies

involving school matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondent's demand for the
release of his ToR.
Ruling:
No. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for
this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power.
However, petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to
"investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions." Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher
Education Act of 1994 certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of
judicial or quasi-judicial power.
Sagip Kalikasan vs. Paderanga
Facts:
On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII PNPRMG received information

that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans
containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were
falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the DENR. On 30
and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR,
and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City,
Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the
shippers and consignees. The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the
certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest
products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged
that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the
DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the PENRO OIC,
Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc. On 1 February
2005, CENRO OIC Loreto A. Rivac sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for
explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products. In an
affidavit dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.'s Branch Manager Alex
Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should not
confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had no knowledge of
the actual content of the container vans On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest
Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO
bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown
owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the
Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication. In a resolution dated 10
March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional
Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor
of the government.
In a complaint dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain
Roger C. Edma prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR,
CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses.
Ruling:
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a
serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits,
and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six
months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of
Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1)
a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or
(4) admonition with warning.
The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga's third offense. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Paderanga, the Court held him liable for grave abuse of
authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while
declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut
up." In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga, the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering
an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits.
In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of
another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases
decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga's arrogance, incorrigibility, and
unfitness to become a judge.
Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 50141, [January 29, 1988], 241 PHIL 515-528
Facts:
Petitioner Aura Laboratories Inc and Beautifont Inc. are domestic corporations
engaged in manufacturing cosmetics and marketing their products. Both applied with
the Board of Investments for authority to accept permissible investments of 2 American
– owned firms, Avon Products and Manila Manufacturing Co., filed in accordance with
RA 5455, Permissive Investments Law, requires approval by BOI of a foreign national in
a local corporation which would exceed 30 % outstanding capital. BOI prepared the
notice of application which was published in Official Gazette and newspapers of general
circulation. Rustan Marketing Corporation and Holiday Cosmetics opposed it: 1) would
conflict with the Retail Trade Nationalisation Act, 2)would pose a clear and present
danger of a monopoly in the cosmetics industry, 3) would be made in an enterprise
already adequately exploited by Philippine national (4) were inconsistent with the
Government’s Investment Priorities Plans as well as declared national policies, and (5)
would not contribute to a sound and balanced development of the national economy.
Notice of hearing published, inviting all interested parties. At the hearing, Rustan and
Holiday (R) alleged fatal jurisdictional defect in proceedings, violation by the BOI of
Section 7 of RA 5455 in that instead of requiring and causing publication of the
applications themselves, which is what in their view the cited provision directs- only
notice thereof had actually been published and posted. Officer of the Philippine
Chamber of Commerce and Industry also appeared to oppose the applications.
Applications were eventually approved, Certificate-of Authority was issued. Petitioner
accepted the foreign equity investment and transfer of stock made.
Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Investments has committed jurisdictional defect in

proceedings.
Ruling:
The consequent policy and practice underlying our administrative law is that of
justice courts should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless
there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof of such evidence is clearly, manifestly
and patently insubstantial.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79684, [February 19, 1991], 272 PHIL 50-61
Facts:
The petitioners Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources entered into contracts on June 30,1973 with the private respondent B.A.
Gonzalez Surveying Company for public land subdivision mapping (Plsm) of the
alienable and disposable lands in the Municipality of Valderama, Antique, and to do the
photo-cadastral mapping (Pcadm) of Project (January 28, 1974) in Numancia, Aklan.
However, B.A Gonzalez failed to commence the Aklan project despite written
demands from the Bureau of Lands; consequently, the later cancelled the contract with
regard to the said project and forfeited the performance bond. B.A Gonzalez failed filed
a motion and the Director of Lands reinstated the said contract on June 20, 1977
without however granting the company's request for a price adjustment, which denial
the private respondent seasonably appealed to the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources. This appeal is pending
On April 14, 1983, the Director of Lands likewise scrapped the ValderamaPlsm
contract because of the non-completion of the project despite the grant of repeated
extensions totaling 1,200 days. Private respondent also appealed and both appeals were
pending.
Meanwhile, without both appeals being resolved, the Director of Lands
conducted a public bidding for the cadastral survey of several municipalities including
the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the Municipality of Valderama, Antique. In
the said bidding, Armando Villamayor and Cristina Matuod were declared as the
successful bidders for the Numancia and Valderama projects, respectively.
Thereupon, Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
with a prayer for TRO, alleging that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in awarding the said cadastral survey projects to other persons while the
appeals of the private respondent remain pending. And the respondent Court of Appeals
granted the said petition, petitioners file motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
WON the CA violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation
of the results of the bidding for the cadastral survey projects conducted by the Director
of Lands. The said injunction issued by the respondent court constitutes a violation of
the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and defeats the very purpose thereof,
which is, "not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the
controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
the courts."
The question on the necessity of either or both projects must be better addressed
to the sound discretion of the proper administrative officials who admittedly have the
competence and technical expertise on the matters. In the case at bar, the petitioner
Director of Lands is "the official vested with direct and executive control of the
disposition of the lands of the public domain." Specifically, Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 provides that . . . [T]he Director of Lands shall have direct executive control
of the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any form of concession or disposition and
management of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources).
Republic v. Migrino
G.R. No. 89483, [August 30, 1990], 267 PHIL 337-352
Facts:
The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt.
Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss.
The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to
petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private
respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent
alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14
and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing
wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are
acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or
subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate him.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and
related executive orders.
Ruling:
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is –

[w]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned. The term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1
and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in E.O. No. 2.
GUILLES VS CA
Facts:
On September 2, 1980, the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a
decision declaring and recognising the preferential rights of therein petitioner June Prill
Brett to explore, develop and exploit and lease the area covered by her “MAMAKAR”
mining claims situated at Sitio Palasaan, Benguet. This decision was appealed by
respondent to the Ministry of Natural Resources. On October 6, 1982, respondent
Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the appeal. From this dismissal, heirs of John
and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal on November 4, 1982 to the Office of the
President, docketed therein as MNR Case No. 5096, but failed to prosecute the same.
Private respondents later filed their respective motions for reconsideration which
however, proved to be belated as the decision of respondent Minister had already
become final and executory. The finality of decision of respondent
Minister of Natural Resources rendered another decision in the same MNR case
number 5096 on June 25, 1984 reversing and setting aside the decision of October 6,
1982 and declaring petitioner’s “MAMAKAR” claims as null and void ab initio.
On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and
prayed for a statuesque order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of
the Minister of Natural Resources issued the status quo order on August 20,1984 and
directed the respondents to answer the motion within five days from the receipt of the
order. However, none of the respondents complied therewith.
On February 19, 1985, with the motion for reconsideration still unresolved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, before this Court, docketed as G.R. no. 69937, for the nullification of the
decision of respondent Minister of Natural Resources dated June 25, 1984 and to
restrain public respondent from further proceeding in the said case. Petitioner
contended that respondent Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction .
Issue:
WON the respondent Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s original action for
certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:
Yes. It is true that in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or
required by public interest, before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of
justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the
controversy at the level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party. It is likewise
true, however, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and
fast rule. Foremost among the exceptions is when the assailed act, order or decision is
patently illegal or was performed or issued without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision in question, datedJune 25, 1984, is of
such a defective nature. The decision it superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was already
final and executory, the belated motions for reconsideration by all the private
respondents in G.R. no. 74223 being patently time-barred. The heirs of Guilles did file a
timely appeal but they likewise failed to prosecute the same. It is obvious and
indisputable, therefore, that respondent Minister Pena gravely abuse his discretion in
reversing his original decision which precisely prompted June Prill Brett to forthwith
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.
Brett v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74223, 77098, [November 27, 1990], 269 PHIL 722-736
Facts:
The director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring and
recognising the preferential right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore,
develop, exploit and lease an area covered by “MAMAKAR” mining claims. The said
decision was appealed by respondents to the thenMinistry of Natural Resources where
the appeal was dismissed. Still the respondents filed an appeal to-the office of the
president but failed to prosecute the same. And yet again they filed motions for
reconsideration which were already late as the decision of the Minister had become final
and executory.But despite the finality of the decision, the minister reversed the previous
decision and rendered the “MAMAKAR” claims as null and void ab initio which lead the
petitioner to seek reconsideration. A change in the minister of the Natural Resources
lead to an appeal by the petitioner to reinstate decision of the former minister which
then leads to a series of motions and petitions until it ultimately leads to this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON Respondent court erred in dismissing petitioner’s original action for
certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:
Even conceding that the pleading filed by the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. with this
Court was only a manifestation and not a petition to annul the order of Minister
Maceda, it is of record that said heirs have a perfected and pending appeal with the
Office of the President. Whether the appeal was perfected by filing a formal notice of
appeal or a mere unsworn and unsubscribed personal letter is of no moment. The fact is
that the Office of the President has taken cognizance of the case as one for its appellate
review and has in fact ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda therein.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact and where a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered. (Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. vs. Royal Class Limousine Service, et
al., G.R. Nos. 79886-87, November 22, 1989). Applying the principle in the case at bar,
respondent court correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari of the heirs of John
Guilles, Sr. on the ground that there is a pending appeal filed by said heirs in the Office
of the President. Indeed, the award of mining claims is more of an executive, and less of
a judicial, function. Also, the issue as to the validity of the authority under which then
respondent Minister Ernesto Maceda issued the order of June 10, 1986, which reversed
the void decision of June 25, 1984, can be competently determined by the executive
department at the initial stage of the quasi-judicial proceeding therein.
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88550, [April 18, 1990], 263 PHIL 352-360
Facts:
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern
Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three
coal blocks.
IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on
which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC. IEI filed for rescission of the
memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo
Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal
blocks prior to finalisation of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the
operation be granted back. Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant
because they have mortgages in favour of MMIC. It was dismissed. Oddly enough, Mr.
Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.
Ruling:
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts
even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, emphasis supplied).
Moomba Mining Exploration Co. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108846, October 26, 1999
Facts:
Moomba Mining Exploration Company (Moomba) filed an availment application

of the rights and privileges over "Rocky 1-100" mining claims. The availment was
rejected by the Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) for failure to
comply with the call-up letters of the BMGS requiring Moomba to submit affidavit of
annual work obligations and official receipts evidencing payment of occupation fees.
Meanwhile, the "Baby Jackie" and "Golden Bay" mining claims were registered. Later,
when the Director reconsidered approving the "Rocky" claims, owners of "Baby Jackie"
and "Golden Bay" claims protested for being in conflict with their claims. The Director
recognized the latter's claims. Minimax, representing itself as the operator of Moomba,
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Director. Moomba filed a
manifestation with the BMGS that their royalty agreement with Minimax had been
cancelled. However, Moomba appealed their case with the Secretary of DENR thru
Minimax and thereafter with the Office of the President both of which denied the
appeal. Moomba, represented by Minimax, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65. The Court referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals for proper determination and disposition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and ruled that in attacking the decision of the Office of the President, the court
would have to review and re-evaluate the evidence on record, which is beyond the
province of the special civil action of certiorari and that the findings of administrative
officers should not be disturbed by the courts. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45
seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in dismissing the petition for certiorari, which is limited to reviewing errors of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is definitely not the proper venue to consider a factual
issue as it is not a trier of facts. The courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special knowledge and training of such agencies. The
petition was denied.
Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service
G.R. No. 79886, 79887, [November 22, 1989], 259 PHIL 175-190
Facts:
The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products found concealed in the truck. Jovito Layugan, the CENRO in Aritao,
Cagayan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof 15 days
within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. The
Spouses De Guzman, however, failed to submit the required explanation. Thus, Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O.277.
Spouses De Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration, which was, however, denied.
Subsequently, the case was brought by Layugan, et al to the Secretary of DENR pursuant
to Sps. De Guzman’s statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their
letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the Secretary."
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, was filed by the Sps.
De Guzman against Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan4 with the RTC, Branch 2
of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to the private
respondents.
Layugan and Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending,
inter alia, that the Sps. De Guzman had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed with the
respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the
question involved is purely a legal question.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Layuganet. al
avers that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the
truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
705, as amended by E.O. 277. The Spouses De Guzman, on the other hand, seeks to
avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because
they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was
unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no
authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest
products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or Not DENR has the primary jurisdiction.
Ruling:
It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations
and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary
and special responsibilities of the DENR. By the very nature of its function, the DENR
should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,
therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
PAAT vs CA
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
Facts:
May 19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because
the driver of the truck was not able to produce the required documents for the forest
products. Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to
submit an explanation. Owner was not able to submit an explanation and the order of
the CENRO was enforced. The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While
pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Trial
court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can
be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
action.
TEOTICO VS. AGDA
197 SCRA 675
Facts:
Democrito Agda Sr. was appointed as Chief, FIDA by Cesar C. Lanuza, former
Administrator of FIDA and was designated Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA
Regions I and II. On November 13, 1987, three months before the local elections, which
were held on January 18, 1987, Agda was reassigned by former FIDA Administrator
Lanuza to the FIDA main office and designated Epitacio E. Lanuza, Jr. as OIC of FIDA
Region 1. On December 15, 1987, Agda requested the CSC to stay the implementation of
Special Order No. 219. On January 7, 1988, Teotico implemented said Special Order
219, despite the fact that Agda requested the CSC to stop the implementation of the said
Special Order 219. On January 12, 1988, Agda requested Teotico to defer the
implementation of said Special Order No. 219. Teotico again implemented Special Order
219, requiring petitioner to submit his accomplishment report. Agda requested Teotico
to defer the implementation of said special order, considering that the same has not yet
been resolved by the Secretary of Agriculture. On December 11, 1987, former FIDA
Administrator designated Wilfredo G. Siguritan as officer-in-charge of FIDA Region 1
Onn March 9, 1988, FIDA Region1 administrator Siguritan requested the Agda through
Teotico to require Agda to turn over to him the keys of the vault in FIDA Region 1 and
on March 14, 1988, Teotico implemented Special Order No. 219, requiring Agda to turn
over said keys to OIC Seguritan. On March 16, 1988, Agda requested the Secretary of
Agriculture to defer the implementation of said special order pending resolution of said
office. On March 23, 1988, Teotico implemented Special Order 219 by instituting
administrative charges against Agda for insubordination prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. On April 4, 1988, Teotico placed Agda under preventive suspension,
effective April 6, 1988. Agda requested respondent Teotico to give him 20 days from
April 11, 1988, within which to submit his explanation to the formal administrative
charges. Teotico granted him an extension of only five days from receipt of
memorandum. Agda sent a letter to the Commission on Elections, inquiring if Special
Order No. 219, series of 1987, of Administrator Lanuza was referred and submitted to it
for approval three days before its implementation. The Commission, informed private
respondent that records of the Department do not show that aforesaid Special Order
was submitted or referred to this Commission for approval. Agda filed with the court a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with preliminary injunction and
restraining order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC. The court
granted said petition and ordered to immediately reinstate Democrito O. Agda, Sr., from
his previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, with full back
wages and allowances mandated by law.
Issue:
Whether or not Agda failed to exhaust administrative remedy as mandated by P.
D.807.
Ruling:
The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-assignment.
If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may
appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the
Commission, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the
appellate jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition to Stay
Implementation and Nullify the Special Order in question with the Civil Service
Commission. It does not, however, appear to us that he exerted genuine and sincere
efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof what appears to be clear is that he
used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandum of
Teotico of 7 January 1988 and the routing slip request of 11 March 1988 for the key to
the safety vault.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996
Facts:
FACTS: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents

Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were
filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After
the consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and
certain motions by the parties, this Court referred the cases to public respondent
SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition. SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the
PCGG sought to implement the sequestration without acting on its motions ". . . To Lift
Sequestration Order" and ". . . For Hearing for Specification of Charges And For Copies
Of Evidence". SIPALAY maintained that the sequestration was without evidentiary
substantiation, violative of due process, and deemed automatically lifted when no
judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period mandated under Article
XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution. Admittedly, this motion to dismiss came nearly
seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this
Court on September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was
SIPALAY's and ALLIED's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG
argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders
to the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6
of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. An "Opposition" and a "Reply" were filed in relation
to the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to

dismissproper without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:
A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies,

when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful
application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to
dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has
already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss
came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for
the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the
SANDIGANBAYAN.
JALANDONI VS DRILON
Facts:
Ledesma, private respondent, filed an administrative complaint forviolation of

the RPC and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actagainst the petitioner with the
Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG) A full-page paid advertisement
was caused to be published byprivate respondents in five major daily newspapers
(ManilaChronicle, Business World, Malaya, Philippine Daily Globe and The Manila
Times).
The advertisement contained allegations against Jalandoni of having committed

illegal and unauthorized dacts constituting graft and corruption relating to a dacion en
pago financing arrangement entered into by Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. with RCBC. It
was about the unauthorized selling of OPMC shares held by Piedras to RCBC for low
prices.
Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of libel before the ProvincialProsecutor
of Rizal against the respondents who were OPMCofficials and directors.
An open letter addressed to the stockholders of OPMC was written by

respondent Coyiuto Jr. as Chairman of the Board and President of OPMC. It contained
remarks regarding the same deal as statedabove.
Again, Jalandoni filed a complaint for libel before the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal. The prosecutors issued memoranda on both cases recommending the indictment
of the respondents and information for libel was filed with the RTC of Makati against
the respondents. Drilon issued an order dismissing the resolutions of the prosecutors
and directing them to withdraw the information filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the power to withdraw information
filed in the RTC.
Ruling:
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretaryover the fiscals
and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
Lopez v. City of Manila
GR No. 127139, Feb. 19, 1999
Facts:
Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of
1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property. The revision of real
property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of Manila.
Upon receipt of Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 from the Bureau of Local Government
Finance relating to the failure of most of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general revision of real property
and after obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City Assessor began
the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real
properties.
The City Assessor’s Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values
to the City Council for its appropriate action. The council then enacted Manila
Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved. With the implementation of the ordinance,
the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increase hence he filed a special
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 for
being “unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.”
Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter, reducing by fifty percent (50%)
the assessment levels (depending on the use of property, e.g., residential, commercial)
for the computation of tax due. The new ordinance amended the assessment levels
provided by Section 74, paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794..
Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the
controversy proceeded. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
dispensed with in the instant case
Ruling: NO. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only
after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the
administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its
decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available
within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be
made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide
the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
courts.
“One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers
which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters
coming primarily within the competence of other department. x x x
There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed
with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases
are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal, (2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent
need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable
damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is
private land; and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted).
In the court’s opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of
the exceptions above-mentioned.
Sunshine Transportation, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission
G.R. No. 116025, February 22, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Sunshine Transportation, Inc. hired private respondent Realucio R.
Santos (hereinafter Santos) as a bus driver on a probationary basis. After six months,
the former then extended the latter a regular appointment as "Bus Driver Class C" on 16
March 1990. On 7 January 1992, Santos received a memorandum 4 dated 4 January
1992 from the petitioner directing him to submit a written explanation within 48 hours
as to why he failed to report for his trip scheduled on 28 December 1991. However,
Santos claimed that on 2 January 1992, he applied for a leave of absence with the
petitioner’s Operations Manager Danilo Alvarado; but Alvarado tore the leave
application, verbally terminated his services, and even forced him off the premises.
Santos then opted to mail his application for leave, also on 2 January 1992.
Subsequently, Santos received a letter of termination dated 22 January 1992 6 premised
on the grounds that: (1) he committed insubordination to a lawful order of his superior
by failing to submit the required written explanation; and (2) such failure amounted to
an admission of his guilt. Nonetheless, he kept reporting for work, but was not allowed
entry into the company’s premises, prompting him to believe that he had been either
suspended or dismissed. Santos filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for (a) illegal
suspension, (b) illegal dismissal, (c) illegal deduction of Bicol trip allowance, (d) non-
payment of salaries, overtime pay, premiums for holidays, rest day and night shift,
allowances, and separation pay. He also prayed for reinstatement with back wages and
moral damages. Santos appealed to the NLRC and, in its decision 11 of 21 April 1994, the
NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter’s finding, but granted Santos’ money claims in the
amount of P158,000.00, as the petitioner "failed to refute the complainant’s claim that
he was underpaid. Unsatisfied with the NLRC decision, the petitioner filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari charging the NLRC with having acted with grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the decision. More concretely, it imputes to the NLRC the
commission of the following errors: (1) in not dismissing the patently defective appeal of
Santos due to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for perfecting an
appeal; (2) in modifying the Labor Arbiter’s decision by granting the private
respondent’s money claim without any factual nor legal basis; (3) in ruling that the
private respondent’s money claims for the year 1989 have not yet prescribed; and (4) in
failing to give consideration to the waiver/quitclaim executed by the private respondent
on 20 October 1992 discharging the petitioner from any obligation arising from his
(private respondent’s) claim for overtime pay.
Issue:
Whether or not a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special
civil action for certiorari may be availed of.
Ruling:
Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which allows an
aggrieved party to file a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution, or decision
of the NLRC, constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy which the said party may
avail of. Accordingly, and in the light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special action for
certiorari may be availed of. In the case at bench, the records do not show and neither
does the petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
challenged decision before it came to us through this action. It has not, as well,
suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to this Court against the decision in
question.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY
DEFENSOR
GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006
Facts:
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary in questioning

validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation.
Ruling:
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR
was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,18 the Court said that it will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest
and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari,calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 19 A perusal, however, of
the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to
warrant the Court's taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also
failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity
of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, 20 the Court's power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or
regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Dy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121587
March 9, 1999
Facts:
The Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order 93-01 creating Task Force
Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of
illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products in that city. The
members of the task force confiscated two vehicles belonging to petitioner and their
cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber of different sizes and dimensions. For lack
of claimants, the DENR Technical Regional Director recommended to the Secretary of
Natural Resources the forfeiture of the lumber and the two vehicles. Accordingly, the
DENR Regional Director ordered the Community Environment Natural Resources
Officer of Butuan City to issue the forfeiture orders. More than two months after the
lumber had been forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a
suit for replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City for its recovery. The trial
court issued a preliminary writ of replevin. Respondent Odel Lausa, the acting chief of
civilian security in the mayor's office, filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond
and a motion to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber
in question, having been seized and forfeited by the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as
amended (Revised Forestry Code), was under its custody and, therefore, resort should
first be made to the DENR. The trial court denied the application for the approval of the
counterbond as well as the motion to dismiss/quash the suit for replevin. Respondent
then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals in which he sought the
approval of his counterbond and the nullification of the orders granting petitioner's
prayer for a preliminary writ of replevin and the denial of his motion to dismiss. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin
suit, considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited
pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before a court's judicial power can be sought. As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed
orders of the trial court granting petitioner's application for a replevin writ and denying
private respondent's motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited in pursuant to P.D. 705,
as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions
seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to said agency.
Cuevas v. Bacal
G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000
Facts:
Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations

in 1989 and on July 28, 1994, she was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional
Director of the Public Attorney's Office. On January 5, 1995, she was appointed by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to the rank of CESO III. On November 5, 1997, she was
designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney. On February 5,
1998, her appointment was confirmed by President Ramos so that, on February 20,
1998, she took her oath and assumed office. However, on July 1, 1998, petitioner Carina
J. Demaisip was appointed "chief public defender" by President Joseph Estrada.
Apparently because the position was held by respondent, another appointment paper
was issued by the President on July 6, 1998 designating petitioner Demaisip as "chief
public defender (formerly chief public attorney).On the other hand, respondent was
appointed "Regional Director, Public Defender's Office" by the President. Respondent
filed a petition for quo warrantoquestioning her replacement as Chief Public Attorney.
The petition, which was filed directly with the Court, was dismissed without prejudice to
its refiling in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, respondent brought her case in the
Court of Appeals which, on March 25, 1999, ruled in her favor, finding her to be lawfully
entitled to the Office of Chief Public Attorney and that her transfer amounted to a
removal without cause. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contended that
respondent Bacal failed to show that she has a clear right to the position of Chief Public
Attorney.
Issue:
Whether or not the quo warranto should have been dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling:
No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a
department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former, there is
greater reason for not requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case
since the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself.
Indeed, we have granted review in other cases involving the removal of the
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and the
Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office without requiring the petitioners
to exhaust administrative remedies considering that the administrative actions in
question were those of the President. In any event, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the question raised is purely legal. In this
case, the question is whether respondent's transfer to the position of Regional Director
of the Public Attorney's Office, which was made without her consent, amounts to a
removal without cause. This brings us to the main issue in this appeal.
Arimao v. Taher
G.R. No. 152651, August 7, 2006
Facts:
Arimao was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non-formal Education,

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS-ARMM). Thereafter, Taher was
appointed Education Supervisor II. Arimao’s appointment, however, was protested on
the ground that said appointment did not pass through any evaluation by the personnel
selection board. Arimao’s appointment was eventually disapproved by the Civil Service
Commission-Field Office for failure to meet the experience required for the position.
The CSC affirmed the findings of the CSC-FO and ordered Arimao to be reverted to her
former position of Education Supervisor II.
She sought reconsideration of the decision. Arimao was granted a study for one
year but she came back as Supervisor II about a year after the expiration of her leave.
Her motion was denied. Arimao and Taher both reported as Education Supervisor II.
Taher filed a complaint against Arimao relative to her continued absence. She was
declared AWOL and was dropped from the payroll. The Regional Vice Governor/Acting
Governor ordered her to reassume her former position as Supervisor II. Taher filed a
Petition for prohibition as she stands to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if
she is removed from the office which she has held for more than 5 years.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should abide by the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies.
Ruling:
The issues to be resolved in this case are purely legal in nature, respondent need
not abide by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Besides, to allow the
matter to remain with the Office of the ARMM Governor for resolution would be self-
defeating and useless and cause unnecessary delay since it was the same office which
gave the conflicting issuances on petitioner's reinstatement.
Lastimoso v. Asayo
G.R. No. 154243, March 6, 2007
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Inspector General
of the PNP for abuse of authority/harassment against the respondent. The latter
allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother Lamberto Asayo, one of
the suspects in the shooting of petitioner’s son. The complaint was referred to the
Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, respondent did not
appear but filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB) which had jurisdiction over the case. Meanwhile, the Inspector General
submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the commencement of summary
dismissal proceedings against respondent. Upon approval of said recommendation, the
administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service for summary hearing.
The PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a decision
dismissing respondent from police service.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent failed to exhaust all the available administrative
remedies prior to the filing of his petition.
Ruling:
The respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first
going through all the administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as when the issue involved is a
purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him.
Said issue being a purely legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies did not apply to the case.
Castro v. Gloria
G.R. No. 132174
Facts:
Petitioner was dismissed from the service for having an illicit affair with his
married co-teacher. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the same, but to no avail.
Later, petitioner went to the court and implored the reduction of his penalty from
dismissal to (1) year suspension. His action, however, was dismissed on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, for failure to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission before coming to the court. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is should be

invoked in this case.
Ruling:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. One

exception is, when the case involves only a legal question, as in the case at bar. The main
issue here is the propriety of the penalty imposed on petitioner. Indeed, the
implementing rules of E.O. No. 292 provides that the penalty for the first offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, to
one (1) year. Dismissal is proper for a second offense. Hence, the former being
applicable to petitioner, his penalty was reduced to one (1) year suspension without pay,
and considering the length of time he has been out of the service, the Court considered
the penalty fully served but without payment of back salaries as petitioner is not
completely exonerated of the charges. Further, he is not entitled to any compensation
for services not rendered.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004
Facts:
Regino was a first year computer science student PCST. During the second
semester of school year 2001–2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign. Each student was
required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. Those who refused to pay were
denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties
and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. Petitioner was not allowed to
take the exam. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad,
who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST's policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint 5 for

damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in

a civil action exclusively for damages based on violation of the human relation
provisions of the Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.
Ruling:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the

present case.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on

the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.
Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor
are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to
award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission.
The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue
is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Malabanan v. Ramento
G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984
Facts:
Petitioner were all officers of the Supreme Student Government of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation, sought and were granted permit to hold a meeting. At
such gathering they manifested their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute
of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They march and demonstrated
outside the place indicated in the permit, disturbing the classes being held. They were
later suspended for one academic year for holding an illegal assembly.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling:
Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case, especially so
where a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the
essence, this Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot
be too sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will
continue to be in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that they
consider of great importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public.
That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.
Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees
G.R. No. 78623, December 17, 1990
Facts:
For two (2) years, Petitioner discharged her duties and functions as vice-
president of the college. However, from the time when Remo retired as President of the
college, there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of Trustees. Dr. Flores
was designated officer-in-charge and later appointed as the new College President.
Anticipating moves to replace her as vice-president, petitioner submitted to the Board of
Trustees a position paper, asserting that the Board could not appoint a vice-president
because the position was not vacant, the vice-president’s term was not co-terminus with
that of the recommending president who had retired, and the incumbent was not
replaceable at the pleasure of the Board. In fact, she stated therein that she is qualified
for the college presidency. Petitioner’s apprehension was proved right by later
development. She received a letter from President Flores assigning her to another
position. Alleging that the appointment of Dr. Gonzaga to the position of vice-president
in effect eased her out of said position. She contended that her constitutional and legal
rights to security of tenure had been violated.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling:
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. It is not necessary

when, from the facts of the case, petitioner has to look to the courts for speedy relief;
when the question presented is "purely a legal one," the controverted act is "patently
illegal" and "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done;" and when
petitioner was denied due process. 16 Each of these exceptions may exempt the
petitioner from the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a court
action. Considering that all these exceptions are present in this case, petitioner may
avail herself of the instant remedy.
Jovenito Madrigal vs. Prov. Aristeo M. Lecaroz, et. al.
G.r. no. L-46218 - October 23, 1990
Facts:
Public respondents, Gov. Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice Gov. Celso Zoleta, Prov. Board
of Marinduque members; Riego and Principe, abolished petitioner's position as
permanent construction capataz by reason of poor financial condition of the province
and it appearing that the position was not essential.
Petitioner then appealed to the (CSC) commission and the same declared the
removal of petitioner as illegal. The respondents moved for the reconsideration but the
same was denied.
Petitioner then asked for the implementation of the resolution of the commission
but was denied because he could no longer be reinstated since his former position no
longer exists.
Petitioner then filed before the court a case for mandamus and damages seeking
restoration of his position, reinstatement and payment of back salaries plus damages.
The RTC dismissed his claim in the ground if laches since it took him 4 years and
20 days to file for reinstatement.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the petition.
Ruling:
No. As seen in the unbending jurisprudence in our jurisdiction, a petition for

mandamus or quo warranto affecting titles to office must be filed within 1 year from date
petitioner was ousted from position. The reason for this is that failure to timely file their
claim shall be considered as abandonment of their right. As applied in persons claiming
rights in the civil service, there must be stability in the service so as to refrain from
public business being unduly retarded. Further, the Gov. must be immediately informed
of any Peron's claim in an office or position in the civil service as against another
holding it so that the government may not be faced with the predicament of having to
pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding office and another for one who not
actually rendering service but entitled thereto.
SALINAS v NLRC
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are employed with private respondent corporation.
On 1989, petitioners file a separate complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent which was jointly heard before the Labor Arbiter. However, such complaint
was dismissed on the findings that petitioners were mere project employees.
Such ruling was upheld by the NLRC on appeal. Thus, petitioners herein resorted
before the Court on certiorari under Rule 65. On the other hand, private respondent
corporation contended that the remedy availed of should have been certiorari under
Rule 45. And assuming arguendo that it is Rule 65, the same shall not warrant since
petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC thus there was
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as required by the rules.
Issue:
WON, petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC
constitutes the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Ruling:
NO. The Court holds that the failure of petitioners to interpose a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision before coming to this Court was not a fatal
omission. The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is not a hard and fast
rule and does not apply where the issue is purely a legal one. A motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite for the bringing of an action under Rule 65 may be
dispensed with where the issue is purely of law, as in this case. At all events and in the
interest of substantial justice, especially in cases involving the rights of workers,
procedural lapses, if any, may be disregarded to enable the Court to examine and resolve
the conflicting rights and responsibilities of the parties. This liberality is warranted in
the case at bar, especially since it has been shown that the intervention of the Court is
necessary for the protection of the herein petitioners.
Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr.
G.R. No. 146875, [July 14, 2003], 453 PHIL 1013-1030
Facts:
On May 27, 1997 respondent Manuel Laxina, Sr. took his oath and thereafter
assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay captain of Barangay
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. His rival candidate, Roque
Fermo, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Fermo
was declared as the winner in the Barangay Elections. Respondent filed a notice of
appeal with the COMELEC, while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
The trial court granted the motion for execution pending appeal. Hence, respondent
vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. The COMELEC, however,
annulled the order which granted the execution of the decision pending appeal on the
ground that there existed no good reasons to justify execution. On October 28, 1999,
Fermo was served a copy of the writ of execution, but refused to acknowledge receipt
thereof. He also refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan Hills.
However, on November 17, 1999, Fermo turned over to respondent all the assets and
properties of the barangay. In Resolution No. 017-S-99 dated December 11, 1999, the
barangay council of Batasan Hills authorized the appropriation of P864,326.00 for the
November to December 1999 salary of its barangay officials and employees. Petitioners
Jose G. Mendoza, Jr., Rosario E. Espino and Teresita S. Mendoza, who were barangay
councilors, refused to sign Resolution No. 017-S-99 as well as said payroll. Petitioners
filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt
practices act and falsification of legislative documents against respondent and all other
barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll. The Special
Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases of the City ruled that respondent had
no power to make appointments prior to his oath taking on November 16, 1999. The
Quezon City Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the Committee.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City seeking to annul the decision of the Quezon City Council. A summary judgment was
rendered by the trial court in favor of respondent. It did not rule on the propriety of the
re-taking of the oath office by the latter, but nevertheless, exonerated him on the basis of
the finding of the City Council that he did not act in bad faith but merely "misread the
law, as applied to the facts." Petitioners then filed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in its decision.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Court, once proclaimed
and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the
functions thereof and the pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin
him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is
annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating
him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties
of the office to which he has been elected. The re-taking of respondent of his oath of
office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on
May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Hence, the
taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was
not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office and to the
exercise of the functions thereof.
National Power Corporation v. Presiding Judge
G.R. No. 72477, October 16, 1990
Fact:
On October 10, 1984, the Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint[1] with
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the
collection of real property tax and special respectively, covering the period 1978 to
1984. Petitioner NAPOCOR then defendant therein, filed a motion to dismiss dated
January 12, 1985 on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the action or suit
and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case. In support of this
motion NAPOCOR cited Presidential Decree No. 242 dated July 9, 1973 which provides
that disputes between agencies of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary
of Justice
The court through Judge Pablito C. Pielago issued an order dated January 28,
1985 denying the motion to dismiss. NAPOCOR filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss[4] on February 22, 1985 citing a resolution of the Fiscal Incentive Review
Board, No. 10-85 effective January 11, 1984, restoring the tax and duty exemption
privileges of petitioner.
On March 27, 1985, NAPOCOR filed its answer to the complaint with
counterclaim. Treating the same as a second motion to dismiss and finding the
affirmative defenses therein stated to be unmeritorious, the court a quo issued an order
on June 27, 1985, denying the second motion to dismiss and requiring both parties to
appear before the court for the purpose of submitting a stipulation of facts.
Petitioner alleges that what has been withdrawn is its exemption from taxes,
duties, and fees which are payable to the national government while its exemption from
taxes, duties and fees payable to government branches, agencies and instrumentalities
remains unaffected. Considering that real property taxes are payable to the local
government, NAPOCOR maintains that it is exempt therefrom.
Issue:
WON the RTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV has jurisdiction to hear Civil
Case No. 9901 filed by respondents Province of Misamis Oriental and Municipality of
Jasaan for the collection of real property tax and special education fund tax from
petitioner covering the years 1978 to 79.
Ruling:
Yes,the RTC has jurisdiction to hear case. An examination of these two decrees
shows that P.D. 242 is a general law which deals with administrative settlement or
adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government
offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. The coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims
and controversies.
The conflict in the provisions on jurisdiction between P.D. 242 and P.D. 464
should be resolved in favor of the latter law, since it is a special law and of later
enactment. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the matter of who or which tribunal or
agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes.
Therefore, respondent court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 9901.
Philsa International Placement Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor
GR NO. 103144, 4 April 2001
Facts:
Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for

overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were
recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement
fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and
P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.
Private respondents filed a case before the POEA for illegal dismissal, payment of
salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exaction/refund of
placement fees and contract substitution. It was alleged that they made to sign another
contract which reduced some of their benefits and privileges days after they started to
work. The employer also subsequently forced them to sign a third contract which
increased their work from 48 hours to 60 hours per week without any corresponding
increase in their monthly salary and because they refused to sign the third contract the
employer terminated their services and repatriated back to the Philippines They sought
for Philsa to return their placement fees and for the payment of the unexpired portion of
their contract however, Philsa refused.
NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by
deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. Private respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC. Private respondents
then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition
for review for certiorari.
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of
the POEA on private respondents’ money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order
dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private
respondents’ complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal
exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioner cannot be held for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. II, Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication.
2. Whether the administrative circular is not among those requiring publication
as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not the general public
Ruling:
1. Administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or
filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may
not be enforced.
2. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely
private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the
ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of
Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were
addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies
engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled
therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced
or implemented.
COSEP VS. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioners were regular employees of Private respondent Premiere Development
Bank at its Guadalupe Branch, then headed by area Manager Gloria Doplito. In
November of 1994, Private respondent suspended Doplito for alleged malversatio of
money belonging to its clients.
Deeply hurt and appalled by the action take by Private respondent in suspending
Doplito, the herein petitioners who have grown close to petitioners and the other
employees, wrote an openly letter to Private respondent criticizing its decision and
expressing their dismay. The said letter was disseminated to the employees of private
respondents various branches.
Private respondent required petitioners to explain what they meant by issuing the
"open letter." It also suspended petitioner and did not pay their 13th month pay and
wages in the meantime. Petitioners filed an answer, explaining that the "open letter" was
just an exercise of their right to freedom of speech.
Private respondent sent to each petitioner a memorandum dismissing them from the
service effective immediately, on the ground that they undermined the interest of the
bank. However, on January 23, 1995, private respondent issued to each petitioner a
"transfer of assignment" temporarily suspending the effects of the previous
memorandum ordering their dismissal.
Petitioners ignored the memorandum transferring them to other branches and,
instead, filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter against private respondent for illegal
dismissal and unpaid wages and 13th month pay. They asked for separation pay and the
award of moral and exemplary damages.
The Labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. However, upon appeal
to the NLRC, it reversed the Labor arbiter's decision. Hence, this recourse before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that petitioners'
"temporary suspension" of termination resulted in the lifting of their termination
Ruling:
Normally, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such the NLRC, which have
acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by the
Supreme Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. 9 But this is true only when they do not come under the
established exceptions. One of these is where the findings of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC are contrary to each other. In the instant case, the findings of the NLRC and the
labor arbiter are inconsistent, hence there is a necessity to review the records to
determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary
facts.
Contrary to the findings of the NLRC that there is a valid ground for dismissal, i.e.
insubordination, we find that petitioners were not actually dismissed due to
insubordination in refusing to comply with the notices of transfer of assignment but
were dismissed for admitting authorship of the "open-letter," as evidenced by the
memorandum issued to petitioners last January 20, 1995. Thus, for want of substantial
basis, in fact or in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally
accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public
respondent NLRC, as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared
"final" by law are not exempt from the judicial review when so warranted.
NEUGENE MARKETING INC. v. CA
GR No. 112941, 1999-02-18
Facts:
Neugene was duly registered with SEC to engage in trading business. Private
Respondents Sy, Yang, and Suen, holders of 5250 shares or 2/3 of the outstanding
capital stock sent notice to the BoD for a board meeting. In this meeting, they
approved a resolution dissolving Neugene. SEC thus issued a Certificate of
Dissolution of Neugene. Petitioners Tan, Martin, Moreno and Lee brought an action
to annul said SEC Certification contending that they were the majority stockholders
of the corporation, and that prior to the board meeting, the private respondents had
already divested themselves of their stockholdings by endorsing them in blank and
delivering them to the Uy family. The latter in turn awarded said stock certificates to
Johnny Uy, who in turn sold the same to petitioners. Hence, private respondents
could no longer validly vote for the dissolution of Neugene at the time of the board
meeting. Private respondents contend that the assignment of shares were simulated
and fraudulently effected since the endorsement in blank by them of the stock
certificates to the Uy family was only for safekeeping when they were stolen from a
vault by Johnny Uy. SEC nullified the Certificate of Dissolution. CA, on the other
hand, upheld Neugene’s dissolution. Hence, this petition with the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred on the finding and conclusion that the certificates of
stock of the private respondents were stolen and therefore not validly transferred.
Ruling:
No. In light of the foregoing and after a careful examination of the evidence on
record, and a judicious study of the provisions of law and jurisprudence in point, we
are with the Court of Appeals on the finding and conclusion that the certificates of
stock of the private respondents were stolen and therefore not validly transferred,
and the transfers of stock relied upon by petitioners were fraudulently recorded in
the Stock and Transfer Book of NEUGENE under the column "Certificates
Cancelled".
Although well-established is the rule that the appellate court will not generally
disturb the factual findings by the trial court for the reason that the trial court heard
the testimonies of the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial and was afforded the singular chance to assess the
probative value of the evidence. The rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
SEC overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered would affect
the result of the case. (Tomas vs. CA, 185 SCRA 627 [1990]; People vs. Alforte, 219
SCRA 458 [1993])
In the case under consideration, records reveal that the SEC En Banc and its
Panel Of Hearing Officers misappreciated the true nature of the relationship between
the stockholders of NEUGENE and the Uy family, who had the understanding that
the beneficial ownership of NEUGENE would remain with the Uy family, such that
subject shares of stock were, immediately upon issuance, endorsed in blank by the
shareholders and entrusted to the Uy family, through Ban Ha Chua, for safekeeping.
Such beneficial ownership of the Uy family is admitted not only in the testimonies of
private respondents but also of the petitioners, Sonny Moreno and Johnson Lee.
Malonzo vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127066 March 11, 1997
Facts:
Reynaldo Malonzo was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8,
1995, winning over former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term,
Malonzo's office as Mayor was put to serious question when 1,057 Punong Barangays
and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen,
constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of
the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval
of PRA Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and
calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.
Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the
COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with
the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the recall process was
deficient in form and substance, and therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC
found the petition devoid of merit and declared the recall proceedings to be in order.
Due to the importance of the matters in issue, and the proximity of the Recall
Election date declared by the COMELEC, the Courtissued a Resolution3 ordering the
respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from proceeding with the recall election
and directing the respondents to file their respective Comments.
According to the Solicitor General, the veracity of notices sent to 42 members of

the Preparatory Recall Assembly were not directly passed upon by the COMELEC
before it issued the questioned Resolution. It thus submits that the propriety of
notices sent to said PRA members must first be determined by the COMELEC, after
giving private respondents the chance to prove the same, otherwise, a discussion of
the other issues in the present petition would be premature.
Issue:
Whether or Not there is need to refer the matter of the veracity of the questioned
notices sent to certain members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly back to the
COMELEC
Ruling:
The COMELEC has already conducted an investigation, and has found the
proceedings instituting the recall to be in accord with law.
The Supreme Court is persuaded strongly by the principle that the findings of fact of
administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great
weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings
are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not
be disturbed.
ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA v. TEODORO PENA
GR No. 57665, 1990-07-02
Facts:
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After
Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement... wherein they waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among
others, in favor of co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia
Reyes. The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932,
and was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.
In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining
Association, later converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the
members conveyed their respective mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann"
claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for
operation. During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim
was registered. On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136
against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with
the Court of First
Issue:
Whether or not public respondents acted within their jurisdiction, or if they

committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Clearly, respondent Minister gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded the
rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect of
reversing respondent Director's finding.
As to petitioners' supposed failure to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped"

claim since 1952, the conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations,
consisting of payment of assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the... year
1975, although not by petitioners.
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that public respondents had the authority
to ascertain the validity of the "Ped" claim. Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of the
decision of the Director of Mines declaring petitioners to have" abandoned and lost their
rights" over the "Ped" claim, respondent Minister committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Bautista v. Agustin
G.R. No. 143092, February 14, 2003
Facts:
The instant controversy arose from the verified letter complaint filed by
petitioner charging herein respondent with grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
acts and oppression. Petitioner alleged therein that she was the major stockholder and
president of PROMAT, a company engaged in construction business, while the
respondent was the district engineer of First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).Petitioner claimed that
because of the work they were engaged in, respondent was able to have an illicit
relationship with her initially through force. Her attempts to extricate herself proved
futile because he constantly warned her that PROMAT could no longer do business with
FMED if their relationship would be severed. The respondent denied petitioner's
allegations. He, however, admitted that through his assistance, PROMAT was awarded
various public works projects valued at millions of pesos. But, when he failed to give his
assurance that she could get a multimillion peso project from his office, she got angry
and threatened to have him removed from his job, thus she filed the instant case against
him. The graft investigation officer found him guilty of the charges and recommended
his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. The
Ombudsman, however, reduced the penalty to suspension without pay for one year.
Both parties moved for reconsideration. Hence, in a joint order, the deputy ombudsman
dismissed the case against respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for review and the
Supreme Court forwarded the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
originally modified the decision to a suspension, but upon a motion for reconsideration,
the CA again dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not substantial evidence is present in case at bar.
Ruling:
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to hold

respondent liable for the charges against him. Here, we are convinced that petitioner's
charges are supported by substantial evidence jurisprudentially defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
UST VS NLRC
Facts:
UST terminated the employment of 16 union officers and directors of UST

Faculty Union for grave misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct
unbecoming a faculty member on the ground that "in publishing or causing to be
published in Strike Bulletin No. 5 the libelous and defamatory attacks against the Father
Rector. Some faculty members staged mass leaves of absence disrupting classes in all
levels at the University. The faculty union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice with the DOLE. The labor arbiter, on a prima facie showing that the
termination was causing a serious labor dispute, certified the matter to the Secretary of
DOLE for a possible suspension of the effects of termination.
Issue:
May UST comply with the NLRC readmission order by granting substantially
equivalent academic assignments, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to dismissed faculty
members?
Ruling:
No. Pursuant to Article 263 (g), 1st paragraph, of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 27 of RA 6715, the NLRC was charged with the task of implementing a valid
return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. As the implementing body, its authority
did not include the power to amend the Secretary's order. Since the Secretary's order
specifically provided that the dismissed faculty members shall be readmitted under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the present dispute, the NLRC should
have directed the actual reinstatement of the concerned faculty members.
It therefore erred in granting the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement.

The grant of substantially equivalent academic assignments cannot be sustained. The
giving of substantially equivalent academic assignments, without actual teaching loads,
cannot be considered a reinstatement under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike. The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" contemplates
actual reinstatement or the return of actual teaching loads to the dismissed faculty
members. Article 263(g) was devised to maintain the status quo between the workers
and management in a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, pending adjudication of the controversy.
The grant of substantially equivalent academic assignments would evidently alter the
existing status quo since the temporarily reinstated teachers will not be given their usual
teaching loads.
BAYANI BAUTISTA VS. PATRICIA ARANETA
GR No 135829, 20 February 2003
Facts:
Bautista alleged that he is the lawful tenant and actual possessor of THREE (3)
HECTARES, more or less, parcel of land, formerly owned by Gregorio Araneta II, and
situated at Carmel Farms, Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Tenancy
relationship between the former owner and plaintiff started way back in 1978. From
then on, plaintiff cultivated and possessed the subject landholding in an open, peaceful,
continuous and uninterrupted manner.
Bautista's was disturbed and even interrupted, by a group of armed security

guards allegedly by Patty Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II.
In his complaint, plaintiff initially asked the Board to issue a temporary

restraining order to enjoin the defendant, through her security guards, from continued
employment of threat and harassment against his person and for the maintenance of
status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant on the subject landholding.
Araneta contended that Bautista has no cause of action against her as the former
is not a tenant on the subject landholding. She added that the subject landholding does
not fall under the coverage of the CARL as it appears to be 18% in slope. DARAB denied
the petition of Araneta and favoured Bautista. The CA reversed DARAB’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in disregarding settled jurisprudence that factual

finding of administrative agencies when supported by substantial evidence should be
final and conclusive.
Ruling:
The CA did not erred in disregarding settled jurisprudence that factual findings of
administrative agencies when supported by substantial evidence should be final and
conclusive.
Factual findings of DARAB are not supported by substantial evidence. This Court
cannot sustain Bautista’s argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of
the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in
favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde
vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or
officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on
courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings especially if they are mere
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.
SAMSON VS OMB
Facts:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work

order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on
various dates during the period September 26 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had
been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and
passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against
respondents who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets
required the public-school teachers to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of the following civil-
service laws and regulations: grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of
Civil-Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without leave.At
the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered them to be placed under preventive
suspension.
Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. The public-school
teachers, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the
committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation
placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the
investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated
Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the
investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered
their immediate dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or Not in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed
activity, the respondent public-school teacher’s right to due process has been violated.
Ruling:
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving
public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to
hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school
superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative
charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of the public-school
teachers.
TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
Facts:
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the
bidding for government construction projects including those under the First Manila
Engineering District (FMED), and private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent
District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant
incidents, Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against
Agustin in a letter-complaint. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. On a motion for
reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
Issue:
1. Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
not raised in the trial?
2. Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?
Ruling:
1. YES. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure
in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time
or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of
lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court
has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
2. YES. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give
this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. As a consequence of our
ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD VS CA
GR NO 98310 , 24 October 1996
Facts:
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging

businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was
established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority
stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to
MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed
a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE
has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The
Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the
Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry
of Natural Resources. Â During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from
MIWPI.
Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged.

Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order
MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of
2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution
against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from
pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed
the ruling of the RTC.
MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that
was sued – a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the
Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the
same was issued patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross
violation of MIWPI’s constitutional rights under the due process clause.Issue:
Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been violated.
Ruling:
The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative

proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact
before hearing all the parties concerned. In Police Commission v. Hon. Judge
Lood, G.R. No. 34637, February 24, 1984, 127 SCRA 757 we held that the
formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an
administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and given the
opportunity to adduce their evidence. The right to notice and hearing is essential
to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the
administrative proceedings. |||
Bernaldo v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 156286, August 13, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Bernaldo was the DPWH Region III Project Engineer of one of the
projects, particularly, The Almacen River II Project. When the contractor finished the
project, a Statement of Work Accomplished and Certificate of Final Inspection and
Certificate of Final Acceptance certified that the Almacen River II Project was 100%
completed by the contractor and the DPWH Region III Engineers. The contractor was
eventually paid 93.58% of the contract price cost. However, the Survey and
Investigation Team of the Bureau of Design of the DPWH, in its Field Survey and
Investigation Report , indicated that the amount of work accomplished by the contractor
on the Project was only about 21% completed. Moreover, in a
Letter-Report to the OMB, the equipments utilized on the Project were evaluated
and it was stated therein that the same could not possibly accomplish the reported full
completion of the said project. Based on the foregoing reports, the DPWH Region III
Engineers connected with the Projects were all administratively charged for
Falsification, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the OMB. Later, the
respondent DPWH Region III Engineers, including petitioner Bernaldo, were ordered
by the OMB for their suspension for a period of nine (9) months without pay and other
benefits. The case was elevated for review in the CA which granted the petition and the
assailed orders of the OMB were annulled and set aside. However, the CA held that the
factual findings of the OMB were supported by substantial evidence to hold petitioner
Bernaldo administratively liable. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari
Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition raises questions of fact which is beyond the
scope of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition. Anent the preliminary matter regarding the mode
of appeal to this Court, the well-settled principle under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
that only questions of law shall be raised in an appeal by certiorari before this Court.
But, it recognizes of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the
findings off act are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8)when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs JOEL S. SAMANIEGO
G.R. No. 175573
Facts:
Joel S. Samaniego was the City Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay. On separate dates, the
Commission on Audit (COA) filed two administrative complaints docketed as OMB –L-
A-03-1060-K and OMB-L-A-03-1061-K for dishonest and grave misconduct. The COA
alleged that respondents incurred shortages in his accountabilities for two separate
periods. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found respondent liable for grave
misconduct because he failed to explain his side and settle his accountabilities in OMB –
L-A-03-1060-K. He was meted the penalty of one year suspension from office. In the
same decision, however OMB –L-A-03-1061-K was dismissed in view of respondents
restitution of his accountability.
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43, respondent assailed the April
11, 2005 joint decision of the office of the Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable in
OMB –L-A-03-1060-K. His prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
was granted.
Since it was not impleaded as a respondent in CA-GR SP No. 89999, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall
the writ of preliminary injunction. The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying its right to intervene considering that its
joint decision was the subject of the appeal.
Ruling:
To aid the Ombudsman in carrying out its tasks, it was vested with disciplinary
authority over government officials. Full disciplinary authority is one of the broad
powers granted to it by the Constitution and RA 6770. These broad powers, functions
and duties are generally categorized into: investigatory power, prosecutory power,
public assistance functions, authority to inquire and obtain information, andthe
function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. So long as the
Ombudsman’s actions are reasonably in line with its official functions and are not
contrary to law and the Constitution, they should be upheld. Defending its decisions in
the CA is one such power. We cannot limit the powers of the Ombudsman if its acts are
not contrary to law or the Constitution.
MORALES V CA AND BINAY
Facts:
Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal cases in connection with
the allegation that he is involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his
previousand present terms as City Mayor of Makati.
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases I
and I were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V
transpired during his first term. His re-election as mayor for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative
cases against him moot and academic.
The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al. under preventive
suspension. The CA granted Binay’s prayer for TRO enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order. According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to
issue a TRO considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then,
applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.’s re-election meant that he can no longer
be administratively charged. Under the Condonation Doctrine, this applies only to
administrative cases:
1. the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct;
2. an elective official’s re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, there by cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
3. courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life
and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the
WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine.
Ruling:
No. The CA’s resolutions were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation
doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at
that time, unwittingly remained “good law,” it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution. However, the
condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis
to support it.
The continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply inconsistent and
impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates
that public office is a public trust and that public official shall be accountable to the
people at all times.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. In fact the LGC
and the RRACCS precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official
who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local
position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post.

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CENTRAL BANK VS ABLAZA

L-33022, 22 April 1975

Whether or not CB is a government entity to apply the provisions of the code.

1|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

L-9657, 29 November 1956

Whether or not NACOCO performing certain functions of government, makes

2|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

G.R. No. 120082; September 11, 1996

1. Whether or not MCIAA a taxable person.

2. Whether or not MCIAA exempt from realty taxation.

3|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code

MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and

4|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991

Moreover, it is a recognized principle that the rule on strict interpretation does

5|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

G.R. Nos. L-55963 H 61045, February 27, 1991

A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially

6|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was

7|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

GR NO 229288, 01 August 2018

Gatchalian was one of the respondents in OMB-C-C-13-0212. The said complaint

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian since he profited

Whether the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under

8|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

G.R. NO. 69871 AUGUST 24, 1990

Veneracion’s complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa was

9|Admi ni s trati ve and El ecti on Laws | pee jay no tes

G.R. No. L-49711, November 7, 1979

G.R. No. 122389, June 19, 1997

Whether or not Singson was deprived of due process on account of Raul T.

Commissioner Aquino cannot be considered as impartial since he was the arbiter

GR NO. 127838, 21 Jan 1999

G.R. No. 109113 January 25, 1995

Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s

As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation

G.R. No. 144464, 22 November 2001

G.R. Nos. 165399, May 30, 2011

Petitioners were non-presidential appointees and career service officials of

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with similarly authorized agencies.

G.R. Nos. 147096, 15 January 2002

GR No. 150178 NOVEMBER 2004

472 SCRA 548 G.R. No. 155784 October 13, 2005

. . . (11)Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it

G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005

On 08 November 1994, Aniano Disierto, then Prosecutor, concurred in the

Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion.

Ombudsman’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and

People’s Graftwatch, referred to the Office of the Ombudsman, for immediate

Ombudsman found Estandarte guilty of grave misconduct and is meted the

Whether or not DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

By virtue of RA 4670, original jurisdiction belongs to the school superintendent.

G.R. No. 182267, [August 28, 2009

A full investigation followed. The hearings were repeatedly postponed as per

Whether or not petitioner was afforded due process.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to

Yes. Since respondent was amply afforded due process in an administrative

Whether or not the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case.

G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002

Petitioner Martin S. Emin was a Non-Formal Education (NFE) Supervisor of the