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UK Department for International Development (DFID) and administered by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB).
The document does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB, DFID or the Government concerned,
and ADB, DFID and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents.
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Guidelines for Road
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preamble..................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3
1 Reference road safety framework ................................................................... 5
1.1 Pakistani road network ............................................................................... 5
1.2 The current road safety situation ............................................................... 5
2 Review of existing standards and guidelines................................................. 14
2.1 Road design standards currently used ................................................... 14
2.2 New geometric design standards ........................................................... 14
2.3 Asian Highway design standards ............................................................. 15
2.4 CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manuals............................................. 16
2.5 NHA Road Safety Audit guidelines .......................................................... 17
3 Sustainable safety principles for road design ................................................ 20
3.1 Safe System principles ............................................................................... 20
3.2 Sustainable Safety principles .................................................................... 21
3.3 Categorization of roads and network design ........................................ 33
3.4 Speed management ................................................................................ 38
4 Road infrastructure safety management ...................................................... 50
4.1 Road safety strategies .............................................................................. 51
4.2 Road safety impact assessment .............................................................. 52
4.3 Road safety audits..................................................................................... 55
4.4 Road safety inspections ............................................................................ 58
4.5 Treatment of crash locations ................................................................... 62
References ................................................................................................................ 77
Annex – Road design standards’ benchmark ...................................................... 79
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Guidelines for Road I
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Preamble
The objective of the TA-8990 PAK: Enabling Economic Corridors through
Sustainable Transport Sector - Road Safety Component is to assist the
Government of Pakistan (GoP) to establish sustainable national road safety
institutions and to build the structures, processes and capacity required at all
levels to achieve long term reductions in road traffic deaths.
The project structure is aligned with the UN Road Safety Pillars and underpinned
by the Safe System Approach. Globally, Pillar 2 ‘Safe Roads’ is a key focus area.
Currently road safety, particularly the safety of vulnerable road users, such as
motorcycle riders, pedestrians, bicyclists and occupants of 3-wheeled vehicles
is not sufficiently prioritised in road design, construction, improvement and
maintenance.
These Road Safety Engineering Guidelines aim to provide a suitable document
for practitioners both being engineers in agencies with a responsibility for road
construction and network management and private consultants. The objective
is therefore to provide a practical tool that will be used by managers and
engineers responsible for designing, improving, and maintaining all classes of
road at all government levels in Pakistan.
The development of Guidelines content and format is being coordinated with
two concurrent NHA projects: development of Pakistan Road Design
Guidelines and the introduction of Pakistan International Road Assessment
Program to ensure that the three initiatives are integrated.
The overall objective is to support Federal, Provincial and Territory road
agencies to deliver safer roads throughout Pakistan.
The Guidelines consist of two parts as follows:
Part I - General recommendations for safer roads
Methodological document in which, after a brief overview of the main
road safety issues affecting Pakistan, a systemic route is defined for
solving problems in a cost-effective perspective.
Reference is made to international best practices such as, for example,
the European Directive 2008/96/EC, or road safety engineering manuals
published in the countries historically most reputable in the field of road
safety (e.g. UK, Netherland, Ireland, Australia, etc.).
Part II - Catalogue of countermeasures for typical road safety issues
Practical design guide consisting of a sample of forms describing typical
cases of infrastructural deficiencies and possible countermeasures.
The catalogue gives brief information, including pictorial
representations, of well-known design errors in a readily understood
way, will suggest a range of methods to overcome these and will give
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Introduction
In Pakistan, WHO statistics (WHO, 2018) indicate that more than 27,000 people
were killed in road collisions in 20161.
According to the international statistics2, we can estimate that the death of
about one third of them is – at least partially – related to the road environment.
In fact, although reliable crash data are still not available in Pakistan, there is
information about many collisions where the road alignment, equipment or
traffic management were one of the main factors
Consequently, it is proven that a good and ‘safety-oriented’ design may
reduce the probability and severity of crashes, and measurable safety gains
have been achieved in all countries where this approach has been
implemented.
On the other hand, if this new approach to design is not part of a management
system that allows the entire cycle from planning to the construction and
maintenance of the infrastructure to be effectively controlled, there is a risk of
providing a sterile tool that is not supported by the institutional and
programming framework.
Currently, Pakistan does not have a shared system for managing road
infrastructure safety. Each activity related to road infrastructure security is
mainly due to occasional initiatives of a few individual organisations (e.g. NHA,
Punjab Road Safety Authority, etc.), without them being part of a broader
national design. This is also in addition to a situation where the limited
adherence to a specific set of road design guidelines is still an issue.
This document, underpinned by the principles of the Safe System approach, is
intended to respond to these needs. After a general description of the
problem, it describes some key processes, already widely tested in other
countries, which, if implemented, can constitute the architecture on which to
implant a new (safety-oriented) approach to design.
The Part I of the Guidelines consists of four main sections:
1. Reference road safety framework
2. Review of existing standards and guidelines
3. Sustainable safety principles for road design
4. Road infrastructure safety management
1 To make a comparison, in the same year, Pakistan lost 1,803 precious lives in terrorism and
insurgency incidences (source: South Asia Terrorism Portal), events that always evoke a
dramatic societal response; unfortunately, the same response was not there for the road
carnage.
2 Cf. Treat et al. (1979) - Tri-level study of the causes of traffic accidents: Final report. US DoT
NHTSA Report DOT HS-805-099, or AASHTO (2010) - Highway Safety Manual. 1st Edn.
Washington, DC.
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3 A map of the national highway network can be found on the NHA website by following
this link: http://nha.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NHA-Map.jpg
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1.2.4 U-turns
The need to provide a safe and efficient
facility to accommodate U-turn
movements is essential for many divided
highways in Pakistan. In some cases,
especially in urban areas, they are also
used to avoid right-turn movements at
junctions4.
Unfortunately, in many cases the median
width neither allows the complete
manoeuvre within the median (vehicles
are forced to cross the opposite
Figure 5 – U-turns along N5 highway with no
carriageway and merge in the traffic
deceleration/acceleration lanes
stream in the travel lane) nor to host safe
deceleration and acceleration lanes. In
some cases, in order to provide enough room to U-turning long trucks, the cross-
section is narrowed, and one or more lanes are devoted to this manoeuvre. It
is clear that such narrowing produces a dangerous bottleneck and provides
further potential for crashes to occur.
These narrowings of carriageway width are usually not signed in advance so
that vehicle manoeuvres are invariably undertaken at the last moment.
1.2.5 Cross-section
The road cross-section will inevitably
have quite a bearing on the relative
safety of road users inasmuch that the
carriageway type and width, the
presence or not of a hard shoulder and
whether vehicle restraints are provided
are factors which will permit or regulate
appropriate vehicle speed.
Generally, throughout Pakistan the more
strategic roads are well equipped with 2-
or 3-lane carriageways in each
direction, separated by a median and Figure 6 - Unsafe vehicle restraint system along
N5 highway
with a hard shoulder. However, even
these strategic roads have deficient
safety aspects, the main concern being the lack of median crash barrier to
prevent the occurrence of cross-over collisions and the lack of crash barrier to
prevent errant vehicles from leaving the carriageway and proceeding out-of-
4This is typified by one of the preferred solutions adopted by the Islamabad Traffic Police of
closing the problematic junction and the provision of U-turns either side
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5 The Asian Highway Network consists of eight core routes that substantially cross more than
one sub-region and a number of other routes within sub-regions or ESCAP member countries.
The network was formalized through an Intergovernmental Agreement that entered into
force in July 2005 (UN ESCAP, 2004).
6 A draft version of both documents is available here:
http://www.unescap.org/events/expert-group-meeting-road-infrastructure-safety-facilities-
asian-highway
7 In the study it is proposed that these would form Annex IV of the International Agreement on
8 The concept of self-explaining roads encourages road designs that promote road-users to
adopt appropriate speeds and behaviour. This subject touches on consistency of alignment
design and a well-defined road hierarchy, and should be introduced into the design
standard wherever applicable.
9 Forgiving designs aim at giving road-users adequate rooms for errors and limiting the severity
on road inspection data and provide a simple and objective measure of the level of safety
that is ‘built-in’ to the road for vehicle occupants, motorcyclists, bicyclists and pedestrians.
11 The ‘baseline’ scenario is the one based on the existing Asian Highway Standards as
These reports cover three key topics in the field of road safety and are therefore
practical points of reference for all practitioners in the region.
The manuals are mainly addressed to CAREC road projects13, but this does not
mean that their use can easily be extended to the entire road network.
13 CAREC focuses investment and other activities on the development of six competitive
transport corridors that link north, south, east, and west through the pivot of Central Asia. The
corridors reflect trade flow patterns and will speed the movement of people and goods
across the region. Critically, they also connect the mainly landlocked CAREC countries to
wider regional and global networks. Pakistan is crossed by Corridors 5a,b and 6c, both of
which follow the Peshawar – Islamabad – Lahore - Karachi route.
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• RSA team
• Writing RSA report
• Responding to RSA report
A series of appendices are also provided
at the end of the manual to provide
prompts for use while auditing, a sample
RSA decision tracking form, potential
design enhancements to address typical
RSA findings on national highways and
glossary of terms used in the manual.
The RSA manual is primarily developed for
RSAs to be conducted on national
highways. However, it is suitable for use
on the entire Pakistani road network,
including networks of Provinces and
Territories, by any person with a
responsibility for, or an interest in, road
safety (e.g. design consultants, police,
academics, provincial government
officers, students, researchers, etc.). Figure 14 – NHA RSA guidelines
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14 Cf. Australian Transport Council (2006) – National Road Safety Action Plan 2007 and 2008
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Figure 15 – Safe System approach (source: Safer Roads, Safer Queensland; 2015)
The concept of Sustainable Safety was launched in the early 1990s in the
Netherlands with the ambition stated above. In 2006 this concept was adopted
and relaunched by SWOV, a Dutch Institute for Road Safety Research, in order
to adapt it, where necessary, to new knowledge and developments (Wegman
& Aarts, 2006).
The Sustainable Safety vision, which is one of the pillars on which the Safe
System approach is built, aims to prevent crashes and, if this is not possible, to
reduce crash severity in such a way that (severe) injury risk is almost excluded.
These objectives are aimed for by means of a proactive approach informed
by prior study of the traffic situations in which serious, injury-producing crashes
can occur. The next stage involves two options: either the circumstances are
changed in such a way that the crash risk is almost totally removed, or, if this is
inevitable, serious crash injury risk is eliminated.
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Homogeneity of mass and/or speed and Equality in speed, direction, and mass at
direction medium and high speeds
Predictability of road course and road user Road environment and road user
behaviour by a recognizable road design behaviour that support road user
expectations through consistency and
continuity in road design
State awareness by the road user Ability to assess one’s task capability to
handle the driving task
(source: Wegman & Aarts, 2006)
3.2.1 Functionality
The first approach to the functional categorization of roads dates back to 1963
when the report Traffic in Towns was published (Buchanan, 1963). This report
contained a comprehensive vision for the design of towns and villages in a
highly motorized society. A distinction was presented between roads having a
traffic flow function (‘distributor designed for movement’), and roads that give
access to destinations (‘access roads to serve the buildings’).
Elaboration of these ideas resulted in a proposal for a route hierarchy, built up
from primary, district and local distributors and access roads to destinations
(Figure 16). All roads are grouped into one of these classes, depending on the
character of the traffic (i.e. local or long distance) and the degree of land
access that they allow.
Typically, road users use a combination of arterial, collector, and local roads
for their trips. Each type of road has a specific purpose or function: some
provide land access to serve each end of the trip; others provide travel mobility
at varying levels, which is needed en route (Figure 17).
There is a basic relationship between functionally classified highway systems in
serving traffic mobility and land access. Arterials provide a high level of mobility
and a greater degree of access control, while local facilities provide a high
level of access to adjacent properties but a low level of mobility. Collector
roads provide a balance between mobility and land access.
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The Sustainable Safety vision builds upon the hierarchy of roads as described
above. Based on the functional usage, roads have to be unequivocally
distinguishable in the function that they perform (‘monofunctionality’).
Motorized traffic should be directed to arterial roads (flow function), causing
roads with an access function to be burdened minimally with motorized traffic.
Roads with a distribution function (collectors) should direct motorized traffic
coming from roads with an access function as quickly as possible to roads with
a flow function and vice versa. This principle is meant to prevent unintended
use of the infrastructure thus minimizing the number of potential conflicts with
severe consequences. On the contrary mixing functions leads to conflicting
road design requirements and, hence, to unclear road design for road users,
resulting in higher risks. A road network functions properly if function, design and
usage (behaviour) are well tuned.
There is no reason to discard this principle of sustainably safe road traffic: a
functional road network categorization is one where each road or street fulfils
only one function – either a flow function, or a distribution function, or an access
function (e.g. the ideal arterial road is a motorway, whereas an ideal access
road is a 30 km/h street).
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Figure 19 – The flow function of the M2 motorway is clear and makes traffic safer
This framework is, generally, accepted in most of the countries and forms part
of road design handbooks and categorization plans.
In Pakistan, too, this is a well-known concept, but unfortunately it is not always
put into practice. However, examples of good practice are also present here.
At urban level, the road network of Islamabad is a typical example of
hierarchic network, where the three functions are pretty well respected (see
Figure 20). The Capital's master plan is in fact a forward-looking and innovative
urban experiment developed at the beginning of the 1960s, where the road
network also benefits from the regular and well-defined structure of the city.
By contrast, in many areas of the country, these principles are not observed
thus resulting in dangerous function mix. Typical examples are housing schemes
that are increasingly developing along the main arterial roads. These areas,
which can accommodate up to thousands of people, often have direct
access to the main road, thus mixing different functions and creating
dangerous points of conflict (see Figure 21).
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3.2.2 Homogeneity
The homogeneous usage of the
road aims to avoid large
differences in speeds, directions
and masses at moderate and high
speeds, thus reducing crash
severity when crashes cannot be
prevented.
The corresponding idea is that it is
beneficial for road safety when
there is little variation in the speeds
of close-moving vehicles travelling
in the same direction.
Worldwide the safest roads are the Figure 22 – Animal drawn vehicle in a trunk road in
Pakistan: differences in speed and mass pose serious
motorways, based on the number road safety problems
of casualties per kilometre driven
as the safety indicator. Although driving speeds are the highest, they are
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relatively uniform and is little variation in direction (e.g. no crossing traffic) and
vehicle mass (no pedestrians, cyclists, mopeds or slow-moving vehicles). The 30
km/h zones and residential areas are also relatively safe despite considerable
variation in the direction and mass of traffic participants. In these cases, the
increased safety is attributable to low driving speeds and small speed variations
between different road users.
The principle of homogeneous use leads, for example, to operational
requirements for directional separation on arterial and collector roads. For
intersections, operational requirements are derived from the starting principle
to eliminate collisions with high speed and mass differences. Pedestrians, cycles
and mopeds should not be present at the points of access of arterial roads.
Speed differences should be reduced to acceptable levels at collector roads
where mass differences are allowed functionally.
In this frame SWOV suggests a system of ‘safe speeds’ (see Table 3) taking into
account that speed limits and travel speeds should not be higher than safe
crash speeds and that is useful to distinguish between urban and rural areas
(although the difference is not always clear for road users).
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Figure 23 - Crash types and indicative fatality risk at speeds (source: Wramborg, as cited by AfDB, 2014)
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3.2.3 Predictability
The predictable usage is aimed at preventing human error by offering a road
environment to the road user that is recognizable and predictable (i.e. ‘self-
explaining’). This indicates permissible road user behaviour and makes the
behaviour of other road users more predictable. Accordingly, within a given
road category, the road and traffic characteristics have to be as uniform as
possible and designed homogeneously because, from a road user
perspective, a considerable amount of uniformity is desirable.
This principle aims in practice to ensure that the road user can recognize the
road type by its road characteristics (recognisability), which makes the road
course and the behaviour of other road users more predictable (predictability).
Unexpected traffic situations in fact simply cost more time for road users to
detect, to perceive, to interpret, to assess, and to elicit the correct behaviour
or response. This also means that transitions from one road category to another
require the necessary precision and time from road users to adapt their
behaviour.
In short, we can state that for the recognisability of roads it is important that
they:
• are distinguishable, and
• evoke and support correct expectations.
According to some research (Van Schagen et al., 1999), only a limited number
of characteristics can be used for distinguishing road categories. These
characteristics must be:
i. continuously perceivable
ii. practical
iii. not disadvantageous for road safety
In practice, to facilitate recognisability, the number of road classes should be
restricted and their design and layout as uniform as possible within each
category. Road users will then have a better idea of what sort of driving
behaviour is expected of them and be better able to anticipate the driving
behaviour of other road users. With ‘self-explaining’ roads, road users will know
at which speed to drive, whether to expect traffic from side roads, and whether
vulnerable users are likely to be on the road. In practice the aim of ‘self-
explaining’ roads is to lower the workload (or mental load) of drivers. This will
have a positive influence on the performance of the driving task.
The requirements for recognition and predictability are:
• avoid unpredictable behaviour by clear designing, marking and signing
• make road categories recognizable
• limit the number of design elements each category and make them
uniform
For Sustainable Safety, the limitation of the number of road categories
produces the largest contribution to the recognition. This assumes that the
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differences between the categories are large, and within each category are
small.
A small set of the operational requirements should ensure the predictability of
the traffic situations:
• speed limits
• longitudinal lane/direction road markings
• separation of directions
• pavement, irregularity of the surface
• presence of hard shoulders and obstacle-free zones (emergency lane
on motorways)
• types of intersections/accesses allowed
• expected road user types
The above set of items must be clear for each road category.
Figure 25 – How to make a road ‘self-explaining’ using marking and signing (source: IRF)
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3.2.4 Forgivingness
The starting principle is that road users make errors and that the environment
should be sufficiently forgiving for road users to avoid the severe consequences
of these errors.
The first step towards making the road user environment forgiving is to make
road shoulders sustainably safe. This activity mainly takes place on rural roads
(arterial and collector) where the speed is supposed to be higher.
A forgiving road has a cross section that is sufficiently wide, has sufficient
bearing capacity and obstacle-free shoulders, and is adapted to acceptable
risks15 to third parties or risks to car occupants. If this is not feasible and if the
danger zone cannot be removed in another way, it is recommended the use
of a protective feature (i.e. vehicle restraint systems).
It is important to underline that the use of restraint systems is just the last solution
to protect road users from roadside hazards. Designers should therefore
preliminarily check alternative solutions, namely:
• remove the hazards;
• make the hazard safe (e.g. by changing the design of the median and
verges of the road);
• replace the hazards with a passive safe structure (e.g. posts and
columns).
Vehicle restraint systems represent in fact a hazard in themselves and should
therefore only be installed if it is more dangerous to drive off the road than to
drive into the vehicle restraint systems. Restraint systems shall be therefore
installed where there are one or more hazards within the ‘safety zone’ (or ‘clear
zone’).
A ‘safety zone’ is an obstacle-free area with flat and gently graded ground,
thus providing road users with sufficient space and the right conditions to regain
control over their vehicles in case of a run-off16.
15 As regards what constitutes acceptable risk, generally it is translated for shoulders on the
basis that if a vehicle leaves the road it should not hit any obstacles causing severe injury.
16 Further details on the ‘clear zone’ concept and, more in general, on the roadside hazard
management, are available in the CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 3 (CAREC,
2018c)
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Safe shoulders along collector roads are however a difficult subject. Often, the
free space is not sufficiently wide, nor has it sufficient bearing capacity, nor is it
obstacle-free for protective devices to work in a safe way. In addition, it is not
yet general practice in Pakistan - like in many other countries - to protect
roadside obstacles on rural collector roads.
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Permitted nodes
1 2 -
2 3 3
Type 1: System interchange (e.g.
cloverleaf)
Type 2: Service interchange (e.g. half
Local
- 3 3 cloverleaf)
Type 3: At-grade intersection
herds
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Speeding has been widely recognized to fall into one of two categories:
• Excessive speed: drivers exceeding the posted speed limit
• Inappropriate speed: drivers choosing a speed that is not safe for the
given conditions
Both types of speeding can potentially raise the likelihood of a crash occurring
through increasing the stopping distance by increases to:
• The distance the vehicle travels between the initial perception of an
event requiring the vehicle to stop and the actual motor action taken to
stop or slow the vehicle.
• The stopping distance of the vehicle at a given speed.
Figure 27 illustrates the stopping distance required at various speeds.
Figure 27 - Braking distances (source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau, as cited by WHO, 2008)
Speed also affects the severity of crashes. Higher speed crashes involve more
kinetic energy (kinetic energy is proportional to the speed squared) and the
more energy that is dispersed in a crash, the more severe it tends to be. It is the
scale of this energy exchange that determines the severity of injury.
The likelihood of being involved in a serious or fatal crash increases significantly
with even small increases in vehicle speed as shown in Figure 28. Reading
across the x-axis (bottom) of this graph, it can be seen that an increase in mean
speeds of 5% leads to an increase in injury crashes of 10% (black dotted line),
and a 20% increase in fatal crashes (black continuous line). Similarly, if mean
speeds were to decrease by 5%, then a reduction in all injury crashes of 10%
and a reduction in fatal crashes of 20% should be expected.
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Figure 28 – Change in number of injured on change in mean speed (source: WHO, 2008)
Figure 29 - Relative injury accident rate on urban roads and rural roads for vehicles going faster and
slower than average speed (source: Kloden et al., as cited in OECD, 2006)
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Driver
factors
Education Vehicles
promotion factors
Driver
Speed
zone/limit speed Road factors
choice
Enforcement Traffic
sanctions conditions
Crash and
injury risk
Figure 30 – Factors affecting speed choice (source: Oxley and Corben, as cited in WHO, 2008)
Even though some research has shown that speed limits have a positive
influence on actual speeds, however, it should be stressed that other research
has indicated that changing the speed limit alone has little effect. In places
where speed limits have been changed and no other action taken, the
change in average speed is only about one quarter of the change of the
speed limit (DETR, 2000). Any changes in speed limits should ideally be
accompanied by appropriate enforcement, engineering and educational
measures. International best practice suggests that the best results are likely to
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Box 1. Factors to consider when setting speed limits (source: WHO, 2008)
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Once the appropriate speed limit has been determined for a road or a section
of road, steps must be taken to ensure drivers adopt the appropriate speed.
The ‘default’ speed limits, in many countries, are not signposted. Nevertheless,
in countries like Pakistan that need to tackle the problem with determination, it
is advisable that they would be clear to existing and new drivers (including
visitors) entering the road network or a specific road (e.g. entering a
motorway).
In specific cases alternative (to default) speed limits can be used. These limits
may include:
• linear speed limits (including transition/buffer speed limits) i.e. along
lengths of roads and streets
• area-wide residential or commercial speed limits, with signs at entry point
to the designated area
• time based speed zones:
o school speed zone, usually twice daily time-based lower limits for
an hour or so at school starting and finishing times
o seasonal speed zone, for example at holiday resorts in busier
summer months when vehicular and pedestrian traffic is greater
• variable speed limits (limits that change under certain conditions or times
of day, e.g. in wet conditions)
• heavy vehicle speed limits
It is recommended, however, not to continuously change the limit as this can
lead to unexpected and inconsistent behaviour. If on a road section it is
necessary to reduce the speed in many locations, it is advisable to adopt a
lower limit than the default one on the entire stretch.
As regards the lower limits for heavy vehicles, it is worth to remind, that the use
of different speed limits for different vehicle categories on a section of road,
could create the opportunity for substantial turbulence within traffic and may
increase the frequency of overtaking manoeuvres, which can in themselves
lead to increased crash risk. If there is to be a lower limit, it is suggested that this
is a consistent amount below general limits, whether default or signed, on all
rural roads. Speed differential is a major cause of crash risk on higher speed
roads (WHO, 2008; see also 3.2.2).
Signs are the primary way of communicating the speed limit of a road to drivers.
Careful consideration needs to be given to the use and placement of signs to
ensure that all drivers on a given section of road are given consistent
information. The recommended intervals are as follows:
• urban areas: 400 m
• rural areas:
o motorways and other arterial roads: 4/5 km
o other roads: 2/3 km
In addition to post-mounted speed limit signs next to the road, markings on the
road can also be used to show the current speed limit.
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21Gateways are devices used to mark a threshold – usually to a village or higher risk location
on the road – where lower speeds are required from drivers. Gateways rely on highly visible
vertical treatments to capture driver/rider attention and usually include signs, pavement
markings, speed limits, but also architectural and rural treatments such as picket fencing or
gates, earth mounds and rock walls.
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3.4.3.1 Narrowing
Wider roads invite drivers to select
higher travel speeds. This may be
because the perceived margin for
error is greater. So, narrower road
widths tend to slow traffic speeds.
Actually, road narrowing cannot
be considered as a speed-
reducing device in itself, but it can
act as a reminder or
encouragement to drive slowly or
calmly. It uses a psycho-perceptive
sense of enclosure to discourage
speeding. Figure 32 – Road narrowing in an urban street in the
USA
Where traffic capacity is not a
problem, the cross section of the
road should change where the built-up area begins and the width of lanes can
be reduced. In many cases, it is possible to change a four-lane road into a two-
lane road through the built-up area.
The new layout can be obtained adding a raised island located along the
centreline of a road that narrows the travel lanes. Fitted with a gap to allow
pedestrians to walk through at a crosswalk, they are also very useful as
‘pedestrian refuges’.
If it is not advisable to reduce the capacity, a simple ‘optical’ narrowing can
be effective too. In this case the cross-section remains unchanged, whereas
the shoulder is changed (e.g. building a sidewalk with kerbstone, planting trees
or bushes, etc.).
3.4.3.2 Horizontal deflection
Horizontal deflection measures use
forces of lateral acceleration to
discourage speeding.
Generally, all horizontal shifts may
be classified as chicanes, more or
less pronounced. In case of
presence of a central island, they
mainly differ because of its width.
A chicane consists of a
displacement of the road axis with
a significant deflection of the
trajectory.
Figure 33 – Chicane with a central island in France
This is a traffic calming measure
used to emphasize the transition between the rural environment and the built-
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As seen at length in Chapter 3, safe roads are roads that are self-explaining
and forgiving of mistakes to reduce the risk of a crash occurring and to protect
road users from fatal or serious injury should a crash occur. This requires roads
and roadsides to be designed, built, and maintained to reduce the risk and
severity of crashes.
To achieve this objective, a comprehensive strategy for road infrastructure
safety management needs to be put in place. Without it, in fact, there is a real
risk of implementing disconnected interventions in a framework of high
inefficiency and consequent possible waste of resources.
The strategy, which is based on the Safe System principles, is outlined in the
Figure 35 and is described in detail in the following paragraphs.
A very good benchmark in this field is the European Directive 2008/96/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on road
infrastructure safety management. This Directive mandates all EU member
States to establish and implement a well-defined set of procedures relating to
abovementioned strategy. This Directive will be referred to several times in the
following paragraphs.
• RSIA at feasibility
Construction • Post-opening RSA
stage • RSI (proactive)
• Pre-opening RSA
• RSA at preliminary • Data analysis and
and detailed design treatement of crash
stages locations (reactive)
Design Operation
Figure 35 - Road safety management approaches throughout the project life-cycle (adapted from
AfDB, 2014)
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The RSIA should be carried out while the project is still at concept stage. At this
stage the assessment explores the road safety implications of each option
being considered, including the Do-Nothing and Do-Minimum options. The
assessment should provide all relevant information necessary for comparison of
the options and selection of the solution, including a comparative analysis of
the road safety implications of each alternative considered and an evaluation
of the road safety benefits and dis-benefits arising from each alternative.
The objective of RSIA is to consider the proposed project from a road safety
point of view, to compare the impact on road safety of each proposed option
and to determine which would give the best road safety outcome. With every
project there is the possibility that the existing situation would be preferable to
any of the options considered, and so it is essential that this alternative is also
considered in the assessment.
Road safety impact is only one of the aspects considered by a design team
when selecting the preferred option. It is important that the reasoning behind
the conclusions of the impact assessment is made clear, so that it is given due
weight in the selection process. This should minimise the risk of collisions
occurring in the future either as a result of planning decisions or as a result of
unintended effects of the design of road schemes.
A methodology for RSIA is set out in the Irish guidelines (NRA, 2016) and is
reported in Box 2.
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22According to iRAP the value of a fatality is about 70*GDP/Capita, whereas the value of a
serious injury is 17*GDP/Capita (McMahon & Dahdah, 2008)
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It is therefore quite obvious that auditor approval is a crucial task for any road
authority. As stated in the CAREC manual, it is suggested that every country
establishes its own national register of auditors. In Pakistan, besides a national
register, which ideally should be administered by NHA, different registers can
be established in each province or territory.
In any case it is of paramount importance to establish clear requirements to
approve applicants. Firstly, it is strongly recommended that application would
be limited only to civil engineers (or equivalent) that have at least experience
in road design and/or traffic planning.
In addition, as recommended by the CAREC RSA manual, it is recommended
that an applicant, in order to be registered as an RSA team leader (i.e. senior
auditor), should:
• have completed an approved road safety audit training course,
• have a minimum of 3 years’ practical experience in a road or road
safety-related field, and
• have completed at least five road safety audits under the guidance of
a senior road safety auditor, of which at least three of the five audits must
be at a design stage.
Finally, to be registered as a team member, an applicant should:
• have completed an approved road safety audit training course, and
• have a minimum of 2 years’ practical experience in a road- or road
safety-related field
According to this scheme is very important to promote the involvement of local
engineers in auditing. In the first period (2/3 years) the audits will be necessarily
leaded by international auditors, but only following this approach the local
practitioners can gain sufficient experience to lead an audit in the future.
The RSA training courses should be officially recognised by national authorities
(e.g. NHA, MoC, etc.), should be at least of 5 days’ duration, presented by an
experienced road safety auditor, and should include a final exam. Only
applicants passing successfully the exam should be allowed to be registered.
The course should contain a program of presentations that should be not
limited to the audit process but should describe in detail the whole road safety
engineering process. Technical topics may include safety in geometric design,
vulnerable road users, signs, delineation, safety at road works, and roadside
hazard management.
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A 7-day Road Safety Auditing & Inspection training course was held in the NUST University
(Islamabad) in February 2018. The course was approved and funded by the ADB in order
to support the Government of Pakistan to:
• build capacity to identify, treat and eliminate high crash and hazardous
locations as identified in the National Highway Authority Road Safety Action Plan
2018-2020, and
• establish a team of informed and skilled focal persons to coordinate
dissemination and piloting road safety engineering best practices.
The course was designed to provide road engineers with a theoretical and practical
knowledge of main road safety engineering tools and specifically to build the
knowledge and skills required to conduct road safety audits and inspections. It
referenced the strategic context for safe roads within the draft National Road Safety
Strategy 2018-2030, with particular reference to Pillar 2 – Safe Roads. Specific objectives
were as follows:
• To train and qualify a first kernel of road safety auditors
• To train road authorities officials on road safety engineering practices to identify
and treat high crash cluster locations
• To train road authorities officials on preventive road safety inspections
• To share international best practices in safe road design
• To discuss main issues concerning road design standards and their current
implementation in Pakistan
The course included theory sessions, best practices and case studies taking into account
the local practice, small group sessions, participant workshops, site visits, submission of a
Road Safety Inspection Report and a final examination.
The training team – contracted by the Danish firm NTU - included both international and
national experts, covering various aspects of road safety (engineering, road crash
investigation, crash data analysis, institutional aspects).
The course was articulated over:
• 9 days (including a weekend)
• 10 modules (both theoretical and practical)
• workshops
• homework
• final examination
The Training Course program was as follows:
• Day 1:
o Module 1: Road safety national and international framework
o Module 2: Crash investigation
• Day 2:
o Module 3: Road safety engineering process
• Day 3:
o Module 4: Conflict studies
o Module 5: The management system of crash data
• Day 4:
o Module 6: Road safety audits and inspections
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• Day 5:
o Module 7: Site visit
• Days 6/7:
o Self-directed preparation of the Road Safety Inspection Report for
examination assessment and preparation for the course examination
• Day 8:
o Module 9: The safe road design
• Day 9:
o Module 10: Principles of traffic engineering
o Final examination
A total of 26 participants completed the course, including representatives from National
Highway Authority (NHA), Capital Development Authority (CDA), Pakhtunkhwa
Highways Authority (PKHA), Communication and Works Departments of Governments of
KP and Balochistan, Engineering Consultancy Services Punjab (ECSP), NUST, University of
Karachi. Only 4 participants did not pass the final exam.
Group photo
The terminology of this definition gives an indication of the scope of the RSI as
follows:
• The term ordinary indicates that an in-depth, forensic investigation is not
expected.
• The measures to be carried out in response to the inspection are
described as maintenance work; this suggests that major changes to the
layout of the road, entailing high cost, are not envisaged as counter-
measures; however, engineering works are often required to remediate
the issues.
• The term periodical indicates the need for inspections to be repeated at
intervals, rather than being a once-off event. Their frequency should be
sufficiently frequent to safeguard adequate safety levels for the road
infrastructure in question23.
RSI is an on-going process, with roads being subject to re-inspection at regular
intervals.
The iRAP programme can be considered as an evolution of the RSI as described
here. This methodology turns the road features detected during the inspection
in quantitative attributes that then, using a quite complex algorithm, provide a
synthetic judgment about road safety. In this case, the inspection is therefore
not limited to the identification of road safety issues, but it is aimed to identify
all road characteristics that, to a different extent, influence the likelihood of a
crash and its severity. More details about iRAP and the techniques developed
under this programme are reported in the Box 4.
RSI responds to the safety implications of changing conditions on the road
network. The road environment is dynamic; it is not fixed over its design life.
Roadside features are added or removed, materials forming the road
deteriorate and are replaced, new developments are built on the road
frontage altering access conditions and changing traffic flows.
Changes also occur to our understanding of road safety and road design
standards; certain engineering designs that would have been considered safe
in the past are today considered unacceptable.
In respect of the timing, the inspection should be carried out:
• By day, in both directions. An inspection by night is advisable if collision
records show an unexpected share of crashes during the night.
• At times of normal operation of the road. Unless otherwise required, avoid
times when the road environment conditions are abnormal, such as
when special events are occurring. However, if events are frequent
(occurring at least weekly), and if the conditions during those events are
considered to affect road safety, then the route should also be driven
23 Irish guidelines (NRA, 2014) suggest the following maximum periods between inspections:
• 5 years for motorways and other dual-carriageway arterial roads
• 3 years for other roads
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Figure 36 – Screenshot of a software to manage videos from a camera provided with GPS (on the top
right it is visible the tracking of the travelled route)
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About iRAP
iRAP was formed in England in 2006 and was granted charity
status in 2011. It is an umbrella organization for road
assessment programmes worldwide (e.g. EuroRAP in
Europe, AusRAP in Australia, usRAP in the US, ChinaRAP in
China, PakRAP – soon – in Pakistan) and facilitates the
development of road assessment work in low- and middle-income countries.
iRAP assumed that reliable crash data would not be available in these countries and
developed new ‘proactive’ techniques to overcome these shortcomings.
Today iRAP works in partnership with government and non-government organisation to
(i) inspect high-risk roads and develop targeted road safety plans, (ii) build local
capability providing training, technology and support, and (iii) track road safety
performance so that funding agencies can assess the benefits of their investments.
Road inspection
Using vehicles equipped with one or more cameras, inspections focus on more than 50
different attributes that are known to influence the likelihood of a crash and its severity.
These attributes include intersection design, the number of lanes and markings, roadside
hazards, footpaths and bicycle facilities.
Star Ratings
Star Ratings are based on road inspection data and provide a simple and objective
measure of the level of safety which is ‘built-in’ to the road for vehicle occupants,
motorcyclists, bicyclists and pedestrians.
Five-star roads are the safest while one-star roads are the least safe. According to iRAP,
every extra star rating results in a halving of crash cost on terms of the number of people
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Star Ratings of N-5 highway for different road users (source: IRAP)
24 On 21 November 2017 WHO Member States agreed 12 road safety performance targets.
Among them, Target 3 states: ‘By 2030, all new roads achieve technical standards for all road
users that take into account road safety, or meet a three star rating or better’
25 Three years is the minimum period to assure statistical reliability
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26 The exception to this ‘rule’ would be a site with a much higher than expected proportion of
fatal and serious crashes. For example, on a high-speed road with one fatal and three serious
injury crashes but no minor injury crashes.
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• The use of the number of casualties as a criterion may distort the network
ranking, potentially making critical road sections with few crashes but
many fatalities and/or injuries27.
• The target of this methodology is the infrastructure. The road does not
have any influence in certain variables determining the number of
casualties (i.e. number of vehicle occupants) or the severity of the crash
(i.e. seat belt/helmet wearing, age of occupants, presence of air bags
and/or other vehicle safety devices, etc.).
In order to classify the road network, the following indexes can be used:
• Collision rate (per volume of traffic)28
• Frequency of collisions (or collisions per km of road)
The difference between the two above indexes is that the second takes no
account of exposure (i.e. traffic). Of course, the accuracy of the collision rate
is dependent on the accuracy of traffic volume information. In a first phase,
where the overall objective is to reduce crash numbers, the frequency is a valid
index and its use is recommended in case the traffic data are not reliable
and/or are not available for the whole network to be analysed.
The above indexes must be referred to homogeneous road sections, that is:
• Layout and traffic flow must not change significantly in any single route
(e.g. sections can contain either motorway links or non-motorway links,
but not both).
• The whole section must fall along the same numbered road to ensure
that crash data can be retrieved using only road number and chainage.
• The design and operation must be as uniform as possible, so that the
conditions along the route are similar and the crash index reflects a
reasonable average over all parts of the section.
• Sections should start and end at relevant junctions.
Besides the above criteria, it is essential to assess lengths that minimise the
impact of year-on-year variability in crash numbers and present a stable
longer-term estimate of crash risk. Research conducted by the Transport
Research Laboratory (TRL) show that the number of crashes on busy networks
over a three-year data period for sections of at least 5 km provide a reasonably
robust estimate of risk. Sections less than 5 km tend to show greater year-on-
year variability in crash numbers in addition to being more likely to change risk
rating from one period to another and were therefore less reliable when
compared over time. For motorways and dual and single carriageways these
differences were significant up to section lengths of 10 km (EuroRAP, 2018).
27As an example, on 11th November 2014, along the Therry bypass (Khairpur, Sindh), a
passenger bus collided a truck. In just one crash 59 casualties occurred. Can a single crash
define a site as hazardous?
67.8799:;:7<;/>?@A × CDE
28 !"##$%$"& ()*+ ,+( 10/ 0+ℎ. 34 = FGH.IH J@>; × KKLM × A7NO? 9?<POQ (ST)
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If data allow this kind of analysis, they should furtherly clustered by common
crash-type or factors like common weather or daylight, common speed range,
etc.29
This analysis should aim to highlight factors common to a number of the
collisions at the site in the view that the prevalence of crashes at only some
locations, and the clustering of crash-types at a single location usually indicates
that there are common causes for the crashes. The aim of this analysis is
therefore to identify sites which have ‘treatable’ collision problems amenable
to road engineering treatments. Figure 38 shows a site with a dominant right
turn accident problem, along with other more individual accident types.
Figure 38 – Site with a predominant right-turn collision problem (source: DoE, 1996)
29For this kind of analysis, it would be very useful to examine the individual police crash report
forms. Unfortunately - in Pakistan like in many other countries - these records are not made
easily available to practitioners.
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To ensure that road deficiencies are identified it is essential that site inspections
are carried out in an extremely systematic and purposeful manner.
If the crash data show a cluster of a particular crash-type, this means several
people are misreading the situation as they approach, drive through, turn at,
walk across, or otherwise negotiate the location. The questions that always
should be done are therefore:
• What is causing them to do this?
• What is misleading or difficult to deal with?
These issues cannot be identified only from crash data, crash report forms or
photographs. It is essential to carry out a site visit always taking into account
the point of view of different road users (‘role play’).
Basic principles of the site visit are as follows:
• Look at the site at in relation of the results of data analysis
• Carry out the visit in conditions similar of those when crashes occur (e.g.
same time, peak/off-peak, light/dark, wet/dry, etc.)
• View the location as the road users in a crash may have seen it
• Drive through the location repeating the manoeuvres featured in the
crash data
• Observe ‘dangerous movements’
• Take notes, photos and videos
4.5.4 Diagnosing the crash problems
The objective of this activity is - basing on crash analysis and site visit - to identify
these common causes and to counter them by applying appropriate remedial
engineering treatments.
It is not possible to define specific rules to identify the causes. One type of crash
may have different causes at different locations. A list of possible contributing
factors for different types of crashes is provided in Table 8.
Table 8 - Some possible contributing factors for different type of crashes
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30 A CMF is a multiplicative factor used to compute the expected number of crashes after
modifying the road characteristics at a specific site (e.g. by implementing a given
countermeasure). A CMF higher than 1 is assumed to increase the likelihood or severity of a
target crash type, while if lower than 1 decreases crash likelihood/severity.
31 A useful reference is SafetyCube, a research project funded by the European Commission
With reference to the above ranges, the following reductions can be assumed:
It may be needed to add collisions generated by the scheme (e.g. shunts at traffic
signals).
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economic terms34. The method can be used to rank proposals at different sites,
but also to rank different options at a site. The FYRR is calculated using the
formula:
Y&&Z)# ["##$%$"& %)0$&\%
VWXX =
][ℎ+4+ ["%*
The options with the highest FYRR are then chosen for implementation.
However, there should be a note of caution here in that high FYRR values are
generally achieved with schemes costing little money but saving fewer crashes
(the temptation to solve every problem by putting up a sign should be
avoided!).
The number of crashes saved within each option should therefore be taken into
account. It is suggested that a minimum predicted crash reduction of 25-30%
should be achievable for each site.
4.5.7 Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring is the systematic collection of data about the performance of road
safety treatments after their implementation.
Evaluation is the statistical analysis of that data to assess the extent to which
the treatment (or a wider treatment program) has met crash reduction
objectives.
Post-implementation monitoring is essential to ascertain the positive and
negative effects of a treatment and thus improve the accuracy and
confidence of predictions of that treatment’s effectiveness in subsequent
applications. There is a duty to ensure that the public does not experience
additional hazards as a result of treatments and this duty carries with it an
implied need to monitor what happens when a scheme is introduced.
The purposes of monitoring a treatment are to (IHT, as cited in Austroads, 2009):
• assess what changes have occurred in crash occurrence and whether
safety objectives have been met
• assess the treatment’s impact on the distribution of traffic and the speeds
of motor vehicles
• call attention to any unintended effects on traffic movements or crash
occurrence
• assess the effects of the treatment on the local environment
• learn of the public’s response to the treatment: its acceptability in
general and any concerns about safety in particular.
34It should be noted that there is a more rigorous method of economic assessment of
proposals known as the Net Present Value (NPV). The NPV method takes a longer-term view
than FYRR and calculates benefits over a 10 or 15-year scheme life, using discount factors to
assess costs and benefits at year 1 prices. It may be more appropriate to use the NPV method
for higher cost schemes.
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35A ‘conflict study’ is a technique that involves observation of the conflicts, or ‘near crashes’,
experienced by road users. Conflicts can be defined as ‘situations involving one or more road
users who approach each other such that there is a risk of collision if their movements remain
unchanged’. In a conflict study the numbers of conflicts are recorded and graded
according to the scale of severity ranging from controlled evasive manoeuvres to extreme
emergency action.
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References
AASHTO (2011) – A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets –
Washington, USA
ADB (2018a) – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 1 / Road Safety Audit
ADB (2018b) – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 2 / Safer Road Works
ADB (2018c) – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 3 / Roadside Hazard
Management
AfDB (2014a) – Road Safety Manuals for Africa – Existing Roads: Proactive
Approaches
AfDB (2014b) – Road Safety Manuals for Africa – Existing Roads: Reactive
Approaches
AfDB (2014c) – Road Safety Manuals for Africa – New Roads and Schemes:
Road Safety Audit
Ahmed, A. et al. (2018) – Road Safety Audit Policy, Procedures & Guidelines –
National Highway Authority, Islamabad, Pakistan
Austroads (2009) – Guide to Road Safety Part 8: Treatment of Crash Locations
– Sydney, Australia
Buchanan, C. (1963) - Traffic in towns; A study of the long term problems of
traffic in urban areas - London, UK
CERTU (1994) - Les ralentisseurs de type dos d’âne et trapézoïdal [Speed humps
and speed tables] (Lyon, France)
Department of Environment (1996) - A Guide to Road Safety Engineering in
Ireland – Dublin, Ireland
DETR (2000) – New directions in speed management: a review of policy –
London, UK
DHV (2005) – Sustainable safe road design – A practical manual – The World
Bank, Washington, USA
Elvik, R., Hoye, A., Vaa, T., Sorensen, M. (2009) - The Handbook of Road Safety
Measures. Second Edition - Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, UK
EuroRAP (2018) – RAP Road Risk Mapping Manual: Technical Specifications –
Basingstoke, UK
McMahon, K. & Dahdah, S. (2008) – The true cost of road crashes. Valuing life
and cost of a serious injury – iRAP, Basingstoke, UK
NRA (2014) – Road Safety Inspection Guidelines - Volume 5 Section 2, Part 2,
NRA HA 17/14 - Dublin, Ireland
NRA (2016) – Road Safety Impact Assessment Guidelines – Volume 5 Section 2,
Part 2, NRA HA 18/16 - Dublin, Ireland
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