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The preparation of these Guidelines was assisted by a technical assistance grant financed by the

UK Department for International Development (DFID) and administered by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB).

The document does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB, DFID or the Government concerned,
and ADB, DFID and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents.

Published by: Ministry of Communications, Islamabad


June 2019
Photo credits: Asian Development Bank, Pakistan
www.communication.gov.pk
Guidelines for Road
Safety Engineering|Part I

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials


AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic
ADB Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir
CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
CDA Capital Development Authority
CMF Crash Modification Factor
DFID Department For International Development
EC European Commission
ECSP Engineering Consultancy Services Punjab
EN European Norm
EU European Union
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FYRR First Year Rate of Return
GB Gilgit-Baltistan
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoP Government of Pakistan
GPS Global Positioning System
iRAP International Road Assessment Programme
ITP Islamabad Traffic Police
KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MASH Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware
MoC Ministry of Communications
NHA National Highway Authority
NH&MP National Highway and Motorway Police
NPV Net Present Value
NTRC National Transport Research Centre
NUST National University of Sciences and Technology
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAK Pakistan
PKHA Pakhtunkhwa Highways Authority
PIARC World Road Association
RSA Road Safety Audit

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RSI Road Safety Inspection


RSIA Road Safety Impact Assessment
TA Technical Assistance
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
WHO World Health Organisation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preamble..................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3
1 Reference road safety framework ................................................................... 5
1.1 Pakistani road network ............................................................................... 5
1.2 The current road safety situation ............................................................... 5
2 Review of existing standards and guidelines................................................. 14
2.1 Road design standards currently used ................................................... 14
2.2 New geometric design standards ........................................................... 14
2.3 Asian Highway design standards ............................................................. 15
2.4 CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manuals............................................. 16
2.5 NHA Road Safety Audit guidelines .......................................................... 17
3 Sustainable safety principles for road design ................................................ 20
3.1 Safe System principles ............................................................................... 20
3.2 Sustainable Safety principles .................................................................... 21
3.3 Categorization of roads and network design ........................................ 33
3.4 Speed management ................................................................................ 38
4 Road infrastructure safety management ...................................................... 50
4.1 Road safety strategies .............................................................................. 51
4.2 Road safety impact assessment .............................................................. 52
4.3 Road safety audits..................................................................................... 55
4.4 Road safety inspections ............................................................................ 58
4.5 Treatment of crash locations ................................................................... 62
References ................................................................................................................ 77
Annex – Road design standards’ benchmark ...................................................... 79

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Preamble
The objective of the TA-8990 PAK: Enabling Economic Corridors through
Sustainable Transport Sector - Road Safety Component is to assist the
Government of Pakistan (GoP) to establish sustainable national road safety
institutions and to build the structures, processes and capacity required at all
levels to achieve long term reductions in road traffic deaths.
The project structure is aligned with the UN Road Safety Pillars and underpinned
by the Safe System Approach. Globally, Pillar 2 ‘Safe Roads’ is a key focus area.
Currently road safety, particularly the safety of vulnerable road users, such as
motorcycle riders, pedestrians, bicyclists and occupants of 3-wheeled vehicles
is not sufficiently prioritised in road design, construction, improvement and
maintenance.
These Road Safety Engineering Guidelines aim to provide a suitable document
for practitioners both being engineers in agencies with a responsibility for road
construction and network management and private consultants. The objective
is therefore to provide a practical tool that will be used by managers and
engineers responsible for designing, improving, and maintaining all classes of
road at all government levels in Pakistan.
The development of Guidelines content and format is being coordinated with
two concurrent NHA projects: development of Pakistan Road Design
Guidelines and the introduction of Pakistan International Road Assessment
Program to ensure that the three initiatives are integrated.
The overall objective is to support Federal, Provincial and Territory road
agencies to deliver safer roads throughout Pakistan.
The Guidelines consist of two parts as follows:
Part I - General recommendations for safer roads
Methodological document in which, after a brief overview of the main
road safety issues affecting Pakistan, a systemic route is defined for
solving problems in a cost-effective perspective.
Reference is made to international best practices such as, for example,
the European Directive 2008/96/EC, or road safety engineering manuals
published in the countries historically most reputable in the field of road
safety (e.g. UK, Netherland, Ireland, Australia, etc.).
Part II - Catalogue of countermeasures for typical road safety issues
Practical design guide consisting of a sample of forms describing typical
cases of infrastructural deficiencies and possible countermeasures.
The catalogue gives brief information, including pictorial
representations, of well-known design errors in a readily understood
way, will suggest a range of methods to overcome these and will give

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an indication of the countermeasure costs and benefits to facilitate


prioritisation of the work.
The catalogue can be used both as a proactive safety tool to ensure
the design faults do not arise in the first place, or a reactive safety tool
to assist in designing cost-effective countermeasures where problems
already exist on the road network.

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Introduction
In Pakistan, WHO statistics (WHO, 2018) indicate that more than 27,000 people
were killed in road collisions in 20161.
According to the international statistics2, we can estimate that the death of
about one third of them is – at least partially – related to the road environment.
In fact, although reliable crash data are still not available in Pakistan, there is
information about many collisions where the road alignment, equipment or
traffic management were one of the main factors
Consequently, it is proven that a good and ‘safety-oriented’ design may
reduce the probability and severity of crashes, and measurable safety gains
have been achieved in all countries where this approach has been
implemented.
On the other hand, if this new approach to design is not part of a management
system that allows the entire cycle from planning to the construction and
maintenance of the infrastructure to be effectively controlled, there is a risk of
providing a sterile tool that is not supported by the institutional and
programming framework.
Currently, Pakistan does not have a shared system for managing road
infrastructure safety. Each activity related to road infrastructure security is
mainly due to occasional initiatives of a few individual organisations (e.g. NHA,
Punjab Road Safety Authority, etc.), without them being part of a broader
national design. This is also in addition to a situation where the limited
adherence to a specific set of road design guidelines is still an issue.
This document, underpinned by the principles of the Safe System approach, is
intended to respond to these needs. After a general description of the
problem, it describes some key processes, already widely tested in other
countries, which, if implemented, can constitute the architecture on which to
implant a new (safety-oriented) approach to design.
The Part I of the Guidelines consists of four main sections:
1. Reference road safety framework
2. Review of existing standards and guidelines
3. Sustainable safety principles for road design
4. Road infrastructure safety management

1 To make a comparison, in the same year, Pakistan lost 1,803 precious lives in terrorism and
insurgency incidences (source: South Asia Terrorism Portal), events that always evoke a
dramatic societal response; unfortunately, the same response was not there for the road
carnage.
2 Cf. Treat et al. (1979) - Tri-level study of the causes of traffic accidents: Final report. US DoT

NHTSA Report DOT HS-805-099, or AASHTO (2010) - Highway Safety Manual. 1st Edn.
Washington, DC.
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1 Reference road safety framework


1.1 Pakistani road network
The Pakistani national road network amounts to more than 263,000 km.
The length of the network under the administration of the NHA is 12,131 km (4.6%
of the total). This road network comprises 39 national highways, expressways
and strategic roads, and carries about 80% of the commercial traffic3.
The rest of the road network contains provincial highways and the roads under
respective local administration e.g. Cantonment Boards, Municipal
Corporations, Local Development Authorities, etc.
Total length of the roads may be seen from the Table below.
Table 1 – Estimated length of roads in Provinces (km; 2016)

Category Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan GB & AJK Total

Low type 30,901 23,415 12,320 8,460 453 75,549

High type 76,817 58,209 30,625 21,030 1,126 187,807

Total 107,718 81,624 42,945 29,490 1,579 263,356


(source: NTRC)

1.2 The current road safety situation


In the following paragraphs the main road safety issues observed across the
Pakistani road network are summarized. This assessment does not intend to be
exhaustive but is rather a brief overview of the most emblematic topics of a
rather critical situation.
1.2.1 Highway hierarchy
With the exception of few cases (e.g. Islamabad urban area), the road
categories are not easily recognizable. It results in a situation where road users
hardly understand which type of behaviour is expected in a specific road
section, thus leading to speeding or other dangerous practices.
In addition, if the function of a road link is not well defined or understood, a very
dangerous mix of traffic categories can be observed. The less homogeneous
traffic is, the more dangerous conflicts are likely: differences in speed and mass
between road users using the same link or junction at the same time should be
reduced to a minimum.

3 A map of the national highway network can be found on the NHA website by following
this link: http://nha.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NHA-Map.jpg
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On the contrary, in Pakistan, especially


on interurban highways or main urban
arterials, often we can observe very
different vehicles using the same link at
the same time: heavy trucks and buses
together with motorcycles and
rickshaws, fast cars with donkey carts or
pedestrians.
1.2.2 Road alignment
The road alignment of the main road
network, usually designed according to Figure 1 - Karachi city centre: disorganized mix
AASHTO standards, is generally of traffic functions

satisfactory although there is a


tendency to utilise long straights
interspersed with fairly tight radii. This is
now known to generate an
unacceptably high number of crashes. A
mixture of large and medium radii to give
a more curvilinear alignment has been
shown to reduce the crash rate.
Unfortunately, we cannot say the same
for most of the local roads, i.e.
secondary, tertiary and access roads,
that in general seem to be just laid Figure 2 - Poor alignment of the road to
Margalla Hills, Islamabad
following the terrain, without significant
earthworks. This obviously leads to very
dangerous alignments, especially in rolling environments. It is not rare to
observe very sharp bends, steep gradients and sharp crest vertical curves, thus
leading to very poor sight distances.
Poor harmonisation of the geometric
elements can be also observed. The
alignment of some rural provincial roads
is composed of long straights, sections of
very large radii and, very sudden, very
tight bends (without proper signage to
alert drivers).
As regards the motorways and other
trunk roads, some major departures from
standards have been observed, i.e.
sharp bends without super-elevation,
Figure 3 - Poor alignment on the M2 motorway steep gradients and sharp crest vertical
(Kallar Kahar section): sharp bends and steep curves. These departures, which are
gradients justified because of the increase of
construction costs in rolling or

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mountainous environments, lead to unexpected and dangerous situations


such as:
- Poor sight distances;
- Lack of proper transition or termination of the vertical alignment;
- Sudden bends, poorly signed, requiring sudden drastic reduction in speed;
- Presence of heavy trucks travelling at a very low speed (less than 30 km/h),
that on downhill sections, because of their poorly maintained brakes and state
of overloading, contribute to many serious crashes as a result of loss of control.
1.2.3 Junctions
The vast majority of non-signalised
junctions identified both in urban and
rural locations throughout Pakistan have
no clearly stated priority and are devoid
of both road markings and signing which
could have been used to convey any
instructions or advice to drivers. The
practice of traffic management at
intersections does not seem to be
practised to any great extent and traffic
is invariably left to drivers to sort out how Figure 4 - Urban junction in Islamabad with no
to negotiate the intersecting lines of markings or signs
travel without actually hitting any other
vehicles.
Even large complex intersections in large urban areas are without any form of
traffic management or control and drivers are left to find their way across many
conflicting lines of traffic as best they can. As a result, even during relatively
quiet off-peak periods there are massive queues at major junctions because of
the need to proceed cautiously and uncertainty shown by many drivers.
Roundabouts in Pakistan are not very common. Some examples have been
observed in schemes recently implemented in urban or sub-urban areas.
Unfortunately, in many cases, the junction layout contains very poor geometry,
i.e. small central islands, wide circulating roadway and, above all, minimal or
no deflection of trajectories. It can result in poor capacity (and therefore long
queues), dangerous conflicts and insufficient speed reduction.
As regards motorway interchanges, it has been observed that most of them
are not provided with the fully required length of acceleration and
deceleration lanes and tapers. In addition, these do not include a weaving
section where the entering vehicles can attain the operating speed of the
motorway lane and merge into the flow in safety. In case of heavy traffic
volume, it could be difficult to carry out this manoeuvre in safety.

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1.2.4 U-turns
The need to provide a safe and efficient
facility to accommodate U-turn
movements is essential for many divided
highways in Pakistan. In some cases,
especially in urban areas, they are also
used to avoid right-turn movements at
junctions4.
Unfortunately, in many cases the median
width neither allows the complete
manoeuvre within the median (vehicles
are forced to cross the opposite
Figure 5 – U-turns along N5 highway with no
carriageway and merge in the traffic
deceleration/acceleration lanes
stream in the travel lane) nor to host safe
deceleration and acceleration lanes. In
some cases, in order to provide enough room to U-turning long trucks, the cross-
section is narrowed, and one or more lanes are devoted to this manoeuvre. It
is clear that such narrowing produces a dangerous bottleneck and provides
further potential for crashes to occur.
These narrowings of carriageway width are usually not signed in advance so
that vehicle manoeuvres are invariably undertaken at the last moment.
1.2.5 Cross-section
The road cross-section will inevitably
have quite a bearing on the relative
safety of road users inasmuch that the
carriageway type and width, the
presence or not of a hard shoulder and
whether vehicle restraints are provided
are factors which will permit or regulate
appropriate vehicle speed.
Generally, throughout Pakistan the more
strategic roads are well equipped with 2-
or 3-lane carriageways in each
direction, separated by a median and Figure 6 - Unsafe vehicle restraint system along
N5 highway
with a hard shoulder. However, even
these strategic roads have deficient
safety aspects, the main concern being the lack of median crash barrier to
prevent the occurrence of cross-over collisions and the lack of crash barrier to
prevent errant vehicles from leaving the carriageway and proceeding out-of-

4This is typified by one of the preferred solutions adopted by the Islamabad Traffic Police of
closing the problematic junction and the provision of U-turns either side
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control down an embankment or into a structure with obvious results of


increased severity of casualties.
The provision not just of crash barrier but the correct installation of the most
appropriate type of barrier is equally important. Incorrect installation will
negate any effect that the crash is intended to have with regard to restraining
errant vehicles. When installed, the crash barrier must be the correct working
distance away from the object it is intended to protect from impact or from the
point at which a vehicle would proceed down an embankment, i.e. the back
of verge.
Again, the type of crash barrier is important. Different types of barriers have
different restraint capacity. Accordingly, for each type of road and traffic mix
a specific type of barrier should be used. At the moment, on the contrary, we
can say that the same type of barrier is used everywhere.
1.2.6 Traffic signs
Traffic sign design is a very extensive
subject in terms of the legibility,
conspicuity, frequency of use, siting and
location. Irrespective of the standards
currently in use for signing, the general
comment with regard to traffic signing in
Pakistan in both rural and urban
situations is that it is considerably lacking
in all these criteria.
Traffic signs are not noticeable as a
means of communication and are often
mostly poorly designed, poorly Figure 7 - Inconsistent signs

fabricated and erected, badly located


and mostly quite inappropriate for the purpose for which they are intended.
Second only to road markings, traffic signs are the next most effective method
of guiding, warning, informing and directing traffic. However, they are only
effective if basic guidelines are followed.
The same criteria should apply to warning and regulatory signs, but they are
often not according to any imposed standard.
An additional feature that is seriously lacking from the current provision of
signing in Pakistan is compliance with the material specification. In many cases
signs are made up locally to no set standards. It results in a lack of
retroreflectivity – so that signs cannot be discerned during night-time – and use
of inappropriate substrates and/or supports that can be hazardous in case of
collisions.

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1.2.7 Road markings


With the exception of the motorway
network, pavement markings are often
worn, not retroreflective or even absent.
In these conditions it is very difficult to
have a precise spatial cognition of the
roadsides and a vision at a distance of
the road alignment, especially under
poor visibility conditions such as might be
encountered in night, rain or fog.
Even in central urban areas where a high
degree of traffic management is required
to cope with high traffic flow levels and at Figure 8 - Road without center lane or edge
lines
quite complex junctions, there is a
conspicuous lack of information and guidance employed on the road surface.
Globally the use of lane markings and directions is used to guide traffic into the
most appropriate lane when approaching major junctions. This practice is
almost non-existent in Pakistan.
1.2.8 Traffic signals
Traffic signals, if they do not already suffer
from a lack of maintenance, are often
inconspicuous incorrectly located, are
insufficient for the number of lanes and
volumes of traffic, do not appear to have
sufficiently illuminated aspects and are
often precariously mounted and
installed. Particularly on the arterial urban
roads, where 3 or more lanes are present,
the small size and the location of the
traffic lights are inadequate and as a
result they are not visible at great Figure 9 - Damaged traffic signals in Karachi
distance, especially in heavy traffic,
when vehicles ahead may obstruct the view. The result is that drivers may be
led to ignore the signs or to brake suddenly.
The authorities in Pakistan do not appear to be following any standards or
guidelines related to the design or layout of signals with regard to i) location of
traffic poles, ii) mounting requirements, iii) size of signal heads, iv) sequence of
phasing and v) pavement marking required on the signalized intersections.
Moreover, signal timing is also based upon anecdotal experience rather than
any specific study or measurement of actual traffic demand.

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1.2.9 Temporary traffic management


Traffic management for road works is
invariably very poor, bordering on the
non-existent, in Pakistan. The work site is
hardly ever signed or protected (it is
often that sites where road construction
is taking place to find that traffic is
permitted to travel into the construction
area), advance warning is usually
absent and the transition to the diversion
is often very sharp. In general, standard
diversion routes are not adopted and
traffic is left to find its own way around Figure 10 – Road works poorly signalised
the construction site.
In addition, road works and temporary diversions are not lit and cannot be seen
at night-time, signing is not retro-reflective and cannot be discerned in poor
light and there is usually confusion with respect to what constitutes the
recommended carriageway and what constitutes the work area. In every
major project, a Traffic Management Plan is supposed to be developed and
submitted to the client by the design consultant. However, during the
implementation stage the approved Traffic Management Plan, if one exists, is
invariably ignored.
As a result, works sites are very dangerous places for both the traffic and those
who have to work within them.
1.2.10 Vulnerable road users
Pedestrians have a hard time in Pakistan
in both urban and rural settings with very
little attention given to the provision of
good facilities for walking. It is almost as
if it is taken for granted that pedestrians
will find a way to their destination and
therefore no special facilities need to be
provided. Worse still they are expected
to find a way across lanes of traffic
where, in some places, this can be quite
a considerable hazard. Figure 11 - No separation between road
vehicles and pedestrians
Even in recently built towns, e.g.
Islamabad, the pedestrians – and other
VRUs – are not properly considered in road planning and design, i.e. pedestrian
paths are interrupted, not effective (and therefore not used), not contiuous or
even not present.

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1.2.11 Traffic calming


Traffic calming techniques can be
observed rarely in Pakistan.
The most common features are speed
humps that are often used in a confused
manner, i.e. along trunk roads or as
isolated measures, without any clear
planning or applied strategy.
In addition, existing speed humps are
often not signalised by markings and/or
warning signs, thus being not visible,
particularly at night. Figure 12 - Typical speed hump in Pakistan
Their profile is usually circular. Flat-
topped humps are also frequent, whereas very few sinusoidal profiles have
been observed. Again, there is no uniform standard on their application or to
cover their design.

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2 Review of existing standards and


guidelines
2.1 Road design standards currently used
In Pakistan, there is no legislation obligating road designers to apply specific
standards.
Currently the most designers use US standards (AASHTO, ‘A Policy on Geometric
Design of Highways and Streets’, 6th Edition, 2011, commonly referred to as the
‘Green Book’). Almost all the roads recently built follows these standards, even
at the provincial level. Moreover, it has been observed that also the
rehabilitation of old roads, built during the period from 1960 to 1980, is carried
out following AASHTO standards.
Recently, it has also been observed that the use of Chinese standards is
increasing, especially for road projects funded by the Chinese government
(e.g. Pakistan Economic Corridor, main arterial highway connecting China
border to Gwadar Port). However, these standards are derived mainly from
AASHTO standards.
A review of ToRs for the design of new roads and rehabilitation of existing road
alignments confirms the use of AASHTO standards. It is worth noting, however,
that a quick analysis of a sample of documents indicates that some parameters
of the AASHTO guidelines are often misinterpreted (or deliberately altered?)
with respect to the AASHTO guidance. The actual implementation of these
standards is therefore in some cases still far from an acceptable level.
The challenge faced by road engineers in implementing AASHTO standards in
Pakistan is that they are complex standards and were developed for a
completely different road environment.
As regards signing and marking, the current standard in Pakistan is the ‘Manual
of Signs, Signals and Road Markings’ developed by NTRC in 1989. By many local
practitioners, it is expected that this outdated manual will be reviewed and
made consistent with current international practices.

2.2 New geometric design standards


In order to tackle the critical issues that have risen up in the use of AASHTO
standards in Pakistan, at the date of these Guidelines, the NHA is developing
an important project for the drafting of new ‘Geometric Design Standards &
Parameters for National Highway System of Pakistan’.
In order to harmonize the road network in Pakistan for all local and international
needs, the new Geometric Design Standards will be country-specific and will
address a spectrum of road types, varying from multi-lane motorways to single
carriageway roads.

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A new functional classification of roads is expected and, besides the main


Geometric Design Standards, it is expected that the following manuals are also
produced:
• Manual for road survey
• Manual for roadway signage
• Manual for pavement marking
• Training manuals
This document will therefore be the main reference for road designers in
Pakistan, who will finally be able to rely on a set of standards tailored to the
local situation.
In order to provide an overview of the design standards currently in use in some
developed countries, a benchmark of the main geometric parameters is
provided as an annex to this document.

2.3 Asian Highway design standards


In order to address the road safety problem along the Asian Highway Network5
the ESCAP secretariat, conducted a study during 2015-2017 on the
development of technical standards on road infrastructure safety facilities.
Among others, the objective was to develop detailed design guidelines for the
selected road infrastructure safety facilities for the Asian Highway Network. The
outcome was a comprehensive document that addresses these facilities from
both the road planning and design perspective. The design standard involves
both active provision of road infrastructure facilities and avoidance of
undesirable practices or design.
The design standard, as developed in the abovementioned study, consists of
two components6:
1. Design Standards, containing mandatory requirements7;
2. Detail Design Manual, consisting of recommendations pertaining to the
design standards.

5 The Asian Highway Network consists of eight core routes that substantially cross more than
one sub-region and a number of other routes within sub-regions or ESCAP member countries.
The network was formalized through an Intergovernmental Agreement that entered into
force in July 2005 (UN ESCAP, 2004).
6 A draft version of both documents is available here:

http://www.unescap.org/events/expert-group-meeting-road-infrastructure-safety-facilities-
asian-highway
7 In the study it is proposed that these would form Annex IV of the International Agreement on

the Asian Highway Network


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The approach followed in drafting the standards is really innovative and


addresses road safety from a holistic perspective incorporating modern
concepts such as ‘self-explaining roads’8 and ‘forgiving design’9.
The purpose of the standards is basically to propose a series of road
infrastructure safety facilities that, if implemented, would allow the risk to be
reduced and the star rating10 to be increased compared to the baseline
scenario11.
The guidelines are organised in seven parts as follows:
1. Road infrastructure
2. Intersections
3. Roadside areas
4. Pedestrians, slow vehicles and traffic calming
5. Delineation, pavement markings and lighting
6. Road signage
7. Tunnels
The document is therefore an important supplement (and source of valuable
information) to the drafting Pakistani geometric design standards.

2.4 CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manuals


The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has recently financed a technical
assistance for enhancing road safety for CAREC countries12. In the frame of this
project three road safety engineering manuals have been produced:
1. Road Safety Audit (March 2018)
2. Safer Road Works (March 2018)
3. Roadside Hazard Management (April 2018)

8 The concept of self-explaining roads encourages road designs that promote road-users to
adopt appropriate speeds and behaviour. This subject touches on consistency of alignment
design and a well-defined road hierarchy, and should be introduced into the design
standard wherever applicable.
9 Forgiving designs aim at giving road-users adequate rooms for errors and limiting the severity

of injuries in case of a crash.


10 Star ratings are the indexes used by iRAP to assess the safety of road users. They are based

on road inspection data and provide a simple and objective measure of the level of safety
that is ‘built-in’ to the road for vehicle occupants, motorcyclists, bicyclists and pedestrians.
11 The ‘baseline’ scenario is the one based on the existing Asian Highway Standards as

stipulated in the Annex II to the Intergovernmental Agreement (i.e. Asian Highway


classification and design standards). According to the study ‘baseline’ scenarios are in the
high risk 1- and 2-star ranges (in a scale 1 to 5).
12 The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program is a partnership of 11

countries and development partners working together to promote development through


cooperation, leading to accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction. Member
countries of CAREC are: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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These reports cover three key topics in the field of road safety and are therefore
practical points of reference for all practitioners in the region.
The manuals are mainly addressed to CAREC road projects13, but this does not
mean that their use can easily be extended to the entire road network.

Figure 13 – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manuals

2.5 NHA Road Safety Audit guidelines


In August 2018, the NHA issued the first national guidelines for road safety
auditing.
This is an important step forward in the prevention of road crashes in Pakistan
and reflects the NHA’s commitment to contribute to national targets for
reducing road deaths and injuries.
NHA’s ambitious goal is to make Road Safety Audits (RSAs) a routine activity in
the road planning and design process.
The document describes policy, procedures and guidelines for planning,
undertaking and documenting RSA. It also defines requirements and
responsibilities for conducting RSA. It is organized in the following sections:
• RSA – An overview
• RSA policy
• RSA phases
• RSA of existing roads – Road safety assessments
• Land use development RSA
• RSA process

13 CAREC focuses investment and other activities on the development of six competitive
transport corridors that link north, south, east, and west through the pivot of Central Asia. The
corridors reflect trade flow patterns and will speed the movement of people and goods
across the region. Critically, they also connect the mainly landlocked CAREC countries to
wider regional and global networks. Pakistan is crossed by Corridors 5a,b and 6c, both of
which follow the Peshawar – Islamabad – Lahore - Karachi route.
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• RSA team
• Writing RSA report
• Responding to RSA report
A series of appendices are also provided
at the end of the manual to provide
prompts for use while auditing, a sample
RSA decision tracking form, potential
design enhancements to address typical
RSA findings on national highways and
glossary of terms used in the manual.
The RSA manual is primarily developed for
RSAs to be conducted on national
highways. However, it is suitable for use
on the entire Pakistani road network,
including networks of Provinces and
Territories, by any person with a
responsibility for, or an interest in, road
safety (e.g. design consultants, police,
academics, provincial government
officers, students, researchers, etc.). Figure 14 – NHA RSA guidelines

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3 Sustainable safety principles for road


design
3.1 Safe System principles
Safe System principles underpin these Guidelines and the road infrastructure
safety management strategy.
The identification and removal or treatment of road elements that may
contribute to crash occurrence or crash severity is a key component of the Safe
System approach to road safety. Adopting a Safe System approach to road
safety recognises that humans, as road users are fallible and will continue to
make mistakes, and that the community should not penalise people with death
or serious injury when they do make mistakes. In a Safe System, therefore, roads
(and vehicles) should be designed to reduce the incidence and severity of
crashes when they inevitably occur.
The Safe System approach requires, in part14:
• Designing, constructing and maintaining a road system (roads, vehicles
and operating requirements) so that forces on the human body
generated in crashes are generally less than those resulting in fatal or
debilitating injury.
• Improving roads and roadsides to reduce the risk of crashes and minimise
harm: measures for higher speed roads including dividing traffic,
designing ‘forgiving' roadsides, and providing clear driver guidance. In
areas with large numbers of vulnerable road users or substantial collision
risk, speed management supplemented by road and roadside
treatments is a key strategy for limiting crashes.
• Managing speeds, taking into account the risks on different parts of the
road system.
Road safety engineering is therefore a cornerstone of this strategy.
Infrastructure treatments, in fact, can primarily reduce the probability of a crash
occurring and secondly to reduce a crash’s severity should it occur. To a lesser
extent road safety engineering can even ensure that rescue services can
reach a crash site promptly (e.g. providing the motorways with emergency
median openings and shoulders).

14 Cf. Australian Transport Council (2006) – National Road Safety Action Plan 2007 and 2008
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Figure 15 – Safe System approach (source: Safer Roads, Safer Queensland; 2015)

3.2 Sustainable Safety principles


‘In a sustainably safe road traffic system, infrastructure design inherently and
drastically reduces crash risk. Should a crash occur, the process that determines
crash severity is conditioned in such a way that severe injury is almost
excluded.’
From: Naar een duurzaam veilig wegverkeer [Towards sustainably safe road traffic], Koornstra
et al., 1992.

The concept of Sustainable Safety was launched in the early 1990s in the
Netherlands with the ambition stated above. In 2006 this concept was adopted
and relaunched by SWOV, a Dutch Institute for Road Safety Research, in order
to adapt it, where necessary, to new knowledge and developments (Wegman
& Aarts, 2006).
The Sustainable Safety vision, which is one of the pillars on which the Safe
System approach is built, aims to prevent crashes and, if this is not possible, to
reduce crash severity in such a way that (severe) injury risk is almost excluded.
These objectives are aimed for by means of a proactive approach informed
by prior study of the traffic situations in which serious, injury-producing crashes
can occur. The next stage involves two options: either the circumstances are
changed in such a way that the crash risk is almost totally removed, or, if this is
inevitable, serious crash injury risk is eliminated.

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In the analysis of and approach to preventing crashes or reducing the severity


of consequences of dangerous situations, human capacities and limitations
are the guiding factors. The central issue is that people, even if they are highly
motivated to behave safely while using the road, make errors that may result
in crashes. In addition, man is physically vulnerable and this has consequences
for injury severity when a crash occurs.
Taking into account these human characteristics as the starting point,
sustainably safe road traffic can be attained by an integral approach to the
components ‘man’, ‘vehicle’ and ‘road’. Focusing on the road infrastructure,
this means that the road has to be designed such that it meets human
capacities and limitations.
Given the fact that people make errors, do not always comply with rules and,
moreover, that they are vulnerable, it is essential that ‘gaps’ in the traffic system
are prevented in order to avoid a breeding ground for crashes. According to
the Sustainable Safety vision, in order to prevent serious unintentional errors, the
environment and the task demands that this environment entails have to be
adapted to a level that the majority of road users can cope with. This produces,
as it were, desirable behaviour almost automatically: the road user knows what
to expect (i.e. ‘self-explaining road’), and possible errors can be absorbed by
a forgiving environment (i.e. ‘forgiving roads’). This also makes the breeding
ground for intentional or unintentional violations less fertile (e.g. speeding would
be less likely, as the road environment itself suggests the most appropriate
speed).
The vulnerable human has to be protected in traffic by the environment by
means of structures that absorb the kinetic energy released in a crash. To this
end, the mass of vehicles sharing the same space needs to be compatible. If
this is not possible, then speeds need to be lowered. This system is embedded
in a traffic planning taxonomy of fast traffic flows on the one hand and access
to residences on the other. Between these two extremes, traffic has to be
guided in good, sustainably safe ways. With this slightly adapted vision on
sustainably safe road traffic, SWOV finally arrives at the five central principles:
• Functionality
• Homogeneity
• Predictability
• Forgivingness
• State awareness
A short description of these principles is given in the Table below.
The first four principles have strict connection with road infrastructure and road
design and are detailed in the following paragraphs.

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Table 2 – The Sustainable Safety principles

Sustainable Safety principles Description

Functionality of roads Monofunctionality of roads as either


through roads, distributor roads, or access
roads, in a hierarchically structured road
network

Homogeneity of mass and/or speed and Equality in speed, direction, and mass at
direction medium and high speeds

Predictability of road course and road user Road environment and road user
behaviour by a recognizable road design behaviour that support road user
expectations through consistency and
continuity in road design

Forgivingness of the environment and of Injury limitation through a forgiving road


road users environment and anticipation of road user
behaviour

State awareness by the road user Ability to assess one’s task capability to
handle the driving task
(source: Wegman & Aarts, 2006)

3.2.1 Functionality
The first approach to the functional categorization of roads dates back to 1963
when the report Traffic in Towns was published (Buchanan, 1963). This report
contained a comprehensive vision for the design of towns and villages in a
highly motorized society. A distinction was presented between roads having a
traffic flow function (‘distributor designed for movement’), and roads that give
access to destinations (‘access roads to serve the buildings’).
Elaboration of these ideas resulted in a proposal for a route hierarchy, built up
from primary, district and local distributors and access roads to destinations
(Figure 16). All roads are grouped into one of these classes, depending on the
character of the traffic (i.e. local or long distance) and the degree of land
access that they allow.
Typically, road users use a combination of arterial, collector, and local roads
for their trips. Each type of road has a specific purpose or function: some
provide land access to serve each end of the trip; others provide travel mobility
at varying levels, which is needed en route (Figure 17).
There is a basic relationship between functionally classified highway systems in
serving traffic mobility and land access. Arterials provide a high level of mobility
and a greater degree of access control, while local facilities provide a high
level of access to adjacent properties but a low level of mobility. Collector
roads provide a balance between mobility and land access.

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Figure 16 - Functional categorization of Figure 17 - Relationship of functionally classified road


roads systems in serving traffic mobility and land access
(Buchanan, 1963) (adapted from AASHTO, 2011)

The Sustainable Safety vision builds upon the hierarchy of roads as described
above. Based on the functional usage, roads have to be unequivocally
distinguishable in the function that they perform (‘monofunctionality’).
Motorized traffic should be directed to arterial roads (flow function), causing
roads with an access function to be burdened minimally with motorized traffic.
Roads with a distribution function (collectors) should direct motorized traffic
coming from roads with an access function as quickly as possible to roads with
a flow function and vice versa. This principle is meant to prevent unintended
use of the infrastructure thus minimizing the number of potential conflicts with
severe consequences. On the contrary mixing functions leads to conflicting
road design requirements and, hence, to unclear road design for road users,
resulting in higher risks. A road network functions properly if function, design and
usage (behaviour) are well tuned.
There is no reason to discard this principle of sustainably safe road traffic: a
functional road network categorization is one where each road or street fulfils
only one function – either a flow function, or a distribution function, or an access
function (e.g. the ideal arterial road is a motorway, whereas an ideal access
road is a 30 km/h street).

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Figure 18 – Chaotic and unsafe mix of function along N5 highway

Figure 19 – The flow function of the M2 motorway is clear and makes traffic safer

This framework is, generally, accepted in most of the countries and forms part
of road design handbooks and categorization plans.
In Pakistan, too, this is a well-known concept, but unfortunately it is not always
put into practice. However, examples of good practice are also present here.
At urban level, the road network of Islamabad is a typical example of
hierarchic network, where the three functions are pretty well respected (see
Figure 20). The Capital's master plan is in fact a forward-looking and innovative
urban experiment developed at the beginning of the 1960s, where the road
network also benefits from the regular and well-defined structure of the city.
By contrast, in many areas of the country, these principles are not observed
thus resulting in dangerous function mix. Typical examples are housing schemes
that are increasingly developing along the main arterial roads. These areas,
which can accommodate up to thousands of people, often have direct
access to the main road, thus mixing different functions and creating
dangerous points of conflict (see Figure 21).

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Figure 20 – Aerial view of the regular Islamabad road network

Figure 21 - Access to a big housing scheme along N5 highway

3.2.2 Homogeneity
The homogeneous usage of the
road aims to avoid large
differences in speeds, directions
and masses at moderate and high
speeds, thus reducing crash
severity when crashes cannot be
prevented.
The corresponding idea is that it is
beneficial for road safety when
there is little variation in the speeds
of close-moving vehicles travelling
in the same direction.
Worldwide the safest roads are the Figure 22 – Animal drawn vehicle in a trunk road in
Pakistan: differences in speed and mass pose serious
motorways, based on the number road safety problems
of casualties per kilometre driven
as the safety indicator. Although driving speeds are the highest, they are

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relatively uniform and is little variation in direction (e.g. no crossing traffic) and
vehicle mass (no pedestrians, cyclists, mopeds or slow-moving vehicles). The 30
km/h zones and residential areas are also relatively safe despite considerable
variation in the direction and mass of traffic participants. In these cases, the
increased safety is attributable to low driving speeds and small speed variations
between different road users.
The principle of homogeneous use leads, for example, to operational
requirements for directional separation on arterial and collector roads. For
intersections, operational requirements are derived from the starting principle
to eliminate collisions with high speed and mass differences. Pedestrians, cycles
and mopeds should not be present at the points of access of arterial roads.
Speed differences should be reduced to acceptable levels at collector roads
where mass differences are allowed functionally.
In this frame SWOV suggests a system of ‘safe speeds’ (see Table 3) taking into
account that speed limits and travel speeds should not be higher than safe
crash speeds and that is useful to distinguish between urban and rural areas
(although the difference is not always clear for road users).

Table 3 – Safe-speed system

Location Safe travel speed


(km/h)
Rural road sections
Arterial road 120
Collector road
with physical separation of driving directions 80
without physical separation of driving directions 70
Local road 40/60
Rural intersections
Collector road and local road
without vulnerable road users 50
with vulnerable road users 30
Urban road sections
Arterial road 50/70
Collector road 40/50
Local road 30
Urban intersections
Collector road 50
Local road 30
(source: adapted from Wegman & Aarts, 2006)

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Speed is therefore a very important factor to be taken into account.


At lower speeds a driver will have greater opportunity to react and avoid a
crash. Speed also affects the severity of crashes. Higher speed crashes involve
more kinetic energy (kinetic energy is proportional to the speed squared) and
the more energy that is dispersed in a crash, the more severe it tends to be.
The Figure 23 shows the expected consequences for three of the main crash
types at different speed. As speed increases, the fatality risk increases very
sharply for each of the crash types. This leads to several guiding principles for
survivability:
• Where conflicts between pedestrians and cars are possible, the speed
at which most will survive is 30 km/h (red line)
• Where side impacts are possible at intersections (e.g. cross roads and T-
intersections), the speed at which most will survive is 50 km/h (green line)
• Where head-on crashes are possible (e.g. where there is no median
separation), the speed at which most will survive is 70 km/h (blue line)
The previous ones are therefore the already mentioned safe crash speeds.
On this basis potential frontal impacts with crash speeds exceeding 70 km/h
have to be excluded. This means that the direction of travel on roads with
speeds of 80 km/h or higher will need to be separated in such a way that
vehicles cannot hit each other head on.

Figure 23 - Crash types and indicative fatality risk at speeds (source: Wramborg, as cited by AfDB, 2014)

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3.2.3 Predictability
The predictable usage is aimed at preventing human error by offering a road
environment to the road user that is recognizable and predictable (i.e. ‘self-
explaining’). This indicates permissible road user behaviour and makes the
behaviour of other road users more predictable. Accordingly, within a given
road category, the road and traffic characteristics have to be as uniform as
possible and designed homogeneously because, from a road user
perspective, a considerable amount of uniformity is desirable.
This principle aims in practice to ensure that the road user can recognize the
road type by its road characteristics (recognisability), which makes the road
course and the behaviour of other road users more predictable (predictability).
Unexpected traffic situations in fact simply cost more time for road users to
detect, to perceive, to interpret, to assess, and to elicit the correct behaviour
or response. This also means that transitions from one road category to another
require the necessary precision and time from road users to adapt their
behaviour.
In short, we can state that for the recognisability of roads it is important that
they:
• are distinguishable, and
• evoke and support correct expectations.
According to some research (Van Schagen et al., 1999), only a limited number
of characteristics can be used for distinguishing road categories. These
characteristics must be:
i. continuously perceivable
ii. practical
iii. not disadvantageous for road safety
In practice, to facilitate recognisability, the number of road classes should be
restricted and their design and layout as uniform as possible within each
category. Road users will then have a better idea of what sort of driving
behaviour is expected of them and be better able to anticipate the driving
behaviour of other road users. With ‘self-explaining’ roads, road users will know
at which speed to drive, whether to expect traffic from side roads, and whether
vulnerable users are likely to be on the road. In practice the aim of ‘self-
explaining’ roads is to lower the workload (or mental load) of drivers. This will
have a positive influence on the performance of the driving task.
The requirements for recognition and predictability are:
• avoid unpredictable behaviour by clear designing, marking and signing
• make road categories recognizable
• limit the number of design elements each category and make them
uniform
For Sustainable Safety, the limitation of the number of road categories
produces the largest contribution to the recognition. This assumes that the

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differences between the categories are large, and within each category are
small.
A small set of the operational requirements should ensure the predictability of
the traffic situations:
• speed limits
• longitudinal lane/direction road markings
• separation of directions
• pavement, irregularity of the surface
• presence of hard shoulders and obstacle-free zones (emergency lane
on motorways)
• types of intersections/accesses allowed
• expected road user types
The above set of items must be clear for each road category.

Figure 24 – Private accesses along an arterial road in Pakistan:


manoeuvres associated with their presence are not ‘predictable’ for users

Figure 25 – How to make a road ‘self-explaining’ using marking and signing (source: IRF)

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3.2.4 Forgivingness
The starting principle is that road users make errors and that the environment
should be sufficiently forgiving for road users to avoid the severe consequences
of these errors.
The first step towards making the road user environment forgiving is to make
road shoulders sustainably safe. This activity mainly takes place on rural roads
(arterial and collector) where the speed is supposed to be higher.
A forgiving road has a cross section that is sufficiently wide, has sufficient
bearing capacity and obstacle-free shoulders, and is adapted to acceptable
risks15 to third parties or risks to car occupants. If this is not feasible and if the
danger zone cannot be removed in another way, it is recommended the use
of a protective feature (i.e. vehicle restraint systems).
It is important to underline that the use of restraint systems is just the last solution
to protect road users from roadside hazards. Designers should therefore
preliminarily check alternative solutions, namely:
• remove the hazards;
• make the hazard safe (e.g. by changing the design of the median and
verges of the road);
• replace the hazards with a passive safe structure (e.g. posts and
columns).
Vehicle restraint systems represent in fact a hazard in themselves and should
therefore only be installed if it is more dangerous to drive off the road than to
drive into the vehicle restraint systems. Restraint systems shall be therefore
installed where there are one or more hazards within the ‘safety zone’ (or ‘clear
zone’).
A ‘safety zone’ is an obstacle-free area with flat and gently graded ground,
thus providing road users with sufficient space and the right conditions to regain
control over their vehicles in case of a run-off16.

15 As regards what constitutes acceptable risk, generally it is translated for shoulders on the
basis that if a vehicle leaves the road it should not hit any obstacles causing severe injury.
16 Further details on the ‘clear zone’ concept and, more in general, on the roadside hazard

management, are available in the CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 3 (CAREC,
2018c)
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Figure 26 – Safety (clear) zone definition

Figure 27 – Example of a ‘safety zone’

According to these principles fixed


roadside objects should be
designed such that crashes at high
speeds cannot result in severe
injuries. Here, international criteria
for vehicle restraint systems
(‘performance classes’) have
been established (e.g. European
Standards EN 1317-1 to 7, US MASH,
etc.). The fact that there are still
many road crash victims following
impact with protective devices,
raises questions as to whether the
Figure 28 – Crash against a poorly installed barrier
currently used criteria require (N5 highway, Taxila, 15/11/2017 - 2 fatalities)
revision, or in turn, the decision to
implement a protective device in certain circumstances.

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Safe shoulders along collector roads are however a difficult subject. Often, the
free space is not sufficiently wide, nor has it sufficient bearing capacity, nor is it
obstacle-free for protective devices to work in a safe way. In addition, it is not
yet general practice in Pakistan - like in many other countries - to protect
roadside obstacles on rural collector roads.

3.3 Categorization of roads and network design


Categorizing roads is a core activity for sustainably safe infrastructure.
The initial three categories (see section 3.2.1) are generally detailed in more
classes in order to take into account local circumstances (e.g. distinction can
be made between inside and outside urban areas).
As stated in the section 0, the influence of the design and the environment on
driver anticipation is crucial. For this reason, according to the function, to each
category of road must be associated, not only a typical cross-section and a
design speed, but also a mode of operation, defining the ‘rules’ to use the
specific infrastructure.
The layout of a road should therefore be appropriate to its function and
‘automatically’ enforce the desired speed. In Pakistan this is presently explicitly
the case for motorways, but not for all other road categories.
The Tables below summarizes the essential characteristics of the main road
categories, both in rural and urban areas.

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Table 4 – Characteristics of main road categories in rural environment

Road Characteristics Example


category
Arterial road - speed limit 120 km/h
Motorway - grade-separated
interchanges
- U-turns not allowed
- physical separation
- at least 2x2 lanes
- emergency lane
- lighting only at interchanges
and other peculiar points

Arterial road - speed limit 90/100 km/h


Trunk road - grade-separated
interchanges
- U-turns not allowed
- physical separation
- 2x2 lanes
- emergency bays and/or semi
hard shoulder
- lighting only at interchanges
and other peculiar points

Collector - speed limit 80 km/h


road - physical carriageway
Dual separation
carriageway - priority road, 2x2 lanes
- closed to (light-) mopeds and
bicycles
- junctions designed as
roundabouts or priority
crossroad with traffic lights
- limited number of U-turns
- limited number of connections
to access roads
- emergency bays or semi-
surfaced shoulder
Collector - speed limit 70 km/h
road - non-physical driving direction
Single separation
carriageway - priority road, 1x2 lanes
- closed to (light-) mopeds and
bicycles
- junctions equipped with speed
reducing provisions or
designed as roundabout
- limited number of connections
to local roads
- emergency bays and semi-
surfaced shoulder

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Road Characteristics Example


category
Local road - speed limit 40/60 km/h
- non-physical driving direction
separation
- 1x2 lanes
- at grade intersections in the
form of a roundabout or a
three or four-arm crossroads
- presence of private accesses

Table 5 – Characteristics of main road categories in urban areas

Road Characteristics Example


category
Arterial road - speed limit 90/100 km/h
Urban - grade-separated
Motorway interchanges
- U-turns not allowed
- physical separation
- at least 2x2 lanes
- emergency lane
- service roads (optional)
- lighting

Arterial road - speed limit 50/70 km/h


Transit - junctions designed as
corridor roundabouts or priority
crossroad with traffic lights
- U-turns not allowed
- physical separation
- at least 2x2 lanes
- service roads (optional)
- lighting

Collector - speed limit 50 km/h


street - physical carriageway
Dual separation
carriageway - priority road, 2x2 lanes
- junctions designed as
roundabouts or priority
crossroad with traffic lights
- limited number of U-turns
- limited number of connections
to access streets
- presence of parking areas,
preferably outside the
carriageway
- presence of footpaths

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Road Characteristics Example


category
- lighting
Collector - speed limit 40/50 km/h
street - non-physical driving direction
Single separation
carriageway - 1x2 lanes
- junctions designed as priority
crossroad with or without traffic
lights
- presence of parking areas,
preferably outside the
carriageway
- presence of footpaths
- lighting
Local street - speed limit 30/40 km/h
- non-physical driving direction
separation
- 1x2 lanes
- at grade intersections in the
form of a three or four-arm
crossroads
- presence of private accesses
- presence of parking slots
- presence of traffic calming
measures
- presence of footpaths (but in
case of 30 km/h areas, the
space can be shared by
pedestrians and motorists)
- lighting

Once the characteristics of each road category have been defined, it is


particularly important to define the principles for designing the network and, in
particular, the interconnection nodes.
The matrix below distinguishes between homogeneous nodes connecting
roads of the same type and non-homogeneous nodes connecting roads of
different types. While in the first (‘homogeneous’ nodes) connections are
always allowed that transfer flows from one road to another, in the second
(‘non-homogeneous’), for safety and functional reasons, the realization of
traffic flow connection may not always be allowed. Therefore, some nodes,
where there is a large difference between the hierarchical levels of the
confluent roads, should be considered ineligible.

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Table 6 – Matrix of possible intersection nodes

Arterial Collector Local Homogeneous nodes


Arterial

Permitted nodes
1 2 -

Not permitted nodes


Collector

2 3 3
Type 1: System interchange (e.g.
cloverleaf)
Type 2: Service interchange (e.g. half
Local

- 3 3 cloverleaf)
Type 3: At-grade intersection

Where connection is allowed, it is possible to distinguish different types of node


according to whether or not intersection conflict points may occur at the node.
In the case of a junction where the roads are all with separate carriageways,
intersection conflict points are not allowed and the connection will be solved
with an interchange (type 1 junction). Where one of the roads converging on
the node has a single carriageway, at-grade manoeuvres may be permitted
on that road, while the crossing of the main currents must be solved by
separating the levels (type 2 node). Where the two roads considered to belong
to types for which the intended cross-section is a single carriageway, the
intersection may be solved at-grade (type 3 node).
The concepts illustrated are generally present in the most widely used road
design standards. In Table 7, as an example, is summarized the mode of
operation of the highways according to the Asian Highway Design Standards.
As regards Pakistan, the classification currently in use divides roads into very
specific categories, even though the modes of operation are not well defined
and, above all, not always easily distinguishable on the roads in operation17.

17 NHA classifies the roads in four main categories:


1. Motorways and Expressways are four or six lane divided highways. The access of the
Motorways is fully controlled, while the access of Expressways is partially controlled.
2. Primary Roads are basically the National Highways and Provincial Roads on the primary
routes. They are further split into three categories:
• Primary I (P-I),
• Primary II (P-II), and
• Primary III (P-III),
depending on the number of lanes and pavement of shoulders.
3. Secondary Roads (S-I) are Provincial Roads that serve as feeder roads for the primary
routes.
4. Tertiary Roads (T-I) are basically the collector roads for the secondary network.
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Table 7 - Mode of operation for each Asian Highway class18

Class Primary Class I Class II Class III


Description Access-
4 or more
controlled 2 lanes 2 lanes
lanes
highways
Mode of operation
Controlled-access Full No19 No19 No
At-grade intersections Not
Yes19 Yes19 Yes
permitted
Overtaking on opposing Not Not
Yes Yes
lane permitted permitted
Pedestrians Not
Yes19 Yes19 Yes
permitted
Slow vehicles20 Not
Yes19 Yes19 Yes
permitted
(source: adapted from UN ESCAP, 2004)

3.4 Speed management


3.4.1 Overview
The issue of speed is central to road safety, and its management requires work
across several road safety sectors. Effective speed management comprises a
series of interventions that can have great benefits for road safety. According
to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2008), addressing speed management
policies and programs plays a critical role in improving a country’s road safety
record. As seen in section 3.1, the role of speed has been recognized as one of
the most important elements of a ‘safe system’ and its relevance to each of
the pillars of the United Nations Decade of Action for Road Safety has been
noted.
According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD, 2006), tension exists between the perception that speed is a sign of
improved efficiency and a tool for progress versus the negative consequences
of speeding. Indeed, it is noted that individuals and the community as a whole
perceive the benefits and dis-benefits of lower speeds differently. So, for
communities, the overall cost of crashes is high, but for the individual the risk
may still be quite low. Arguably the environmental benefits (e.g. air pollution
and noise) of reducing speeds for individuals (perhaps with the exception of a
reduced fuel bill) are less apparent than for society at the aggregate level.

18 Asian Highway Design Standards do not apply to built-up areas


19 Unless specially designed for controlled-access operation
20 Bicycles, low power motorcycles, agricultural vehicles, mopeds, animal-drawn carts, animal

herds
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Speeding has been widely recognized to fall into one of two categories:
• Excessive speed: drivers exceeding the posted speed limit
• Inappropriate speed: drivers choosing a speed that is not safe for the
given conditions
Both types of speeding can potentially raise the likelihood of a crash occurring
through increasing the stopping distance by increases to:
• The distance the vehicle travels between the initial perception of an
event requiring the vehicle to stop and the actual motor action taken to
stop or slow the vehicle.
• The stopping distance of the vehicle at a given speed.
Figure 27 illustrates the stopping distance required at various speeds.

Figure 27 - Braking distances (source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau, as cited by WHO, 2008)

Speed also affects the severity of crashes. Higher speed crashes involve more
kinetic energy (kinetic energy is proportional to the speed squared) and the
more energy that is dispersed in a crash, the more severe it tends to be. It is the
scale of this energy exchange that determines the severity of injury.
The likelihood of being involved in a serious or fatal crash increases significantly
with even small increases in vehicle speed as shown in Figure 28. Reading
across the x-axis (bottom) of this graph, it can be seen that an increase in mean
speeds of 5% leads to an increase in injury crashes of 10% (black dotted line),
and a 20% increase in fatal crashes (black continuous line). Similarly, if mean
speeds were to decrease by 5%, then a reduction in all injury crashes of 10%
and a reduction in fatal crashes of 20% should be expected.

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Figure 28 – Change in number of injured on change in mean speed (source: WHO, 2008)

Speed differential (differences in speeds travelled by different vehicles) is also


crucial factor influencing crash rates and outcomes. This is particularly the case
in urban areas; however, it is also an issue on high-speed roads. Speed
differential is strongly linked to fatality rates on rural roads and urban arterials
(OECD, 2006).
Research on urban roads indicates that crash rates increase as the proportion
of drivers who exceed the speed limit increases. Research in Australia (Kloeden
et al., as cited in OECD, 2006) shows that faster drivers have a higher crash risk
as shown in Figure 29 (as average speed driven by a driver increases along the
x-axis, relative crash risk increases particularly strongly for urban roads). The
same Figure indicates that slower drivers do not have a higher crash risk.

Figure 29 - Relative injury accident rate on urban roads and rural roads for vehicles going faster and
slower than average speed (source: Kloden et al., as cited in OECD, 2006)

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Increasing the speed at which activities can be undertaken is generally taken


as a benefit to society. In transportation, speed is seen as a key element as it
reduces journey time and, as a consequence, it can reduce business costs and
allow people to enjoy activities before or after the journey for longer. Smooth
and quick journeys are often seen as an indication of an advanced and
efficient transportation system.
However, there are also significant dis-benefits associated with speed. The
severity and frequency of crashes are closely linked to increased speed (see
section 3.2.2). This is particularly the case in urban areas.
There are a number of factors that drivers will take into account when choosing
the speed to travel, as indicted in Figure 30, and the posted speed limit is only
one of them. In accordance with the multi-faceted nature of the problem,
effective treatment of speed also needs to be multi-faceted in order to
adequately address the complex reasons behind speeding.

Driver
factors

Education Vehicles
promotion factors

Driver
Speed
zone/limit speed Road factors
choice

Enforcement Traffic
sanctions conditions

Crash and
injury risk

Figure 30 – Factors affecting speed choice (source: Oxley and Corben, as cited in WHO, 2008)

Even though some research has shown that speed limits have a positive
influence on actual speeds, however, it should be stressed that other research
has indicated that changing the speed limit alone has little effect. In places
where speed limits have been changed and no other action taken, the
change in average speed is only about one quarter of the change of the
speed limit (DETR, 2000). Any changes in speed limits should ideally be
accompanied by appropriate enforcement, engineering and educational
measures. International best practice suggests that the best results are likely to
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be achieved when engineering, educational and enforcement interventions


are implemented to compliment and reinforce speed limit adherence.
In particular engineering refers to the design of the road and any physical
interventions which have a direct impact on driver speed choice. Interventions
can range from the manipulation of the geometry of the road (curve radius,
incline and sight distance), to fixed interventions such as road humps.
Engineering measures can also be used to prevent crashes or reduce the
severity of crashes that do occur. In the previous sections has already been
described as a road can be self-explaining (i.e. engineering measures can
enhance the degree to which speed limits are credible and understood by
drivers and riders; see section 0) or forgiving (i.e. roads can be designed such
that when a crash happens, crash forces are effectively dissipated between
the vehicle and the road; see section 3.2.4). Roads can be also self-enforcing,
i.e. at particular locations physical measures (e.g. speed humps or chicanes)
can ensure that speeds are low (i.e. ‘traffic calming’ measures). These locations
include areas where there is a high concentration of vulnerable road users, for
example in residential areas and outside schools or busy shopping areas.
Speed management is a complex issue and, as seen in Figure 30, there is no
single solution to the problem of excessive and inappropriate speeds and a
package of countermeasures is necessary. The countermeasures should
complement one another and increase the overall effectiveness of, and
compliance with, the speed limit. An effective speed management policy
targets both inappropriate and excess speed using engineering, enforcement
and educational measures to reduce speeds that will ultimately result in fewer
speed-related crashes and reduced severity of crashes that do occur.
Speed management requires therefore a systematic approach incorporating
all of the following elements:
• Setting and signing speed limits: Speed limits need to be appropriate for
the road to which they apply and should reflect the road function, traffic
composition, frontage development and road design characteristics.
The driver should always know what the speed limit is. The conventional
way to achieve this is to use traffic signs and road markings.
• Road engineering measures: The road infrastructure can be designed
such that roads are self-enforcing (at certain locations road designs such
as speed humps may be used to make it difficult for motorists to travel at
higher speeds than desired) and self-explaining (road designs are
intuitive and clear such that road users understand the speed limit and
the speed limit is credible). In addition, roads should be also forgiving (the
road and vehicle in combination protect the road user from serious or
fatal injury at legally permitted speeds),
• Education: The provision of information and education for drivers is also
a very important activity. If drivers understand the importance of speed
limits, it is more likely that they will comply with them.
• Police enforcement: Police enforcement is necessary to deter intentional
speed violations.
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This document focuses on speed limits and engineering measures, a brief


overview of which is presented in the next paragraphs.
3.4.2 Setting speed limits
Speed limit setting has traditionally reflected attempts to achieve a balance
between safety and mobility. However, countries that recognize their poor
safety record and are committed to reducing road deaths and injury are
shifting this balance in favour of safety. According to the Safe System approach
principles (see section 3.1), some countries are now setting speed limits with
reference to the limits of human injury tolerance, that is, to a level that will not
usually result in death or serious injury to road users when crashes occur.
Guidelines for setting limits according to Safe System principles have been
already presented in section 3.2.2. It is recommended to consider the ‘safe
speeds’ reported in Table 3 as ‘default’ speed limits or, better, as ‘national
speed limit regime’. Nevertheless, they should be adapted to local situation
according to factors described in the Box 1.

Box 1. Factors to consider when setting speed limits (source: WHO, 2008)

• Traffic mix and the different types of vulnerable road user.


• Crash history, severity (injury) and crash rate (per vehicle kilometre of travel) where
possible. Road alignment (both vertically and horizontally). Crash prone stretches
of road should have lower limits.
• Road shoulder width and pavement quality – narrow shoulder widths (especially
those with poor pavement quality) can run an increased risk of ‘loss of control’
crashes. Therefore, speed limits should be lower for these conditions.
• Road delineation – edge and centre-line marking, reflectors and guideposts on
the edge of shoulders and advisory speed limits. Where roads have poor visual
definition, the speed limits should be lower to enable time for driver judgements.
• Road and lane widths should be adequate (i.e. at least two lanes with a minimum
lane width of 3.4 metres). Narrow lane widths offer little margin of error and
therefore speed limits must not exceed that required by drivers to keep consistently
within a lane.
• The intensity of land development abutting a carriageway – in built-up areas, there
is a dual risk of poor visibility and more varied activity of people and vehicles
entering the road environment, and therefore speed limits should be lower.
• The type of intersections and the nature of traffic control measures at intersections.
While all types of intersection present increased risk to road users – and roads other
than motorways should have lower limits – poorly marked intersections require
even lower speeds leading up to them than other, more clearly marked
intersections or roundabouts.
• Traffic volume and traffic flow – lower speed limits in areas of high traffic volume
can be used to smooth traffic flows, making for better network efficiency and
environmental benefits, as well as improved safety.
• Types and standards of vehicles allowed to access – roadways that vulnerable
road users such as cyclists are allowed to use should have lower limits than those
that only allow four- wheeled (or above) motor vehicles.
• The free travel speed of the road.
• The ability to overtake safely (within sight distance) at the posted speed.

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Once the appropriate speed limit has been determined for a road or a section
of road, steps must be taken to ensure drivers adopt the appropriate speed.
The ‘default’ speed limits, in many countries, are not signposted. Nevertheless,
in countries like Pakistan that need to tackle the problem with determination, it
is advisable that they would be clear to existing and new drivers (including
visitors) entering the road network or a specific road (e.g. entering a
motorway).
In specific cases alternative (to default) speed limits can be used. These limits
may include:
• linear speed limits (including transition/buffer speed limits) i.e. along
lengths of roads and streets
• area-wide residential or commercial speed limits, with signs at entry point
to the designated area
• time based speed zones:
o school speed zone, usually twice daily time-based lower limits for
an hour or so at school starting and finishing times
o seasonal speed zone, for example at holiday resorts in busier
summer months when vehicular and pedestrian traffic is greater
• variable speed limits (limits that change under certain conditions or times
of day, e.g. in wet conditions)
• heavy vehicle speed limits
It is recommended, however, not to continuously change the limit as this can
lead to unexpected and inconsistent behaviour. If on a road section it is
necessary to reduce the speed in many locations, it is advisable to adopt a
lower limit than the default one on the entire stretch.
As regards the lower limits for heavy vehicles, it is worth to remind, that the use
of different speed limits for different vehicle categories on a section of road,
could create the opportunity for substantial turbulence within traffic and may
increase the frequency of overtaking manoeuvres, which can in themselves
lead to increased crash risk. If there is to be a lower limit, it is suggested that this
is a consistent amount below general limits, whether default or signed, on all
rural roads. Speed differential is a major cause of crash risk on higher speed
roads (WHO, 2008; see also 3.2.2).
Signs are the primary way of communicating the speed limit of a road to drivers.
Careful consideration needs to be given to the use and placement of signs to
ensure that all drivers on a given section of road are given consistent
information. The recommended intervals are as follows:
• urban areas: 400 m
• rural areas:
o motorways and other arterial roads: 4/5 km
o other roads: 2/3 km
In addition to post-mounted speed limit signs next to the road, markings on the
road can also be used to show the current speed limit.

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Figure 31 – Speed limits marked on the road pavement in Spain

3.4.3 Road engineering measures to reduce speed


There is a large range of engineering treatments that have been shown to be
of varying use in speed management. These measures are described in
significant detail in various manuals; however, a broad overview of available
treatments is given below. Practical examples will be also duly described in Part
II of these Guidelines.
Treatments include engineering or re-engineering the road to encourage lower
speeds, or make the road and its environment ‘self-enforcing’ or ‘self-
explaining’. They generally relate to so-called ‘traffic calming’ measures, which
include a range of physical features that have been developed by road safety
and traffic management engineers to encourage, or force, drivers to drive
more slowly. Many of these treatments have the effect of making it feel
uncomfortable to drive in excess of the legal or recommended speed.
Measures can be grouped in three main methods:
a) Narrowing
b) Horizontal deflection
c) Vertical deflection
Of course, they can be combined to address complex situations where the
individual measure would be ineffective. A typical example is the treatment at
the entrance of settled areas where a ‘gateway’21 is generally accompanied
by other measures aimed to alert the drivers and force them to adapt the
speed.

21Gateways are devices used to mark a threshold – usually to a village or higher risk location
on the road – where lower speeds are required from drivers. Gateways rely on highly visible
vertical treatments to capture driver/rider attention and usually include signs, pavement
markings, speed limits, but also architectural and rural treatments such as picket fencing or
gates, earth mounds and rock walls.
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3.4.3.1 Narrowing
Wider roads invite drivers to select
higher travel speeds. This may be
because the perceived margin for
error is greater. So, narrower road
widths tend to slow traffic speeds.
Actually, road narrowing cannot
be considered as a speed-
reducing device in itself, but it can
act as a reminder or
encouragement to drive slowly or
calmly. It uses a psycho-perceptive
sense of enclosure to discourage
speeding. Figure 32 – Road narrowing in an urban street in the
USA
Where traffic capacity is not a
problem, the cross section of the
road should change where the built-up area begins and the width of lanes can
be reduced. In many cases, it is possible to change a four-lane road into a two-
lane road through the built-up area.
The new layout can be obtained adding a raised island located along the
centreline of a road that narrows the travel lanes. Fitted with a gap to allow
pedestrians to walk through at a crosswalk, they are also very useful as
‘pedestrian refuges’.
If it is not advisable to reduce the capacity, a simple ‘optical’ narrowing can
be effective too. In this case the cross-section remains unchanged, whereas
the shoulder is changed (e.g. building a sidewalk with kerbstone, planting trees
or bushes, etc.).
3.4.3.2 Horizontal deflection
Horizontal deflection measures use
forces of lateral acceleration to
discourage speeding.
Generally, all horizontal shifts may
be classified as chicanes, more or
less pronounced. In case of
presence of a central island, they
mainly differ because of its width.
A chicane consists of a
displacement of the road axis with
a significant deflection of the
trajectory.
Figure 33 – Chicane with a central island in France
This is a traffic calming measure
used to emphasize the transition between the rural environment and the built-

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up area. It is generally located after the sign of beginning of settlement and


strengthens the image of the entrance into the settlement.
Depending on the site configuration, two types of chicanes are possible:
• Chicane with a central island:
• Chicane without a central island (simple or double): suitable in case the
speed is already substantially lowered before the chicane
The extreme case is represented by a roundabout that, of course,
accomplishes also other functions. Roundabouts are effective in reducing the
severity of crashes at an intersection because they require traffic to deviate
from a straight path and therefore slow down to undertake the manoeuvre.
The reduced speeds of travel through an intersection that a roundabout can
achieve, together with the non-right-angle nature of side-impact crashes
because of the geometry of the roundabout, result in reduced crash severity.
3.4.3.3 Vertical deflection
Much can be achieved by road
design and the simple physical
countermeasures described
above.
However, some drivers will still drive
very fast despite the signs. The
hazards these drivers create can
only be tackled by strong physical
measures such as:
• speed humps
• speed tables
Figure 34 – Speed hump in France
• rumble strips
These vertical measures use forces of vertical acceleration to discourage
speeding.
In general, these measures, except for rumble strips, aim to reduce the speed
to 30 km/h. Therefore, for safety reasons, CERTU (CERTU, 1994) recommends
implementing these measures only if the approaching speed of the 85th
percentile of users is less than 60 km/h. If this value is exceeded, other
preliminary measures (i.e. narrowing, horizontal deflection) must be
implemented in the previous road section.
These measures should not be stand-alone, but they should be implemented in
series.
3.4.4 Separation of vulnerable road users
Speed should be limited to ensure that vulnerable road users are not exposed
to risk of serious injury. If this is not possible, separating the vulnerable road users
from motorized traffic is an alternative.

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Pedestrian fencing is useful for improving the safety of pedestrians by directing


larger flows of pedestrians away from random crossing locations (particularly in
busy pedestrian crossing locations) to safer crossing points, which may be
equipped with treatments such as speed humps or raised platforms in the
roadway, or a set of traffic signals.
Refuge islands and medians can assist pedestrians in crossing the road by
allowing a staged crossing and simplifying decision-making. Kerb extensions
can also improve pedestrian safety by reducing the crossing distance, and the
area and time in which the pedestrian is at risk. This is particularly helpful for
older or disabled pedestrians who may have difficulty choosing a safe gap in
traffic at a conventional crossing point.
In many situations in rural (and urban) areas there will not be any footpath
provision for the large numbers of pedestrians walking from point to point. They
will often be forced to walk on the carriageway. Provision of a walking path is
a highly effective means of removing the pedestrians from a medium to high-
speed carriageway.
Bicycles should be separated from motorized traffic as well, if at all possible.

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4 Road infrastructure safety management


Safer roads are the Pillar 2 of the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-
2020 (WHO, 2010) and are one of the aspects of the Safe System approach as
discussed in section 3.1.

As seen at length in Chapter 3, safe roads are roads that are self-explaining
and forgiving of mistakes to reduce the risk of a crash occurring and to protect
road users from fatal or serious injury should a crash occur. This requires roads
and roadsides to be designed, built, and maintained to reduce the risk and
severity of crashes.
To achieve this objective, a comprehensive strategy for road infrastructure
safety management needs to be put in place. Without it, in fact, there is a real
risk of implementing disconnected interventions in a framework of high
inefficiency and consequent possible waste of resources.
The strategy, which is based on the Safe System principles, is outlined in the
Figure 35 and is described in detail in the following paragraphs.
A very good benchmark in this field is the European Directive 2008/96/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on road
infrastructure safety management. This Directive mandates all EU member
States to establish and implement a well-defined set of procedures relating to
abovementioned strategy. This Directive will be referred to several times in the
following paragraphs.

• RSIA at feasibility
Construction • Post-opening RSA
stage • RSI (proactive)
• Pre-opening RSA
• RSA at preliminary • Data analysis and
and detailed design treatement of crash
stages locations (reactive)

Design Operation

Figure 35 - Road safety management approaches throughout the project life-cycle (adapted from
AfDB, 2014)

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4.1 Road safety strategies


The treatment of crash locations and correcting safety problems across the
road network which may result in road trauma by undertaking Road Safety
Audits (RSA) and Inspections (RSI) form an integral part of a Safe System.
These methods belong to two main road safety strategies:
• Proactive approach, assessing a design or concept before it is built (and
thus before crashes happen), or the safety of an existing road once built
based on safety features present to identify any treatment to reduce the
likelihood or severity of a crash.
• Reactive approach, responding to an existing crash problem.
Effective road safety management programs should exercise an optimal
balance between reactive and proactive strategies.
4.1.1 Proactive approach
A proactive approach focuses on the evolving ‘science of safety’, that is, what
is known about the evolving specific safety implications of road design and
operations decisions. The proactive approach applies this knowledge to the
roadway design process or to the implementation of improvement plans on
existing roads to diminish the potential of crashes occurring prior to the road
being built or reconstructed.
Conducting RSAs is an example of a proactive road safety strategy, but also
RSIs can be conducted following this approach.
The advantages of a proactive approach include:
• Crash prevention: it is not necessary for crashes to occur before crash
prevention measures are taken (‘preventing is better than curing’).
• Lower costs: changing plans is easier and less costly than to implement
an improvement plan on a road open to the public.
4.1.2 Reactive approach
A reactive approach to road safety is based on the analysis of existing crash
data. Road safety improvements proposed are considered in reaction to
identified safety problems brought to light by crashes that have occurred after
the road has been designed, built, and opened to the traveling public.
Traditional reactive road safety engineering processes include such activities
as information collection and management (crash information systems),
identification of problem locations on the road network, analysis, development
and implementation of countermeasures.
A ‘blackspot programme’ is an example of reactive approach to crash
frequency and/or severity reduction.
Limitations of the reactive approach are as follows:
• It requires the identification of high crash locations before improvement
plans may be developed and implemented.
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• The supporting crash data is often dated, incomplete and/or insufficient


to support accurate diagnosis and intervention.
• It may also be costlier, since improvement plans are necessarily
implemented on a road already built and open to public.
Despite these limitations, no road safety management system can be
considered complete without a reactive component as it is a powerful tool for
addressing existing safety problems.

4.2 Road safety impact assessment


According to the European Directive 2008/96/EC ‘road safety impact
assessment’ (RSIA) means a ‘strategic comparative analysis of the impact of a
new road or a substantial modification to the existing network on the safety
performance of the road network’.
The RSIA should be carried out at the initial planning stage before the
infrastructure project is approved. It should indicate the road safety
considerations which contribute to the choice of the proposed solution. It
should further provide all relevant information necessary for a cost-benefit
analysis of the different options assessed.
Any new infrastructure project realignment or change to existing infrastructure
that substantially affects the performance of the national road network should
be assessed. RSIA is required only where the anticipated effect on the main
road network is substantial. Small projects generally do not require assessment.
RSIA should be carried out at the initial planning stages of a project and should
be used as one of the tools for project selection. This assessment should
consider the safety implications of the different alternatives as well as the
option to not proceed with the project.
As the project design progresses the RSIA should be regularly reviewed to
ensure that the road safety implications of all design revisions are considered.
RSIA is an integral part of the design process and can be carried out within the
design team. The assessment team, generally comprising at least two
individuals, should include at least one experienced road design engineer and
at least one experienced road safety engineer/auditor. In the absence of
competence in RSIA within the design team, an assessment team should be
sourced from elsewhere and should join the design team for this specific task.
It is important to note that a RSIA is not a separate audit of the project carried
out by an independent team. It is an on-going task within the design process
and generally carried out within the design team. If an external assessment
team is brought in to provide road safety expertise, then that team shall be
viewed as temporarily part of the design team.
In this view RSIA does not replace or preclude RSA, which is carried out by a
team independent of the design process. RSA is described in the following
paragraph.

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The RSIA should be carried out while the project is still at concept stage. At this
stage the assessment explores the road safety implications of each option
being considered, including the Do-Nothing and Do-Minimum options. The
assessment should provide all relevant information necessary for comparison of
the options and selection of the solution, including a comparative analysis of
the road safety implications of each alternative considered and an evaluation
of the road safety benefits and dis-benefits arising from each alternative.
The objective of RSIA is to consider the proposed project from a road safety
point of view, to compare the impact on road safety of each proposed option
and to determine which would give the best road safety outcome. With every
project there is the possibility that the existing situation would be preferable to
any of the options considered, and so it is essential that this alternative is also
considered in the assessment.
Road safety impact is only one of the aspects considered by a design team
when selecting the preferred option. It is important that the reasoning behind
the conclusions of the impact assessment is made clear, so that it is given due
weight in the selection process. This should minimise the risk of collisions
occurring in the future either as a result of planning decisions or as a result of
unintended effects of the design of road schemes.
A methodology for RSIA is set out in the Irish guidelines (NRA, 2016) and is
reported in Box 2.

Box 2. RSIA methodology (adapted from NRA, 2016)

i. Define the project and its objectives:


• Clarify the objectives of the project (e.g. to increase capacity, to remove traffic
from a village, to eliminate poor alignment, to provide an amenity, etc.).
• Clarify whether the major objective of the scheme is to address road safety issues.
ii. Define the study area and the area of influence of the project:
• Clarify the extents of the surrounding road network where any of the proposed
options would affect the operation of the network. Check the likely changes to
drivers’ route choice and choice of travel mode or time, and thus the likely
effects on traffic patterns.
• The entire study area shall be examined when assessing each proposed option,
so that like can be compared with like.
iii. Establish the existing road safety problems:
• Examine existing collision statistics and carry out an analysis.
• Establish any patterns in the collisions and any high collision locations, either
stretches of road or single sites at junctions or other conflict points.
• Establish any patterns over time of day or year, or any patterns involving road
user type. Examine any road safety reviews that may have been carried out
previously on all or part of the area.
• Collision statistics for national roads are available from NH&MP. For provincial
projects, it is recommended to contact the local authorities (e.g. Police,
Communication & Works Departments, etc.) who might have information on

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crashes that they have attended.


iv. Road safety objectives:
• Define the road safety objectives of the scheme.
• This will usually include addressing the existing road safety problems, but there
may be further objectives, such as improving pedestrian access to an amenity or
improving public transport access.
v. The options, including Do-Nothing and Do-Minimum:
• Examine the drawings of each proposed option for the project.
• Include the existing Do-Nothing situation which would prevail if no works at all
were to be implemented.
• Include the Do-Minimum situation, where the very minimum possible is to be
implemented, such as provision of signs, surface overlay and any committed
schemes.
• Visit the site to visually establish the alignment of each proposed option and the
surrounding topography. A site visit is important as it may identify existing
arrangements or patterns of use that may not be evident in the drawings and
other information examined.
• Examine both existing and proposed traffic flows. It may be necessary to establish
peak times of use for certain parts of the network, such as access to schools or
sports grounds or weekly markets, so that the appropriate flows can be
examined.
• Patterns of use of all road users must be considered. In general pedestrians and
other vulnerable road users are affected more acutely than other road traffic by
both changes in road alignment and changes to available routes of travel.
vi. Analysis of impacts on road safety of the proposed alternatives:
• The main element of the assessment is the comparison of the road safety effects
of each alternative proposal. This must include Do-Nothing and Do-Minimum
options.
• The effects on the entire study area must be examined for each proposed option.
Where proposed alternatives differ in scale and cover differing lengths or areas
of the existing network, the remainder of the road network outside the proposed
works must be included in the analysis. The assessment area must be the same
for all options being compared.
• An assessment of the effects of each alternative must be carried out in terms of
predicted collisions. Quantitative indicators can be used such as collision rates
and collisions per junction type.
• To assess the likely collision occurrence in the proposed options, it is
recommended to use established local collision rates in the surrounding area for
equivalent road types. If these are unavailable, then the collision rates for road
types at national level should be used.
• To establish the economic collision cost of each option, in absence of a Pakistani
assessment, it is suggested to refer to average values based on local GDP22.
• All effects on traffic flow and traffic patterns must be considered. Any projected
change in modal split as a consequence of the proposals is important as this may
not only affect the mix of vehicle category within the traffic flow, but may also
impact on patterns of pedestrian and cycle travel and locations where conflicts

22According to iRAP the value of a fatality is about 70*GDP/Capita, whereas the value of a
serious injury is 17*GDP/Capita (McMahon & Dahdah, 2008)
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with other vehicles occur.


• Seasonal and climatic conditions such as the likelihood of flooding and foggy
conditions should be considered, as this might differ between options.
• The possibility of seismic activity should also be considered.
vii. Comparison and ranking:
• Comparison of the alternatives should not only give a qualitative list of benefits
and dis-benefits, but should also include a cost benefit analysis of the road safety
aspects.
• The options, including the Do-Nothing and Do-Minimum option, should be ranked
in terms of road safety considerations, giving an order of preference and an
indication of the magnitude of difference between options. If one option, or a
group of options, shows considerably more or less benefit than the others then
this should be highlighted. Conversely, if there is little difference in road safety
terms between two or more of the proposals then these should be given the
same ranking.

4.3 Road safety audits


The RSA process was initiated when road safety engineers realised that they
were carrying out collision remedial schemes on relatively new roads. Adopting
the principle of ‘preventing is better than curing’, they decided to use some of
the safety experience that they had gained from the remedial work to design
safety into new road schemes. Since then the concept grew over the years
from an informal check of new schemes to the current system of RSA as an
essential integral part of design and construction procedures.
According to the European Directive 2008/96/EC ‘road safety audit’ means an
‘independent detailed systematic and technical safety check relating to the
design characteristics of a road infrastructure project and covering all stages
from planning to early operation’.
Accordingly, RSA should be carried out for all road infrastructure projects and
should form an integral part of their design process at least at following stages:
• Preliminary design
• Detailed design
• Pre-opening
• Early operation
Practical instructions on how to carry out and manage an RSA can be found
on the CAREC RSA manual (ADB, 2018a).
It is here important to highlight that an RSA should be carried out by an auditor
appointed in accordance with the following provisions:
• She/he should have undergone an initial training resulting in the award
of a certificate of competence
• She/he should have relevant experience or training in road design, road
safety engineering and crash analysis
• She/he should not at the time of the audit be involved in the conception
or operation of the relevant infrastructure project

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It is therefore quite obvious that auditor approval is a crucial task for any road
authority. As stated in the CAREC manual, it is suggested that every country
establishes its own national register of auditors. In Pakistan, besides a national
register, which ideally should be administered by NHA, different registers can
be established in each province or territory.
In any case it is of paramount importance to establish clear requirements to
approve applicants. Firstly, it is strongly recommended that application would
be limited only to civil engineers (or equivalent) that have at least experience
in road design and/or traffic planning.
In addition, as recommended by the CAREC RSA manual, it is recommended
that an applicant, in order to be registered as an RSA team leader (i.e. senior
auditor), should:
• have completed an approved road safety audit training course,
• have a minimum of 3 years’ practical experience in a road or road
safety-related field, and
• have completed at least five road safety audits under the guidance of
a senior road safety auditor, of which at least three of the five audits must
be at a design stage.
Finally, to be registered as a team member, an applicant should:
• have completed an approved road safety audit training course, and
• have a minimum of 2 years’ practical experience in a road- or road
safety-related field
According to this scheme is very important to promote the involvement of local
engineers in auditing. In the first period (2/3 years) the audits will be necessarily
leaded by international auditors, but only following this approach the local
practitioners can gain sufficient experience to lead an audit in the future.
The RSA training courses should be officially recognised by national authorities
(e.g. NHA, MoC, etc.), should be at least of 5 days’ duration, presented by an
experienced road safety auditor, and should include a final exam. Only
applicants passing successfully the exam should be allowed to be registered.
The course should contain a program of presentations that should be not
limited to the audit process but should describe in detail the whole road safety
engineering process. Technical topics may include safety in geometric design,
vulnerable road users, signs, delineation, safety at road works, and roadside
hazard management.

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Box 3. Case study: RSA&I training course at NUST University

A 7-day Road Safety Auditing & Inspection training course was held in the NUST University
(Islamabad) in February 2018. The course was approved and funded by the ADB in order
to support the Government of Pakistan to:
• build capacity to identify, treat and eliminate high crash and hazardous
locations as identified in the National Highway Authority Road Safety Action Plan
2018-2020, and
• establish a team of informed and skilled focal persons to coordinate
dissemination and piloting road safety engineering best practices.
The course was designed to provide road engineers with a theoretical and practical
knowledge of main road safety engineering tools and specifically to build the
knowledge and skills required to conduct road safety audits and inspections. It
referenced the strategic context for safe roads within the draft National Road Safety
Strategy 2018-2030, with particular reference to Pillar 2 – Safe Roads. Specific objectives
were as follows:
• To train and qualify a first kernel of road safety auditors
• To train road authorities officials on road safety engineering practices to identify
and treat high crash cluster locations
• To train road authorities officials on preventive road safety inspections
• To share international best practices in safe road design
• To discuss main issues concerning road design standards and their current
implementation in Pakistan
The course included theory sessions, best practices and case studies taking into account
the local practice, small group sessions, participant workshops, site visits, submission of a
Road Safety Inspection Report and a final examination.
The training team – contracted by the Danish firm NTU - included both international and
national experts, covering various aspects of road safety (engineering, road crash
investigation, crash data analysis, institutional aspects).
The course was articulated over:
• 9 days (including a weekend)
• 10 modules (both theoretical and practical)
• workshops
• homework
• final examination
The Training Course program was as follows:
• Day 1:
o Module 1: Road safety national and international framework
o Module 2: Crash investigation
• Day 2:
o Module 3: Road safety engineering process
• Day 3:
o Module 4: Conflict studies
o Module 5: The management system of crash data
• Day 4:
o Module 6: Road safety audits and inspections

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• Day 5:
o Module 7: Site visit
• Days 6/7:
o Self-directed preparation of the Road Safety Inspection Report for
examination assessment and preparation for the course examination
• Day 8:
o Module 9: The safe road design
• Day 9:
o Module 10: Principles of traffic engineering
o Final examination
A total of 26 participants completed the course, including representatives from National
Highway Authority (NHA), Capital Development Authority (CDA), Pakhtunkhwa
Highways Authority (PKHA), Communication and Works Departments of Governments of
KP and Balochistan, Engineering Consultancy Services Punjab (ECSP), NUST, University of
Karachi. Only 4 participants did not pass the final exam.

Group photo

Workshops on site (left) and in the classroom (right)

4.4 Road safety inspections


RSI should be undertaken in respect of the roads in operation in order to identify
the road safety related features and prevent crashes.
According to the European Directive 2008/96/EC ‘road safety inspection’
means an ‘ordinary periodical verification of the characteristics and defects
that require maintenance work for reasons of safety’.
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The terminology of this definition gives an indication of the scope of the RSI as
follows:
• The term ordinary indicates that an in-depth, forensic investigation is not
expected.
• The measures to be carried out in response to the inspection are
described as maintenance work; this suggests that major changes to the
layout of the road, entailing high cost, are not envisaged as counter-
measures; however, engineering works are often required to remediate
the issues.
• The term periodical indicates the need for inspections to be repeated at
intervals, rather than being a once-off event. Their frequency should be
sufficiently frequent to safeguard adequate safety levels for the road
infrastructure in question23.
RSI is an on-going process, with roads being subject to re-inspection at regular
intervals.
The iRAP programme can be considered as an evolution of the RSI as described
here. This methodology turns the road features detected during the inspection
in quantitative attributes that then, using a quite complex algorithm, provide a
synthetic judgment about road safety. In this case, the inspection is therefore
not limited to the identification of road safety issues, but it is aimed to identify
all road characteristics that, to a different extent, influence the likelihood of a
crash and its severity. More details about iRAP and the techniques developed
under this programme are reported in the Box 4.
RSI responds to the safety implications of changing conditions on the road
network. The road environment is dynamic; it is not fixed over its design life.
Roadside features are added or removed, materials forming the road
deteriorate and are replaced, new developments are built on the road
frontage altering access conditions and changing traffic flows.
Changes also occur to our understanding of road safety and road design
standards; certain engineering designs that would have been considered safe
in the past are today considered unacceptable.
In respect of the timing, the inspection should be carried out:
• By day, in both directions. An inspection by night is advisable if collision
records show an unexpected share of crashes during the night.
• At times of normal operation of the road. Unless otherwise required, avoid
times when the road environment conditions are abnormal, such as
when special events are occurring. However, if events are frequent
(occurring at least weekly), and if the conditions during those events are
considered to affect road safety, then the route should also be driven

23 Irish guidelines (NRA, 2014) suggest the following maximum periods between inspections:
• 5 years for motorways and other dual-carriageway arterial roads
• 3 years for other roads
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under those conditions. School-times and commuter congestion are


examples of factors which may need consideration if they apply to the
route and are significant in safety terms. Off-peak conditions should
however always be considered.
The RSI should be conducted by a team of at least two experienced
practitioners. The benefits of a team approach are that reports are likely more
balanced, and the likelihood to miss some issues are is lower. An additional
consideration is that it is often not practical to carry out an RSI alone.
It is recommended that at least one team member (to be appointed as Team
Leader) would be an approved road safety auditor according to the scheme
described in the previous paragraph. In addition, it is strongly recommended
that all team members would be independent of the maintenance and
operation of the road. The inspection is intended to be a fresh, independent
look at the road and therefore it is not recommended that the inspector have
had a role in the design or maintenance of the route, within the three-year
period prior to the inspection. It does not mean that the inspector cannot be
an employee of the road authority or road operator.
The inspection is carried out with a vehicle and, given its ‘ordinary’ nature, it is
not needed to stop for in-depth investigations.
It is strongly recommended to equip the vehicle with a high-resolution video-
camera provided with a GPS device. It allows in fact an easy positioning of the
identified issues on a map (see Figure 36). The camera must be tight installed
on the windscreen through a suction cup or similar (the camera cannot be
handled).

Figure 36 – Screenshot of a software to manage videos from a camera provided with GPS (on the top
right it is visible the tracking of the travelled route)

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Box 4. iRAP methodology

About iRAP
iRAP was formed in England in 2006 and was granted charity
status in 2011. It is an umbrella organization for road
assessment programmes worldwide (e.g. EuroRAP in
Europe, AusRAP in Australia, usRAP in the US, ChinaRAP in
China, PakRAP – soon – in Pakistan) and facilitates the
development of road assessment work in low- and middle-income countries.
iRAP assumed that reliable crash data would not be available in these countries and
developed new ‘proactive’ techniques to overcome these shortcomings.
Today iRAP works in partnership with government and non-government organisation to
(i) inspect high-risk roads and develop targeted road safety plans, (ii) build local
capability providing training, technology and support, and (iii) track road safety
performance so that funding agencies can assess the benefits of their investments.
Road inspection
Using vehicles equipped with one or more cameras, inspections focus on more than 50
different attributes that are known to influence the likelihood of a crash and its severity.
These attributes include intersection design, the number of lanes and markings, roadside
hazards, footpaths and bicycle facilities.

Example of road attributes

Star Ratings
Star Ratings are based on road inspection data and provide a simple and objective
measure of the level of safety which is ‘built-in’ to the road for vehicle occupants,
motorcyclists, bicyclists and pedestrians.
Five-star roads are the safest while one-star roads are the least safe. According to iRAP,
every extra star rating results in a halving of crash cost on terms of the number of people

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who are killed and seriously injured.


Star Ratings can be completed without reference to detailed crash data (proactive
approach).
The process offers an opportunity for road owners to set a performance-based star rating
target for all road users24.
PakistanRAP
To help reduce the risk of deaths and serious injuries in Pakistan, the ADB engaged iRAP
to assist the NHA to develop the Pakistan Road Assessment Program (PakistanRAP).
The initiative includes developing Star Rating and Safer Roads Investment Plans for some
14,000 km of national highways and building local capacity to perform assessments and
make use of the data produced to guide policy and investment.
To accelerate knowledge exchange and capacity building, the ChinaRAP team, which
has extensive experience in implementing the Highway Safety to Cherish Life project in
China, is playing a key role in the initiative.
A pilot phase of the initiative involved assessment of National Highway 5 (N-5) which is
approximately 3,500 carriageway kilometres in length and introductory training for NHA
staff. The following phases involve assessment of a further some 10,000 carriageway
kilometres of national highways and more in-depth training for local engineers.

Star Ratings of N-5 highway for different road users (source: IRAP)

4.5 Treatment of crash locations


The treatment of crash locations involves a step-by-step process starting with
the identification and ranking of sections of the network in operation which
have a high collision concentration.
This analysis is therefore based on crash data (i.e. reactive approach).
In other words, it means to analyse and rank sections of the road network which
have been in operation for more than three years25 - and upon which a large
number of crashes have occurred - in order to recognise the causes, select

24 On 21 November 2017 WHO Member States agreed 12 road safety performance targets.
Among them, Target 3 states: ‘By 2030, all new roads achieve technical standards for all road
users that take into account road safety, or meet a three star rating or better’
25 Three years is the minimum period to assure statistical reliability

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possible countermeasures and identify those having a potential for


improvement.
The treatment of crash locations is therefore a multi-stage process that follows
the steps listed below:
a) Initial desktop study
b) Detailed desktop study
c) Site visit
d) Diagnosing the crash problem
e) Treating the crash problems
f) Prioritising the schemes on the network
g) Monitoring and evaluation
4.5.1 Initial desktop study
The initial desktop study is based on the crash analysis.
The availability of comprehensive and accurate data about crashes is
therefore crucial, because the whole process of investigating, analysing and
effectively treating crash locations relies on them. Data about road and traffic
characteristics of the crash locations are also important.
Good data permits, amongst other things (Austroads, 2009):
• crash locations to be accurately pinpointed
• the sequence of events in a crash to be appreciated
• the contributing factors in a crash or a group of crashes to be identified,
so that treatment can be directed at those factors
• common factors across a number of crashes to be identified
• the cost consequences of a single crash, all crashes at one location or
several crashes with common factors to be identified
• several crash sites to be ranked, so that treatment can be applied to the
worthiest sites first
Unfortunately, the data set currently available in Pakistan does not allow most
of the above analysis, but it is sufficient to implement the basics of this strategy.
The desktop analysis should be carried out taking into account only collisions
resulting in personal injury because the reporting level of material damage
collisions is variable and the information recorded – if any – is minimal.
It is recommended that the number of collisions be taken into account as a
method, which means that the number of fatalities and injuries should be
ignored26. This approach is based on the following assumptions:

26 The exception to this ‘rule’ would be a site with a much higher than expected proportion of
fatal and serious crashes. For example, on a high-speed road with one fatal and three serious
injury crashes but no minor injury crashes.
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• The use of the number of casualties as a criterion may distort the network
ranking, potentially making critical road sections with few crashes but
many fatalities and/or injuries27.
• The target of this methodology is the infrastructure. The road does not
have any influence in certain variables determining the number of
casualties (i.e. number of vehicle occupants) or the severity of the crash
(i.e. seat belt/helmet wearing, age of occupants, presence of air bags
and/or other vehicle safety devices, etc.).
In order to classify the road network, the following indexes can be used:
• Collision rate (per volume of traffic)28
• Frequency of collisions (or collisions per km of road)
The difference between the two above indexes is that the second takes no
account of exposure (i.e. traffic). Of course, the accuracy of the collision rate
is dependent on the accuracy of traffic volume information. In a first phase,
where the overall objective is to reduce crash numbers, the frequency is a valid
index and its use is recommended in case the traffic data are not reliable
and/or are not available for the whole network to be analysed.
The above indexes must be referred to homogeneous road sections, that is:
• Layout and traffic flow must not change significantly in any single route
(e.g. sections can contain either motorway links or non-motorway links,
but not both).
• The whole section must fall along the same numbered road to ensure
that crash data can be retrieved using only road number and chainage.
• The design and operation must be as uniform as possible, so that the
conditions along the route are similar and the crash index reflects a
reasonable average over all parts of the section.
• Sections should start and end at relevant junctions.
Besides the above criteria, it is essential to assess lengths that minimise the
impact of year-on-year variability in crash numbers and present a stable
longer-term estimate of crash risk. Research conducted by the Transport
Research Laboratory (TRL) show that the number of crashes on busy networks
over a three-year data period for sections of at least 5 km provide a reasonably
robust estimate of risk. Sections less than 5 km tend to show greater year-on-
year variability in crash numbers in addition to being more likely to change risk
rating from one period to another and were therefore less reliable when
compared over time. For motorways and dual and single carriageways these
differences were significant up to section lengths of 10 km (EuroRAP, 2018).

27As an example, on 11th November 2014, along the Therry bypass (Khairpur, Sindh), a
passenger bus collided a truck. In just one crash 59 casualties occurred. Can a single crash
define a site as hazardous?
67.8799:;:7<;/>?@A × CDE
28 !"##$%$"& ()*+ ,+( 10/ 0+ℎ. 34 = FGH.IH J@>; × KKLM × A7NO? 9?<POQ (ST)

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Minimum thresholds of 10 km for motorways and dual carriageways and 5 km


for single carriageways are therefore recommended.
Following this method, this initial study results in a risk mapping that identifies
high collision sections which are then subject to a detailed desktop study.

Figure 37 – Risk map of motorway and national road network of France

4.5.2 Detailed desktop study


Per each high collision section, a detailed review of the collision data should
be undertaken to identify:
• Clusters of crashes (i.e. blackspots)
• Factors which can explain how the various road users failed to cope
immediately prior to the collisions
Unfortunately, the second analysis requires information that in Pakistan is not
yet fully available. The desktop analysis must be therefore necessarily
supplemented by a site inspection carried out following a proactive approach
(see following paragraph).

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If data allow this kind of analysis, they should furtherly clustered by common
crash-type or factors like common weather or daylight, common speed range,
etc.29
This analysis should aim to highlight factors common to a number of the
collisions at the site in the view that the prevalence of crashes at only some
locations, and the clustering of crash-types at a single location usually indicates
that there are common causes for the crashes. The aim of this analysis is
therefore to identify sites which have ‘treatable’ collision problems amenable
to road engineering treatments. Figure 38 shows a site with a dominant right
turn accident problem, along with other more individual accident types.

Figure 38 – Site with a predominant right-turn collision problem (source: DoE, 1996)

If there is not a dominant crash-type, development of a remedial treatment


can be very difficult. Indeed, it may be that no engineering measure is
applicable to the problems at that site. Alternatively, there may be two or more
major crash-types, with two or more different remedial engineering treatments
called for.
4.5.3 Site visit
Once the collision data and other relevant data for a particular location have
been studied, it is necessary to carry out a site visit. The site visit should only take
place after the initial collision study has been completed. This should avoid the
pre-judgement of collision problems that can happen if the site is visited prior
to the collision data been examined.
The primary purpose of the site visit is to identify any environment and traffic
deficiencies which may have contributed to the recorded crash history.

29For this kind of analysis, it would be very useful to examine the individual police crash report
forms. Unfortunately - in Pakistan like in many other countries - these records are not made
easily available to practitioners.
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To ensure that road deficiencies are identified it is essential that site inspections
are carried out in an extremely systematic and purposeful manner.
If the crash data show a cluster of a particular crash-type, this means several
people are misreading the situation as they approach, drive through, turn at,
walk across, or otherwise negotiate the location. The questions that always
should be done are therefore:
• What is causing them to do this?
• What is misleading or difficult to deal with?
These issues cannot be identified only from crash data, crash report forms or
photographs. It is essential to carry out a site visit always taking into account
the point of view of different road users (‘role play’).
Basic principles of the site visit are as follows:
• Look at the site at in relation of the results of data analysis
• Carry out the visit in conditions similar of those when crashes occur (e.g.
same time, peak/off-peak, light/dark, wet/dry, etc.)
• View the location as the road users in a crash may have seen it
• Drive through the location repeating the manoeuvres featured in the
crash data
• Observe ‘dangerous movements’
• Take notes, photos and videos
4.5.4 Diagnosing the crash problems
The objective of this activity is - basing on crash analysis and site visit - to identify
these common causes and to counter them by applying appropriate remedial
engineering treatments.
It is not possible to define specific rules to identify the causes. One type of crash
may have different causes at different locations. A list of possible contributing
factors for different types of crashes is provided in Table 8.
Table 8 - Some possible contributing factors for different type of crashes

Crash type Possible contributing factors


Right angle - Restricted sight distance.
collisions - High approach speeds.
- ‘See through’ effect on a minor approach.
- Obscured control sign, control lines or signal lanterns.
- The presence of the intersection is not otherwise evident (at time
of day).
- Traffic volumes too high for Give Way or Stop controls (inadequate
gaps).
Right turn - Restricted visibility.
collisions with - Queued oncoming right turners block visibility.
oncoming - Insufficient number of gaps in oncoming traffic.
traffic - Too many lanes of oncoming traffic to filter across.
- Complex intersection layout.

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Crash type Possible contributing factors


Straight ahead - Queued right turn vehicles further ahead.
rear end - Traffic signals around curve or over crest.
collisions - Other unexpected cause of delay further ahead.
- Inadequate skid resistance or pavement drainage.
- Wrong offset timing of linked signals.
- ‘See through’ effect of consecutive traffic signals.
- Inadequate inter-green phase on signals.
- Presence of parked cars.
- Unstable flow on high speed road.
Right or left turn - Turning vehicles where they are not expected (e.g. just before or
rear end just after signals).
collisions - A left turn slip lane permitting high speed turns.
Hit fixed object - Islands not visible.
crashes - Complex layout.
- Reasons as for Run-off-road crashes
Crashes - Unexpected parked vehicle in traffic lane.
involving a - Edge line not visible.
parked vehicle - Lanes too narrow.
Side-swipe - Lanes too narrow (for traffic composition, speed, curvature of
collisions road, angle of lanes).
- Lane lines, edge lines not visible.
- Presence of parked cars or other obstruction.
- Unexpected lane drop or merge area.
- Inadequate direction information.
Head-on - Lanes too narrow (for traffic composition, speed or curvature of
collisions road).
- Centreline not visible.
- Severity of curve cannot be judged.
- A hidden dip or crest.
- Insufficient overtaking opportunities.
- Road surface deficiencies.
Run-off-road - Narrow lanes or narrow seal.
type crashes - Severity of curve cannot be judged.
- Edge of the road is not evident.
- Gravel shoulders do not allow recovery of control.
- Alignment of road is deceptive.
- Inadequate skid resistance or pavement drainage.
Pedestrian - Too much traffic for adequate gaps.
crashes - High speed, multi-lane and two-way traffic.
- Complex or unexpected traffic movements.
- Traffic hidden by parked cars, other objects or excessive
landscaping.
- A marked crossing which is not evident to drivers.
- Long signal cycles which encourage pedestrians to disobey
signals.
- Inappropriate device or lack of devices for mix of pedestrians (e.g.
disabled).
- Inadequate lighting.

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Crash type Possible contributing factors


Railway level - Location of crossing is not evident.
crossing - Impending presence of train is not evident.
crashes - Form of control is not accurately identified (or is inconsistent).
- Driver’s attention distracted by intersection or other feature.
- Obscured control devices.
(source: Austroads, 2009)

4.5.5 Treating the crash problems


4.5.5.1 Approaches to crash reduction
Once the crash patterns and causes are identified, the issues can be
approached using different strategies. In general, the following four
approaches can be referred to:
i. Single site: Crashes occurring at an individual site are examined in detail,
common crash types are identified and measures introduced to treat
the problems identified. An example could be the introduction of a
chevron sign on a bend with a loss of control accident problem.
ii. Route action: Sections of road are identified and treated together. An
example of this could be the introduction of edge line markings along a
route with a record of vehicles leaving the road, or the introduction of
traffic calming and gateways through a village on a national route.
iii. Mass action: Groups of sites are identified with common crash causes
and a single measure introduced at all the sites. An example of this
approach could be to identify a series of sites with wet skid accidents
and apply anti-skid surfacing to those sites. The mass action approach is
particularly useful in rural areas on local roads with small crash numbers.
iv. Area-wide action: Parts of an urban area are identified where crashes of
a particular type can be identified, but are not confined to single sites or
routes. An example of this could be the introduction of traffic calming to
reduce pedestrian accidents in an urban area.
These approaches illustrate the various ways in which an authority can tackle
its road safety problems. Each approach has a different emphasis and is likely
to produce a variation in the type of crash likely to be treated.

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Figure 39 – Possible approaches to crash reduction (source: DoE, 1996)

4.5.5.2 Selecting the countermeasures


Having identified the elements of the road and traffic environment which
contributed to the crashes, the next step involves consideration of
countermeasures. For a solution to be effective, it must be applied to a
particular problem which it is known to affect. It must be an effective
countermeasure.
The aim of countermeasure development is to:
• select countermeasures which, on the basis of professional judgement
and experience, can be expected to reduce the number or severity of
crashes of the type(s) dominant at the location
• check that adopted countermeasures do not have undesirable
consequences, either in safety terms (e.g. lead to an increase in the
number or severity of another crash-type) or in traffic efficiency or
environmental terms
• be cost-effective, i.e. maximise the benefits from the whole program of
expenditure over a number of sites
• be efficient, i.e. produce benefits which outweigh the costs.
There are several criteria for countermeasure selection, including (Ogded, as
cited in Austroads, 2009):
• technical feasibility: can the countermeasure provide an answer to the
safety problems which have been diagnosed and does it have a
technical basis for success?
• economic efficiency: is the countermeasure likely to be cost-effective
and will it produce benefits to exceed its costs?
• affordability: can it be accommodated within the program budget; if
not, should it be deferred, or should a cheaper, perhaps interim solution
be adopted?
• acceptability: does the countermeasure clearly target the identified
problem and will it be readily understandable by the community?
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• practicability: is there likely to be a problem of non-compliance, or can


the measure work without unreasonable enforcement effort?
• political and institutional acceptability: is the countermeasure likely to
attract political support and will it be supported by the organisation
responsible for its installation and ongoing management?
• legal conformity: is the countermeasure a legal device, or will users be
breaking any law by using it in the way intended?
• compatibility: is the countermeasure compatible and consistent with
other strategies, either in the same locality or which have been applied
in similar situations elsewhere?
The key to the selection of countermeasures is to concentrate on the particular
crash-types which have been identified in the diagnosis phase and which are
amenable to treatment with road or traffic engineering measures. If this
relationship between detected issues and countermeasures fails, the
investment is destined to be not cost-effective.
Often there will be a number of alternative remedial treatments which could
be applied, either individually or in combination. The final choice about which
countermeasure(s) to select requires road safety engineering experience and
judgement about the factors which have led to the crashes. A catalogue of
possible countermeasures to be implemented in Pakistan is reported in the Part
II of these Guidelines.
4.5.5.3 Assessing the crash reduction
Once the countermeasure is selected its effect in crash reduction must be
determined as well as its implementation cost (even if approximated).
Several studies have been performed to estimate the safety impact of various
types of road infrastructure improvements. Many existing Crash Modification
Factors (CMF)30 are derived from these evaluation studies, like before-and-after
analysis of actual countermeasures implementation (see, for instance, Elvik et
al., 2009)31.
An alternative method, more pragmatic, guesstimates collisions savings
comparing the current crash patterns with a situation where the measure is
already implemented. In practice, it is assumed that unless something is done
at the site the existing pattern of crashes will be repeated over time. The
collision record is therefore re-examined, and each crash assessed to

30 A CMF is a multiplicative factor used to compute the expected number of crashes after
modifying the road characteristics at a specific site (e.g. by implementing a given
countermeasure). A CMF higher than 1 is assumed to increase the likelihood or severity of a
target crash type, while if lower than 1 decreases crash likelihood/severity.
31 A useful reference is SafetyCube, a research project funded by the European Commission

under the programme Horizon 2020 (www.safetycube-project.eu). Under this project an


innovative road safety Decision Support System (DSS) providing detailed interactive
information on a large list of road crash risk factors and related road safety countermeasures
has been developed (www.roadsafety-dss.eu).
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determine whether that particular crash would have happened if the


proposed measure had been implemented.
An application is presented in Box 5.

Box 5. Assessment of collision savings (example)

There is an urban priority junction with a history of


10 injury collisions in 3 years, distributed as
follows:
- 4 overshoots from side road
- 3 right turns from main road
- 3 pedestrians crossing main road
It is proposed to install traffic signals.

How can the reduction of crashes be estimated?


The following table can be used as a reference guide.

Type of measure Collision reduction


Measure totally eliminating the risk factor - 75/100%
(e.g. segregation of different traffic
streams)
Measure partially eliminating the risk - 35/75%
factor
(e.g. new traffic signal)
Measure not eliminating the risk factor, - 25/35%
but making users aware of its presence
(e.g. new markings)

With reference to the above ranges, the following reductions can be assumed:

Manoeuvre Potential % collision Potential collision


reduction saving
Cross over 75% x 4 3.0
Right turn 50% x 3 1.5
Pedestrian 33% x 3 1.0
Total 5.5

It may be needed to add collisions generated by the scheme (e.g. shunts at traffic
signals).

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4.5.6 Prioritising the schemes on the network32


Having decided upon treatments for high collision sites, the road authority
should prioritise all potential schemes within their network33.
This should be done using an economic appraisal that essentially concerns with
the economic efficiency of alternative proposals. With this appraisal economic
costs of a proposal are compared with the economic benefits. The outcome is
not only an assessment of the quality of an individual project (i.e. there is a net
economic benefit, such that the community is economically better off by
implementing the project than by not doing so), but also - and above all - an
indication of which project (or set of projects) is the best.
While the assessment of costs is rather simple and does not require any
additional information, the assessment of benefits is more complex.
Benefits are assessed by assigning a monetary value to the crashes saved.
There is in fact a cost incurred to the community when a road crash takes
place. Collision costs can be classified into:
• lost output due to death or injury
• human costs of pain, grief and suffering
• resource cost in terms of:
o hospital
o emergency service
o damage to property
o insurance costs
At this stage, no studies are available to estimate this social cost for Pakistan.
For the time being, therefore, we can only rely on proxy analyses.
iRAP provides a statistical evaluation of life that can be applied worldwide,
along with typical fatal to serious injury ratios (McMahon & Dahdah, 2008). The
recommended values for middle and high-income countries are as follows:
• Value of fatality = 70 x GDP per capita
• Value of serious injury = 25% of the Value of fatality
It should be borne in mind that these figures should in any case be related to
the ‘average crash’ in Pakistan. In practice, the total cost of the crashes has to
be calculated using the above method and then divided by the number of
injury crashes.
Once costs and benefits are estimated, it is possible to compare them and
decide the best schemes to be implemented.
The most efficient means of prioritising is to use the First Year Rate of Return
(FYRR) that is a simple way of calculating whether a scheme can be justified in

32This methodology mainly refers to a ‘single site’ approach


33The described methodology can be applied also to a single site in case it is necessary to
choose between alternative options
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economic terms34. The method can be used to rank proposals at different sites,
but also to rank different options at a site. The FYRR is calculated using the
formula:
Y&&Z)# ["##$%$"& %)0$&\%
VWXX =
][ℎ+4+ ["%*
The options with the highest FYRR are then chosen for implementation.
However, there should be a note of caution here in that high FYRR values are
generally achieved with schemes costing little money but saving fewer crashes
(the temptation to solve every problem by putting up a sign should be
avoided!).
The number of crashes saved within each option should therefore be taken into
account. It is suggested that a minimum predicted crash reduction of 25-30%
should be achievable for each site.
4.5.7 Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring is the systematic collection of data about the performance of road
safety treatments after their implementation.
Evaluation is the statistical analysis of that data to assess the extent to which
the treatment (or a wider treatment program) has met crash reduction
objectives.
Post-implementation monitoring is essential to ascertain the positive and
negative effects of a treatment and thus improve the accuracy and
confidence of predictions of that treatment’s effectiveness in subsequent
applications. There is a duty to ensure that the public does not experience
additional hazards as a result of treatments and this duty carries with it an
implied need to monitor what happens when a scheme is introduced.
The purposes of monitoring a treatment are to (IHT, as cited in Austroads, 2009):
• assess what changes have occurred in crash occurrence and whether
safety objectives have been met
• assess the treatment’s impact on the distribution of traffic and the speeds
of motor vehicles
• call attention to any unintended effects on traffic movements or crash
occurrence
• assess the effects of the treatment on the local environment
• learn of the public’s response to the treatment: its acceptability in
general and any concerns about safety in particular.

34It should be noted that there is a more rigorous method of economic assessment of
proposals known as the Net Present Value (NPV). The NPV method takes a longer-term view
than FYRR and calculates benefits over a 10 or 15-year scheme life, using discount factors to
assess costs and benefits at year 1 prices. It may be more appropriate to use the NPV method
for higher cost schemes.
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There are three elements to monitoring and evaluation (County Surveyors’


Society, as cited in Austroads, 2009):
• Pay careful attention to a site immediately after treatment in case things
go badly wrong.
• Assess the effects over a longer time period, say three years, to attempt
to determine the influence of the treatment on crashes or other
performance measures. This requires careful statistical analysis,
correcting for external factors and bearing in mind that crash
frequencies may be so low that any observed changes in crashes may
not be statistically significant.
• Focus, over this longer time period, upon the crash-types which the
treatment was intended to correct and assess whether these have
declined.
The first parameter to be monitored is, of course, the frequency of crashes. The
main problem is that to have reliable before-after comparisons a three-year
period of analysis is needed.
An early indication of safety benefits can be obtained from other observations
like:
• traffic and speed surveys
• conflict studies35

35A ‘conflict study’ is a technique that involves observation of the conflicts, or ‘near crashes’,
experienced by road users. Conflicts can be defined as ‘situations involving one or more road
users who approach each other such that there is a risk of collision if their movements remain
unchanged’. In a conflict study the numbers of conflicts are recorded and graded
according to the scale of severity ranging from controlled evasive manoeuvres to extreme
emergency action.
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References
AASHTO (2011) – A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets –
Washington, USA
ADB (2018a) – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 1 / Road Safety Audit
ADB (2018b) – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 2 / Safer Road Works
ADB (2018c) – CAREC Road Safety Engineering Manual 3 / Roadside Hazard
Management
AfDB (2014a) – Road Safety Manuals for Africa – Existing Roads: Proactive
Approaches
AfDB (2014b) – Road Safety Manuals for Africa – Existing Roads: Reactive
Approaches
AfDB (2014c) – Road Safety Manuals for Africa – New Roads and Schemes:
Road Safety Audit
Ahmed, A. et al. (2018) – Road Safety Audit Policy, Procedures & Guidelines –
National Highway Authority, Islamabad, Pakistan
Austroads (2009) – Guide to Road Safety Part 8: Treatment of Crash Locations
– Sydney, Australia
Buchanan, C. (1963) - Traffic in towns; A study of the long term problems of
traffic in urban areas - London, UK
CERTU (1994) - Les ralentisseurs de type dos d’âne et trapézoïdal [Speed humps
and speed tables] (Lyon, France)
Department of Environment (1996) - A Guide to Road Safety Engineering in
Ireland – Dublin, Ireland
DETR (2000) – New directions in speed management: a review of policy –
London, UK
DHV (2005) – Sustainable safe road design – A practical manual – The World
Bank, Washington, USA
Elvik, R., Hoye, A., Vaa, T., Sorensen, M. (2009) - The Handbook of Road Safety
Measures. Second Edition - Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, UK
EuroRAP (2018) – RAP Road Risk Mapping Manual: Technical Specifications –
Basingstoke, UK
McMahon, K. & Dahdah, S. (2008) – The true cost of road crashes. Valuing life
and cost of a serious injury – iRAP, Basingstoke, UK
NRA (2014) – Road Safety Inspection Guidelines - Volume 5 Section 2, Part 2,
NRA HA 17/14 - Dublin, Ireland
NRA (2016) – Road Safety Impact Assessment Guidelines – Volume 5 Section 2,
Part 2, NRA HA 18/16 - Dublin, Ireland

77
Guidelines for Road
Safety Engineering|Part I

NTRC (1989) – Manual of Signs, Signals and Road Markings – Islamabad,


Pakistan
OECD (2006) – Speed management – Paris, France
OECD (2008) – Towards Zero: Ambitious Road Safety Targets and the Safe
System Approach – Paris, France
PIARC (2015) – Road Safety Manual – A manual for practitioners and decisions
makers on implementing Safe System infrastructure! – Paris, France
UN ESCAP (2004) – Intergovernmental agreement on the Asian Highway
Network – Shanghai, China
UN ESCAP (2017a) - Development of road infrastructure safety facility standards
for the Asian Highway Network (draft version) – Bangkok, Thailand
UN ESCAP (2017b) - Recommended Detail Design Guidelines on Road
Infrastructure Safety Facilities for the Asian Highway Network (draft version) –
Bangkok, Thailand
Van Schagen, I. N. L. G., Dijkstra, A., Claessens, F. M. M. & Janssen, W. H. (1999)
- Recognition of sustainably safe road types - SWOV Institute for Road Safety
Research, Leidschendam, The Netherlands
Wegman, F. & Aarts, L. (2006) - Advancing Sustainable Safety: National Road
Safety Outlook for 2005-2020 - SWOV Institute for Road Safety Research,
Leidschendam, The Netherlands
WHO (2008) - Speed management: a road safety manual for decision-makers
and practitioners – Geneva, Switzerland
WHO (2010) – Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011 – 2020
- Geneva, Switzerland
WHO (2018) – Global status report on road safety 2018 – Geneva, Switzerland

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Annex – Road design standards’


benchmark

Road design standards analysed:

Standard Reference Region/


Country
Asian UN ESCAP - Recommended Detail Design Guidelines on Asia
Highway Road Infrastructure Safety Facilities for the Asian Highway
Standards Network – April 2017
TEM UNECE – TEM standards and recommended practice – Europe
February 2002
AASHTO AASHTO - A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and USA
Streets – 2011, 6th Edition
Austroads Austroads – Guide to Road Design Part 3 – Geometric Australi
Design – September 2016 a
DMRB Design Manual for Roads and Bridges: Volume 6 – Road UK
Geometry
ICTAAL Ministry of Public Works - Instruction sur les Conditions France
Techniques d’Aménagement des Autoroutes de Liaison
[Instruction on technical design requirements for rural
motorways] – Circular of 12th December 2000
ARP Ministry of Public Works – Aménagement des routes France
principales [Construction of main roads] – August 1994
Instrucción de Ministry of Development - Instrucción de Carreteras – Spain
Carreteras Norma 3.1-IC – Trazado [Road instruction – Standard 3.1-
IC – Alignment] - Order FOM/273/2016 of 16th February
2016
Italian Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports – Norme Italy
Standards funzionali e geometriche per costruzione delle strade
[Functional and geometric standards for road
construction] – Ministerial Decree 5th November 2001

The comparative analysis refers to two typical cases:


• dual carriageway motorway
• single carriageway rural road

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Motorways (design speed: 110/120 km/h)

Standard Region/ Category Minimum radii (m) Max. Cross-section


Country grade
Horizontal1 Vertical Lane Shoulder width (m) Median
(%)
width (m) width (m)
Crest Sag Outer Inner
Asian Highway Asia Primary N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.50-3.75 >1.00 N/A >1.00
Standards road
TEM Europe Motorway 650 12,000 4,444 6 3.50-3.75 3.00 - >4.00
AASHTO USA Freeway 667 N/A N/A 3-4 3.60 3.00 1.20-2.40 >3.00
Austroads Australia Motorway 667 N/A N/A 3-6 3.50 2.50-3.002 1.00 N/A
DMRB UK Motorway 510 N/A N/A 3 3.65 3.30 0.70 >3.10
(D2M)
ICTAAL France L1 600 12,500 4,200 5 3.50 2.50-3.00 1.00 N/A
Instrucción de Spain Motorway 700 N/A N/A 4 3.50 2.50 1.00-1.50 >2.00
Carreteras (A-120)
Italian Standards Italy Motorway 667 8,000 4,800 5 3.75 3.00 0.70 >2.60
(A)

1 With superelevation (max. 8%)


2 Depending on traffic volume

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Rural roads (design speed: 80 km/h)

Standard Region/ Category Minimum radii (m) Maximum Cross-section


Country grade
Horizontal3 Vertical Lane width Shoulder
(%)
(m) width (m)
Crest Sag
Asian Highway Standards Asia Class II road 200-400 N/A N/A N/A 3.50 >1.00
AASHTO USA Collector road 229 N/A N/A 6-9 3.00-3.604 0.60-2.405
Austroads Australia Intermediate 153 N/A N/A 4-9 3.10-3.505 1.50-2.505
speed rural
road
DMRB UK Rural all- 255 N/A N/A 6 3.65 1.00
purpose road
(S2)
ARP France All-purpose 240 3,000 2,200 5 3.50 2.00
road (R80)
Instrucción de Carreteras Spain Conventional 265 N/A N/A 5 3.50 1.50
road (C-80)
Italian Standards Italy Secondary rural 252 3,000 3,000 7 3.75 1.50
road (C1)

3 With superelevation (max. 8%)


4 Depending on design volume and speed
5 Depending on design volume

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