SPE/IADC

SPEIIADC 21991

Re-Entry and Relief Well Drilling To Kill an Underground Blowout

in a Subsea Well: A Case History of Well 2/4-14
T.<1>lberg, T. Gilhuus, F. Leraand, and J. Haga, Saga Petroleum AlS

Copyright 1991, SPElIADC Drilling Conference.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1991 SPEJIADC Drilling Conference held in Amsterdam. 11-14 March 1991.

This paper was selected for presentation by an lADClSPE Program Committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(sj. Contents of the
paper as presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers or the International Association of Drilling Contractors and are subject to correction by the author(s).
The ~aterial, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any position of the IADC or SPE, its officers, or members. Papers presented at lADC/SPE meetings are SUbject to publication
review by Editorial Committees of the IADC and SPE. Permission to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words. Illustrations may not be copied. The abstract should
contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper is presented. Write Publications Manager, SPE, P.O. Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836. Telex. 730999 SPEDAL

ABSTRACf I The objective of this activity was identified as:

Well 2/4-14 in the Norwegian Sector encountered well control problems
in January 1989 at a depth of 4734 m. After some days effort to
reestablish normal pressure control the well blew out on surface of the
floater and had to be closed in using the shear ram. This left the subsea
BOP closed and with a shut in wellhead pressure of 10000 psi. In I
addition a full string of drillpipe with approximately 4500 m of coiled
tubing was left in the well. After an attempt to regain control by
bullheading heavy mud, in which a flexible kill line bursted, the well
was left for a periode. Preparations were made to reenter the well with
high pressure snubbing equipment to fish out the drillpipe and coiled
tubing, so that the well could be circulated dead. In parallel to this
effort a relief well was started immediately.
After the well was reopened it was discovered that the casing had
bursted and that the well was blowing out underground.
On December 12, 1989,295 days after the shear ram was closed, the
well was killed.
Another four months were required to finish cleanup and final
abandonment of the blowout well.
The paper presents the case history and indicates some of the tools and
technology that was developed to regain control of this well.
INTRODUcnON
On January 20 and 21, 1989 well 2/4-14 blew out twice before finally
being closed in with the shear ram/fail safe valves on the BOP
(See Fig. 1,2). Only a minor amount of oil/gas was released to the
environment but the shut in wellhead pressure was left at approximately
10.000 psi (690 bar).
PLANNING OF CONTROL OPERATION
An evaluation of the operations on and responses of the well prior to
closing in, - and the complex tubular strings left in the well, resulted in
a conclusion that a major well control operation had to be initiated.
I
"To regain control of 2/4-14 as soon as possible in a manner which
permits the well to be securely plugged and abandoned according to
the objectives in the NPD drilling regulations. During this operation
safety shall be a primary consideration".
Further, a safety philosophy was established which stated:
"The operation shall if possible be performed with normal level of
safety for personnel and environment."
"Two risky operations will not be performed at the same time, and as
far as possible the operation will be performed so that a reasonable
fallback is maintained at all times".
Through evaluations it was concluded that in order to satisfy the
. objective plugging of the well, a significant amount of the tubulars
(drillpipe/coiled tubing) had to be removed from the well. Otherwise the
deep parts of the well could not be satisfactory plugged.
A parallel approach was chosen:
- To start drilling of a kill well (2/4-15S)
- To start mobilizing for a high pressure snubbing operation in 2/4-14
This parallel approach was considered to give the best probability for
reaching the objective as it was identified.
MOBllJZATION AND START OF OPERATION
Drilling ofthe kill well2/4-15S started January 31, 1989 using the semi-
submersible drilling rig "Treasure Saga" (TS), immediately after
installing a back up plug in the annular preventer of the BOP stack on
the 2/4-14 wellhead. The kill well was spudded 1182 m south of the
2/4-14 well (See Fig. 3).
For the reentry operation it was decided to contract the jack-up drilling
rig "Neddrill Trigon" (NT) and use this as a base for a surface snubbing
operation into the subsea well.

775
 REENTRY AND RELIEFWElL DRILLING TOKIlL AN UNDERGROUND BLOWOUTIN A SUBSEA WELL
2
A CASE IDSTQRY OF WElL 2/4-14 SPEIIADC 21991

The time between the end of January 1989 and mid April 1989 was used
to mobilize rig(s), snubbing equipment and personnel, manufacture high
pressure riser and other equipment, modifications to NT and
development of the operational program and procedures. The riser had
an 11" nominal ill and was pressure rated to 12500 psi WP. The
connections were a flanged type called VCF. The modifications on NT
consisted of the following:
- Transport stool for extra BOP
- Overhead crane for handling in BOP area
- Texas deck around BOP level
- Outriggers and choke manifold platform
- 4" firewater line
- Platform for flotell bridge
- Coflex hose guide funnel
It was also decided to mobilize "Safe Britannia" (SB) to provide a safe
haven and accomodation for the personnel involved in the reentry
operation.
This fact, plus the observed annulus pressure, also led to the conclusion
that an underground blowout was going on and that the 9 5/8" casing
most likely was bursted. It also seemed likely that the 13 3/8" casing
was bursted.
This resulted in an extensive activity to establish the actual well
situation. A PLT was run inside the drillpipe. This verified a flow of
approximately 2900 m3/d, at flowing conditions, through a leak in the
overshot packoff. A shallow seismic survey was performed (11.06.89 -
16.06.89) and indicated (28.06.89) a new anomaly in the Early Pliocene
sand (828 - 878 m RKB).
The plans for the activity and the involved risks were reevaluated in light
of the new situation but it was decided to continue according to the
original plan.
Recovery of coiled tubing continued but progress was slow. By mid
June approximately 600 m of CT had been recovered.
In 2/4-15S the 95/8" casing was set at 4524 m MD on June 17, 1989.

REENTRY Well 2/4-14 had been crossed at 3829 m TVD with a distanse of
6.3 m +1- 0.7m (See Fig. 6,7). The bypass was monitored by the use
Finally, May 1, all preparations were finished and well 2/4-14 was of Wellspot elektro magnetic ranging tool. The surface coordinate shift
reentered (See Fig. 4). was only 5 m from the surveyed location at the bypass depth. After
crossing, the well was dropped to vertical, and drilling continued at a
It was found that the pressure had been reduced from initially 10000 psi distance of approximately 20 m. This way the relative position
to 2800 psi. A number of possible situations were identified, including: uncertainty was minimized and so was also the possible need for
extensive directional work deep in the high temperature well.
a) an ongoing deep underground crossflow below 9 5/8" casing shoe
After the 9 5/8" casing was set, additional equipment was installed to
b) bridging of the well after pressure had been relieved by fracturing of prepare for the kill operation if the top intervention work in 2/4-14 was
the 9 5/8" caSing shoe not successful. Three kill mud storage tanks, each with a 500 bbls
capacity was installed on deck TS. These tanks were hooked up to 16
c) bridging of the well after pressure had been relieved by bursting the Halliburton HT-400 kill pumps through a manifold system. The kill
9 5/8" casing pumps could also be supplied with seawater and mud from mud pits. To
facilitate plumping into the well, a special built pump in spool was
d) an ongoing underground blowout through a bursted 9 5/8" casing installed above the BOP stack, and connected to the kill pumps through
two Coflexip hoses.
e) a situation where the initial gas on top of the well had gone back into
solution after the well had bridged THE FIRST TIME THE WElL IS Jrn.I .ED
With the available data none of the above situations could be excluded, Late June it was decided to replace the leaking packoff overshot and
but based on the stability of the pressure and the design parameters of attempt to kill the well by bullheading with 2.16 sg Zink Bromide brine
the 95/8" casing option b) was considered as the most likely scenario. (See Fig. 8). This was done June 30, 1989. Judged by the observed
pressures, etc., it is considered likely that the well at this time was
While the reentry equipment was mobilized, TS had encountered hole actually killed for a short period. The build up of pressure differential
problems in the 17 112" section of the kill well. After three sidetracks, between the inside of the drillpipe and the annulus exceeded the
these were finally cured by setting a 16" scab liner at 2100 m and the remaining integrity deep in the well and flow resumed, but this time up
13 3/8" casing was set at 2653 m MD on April 22, 1989. The kill well the annulus. Two scenarios were considered likely; either a bridge in
geometry was based on a build, hold and drop well path to cross the the annulus outside the drillpipelBHA broke or the drillpipe itself started
2/4-14 casing between 3800 and 3900 m 10 m to the west. The well leaking. .
was surveyed with MWD and inertial gyro at the 13 3/8" casing shoe.
At this time a sharp increase in gas readings was observed in 2/4-15S.
This was interpreted as communication with 2/4-14, and most likely
In 2/4-14 the drillpipe was reconnected and hung off in an inverted through fractures around the 9 5/8" shoe. As it could not be determined
piperam (09.05.89) and fishing for the 1.5" coiled tubing (CT) started . if the gas influx represented a permanent communication, or something
(12.05.89). that was caused by an increase in bottomhole pressure (BHP) in 2/4-14
by the bullheading on June 30, it was decided to suspend further drilling
By the end of May indications that the well might be flowing were in 2/4-15S. The only way of determining what caused the gas increase
observed. To determine if this was actually the case, a small DP packer was to use time and let the absence of further gas readings be a
was run inside the drillpipe to below the packoff overshot. The fact that verification that we had no permanent communication and consequently
the packer was blown out of the drillpipe clearly documented that the that the gas was caused by the increased BHP after bullheading. The
well was flowing up the drillpipe and out through the overshot decision to suspend further drilling in 2/4-15S was a direct consequence
(See Fig. 5). of the safety philosophy of not conducting two risky operations at the
same time.

776
3 T.S. eLBERG. F. LERAAND. T. GILllUUS. J. RAGA
DRILLING IS RESUMED
After 5 weeks it was decided that drilling could be resumed because no
further gas had been observed in 2/4-15S and thus that no permanent
communication between the two wells was open.
SLOWLY THE WELL IS CLEANED UP
During this period fishing of coiled tubing continued in 2/4-14 and now
with better success. By mid August 3500 m of CT had been recovered.
Based on temperature logs run in 2/4-14, it was concluded that the well
was flowing up the drillpipelcasing annulus and through a leak: in the
95/8" casing at 1370 m (See Fig. 9,10,11). These logs also showed that
the flow was leaving the well at approximately 900 m and flowing into
a sandstone formation at approximately 840 - 890 m (NT). The
identification of the recipient sandstone formation was confirmed by
repeated seismic surveys which revealed a growing seismic anomaly at
a depth of approximately 870 m (NT).
THE CONfROL CONCEPT IN THE BLOWING WELL
Based on the condition of the well, with a leaking casing and a
significant flow into a high permeability shallow formation, it was
considered that running a purpose built packer and a tieback string would
give the best probabilities for killing the well, and keeping it in balance
after killing. The packer, developed by Baker Oil Tools could be run
and set in a flowing well (See Fig. 12). As it was set, the flow could be
shut in, or a sliding sleeve located above the packer in the tieback string
could be run in an open position. This would reduce the shock and
immediate differ.ential pressure accross the packer. The sliding sleeve
could be shifted to a closed position later, and the integrity of the well
would be regained. Both the packer and the sliding sleeve was verified
for the condition of well 2/4-14. The actual killing operation was
planned as a coordinated effort using both the kill well (2/4-15S) and
214-14, or if communication was not achieved from 2/4-15S, do the
killing internally in 2/4-14 only.
Drilling continued in 2/4-15S and by September 17, the 7" liner was set
pointing at the target (See Fig. 13). Progress in this section had been
slow mainly because of tight directional control and the need for rotary
drilling through several possible loss zones to avoid reduced pumping
capacity through MWD and the downhole motor.
When the 7" liner had been set, fishing of coiled tubing in 2/4-14 was
stopped. At this time approx 4000 m of CT had been recovered and the
drillpipe cleared down to 4100 m (See Fig. 14).
By the end of September the drillpipe was cut at 4061 m and a pump test
was performed with the primary objective of testing the pumping
equipment available for pumping in well 2/4-14. PLT-logging in the
well below the cut drillpipe at 4061 m measured a hydrocarbon flow rate
of 5100 m3/d at flowing conditions and a pressure of 260 bar. Prior to
cutting the drillpipe it was plugged below the planned cut point. Noise
logs run in the relief well identified a noise peak: at about 4100 m. This
latest information led to the conclusion that the well probably was
flowing up through the bit and BBA and out through a hole in the
drillpipe at 4100 m with no flow in the annulus below this level.
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE KIlL OPERATION
The final stages of preparation for the kill operation had started and
drilling of the 5 7/8" section in 2/4-15S was suspended until all these
were finished and the tieback assembly in 2/4-14 ready to be activated.
The cut drillstring was pulled from the well. This operation required
14 days and was finished October 15, 1989.
777
SPFJIADC 21991
A milling assembly was to be run in 2/4-14 to verify that there were no
obstructions in the 9 5/8" casing before the blowout packer was run.
Some minor obstructions were encountered but finally October 20, the
well had been cleared to below 3800 m. When pulling the mill out of
hole the DP parted above the back pressure valves and a small blowout
occured before the well was closed using the shear rams again. This of
course, complicated the further operation. First because the string had
to be recovered and secondly because during the time this recovery took
place the 9 5/8" casing string parted (24th October) and prevented
further plans for setting of a packer and tieback.
After the upper fish had been recovered and the well cleared down to
1450 m, it was verified that the 9 5/8" casing now had lost integrity up
to 840 m. Based on this and the experienced problems in working into
the well it was decided to go ahead with the kill operation without being
able to isolate the leaking parts of the 9 5/8" casing (i.e. not able to run
packer and tieback).
To plan the dynamic kill operation, which was the kill method finally
chosen, simulations by use ofthe dynamic two-phase pipe flow simulator
OLGA were performed. This program greatly improved the planning
basis from what could be achieved by the use of a conventional (steady
state) tubing hydraulics program. In particular, estimates of the
necessary volumes ofkill fluids, the duration ofthe pumping periods and
time plots of all important parameters were results which were of great
value both for the planning and interpretation of the dynamic kill
operation.
Personnel and equipment was now mobilized for the kill operation. The
stimulation vessel "Big Orange 18" was mobilized to provide additional
storage and pumping capacity for kill mud. In addition the supply boat
"Far Scotchman" was equipped with a large kill mud storage tank on
deck with transfer pumps. These two vessels were holding 3500 and
2500 bbls of kill mud, respectively.
AT LAST: KIlL OPERATION
By December 10, 1989 all preparations for kill was finished and drilling
out of the 7" liner shoe in the kill well was resumed (See Fig. 15,16).
The kill operation of 2/4-14 started when the formation integrity test was
performed in we1l2/4-15S at a depth of 4676 m TVD RKB on December
12, 1989. The test was successfully performed up to a value of 2.25 sg
equivalent mudweight. The value was chosen to be equivalent with the
kill mud weight, and would determine the maximum bottom hole
pumping pressure to be used during the kill job.
The 5 7/8" hole section of 2/4-15S was drilled with a BHA designed to
intersect with 2/4-14 at 4705 m TVD RKB. When designing the BHA,
optimization of the pumping capabilities both internally and externally
of the assembly was important. A mudweight of 1.95 sg was used for
drilling of the 57/8" hole. The rate of penetration achieved was much
higher than when drilling the same section in well 2/4-14.
Communication was established between the two wells after drilling
reached a depth of 4705 m TVD RKB. When communication was
achieved, circulation was lost immediately in 2/4-15S and the drillstring
was pulled out one stand. The hole was topped up with 1.95 sg mud all
the time. Mud was 4>st at an initial rate of 12 BPM. This rate quickly
decreased to 10 BPM and after approximately four hours the hole was
taking fluid at a rate of 3 BPM.
4 REENTRY AND RELIEF WELL D.RILLING TO.KIlL AN UNDERGROUND BLOWOUT IN A SUBSEA WELL
SPEIIADC 21991
A CASE HISTORY OF WELL 2/4-14

Soon after communication was established between the two wells, the
readings from the Production Logging Tool (pLT) located at
approximately 1460 m in 2/4-14 indicated that all mud lost in well
2/4-15S entered the bottom of 2/4-14. Since virtually no mud was lost
to the formations, the program was changed and 2.25 sg kill mud was
pumped following the 1.95 sg drilling mud instead of the planned
seawater.
During the entire kill period seawater was pumped down the 3 1/2" by
9 5/S" annulus at a low rate. This was done to maintain and monitor a
constant backpressure at the receiving formation. By using annulus
pressure, hydrostatic head of seawater and the pressure read by the PLT,
one could determine the density of the fluid between the PLT and the
leak: in the 9 5/S" casing. The density found could also be double
checked by the densiomenter on the PLT, at least up to a certain value
when the densiometer became erratic.
After 2.25 sg mud had reached the 9 5/S" casing leak: point in well
2/4-14,2.25 sg temperature degradable mud was pumped down
2/4-15S to settle out at bottom of both wells and form the lower plug.
This plug was pressure tested after the barite had settled out, and this
concluded the kill operation of well 2/4-14 (See Fig. 17).
The work to permanently plug and abandon well 2/4-14 was resumed.
To achieve an acceptable plugging it was still necessary to remove all the
junk from the well.
REFERENCES
- Leraand, F., Wright, J., Zachery, M., Thompson, B.: "Relief Well
Planning and Drilling for a North Sea Underground Blowout" , paper
SPE 20420, presented at the 65th Annual Conference in New Orleans,
September 23 - 26, 1990.
- Kuckes, A.F.: "An Electromagnetic Survey Method for Direetionaly
Drilling a Relief Well into a Blown Out Oil or Gas Well", SPEJ,
(June, 1984).
- Smestad, P. and Slungaard, C.: "Noise and Temperature Logging
Used to Determine Underground Blowout Flow Path", presented at
the 13th European Formation Evaluation Symposium, Budapest,
October 1990.
- Lie, A. and Larsen, D.O.: "Monitoring of an Underground Flow by
Shallow Seismic Data - A Case Study" , presented at the SEG annual
meeting 1990, San Fransisco, September 1990.
- Rygg, O.B. and Gilhuus, T.: "Use of a Dynamic Two-phase Pipe
Flow Simulatior in Blowout Kill Planning", SPE 20433, presented
at the 65th SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition,
New Orleans, September 1990.

A time consuming operation where the 9 5/S" casing was recovered

down to S90 m and the well cleaned to 3560 m lasted until
March 2, 1990. After this the well was cemented back and finally
abandoned April 14, 1990 (See Fig. IS).

Although the operation ended out to be much more extensive than

initially excpected the objectives were satisfied and the safety philosophy
adhered to. The most significant lessons to be learned must be that for
operations of this nature, where so many factors are, and must remain,
unknown, it is essential that the planning horizon with respect to
personnel is kept far (4 - 6 months) beyond the expected finishing date.
Further it is essential that fallback alternatives are maintained and
developed at all stages. This proved to be vital to the success of the
operation.

CONCLUSIONS

The blowout kill operation in well 2/4-14 was a most challenging

operation which gave valuable experience on a wide number of different
topics of importance for well kill operations. Some of these experiences
are summarized below:

- The use of a dynamic kill simulator proved to be a most valuable tool

for planning and interpretation of the dynamic kill operation.

_ The use of temperature and noise logs was of great value for the
identification of the blowout flowpath and the mechanical condition
of the blowing well.

- The new relief well profile proved a success and achieved a reduced
ellipse of uncertainty and significantly improved the probability for a
direct hit.

778
 i!l991
Leaking Overshot on 2/4-14 Electromagnetic Triangulation of 2/4-14 Casing

N
2/4-15S Vertical
High pressure
riser/additional BOP
stack assemblies
at 4120m TVD

t
Horizontal View

Fix 2 Position of Casing

and Uncertainty @ 24 m
Treasure Saga BOP stack
Flow up drillpipe and out
through overshot was Fix 3 Position ofCasing
verified by running PLT log and Uncertainty @ 13 m

30" O5g shoe

Fix 3 @ 3790 m TVD Fix 4, Casing Trianulation

20" csg shoe
@ 3829 m, 6.3m @
93 deg AZM, +/- 0.7 m

Fix 1 Position of Casing

13 3/8" O5g shoe and Uncertainty from 42 m

Path of 2/4-15S
Crossing
Blowout Casing

Fix 2 @ 3706 m TVD

Figure 6
FigureS

Relative Position Uncertainty Blowout Flowpath on 2/4-14 After Bullheading

214·155
High pressure
riser/additional BOP stack
assemblies

Treasure Saga BOP stack

MWD Survey tied to

Gyro While Drilling to
First ranging Point
30" csg shoe
840m
First Ranging Early pliocene sand
Estimated Position Uncertainty
@3560mTVD 890 m
of 2/4-15S at First Ranging, +/- 8 m
20"csg shoe

Estimated Position Uncertinty Casing Cross Pumping lest indicates

of 2/4-14 at Casing Cross, +/- 8 m 3829 mTVD flow goes out 9 5/8" csg
at approx 1370 m and
:~[g~~i~n~nS~n~wnpath
Relative Position Uncertainty
Reduced to +/- 1 m After Bypass 13 3/8" csg shoe
North Seeking Gyro in
9 518" to Casing Cross

MWD, EMS, & North Seeking Flow is now coming up

Gyro in Drillpipe in 8 112" Hole annulus or hole in
drillpipe below 4000 m

Combined Uncertainty From Surveying at

Kill Point +/- 1.7 m RSS, +/- 3 m Worst Case Kill Point
@4705m

Figure 7 Figure 8
780
 seE 21991
Temperature Logs Recorded in the Blowing Well, Temperature Logs from the Blowing Well,
No Injection Annulus Injection and No Injection Case

600
\
.. 600

800
"~::-...~.".".".".".".":..:. _~.:.:.:.:::.::::
..
'.,
800
i
i
i
1000
1000 •.....__.__•...._•.•...•........--.--.--_._'--,~,
\ g
E
i
~
1200
\
\
\,
a
Q
QI
1200

1400
- 9. July 1989 \ 1400 'l.•••••~

- - 3. Sept. 1989
...... 1. Oct. 1989 \ :
:
no Injection
seawater annulus Injection
1600 \ 1600
+
20 40 60 60 100 120 140
1
160
~
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Temperature (OC) Temperature ( DC )

Figure 9 Figure 10

Pressure Profile, Blowing Well

......... \ - Annulus gas gradient

Annulus ...... \
seawat~r ......... ~Recipient Injection pressure
1000 gradient ...... ~
" ' - - 9 5/8" csg hole
... Drillpipe fluid level
......
2000 .........
I ...... ......
...
!'" 3000
Drillpipe ......
seawater ""' ..... "
gradient ......
.........

4000 ...... ~ Approx flowing BHP

bi~
...... _ Drillpipe hole

Flowing gradient in BHA - Loss through

4700
T
0 100 200 300 400 500

Pressure (bar)

Figure 11
 SfE 21991
8 112" Hole Section

214-155 214-14

Kill Option Using Full Bore Packer

4437 m TVD _ 21m@171°

6 112" Drill Collars

Rotary Drill Without MWD

Zone 1

.:·:f:'.. ·······,·..··.c;;.:.;.:.;., .:. ..:.;.

~: :.:;~:::,;.:.: , ; ~ . Zone 2

With sliding sleeve closed

2/4-14 can be bullheaded down Start Nudge Toward
tubing or act as a choke with 2/4-14 @ 4557 m TVD
2/4-15S pumping from bottom
Rotary Drill

Hole in 9 5/S"csg at 1372 m

16.3 m@ 17?O Survey
Fix#6
5" tUbing 3.S1" nipple lor piug 16.3 m @ 1870 Ranging
000 Sliding sleeve
133/S" shoe
3" polished bore section
TOC at 3050 m
13.7 m @ 1780 Survey ..
Fix#7
13.7 m @ 1890 Ranging
Inflatable packers ""'---~'"
Perforated sub ---taLl!!
7" mill
10.7 M@ 1890
4062m @4642mTVD
Fix # 8
9 SIS" shoe Zone 4

.........."..",... Zone 5

Bit at 4700 m 7" liner shoe at 4672 m VD

Casing Point 4673 m TVD 7.1m@192.0°
9.1 0 Incl. & 191 0 Azimuth @4668mTVD
TO at 4734 m ...L~-L. _ Fix #9

Figure 12 Figure 13

2/4-155 to 2/4-14
All depths AKB TVD Treasure Saga
add 12 mfor Nedrill Trigon

Well Configuration
214-14 2/4-158
NedrillTrigon Treasure Saga

Relielwell Blowing well

855m

1460m

4000m
40S0m

4700m
• """,'0':'0' :,.!. 4700m
4733m ,/\,

Figure 14
Figure 15

782
 SPE ~1991

Projection of 2/4-15S from Liner to Kill Point

2/4-15S
2/4-14

7" liner set @ 4673m TVO

9.1 0 Inc'l. 191 0 Azimuth +1- 1.7 m Cylinder around 2/4-14

i _ _ +1- 3 m Cyiinder. Worst Case

Projected Wellpath of 2/4-15

to Target at 4705 m TVO

Final P&A Status of Well 2/4-14

Projected Wellpath Enters Water depth 6S m

+1- 3 m (worst case) Zone at
4692m TVO and the +1- 1.7 m Bit @ 4700 m TVO
zone at 4700 m TVO Top 30" and 20" csg
at100m

8 112" Open Hole Top 13 3IS" csg at 169 m Inflatable packer at 165 m

Cementplug inside 13 318" csg

30" csg at 215 m 339-169 m
Cement retainer at 339 m

Cementplug inside 13 31S" csg

Top 9 5/8" csg at S71 m 365-869 m
20" csg shoe at 901 m

191 0 ,.. Cementplugs inSide 9 5/S" csg

969-2529 m
Vertical Section

Figure 16 13 3IS" csg shoe at 2509 m

9 5/S" csg perforated at 2689 m

Theoretical TOC at 3050 m
Cementplug 2750-3421 m
5" OP cut at 3431 m
Cementplug inside 5" OP 3483-3565 m

Top 5" OP at 4050 m

Noise Logs Recorded in the Relief Well
Before and After a Succsessfully Kill Operation
9 518" csg at 4437 m
Baryte plug

3700 TO at 4734 m

Figure 18
3900

g 4100
..c
a.
CI)
c 4300
before kill operation
after kill operation
4500

4700
·10 o 10 20 30 40 50
Noise (mv)

Figure 17

783