G.R. No.

L-48050 October 10, 1994
FELICIDAD
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
Cesar E. Palma for petitioner.
Saturnino V. Bactad for private respondent.
started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land which
contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less. 1
JAVIER, petitioner,
On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4, 2 dismissed Civil Case
No. 926 on the ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has
considered the area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ." 3 The
Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and executory on 30 April
1973 when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br.
3,4 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court
holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to prove that
the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot No. 1641. 5

Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional trial court citing
the final decision of the city court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible entry,
and on the basis thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of  res
judicata. We summon the time-honored remedies accion interdictal, accion
publiciana and accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion to resolve the issues
presented in the petition.
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan,
Olongapo City, with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City.
Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion
of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before
the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 926, stating in pars. 2 and
3 therein that —
. . . plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical
possession of a certain parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan,
City of Olongapo, said lot being designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-
308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision since 1961 and up to
the present time, until the day and incidents hereinafter narrated. .
. . Sometime on December 12, 1970, the defendant, without
express consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, through
scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the
southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with the assistance of
hired helpers, started construction of riprap along the Kalaklan
River perimeter of said portion of land; said entry was further
augmented by removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with
galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise destroying
plants introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of
Lands) monuments thereon, and by these actions, defendant
Patent No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No.
1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for
forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about
200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded
the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused
to comply with the demand.
On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court
of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0,
alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein that —
. . . plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite
Subdivision . . . covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
3259, issued by the Register of Deeds for the province of
Zambales. . . . Sometime in December,
1970, and until present, defendants, relying on an application filed
on December 23, 1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however have
squatted, illegally occupied and unlawfully possessed the
southwestern portion of plaintiff's above-described property of
about 200 square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL and
now by defendant REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the
entirety of his property to the latter, including the portion in
question. . . . 6
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private
respondent herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Defendant Ben Babol did not file any pleading.
In its Order dated 27 January 1978, 7 the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br.
1,8 sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 9 Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no
identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which
had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title.
She argues that private respondent Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense or res
judicata, was never impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action  in
personam; neither was he a purchaser pendente lite who, perhaps, could have validly
invoked the defense of res judicata. With regard to the cause of action, she maintains
that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry,
which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the
subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the
disputed land.
Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases
since he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the
commencement of the first action. On the issue of identity of causes of action, he
simply states that neither of the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the
subsequent petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action. Thus, private
respondent continues, both cases have to be dismissed.
Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a
subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final
judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4)
There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and
of causes of action. 10 The presence of the first three requirements and the identity of
subject matter in the fourth requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues
remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0
there is identity of parties and of causes of action which would bar the institution of
Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is
without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required
is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. 11 It is fundamental that the
application of res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in
a subsequent litigation. In fact we have said that there is still identity of parties
although in the second action there is one party who was not joined in the first action,
if it appears that such party is not
a necessary party either in the first or second action, 12 or is a mere nominal
party. 13 Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court, provides that ". . . the
judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity."
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor
in interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of
the first action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between
the two actions. But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of
causes of action between Civil Case
No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior
possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. 14 Thus,
"[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of
real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy
underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror." 15 And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of
possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the
ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. 16
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for
"Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to
recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil Code,
and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal.
From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein
(petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be
ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given
possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion
reivindicatoria. 18
The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 19, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still
good law and has preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and
jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely accion interdictal, which
is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's
possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful
detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; 20 accion publiciana which is a plenary
action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper
regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff
alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 21 It
is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges
proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. 22
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the Court of
the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch
Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she 552 and the resolution denying reconsideration. 3
be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in
Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful (possessor)
Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. 4 He had four (4) children, namely:
and in actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil
Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.
Case
No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel
of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition 5 of the estate of
Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses 6 G. Mendoza,
defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. 7 The description of the property reads as
including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, follows:
this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no
other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by
"A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro,
no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title
Masantol, Pampanga. Bounded on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the
of ownership. 23
East, by Paulino Fajardo; on the South, by Paulino Guinto. Containing an
area of 5,253 sq. mts., more or less. Declared under Tax Declaration No.
And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 24 even if we 3029 in the sum of P710.00."
treat Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it
has a cause of action different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no
At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later,
identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0,
the cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were
the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or
specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which
petition to quiet title.
was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was
subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the
then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City,
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to
dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration
her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court of a
complaint for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold
quo and the latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate
to him.8
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.

During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15,
SO ORDERE
1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.
On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to
G.R. No. 120784-85        January 24, 2001 spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray.

SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners, On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55
vs. rendered a decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA- provides:
VIRAY, respondents.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
PARDO, J.: of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.1âwphi1.nêt

"1. The division and partition of the parcel of land identified and described
earlier with the aid and assistance of a qualified surveyor, segregating
 therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right
eastern portion which is toward the national road the same to be determined
by one (or the said surveyor) standing on the subject land facing the
municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiffs;
"2. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by
metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs;
"3. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should
be taken, a commission is hereby constituted, and the OIC-Clerk of Court is
hereby appointed chairman, and the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of Branches
54 and 55 of this Court are hereby appointed members, to carry out the
orders contained in the foregoing first two paragraphs;
"4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's
fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
"SO ORDERED."9
On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and
Herminia Reyes-Bustos.
In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-
Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer 10 against
spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as
lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land.
The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray.
Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed
when spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe,
Branch 55,11 a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.
On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is as it is hereby,
dismissed. The preliminary injunction is ordered dissolved and the
petitioners and Meridian Assurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly
and severally, to pay the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 by way
of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and to pay the cost of the
proceedings."12
In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.13
On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals.14
Upon motion for consolidation of the petitioners, on August 9, 1993, the Court of
Appeals resolved to consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No. 37606. 15
On August 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases,
the dispositive portion of which provides:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, consolidated judgment is
hereby rendered for bot CA-G.R. SP No. 37607 and CA-G.R. SP No. 30369
as follows:
"1. The appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses
Mendoza is declared as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned
by Manuela Fajardo; and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
February 8, 1989 in Civil Case No. 83-0005-M is affirmed but MODIFIED as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and
hereby orders.
"1. A relocation survey to be conducted (at the expense of the
plaintiffs) to retrace the land subject of the deed of sale dated
September 30, 1964 between Manuela Fajardo and Moses
Mendoza;
"2. The division and partition of said relocated land by segregating
therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the
vacant right eastern portion which is toward the national road, the
same to be determined by one standing on the subject land facing
the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiff-appellees;
"3. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion,
described by metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and
assigned to the plaintiffs-appellees;
"4. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern
portion should be taken, a Commission is hereby constituted, with
the OIC/present Clerk of Court as Chairman, and the OIC/present
Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of the Court (RTC)
as members, to carry out and implement the Orders contained in
the second and third paragraphs hereof;
 "5. The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
"2. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 92-0421-M is AFFIRMED but the
reasons for its dismissal shall be effective only as to the issue of
possession. CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 is DISMISSED.
"3. No. pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."16
On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; 17 however, on
June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.18
Hence, this petition.19
The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own
land.
The petition is meritorious.
In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the
unlawful detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as
to possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This
means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court
declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the
ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment
admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal,20 the Supreme Court
reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of
special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579);
whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil.
164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became
final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135
SCRA 354)."
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are
now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the
judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in
grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court
adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of
the same. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of
ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to
accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a
crippled owner."22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals I Ca G.R. SP No. 30609 for being moot and academic. We AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 37606.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128177            August 15, 2001
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and
AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated September
20, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 as well as its Resolution 2
dated January 15, 1997, denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
We quote the undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals, to wit —
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of
24,550 square meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Nipa with an area of 8,410 square meters;
fishpond with an area of 14,000 square meters; and residential
land with an area of 1,740 square meters, more or less. Bounded
 on the N, by river and Filemon Anselmo; on the South by
Alejandro Soriano and Filemon Anselmo; and on the West by
Fortunata Soriano.
Originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, the above-
described property passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses
David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years
beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman Soriano, one of the children of Adriano
Soriano, acting as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease.
After executing an extra judicial settlement among themselves, the heirs of
Adriano Soriano subsequently subdivided the property into two (2) lots, Lot
No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes,
Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to
Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was sold
by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio
and Aquilina Abalos (hereinafter referred to as petitioners), while, Elocadio,
Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares in Lot No. 8459 also to
petitioners.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as
caretaker and appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his
substitutes. Thereafter, Roman Soriano filedCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for
reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses. The agrarian
court authorized the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on appeal, the
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which decision became final
and executory. However, prior to the execution of the said decision, the
parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera
spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the
termination of the lease in 1982. In an Order dated December 22, 1972, the
post-decisional agreement was approved by the agrarian court.
On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over
Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (3/4)pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed
asLRC Case No. N-3405. Said application for registration was granted by
the trial court, acting as a land registration court, per Decision dated June
27, 1983. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the land
registration court. The petition for review filed with the Supreme Court by
Roman Soriano docketed asG.R. 70842, was denied for lack of merit and
entry of judgment was entered on December 16, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of
the land registration court's decision, Roman Soriano, together with
Elocadio and Librada Soriano, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Branch 37, and against petitioners, an action for annulment of
document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, docketed asCivil
Case No. 159568 (sic; should be 15958). Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground ofres judicata, pendency of another action, laches,
misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the trial
court.
Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of
the post-decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de
Vera inCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation,
petitioners filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said post-
decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the
property. The motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of the
subject property, jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of
Roman's property to answer for the use and occupation by Soriano of 6/7
share of the property. On October 25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion
to suspend hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, which, however,
was denied by the agrarian court. The agrarian court likewise authorized the
substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners. Soriano's motion for
reconsideration was also denied, prompting Soriano to file a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985. Thus, the
complaint inCivil Case No. 159568 (sic) for annulment of document and/or
redemption, ownership and damages, was amended to substitute Soriano's
heirs, herein private respondents, as party-plaintiffs. The complaint was
again amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-defendant for having
allegedly purchased part of the disputed property from petitioners. On
motion of petitioners, the re-amended complaint was dismissed by the trial
court on the ground that the re-amended complaint altered the cause of
action. Upon reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and petitioners
were ordered to file their Answer, in view of which petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed asC.A. GR
SP No. 22149.
On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Roman
Soriano (substituted by private respondents) impugning the denial of their
motion to suspend hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, and
authorizing the substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners, on the
ground that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the agrarian
court. Thus, private respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 93401.
Meanwhile, on December 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No.
22149, also denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners, ruling that the land registration court committed no error when it
refused to adhere to the rule ofres judicata. Petitioners then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed asG.R. 99843.
On June 26, 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision inG.R.
93401, and granted the petition filed by private respondents. Thus, the
decision of the Court of Appeals denying the petition of private respondents
 was set aside, and the motion for execution filed by petitioners inCAR Case
No. 1724-P-48 was denied.
On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court, inG.R. 99843, reversed and set
aside the denial of the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, and
consequently,Civil Case No. 15958 for annulment of document and/or
redemption, ownership and damages, was ordered dismissed.
On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed with the Department of
Agrarian Adjudication Board (sic), a complaint against petitioners for
"Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary
Injunction" docketed asDARAB Case No. 528-P-93.
Meanwhile, it appears that the decision of the land registration court inLRC
Case No. N-3405 was partially executed with the creation of a Committee
on Partition per Order dated March 25, 1987. On July 27, 1988, the land
registration court approved the partition of Lot No. 8459, with Lot No. 8459-
A assigned to private respondent, and Lot No. 8459-B assigned to
petitioners. For Lot No. 60052, O.C.T. No. 22670 was issued in the name of
petitioners; for Lot No. 8459-B, O.C.T. No. 22687 was issued, also in the
name of petitioner; and for Lot No. 8459-A, O.C.T. No. 22686 was issued in
the name of Roman Soriano. Dissatisfied with said partition, private
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed asCA G.R. SP No.
119497. The appellate court affirmed the partition but reversed the order of
the land registration court directing the issuance of a writ of possession on
the ground of pendency ofCivil Case No. 15958.
On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the
Supreme Court inG.R. No. 99843, dismissedCivil Case No. 15958, in view
of which, petitioner, on November 25, 1993, inLRC Case No. N-3405,
moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of
possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-
B. Per Resolution dated January 21, 1994, said motion was held in
abeyance by the land registration court until and afterDARAB Case No.
528-P-93 for security of tenure with prayer forstatus quo, has been resolved.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 5, 1984,
petitioners interposed an appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R.
115073. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1994 issued by the Supreme Court,
petitioners' appeal, which was treated as a petition for certiorari, was
referred to this Court [of Appeals] for determination and disposition.3
The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Resolution of the land registration
court and ordered instead the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in
favor of private respondents. With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners are now before us raising the following grounds:
1. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SECURITY
OF TENURE OF TENANT-CARETAKER.
2. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISION ON RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD EARLIER
PERFECTED AN APPEAL OF THE RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF THEIR
PETITION.4
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right
to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is
defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess
means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may
be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of
a holder.5 A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession.
The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A
person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due
hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A
judgment for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident.6
There is no dispute that private respondents' (petitioners below) title over the land
under litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such
declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession,
especially so in the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel
of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final
judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet,
controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed
by petitioners (private respondents below) before the DARAB.
It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled
owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to
limitations that may be imposed by law. 7 The Tenancy Act provides one such
limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right
to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established.
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life
itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood.8 The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the
exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
However, petitioners' status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In
keeping with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be
dispossessed of the subject property. As ratiocinated inNona v. Plan9 —
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 dated September 20, 1996, as
well as its Resolution dated January 15, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in LRC Case No. N-3405 dated January
21, 1994 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

It is to the credit of respondent Judge that he has shown awareness of the G.R. No. 133140           August 10, 1999
recent Presidential Decrees which are impressed with an even more
solicitous concern for the rights of the tenants.If, therefore, as he pointed
JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner,
out in his order granting the writ of possession, there is a pending case
vs.
between the parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations, ordinary
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO AND PHILIPPINE
prudence, let alone the letter of the law, ought to have cautioned him
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
against granting the plea of private respondents that they be placed in
possession of the land in controversy,x x x. At the time the challenged
orders were issued, without any showing of how the tenancy controversy in PUNO, J.:
the Court of Agrarian Relations was disposed of, respondent Judge could
not by himself and with due observance of the restraints that cabin and
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
confine his jurisdiction pass upon the question of tenancy. (Emphasis ours)
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T.
Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Spouses Luisito and Ma. Luisa Magpayo and Sheriff
In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the principle of of Makati, Defendants, Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant". 1
finality of judgments. It applied the legal doctrine that once a judgment has become
final, the issuance of a writ of execution becomes ministerial. The appellate court held
The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz.:
that petitioner's situation does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule since his
occupation of the subject land did not transpire after the land registration court's
adjudication became final. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel
of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was
registered, sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same
In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals loses sight of the fact that petitioner's claim
to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the
of possession as a tenant of the litigated property, if proven, entitles him to protection
Magpayos).
against dispossession.

On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank
Private respondents argue that petitioners' tenancy claim is barred byres judicata,
of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan, Five Hundred Sixty Four
having been ruled upon in G.R. Nos. 99843 and 93401. However, not being an issue
Thousand (P564,000.00) Pesos according to them, One Million Two
in the case before us, this question should properly be resolved in DARAB Case No.
Hundred Thousand (P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to
528-P-93. To restate, the only issue before us is whether or not a winning party in a
PBCom.1âwphi1.nêt
land registration case can effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of
tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB.
On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the name of the
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the
Magpayos.
possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination
before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case
cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of
to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy was Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title.
unlawful.
The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment. 2
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale,
PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the land.
In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the
Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. It found that:
The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the
Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated
. . . [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the
in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer
mortgage in favor of the defendant PBCom on March 5, 1981, the said
Certificate of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name.
spouses were not yet the owners of the property. This finding is evident
from the other undisputed fact that a new Torrens title was issued to the
On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint defendants Magpayo spouses only on March 9, 1981 . . . . The Magpayo
seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by the execution
auction sale, and PBCom's title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This of the Deed of Sale because the property was in the possession of the
complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession and hence
could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document
(MANALILI V. CESAR, 39 PHIL. 134). The conclusion is therefore
On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
inescapable that the said mortgage is null and void for lack of one of the
Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land,
essential elements of a mortgage as required by Art. 2085 of our Civil
docketed as LRC Case No. M-731, which Branch 148 thereof granted.
Code . . . .3

Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T.
Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233 issued to
Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and
PBCom. Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. In reversing the trial court, the Court of
filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which
Appeals held:
motion was denied.

(P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed property

Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff
was not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the
the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter
time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and
alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T.
adverse possession thereof does not lie.
Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover.

For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered into

In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim over the land is
belied by the fact that it is not among the properties owned by his mother
listed in the Inventory of Real Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City,
Branch 27, in SP Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of Administration, Pedro V. Garcia
Petitioner-Administrator.
The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was
transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to enable them (Magpayos)
to borrow from PBCom.
Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that judgment be
rendered in his favor to which PBCom counter-motioned that judgment
should be rendered in its favor.
possession of the disputed property only upon the demise of his mother,
from whom he alleges to have inherited it but who was not the registered
owner of the property, that is, on October 31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p.
17, Records), by which admission he is bound. Since the execution of the
deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place
earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, plaintiff-appellee
was not in possession of the property at the time of the execution of said
public instrument.
Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the
property which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was
likewise registered, then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos
were free to exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to
mortgage the land.

The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument
that PBCom raised in its answer both factual and legal issues which could of sale is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the
only be ventilated in a full-blown trial.
 buyer may exercise the actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 55).
That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days
following the execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment,
for registration under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is
intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already
have on the land (Municipality of Victorias v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
32, 44-45 [1987]).
Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of above decision which was denied. He
now comes before us raising the following errors committed by the Court Appeals:
I
The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of
proceedings when it decided the appeal subject of this case based on issues which
were raised neither in the trial court nor in the appellant's brief.
II
The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord with applicable
jurisprudence when it disregarded the admissions of the private respondents and,
despite ruling that Summary Judgment was proper, made its own findings of facts
which were contrary to the said admissions.
III
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord with established
jurisprudence and even contradicts itself, as far as the issue of the propriety of the
Summary Judgment is concerned.
The petition has no merit.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals
resolved the issues "ownership" and "possession" though they were not raised by
PBCom in its appellant's brief. The allegation is belied by page 17 of PBCom's
appellate brief, viz.:
Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously that
"Magpayo Spouses could not have acquired the property merely by the
execution of the deed of sale because the property was in the possession of
the plaintiff" (Order, p. 10).
Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession.
Ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts.
Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court, started only "at the
time of the filing of the complaint in this present case up to the present."
(page 2, Summary Judgment).
Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only
in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His
possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat
PBCom's Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept
of an owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was
registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was
subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a
public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in
1985.
Anent the second-assignment of error, petitioner contends that the following facts
were admitted by the parties in the trial court:
1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty. Pedro V.
Garcia and Remedios Tablan Garcia;
2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the conjugal property
of the said spouses;
3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously to the
present in actual physical possession of the property. At the time of the
alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, petitioner was in possession of the
property;
4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died, sometime in
October, 1980, he became, by operation of law, a co-owner of the property;
5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in
favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject
property.4
We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records shows that these
alleged admitted facts are his own paraphrased portions of the findings of fact listed
by the trial court in the summary judgment. 5 Indeed petitioner did not cite any page
number of the records or refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who
admitted the said facts.
Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is
entitled to a summary judgment merits scant attention. A summary judgment is one
granted by the court, upon motion by either party, for an expeditious settlement of the
case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that
no important questions or issues of fact are involved (except the determination of the
amount of damages) and that therefore the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.6 Under Rule 34, either party may move for a summary judgment — the
claimant by virtue of Section 1 and the defending party by virtue of Section 2, viz.:
Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may,
at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is
sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless,
PBCom likewise moved for a summary judgment with supporting affidavit and
documentary exhibits, to wit:
COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment
The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also by the
defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims as clearly
shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 34.
xxx     xxx     xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render
summary judgment in PBCom's favor by DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint
as well as Sps. Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous. 7
Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to
summary judgment as prayed for by both parties.
We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his
will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of
others.8 Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to
dispose of the thing by way of sale. 9 Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios
exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject
property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. 10 Literally, to possess means to actually
and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of
two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. 11 "A
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to
be so."12 On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right
or wrong."13 The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept
of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza
v. Court of Appeals  14 that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house,
rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the
latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the
property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a
valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of
ownership as successor to his mother's share in the conjugal asset is belied by the
fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his
father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no
longer considered owned by petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals
in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid
notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to
them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer
ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. 15 The
deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and
authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership.16 All said, the
Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to
PBCom.17
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129609. November 29, 2001.]
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN
BONDOC, TERESITA BONDOC-ESTO, DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR and CHUA HUAY
SOON, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 135537. November 29, 2001.]
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. IDES O’RACCA BUILDING TENANTS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.: Manila against the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION. 12
RODIL prayed that a restraining order be issued enjoining the ASSOCIATION or any
person acting under it from collecting rentals from the occupants or sub-lessees of
O’RACCA. On 26 October 1987 the trial court granted the writ of preliminary
These twin petitions filed under Rule 45 seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of injunction. 13 On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the issuance of the writ of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 39919, 36381 and 37243. preliminary injunction and ordered the deposit of the monthly rentals with the lower
court pendente lite.
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca Building
(O’RACCA) since 1959. 1 It was a "former alien property" over which the Republic of On 20 November 1987 the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas and Factora filed their
the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477, as amended. 2 Answer with Counterclaim for damages. On 21 December 1987 the ASSOCIATION
also filed its Answer with Counterclaim for damages.
Sometime in 1980 RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen
Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, 3 members De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran
of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).chanrob1es of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for
virtual law library specific performance. On 31 May 1988 Factoran issued Order No. 1 designating the
Land Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian
On 4 September 1972 the lease contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was of all "former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC.
renewed for another fifteen (15) years. 4 At that time the O’RACCA was under the
administration of the Building Services and Real Property Management Office On 18 May 1992 RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was
(BSRPMO) then headed by Director Jesus R. Factora. 5 approved by Secretary Factoran. 14 The renewal contract would extend the lease for
ten (10) years from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was
On 12 September 1982 BP 233 6 was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease
properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the O’RACCA building was contract were increased. 15
classified as commercial property. 7
On 14 August 1972 the action for specific performance was dismissed by the trial
On 8 January 1987 RODIL offered to purchase the subject property conformably with court upon joint motion to dismiss by RODIL and the Solicitor General. The order of
BP 233 and the REPUBLIC responded that its offer to purchase would be acted upon dismissal however was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals. 16
once the Committee on Appraisal shall have determined the market value of the
property. 8 On 25 September 1992 the spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez,
sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the
On 22 July 1997 the ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same building through authority of Factoran to enter into the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 with RODIL,
the Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management and claiming the right to purchase the subject property. 17
(DGSREPM). 9
While the appeal of the ASSOCIATION from the order of dismissal and the letter-
Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property, Director Factora of the appeal of the spouses Alvarez were pending, the ASSOCIATION instituted Civil Case
BSRPMO granted RODIL’s request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23 No. 92-63833 with the Regional Trial Court of Manila 18 praying for the setting aside
September 1987 for another five (5) years from 1 September 1987. 10 The renewal of the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of 25
contract was forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of DGSREPM for approval. May 1992, and further praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3
May 1993 the trial court denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
On 25 September 1987 Undersecretary of DGSREPM Rufino B. Banas recommended
to Secretary De Jesus the suspension of the approval of the renewal contract because On 30 July 1993 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria
the offer of the ASSOCIATION was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC. Footwear, 19 and on 4 August 1993, a similar action against Chua Huay Soon. 20
Resultantly, on 30 September 1987 Secretary De Jesus issued another memorandum On 10 September 1993 the trial court dismissed the action for declaration of nullity of
to Director Factora disapproving the renewal contract in favor of RODIL, at the same the lease contract filed by the ASSOCIATION on the ground of litis pendentia. 21 The
time recalling all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus Order stated that the action for declaration of nullity and the action for specific
likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of performance filed by RODIL were practically between the same parties and for the
a temporary occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION. 11 same causes of action. 22 This Order was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the
Court of Appeals. 23
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of
On 19 January 1994 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondent of P15,000.00; d) Costs of suit.
Teresita Bondoc-Esto, 24 and on 1 February 1994 filed another action against
respondent Carmen Bondoc, 25 both with the Metropolitan Trial Court of IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142282-CV —
Manila.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. defendant CHUA
On 8 February 1994 the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Teofisto HUAY SOON and all persons claiming rights through him, to vacate the premises
Guingona Jr. denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez, but nullified the renewal occupied by him at O’RACCA Building, located at the corner of Folgueras and M.
contract of 18 May 1992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992. 26 delos Santos Street, Binondo, Manila, and turn over possession thereof to plaintiff
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.; 2. defendant to pay rentals in arrears from October
Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL’s right to eject 1987 up to June 1993 at the rate of P6,175.00 a month, representing the rentals in
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, 27 as arrears; 3. defendant to pay P6,175.00 per month from July 1993 until he vacates the
promulgated in separate decisions the dispositive portions of which read — premises, as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises; 4. defendant to
pay the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees; 5. defendant to pay interests on the
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143301 — amounts mentioned in Nos. 2 and 3 above at ten (10%) percent per annum from the
date of the filing of the complaint until said amounts are fully paid; and, 6. defendant to
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor pay the costs.
of the plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.] and against the defendant [CARMEN
BONDOC], to wit: 1. Ordering the defendant and all those claiming title under her to The Regional Trial Court affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court 28 in all the four (4)
vacate the subleased portion of the O’Racca Building, corner Folgueras and M. de los decisions above quoted. Thus, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Divisoria
Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the back Footwear subsequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, 29
rentals from October 1987 to August 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 per month and followed by respondent Chua Huay Soon. 30
from September 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 per month plus a yearly increase of
20% per month up to the time that she vacates the premises; 3. Ordering the While the consolidated appeals from the unlawful detainer cases were pending, the
defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of Second Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 12 April 1996
suit. with regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919 declaring the renewal contract between RODIL and
the REPUBLIC null and void. 31 RODIL moved for reconsideration but its motion was
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143216 — denied. 32 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 33

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [RODIL
ENTERPRISES, INC.] as against the defendant [TERESITA BONDOC ESTO]
ordering the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the
premises at O’Racca Building located at corner Folgueras and M. de los Santos
Streets, Binondo, Manila, and turn over the possession thereof to plaintiff; ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,700.00 as rental in arrears for the period
from September 1992 plus legal rate of interest less whatever amount deposited with
the Court; ordering defendant to pay the sum of P3,000.00 as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from January 1994 until
defendant shall have finally vacated the premises minus whatever amount deposited
with the Court as rental; ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the
amount of P2,000.00 and the costs of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142258 — within the enumerations under Arts. 1305 and 1409, and an implied new lease still
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [RODIL
ENTERPRISES, INC.], ordering defendant [DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR], its
representatives, agents, employees and/or assigns to vacate the leased premises or
portion of the Ides O’Racca Building presently occupied by said defendant and to pay
plaintiff the following: a) Rentals in arrears from October 1987 to June 1993 in the
amount of P521,000.00; b) Rentals in the amount of P9,000.00 a month from July,
1993 until defendant will have vacated the premises; c) Attorney’s fees in the amount
On 29 November 1996 the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. No. 36381 and CA-G.R. No. 37243 setting aside
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, which sustained the Metropolitan Trial Court,
and dismissing the action for unlawful detainer filed by RODIL against its lessees. 34
RODIL moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. 35 Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. 36
On respondents’ motion, G.R. Nos. 129609 and 135537 were consolidated.
RODIL now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling its renewal contract
with the REPUBLIC and in dismissing its actions for unlawful detainer against
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua. RODIL claims that
the assailed contracts are neither void nor voidable as the facts show they do not fall
exists by virtue of Art. 1670. As a result, the right to eject respondents properly
belongs to it. 37
With regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919, RODIL argues that the REPUBLIC, the only
defendant who is a real party in interest, signified its assent to having the action
dismissed. Assuming arguendo that the ASSOCIATION was a real party in interest, its
counterclaim was nonetheless unmeritorious. 38
On the other hand, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua
contend that the lease contract which the lease contract of 18 May 1992 was to
renew, never came into existence. Therefore, since there was no contract to "renew,"
the renewal contract had no leg to stand on, hence, is also void. 39 Respondents then
conclude that since there was no lease contract to speak of, RODIL had no right to
relief in its action for unlawful detainer. The ASSOCIATION, for its part, argues that
the counterclaim it filed against RODIL cannot be dismissed because the trial court
has not passed upon it. 40
We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. 41 Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no
exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus
disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the
leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful
detainer are present.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992
and 25 May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts. 42 This is true only of the
Contract of Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not
approve. RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it.
The so-called approval of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal
memorandum of Secretary De Jesus addressed to Director Factora. 43 This is evident
from the fact that Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a
lease contract and forward it to his office for approval. 44 The consequences of this
fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that no contract shall arise unless acceptance
of the contract is communicated to the offeror. 45 Until that moment, there is no real
meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence, no contract. 46
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As
argued by RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law
prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there
is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained. 47
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly
executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial
Court. 48 The appellate court however failed to note that the order restrains the
REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent
ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was
indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed
contracts were entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act
already fait accompli. 49
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that
respondents consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease
contract of 23 September 1987. However, novation is never presumed. 50 Also, the
title of a contract does not determine its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific
provisions of the contract which dictate its nature. 51 Furthermore, where a contract is
susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that would make it valid and another that
would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted. 52 The assailed
agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that the
term of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987. This is
hardly conclusive of the existence of an intention by the parties to notate the contract
of 23 September 1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the
requisite incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent one is not
present. 53 Based on this factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract cannot
be said to have been overturned.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President
declaring null and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should
be counted in its favor.
We do not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court’s
judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto.
Respondent ASSOCIATION finally argues that the 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992
contracts can be considered rescissible because they concern property under litigation
and were entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority. 54 Civil Case No. 87-42323 involved an action for specific
performance and damages filed by RODIL against the REPUBLIC and the
ASSOCIATION. The right to file the action for rescission arises in favor of the plaintiff
when the defendant enters into a contract over the thing under litigation without the
knowledge and approval of the plaintiff or the court. The right of action therefore arose
in favor of petitioner RODIL and not respondent ASSOCIATION.
Having preliminarily dealt with the validity of the lease contracts, we now proceed to
resolve the issue raised by respondent ASSOCIATION with regard to its counterclaim.
The ASSOCIATION argues that its counterclaim should not have been dismissed. On
this point, we agree. The requisites for the application of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure are clearly present. 55 The counterclaim is necessarily connected with the
transaction that is the subject matter of the claim. In malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charge
was false and groundless. 56 A determination of whether the charge is groundless
would necessarily involve an analysis of whether the action instituted by RODIL is
meritorious. The counterclaim did not require the presence of third parties over which
the court could not acquire jurisdiction, and that the court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the counterclaim since the amount of damages claimed by the
ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim amounted to P3,500,000.00, clearly within the
jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court under BP 129.
However, in the interest of making a final adjudication on an issue which has been
pending for fourteen (14) years, we will rule on the issues raised by the
ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim, and accordingly deny the same, dispensing with
any discussion regarding the merits of RODIL’s cause of action which is clearly neither
"false" nor "groundless." Therefore, the elements of malicious prosecution are
absent.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As regards the action for unlawful detainer, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto,
Divisoria Footwear and Chua argue that this should not prosper because RODIL is not
in actual possession of the property and because they are not its sublessees. 57 Their
arguments do not convince.
In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease
contract with the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject
property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. 58 The records clearly show this to be
the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a "temporary occupancy permit" which was
not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or
Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation of respondents was
merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter remained
uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately
for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by
virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had
the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom
possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.
Respondents finally argue that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory
provisions of Rule 45 so that its petition must be dismissed. They allege that petitioner
failed to state in its petition that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the date of
filing, when the motion was denied, and the date when the resolution denying the
motion was received.
A cursory review of RODIL’s petition belies respondents’ assertion. All dates required
under Rule 45, Sec. 4, are properly indicated except when the motion for
reconsideration was filed. Procedural rules are required to be followed as a general
rule, but they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his noncompliance with the procedure required. Dismissal of appeals
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. The rules have been
drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting the proper
dispensation of justice. As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert
and defeat, instead of promote and enhance its objective, suspension of the rules is
justified. 59 Petitioner did not repeat its error in its later petition filed under G.R. No.
135537. The oversight must be fashioned with leniency.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 36381, 37243 and 39919 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 39, in Civil
Cases Nos. 94-70776, 94-71122 and 94-71123 as well as the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 23, in Civil Case No. 94-72209 affirming in toto the Decisions
of the MeTC — Br. 28 in Civil Case No. 143301, MeTC — Br. 15 in Civil Case No.
143216, MeTC — Br. 7 in Civil Case No. 142258, and MeTC — Br. 24 in Civil Case
No. 142282-CV, as herein quoted, and the Orders dated 14 August 1992 and 6
November 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 87-42323,
recognizing the validity and legality of the Renewal of the Lease Contract dated 18
May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992, are REINSTATED,
AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. Costs against private respondents in both cases.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138053. May 31, 2000.]
CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE, Petitioner, v. FELICITAS DE LARA, Respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre assails the October 5, 1998 decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals 2 and its Resolution promulgated on March 5,
1999.chanrobles.com.ph : red
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre,
filed with the Bureau of Lands on January 17, 1942 and with an area of 2,342 square
meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife — respondent
Felicitas de Lara, as claimant. On November 19, 1954, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales application to cover only 1,600
square meters. Then, on November 3, 1961, by virtue of a decision rendered by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated November 19, 1954, a
subdivision survey was made and the area was further reduced to 1,000 square
meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for
taxation purposes under TD 43927 in the name of respondent’s sons — Apolonio and
Rudolfo, both surnamed de Lara.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National
Bank. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner
Cornelio M. Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. On February 10,
1960, a document denominated as a "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and
Interests" was executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250
square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and
residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in consideration of
the sum of P5,000.
Sometime in May 1968 Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against
petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building. 3
However, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on
the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984,
resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February 13,
1984, in the name of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over
the entire 1,000 square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter
portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-13038 on June 19, 1989, in the name of Respondent.
4 mortgagee in an equitable mortgage fear that the contract relied upon is not registered
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May 17,
1990. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the merits,
the trial court rendered judgment on October 19, 1992, in favor of petitioner declaring
him to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the
parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale. 5 The
appellate court’s decision was based on the inadequacy of the consideration agreed
upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a large portion of the "purchase
price" was made after the execution of the deed of sale in several installments of
minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to confirm
his rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the execution of the
deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 issued in favor of petitioner to be null and
void. On July 8, 1996, in a case docketed as G. R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and on September 11, 1996, we denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
On May 5, 1997. respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying
for the immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was
granted on August 18, 1997. On February 3, 1998, respondent moved for a writ of
possession, invoking our ruling in G. R. No. 120832 Petitioner opposed the motion,
asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until payment of the loan
and the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property. On March 12,
1998, the trial court granted respondent’s motion for writ of possession. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on May 21, 1998.
Consequently, a writ of possession dated June 16 1998, together with the Sheriff’s
Notice to Vacate dated July 7, 1998, were served upon petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to
annul and set aside the March 12 1998 and May 21, 1998 orders of the trial court,
including the writ of possession dated June 16, 1998 and the sheriff’s notice to vacate
dated July 7, 1998. 6 or flaw in his mode of acquisition. Nevertheless, the appellate court declared petitioner
The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as follows: (1)
whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain
possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount of
indebtedness by the mortgagor; and (b) whether or not petitioner can be considered a
builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he made on the property before
the transaction was declared to be an equitable mortgage.chanrobles.com : law library
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of the
subject property. It said that —
. . . the mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the certificate of title
in order to protect his rights against third persons and thereby secure the debt. There
is therefore no necessity for him to actually possess the property. Neither should a
and hence, may not operate as a mortgage to justify its foreclosure. In Feliza Zubiri v.
Lucio Quijano, 74 Phil 47, it was ruled "that when a contract . . . is held as an equitable
mortgage, the same shall be given effect as if it had complied with the formal
requisites of mortgage. . . . by its very nature the lien thereby created ought not to be
defeated by requiring compliance with the formalities necessary to the validity of a
voluntary real estate mortgage, as long as the land remains in the hands of the
petitioner (mortgagor) and the rights of innocent parties are not affected."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Proceeding from the foregoing petitioner’s imagined fears that his lien would be lost by
surrendering possession are unfounded.
In the same vein, there is nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara from acquiring
possession of the property pending actual payment of the indebtedness to petitioner.
This does not in anyway endanger the petitioner’s right to security since, as pointed
out by private respondents, the petitioner can always have the equitable mortgage
annotated in the Certificate of Title of private respondent and pursue the legal
remedies for the collection of the alleged debt secured by the mortgage. In this case,
the remedy would be to foreclose the mortgage upon failure to pay the debt within the
required period.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
It is unfortunate however, that the Court of Appeals, in declaring the transaction to be
an equitable mortgage failed to specify in its Decision the period of time within which
the private respondent could settle her account, since such period serves as the
reckoning point by which foreclosure could ensue. As it is, petitioner is now a dilemma
as to how he could enforce his rights as a mortgagee. . . .
Hence, this Court, once and for all resolves the matter by requiring the trial court to
determine the amount of total indebtedness and the period within which payment shall
be made.
Petitioner’s claims that he was a builder in good faith and entitled to reimbursement for
the improvements he introduced upon the property were rejected by the Court of
Appeals. It held that petitioner knew, or at least had an inkling, that there was a defect
to have the following rights:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . He is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which he may have
incurred over the property, in accordance with Art. 526 and Art. 452 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, considering that the transaction was merely an equitable mortgage, then he
is entitled to payment of the amount of indebtedness plus interest, and in the event of
non-payment to foreclose the mortgage. Meanwhile, pending receipt of the total
amount of debt, private respondent is entitled to possession over the disputed Court of Appeals’ decision in G.R. CV No. 42065 nor this Court’s decision in G.R. No.
property.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary 120832 ordered immediate delivery of possession of the subject property
to Respondent.
The case was finally disposed of by the appellate court in the following
manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The dispositive portion of the March 31, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R.
CV No. 42065, which was affirmed by this Court, provides that —
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and this case is ordered remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for further proceedings, as IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (l) dismissing, the complaint; (2) declaring the
"Document of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" (Exhibit B) dated
1) The trial court shall determine — February 10, 1960, to be an equitable mortgage not a sale; (3) upholding the validity
of OCT No. P-13038 in the name of Felicitas de Lara; and (3) declaring null and void
a) The period within which the mortgagor must pay his total amount of indebtedness OCT No. P-11566 in the name of plaintiff Cornelio Isaguirre. All other counterclaims
for damages are likewise dismissed Costs against the appellee. 11chanrobles.com :
b) The total amount of indebtedness owing the petitioner-mortgagee plus interest virtual law library
computed from the time when the judgment declaring the contract to be an equitable
mortgage become final. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned decision merely settled the following
matters: (1) that the transaction between petitioner and respondent was not a sale but
c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner over the property. 7 an equitable mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of respondent is valid;
and (3) that OCT No. P-11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void. Since the
On March 5, 1999, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate aforementioned decision did not direct the immediate ouster of petitioner from the
court. 8 Hence, the present appeal wherein petitioner makes the following assignment subject property and the delivery thereof to respondent, the issuance of the writ of
of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library possession by the trial court on June 16, 1998 constituted an unwarranted
modification or addition to the final and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No.
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE 120832. 12
RTC ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION’ AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION We do not agree with petitioner’s contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995
IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF decision of the appellate court, which was affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996,
RESPONDENTchanrobles.com.ph:red served as more than adequate basis for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor
of respondent since these decisions affirmed respondent’s title over the subject
A.1 The RTC patently exceeded the scope of its authority and acted with grave abuse property. As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without
of discretion in ordering the immediate delivery of possession of the Property to any other limitations than those established by law. 13 Corollary to such right,
respondent as said order exceeded the parameters of the final and executory decision respondent also has the right to exclude from the possession of her property any other
and constituted a variance thereof. person to whom she has not transmitted such property. 14

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, THAT It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights over the
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY property enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant
PRIOR TO THE PAYMENT OF RESPONDENT’S MORTGAGE LOAN. or lessee. 15 Petitioner anchors his own claim to possession upon his declared status
as a mortgagee. In his Memorandum, he argues that —
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH 4.8 It was respondent who asserted that her transfer of the Property to petitioner was
by way of an equitable mortgage and not by sale. After her assertion was sustained by
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT the Courts, respondent cannot now ignore or disregard the legal effects of such
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST COMPUTED ONLY FROM THE TIME judicial declaration regarding the nature of the transaction.
WHEN THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE CONTRACT TO BE AN EQUITABLE
MORTGAGE BECAME FINAL. 9 x       x       x
Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject
property until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful 4.13 Having delivered possession of the Property to petitioner as part of the
improvements he made upon such property. 10 According to petitioner, neither the constitution of the equitable mortgage thereon, respondent is not entitled to the return
of the Property unless and until the mortgage loan is discharged by full payment
thereof. Petitioner’s right as mortgagee to retain possession of the Property so long as
the mortgage loan remains unpaid is further supported by the rule that a mortgage
may not be extinguished even though then mortgagor-debtor may have made partial
payments on the mortgage loan:chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
"ARTICLE 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be
divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or the creditor.
"Therefore, the debtor’s heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied.
"Neither can the creditor’s heir who has received his share of the debt return the
pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who have not been
paid." (Emphasis supplied.)
x       x       x
4.14 To require petitioner to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior to
the full payment of the latter’s mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation
of the mortgage. Such effective cancellation would render petitioner’s rights ineffectual
and nugatory and would constitute unwarranted judicial interference.
x       x       x
4.16 The fact of the present case show that respondent delivered possession of the
Property to petitioner upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Special
Cession of Rights and Interest dated 10 February 1960. Hence, transfer of possession
of the Property to petitioner was an essential part of whatever agreement the parties
entered into, which, in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed to be an equitable
mortgage.
x       x       x
4.19 Petitioner does not have the mistaken notion that the mortgagee must be in
actual possession of the mortgaged property in order to secure the debt. However, in
this particular case, the delivery of possession of the Property was an integral part of
the contract between petitioner and Respondent. After all, it was supposed to be a
contract of sale. If delivery was not part of the agreement entered into by the parties in
1960, why did respondent surrender possession thereof to petitioner in the first place?
chanrobles.com : virtual law library
4.20 Now that the Courts have ruled that the transaction was not a sale but a
mortgage, petitioner’s entitlement to the possession of the Property should be deemed
as one of the provisions of the mortgage, considering that at the time the contract was
entered into, possession of the Property was likewise delivered to petitioner. Thus,
until respondent has fully paid her mortgage loan, petitioner should be allowed to
retain possession of the subject property. 16
Petitioner’s position lacks sufficient legal and factual moorings.
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation. 17 It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the
proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is
nevertheless binding between the parties. 18 Thus, the only right granted by law in
favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document
in which the mortgage is formalized. 19 As a general rule, the mortgagor retains
possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the
property does not pass to the mortgagee.20 However, even though a mortgagee does
not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it
was constituted. 21 If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may
institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially,
whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds
therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage
loan. .Apparently petitioner’s contention that" [t]o require [him] . . . to deliver
possession of the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter’s
mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without
basis. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the
prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtor’s default in the payment of his loan
obligation.
Moreover, this Court cannot find any justification in the records to uphold petitioner’s
contention that respondent delivered possession of the subject property upon the
execution of the "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" on
February 10, 1960 and that the transfer of possession to petitioner must therefore be
considered an essential part of the agreement between the parties. This self-serving
assertion of petitioner was directly contradicted by respondent in her pleadings. 22
Furthermore, nowhere in the Court of Appeals’ decisions promulgated on March 31,
1995 (G.R. CV No. 42065) and on October 5, 1998 (G.R. SP No. 48310), or in our
own decision promulgated on July 8, 1996 (G.R. No. 120832) was it ever established
that the mortgaged properties were delivered by respondent to
petitioner.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
In Alvano v. Batoon, 23 this Court held that" [a] simple mortgage does not give the
mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should
contain some special provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not
presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the
real intention of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged
property until full payment of the loan.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor
of Respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of this Court’s ruling in
G.R No. 120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-
13038) in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying
the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-11566) in the name of petitioner Cornelio
Isaguirre Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be
redundant for respondent to go back to court simply to establish her right to possess
subject property. Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the issuance of the writ of possession
by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of our decision in G.R.
No. 120832, but rather, was necessary complement thereto. 24 It bears stressing that
a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.25cralaw:red
With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the
Court of Appeals’ characterization of petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based on
the factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from the
very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondent’s property as
mere security for the payment of the loan obligation Therefore, petitioner may claim
reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to
reimbursement for any useful expenses 26 which he may have incurred. 27
Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals., this case should be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for a determination of the total
amount of the loan, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner, and the period
within which respondent must pay such amount. 28 However, no interest is due on the
loan since there has been no express stipulation in writing. 29
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998
and its Resolution dated March 5, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent is
entitled to delivery of possession of the subject property. This case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for determination of the amount of the loan, the
necessary expenses incurred by petitioner and the period within which the respondent
must pay the same.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 146082 : July 30, 2004]
MELCHOR CUSTODIO, Petitioner, v. ROSENDO F. CORRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated July 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 45764, and its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated
September 9, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9,
in RTC Appeal Case No. 3301, which reversed the Decision 4 dated August 19, 1996
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas, dismissing respondent
Rosendo F. Corrados Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.
The facts and antecedent proceedings, as culled from records, are as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment 5 case against
petitioner Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil
Case No. 116. It was dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that
(1) it had no jurisdiction as the complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was
no barangay conciliation, and (3) the plaintiff failed to prove his case by
preponderance of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC of Balayan, Batangas affirmed the
appealed decision docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.6 cralawred
On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No.
120,7 and which is the core case subject of the present petition.
The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the
registered owner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered
by TCT No. T-21342.He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the
complaint, petitioner Melchor Custodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of
tenancy relationship with respondents father, Crisanto Corrado and without his
knowledge and consent, demolished his old residential house on the said lot and
constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his family now reside.
In his Answer,8 petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold
tenant of Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that
respondents father consented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years ago
when the subject lot was still owned by respondents father and before it was
transferred to respondent. As affirmative defenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action; (b) the required barangay conciliation under P.D.
15089 was not complied with; and (c) the present complaint is now barred on the
ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on forum shopping.
The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts during the pre-trial
conference:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
1.That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21342 covering the lot in question is in the
name of plaintiff Rosendo Corrado;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.That the defendant has never been a tenant of the
plaintiff;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3.That the construction of the two-bedroom bungalow structure on the subject
premises was without the consent of the plaintiff;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4.That the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 which involved the same parties was by
reason of alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No.
1508;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5.That subject property is located in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, and not in Barangay
Gulod, Calatagan;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6.That no Barangay Certification is attached to the instant complaint pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1508;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
7.That the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court was appealed before the Regional
Trial Court which was docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099. 10 cralawred
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.11 cralawred
The MTC initially resolved several issues and ruled inter alia that: (a) It has jurisdiction
over the complaint which is an accion publiciana case although denominated as
recovery of possession and ownership; (b) Prior compliance with barangay conciliation
is not required because the parties reside in non-adjoining barangays of different
municipalities with respondent residing in Barangay Binubusan, Municipality of Lian,
Batangas, and petitioner residing in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan and the complaint
included a prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO; and (c) The filing of the present
Civil Case No. 120 does not constitute forum shopping and the judgment in the
previous ejectment case in Civil Case No. 116 will not amount to res judicata in the
present case because there was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 116. The
MTC noted that there was no adjudication as to the rights of the parties, particularly
the determination of their possessory rights in Civil Case No. 116 as its dismissal was
anchored on respondents non-compliance with the required barangay conciliation
under P.D. No. 1508 and on respondents failure to allege the particular date of
deprivation of possession required for the court to determine whether the case was
filed within the one (1) year period.
However, the MTC finds that the petitioners continued stay on respondents property
has factual and legal basis since evidence on record, such as milling tickets,
convincingly show that petitioner has been a tenant of respondents father, Crisanto
Corrado, cultivating the latters three (3) -hectare sugarcane land, including the subject
lot, since 1961. It did not give credence to respondents claim of ignorance to the
tenancy relationship between petitioner and his father since the latest milling tickets
showed that petitioner continued working on the subject lot even after it was
transferred to respondents name.
Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC, which set aside and reversed the
MTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 and a new one entered declaring
the plaintiff as the true and absolute owner of the residential lot in question; ordering
the defendant to deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiff and to vacate the same,
with costs against the defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.12 cralawred
In reversing the MTC, the RTC found merit in respondents allegation that petitioner
cannot claim any right to possess respondents lot on the premise that he is an alleged
tenant of respondents father. The RTC found it unacceptable for the MTC to rule that
respondent is bound by the action of his father in allowing petitioner to construct a
house on the subject lot and occupy the same. The RTC stressed that the parties had
stipulated during the pre-trial that the subject lot is registered under the name of
respondent and that petitioner is not a tenant of respondent. Further, respondent
acquired the said lot in 1970 not from his father but from the government, which was
the registered owner since 1909. Thus, respondents father never acquired any right
over the said land, hence, he has no right to transmit or alienate the land to anyone.
The RTC further stated that petitioners alleged possession, if any, would have been
only by tolerance by the government and he would have acted promptly at the time
respondent purchased the lot if he truly believed that he had the legal right over the
lot. Finally, the RTC clarified that contrary to the MTCs ruling, the case is not merely
an accion publiciana, where only physical possession is involved, but one of accion
reinvindicatoria because respondent claimed recovery of full possession as an
absolute owner. The RTC concluded that since respondent is the absolute owner of
the property, the MTC cannot bar him from recovering possession based on spurious
authority granted by a third party who is not an owner.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC
decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the RTC decision dated September 9, 1997 in RTC
Appeal Case No. 3301.
SO ORDERED.13 cralawred
The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no
identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the
former is an ejectment suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the
date of deprivation of possession while the latter is for recovery of possession, and not
ejectment. It also brushed aside the alleged tenancy relationship between petitioner
and respondent, noting that the milling tickets were issued for respondents father as
the planter and petitioner as the tenant, but without any evidence showing that they
referred to the subject lot and without any indication that petitioner was getting his
share from the subject lot.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 116 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 120 HAVE TWO (2) SEPARATE
CAUSES OF ACTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHAT DETERMINES THE
NATURE OR CAUSE OF THE ACTION IS NOT THE CAPTION OF THE COMPLAINT
BUT THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN
NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT FOR RES JUDICATA TO
APPLY, SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION
WILL SUFFICE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS AMPLY ESTABLISHED BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WITH
RESPONDENT AND HIS FATHER, CRISANTO CORRADO. 14 cralawred
In our view, the relevant issues for our resolution are: (a) whether or not the principle
of res judicata is applicable in this case; and (b) whether the alleged tenancy
relationship between petitioner with respondent and the latters father was established
by preponderance of evidence.
On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this
case since the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120
would clearly reveal an identity of cause of action.Citing jurisprudence, it argued that
what should control in determining the cause of action are the averments in both
complaints seeking recovery of possession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of
dispossessing and ejecting petitioner from the property and restoring it to respondent
and not the different captions of the two complaints. He argued further that the
application of the principle of res judicata only requires substantial and not absolute
identity of causes of action. For his part, respondent countered that while there may
be identity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are not identical in Civil
Case Nos. 116 and 120 as the former is one for ejectment to recover material
possession while the latter is one for recovery of possession and ownership of the
subject land.
We find petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is
inapplicable because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits
and its cause of action is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession
and ownership.
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
(a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of
action.15 cralawred
In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A
judgment on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when
there is determination which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without
trial.16 Thus, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of
action and the subject matter of the case. 17 In this case, the MTCs dismissal of Civil
Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack of jurisdiction and lack of proof of the date of
demand without determining and resolving who has the right of possession between
petitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was not resolved on the merits but was
dismissed on technical points. A judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction
cannot operate as res judicata on the merits.18 cralawred
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. We
agree with the findings of the CA which we find no reason to set aside, to
wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and for
failure of plaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was deprived of his
possession, the court held that it did not entitle him to file an ejectment suit against
herein defendant-petitioner. In Civil Case No. 120, the cause of action is for recovery
of possession and not ejectment.These are two separate causes of action and
therefore the principle of res judicata does not apply to the present case.19 cralawred
Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of
action from an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No.
120, and the judgment of the former shall not bar the filing of another case for
recovery of possession as an element of ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who
has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership. 20 Incidentally, we agree with
the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion publiciana but more of
an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondents allegation in the complaint
that he is the registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had
constructed a bungalow thereon and had been continuously occupying the same since
then.
The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms
of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside
from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to
recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions
to judicially recover possession.21 cralawred
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the
circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence.
In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals ,22 we held that a judgment in a case for
forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de
facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between the same parties respecting
title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of
a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity of causes of
action between the two.
Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him
and respondents father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that
this is a factual issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value of
evidences presented which is not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari .
Besides, this issue had already been squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and
we find no impelling reason to set it aside. According to the Court of Appeals, the
milling tickets only showed that they were issued to Crisanto Corrado but did not show
whether such tickets referred to the same lot in question. In Petitions for Review
on Certiorari , the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of
law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on
this Court, which is not a trier of facts. 23 cralawred
At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-
trial stage where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of
respondent and that petitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and
respondent are bound by such stipulations which are deemed settled and need not be
proven during the trial. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the
basic issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the
trial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that
the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-
trial.24 cralawred
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision
dated July 28, 2000 and Resolution dated November 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 45764 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 84831. June 20, 2001.]
PACENCIO ABEJARON, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ALEJANDRO
ABEJARON, Petitioner, v. FELIX NABASA and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION*
PUNO, J.:
With the burgeoning population comes a heightened interest in the limited land
resources especially so if, as in the case at bar, one’s home of many years stands on
the land in dispute. It comes as no surprise therefore that while this case involves a
small parcel of land, a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in
Silway, General Santos City, the parties have tenaciously litigated over it for more
than twenty years.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to annul the respondent
court’s Decision dated April 26, 1988 and Resolution dated July 12, 1988 reversing
the trial court’s decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the owner of the subject lot.
The following facts spurred the present controversy:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a
118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General
Santos City described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded on the North by Road,
on the South by Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by Felix Nabasa, and on the West
by Road." 1 In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-
square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the
area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. In 1949,
petitioner improved their abode to become a two-storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet
or 87.78 square meters made of round wood and nipa roofing. 2 This house, which
stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 and a portion of
the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioner’s daughter, Conchita
Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed and in its stead, petitioner
Abejaron built another store which stands up to the present. In 1951, he planted five
coconut trees on the property in controversy. Petitioner’s wife, Matilde Abejaron,
harvested coconuts from these trees. 3 Petitioner Abejaron also planted banana and
avocado trees. He also put up a pitcher pump. 4 All this time that the Abejaron’s
introduced these improvements on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not
oppose or complain about the improvements.
Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his
house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and
1978. 5 The last two declarations state that petitioner Abejaron’s house stands on Lots
1 and 2, Block 5, Psu 154953. 6 Abejaron paid taxes on the house in 1955, 1966, and
1981. 7
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining
57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. 8 Nabasa built his house
about four (4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron’s house. Beatriz Gusila, a
neighbor of the Abejarons and the Nabasas confirmed that when she arrived in Silway
in 1949, Nabasa was not yet residing there while Abejaron was already living in their
house which stands to this day.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy.
Abejaron merely watched them do the survey 9 and did not thereafter apply for title of
the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government
property. 10 Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa
"clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in
his name" of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, including petitioner Abejaron’s
118-square meter portion. 11 Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of
Nabasa because in applying for and causing the titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5,
Psu-154953, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the
entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion despite
knowledge of Abejaron’s actual occupation and possession of said portion. 12
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140
pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. As the
title included petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion of the lot, his son,
Alejandro Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron (petitioner Abejaron’s wife), filed a
protest with the Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa’s title
and application. The protest was dismissed on November 22, 1979 for failure of
Matilde and Alejandro to attend the hearings. 13 Alejandro claims, however, that they
did not receive notices of the hearings. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration
dated January 10, 1980. Alejandro also filed a notice of adverse claim on January 14,
1980. Subsequently, he requested the Bureau of Lands to treat the motion as an
appeal considering that it was filed within the 60-day reglementary period. The motion
for reconsideration was endorsed and forwarded by the District Land Office XI-3 of the
Bureau of Lands in Koronadal, Cotabato to the Director of Lands in Manila on
November 24, 1981. 14 But because the appeal had not been resolved for a
prolonged period for unknown reasons, petitioner Abejaron filed on March 12, 1982 an
action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before Branch 22,
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 15 On May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a
notice of lis pendens. 16
Abner Lagsub, geodetic engineer, testified for the petitioner. Lagsub stated that on
March 30, 1980, Alejandro Abejaron hired him to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953,
the land in controversy. He surveyed the lot measuring 175 square meters. Fifty-seven
(57) square meters of Lot 1 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 3 were occupied by
Nabasa’s house. This portion was fenced partly by hollow blocks and partly by
bamboo. On the remaining 118 square meters stood a portion of petitioner Abejaron’s
house and two coconut trees near it, and his store. Abejaron’s 118-square meter
portion was separated from Nabasa’s 57-square meter part by Abejaron’s fence made
of hollow blocks. Both Nabasa’s and Abejaron’s houses appeared more than twenty
years old while the coconut trees appeared about 25 years old.
Back in 1971, Lagsub conducted a subdivision survey on Psu-154953. He was then
hired by the Silway Neighborhood Association to conduct the survey for purposes of
allocating lots to the members of the association, among whom were respondent
Nabasa and petitioner Abejaron. When the 1971 survey was conducted, both the
Abejarons and Nabasa were already occupying their respective 118 and 57 square
meter portions of Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa and Matilde Abejaron, representative of
petitioner, were present during the survey. 17
Respondent Nabasa had a different story to tell. He contends that he had been
residing on a 12 x 15 meter or 180-square meter public land in Silway, General Santos
City since 1945. He admits that petitioner Abejaron was already residing in Silway
when he arrived there. Nabasa constructed a house which stands to this day and
planted five coconut trees on this 180-square meter land, but only two of the trees
survived. Nabasa never harvested coconuts from these trees as petitioner Abejaron
claims to own them and harvests the coconuts. In many parts of respondent Nabasa’s
testimony, however, he declared that he started occupying the 180-square meter area
in 1976. 18
Nabasa avers that previously, he and petitioner Abejaron were in possession of
portions of Lot 2, Psu-154953. This lot was subsequently surveyed and divided into
smaller lots with the area of petitioner Abejaron designated as Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-
154953 measuring one hundred eighty (180) square meters, while his was designated
as Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with an area of one hundred seventy five (175) square
meters.
Instead of applying for free patent over his Lot 2, petitioner Abejaron gave this lot to
his daughter Conchita Abejaron-Abellon and allowed her to file the application with the
District Land Office XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato. Conchita
secured Free Patent No. (XI-4)-3293 over Lot 2. Pursuant to this, she was issued
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4420. On April 27, 1981, Conchita’s title was
transcribed in the Registration Book of General Santos City.
Respondent Nabasa, on the other hand, filed an application for Free Patent over Lot
1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with the District Land Office No. XI-4, Bureau of Lands,
Koronadal, South Cotabato. While the application was pending, petitioner Abejaron
forcibly encroached upon the northern and southwestern portion of Lot 1, Block 5,
Psu-159543. Abejaron fenced the disputed 118-square meter portion of Lot 1 and
despite Nabasa’s opposition, constructed a store near the road. Petitioner Abejaron
then transferred his old house constructed on Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-154953 to a portion
of the disputed 118-square meter area. Petitioner’s daughter, Conchita, patentee and
title holder of Lot 2, constructed her own house in Lot 2. execute a registerable document in favor of plaintiff Pacencio Abejaron, Filipino,
married and a resident of Silway, General Santos City, his heirs, successors and
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877, covering Lot 1, Block 5, was issued to respondent assigns over an area of one hundred eighteen (118) square meters of Lot No. 1, Block
Nabasa on September 24, 1974. But before the patent could be transcribed on the 5, Psu-154953, situated at Silway, General Santos City, on the Western portion of said
Registration Book of the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, the District Land lot as shown in the sketch plan, Exhibit "R", and the remaining portion of 57 square
Officer of District Land Office No. XI-4 recalled it for investigation of an administrative meters of said lot to be retained by defendant Felix Nabasa;
protest filed by the petitioner. 19 The protest was given due course, but petitioner
Abejaron or his representative failed to appear in the hearings despite notice. 2. Should Felix Nabasa fails (sic) to do so, upon the finality of this judgment, the Clerk
of Court shall executed (sic) it in the name of Felix Nabasa, widower, and will have the
On November 22, 1979, the administrative protest was dismissed by the District Land same effect as if executed by the latter and the Register of Deeds, General Santos
Officer for failure of petitioner Abejaron or his representative to appear in the hearings City, is hereby directed to issue New Transfer Certificate of Title to Alejandro Abejaron
despite notice. 20 Respondent Nabasa’s Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 was then re- over 118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, and New Transfer
transmitted by the District Land Officer of District Land Office XI-4 to the Register of Certificate of Title over 57 square meters of same Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, in
Deeds, General Santos City, and the same was transcribed in the Registration Book favor of Felix Nabasa, and ultimately to have OCT No. P-4140 of Felix Nabasa
of the Registry of Property of General Santos City on December 13, 1979. Original cancelled accordingly."cralaw virtua1aw library
Certificate of Title No. P-4140, covering Lot 1, Block 2, Psu-154953, was issued to
respondent Nabasa. 21 Respondent Nabasa’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, he appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for favor of respondent Nabasa, viz:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of
Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. ". . . the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud. In this case, Abejaron failed to
substantiate the existence of actual fraud. . . There was no proof of irregularity in the
During the trial, respondent Nabasa presented Abundio Guiral, his neighbor who had issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor was there a claim that
been living since 1945 in Lot 3, Block 5, Psu-154953, adjoining Nabasa’s Lot 1. He fraud intervened in the issuance of the title, thus, the title has become indefeasible
testified that when he arrived in Silway, petitioner Abejaron was already living there. (Frias v. Esquival, 67 SCRA 487). Abejaron was not able to establish his allegation
Four months after, Nabasa started residing in the area. Nabasa constructed a house, that Nabasa misrepresented his status of possession in his application for the title. . .
planted coconut trees, and fenced his 12 x 15 meter area. Abejaron’s house in 1945 is In fact, in Abejaron’s answer to Nabasa’s counterclaim, he said that Nabasa has been
still the same house he lives in at present, but in 1977, it was jacked up and occupying the area since 1950.
transferred from Lot 2 to Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa tried to prevent the transfer to no
avail. The house was then extended towards Lot 2. 22 Contrary to the finding of the court a quo, the Bureau of Lands conducted an ocular
inspection before the title was issued. This was confirmed by Abejaron himself (tsn,
On rebuttal, petitioner Abejaron presented two neighbors. One of them, Alejandra January 19, 1984).
Doria, started living in Silway in 1947. She testified that when she arrived in the
neighborhood, Abejaron’s fence as it now stands between the 57-square meter portion x       x       x
occupied by Nabasa’s house and the 118-square meter area claimed by petitioner
Abejaron was already there. 23 The other neighbor, Pacencia Artigo, also started
living in Silway in 1947. She declared that the house of the Abejarons stands now WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
where it stood in 1947. She also testified that the Abejarons previously had a store REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring Felix Nabasa as the
smaller than their present store. 24 owner of the lot covered by O.C.T. No. P-4140. Costs against Plaintiff-Appellee.
On September 27, 1985, after trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
petitioner Abejaron, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioner Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision.
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this court hereby renders On July 22, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying the motion for
judgment as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the
following assignment of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1. Declaring the possession and occupancy of Pacencio Abejaron over 118 square
meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in good faith and thereby declaring the "I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
inclusion of 118 square meters of said lot in OCT No. P-4140 erroneous and a ACTUAL FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
mistake, and for which, defendant Felix Nabasa is hereby ordered to reconvey and PROVEN BY THE PETITIONER AND SUSTAINED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROCURED THE TITLE IN HIS NAME OF THE AREA OF
THE LOT IN QUESTION, LOT 1, BLOCK 5, LOCATED AT SILWAY, DADIANGAS,
GENERAL SANTOS CITY.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
LOT WHICH BELONGS TO THE PETITIONER IS LOT 2 OF THE SAME BLOCK
AND PSU, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FORCIBLY ENTERED INTO LOT 1 OF
THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND FORCIBLY TRANSFERRED HIS OLD HOUSE
FROM LOT 2 TO LOT 1 IS BASED ONLY ON THE SELF-SERVING ALLEGATIONS
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY COMPETENT
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS A CLEAR RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN IN ACTUAL AND LAWFUL POSSESSION
FOR SO MANY YEARS AND A CLAIMANT OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION."cralaw virtua1aw library
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name after one
year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. 25 The action does not seek to reopen the registration
proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the
person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real
owner thereof. 26 Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance
based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove
by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. 27
Petitioner Abejaron does not claim to own Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. He in fact
admits that he believed the land in dispute was public in character, thus he did not
declare it for taxation purposes despite possession of it for a long time. Neither did he
apply for title over it on the mistaken belief that he could not apply for title of a public
land. In his Complaint, he stated that respondent Nabasa’s fraudulent procurement of
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 and OCT No. P-4140 over the disputed land deprived him
not of ownership, but of his "right to file the necessary application thereon with the
authorities concerned" 28 as long-time possessor of the land.
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance is proper,
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . for an action of reconveyance of a parcel of land to prosper, it is not necessary
that the proponent be the absolute owner thereof. It is enough that the proponent has
an equitable right thereon. In the case at bar, the plaintiff had been in lawful, open,
continuous and notorious possession, occupation and control in the concept of an
owner of a greater portion of the subject lot since 1945 and have (sic) thereby
acquired an equitable right thereon protected by law. Possession of public lands once
occupation of the same is proven, as the herein plaintiff did, under claim of ownership
constitutes a grant from the state (Republic v. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). A portion of the
public land ceased to be public as soon as its claimant had performed all the
conditions essential to a grant (Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA. 875)." 29
Petitioner’s contention, buttressed by the Vera case and Chief Justice Teehankee’s
dissent in the Villanueva case, is similar to the position taken by the plaintiff in Mesina
v. Vda. de Sonza, Et. Al. 30 In that case, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija an action for cancellation of the original certificate of title procured by the
defendant by virtue of a homestead patent. The title covered a public land which she
claimed to own through public, open, and peaceful possession for more than thirty
years. The law applicable in that case, which petitioner Abejaron apparently relies on
in the case at bar, is Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957,
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act (now Property Registration Decree), to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x       x       x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter." (Emphasis
supplied)
Citing Susi v. Razon, 31 the Court interpreted this law, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly with a right
to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141),
the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an
application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by a legal fiction, Valentin
Susi had acquired the land in question by grant of the State, it had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. (Emphasis supplied)"
The Mesina and Susi cases were cited in Herico v. Dar, 32 another action for
cancellation of title issued pursuant to a free patent. Again, the Court ruled that under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, with the
plaintiff’s proof of occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessor-in-interest, title over the land had vested in him as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thenceforth, the land was no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent. 33 The Court held,
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As interpreted in several cases (Susi v. Razon, Et Al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina v. Pineda
Vda. de Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960) when the conditions as specified in
the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of public domain, and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent." 34
In citing Republic v. Villanueva, Et Al., 35 petitioner Abejaron relied on the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Teehankee. However, the en banc majority opinion in that
case and in Manila Electric Company v. Bartolome, 36 departed from the doctrines
enunciated in the Susi, Mesina, and Herico cases. Citing Uy Un v. Perez, 37 the Court
ruled that "the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation
of his title under Sec. 48(b) of Com. Act. No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
is ‘derecho dominical incoativo’ and that before the issuance of the certificate of title
the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State." 38
The Court pointed out that the Villanueva and Meralco cases are different from the oft-
cited Susi case as the latter involved a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen
since time immemorial, while the land in dispute in the Villanueva and Meralco cases
were sought to be titled by virtue of Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. In
explaining the nature of land possessed since time immemorial, the Court quoted Oh
Cho v. Director of Lands, 39 viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before
the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In 1986, however, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., 40 this
Court en banc recognized the strong dissent registered by Chief Justice Teehankee in
the Villanueva case and abandoned the Villanueva and Meralco ruling to revert to the
Susi doctrine. Reiterating the Susi and Herico cases, the Court
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of character and duration prescribed by statute as
the equivalent of express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself
[Sec. 48(b)] that the possessor(s) ‘. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title . . ..’ No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at
the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already
effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete." 41 (Emphasis supplied)chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
This is the prevailing rule as reiterated in the more recent case of Rural Bank of
Compostela v. Court of Appeals, a ponencia of now Chief Justice Davide, Jr., 42
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The rule under the latter (Section 48[b] of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 1942), is that when the conditions specified therein are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government
grant, without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be
part of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands." 43
The question brought to the fore, therefore, is whether or not petitioner Abejaron has
satisfied the conditions specified in Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 1942. Sec. 48(b) has been further amended by P.D. No. 1073 which took
effect on January 25, 1977. Sec. 4 of the P.D. reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945."cralaw virtua1aw library
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
(Emphasis ours) 44
However, as petitioner Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and occupation
required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that
occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not
apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b)
takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron’s satisfaction of the requirements
of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This
follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et
Al., 45 that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly
stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have
been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. 46
Having laid down the law applicable to the case at bar, i.e., Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942, we now determine whether or not petitioner has
acquired title over the disputed land. In doing so, it is necessary for this Court to wade
through the evidence on record to ascertain whether petitioner has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the 118-square
meter disputed land for 30 years at least since January 24, 1947. It is axiomatic that
findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive on
the parties and upon this Court, which will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal
unless these findings are not supported by evidence or unless strong and cogent
reasons dictate otherwise. 47 One instance when findings of fact of the appellate court
may be reviewed by this Court is when, as in the case at bar, the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory. 48
Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he
built a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. This
nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was also
made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also changed to a fence made of hollow
blocks. The two-storey house, bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this
day. In 1951, petitioner planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner has
shown continued existence of these improvements on the disputed land, they were
introduced later than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the
disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually
occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot determine
the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed
land was surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970’s. Therefore,
prior to the survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of the land
petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and
incontrovertible proof.
The neighbors presented by the petitioner, namely Alejandra Doria, Pacencia Artigo,
and Beatriz Gusila, could not also further his cause as both Doria and Artigo stated
that they started residing in Silway in 1947, without specifying whether it was on or
prior to January 24, 1947, while Gusila arrived in the neighborhood in 1949. While
Doria testified that there was a fence between Abejaron’s and Nabasa’s houses in
1947, she did not state that Abejaron’s 118-square meter area was enclosed by a
fence which stands to this day. This is confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Lagsub’s 1984
survey plan which shows that a fence stands only on one side of the 118-square
meter area, the side adjacent to Nabasa’s 57-square meter portion. Again, this poses
the problem of determining the area actually occupied and possessed by Abejaron at
least since January 24, 1947.
Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for
taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or
supported by other effective proof. 49 Even the tax declarations and receipts covering
his house do not bolster his case as the earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner’s evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at
least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."
50 As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the land in
controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free
patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.
In De La Peña v. Court of Appeals and Herodito Tan, 51 the petitioner filed an action
for reconveyance, claiming preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4 hectare
of land and imputing fraud and misrepresentation to respondent in securing a free
patent and original certificate of title over the land in controversy. The action for
reconveyance was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. This Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name. (Tomas v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v. Barlongay,
G.R. No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, Et Al.,
104 Phil. 126 [1958]; Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826
[1953]; Azurin v. Quitoriano, Et Al., 81 Phil. 261 [1948]). In the case at bench,
petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he
has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual
possession since January 1947. . . Title to alienable public lands can be established
through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. . .
Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally
issued by the State. (Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 [1936]) In such cases, the
real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would
revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent
issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the
grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. (See Sec. 101 of C.A.
141 [Public Land Act]; Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 [1957]; Sumail v. Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Et Al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 [1955]). Not being
an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance."
(Emphasis supplied) 52
In the more recent case of Tankiko, Et. Al. v. Cezar, Et Al., 53 plaintiffs filed an action
for reconveyance claiming that they were the actual occupants and residents of a
126,112-square meter land which was titled to another person. The trial court
dismissed the action, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. Despite the
appellate court’s finding that plaintiffs had no personality to file the action for
reconveyance, the disputed land being part of the public domain, it exercised equity
jurisdiction to avoid leaving unresolved the matter of possession of the land in dispute.
On appeal to this Court, we reinstated the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
action for reconveyance, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the basis of the action filed and relief
sought, has a clear right that he seeks to enforce, or that would obviously be violated if
the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of standing. In the present case,
respondents have no clear enforceable right, since their claim over the land in
question is merely inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only applicants for
sales patents on the land, they are not and they do not even claim to be owners
thereof.
Second, it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because they
admit that they are not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents
thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is public in character and that it should revert
to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically
declares that only the government may institute an action for reconveyance of
ownership of a public land. . .
x       x       x
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land.
Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents
thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly
affected by the judgment in such suit.
x       x       x
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed. Thus,
in Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, September 23, 1957, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by
fraudulent means and consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the
cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring
the action was the government, to which the property would revert." 54
Similarly, as petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is
not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the
reversion of the land to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion. 55 He has
the specific power and function to "represent the Government in all land registration
and related proceedings" and to "institute actions for the reversion to the Government
of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in
violation of the Constitution." 56 Since respondent Nabasa’s Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a
matter between the grantor and the grantee. 57
Having resolved that petitioner Abejaron does not have legal standing to sue and is
not the real party in interest, we deem it unnecessary to resolve the question of fraud
and the other issues raised in the petition. These shall be timely for adjudication if a
proper suit is filed by the Solicitor General in the future.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2492 before the
Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato, Branch 1, is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203760               December 3, 2014
HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural guardian, SUSAN G.
CANENCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated September 29,
2011 and the Resolution3 dated October 1, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 113046 which set aside the Decision 4 dated August 20, 2009 and the
Order5 dated January 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74
(RTC) in Sp. Civil Case No. 08-744, finding that the action instituted by petitioner was
not one for forcible entry, but for recovery of ownership and possession, hence, within
the original jurisdiction of the latter. Consequently, the CA ordered the remand of the
case to the R TC for trial on the merits.
The Facts
This case originated from a forcible entry Complaint 6 dated July 3, 2007 filed by
petitioner Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G.
Canencia (petitioner), against respondent Susan Lumontad (respondent) before the
Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal (MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 1929.
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T.
Javier (Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land
located at Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal
(subject land),7 covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 00-TY-002-11458. 8 Since his
birth, petitioner’s family has lived in the residential house erected thereon. 9 Upon
Vicente’s death, petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession over
the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into the subject land and
started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion
thereof, despite petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests. 10 The dispute was
submitted to barangay conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between
the parties.11 Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent the instant
forcible entry complaint, averring, in addition to the foregoing, that reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the above-said portion may be fixed at
5,000.00 per month.12
In her Answer13 dated July 30, 2007, respondent admitted that during Vicente’s
lifetime, he indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject
land.14 Nevertheless, she claimed tobe the owner of the portion where the subject
building was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 15 in her
name.16 Hence, she took possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as
its owner.17
The MTC Ruling
In a Judgment18 dated November 11, 2007, the MTC dismissed the complaint for want
of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.19
It found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot,
with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an
area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject building was erected, was given toone
Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but
was eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through sale. 20 Based on this
finding, the MTC concluded that petitioner had no cause of action against respondent
since she was merely exercising her rights asthe owner of the 172.80 sq. m.
subdivided lot.21
Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s complaint failed to aver the required
jurisdictional facts as it merely contained a general allegation that respondent’s entry
into the disputed portion was made by means of force and intimidation, without
specifically stating how, when, and where were such means employed. With such
failure, the MTC intimated that petitioner’s remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria instituted before the proper
forum.22 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
23
In a Decision  dated August 20, 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the MTC
ruling, and accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the disputed portion and
surrender possession thereof to petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay
petitioner the amounts of ₱5,000.00 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said
portion, as reasonable compensation for its use and occupation, and ₱20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, including costs of suit.24
Preliminarily, the RTC ruled that the facts averred in petitioner’s complaint – namely,
that petitioner, through his late father, owned and possessed the subject land, and that
by means of force and intimidation, respondent gainedentry thereto 25 – show that his
cause of action is indeed one of forcible entry that falls within the jurisdiction of the
MTC.26
On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being the owner and possessor of the
property in question, has the right to be respected in his possession and that
respondent forcibly and unlawfully deprived him of the same.27
Unconvinced, respondent moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in
an Order29 dated January 18, 2010, prompting petitioner to file an appeal before the
CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated September 29, 2011, the CA set aside the RTC ruling and
remanded the case to the latter court for trial on the merits.31
It held that the issue of possession of the subject land is intimately intertwined with the
issue of ownership, such that the former issue cannot be determined without ruling on
who really owns such land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the
merits in the exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.32
This notwithstanding, the CA still concluded that respondent had the subject building
constructed in the concept of being the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the
subject land.33 In this relation, it was observed that petitioner gave a misleading
description of TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, considering that said tax declaration only
covered petitioner’s family house and not the subject land where said improvement
was built, as petitioner alleged in his complaint. 34 In truth, the CA found that the
subject land is separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-9660, 35 which was cancelled
when the land was subdivided into two (2) lots, namely: (a) the 187.20 sq. m. lot
covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-12825 36 given by Vicente to petitioner; and (b) the
172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-12824 37 given by Vicente to Anthony,
which the latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. 00-TY-002-
1303138 in her name.
Further, the CA stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that
respondent employed force and intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of
the subject landas he failed to demonstrate the factual circumstances that occurred
during his dispossession of said property.39
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 40 which was, however, denied
in a Resolution41 dated October 1, 2012, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly set aside
the RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the case to the latter court for trial on the
merits in anaction for recovery of ownership and possession.
The Court’s Ruling
Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for forcible entry,
petitioner’s case nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that the allegations
in the petitioner’s complaint do not make a case for forcible entry but another action
cognizable by the RTC.42
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, 43 "[t]he invariable rule is that what
determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the
case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in
physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by
another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential,
however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it
would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said
conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act
of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior
physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as
the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter."44
A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional
averments, so as to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been
complied with. Said pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e.,
Vicente’s, successor-in-interest, was in prior physical possession of the subject land
but was eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by
respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the same and,
thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly, with these details, the means by which
petitioner’s dispossession was effected cannot be said to have been insufficiently
alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed by the CA. The "how"
(through unlawful entry and the construction of the subject building), "when" (March
26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the dispossession
all appear on the face of the complaint. In Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan, 45 the Court held
that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon,
and excluding therefrom the prior possessor, would necessarily imply the use of
force,46 as what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint. Hence, it was
erroneous to conclude that petitioner only made a general allegation that respondent’s
entry in the premises was made by means of force and intimidation 47 and,
consequently, that a forcible entry case was not instituted before the MTC. Given that
a forcible entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred in
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for
recovery of possession and ownership, otherwise known as an accion
reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.– x x x.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding
section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice.
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level
courts by express provision of Section 33 (2) 49 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 50 in
relation to Section 1,51 Rule 70, of the Rules of Court.52 Even in cases where the issue
of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts
maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, 53 as they are given
the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling
the issue of possession. 54 It must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title tothe property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership.55
B. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint.
Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry
complaint, nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed
to justify his right to the de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the
disputed premises.1âwphi1
As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from
which petitioner hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only
covers his house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that
he has the right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the
contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in view of
TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering the same property as registered in her name.
Thus, with no evidence in support of petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence
showing respondent's right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion as
its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, petitioner's forcible entry
complaint in Sp. Civil Case No. 08-744 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195669, May 30, 2016
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., Petitioner, v. DANTE ANDO,
ABENIGO AUGIS, EDGAR CARDONES, ZACARIAS GUTIERREZ, CORNELIO
IBARRA, JR., ZENAIDA IBARRA, TEOFILOI LIRASAN, EUNICE LIRASAN, RUTH
MISSION, DOLLY ROSALES & EUNICE TAMBANGAN, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH COUNCIL MEMBERS; MANDAUE BRADFORD
CHURCH; AND UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Well-settled is the rule that the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during
the pendency of an action for recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land
subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer does not amount to forum-
shopping.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the December 10, 2010
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition in CA-GR. SP No.
01935 and its January 26, 2011 Resolution 3 which denied petitioner's
In an Order dated February 9, 2005, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its
Complaint should not be dismissed for its failure to comply with the requirement on the
certification against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.6 According to the MTCC, BUCCI failed to mention in its certification against
non-forum-shopping a complete statement of the present status of another case
concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of land earlier filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI and the MBC against BUCCI. (Civil Case
No. MAN-1669, captioned "United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. and
Mandaue Bradford Church, Plaintiff v. Bradford United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, Defendant, for Recovery of Ownership with Preliminary Injunction".)7
The recovery of ownership case also involved Lot 3-F, the same parcel of land subject
of the unlawful detainer case, and yet another parcel of land, denominated simply as
Lot 3-C. On October 13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City-rendered its judgment in the
recovery of ownership case against therein plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of
therein defendant BUCCI. On November 19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed
a motion for reconsideration of said decision but their motion was denied by Order of
March 10, 2005.8
Meanwhile, the MTCC Branch 2 of Mandaue City, issued an Order 9 dated March
31,2005 dismissing the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to
comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed to the
RTC which was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5126-A.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision10 of March 13, 2006 in the unlawful detainer case, the RTC of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, affirmed the MTCC's dismissal thereof, with prejudice. The RTC held
that BUCCI was guilty of forum-shopping because it failed to certify under oath that
there was another action involving the same parties and the same Lot 3-F still pending
before another court.
BUCCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Order 11 of June 23,2006.
Aggrieved, BUCCI filed a Petition for Review 12 before the CA docketed as CA-GR. SP
No. 01935.

Motion for Reconsideration thereon. 4 Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) In its Decision13 of December 10, 2010, the CA held that the MTCC and the RTC
correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The CA opined that whatever decision
Before Branch 2 of the MTCC of Mandaue City, the petitioner Bradford United Church mat would be rendered in the action for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in
of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against question would amount to res judicata in the unlawful detainer case. The CA ruled that
herein respondents Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar Cardones, Zacarias Gutierrez, identity of the causes of action does not mean absolute identity, and that the test lies
Cornelio Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida Ibarra, Teofilo Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth Mission, not in the form of action but in whether the same set of facts or evidence would
Dolly Resales and Eunice Tambangan, in their capacities as Members of the support both causes of action. Furthermore, the CA found that BUCCI indeed failed to
Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC), and the state in the certification against forum-shopping in the unlawful detainer case a
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). This Complaint was docketed complete statement of the status of the land ownership recovery case; and that such
thereat as Civil Case No. 4936. 5 failure impinges against Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CA
dismissed BUCCI's Petition for Review. The CA likewise denied BUCCI's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution dated January 26, 2011. 14
Hence, BUCCI is now before this Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.15
Issue
Petitioner presents the following issue for our consideration
WHETHER XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM[-] SHOPPING FOR FILING THE CASE FOR
EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER (CIVIL CASE NO. 4936) DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE [ACTION FOR] RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP XXX (CIVIL
CASE NO. MAN-1669)[,] AND FOR FAILING TO [DISCLOSE] THE PENDENCY OF
THE [LATTER CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669] IN THE CERTIFICATION OF NON[-]
FORUM[-]SHOPPING IN THE [FORMER CIVIL CASE NO. 4936]. 16
The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether BUCCI committed forum-
shopping when it failed to disclose in the certification on non-forum shopping of the
unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the action for recovery of
ownership of property then pending before the RTC of Mandaue City. The unlawful
detainer suit involved Lot 3-F which was also involved in the complaint for recovery of
ownership.
Herein petitioner BUCCI's verification and certification against forum-shopping
attached to the instant Petition, stated that UCCP had also filed an appeal with the CA
pertaining to the recovery of ownership suit; and this appeal was docketed as CA-GR.
No. 00983, then still pending adjudication before the CA. In the same verification and
certification against forum-shopping, BUCCI stressed that the case for recovery of
ownership of the disputed parcels of land was entirely different from the unlawful
detainer case, because the first case does not involve at all the issue of material/
physical possession of Lot 3-F.17
Petitioner's arguments
BUCCI posits that the most decisive factor in determining the existence of forum-
shopping is the presence of all the elements of litis pendentia, namely, (1) identity of
parties or representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for; (3) the reliefs are founded on the same facts; and (4) the identity of the
preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the
other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the unlawful
detainer case and the case for recovery of ownership; and that the other three
essential elements are absent, to wit: that mere be identity of cause/s of action; that
the reliefs sought are founded on the same facts; and that the identity of the two
preceding particulars be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration. Specifically, BUCCI maintains that the cause of action in Civil
Case No. MAN-1669 is for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in dispute,
whereas the cause of action in Civil Case No. 4936, the summary action of unlawful
detainer, is the determination of who has the better or superior right to the
material/physical possession (or possession de facto), of Lot 3-F; that the prayer that
they be declared the lawful owners of the disputed lots in said Civil Case No. MAN-
1669 is entirely different or dissimilar from the reliefs prayed for in the summary action
of unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 4936) by BUCCI, which is that BUCCI be given or
awarded the material or physical possession (or possession de facto) of the disputed
Lot 3-F.
Respondents' arguments
Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two cases are
dissimilar or different is of no moment or consequence because the latter's deliberate
non-disclosure in the certificate against non-forum shopping in the summaiy action of
unlawful detainer of the pendency-in-fact of the action for recovery of ownership of the
disputed parcels of land, which involved the same parties and the same property, in
the action for recovery of ownership, is an irremissibly fatal defect that cannot be
cured by mere amendment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC, 5. Certification against forum[-]shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission, of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum[-]shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions, (n)
The above-stated rule requires a twofold compliance, and this covers both the non-
commission of forum-shopping itself, and the submission of the certification against
forum-shopping.18
xxx The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.19
Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer
and the land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or
similar in the two cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is
entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or physical possession of the disputed
parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact); whereas the issue in the action for
recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful owner of
the disputed parcels of land.
With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the institution
of a subsequent action: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and [over] the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of
cause of action."20 It bears notice that in its certification against non-forum shopping,
now attached to this instant Petition, BUCCI mentioned that the decision in the land
ownership recovery case was still pending appeal before the CA, a claim that was not
controverted at all by respondents. Simply put, this means that the former judgment is
not yet final. Furthermore, the causes of action in the two cases are not identical or
similar. To repeat, in the summary action of unlawful detainer, the question to be
resolved is which party has the better or superior right to the physical/material
possession (or de facto possession) of the disputed premises.  Whereas in the action
for recovery of ownership, the question to be resolved is which party has the lawful
title or dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to the disputed premises. Thus,
in Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.21 the petitioner therein asserted, among
others, that the complaint for unlawful detainer against him must be dismissed on
grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping in view of the pending case for
annulment of an action for dacion en pago and for the transfer certificate of title in
another case, this Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a pending action involving
ownership neither suspends nor bars the proceedings in the summary action for
ejectment pertaining to the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or differences
in the reliefs prayed for.
Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases.
The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence
being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the
ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.
The issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the
principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action involving possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate
an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or
consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because
an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a
piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof,
without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical
possession in appropriate proceedings. 22
The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of
ownership case would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful
detainer case, such that the court handling the latter case would be bound thereby
and could not render a contrary ruling in the issue of physical or material
possession."23 It bears belaboring that BUCCI alleged in the instant Petition that
although the RTC dismissed the complaint against it in the ownership recovery case, it
still filed the unlawful detainer case because there was never a ruling in the former
case as to who between the parties had the better right to the material or physical
possession (or possession de facto) of the subject property. Of course, no less
significant is the assertion by BUCCI that although it had previously tolerated or put up
with the lawful occupation of the disputed property by respondent MBC, it nonetheless
had to put an end to such tolerance or forbearance, because all possible avenues for
reconciliation or compromise between the parties in this case had already been
closed.24 Thus, a favorable ruling for BUCCI in the action for recovery of ownership
would not at all compel or constrain the other court (here the MTCC of Mandaue City)
to also obligatorily rule in the summary action of ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to
the material or physical possession, (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F
because even if it be proved that it has the lawful title to, or the ownership of, the
disputed lots, there is still bom the need and necessity to resolve in the summary
action of unlawful detainer whether there are valid or unexpired agreements between
the parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by the actual occupants of the
disputed property. Indeed, in a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of
a parcel of land can be ousted or evicted therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a
better or superior right to the material or physical (or de facto) possession thereof by
virtue of a valid lease or leasehold right thereto.
In Custodio v. Corrado,25 we declared that res judicata did not obtain in the case
because, among others, the summary action of ejectment was different from the case
for recovery of possession and ownership. There, we expounded that:
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. xxx
xxxx
The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (action publiciand) and from a reinvindicatory action (action
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (action interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two fonns
of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside
from the summary action of ejectment, action publiciana or the plenary action to
recover the right of possession and action reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions
to judicially recover possession.
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the
circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence.
In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that a judgment in a case for
forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de
facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between the same parties respecting
title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of
a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity of causes of
action between the two.26
This ruling holds true in the present Petition.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The December 10, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its January 26, 2011 Resolution in CA-GR. SP No. 01935
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Mandaue City,
Branch 2 is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to the complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936, instituted therein by
petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. against therein respondents.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No.
50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980
which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August
5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under
Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property
covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on
February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the
property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner
advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless,
petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the
portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of
Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some
twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first
week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the
needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983
and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due
process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence
enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing
trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and
intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to
harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in
violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents'
complaint for forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July
24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of
the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents
have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by
the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to
petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the
opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file
a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 10
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents
on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil
Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be
exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code
which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation
as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due SO ORDERED
process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently
addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents
G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970
before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not
await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was
heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO VILLADELREY, petitioners,
of due process. vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.
forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry
is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio
not involved. 8
G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property,
private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the
spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary,
private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even CONCEPCION, C.J.:
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act
of destroying their crops.
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and
Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the
title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior crime of Grave Coercion, with which they are charged, and sentencing each to four (4)
actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:
well as one-third of the costs.
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this: complainant and Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot
105-A. The following day June 16, 1959, the complainant
allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra
be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned
who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda
incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the peace
Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident
Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the
of June 15, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No.
deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by
968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust vexation for the
Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The
incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal
overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused
Case No. 970. Both cases, however, were filed only on June 25,
herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident presently
1959.
involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and
litigations involving the complainant and her husband, on one
hand, and the men of Hacienda Palico on the other. In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were
filed eight (8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy
that both cases were — on motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed
thereof — provisionally dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First
an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition
Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of record ... are insufficient
as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." The decision of said
Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958, the Court of
court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:
Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case,
inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land.
An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria
appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated April 10, 1958. Cabalag to remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the
chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff
Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed Caisip that
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino
he could not act on the request to eject Gloria Cabalag and to
Guevarra in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas,
stop her from what she was doing without a proper court order.
for forcible entry, praying therein that Guevarra be ejected from
Caisip then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda
the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing, the said Court
administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of police and
in a decision dated May 2, 1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the
requested for the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief
lot and to pay damages and accrued rentals. A writ of execution
of police, acting on said request, assigned the accused Ignacio
was issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of
Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, police sergeant and police
Nasugbu, which was served on Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and
corporal, respectively, of the Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-
the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R.
bote.1
Aquino of this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ
recites among other things that the possession of the land was
delivered to the Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion
Guevarra was given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within which of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to
to leave the premises. leave, but she refused to do so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to
stay there and that the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude,
even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to
Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some distance away,
the complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice
and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position,
of the peace who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an
to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her
attempt to appeal, which was not given due course because the reglementary period
right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding.
therefor had expired; that a motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by
Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged
him; and that a second motion for reconsideration was "still pending consideration,"
and it was October 19, 1959 when such testimony was given.
her northward — towards a forested area, where there was a banana plantation — as which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959
Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun. — or within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had
merely remained in possession thereof, even though the
hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her neighbors, Librada Dulutan,
did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened ...
followed, soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they
physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a
were dragging her. The policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to
property of which she and her husband were in
town which was on the west — Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be released,
possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed
saying that, if their purpose was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with
against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff
them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged about eight meters and her
had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to June
dress, as well as her blouse 3 were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to the
26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them
municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within Lot 105-A, in
therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they
passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to
which she was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a
whereupon, he went down the house and accompanied them to the municipal crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period,
building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is
on duty, and then departed. After being interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the
upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and allowed to go home. hacienda owner's representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had
impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her
husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that,
the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his representative,
upon being asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria,
Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and
not only refused to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the
to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
defense, she was arrested because of the crime of slander then committed by her.
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been
Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they were heading
sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that
towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear her clothes.
they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind
whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and refunded to every possessor,"5 and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has
found that of the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses. 6
Appeals, which fully concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review
on certiorari its appealed decision is limited to questions purely of law. 4 Appellants
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without
maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding their acts "justified
legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not
under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that the 20-day period of grace
prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do
given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot
something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be
105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of grave
right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the
coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in finding appellants guilty as charged.
Revised Penal Code.7
This pretense is clearly untenable.

Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
witness, he should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial
Judge, correctly observed:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were
to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
the ones who used force against Gloria, and while the Court is
invasion or usurpation of his property.
also inclined to discredit the claim of the complainant that Felix
Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it sufficiently appears from
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at the record that the motivation and inducement for the coercion
bar, for, having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within perpetrated on the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It
 was his undisguised and particular purpose to prevent Gloria from
entering the land and working on the same. He was the one who
first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried to
prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria
from doing the same act even the day previous to the present
incident. It was Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to
accomplish his purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the
land and making her leave the premises. The policemen obeyed
his bidding, and even when the said policemen were already
over-asserting their authority as peace officers, Caisip simply
stood by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could be
hardly said to have disapproved an act which he himself induced
and initiated.8
In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip,
so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a
principal by induction.9
In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength 10 and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her
sex, 11 were present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards
appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance
of having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local police force.
Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to appellants herein, which is the
minimum of the maximum prescribed in said Art. 286, 12 and the fine imposed upon
them, are in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., is on leave.
Makasiar and Villamor, JJ., took no part.
[G.R. NO. 192999 - July 18, 2012]
DIAMOND FARMS, INC., Petitioner, v. DIAMOND FARM WORKERS MULTI-
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, ELlSEO EMANEL, VOLTAIRE LOPEZ, RUEL
ROMERO, PATRICIO CAPRICIO, ERNESTO FATALLO, ZOSIMO GOMEZ AND 100
JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Diamond Farms, Inc. appeals the Decision 1 dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution 2 dated July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
101384.
The facts of the case are as follows:ςrαlαω
Petitioner is a corporation engaged m commercial farming of bananas. 3 It owned
1,023.8574 hectares of land in Carmen, Davao. A big portion of this land measuring
958.8574 hectares (958-hectare land) was initially deferred for acquisition and
distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 4 On
November 3, 1992, Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) likewise approved the Production and Profit Sharing (PPS) Scheme
proposed by the Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters Association as the mode
of compliance with the required production sharing under Section 32 of Republic Act
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).5Ï‚rνll
Later, on February 14, 1995, the Deferment Order was lifted and the aforesaid 958-
hectare land was placed under CARP coverage. Thereafter, 698.8897 hectares of the
958-hectare land were awarded to members of the Diamond Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO). Petitioner, however,
maintained management and control of 277.44 hectares of land, including a portion
measuring 109.625 hectares (109-hectare land).
On November 23, 1999, petitioner s certificates of title over the 109-hectare land were
cancelled. In lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-154155 to T-
154160 were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. On August 5,
2000, the DAR identified 278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land, majority of
whom are members of respondent Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(DFWMPC). On October 26, 2000, the DAR issued six Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) collectively in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. 6ςrνll
Subsequently, on July 2, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint 7 for unlawful occupation,
damages and attorney s fees against respondents. Petitioner alleged that as of
November 1995, it was the holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073 covering two
parcels of land within the 109-hectare land. It alleged that it had been in possession
for a long time of the two lands, which had a total area of 74.3393 hectares (74-
hectare land), and grew thereon export-quality banana, producing on average 11,000
boxes per week worth P1.46 million. It alleged that the DAR s August 5, 2000
Order distributing the 109-hectare land to 278 CARP beneficiaries was not yet final on
account of appeals, and therefore petitioner remains the lawful possessor of the
subject land (109-hectare land) and owner of the improvements thereon. But while the
CARP beneficiaries have not been finally designated and installed, respondents its
farm workers refused to do their work from June 10, 2002, forcibly entered and
occupied the 74-hectare land, and prevented petitioner from harvesting and
introducing agricultural inputs. Thus, petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to
vacate the subject land; that it be allowed to harvest on the 74-hectare land; and that
respondents be ordered to pay it lost income of P1.46 million per week from June 10,
2002 until farm operation normalizes, exemplary damages of P200,000, attorney s
fees of P200,000, appearance fees, incidental expenses of P100,000 and costs.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, 8 respondents admitted that petitioner
was the holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073, covering the 74-hectare land and
that the said land produces 11,000 boxes of export-quality bananas per week.
Respondents added that besides the 74-hectare land, petitioner owned four other
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 112058, 112059, 112062 and 112063 having a
total area of 35.2857 hectares (35-hectare land). These six parcels, which altogether
have a total area of 109.625 hectares (109-hectare land), were acquired by the
government upon the issuance of TCTs in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
But even after CLOAs were issued to the 278 CARP beneficiaries, petitioner
continued to manage the 109-hectare land, paying wages to respondents as farm
workers. Since 1995 they had been demanding from petitioner payment of their
production share to no avail.
Respondents further claimed that petitioner conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to
occupy and cultivate the 35-hectare land. Petitioner tried to allow alleged beneficiaries
to occupy portions of the 74-hectare land, but respondents guarded it to protect their
own rights, so the intruders were able to occupy only the pumping structure.
Thereafter, petitioner stopped farm operation on the 74-hectare land and refused their
request to resume farm operation. By way of relief, respondents prayed that their
rights as CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land be recognized and that their
counterclaims for production share, profit share, accrued income and interest be
granted.
Petitioner filed a reply9 and alleged that respondents initiated the commission of
premature and unlawful entry into the 35-hectare land and did nothing to curb the
unlawful entry of other parties. Petitioner also admitted that respondents recently
allowed it to harvest and perform essential farm operations.
In their rejoinder,10 respondents denied that they illegally entered the 35-hectare land.
They averred that petitioner promoted the entry of third parties and cited petitioner s
agreements with third parties for the harvest of fruits thereon.
During the proceedings before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, petitioner
submitted its computation of respondents production and profit share from the 109-
hectare land for the years 1995 to 1999 and accordingly deposited the amount of
P2.51 million. Respondents were required to submit a project of distribution, and the
parties were ordered to submit position papers. Upon compliance by respondents with
the order to submit a project of distribution, the Office of the Regional Adjudicator
ordered the release of the amount deposited by petitioner to
respondents.11 Respondents thereafter submitted their position paper, 12 wherein they
reiterated that they had to guard the land to protect their rights. They confirmed
petitioner s acceptance of their request to resume normal farm operation, and
manifested that a precarious peace and harmony thereafter reigned on the 109-
hectare land. They also repeated their prayers in their answer. Petitioner, on the other
hand, failed to file its position paper despite several requests for extension of time to
file the same.13ςrνll
In his Decision,14 the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled that petitioner lost its
ownership of the subject land when the government acquired it and CLOAs were
issued in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. The appeals from the Distribution Order
will not alter the fact that petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject land. Also,
respondents have been identified as CARP beneficiaries; hence, they are not
unlawfully occupying the land. The Adjudicator added that petitioner is unlawfully
occupying the land since it has no contract with the CARP beneficiaries. Thus, the
Adjudicator denied petitioner s prayers in its complaint and granted respondents
counterclaims.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DARAB, but the DARAB denied petitioner s
appeal in a Decision15 dated December 11, 2006. The DARAB ruled that petitioner is
unlawfully occupying the subject land; hence, its complaint against respondents for
unlawful occupation lacks merit. It also ruled that petitioner is no longer entitled to
possess the subject land; that petitioner lost its ownership thereof; that ownership was
transferred to the 278 CARP beneficiaries; that the appeals from the Distribution Order
concern distribution and will not restore petitioner s ownership; that the 278 CARP
beneficiaries can now exercise their rights of ownership and possession; and that
petitioner should have delivered possession of the 109-hectare land to the CARP
beneficiaries on August 5, 2000 instead of remaining in possession and in control of
farm operations.
In awarding production and profit share, the DARAB held that Section 32 of the CARL
requires petitioner to distribute said share to respondents. The DARAB computed the
production and profit share based on the PPS Scheme proposed by the Philippine
Banana Growers and
Exporters Association and approved by DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. The
dispositive portion of the DARAB s December 11, 2006 Decision reads:ςrαlαω
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
1. DENYING the reliefs prayed for in the complaint;
2. ORDERING the [petitioner] to turn over to the respondents the possession of the
subject landholding and respect the respondents peaceful possession thereof;
3. ORDERING the [petitioner] to pay the respondents the following
amount:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
A. P27,553,703.25 less P2,511,786.00 as Production and Profit Share (PPS) from 15
February 1995 to 31 December 2005;
b. P17,796,473.43 as lease rental for the use of the land of petitioner from 26 October
2000 up to 31 December 2005;
c. P6,205,011.89 as accrued interest on the unpaid PPS from 01 March 1996 to 01
March 2006; and d. P2,241,930.90 as accrued interest on the unpaid lease rental from
01 January 2001 to 01 January 2006.
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4. ENCOURAGING the parties to enter into an agribusiness venture over the subject
landholding, if feasible.
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SO ORDERED.16ςrνll
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to the CA
raising the following arguments: (1) respondents are not the lawful possessors of the
subject land as well as the valuable improvements thereon, prior to receipt by
petitioner of the corresponding payment for the land from the government, or upon
deposit in favor of petitioner of the compensation for the same in cash or in Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) bonds; (2) not being lawful possessors of the subject land,
respondents are not entitled to production share in the amount of P25.04 million and
interest thereon in the amount of P6.21 million; and (3) not being lawful possessors of
the subject land, respondents are not entitled to lease rentals as well as accrued
interest thereon.17ςrνll
As afore-stated, the CA in the assailed Decision affirmed the DARAB decision. The
CA, however, deleted the award of lease rentals and interest thereon, to wit:ςrαlαω
WHEREFORE, the assailed December 11, 2006 Decision and August 29, 2007
Resolution are MODIFIED to delete the DARAB s award of lease rentals and interests
thereon in favor of respondents. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18ςrνll
The CA agreed with the DARAB in rejecting petitioner s bare and belated allegation
that it has not received just compensation. The alleged nonpayment of just
compensation is also a collateral attack against the TCTs issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The CA found that petitioner has never sought the
nullification of the Republic s TCTs. Further, the CA found no credible evidence
relating to proceedings for payment of just compensation. The CA held that the
issuance of the Republic s TCTs and CLOAs in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries
implies the deposit in cash or LBP bonds of the amount initially determined as
compensation for petitioner s land or the actual payment of just compensation due to
petitioner. Additionally, the appeals over the Distribution Order cannot justify petitioner
s continued possession since the appeals concern only the manner of distribution.
The CA held that petitioner became liable for respondents production share when the
Deferment Order was lifted. The CA noted that the DARAB computed the production
share based on the approved PPS Scheme. The CA also noted petitioner s deposit of
P2.51 million as petitioner s recognition of respondents right to production share.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that the CA
erred when it affirmed the DARAB in ordering petitioner to (1) turn over possession of
the subject land to respondents and respect their possession thereof and (2) pay
respondents production and profit share of P25.04 million and interest of P6.21
million.19 The CA, however, denied petitioner s motion for partial reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed the present appeal. Respondents, on the other hand, no longer
appealed the CA Decision and Resolution.
In its petition, petitioner argues thatςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN
COMPLETE DEROGATION OF THE PETITIONER S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
RECEIVE JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING OF ITS PROPERTY,
COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE PORTION OF THE DECISION OF THE
DARAB BASED ON ITS REASONING THAT THE ISSUE OF NON-PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION TO THE PETITIONER IS AN ISSUE RAISED ONLY AT THE
DARAB LEVEL; THIS RULING IS SIMPLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CONSIDERING THE PETITIONER S ASSERTION
OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION AS A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE REPUBLIC S TITLE20ςrνll
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents are guilty of
unlawful occupation and liable to petitioner for damages and attorney s fees, (2)
whether petitioner should turn over possession of the subject land to respondents and
respect their possession thereof, and (3) whether the award of production share and
interest was proper.
Petitioner insists that prior to its receipt of the corresponding payment for the land from
the government or deposit in its favor of the compensation for the land in cash or in
LBP bonds, respondents cannot be deemed lawful possessors of the subject land and
the valuable improvements thereon, citing Section 16 (e) of the CARL. According to
petitioner, "it has yet to receive any compensation for the lands acquired by the
government."21 Petitioner also contends that the CA erred in ruling that the issue of
nonpayment of just compensation was raised only at the DARAB level, such being an
unavoidable issue intertwined with its cause of action. Petitioner further avers that the
CA erred in ruling that petitioner s assertion of its constitutional right to just
compensation is a collateral attack on the TCTs of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner maintains that the Republic s TCTs which are derived from its TCTs
pursuant to the CARL are neither attacked nor assailed in this case. Petitioner thus
prays that it be declared as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject land until its
actual receipt of just compensation.
In their comment, respondents claim that petitioner is just trying to mislead this Court
that it has not been paid compensation for its property. Respondents cite two
Certifications22 of Deposit (CARP Form No. 17) showing that the LBP deposited P9.92
million in cash and agrarian reform bonds as compensation for 91.3925 hectares of
land and another 18.2325 hectares of land, or for 109.625 hectares of land (109-
hectare land), owned by petitioner and covered by TCT Nos. T-112058, 112059,
112062, 112063, 112068, and 112073. Respondents also cite a DAR
Memorandum23 dated November 22, 1999 (CARP Form No. 18) requesting the
Register of Deeds to issue TCTs in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondents then summarized the consequent cancellations of the TCTs by attaching
certified true copies of:
x    x    x
4. [TCT Nos.] T-112058, T-112059, T-112062, T-112063, T-112073 and T-112068 of
petitioner which show that LBP Certificates of Deposit and DAR Memorandum-
Request were duly annotated at the back thereof, and that the same were cancelled
on 23 November 1999 upon issuance of TCTs in favor [of] the Republic of the
Philippines;
5. [TCT Nos.] T-154159, T-154160, T-154157, T-154156, T-154155 issued in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines showing that the same were cancelled on 30 October
2000 upon issuance of TCT[s] in favor of herein respondents;
6. [TCT Nos.] C-14005, C-14006, C-15311, C-15526, C-15527, C-14007, C-14004
issued infavor of herein respondents showing THAT THE FARM/HOMELOT
DESCRIBED IN THIS CERTIFICATE OF LANDOWNERSHIP AWARD IS
ENCUMBERED IN FAVOR OF THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO
SECURE FULL PAYMENT OF ITS VALUE UNDER [THE CARL] BY THE FARMER-
BENEFICIARY NAMED HEREIN, and that the same were already cancelled on April
30, 2009 upon issuance of TCTs in favor of herein respondent cooperative now Davao
Farms Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative
DFARBEMPCO.24ςrνll
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In its reply, petitioner states that to "set the record straight, the documents presented
by respondents refer to the deposit of the initial valuation of the land" as determined
by the LBP. This is not the just compensation for the land which is required to be
determined by a court of justice. 25 According to petitioner, Sections 56 and 57 of the
CARL provides that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian Court
(SAC), has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners. Petitioner also states that the issue
of just compensation may be easily gleaned at least from the submissions of the
parties in their pleadings and one that had therefore been tried under the parties
implicit agreement. We find petitioner s contentions bereft of merit. On the first issue,
we agree that respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation and that there exists
no basis to award damages and attorney s fees to petitioner as respondents are
agrarian reform beneficiaries who have been identified as such, and in whose favor
CLOAs have been issued. We thus uphold the ruling denying petitioner s prayers in its
complaint for unlawful occupation, damages and attorney s fees. However, we note
significant facts which dispute some findings of the Adjudicator, DARAB and CA, and
make the necessary clarification or correction as appropriate.
It is beyond doubt that petitioner is the farm operator and manager while respondents
are the farm workers. Both parties enjoyed possession of the land. Together, they
worked thereon. Before CARP, petitioner was the landowner, farm operator and
manager. Respondents are its farm workers. After the deferment period, CARP finally
dawned. Petitioner lost its status as landowner, but not as farm operator and manager.
Respondents remained as petitioner s farm workers and received wages from
petitioner.
Now, the unrebutted claim of respondents in their answer and position paper is that
they guarded the 74-hectare land to protect their rights as farm workers and CARP
beneficiaries. They were compelled to do so when petitioner attempted to install other
workers thereon, after it conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy the 35-
hectare land. They were fairly successful since the intruders were able to occupy the
pumping structure. The government, including this Court, cannot condone petitioner s
act to thwart the CARP s implementation. Installing workers on a CARP-covered land
when the DAR has already identified the CARP beneficiaries of the land and has
already ordered the distribution of the land to them serves no other purpose than to
create an impermissible roadblock to installing the legitimate beneficiaries on the land.
We also find the action taken by respondents to guard the land as reasonable and
necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent precisely what petitioner
attempted to do. Such course was justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code which
reads:ςrαlαω
ART. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means to protect
their possession, respondents were not guilty of unlawful occupation.
As to the immediate resumption of farm operations, petitioner admitted that
respondents have already allowed it to harvest and perform essential activities.
Respondents have confirmed that petitioner accepted their request to resume normal
farm operations such that a precarious peace and harmony reigned on the 109-
hectare land. That farm operations resumed is evident from petitioner s claim of lost
income amounting to P1.46 million a week for four weeks, from June 10, 2002 to July
7, 2002.26 Due to the parties quick and voluntary agreement, farm operation and the
parties relationship normalized within five days from the filing of the complaint on July
2, 2002. We thus agree that petitioner must respect respondents possession.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Adjudicator and DARAB that petitioner is
guilty of unlawful occupation. Since respondents themselves have asked petitioner to
resume its farm operation, petitioner s possession cannot be said to be illegal and
unjustified.
This notwithstanding, we sustain the order for petitioner to turn over possession of the
109-hectare land. The DARAB and the DAR shall ensure that possession of the land
is turned over to qualified CARP beneficiaries.
The procedure for acquisition of private lands under Section 16 (e) of the CARL is that
upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries, to wit:ςrαlαω
SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:ςrαlαω
xxxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
x    x    x
Petitioner eventually acknowledged that there was indeed a deposit of the initial
valuation of the land. There were two deposits of cash and agrarian reform bonds as
compensation for the 109-hectare land owned by petitioner and covered by TCT Nos.
T-112058, 112059, 112062, 112063, 112068 and 112073. Notably, petitioner also
manifested that the Republic s TCTs which are derived from its TCTs pursuant to the
CARL are neither attacked nor assailed in this case. Petitioner even argued that the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government is conditioned
upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the
DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. 27 Following petitioner s own
reasoning, petitioner has already lost its possession and ownership when the
condition was fulfilled. Likewise undisputed is that in 2000, CLOAs had been issued
collectively in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land. These
CLOAs constitute evidence of ownership by the beneficiaries under the then
provisions of Section 2428 of the CARL, to wit:Ï‚rαlαω
SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall
commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award
shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR takes
actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award, x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the light of the foregoing, this Court cannot grant petitioner s plea that it be declared
as the lawful owner of the 109-hectare land. It is also to be noted that in its complaint,
petitioner did not even claim ownership of the 109-hectare land. Petitioner could only
state that as of November 1995, it was the holder of the TCTs covering the 74-hectare
land and that pending resolution of the appeals from the distribution orders, it remains
in the meantime as the lawful possessor of the 109-hectare land. Nothing therefore
supports petitioner s claim that it is the lawful owner of the 109-hectare land.
To reiterate, petitioner had lost its ownership of the 109-hectare land and ownership
thereof had been transferred to the CARP beneficiaries. Respondents themselves
have requested petitioner to resume its farm operations and this fact has given
petitioner a temporary right to enjoy possession of the land as farm operator and
manager.
We, however, agree that petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare
land.
The matter has already been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al.,29 when we ruled that the Constitution and
the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over
agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught. We
stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the
CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular
farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. The
policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in
the hands of the farmers.
Under Section 16 (e) of the CARL, the DAR is mandated to proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries after taking possession of the
land and requesting the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Section 24 of the CARL is yet another mandate to
complete the award of the land to the beneficiary within 180 days from the time the
DAR takes actual possession of the land. 30 And under Section 20 of DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, also known as the Rules and Regulations
on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred Commercial
Farms, CLOAs shall be registered immediately upon generation, and the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) shall install or cause the installation of the
beneficiaries in the commercial farm within seven days from registration of the CLOA.
Section 20 of the Rules provides:ςrαlαω
SEC. 20. Registration of CLOAs and Installation of Beneficiaries CLOAs shall be
registered immediately upon generation. The PARO shall install or cause the
installation of the beneficiaries in the commercial farm within seven (7) days from
registration of the CLOA.
We hold that the 109-hectare land must be distributed to qualified CARP beneficiaries.
They must be installed on the land and have possession and control thereof.
A problem that emerged in this case is the identification of qualified CARP
beneficiaries. Respondents own evidence does not definitively show who are the
legitimate CARP beneficiaries in the 109-hectare land. TCT Nos. 112058, 112059,
112062, 112063, 112068, and 112073, issued in the name of petitioner, were
cancelled by TCT Nos. 154155 to 154160 issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Republic s TCTs were cancelled by TCT Nos. C-14002 to C-
14007.31 Notably, TCT Nos. C-14004, 32 C-14006,33 and C-1400734 show that they were
respectively cancelled by TCT Nos. C-27342, C-27344, and C-27345, all in favor of
DFARBEMPCO. It must be verified however if DFARBEMPCO is the legitimate
successor of DFWMPC, herein respondent cooperative. As regards TCT No. C-
14005,35 there was a partial cancellation by TCT No. C-27110 in favor of
DARBMUPCO and total cancellation by TCT No. C-27343 in favor of DFARBEMPCO.
Nothing is shown about TCT Nos. C-14002 to C-14003.
areas covered by TCT Nos. C-15311, C-15526, and C-15527 also appear to be
different than those covered by the cancelled TCTs in the name of petitioner and the
Republic of the Philippines. Hence, it is imperative that the DAR and PARO assist the
DARAB so that the 109-hectare land may be properly turned over to qualified CARP
beneficiaries, whether individuals or cooperatives. Needless to stress, the DAR and
PARO have been given the mandate to distribute the land to qualified beneficiaries
and to install them thereon.
To fully address petitioner s allegations, we move on to its claim that the issue of just
compensation is an issue that may easily be gleaned at least from the submissions of
the parties in their pleadings and one that had therefore been tried under the parties
implicit agreement.
Petitioner s claim is unfounded. Even the instant appeal 39 is silent on the factors to be
considered40 in determining just compensation. These factors are enumerated in
Section 1741 of the CARL which reads:Ï‚rαlαω
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
What petitioner stressed before us and before the CA to assail respondents
possession is its less-than-candid claim that it has yet to receive any compensation for
the lands acquired by the government. 42 Petitioner s cause of action in its complaint for
unlawful occupation with prayer that respondents be ordered to vacate and pay
damages and attorney s fees cannot also be mistaken as one for determination of just
compensation. Thus, just compensation was never an issue in this case.
Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL likewise provides that the RTC, acting as SAC, has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, to wit:ςrαlαω
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1)
branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special
Agrarian Court.
x    x    x

SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
Neither can TCT Nos. C-15311, 36 C-15526,37 and C-1552738 provide clarity. These
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
TCTs cited by respondents contain entries of partial or total cancellation by TCT Nos.
landowners, x x x.
C-27346, C-27115 and C-27114, in favor of DFARBEMPCO or DARBMUPCO. The
We said that the DAR s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, PPS Scheme. Notably, petitioner has admitted the fact of approval of the PPS
final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action Scheme.44ςrνll
with the RTC acting as SAC to determine just compensation. The court has the right to
review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision dated
function.43ςrνll
December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101384.
This case however was not brought before the SAC on determination of just
compensation. No reversible error was therefore committed by the CA when it did not
We also DIRECT the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Provincial Agrarian
rule on just compensation.
Reform Officer to assist the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in the
distribution of the I 09-hectare land to the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries,
On the third issue, petitioner contends that respondents are not entitled to production whether individuals or cooperatives.
share as well as interest since they are not lawful possessors of the subject land.
Petitioner asserts that the 3% production share under Section 32 of the CARL may
Let a copy of this Decision be served upon the Department of Agrarian Reform.
only be given if there are sales from the production of the land. Petitioner however
claims that it has incurred losses and that respondents admitted that farm operations
in the subject land have not normalized. Petitioner thus submits that there is no factual With cG.R. No. 178902               April 21, 2010
basis in the production share from the sale of agricultural products in the subject land.
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
The contention has no merit. vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and
PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents.
We have already ruled that respondents possession is legitimate. On petitioner s claim
that it incurred losses, Section 32 of the CARL clearly states that the 3% production
share of the farm workers is based on "gross sales from the production of such lands," DECISION
to wit:ςrαlαω
ABAD, J.:
SEC. 32. Production-Sharing. Pending final land transfer, individuals or entities
owning, or operating under lease or management contract, agricultural lands are
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged
hereby mandated to execute a production-sharing plan with their farmworkers or
affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of
farmworkers organization, if any, whereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from
right to declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the
fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or The Facts and the Case
entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR,
upon proper application, determines a lower ceiling. (Underscoring ours.)
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On
October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of
Petitioner cites its net losses, computed after deductions were made on the amount of absolute sale.1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title
its sales. These losses however, have no bearing in computing the production share transferred to his name.
which is based on gross sales. And petitioner s own allegation of weekly production
worth P1.46 million the same amount used by petitioner as basis of its claim for
damages debunks its claim that no basis exists that there were sales from agricultural Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and
products of the subject land. Likewise supporting the existence of sales is petitioner s Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty.
own computation of respondents production share and its deposit of the amount of Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later
P2.51 million before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator. It must be noted also that signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared 2 dated April 29, 1988, which
farm operations normalized within five days from the filing of the complaint. agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.

In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error committed by the CA in affirming The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of
the DARAB s computation of respondents production share based on the approved ₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano
was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s
compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the
lot and pay him an additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on whether or
not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to
comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot
without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the
other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one
of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. 3 As soon as Tarciano
met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga
City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale 4 in favor of the
Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their
agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses 5 who immediately
constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away,
followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with
Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the
land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses
was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature
on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who
testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco,
Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the
document in Zamboanga City four months later on January 11, 1989. 7 All the same,
the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and
she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the
sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial.
Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various
documents she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written
by the same person. Making the same comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded
that they were.8
new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after
the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989. 9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud.
Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery. 10 The
RTC ruled that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court
could not be bound by his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the
same. Atty. Plagata’s testimony remained technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of
consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on
the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She
personally signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found
sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony
that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also,
upon comparing the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted
significant variance between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living
separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature
had been forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their
property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the
wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the
action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11,
1989 sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was
merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement
of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until
actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they
were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the
improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award damages in favor of
the Rocas and deleted the award of attorney’s fees to the Fuentes spouses. 13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition
for review.14
The Issues Presented

On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that
The case presents the following issues:
the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling
the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four
years after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the
fraud from the date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the
 1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her
husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was
forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale
to the spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could
bring the action to annul that sale.
The Court’s Rulings
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document
of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave
her consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues
merely academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent 15 and her specimen
signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario
sign the document in Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his
declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January
11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the
affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other
hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and
"s" were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the
untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she
signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for
comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from
any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she
signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from
Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would
have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk
that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent.
That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga
City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it
about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of
forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the
sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as
proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic
consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case
is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in
1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11,
1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano
the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 17 prohibited him from
selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the
same without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years
from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after
dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently
sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil
Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. 18 Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships
of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January
11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus
provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, 20 as in the case of a sale
of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated
either by ratification or prescription. 21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it
aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence
is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. 22 This action,
according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s
(his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such
an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the
CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale
on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the
transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell
within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on
fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which
applies to fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice
of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the
Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in
that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that
Rosario’s written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the
time they learned that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to
annul the sale and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the
right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a
false representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it
turned out that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time
she discovered the fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that
is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her
consent was simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her
written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery
but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely
evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s
sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this
mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that
sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,
namely, the Rocas.23 As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of
the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other
things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid
him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land
and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted
with closing and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s
signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe
that the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing
that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence
that they had a premonition that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty.
Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price months
earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that
everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in
their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on
the documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new
title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that
the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good
faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for
their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against
them.24 What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the
improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the
reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and
in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil
Code,25 of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or
paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such
improvements.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as
follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed
in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the
Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that
deed of sale are DECLARED void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate
Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married
to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the ₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T.
Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable
against his estate;
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to
indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their
expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay
the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those
improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land
until the indemnity is made; and
5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is
DIRECTED to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to
which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.
SO ORDERED.
osts against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 215305
MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26
June 2014 1 and the Resolution dated, 15 October 2014 2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 01099. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence
dated 15 September 2011 3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao
City in Criminal CaseNo. 65, 734-09, finding petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high-powered firearm,
ammunition, and explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866, 4 as amended (PD
1866).
The Antecedent Facts
On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force
Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao
City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to
remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry
of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a
small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He
lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the
male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified
as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag.
Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus
conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back.
SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept a Metro
obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber Shuttle passenger bus and you requested all passengers to alight?
carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions;
(3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then
A Yes.
asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives.
Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by
SCAA Buco. Q passengers were left inside?

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for A Yes, Your Honor.
Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7 May 2009, 5 the latter found probable cause to
charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of the
explosive under PD l 866. The Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:
passengers in the bus?

That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
A Yes.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly, with intent to possess, had in his possession and under his custody an
improvised high powered firearm caliber .30 carbine bearing Serial No. 64702 (made xxxx
in Spain) with one (1) magazine loaded with three (3) live ammunitions and one (1)
"'cacao" type hand grenade explosive, without first securing the necessary license to
possess the same. Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black gray colored
pack bag which was placed at the back portion of the bus?

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
A Yes.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Q You said that the hag was heavy?

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura
(Tabura), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine A Yes.
National Police, and SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5
November 20097 attesting that petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s inside the bus
kind and caliber per verification from records." Meanwhile, SCAA Buco identified and that was the only thing or item inside the bus which was heavy. Is that correct?
petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and testified on the details of the routine
inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA
Buco further elaborated on the search conducted: A There were many bags and they were heavy. When l asked who is the owner of the
bag because it was heavy but the bag was small. when I asked, he said the content
of the bag was a cellphone. But 1 noticed that it was heavy.
Atty. Mamburam
xxxx
Q And that check point, which was conducted along llang [R)oad,
Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that correct?
Davao City, was by virtue of a memorandum?
A Yes.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?
xxxx
A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)
Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one male Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task force?
passenger you pointed as the accused kept looking at you'?
A I told him it was only a cellphone.
A Yes.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?
 
A My elder brother.
Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not looking at
you?
Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task force
when, in fact, you were not the owner of the bag?
A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the] window
looking towards his bag.
A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my brother who were
seated at the back.
xxxx
xxxx
Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested him to open
the bag'?
Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the content of the
bag was cellphone, what happened next?
A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.
A He asked if he can open it.
Q And, when he opened it?
Q And what was your reply?
A I saw the handle of the firearm. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
A I told him yes, just open it.
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct
examination, petitioner denied ownership of the bag. However, he also admitted to
xx xx
answering SCAA Buco when asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco to
open it after the latter sought for his permission:
Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that bag was your
brother, what is the name of your brother?
ATTY. MAMBURAM

A Roger Saluday.
Q x xx After the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that you and
your brother were seated at the back of the bus. can you please tell us what happened
next'? Q Where is your brother Roger now?

A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and what were the
contents of the bag.
Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?
A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.
A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor
when the latter was asked who owned the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never
disclosed he was with his brother when he boarded the bus:
PROS. VELASCO
Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of saving yourself SO ORDERED. 11
considering you don't own the bag> did you not volunteer to inform them that [the] bag
was owned by your brother?
On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 12

A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my brother because
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
I was also afraid of my brother.

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged

Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you had a
brother at that time when you were boarding that bus, correct?
A No, sir, I did not.
misappreciation of evidence by the trial court and the supposed illegality of the
search. 13 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the
warrantless search was valid being a consented search, and that the factual findings
of the trial court can no longer be disturbed. 14

xxxx
Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you confirm
now that it was the conductor of that bus who pointed you as the owner of the bag,
correct?
A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at the
back. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of
petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification:
WHEREFORE. the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated September 15,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, Davao City, in
Criminal Case No. 65, 734-09, finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and
explosive is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition, he is
The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to
imposed an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
present rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the trial court, the parties submitted their
(21) days of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to seven (7) years
respective memoranda.
and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition to the
fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00); and
The Decision of the Trial Court
(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the
Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
to be in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or
license. Consequently, in the dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September
SO ORDERED.15
2011, petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 16 to which the OSG filed its
Comment. 17 In its Resolution dated 15 October 2014, 18 the Court of Appeals denied
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed this
Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of illegal possession of high powered firearm,
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ammunition and explosive. For the offense of illegal possession of high powered
firearm and ammunition, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision
mayor in its minimum period. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00. For The Issue
the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal. He is
Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the Court of
likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱50,000.00.
Appeals as to warrant his conviction for the offenses charged.

xxxx
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.19 As a result, the Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh
and sift through the evidence presented during trial. 20 Further, factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect, even
finality. 21
Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of high-powered firearm
and ammunition under PD 1866, and illegal possession of explosive under the same
law. The elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm,
ammunition or explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or
explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess. 22 As regards the second and third
elements, the Corn1: of Appeals concurred with the trial court that petitioner was in
actual or constructive possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive without the requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in
pertinent part:
In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has no
license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition and explosive by
presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a representative of the Firearms and
Explosives Division (FED) of the PNP. He identified the Certification issued by the
Chief. Records Section. FED of the PNP, stating that appellant "is not a
licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records of this
office."
Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the veracity or
truthfulness of the Ce1tification. He claims that the officer who issued it should have
been the one presented so he would not be denied the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.
There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:
xxxx
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of,
or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive
Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. The
prosecution more than complied when it presented both.
xxxx
Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the firearms,
ammunition and explosive. However, his denial flies in the face of the following
testimonies which he himself made:
xxxx
Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, on the contents of the bag. He even
allowed the police officer to open it. Based on his actuations, there could be no doubt
that he owned the bag containing the firearm, ammunition and explosive.
Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to fabricate. Besides,
the allegation that his brother owned the bag is uncorroborated and self-serving. 23
As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal possession
of firearm, ammunition, and explosive raises questions of fact. Considering further that
the Court of Appeals merely echoed the factual findings of the trial court, the Court
finds no reason to disturb them.
As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of SCAA Buco on
four important points: one, that petitioner was a passenger of the bus flagged down on
5 May 2009 at a military checkpoint in Ilang, Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco
boarded and searched the bus; three, that the bus conductor pointed at petitioner as
the owner of a small, gray-black pack bag on the back seat of the bus; and four, that
the same bag contained a .30-caliber firearm with one magazine loaded who three live
ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Notably, petitioner does not challenge the chain of
custody over the seized items. Rather, he merely raises a pure question of law and
argues that they are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task
Force Davao was illegal.
The Court disagrees.
Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth
Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, 24 reads:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates
against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. 25
Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article HI of the Constitution
does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable search, the pronouncements of
the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction, 26 may shed light on the
matter.
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,  27 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment
protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have
attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which
the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth
was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal
vigor that it was not. But this effo1i to decide whether or not a given "area,'' viewed in
the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem
presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253; £:y; parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
733.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that
would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.29 Second, the expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). 30
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs. and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.32 (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People,33 the Court described seaport searches as
reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a
person's right to privacy:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without
search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions
protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable
safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
xxxx
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related
functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case.
Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per
se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin
to routine security procedures in airports.

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's xxxx
right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of
privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered.
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they] used x-ray
Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's
scanning machines for inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray
expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a
scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable
"search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
cause to conduct u search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the
results of the x-ray scan.34
A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To
illustrate, in People v. Johnson,31 the Court declared airport searches as outside the
In People v. Breis,35 the Court also justified a bus search owing to the reduced
protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of
expectation of privacy of the riding public:
privacy that society will regard as reasonable:

Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
performance of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
Breis or Yurnol. Neither did his presence in the bus constitute an excess of authority.
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation of privacy
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
in relation to the constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus
nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
vehicles has been upheld.36
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the
case.37 Other factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a
particular activity may diminish this expectation.38 In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,39 a common carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due to
the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and subsequently seized the bus. The
Could held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers,
such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-
intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have
been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights." 40 In Costabella
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 41 a compulsory right of way was found improper for the
failure of the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway they sought
to be re-opened was at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the servient estate.
The Court thus explained, ''[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach
resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its
premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons
would be compromised."42 Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors and body
scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for entry. Needless to say, any
security lapse on the part of the mall owner can compromise public safety.
Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private
property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same
time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State,
much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those
going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and
the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of
the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the
promotion of public safety. Necessad1y, a person's expectation of privacy is
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the
public.
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a
military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro
Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual
and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical
inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further
be required to open their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the
bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby
precluding the necessity for a warrant.
As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that
petitioner consented to the search) thereby making the seized items admissible in
evidence.43 Petitioner contends otherwise and insists that his failure to object cannot
be construed as an implied waiver.
Petitioner is wrong.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right, which may be waived. 44 However, to be valid, the consent must be
voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion.45 Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a
public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively
looked on;46 (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; 47 (g) the
nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 48
In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,49the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. According to the Court,
petitioner himself freely gave his consent to the search. In People v. Montilla,  50 the
Court found the accused to have spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition
by opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts amounted
to a clear waiver of his right. In People v. Omaweng, 51 the police officers asked the
accused if they could see the contents of his bag, to which the accused said "you can
see the contents but those are only clothings." The policemen then asked if they could
open and see it, and the accused answered "you can see it." The Court held there
was a valid consented search.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA
Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner
answered ''yes, just open if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear
consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of his bag. In its Decision dated 26
June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly held:
A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the
accused if they could see the contents of his bag and he answered "you can see the
contents but those are only clothings.'' When asked if they could open and see it, he
said "you can see it." In the present case, accused-appellant told the member of the
task force that "it was only a cellphone" when asked who owns the bag and what are
its contents. When asked by the member of the task force if he could open it, accused-
appellant told him "yes, just open it." Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a waiver of
accused-appellants right against warrantless search. 52
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on
the other, are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a
warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A
reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include
searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public ·places. In
contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for
reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include
search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented
search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under
guidelines.1âwphi1 Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this
regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they
terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers
applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of
can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which
taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can
inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object,
no longer be flagged down by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight
he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
from the vehicle.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the
personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of
Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099
information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the
are AFFIRMED.
passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person
and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon
receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger SO ORDERED.
onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective
passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the
person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is
able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be vs.
flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
luggages.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the
bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or
persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public
embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from
any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar
motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with FERNAN, C.J.:
disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the
purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent
the accused. land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be the criminal case.
put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that The antecedent facts are as follows:
category.
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal
or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners'
land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed
away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy
and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No.
TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of
herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article
324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against
respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the
same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted
including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court,
acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action,
issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial
court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case
was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule
III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division,
promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution
dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend
that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather
by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is
not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that
the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso),
Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of
plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the
middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also
constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate
fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a
man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of
the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening
thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on
the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is
likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big
canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs northward
towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which
separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which
serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of
defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside
the land of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake,
the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled
thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron
pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or
stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into,
and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining
land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's
aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators,
 a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs
suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were
eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs
were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives
of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other
portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed
to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes
fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176
of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a
bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a
river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the
residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to
the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431
of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such
a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an
owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused
by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which
states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature
of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and SERENO, J.:
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal of the 12 August 2008 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or 22 October 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196.
culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
The assailed issuances affirmed with modification the 31 August 1999 "Judgment"
crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Judicial Region, Kabacan,
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence
Cotabato. The RTC had fixed the just compensation for the value of the land and
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
improvements thereon that were expropriated by petitioner, but excluded the value of
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
the excavated soil. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is represented in this case by
Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the National Irrigation Authority (NIA).
the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. The Facts

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action
is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the
Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution —
whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-
748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This
decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation development
and management in the country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 552 on 11 September 1974 and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out its
purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of
eminent domain.1
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-
Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan,
Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land
covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters.2 The case was docketed as Special Civil
Case No. 61 and was assigned to RTC-Branch 22. The affected parcels of land were
the following:
1) Lot No. 3080 – covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-61963
and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan

SO ORDERED.
2) Lot No. 455 – covered by TCT No. T-74516 and registered under the
names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all surnamed Lao
G. R. No. 185124               January 25, 2012
3) Lot No. 3039 – registered under the name of Littie Sarah Agdeppa3
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION (NIA), Petitioner,
On 11 July 1995, NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa Nanette A.
vs.
Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as registered owners of Lot No. 3039. 4
RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LEOSA
NANETTE AGDEPPA and MARCELINO VIERNES, MARGARITA TABOADA,
PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ, represented by LINA ERLINDA A. ORTIZ and On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the
MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN MAMAC and GLORIA MATAS, Respondents. area sought to be expropriated, the exact address of the expropriated properties and
the owners thereof. NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate
possession of the properties after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the
DECISION
amount of ₱ 19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.5
On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special 4) That the gmelina tress found in the area already occupied and used for
Defenses and Counterclaim.6 They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to [the] road is planted with gmelina with spacing of 2x2 and more or less one
expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it (1) year old;
was not necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an abandoned
government property adjacent to theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot
5) That the gmelina trees found in the area to be occupied are already four
No. 3080 was no longer owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIA’s valuation of
(4) years old;
their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land
that should have placed its value at ₱ 5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with the
landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and 6) That the number of banana clumps (is) two hundred twenty (220);
irreparable damages to their properties valued at ₱ 250,000. 7
7) That the number of coco trees found (is) fifteen (15).13
On 11 September 1996, the RTC issued an Order forming a committee tasked to
determine the fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish the just
The report, however, stated that the committee members could not agree on the
compensation to be paid to the owners. The committee was composed of the Clerk of
market value of the subject properties and recommended the appointment of new
Court of RTC Branch 22 as chairperson and two (2) members of the parties to the
independent commissioners to replace the ones coming from the parties only. 14 On 22
case.8
October 1996, the RTC issued an Order 15 revoking the appointments of Atty. Agdeppa
and Engr. Mabang as members of the committee and, in their stead, appointed
On 20 September 1996, in response to the expropriation Complaint, respondents- Renato Sambrano, Assistant Provincial Assessor of the Province of Cotabato; and
intervenors Margarita Tabaoda, Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Jack Tumacmol, Division Chief of the Land Bank of the Philippines–Kidapawan
Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas filed their Answer-in-Intervention with Affirmative Branch.16
and Special Defenses and Counter-Claim. They essentially adopted the allegations in
the Answer of the other respondents and pointed out that Margarita Tabaoda and
On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its Commissioners’ Report to
Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz were the new owners of Lot No. 3080, which the two
the lower court. The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land to be
acquired from the Rural Bank of Kabacan. They further alleged that the four other
expropriated should be ₱ 65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the
respondents-intervenors were joint tenants-cultivators of Lot Nos. 3080 and 3039. 9
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). As regards the improvement on the properties, the
report recommended the following compensation:
On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of
possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair market value of the
a. ₱ 200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years old
properties, subject of the expropriation proceedings. 10 The lower court later amended
its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of Possession in favor of NIA. 11
b. ₱ 150 for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old
On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners’ Report 12 to the RTC
stating the following observations: c. ₱ 164 for each coco tree

In the process of ocular inspection, the following were jointly observed: d. ₱ 270 for each banana clump17

1) The area that was already occupied is 6x200 meters which is equivalent
to 1,200 square meters;
2) The area which is to be occupied is 18,930 square meters, more or less;
3) That the area to be occupied is fully planted by gmelina trees with a
spacing of 1x1 meters;
On 03 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another report, which
had adopted the first Committee Report, as well as the former’s 25 November 1996
report. However, the committee added to its computation the value of the earthfill
excavated from portions of Lot Nos. 3039 and 3080. 18 Petitioner objected to the
inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the
land.19
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 August 1999, the RTC promulgated its "Judgment,"20 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of all the foregoing considerations, the court finds and so
holds that the commissioners have arrived at and were able to determine the fair
market value of the properties. The court adopts their findings, and orders:
1. That 18,930 square meters of the lands owned by the defendants is
hereby expropriated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through the
National Irrigation Administration;
2. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants the amount of ₱ 1,230,450 for
the 18,930 square meters expropriated in proportion to the areas so
expropriated;
3. That the NIA shall pay to the defendant-intervenors, owners of Lot No.
3080, the sum of ₱ 5,128,375.50, representing removed earthfill;
4. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants, owners of Lot No. 3039, the
sum of P1,929,611.30 representing earthfill;
5. To pay to the defendants the sum of ₱ 60,000 for the destroyed G-melina
trees (1 year old);
6. To pay to the defendants the sum of ₱ 3,786,000.00 for the 4-year old G-
melina trees;
7. That NIA shall pay to the defendants the sum of ₱ 2,460.00 for the
coconut trees;
8. That all payments intended for the defendant Rural Bank of Kabacan
shall be given to the defendants and intervenors who have already acquired
ownership over the land titled in the name of the Bank. 21
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision of the
RTC to the CA, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 65196. NIA assailed the
trial court’s adoption of the Commissioners’ Report, which had determined the just
compensation to be awarded to the owners of the lands expropriated. NIA also
impugned as error the RTC’s inclusion for compensation of the excavated soil from
the expropriated properties. Finally, it disputed the trial court’s Order to deliver the
payment intended for the Rural Bank of Kabacan to defendants-intervenors, who
allegedly acquired ownership of the land still titled in the name of the said rural bank. 22
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 12 August 2008, the CA through its Twenty-First (21st) Division, promulgated a
Decision23 affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee
tasked to determine the fair market value of the properties and improvements for the
purpose of arriving at the just compensation, properly performed its function. The
appellate court noted that the committee members had conducted ocular inspections
of the area surrounding the expropriated properties and made their recommendations
based on official documents from the BIR with regard to the zonal valuations of the
affected properties.24 The CA observed that, as far as the valuation of the
improvements on the properties was concerned, the committee members took into
consideration the provincial assessor’s appraisal of the age of the trees, their
productivity and the inputs made. 25 The appellate court further noted that despite the
Manifestation of NIA that it be allowed to present evidence to rebut the
recommendation of the committee on the valuations of the expropriated properties,
NIA failed to do so.26
The assailed CA Decision, however, deleted the inclusion of the value of the soil
excavated from the properties in the just compensation. It ruled that the property
owner was entitled to compensation only for the value of the property at the time of the
taking.27 In the construction of irrigation projects, excavations are necessary to build
the canals, and the excavated soil cannot be valued separately from the land
expropriated. Thus, it concluded that NIA, as the new owner of the affected properties,
had the right to enjoy and make use of the property, including the excavated soil,
pursuant to the latter’s objectives.28
Finally, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that recognized defendants-intervenors
Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz as the new owners of Lot No.
3080 and held that they were thus entitled to just compensation. The appellate court
based its conclusion on the non-participation by the Rural Bank of Kabacan in the
expropriation proceedings and the latter’s Manifestation that it no longer owned Lot
No. 3080.29
On 11 September 2008, the NIA through the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the 12 August 2008 Decision, but that motion was denied. 30
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issues
The following are the issues proffered by petitioner:
The Court of appeals seriously erred in affirming the trial court’s finding of just
compensation of the land and the improvements thereon based on the report of the
commissioners.
The court of appeals erred in ruling that the payment of just compensation for lot no.
3080 should be made to respondents margarita taboada and Portia charisma ruth
Ortiz.31
The Court’s Ruling
On the first issue, the Petition is not meritorious.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.32 The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a
sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed
by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one
who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.33
In the instant case, we affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the commissioners
properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose
properties were expropriated by petitioner.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to
determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of
committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the
expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and
the number of improvements on the properties. 34 When the members were unable to
agree on the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court
selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining
the value of the land and the improvements.
The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection of the
expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal
valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners,
and considered other factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town
center.35 Further, the committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No.
173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which
provide for the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. 36
We can readily deduce from these established facts that the committee members
endeavored a rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to
the owners of the expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to,
oversimplify the process undertaken by the committee in arriving at its
recommendations, because these were not based on mere conjectures and unreliable
data.
In National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, 37 this Court emphasized that the "just"-
ness of the compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as
bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we
referred to in that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in the area, as well as
tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. In disregarding the Committee
Report assailed by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus:
It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual
and reliable basis. First, the market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots
were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as
sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal
valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings
and commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by
how much the community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of
respondent’s property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings alluded to in
the report were not even appended thereto.
As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners’ report of land prices which is
not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be
disregarded by the court.
The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line, and
sinker. It did not even bother to require the submission of the alleged "market sales
data" and "price listings." Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the recommended
just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than two years
after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just compensation is
to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the filing of the complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in the
commissioners’ report is unacceptable.38
In the instant case, the committee members based their recommendations on reliable
data and, as aptly noted by the appellate court, considered various factors that
affected the value of the land and the improvements.39
Petitioner, however, strongly objects to the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s adoption
of Provincial Ordinance No. 173. The OSG, on behalf of petitioner, strongly argues
that the recommendations of the committee formed by the trial court were inaccurate.
The OSG contends that the ordinance reflects the 1999 market values of real
properties in the Province of Cotabato, while the actual taking was made in 1996. 40
We are not persuaded.
We note that petitioner had ample opportunity to rebut the testimonial, as well as
documentary evidence presented by respondents when the case was still on trial. It
failed to do so, however. The issue raised by petitioner was adequately addresses by
the CA’s assailed Decision in this wise:
A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the second set of Commissioners, with
Atty. Marasigan still being the Chairperson and Mr. Zambrano and Mr. Tomacmol as
members, was not arbitrary and capricious in performing the task assigned to them.
We note that these Commissioners were competent and disinterested persons who
were handpicked by the court a quo due to their expertise in appraising the value of
the land and the improvements thereon in the province of Cotabato. They made a
careful study of the area affected by the expropriation, mindful of the fact that the
value of the land and its may be affected by many factors. The duly appointed
Commissioners made a second ocular inspection of the subject area on 4 September
1997; went to the BIR office in order to get the BIR zonal valuation of the properties
located in Carmen, Cotabato; interviewed adjacent property owners; and took into
consideration various factors such as the location of the land which is just less than a
kilometer away from the Poblacion and half a kilometer away from the highway and
the fact that it is near a military reservation. With regard to the improvements, the
Commissioners took into consideration the valuation of the Provincial Assessor, the
age of the trees, and the inputs and their productivity.
Thus, it could not be said that the schedule of market values in Ordinance No. 173
was the sole basis of the Commissioners in arriving at their valuation. Said ordinance
merely gave credence to their valuation which is comparable to the current price at
that time. Besides, Mr. Zambrano testified that the date used as bases for Ordinance
No. 173 were taken from 1995 to 1996.41
Moreover, factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this Court. The rule
admits of exceptions, though, such as when the factual findings of the appellate court
and the trial court are contradictory, or when the findings are not supported by the
evidence on record.42 These exceptions, however, are not present in the instant case.
Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, we affirm the findings of the CA, which
sustained the trial court’s Decision adopting the committee’s recommendations on the
just compensation to be awarded to herein respondents.
We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the
excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to
separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties,
contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily
refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such
value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al., 43 we held that rights over lands are
indivisible, viz:
[C]onsequently, the CA’s findings which upheld those of the trial court that
respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata was possessed
by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover,
the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the
property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of
the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to
special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of
aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and possession of their
properties in the event the latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real
properties are characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners,
they are entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the landowners’ right extends to the sub-soil
insofar as necessary for their practical interests serves only to further weaken its case.
The theory would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility which such
area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the landowners’ right extends to such
height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and
it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest protected by
law.
Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial court’s Decision when it ruled thus:
We agree with the OSG that NIA, in the construction of irrigation projects, must
necessarily make excavations in order to build the canals. Indeed it is preposterous
that NIA will be made to pay not only for the value of the land but also for the soil
excavated from such land when such excavation is a necessary phase in the building
of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and
is of no concern to the landowner who has been paid the fair market value of his land.
As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to
the surface area only. Further, NIA, now being the owner of the expropriated property,
has the right to enjoy and make use of the property in accordance with its mandate
and objectives as provided by law. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to
allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and
would discourage the construction of important public improvements.44
On the second issue, the Petition is meritorious. and was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan manifested that the
owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but the defendants-intervenors; however, it
presented no proof as to the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the payment of just
remand this case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the
compensation – intended for Lot No. 3080 registered in the name of the Rural Bank of
present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive the payment of just
Kabacan – to the defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the
compensation.
rural bank in the proceedings and the latter’s subsequent Manifestation that it was no
longer the owner of that lot. The appellate court erred on this matter.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12 August 2008 CA Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding just compensation to the defendants as owners
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public
of the expropriated properties and deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated
funds.45 In this kind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in
soil, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to
their evaluation of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the
the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No.
expropriated property.46 Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on the
3080. No pronouncements as to cost.
Rural Bank of Kabacan’s mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in
the expropriation proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors’ claim of entitlement to
that payment. SO ORDERED.

The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property
to be valid.1âwphi1 It should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property to be
valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public document 47 and registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds where the property is situated. 48

We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of
conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered
owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still
registered in the name of the said rural bank. It is not disputed that the bank did not
participate in the expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it no longer
owned Lot No. 3080. The trial court should have nevertheless required the rural bank
and the defendants-intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the
conveyance of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mere inference, considering
that the payment of just compensation is intended to be awarded solely owner based
on the latter’s proof of ownership.

The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, which provides thus:

SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property

taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may
order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the
court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s Order to award payment
of just compensation to the defendants-intervenors. There is doubt as to the real
owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963